HELLENIC ARMY GENERAL STAFF
ARMY HISTORY DIRECTORATE



A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN IN ASIA MINOR 1919–1922

SECOND EDITION

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Ücreti Yoktur
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Levent Şahverdi Arşivi

Dedicated
to the Officers and Men
of the Hellenic Field Army
of Asia Minor

A Concise History of the Campaign in Asia Minor 1919–1922

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DECISION

Approval of the historical volume in the English language under the title "A Concise History of the Campaign in Asia Minor, 1919–1922."

1. Taking into consideration
   a. Standing Order 9-1/1984/HAGS
   b. Standing Order 9-26/2000/HAGS
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WE DECIDE

the ratification of the historical volume "A Concise History of the Campaign in Asia Minor, 1919–1922" in the English language and command its publication by the Hellenic Army Printing Office (HARPO) in three thousand (3,000) copies.

2. The supervision of the publication, correct printing and distribution is assigned to AHD/HAGS.

4. The cost of the publication will be charged to the budget of AHD/HAGS for the year 2003.

Giannos Papantoniou
Minister of National Defense

True Copy

Signed-Sealed
Major (INF) Panagiotis Kephalas
Section Chief DEKP/3c/1

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PROLOGUE

The campaign of the Hellenic Army in Asia Minor (1919–1922) constitutes the last phase of the decade of hostilities that had begun with the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 and continued with the participation of our country in World War I and the Campaign in the Ukraine.

The Hellenic Field Army, jumping off from Thessalonica in October 1912, liberated Epirus, Macedonia, western Thrace, a part of eastern Thrace, and, in cooperation with the Fleet, the islands of the Aegean. It contributed to the breaking of the Macedonian Front in September 1918, and fought on the side of the Allies in southern Russia in 1919, where its heroism matched that of the Sacred Battalion that had initiated the fight for the nation's liberation in Moldo-Wallachia in 1821. It sailed past Troy and landed on 2 May 1919 on the Aegean's east coast, in Ionia, where Greek cities and towns had been flourishing for over three millennia. There, the brave fighters of the Field Army of Asia Minor revived memories of the Ionian uprising against the Persians over 2,500 years ago and encountered the traces left by Xenophon's Ten Thousand. They recalled the wars with the Medes and the glorious campaign of Alexander the Great that took place twenty–three centuries ago. Finally, they fought in the same fields in which their ancestors in the East Roman Empire first encountered the barbarians from central Asia in the eleventh century.

The Campaign in Asia Minor lasted about two and one-half years, during which time the Hellenic Army undertook many large–scale operations and was nearly always dominant in the field of battle. The Greek soldier demonstrated his fighting spirit throughout, his decisiveness, boldness, discipline, courage and heroism, and in all cases forced the opponent into difficult situations. Despite this, the desired strategic objective, viz. the wholesale destruction of the enemy's forces, was not achieved. The causes of this failure were many, they are easily discerned after a review of the diplomatic and political events that are hereby recounted, with special care given not only to the ways of command, but also to the direction and manner of operations.

The Hellenic Army was forced to interrupt its drive toward Ankara and to return to its jump–off points at a critical time, on account of the lack of reserves and the insoluble problems of resupply and maintenance that were created as a result of the inordinate extension of its lines of communication. This, in combination with the Army's year–long inactivity in the same line, the concomitant lowering of morale, and especially the negative attitude of the Allies, had as consequences the collapse of the front, the breakdown of forces, the decision to evacuate Asia Minor, and the catastrophe that followed in its wake.

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Many factors contributed to the lowering of morale, the main ones included the heavy casualties, the insufficiency of forces, the difficulties in resupply, in many cases the poor food, clothing and footwear, a long drawn out campaign that tested the limits of human endurance, and the general sense that had been created about the loss of the objective of the struggle. Most of all, however, the outcome was influenced by the internal political schism that had divided the country deeply since 1915, a division that extended into the military forces conducting the campaign.

The change of the Allied attitude, especially after the Treaty of Sevres (10 August 1920), was based on their conflicting interests in the region. Even Great Britain, which appeared as a friend, was largely preoccupied with control of the Middle East, especially the Mosul oil fields.

It followed that under these circumstances Greece would be forced to yield and, despite the heroism of its fighters, its human and economic sacrifice, abandon Asia Minor. The Treaty of Lausanne signaled the end of the drama. The country was forced to abandon the vision of a "Greater Greece," and thus to seal the uprooting of Hellenism from Asia Minor and eastern Thrace, and to withdraw in order to heal its deep wounds and to care for over a million refugees.

Athens
August, 1999

Lieutenant General
IOANNIS KYROCHRISTOS
Director of AHD/HAGS

INTRODUCTION

The present volume titled A Concise History of the Campaign in Asia Minor 1919–1922, *constitutes an improved version of the edition that first was published in 1967 by the Army History Directorate. It was deemed necessary to publish the new edition because not only had the original edition gone out of print, but also this provided the opportunity to make certain changes of a substantive nature and to produce a work in the contemporary Greek language. As with the first, this new edition describes concisely, with all the accuracy and fullness the authors could muster, the campaign conducted by the Hellenic Army in Asia Minor, beginning in May 1919 until September 1922. It is divided into three parts.*

Part One covers the Allied Mandate and the landing of the Hellenic Army in Smyrna on 2 May 1919; the expansion of the zone of occupation; the advance towards Philadelphia, Prusa and Ushak; the strategic reconnaissance of December 1920 that aimed to probe the Kemalist forces; and, the operations of March 1921 towards Eskishehir and Afyon Karahisar. Also included is the rejection of the Treaty of Sevres by Kemal on 10 August 1920; the political change in Greece in November 1920 and the return of King Constantine on 6 December 1920.

Part Two includes the large scale operations conducted in June–July 1921 that resulted in the capture of Afyon Karahisar on 30 June and of Eskishehir on 6 July, without however the achievement of the strategic objective, viz. of crushing the enemy forces. There followed, the crossing of the Sangarius river; the operations in the direction of Ankara under the unbearable conditions in the Almyra desert; the failure to outflank the left side of the enemy; the cessation of the struggle as a result of the lack of reserves and the insoluble problems of maintenance and resupply; the pullback to the jump–off line, where the Hellenic Army remained static until August 1922.

Part Three describes the difficult conditions that had been created as a result of heavy casualties, the hardships and the breakdown of morale, as well as by the extended front and the long distances from the resupply centers. Also included in this part is the Turkish surprise attack of 13 August 1922 west of Afyon Karahisar, the collapse of the front in the days that followed, the decision to evacuate the Hellenic Army from Asia Minor, the events that followed until the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July 1923.

The work is supplemented and augmented by the necessary tables, sketchmaps, indices and images. The dates are in the Old (Julian) Calendar, since this was used in Greece until 1923; the New (Gregorian) Calendar is used only in certain instances, as with Allied references, and is marked "NS," i.e. "new style."

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Finally, the narrative of events and the description of the circumstances as a result of which the former unfolded, are given without comment. It is left to the readers and to other interested specialists to derive their own, hopefully, detached and objective conclusions.

Athens
August 1999

KONSTANTINOS POLYZOES
Major General (Ret.)

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A Note on Transliteration

Names of people, places and terms in Greek are transliterated according to the US Library of Congress rules. The only exception to this practice is for Greek names that have been used in English literature over time: hence Athens not Athenai, Corinth not Korinthos, Thessalonica not Thessalonike etc.

In addition, names of individuals well–known to English–speaking audiences, and whose names appeared in print in the Anglicized form, are rendered accordingly; hence, John Capodistria, not Ioannes Kapodistrias, [King] Constantine, not Konstantinos etc.

For names of non–Greek origin, an effort has been made to restore the form of the original language. Reasons of historical accuracy dictated the use of certain place names in the form contemporary to the period covered (for example, Durazzo, modern Durres). Turkish names, toponyms and other terms are transliterated according to the requirements set forth by the Army History Directorate.

Unless otherwise stated, all dates are given in the Julian (Old Style, OS) Calendar –used by Greece until 1923–, which differed from the Gregorian (New Style, NS) Calendar by twelve days during the 19th century and thirteen during the 20th.

The toponyms of Asia Minor represent a major problem, as with all historic areas attesting to the millennial presence of Hellenism. In this edition the translators/editors have followed the principle of using the historical Greek name, where such applies,or variant Greek, Turkish or other names prevalent during the period covered by this work, and the present–day administrative name, where such a reference would be useful to the reader.

CHAPTER 1

Origins of and Reasons for the Campaign. The Occupation of Smyrna and its Hinterland

General Overview

1. The campaign of the Hellenic Army into Asia Minor, lasting between 2 May 1919 and 6 September 1922, aimed at the liberation of the Greek populations that lived in the western part of this area and sought to realize the age–old aspirations of all Greeks for their full national restitution. The origins of this campaign is linked to the history of Hellenism itself and is deeply rooted in its glorious past. There is evidence of flourishing Greek settlements on the northern, western and southern Asia Minor coasts, bordered by the Aegean and the Black Seas, as far back as the second millennium BC.

In antiquity Aeolian, Dorian and Ionian colonies were thriving on the Asia Minor coasts. In the age of Alexander the Great and his successors i.e. during the Hellenistic period, the civil institutions of Greek culture were disseminated in this area and the Greek language that prevailed throughout the East became the official language of administration and trade, and later, the medium for the spread of Christianity.

In the period of the rise of the Byzantine Empire, the area of Asia Minor became the center of its thousand year long civilization. Even after the Turks took control of Asia Minor in the wake of the Empire's decline, predominately Greek populations lived and prospered for centuries on the coasts of the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmara, Aeolis, Ionia and the coasts of Pamphylia and Cilicia. Even in Central Asia Minor and Cappadocia, Christian populations with Greek consciousness remained until the Revolution of 1821, when the Greek people succeeded in creating an independent state.

The Greek–Turkish War (1897), the Macedonian Struggle (1904–1908) and the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) represented the nation's efforts to bring into its bosom the unredeemed Greek populations that had lived for centuries under Ottoman Turkish rule.

Although almost two million of our compatriots and coreligionists were redeemed as a result of the victorious Balkan Wars, this did not complete the task of national liberation. Almost two million Greeks remained under the Turkish tyrant's yoke. In an outburst of wrath for humiliating defeats it suffered during the Balkan Wars, and following customary policies, Turkey set in operation an extensive plan of persecution and genocide against the entire Christian population living on its lands, with massive displacements of Greeks from Asia Minor and Thrace. The repeated efforts by the Greek government to attenuate these harsh and inhumane measures bore no

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positive results until the outbreak of World War I, which drew Greece and Turkey into its whirlwind and pitted them against each other. It presented a good opportunity for the Greeks to undertake the effort to liberate their enslaved brothers in Asia Minor.

2. Shortly after the end of the Balkan Wars, in November of 1913, after having secured superiority at sea through the purchase of new battleships, Turkey denied all Greek remonstrances for the cessation of persecutions against the Greek populations in Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace. Following this the Greek Government concluded that war with Turkey was inevitable and the Army Staff Service Second in Command, Lieutenant Colonel (Eng) Ioannes Metaxas submitted a memorandum to Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos, suggesting a surprise landing by the Hellenic Army on the Gallipoli Peninsula, with no prior declaration of war, thus posing an immediate threat to Constantinople itself. Venizelos initially adopted this plan, while he, at the same time, issued an austere warning note to Turkey stating that the threatened extermination of its unredeemed brothers would push Greece to take extreme measures. At the same time Greece concluded successfully the purchase from the United States of the battleships *Kilkis* and *Lemnos* to reinforce its naval forces. The recommendations of the Great Powers, the mediation of Serbia and the loss of the supremacy at sea, forced Turkey to limit the persecutions.

On 7 May 1914 the two countries decided to exchange the Greek population of the vilayet of Smyrna and the Turkish population of Macedonia. However, the persecutions against the Asia Minor Greeks, resumed shortly thereafter. Large numbers of Greek refugees fled to Chios and Mytilene islands, while the Patriarchate in Constantinople closed down all Christian churches in view of the harshness of the Turkish measures, and declared the Orthodox Church to be under a state of persecution. At the time the Greek population in Asia Minor was calculated at two and a half million. 2,177 schools operated with 177,505 students and 4,596 teachers, and there existed 2,232 churches with 2,870 priests (*see* Sketchmap 1). Equally telling is the fact that the greatest parts of industry, commerce and maritime operations in the Ottoman Empire were largely in Greek hands.

On 29 May 1914 the Greek government delivered a communiqué to the Sublime Porte, demanding an end to all persecutions and the guarantee of the life and property of all Greeks in Asia Minor, otherwise threatening to sever diplomatic relations. The Turkish government rejected the Greek protest. Nevertheless, it was agreed that the prime ministers of the two states meet in Brussels in order to negotiate about the future of the Greek minority populations in Turkey. This meeting never took place as planned due to the outbreak of the First World War.

The origins of this war are to be traced to the broader political and economic antagonism of the Great Powers, who having formed two rival coalitions, namely the Triple Alliance that included Germany, Austria–Hungary and Italy on the one hand,[1] and the Triple Entente, that included Great Britain, France and Russia on the other, clashed over the expansion of their political and economic interests in the Balkans and the Orient. The pretext was readily provided by the assassination of the Heir to the Throne of Austria–Hungary at the capital of Bosnia, Sarajevo.

3. Austria–Hungary was the first to declare war on Serbia, holding the latter responsible for the assassination of the heir to its throne. Germany, Russia, France and Great Britain successively entered the war. This resulted in the widening of this conflict in September of 1914, which was to last for more than four years.

Although Serbia faced Austria–Hungary alone, following fierce struggles, it succeeded in containing its powerful opponent. It was subdued only after the coordinated attack by the Austro–Hungarian, German and Bulgarian forces.

In the meantime Turkey having decided to join the Triple Alliance, at the end of July 1914, allowed the entry of two German battleships, which were being pursued by the Mediterranean British fleet, into the Dardanelles. To the demarches of the ambassadors of the Triple Entente, the Sublime Porte responded that it had purchased the two vessels to strengthen its naval forces. On 29 October 1914 these two battleships shelled four Russian ports on the Black Sea without prior declaration of war. Following this incident the Entente declared war against Turkey.

After many internal conflicts and much political wrangling arising from the stance to be adopted vis–à–vis the warring parties, Greece eventually entered the war on the side of the Entente in June 1917. The Hellenic Army participated with all its forces in the victorious operations in Macedonia and its contribution to the Allied victory was undoubtedly decisive.

An armistice was signed on 17 October 1918 at Moudros (a village on the island of Lemnos) between the Entente and Turkey, by virtue of which all war operations were to be terminated beginning the next day. According to the terms of the armistice, passage through the straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosporus would be free, while Allied forces would occupy the surrounding forts. The Turkish Army would be discharged with the exception of the units necessary for the public order and the guarding of the borders. All battleships

1. Italy's attitude towards the Triple Alliance was ambiguous, on account of its differences with Austria–Hungary. When it did enter the war in May 1915, it was on the side of the Entente.

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in Turkish waters would surrender to the Entente forces. The latter had the authority to occupy any strategic point on Turkish territory. The Turkish garrisons in Hejjaz, Yemen, Syria and Mesopotamia would surrender to the nearest Allied Commanding Posts and the Turkish forces would evacuate Cilicia. The equipment, arms and ammunition as well as all transportation means of the Turkish Army would be put at the disposal of the Allies. Finally, all German and Austrian nationals (army, navy and civilian personnel) would abandon Turkish territory within a month and Turkey would break all relations with the Central Powers.

4. The armistice at Moudros marked the end of the plight for the Christian populations. The Ottoman Empire was in a dismal condition and on the verge of total collapse. Sizeable areas in the Middle East were lost, Allied troops occupied Constantinople and Nicomedia and the remaining territory was partitioned in Allied Control Zones. The losses in personnel were enormous and shortages among the local population were insurmountable. In the mainland, anarchy prevailed and along the coast of the Black Sea irregular groups of bandits ravaged the land.

The Turkish Army was in disarray, exhausted, with low morale. Its personnel was in continuous flight towards their hometowns, taking along in many cases their own arms. The leaders of the Young Turk Committee, having ruled Turkey for a decade, fled abroad, fearing they would be blamed for the destruction of their state, the massacres of the Armenians and the efforts to exterminate Hellenism.

The implementation of the terms of the armistice progressed at a slow pace and was nowhere near its completion even after five months. Various matters were delayed due to conflicts within the Allied delegations in Constantinople. Rivalry and conflict of interest did not allow the timely undertaking of the necessary measures for the enforcement of the terms of the armistice.

The occupation of Constantinople secured the control of the straits and the European portion of Turkey. On the contrary no effort was made for the occupation of the major military centers of the Asiatic part of Turkey. A few dozen Allied officers deployed far and wide in the East, were assigned to implement the discharge and the disarmament of the Turks. None of these measures were ever implemented. The Allies especially the British were content to address protests to the powerless Sultanate in Constantinople whose ministers and almost all provincial instruments left many doubts as to their sincerity.

Amidst many differences and especially mutually conflicting interests, Great Britain, France and Italy followed their own separate policies. The Turkish nationalistic elements exploited these differences to their own benefit.

The Turkish Army had to limit itself to the necessary forces for the guarding of the borders and all the surplus war material had to be placed at the disposal and under the control of the Allies in depots along railroad lines, whose security was assigned to Allied detachments. In the course of time, Allied control became more relaxed and this term was never implemented. Thus most Turkish garrisons kept their arms, as well as their guns.

The Rise of the Kemalist Movement

5. From the beginning of 1918 differences among the Allies manifested themselves. The measures taken by the Allies became less strict. In Asia Minor, the initial limited authority of the Allies became inconsequential. The Allied forces began to disband and to withdraw from the Turkish areas. The people desired to return to a state of peace, while the attention of the governments was absorbed by the enormous financial problems arising from the war. No preliminary work and almost nothing was ever mentioned concerning a peace treaty with Turkey.

All these constituted the basis for national aspirations that Turkish General Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ataturk) managed to embody. Kemal participated in the operations of Tripoli, the Caucasus, Palestine, Syria and the Dardanelles and was distinguished for his courage, bravery and initiative. Following the armistice, he assumed command of the remnants of the Field Army of Syria, he concealed the arms in mountainous regions, created resistance cells and organized "Resistance Commissariats."

The dismal situation he encountered when he reached Constantinople strengthened his resolve for resistance particularly in the interior of Anatolia, where the formation of centers of resistance and the shipment of arms were feasible. Furthermore, the first revolutionary cells had already been established there. Clandestine organizations started to be founded in Constantinople for the formation of new cells and the preparation for the struggle, and highly ranked officials in the Government of the Sultan exhibited eagerness to contribute to the cause from the beginning. The Minister of the Army Ismet Pasha (Ismet Inonu) the Commander of the Army Staff Service General Fevzi, the Minister of the Interior Fethi, the Minister of the Navy Captain Reuf and others who later became major officials in the state of Ankara were friends of Kemal and provided covert support to his plans. These actions were the steps in an effort destined to lead its protagonists to a decisive victory over the Allies.

The movement for the organization of a nationalist resistance in the interior of Anatolia was known to the British and provoked their reaction. On the contrary the Italians were unaffected except only to support the Turkish reaction. The British and the Sultan agreed to confront the danger. In a very

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fateful and largely incomprehensible coincidence, they turned to the leader of the nationalist movement Kemal Mustafa Pasha, the friends of whom at the Sultanate managed to present him as the sole person capable of imposing order.

In the beginning of May 1919, Kemal with the consenting opinion of the Allies was appointed Military Inspector in the eastern territories on a mission to reinstate order and security, to implement of disarmament and suppress any government movement. At the last moment, the Sultan requested from the British to stop him, since there was information that he was going there in order to rouse the population. Nevertheless, the complex, slow–moving, and unorganized operation of inter–allied control resulted in his unhindered departure.

The Decision to Land the Hellenic Army in Smyrna.
Sketchmap 2

6. A short time after the signing of the armistice in Moudros, Allied battleships started to sail into the Gulf of Smyrna giving the opportunity to the local Greek population to celebrate exuberantly. The quay, the shops and the houses were all clad with the blue and white flags and Allied nations flags.

On 11 December 1918 the arrival of the destroyer *Leon* gave rise to new demonstrations of the people of Ionia, who regarded this event as a harbinger of their liberation. A few days later the sailing of a Greek fleet auxiliary ship transporting a Greek Red Cross echelon resulted in new patriotic demonstrations of the Greek people. In general, in the first months of 1919, the Greeks of Smyrna had mobilized for peaceful political action. The representatives of the Allies in Smyrna competed in the supply of protection to the two rival populations, the Greeks and the Turks. The British exhibited support for the Greeks, the French observed the situation avoiding to side with anyone, while the Italians provided all moral and material support to the Turks and the Levantines,[2] slandering the Greeks.

The Greek movement in Smyrna saw its greatest opponent in the person the Turkish General Nureddin Pasha, *vali*) (general administrator) of Smyrna, who had enormous influence over the Turkish population and worked actively against the Greeks. He organized the "Reserve Officers Association" and clandestine armed groups in the provinces

During the first days of May 1919, secret documents addressed by Nureddin to the rural police of Aydin came into the possession of the commander of the destroyer *Leon*. These documents revealed the organization of Turkish armed units for the massacre of Christians. After intense demarches, Nureddin was replaced by Izzet Pasha. His replacement came as a relief to the Christian population, but alarmed the Young Turk Committee who were deprived of a leader capable of organizing revolution. For this purpose he turned to Italian propaganda. The cooperation of the two parties became closer and aimed at combating Greek aspirations.

2. *Levantines* (or *Franco–levantines*) generally were Roman Catholic nationals of European powers who were established in the Near East, largely in the Ottoman Empire, until the advent of the First World War. They enjoyed a special status, with the accruing advantages.

In the meantime, about thirty Allied warships had sailed into the harbor of Smyrna. Among them was an American battleship and a squadron of the Greek fleet led by the flagship cruiser *Averoff*.

7. The city of Smyrna (Sketchmap 2) located in the innermost part of the bay by the same name, was built in part on the northeastern slope of the Pagus mountain and partly on the southeastern plain between the sea and Meles River. This river got its name after the ancient poet Homer who, according to tradition, was born by its banks. Smyrna consisted of an upper city part (Pagus) inhabited by the Turkish population and the lower city extending along the coast from the district of Karantina to Fort Pounta. There along with the commercial center, in those districts were the neighborhoods of the Greeks and the foreigners.

Smyrna was the greatest, most heavily commercialized, most prosperous and the most densely populated city in Asia Minor. Its population was 370,000 people of whom 165,000 were Greeks, 80,000 were Turks, 40,000 Armenians, 55,000 Jews and 30,000 were of various other nationalities. The numerical superiority of the Greek population, its domination of commerce and in other fields of social life and the Greek language spoken by all nationalities had permeated the city with a distinctive Greek atmosphere, which the Turks called *Gavur Izmir* ("Infidel Smyrna").

The intellectual and social life of the Greeks of Smyrna were well developed. The main Greek educational institutions was the famous *Evangelical School* with a complete upper school curriculum, a library with 35,000 volumes, 180 ancient manuscripts and a museum, as well as the *Central Girls' School* in the court of the church of Agia Photeine. Both presently are used by the Turks as schools. There also functioned at the time three large Greek charitable institutions, *Agios Charalampos*, the *Vrephokomeio* (i.e. infant nursery) and the *Orphanotropheion* (orphanage), that were totally destroyed by the fire of 1922. There were also many different national and social centers, various clubs (literary, artistic and sports) as well as charitable associations. The Greek press was highly developed and included the publications of Greek newspapers such as *Amaltheia* (founded in 1838), *Harmonia*, *Nea Smyrne*, *Proodos* and many periodicals as such as *Kosmos*, *Kopanos* and *Homeros*.

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
Due to its geographical location, its excellent accessibility to the rest of Turkey, the rich mainland and the dense communication network, Smyrna was a great trading center conducting most of the import and the export trade of Asia Minor. Commerce was mainly handled by the Greeks. In the harbor of Smyrna 3,500 sailing ships and 2,500 steamships sailed each year, shipping 2,500,000 tons of merchandise. All those shipping activities were mainly handled by Greeks. Smyrna was the capital of the *vilayet* of Smyrna or Aydin. It consisted of *sanjaks* (prefectures) with a varying number of *kaza* (subadministrations). The respective administrators were the *vali* (general director), the *muttesherif* (prefect) and the *kaymakam* (provincial administrator). The *sanjaks* of Smyrna, Aydin, Magnesia, Mugla and Denizli comprised the *vilayet* of Smyrna.

8. Before the end of World War I, the forces of the Entente began to plan its post–war stance towards Turkey. From October 1916, they had already embarked on the fragmentation of Turkey into zones of influence: Constantinople, the straits and Armenia were to be recognized as zones under Russian control, Syria and Palestine as a French zone, Arabia and Mesopotamia as far as the Persian Gulf as British zone, with a view to the security of the Suez Canal and Egypt and the coverage of the land and sea communications to India. The *vilayets* of Aydin (Smyrna), Iconium and Adana would be recognized as an Italian zone.

After the Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917 Russia lost its influence in Ottoman territories. A new Anglo–French treaty signed in Paris on 10 December 1917 divided Russia itself into zones of intervention: the French north of the Black Sea against the Germans and Russians with a hostile disposition, while the British would intervene in the south of the same sea, against the Turks. The British zone of intervention included Georgia, Armenia, the rest of the Caucasus and Kurdistan. Besides the above agreement the Asia Minor issue was also addressed by President Wilson in his *Fourteen Points*, which spelled out a resolution along the lines of limiting the Ottoman Empire "to the interior of those countries in which the Ottoman population predominates."

Immediately after the Armistice, and in view of the upcoming peace conference, there were intense activities of delegations in Paris. All victorious countries, whether great or small, vied to seize as much territory as they could. The participation of Greece with ten divisions in the final attack on the Macedonian front entitled it to claim the fulfillment of its national aspirations and pressed on the Allies the obligation to support the Greek demands. Greece, however, had to struggle against conflicting interests and the decisions already taken by the Great Powers.

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Sketchmap 2. The Hellenic Army Landing in Smyrna.

9. On 30 December 1918, the Greek delegation in Paris submitted a memorandum to the Peace Conference for the crucial Greek issues and the claims of Greece. The arguments raised by the Greek side were historical and geographical, based however on the prevalence of Greek populations, in accordance with the proclamations of the Allies and the *Fourteen Points* of US President Wilson.

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The most notable of the Greek claims, not including those regarding Northern Epirus and Thrace were the following:

Constantinople: In accordance to the terms of the program of President Wilson, Constantinople would remain outside the future Turkish state. The *vilayet* of Constantinople would have to be ceded to Greece under international guarantees for the freedom of the straits. Historical reasons and the majority of the Greek population supported such a claim, since out of a total population of 1,173,673, the Turks numbered a mere 490,000. If the League of Nations were to be established, then on account of international interests, Constantinople could become an independent zone under its protection.

Asia Minor: Also according to President Wilson's principles, Turkish sovereignty in Asia Minor would have been limited to the areas with a preponderant Turkish population. The eastern provinces inhabited by a great number of Armenians along with the Russo–Armenian provinces would have comprised an independent state under the tutelage of the Great Powers. The greatest part of the *vilayet* of Trebizond that included approximately 350,000 Greek inhabitants would have been ceded to this independent state. To the west, the *vilayets* of Aydin (Smyrna) and Bursa (Prusa) and the *sanjaks* of the Dardanelles and Nicomedia had 1,013,195 local Greeks. There had been a Greek population there for about thirty centuries, which dominating the cultural and economic fields. The schools operating there numbered 752 with 93,486 students. The area comprised a coherent geographical and economic unity along with the Greek islands of the Aegean Sea. Consequently, reasons of justice obligated the cession of western Asia Minor to Greece, the *vilayet* of Smyrna included with the exception of the Turkish *sanjak* of Denizli and a part of the *vilayet* of Bursa. Finally the memorandum stressed the impossibility of reverting Greek and Armenian populations to Turkish administration, who in the course of the war had exterminated 900,000 Greeks and 750,000 Armenians, while an additional 450,000 Greeks were expelled and took refuge in Greece.

Greek islands and the Dodecanese: The Greek delegates requested the cession of the Greek islands and the Dodecanese to Greece. The Allied Powers, with a secret treaty signed in London on 26 April 1915, had conceded the occupation of the Dodecanese to the Italians. Since this treaty predated the proclamation of the principles of President Wilson, the Greek memorandum expressed the hope that Italy would take the initiative to cede them to Greece and not impose its authority over Greek populations nor initiate any new tensions. The Greek issues were referred for further inquiry to a special Committee for the Greek Case, in which the Greek representatives presented the Greek demands.

10. In all discussions about the Greek claims, especially on Asia Minor and the Dodecanese, the only obvious rival was Italy. It invoked previous secret treaties and obligations of the Allies to its favor such as the Treaty of London of 13 April 1915, according to which an Italian zone of influence was established in the *sanjak* of Antalya, and the Treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne in Savoy (region of southeastern France near the Swiss and Italian borders) of 6 April 1917, which promised the cession of the *vilayet* of Smyrna and the extended zone of Antalya.

Despite the reaction of Italy, whose claims were founded solely on the theory of its right to a balance of power in the Mediterranean, it was becoming evident that the solution would be favorable for the Greek issues, thanks to the support of Great Britain and France and in some cases of the United States. The acceptance by Greece to participate in the expedition into southern Russia (Ukraine) contributed greatly to the support of the Greek claims by France.

In November of 1918, Italy exhibited a propensity for military intervention in Asia Minor, planning the occupation of areas for which previous secret treaties had conceded rights to Italy. Italy cited the Turkish violation of the truce concerning Tripoli (western Libya) as a pretext. The British government characterized the Italian intervention with no prior authorization by the Allies as unjustified. In December of the same year, the Italian Government stirred up the issue and then the British Ambassador cautioned the Italians for the consequences of such an action. However, despite the clear warnings, and disregarding all the protests of the Allies, the Italians occupied the territory of Antalya with no prior agreement. This action was the grounds for the development of tension in the relations between the Italians and the Allies. An even wider rift was created as a result of the issue of Fume (or Rijeka, a significant Croatian port in the Adriatic Sea), which the Italians previously had annexed arbitrarily. On these grounds and following a vehement clash with the President of the United States, the Italian representatives withdrew from the conference in the middle of April 1919, stating that in case their demands were not met, Italy would not be present in the upcoming handing of the peace terms to Germany.

11. The historical events leading to the deployment of Greek troops in Asia Minor dated back to 1 February 1919, when the Greek Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos appeared before the Supreme Council and demanded the cession of the area of Smyrna. The British and the French supported the claim, whereas the Americans refused to satisfy any Greek demands on Asia Minor. The Italian delegates did not participate in the meetings of mid–April 1919. However the threat that a possible abstention from the signing of the Peace Treaty would have grave consequences for them, forced them to return

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to the conference. A short time prior to their return the British prime minister having some information about suspicious Italian moves in Asia Minor proposed on 22 April 1919 that American troops be immediately sent to Constantinople and Armenia and French troops be sent to Syria, in conjunction with the deployment of British forces from Caucasus to the area of Constantinople. There was thus the possibility of an immediate reaction to any possible Italian moves. Furthermore he requested that permission be granted to the Greeks to send armed forces to Smyrna, where, as he stated, their compatriots were being massacred, and he insisted on the implementation of these decisions before the arrival of the Italian delegation. However, American forces could not deploy in Turkey immediately, since an amendment to American legislation was necessary. At any rate, none of the Allies was eager to relieve the British forces that would be withdrawn from the Caucasus. These difficulties exacerbated the worries of the British prime minister, who feared that, if the Italians were left unhindered, they would occupy the whole of Asia Minor. President Wilson on his part appeared indifferent and relied on the theory that he had the means to impose his own will. "If the Italians don't sit tight," Wilson would repeat over and over again, "then no money."

On the next day, 23 April 1919, the British prime minister requested that Greece should be permitted to send two or three divisions to Smyrna for the protection of the Greeks in Turkey. President Wilson consented to this without any serious objections as well as French President Clemenceau, who did not miss the opportunity to remind everyone of the provisions of the Treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne (6 April 1917). The same day the Greek prime minister in a cable communication from Paris to the Ministry of the Army ordered that I Division of Army Corps A, which was stationed in the area of Eleutheroupolis (Pravi) of Kavalla be prepared as soon as possible for transportation to Smyrna. At the same time the commander in chief of the Allied Forces of the East Franchet d'Esperay was being informed about the prospect of the necessary strengthening of I Division in Smyrna with the other two divisions of the Hellenic Army Corps A, which participated in the southern Russia expedition.

After the completion of the agenda at noon of 29 April and while the Italian Prime Minister Orlando had returned from the conference, the President of the Council Clemenceau stated that during the absence of the Italians the Greeks had requested and succeeded in securing the authorization of their landing at Smyrna. He justified this decision as a measure that did not predetermine the fate of Smyrna but as an action for the protection of the Greeks of Smyrna, many of whom had been slaughtered. Then Clemenceau added that according to available information, the Italians had landed a few sailors a little earlier, who were withdrawn following a short stay there. Orlando confessed ignorance of the event and promised to respond following a briefing with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sonino. A similar reservation

was expressed by Orlando in response to another question by British Prime Minister Lloyd George concerning the Italian landings on certain places of southwestern Asia Minor (Nea Ephesus, Marmaris, Halicarnassus and Antalya)

In the afternoon of the same day, through an urgent telegram, the Greek Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Athens that, "[t]he Supreme Council of the Conference at its session today decided that the Expeditionary Force should immediately depart for Smyrna. The decision was unanimous. Long live our Nation."

The aforementioned decision was made necessary by the will of the British, the Americans and the French to stave off in this exceptionally tough circumstance any new occupations of Asia Minor territories by the Italians. Furthermore the presence of Greek Forces in Smyrna would serve the interests of the Allies as well, since it would reinstate law and order which had already started to be disturbed in Western Asia Minor and it would prevent the threatened slaughtering of Christian populations. Despite all these on 1 May 1919, on the eve of the landing of the Hellenic Army in Smyrna, in an ambiguous policy, the Peace Conference gave the order to Greece to occupy the city of Smyrna and a part of its *vilayet* and to Italy to occupy the territorial zone to the south of the River Maeander.

Preparations of the Greek Expeditionary Corps

12. The expeditionary force, to which the occupation of Smyrna was assigned comprised I Division, stationed in the area of Eleutheroupolis under the command of Colonel (Arty) Nikolaos Zapheiriou and Major (Inf) Andreas Spanopoulos, as Chief of Staff. The division had three Infantry regiments (the 4, 5 and the Evzone 1/38), two Pack Artillery batteries and a two company force of Engineers. On 25 April the Greek General Headquarters at Thessalonica issued an order to I Division for an urgent boarding and transport to Asia Minor in order to occupy Smyrna and the surrounding area. The Infantry units were to board from the port of Eleutherai, the Artillery units from the bay of Stauros and the Engineers unit from Kavalla. Boarding, on a total of eighteen troop ships, began at 0900 on 27 April. While the boarding was still in progress, at 2300 of the following day, a new order by General Headquarters made clear the following: in accordance to the decision by the Allied forces of Great Britain, France and the United States, military occupation of Smyrna and the surrounding areas would have to be implemented; the division commander would be directly under the orders of the Greek government exercising his duties in the capacity of Occupation Force Commander; the civic authorities would temporarily be under his control; a high commissioner would be sent as his legal counsel; and finally, the troop ships would be escorted by a squadron of destroyers.

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Boarding from the port of Eleutherai continued in earnest and was completed by 0930 on 29 April. A little earlier, a steamship from Kavalla with a two company force of Engineers had arrived along with two steamships from the bay of Stauros with the Artillery units. While the signal to sail was expected, the commander in chief announced at approximately 1100 that in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council, the departure would be postponed for forty–eight hours. In the early hours on 30 April two new telegrams reached Division Headquarters. The first one ordered the immediate departure and delivered the greetings of both the prime minister and the commander in chief for the success of the mission. The other one provided instructions concerning the deployment of the units and the occupation of the vital areas and the routes leading to the city.

13. Just before dawn on 30 April a naval squadron consisting of three British and four Greek destroyers under the command of British Captain Granville was deployed to escort the convoy. Upon his arrival, the British Captain transmitted a signal to the division commander, in which he stressed that in case of an encounter with the Italian fleet, he would warn it that the convoy was under the protection of Great Britain.

At 0700 in an atmosphere of exuberance, the order of the day of the division was made known and one half hour later the signal of sailing was given. However, it was not until 1700, that is, after a twelve hour delay, that the operation got underway. This intervening period was wasted, at trying to counter objections put by the British commander in chief of the squadron, who had been informed that the order of sailing was issued by the General Headquarters at Thessalonica and not by the Greek government. Therefore, he went on to prohibit any sailing by means of stern statement.

In the early afternoon of 1 May, the convoy under orders of the British captain set anchor in the Gulf of Gera on Mytilene. This change in plans was ordered by British Admiral Calthorpe from Smyrna, since there was a need to stall operations until the following day, so that the launches could be better organized and conducted in daylight. The new delay gave the opportunity to the commander of the division, along with the Infantry commander, the chief of staff and the regiment commanders to reconnoiter the port of Smyrna for the designation of the objectives of the units. Reconnaissance was conducted from the bridge of the cruiser *Averoff*, which docked at the city port. All matters concerning the organization of the landing and deployment of the units to the city were arranged with the cooperation of the Commander of the *Averoff* Elias Mauroudes. The division commander contacted Admiral Calthorpe who informed him that the means for landing were ready and that the Turkish Army in the city (about 3,000 men) were ordered to stay in their barracks during landing.

At 0200 on 2 May the convoy sailed into Smyrna, while the order of the day was read to the officers and the sailors, recommendations made concerning the behavior of the Occupation Army and Eleutherios Venizelos ended his order of the day as follows:

> *Recommendations, concerning your treatment of your compatriots, I need not make. They have been waiting for this blessed day for centuries without ever losing faith, not even while suffering the greatest calamities. However, to the Turkish, Jewish and the Armenian populations and the various European communities, you shall demonstrate through your behavior that the Hellenic Army not only is not lacking in bravery, self–sacrifice and nobility of the spirit compared to Allied Armies, but also claims to be at the forefront of civilization.*
>
> *The fulfillment of our national aspiration shall to a great extent depend on the trust that you shall inspire in all foreign populations, and especially, in that which is most numerous i.e. the Turkish. The prayers of our Nation are with you.*

Smyrna on the Eve of the Landing

14. On the morning of 1 May 1919 while calm prevailed in the city, rumors spread concerning imminent action by Allied warships. A short while later, a communique by Admiral Calthorpe was handed to the *vali* of Smyrna Izzet Pasha stating that the Allies would implement a landing on the city, in order to occupy the forts and maintain order, in accordance with the terms of the Armistice. Annoyed, the *vali* of Smyrna in turn called the Commander of Turkish XVII Army Corps, Ali Nadir for cooperation. He telephoned his government in Constantinople, which reassured him. The information related to a landing spread immediately throughout the city and caused a gathering of people on the quay, while preparations for the landing were being made on the warships. There was concern among the Turkish communities and confusion among the Young Turks, who displayed unusual activities. The Turkish XVII Army Corps in Smyrna had been demobilized and maintained a force of a mere 3000 men in administrative duties and various army posts. They were ordered to watch the unfolding of events, until further orders by the Constantinople government were received.

Around noon, armed Allied naval detachments disembarked from the warships and were assigned the guarding of consulates, banks and international postal services. At the same time, the outer forts on Smyrna Bay were also occupied after the withdrawal of the Turkish units. The city population that watched the armed detachments march through, was not yet aware of the imminent landing of the Hellenic Army. Despite the reserve on the part of the *vali* of Smyrna, the news reached the Turkish communities. Most members of the Young Turk Committee and the organizations of the former *Vali*,

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General Nureddin Pasha ordered the Turkish forces to resist. At the same time, it was decided that the Turkish population would assemble to demonstrate its will to defend. Actually, at noon on 1 May the Turkish administration ceased to exist and the illegitimate shadow government of Nureddin Pasha tried to draw the Turkish population into resistance against the Allied activities. The idea of resistance was favored by the junior officers as well as by the chief of staff of Turkish XVII Army Corps. These men formed the first cells of resistance in a "struggle of honor," as they termed it. The Turkish soldiers were quickly assembled in their barracks, where their officers told them about the dangers to their country and religion. At the same time, Nureddin and Young Turk Commissariat functionaries were recruiting the most fanatical and bold elements, to whom they handed firearms and knives. The Turkish quarter was simmering with resentment, while proclamations were being circulated, calling the Turkish community to resist the foreign troops.

15. The news of the upcoming occupation of Smyrna by the Hellenic Army was announced as late as 1600 by the chief of the Greek Mission in the Metropolitan Hall. Metropolitan Chrysostomos and the rest of the Asia Minor hierarchs were obviously touched. In the Agia Photeine courtyard, the Greek population was anxiously waiting to hear the news. In an atmosphere of tense silence the Greek Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos started reading the proclamation. The first words were greeted with great enthusiasm and cheers, everybody present was crying, unable to contain emotion and the reading of the proclamation could not continue. Calm was restored only after much effort and the reading was finally completed. The proclamation by the prime minister stressed that Greece was called by the Peace Conference to occupy Smyrna in order to maintain order, since its unification with Greece exposed the will of the Allies. Any expression of sentiment should not assume the form of hostility or arrogance against any non–Greek populations of the city. On the contrary, freedom should bring to all, regardless of ethnic background or religion, equality and justice, especially to the Italians, since the occupation of the city was made possible only after the consent of Italy. After the reading of the proclamation, the outpouring of sentiment and enthusiasm could hardly be put in words. Before his departure, the chief of the Greek Mission advised restraint and composure, stressing that the motherland demanded that everyone demonstrate that they deserved their freedom. He suggested to the community leaders that all stores remain closed until the completion of the occupation of the city by I Division.

After the dissolution of the gathering, the news immediately spread like fire throughout the city. The Greeks converged on the quay, with their eyes turned to the outreaches of the Bay of Smyrna. There was intense bustle on the warships. Wireless communication operated uninterruptedly, while the steam launches came in continuously.

Admiral Calthorpe in the meantime was kept informed of the Turkish moves by the Greek Consulate. The former had warned both the Turkish military commander and the *vali* of Smyrna that they would be held responsible for any deviation on the part of Turkish troops.

The same night (1/2 May) as the Turkish proclamations were being distributed, on the premises of the Greek newspaper *Amaltheia* a statement by the commander of the Greek forces was being printed, while Metropolitan Chrysostomos was making public the upcoming landing of the Greek forces through another proclamation.

The *vali* of Smyrna Izzet Pasha revealed later, just before his death, that he had not been able to communicate with the Grand Vizier (Prime Minister) Damat Ferit at Constantinople and thus had not had any official guidance with respect to his stance regarding the imminent landing.

During that same night, another important event took place. The central Turkish prison right behind the military courthouse was opened and all prisoners were released. These prisons, which held only Turkish prisoners convicted under public criminal law, were under the responsibility of an Italian major. This was the signal for unrest, since all criminals and social outcasts would take advantage of the situation to commit violent acts and looting rampages. This event was crucial to what followed the next day.

The Landing and the Ensuing Events

Sketchmap 2

16. In the morning of 2 May, all preparations for the landing were completed. The fog clouding the port started to dissipate and the moment had come for the Greek forces to set foot for the first time on the soil of Ionia. The Greeks of Smyrna had happily made available many barges, while engineers and laborers were active in the fast preparation in front of the Hunting Club and Pounta. Greek seamen were patrolling the quay for the keeping of order and the security of the landing. People in throngs continuously joined the residents of Smyrna, arriving with any available transport means from the interior of Ionia to witness firsthand the fulfillment of national aspirations.

At 0730, eighteen Greek troop ships entered Smyrna harbor in succession and proceeded to their assigned objectives. Before long the whole quay had the appearance of an army camp. Right before the Hunting Club, stood Metropolitan Chrysostomos with the clergy, blessing the landing troops. Holding pictures of Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos, exuberant masses of people had covered the whole quay.

Around 0830, most of 4 Infantry Regiment had landed on the dock of Pounta. They then moved forward to the Greek–Turkish quarter demarcation lines in a marching formation. 5 Infantry Regiment landed on the same dock, assigned with the encircling of the city from the northeast.

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Exactly one hour later, 1/38 Evzone Regiment joined the landing in front of the Hunting Club, with the exception of two companies and the divisional Artillery battery of 3/38 Evzone Battalion. Those units under the order of Commander of *Averoff* Captain Elias Mauroudes proceeded along with the steamship *Atrometos* to the quay instead of Karantina, as provided and stipulated in the initial order (Sketchmap 2). The Commander of 1/38 Evzone Regiment Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Dionysios Staurianopoulos as soon as he realized this deviation ordered 1/38 and 2/38 Evzone Battalions to move forward from the seashore road to Karantina and to encircle the city from that direction. The movement was conducted in formation of four abreast with the flag at the head and the men at the ready. The column moved with difficulty through the masses of people, who had taken up the seashore road and were delirious with enthusiasm.

17. Approximately at 1030, gunshots could be heard from the Customs House and some shorefront buildings. They were initially taken for festive shots and the Division Commander Colonel (Arty) Nikolaos Zapheiriou dispatched one of his staff officers to investigate what was happening and to take all required measures. The officer was back in a short while and reported that a serious attack had taken place in the Governor's Palace area, as 1/38 Evzone Regiment was passing by.

As was confirmed afterwards the head of the column i.e. 2/38 Evzone Battalion was fired upon as they were passing by the Governor's Palace on their way to the road to Karantina. The shooting took place from local Turkish Army posts, the Gendarmerie Headquarters building, the prison house, various Turkish residences, the Turkish hotel, the Army barracks, the Governor's Palace, the Gendarmerie Academy and small Turkish boats harbored in the port and Turkish civilians gathered in the side streets of the Turkish quarter.

2/38 Evzone Battalion regrouped and then attacked the Turkish resistance capturing many enemy fighters. However, many of them, mainly soldiers, escaped to Karantina. The Military Commander of Smyrna Nadir Pasha was among the prisoners along with two generals, twenty eight senior officers, 123 lower officers, 540 enlisted men and approximately 2,000 irregulars. They were all led and taken into custody aboard the steamship *Patris*. The engagement lasted for about an hour. The Turkish military personnel that escaped was estimated at about 2,000. Others retreated into Karantina with their armament and still others went into hiding. A significant number of Turkish civilians armed with revolvers and knives had infiltrated the masses of Greeks gathered on the seashore road and the surrounding side streets and then taking advantage of the confusion went on to attack many of the bystanders. Scuffles, fistfights, and even killings took place between Turks

and Greeks at other points throughout the city. Due to the crowding, some of the people fell into the sea and drowned. Furthermore, some Greek soldiers responded to the Turks' fire from windows of surrounding residences. The sporadic clashes created the impression to the Allied officers, who were watching the events from the ships, that these resulted from an attack on the column of prisoners. However, none of these was murdered or even abused. On the contrary, they were all conducted to the steamship *Patris* in complete safety.

All arrests were executed by 1/38 Evzone Regiment only at the scene of the clashes. As soon as the armed resistance was quelled, all those involved were apprehended. The main center of resistance was the Governor's Palace. Those on its premises resisted fiercely. Many weapons were found there. Therefore all men found in the Governor's palace were arrested, including the *vali* of Smyrna.

Total casualties on the Greek side amounted to two killed and thirty–four wounded enlisted men and nine civilians wounded, whereas on the Turkish side five enlisted men and eight officers were killed, while eight enlisted men were wounded. There were also forty–seven killed or wounded from various ethnic groups.

The ensuing investigation confirmed that one half hour before the docking of the troop ships, weapons and ammunition were distributed to Turks on the shore. This fact was also confirmed by Kemal Bey, Chief of Staff of Turkish XVII Army Corps, who presented this distribution as a result of looting, despite action taken by the military authorities.

In the early afternoon hours, the *vali* of Smyrna was brought to the commander of I Division aboard the cruiser *Leon*. The *vali* was accompanied by his son and the harbormaster, a lieutenant commander, who had masterminded the murderous attack against the Greek Army. He claimed that the organized armed resistance was the work of a gang of Young Turk rebels and further maintained that he was opposed to this kind of action. At the same time, he promised to cooperate closely with the Occupation Force, provided he retained his position. Two days later he was reinstated and was provided with a guard and a Greek officer as his adjutant.

Following the suppression of the Turkish uprising in the Governor's Palace, the Greek units continued their moves to implement their objectives. By 1500, order was almost completely restored. An hour later, the encircling of the city and the occupation of all required points were complete. During the night there was relative calm.

18. The following day the Greek Garrison Headquarters became operational headed by the division's Infantry Commander Colonel (Inf) Charalampos Tseroules. Preliminary interrogations were underway in order to punish those guilty of the insurrection. The division commander issued a proclama-

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tion referring to the occupation of the city and provided assurances that religion, dignity, heritage, customs and traditions of all people regardless of ethnic background would be protected. Furthermore, with another order he made known that he assumed the duties of Smyrna Military Commander and imposed a curfew between 0200 and 0600.

On 4 May the Court Martial was established. The first case tried involved accusations against Greeks, and it aimed at curbing incidents of exploitation of the Turkish population by the local Greeks. Moreover, this action sought to provide tangible evidence that the Hellenic Army was impartial in the administration of justice regardless of ethnic background. Over two days two men, an Evzone and a civilian, were condemned to death. The summary execution of their sentence, on the same day as the court's decision, made a strong impression, especially on the Turkish minority of the city, and consolidated the trust in the impartiality of the Occupation Army. The decisions of the Court Martial were made known to British Admiral Calthorpe and publicized in the newspapers.

On the same day the aforementioned sentences were issued, the French and British commanders of the Allied Fleet submitted demarches to the commander of I Division in a confusing and vague manner. Their objection consisted of the allegations that some of the Turkish prisoners were publicly ridiculed, abused or even murdered by the mob or perhaps soldiers, as they were being escorted to the steamship *Patris*. However, pertinent investigations affirmed that the fifteen casualties, Greek and Turkish alike, were all the result of clashes, instigated by armed Turkish criminals, mingling with the crowd. The report stressed that any identification of persons or reconstruction of the precise events was a sheer impossibility, given the mingling of soldiers, citizens, sailors and prisoners.

19. From the very first moment the Greek Occupation authorities came up against devious slander and mean intentions of various non–Greek groups, that aimed to defame the Hellenic Army and to create the impression that it was incapable of maintaining law and order. In spite of these attempts, the Greek troops treated all locals with dignity and fairness and no discrimination. Furthermore, they managed very early to gain the confidence of the people, a fact that was internationally acknowledged by all. During the first days of the occupation, the Italians orchestrated various incidents, with the intention of justifying the need for the landing of Italian troops for the protection of their own nationals. The tenacity of the commander of I Division along with the intervention of British Admiral Calthorpe did not permit them to achieve their aims.

From the very first day, and despite the aforementioned unfortunate events during the landing, the Greek Command started to operate with a

spirit of impartiality and fairness. It did not wish in any case to be regarded as inferior to any other Great Power, with respect to the fair treatment of the local residents.

In accordance with the decision by the Great Powers, the Hellenic Army was expected to extend its occupation further inland, after establishing order in Smyrna. The commander of the Occupation Forces would report directly to the Greek government and would take its orders through an appointed High Commissioner. The Turkish civic authorities would continue their activities. The *vali* of Smyrna would exercise the civic administration over the *vilayet* of Smyrna both in the areas under Hellenic Army occupation and those under Turkish Army control. Furthermore, the *vali* being a Turkish employee should execute orders by the Turkish government, a fact, which would contribute to the unhindered administration and the maintenance of law and order.

In general, this form of administration appeared as a mixed situation, capable of functioning only under the condition of open cooperation of the military and civic delegates of the Turkish government. This hardly ever happened. Thus in the *sanjak* of Magnesia, despite the honest cooperation of Muttesherif Hussein Bey, not only was order never restored, but also later on even Turkish irregular units were recruited. For reasons of political expedience, censorship, a necessity given the circumstances, was never imposed.

On 5 May, the Prefect of Drama Nait Zade, whose presence was deemed necessary, arrived at Smyrna. Three days later the appointed High Commissioner Aristeides Stergiades arrived in the city. However, the number of staff members of I Division was insufficient for the simultaneous exercise of the military command and civic administration. This became evident from the very beginning, despite their unending, dedicated and exhausting work.

Restoration of Order and Expansion of the Occupation Zone

20. The day following the occupation of Smyrna, order was fully restored in the city. After having rearmed the remaining sixty–two gendarmes, the Turkish police authority assigned them to their posts, while the Greek units received orders to provide assistance to their tasks. The Turkish troops, approximately 2,000 foot soldiers and 150 Cavalry, who had escaped from Smyrna after the initial clashes, were united with the Gendarmes and armed Turkish civilians. They all then embarked on bringing unrest, at the instigation of various other elements. They roused the locals to rebellion, they disturbed law and order and threatened others with slaughter. At the same time unrest was created by a great number of Turks who had taken arms from military depots and had fled to the countryside, where they went on looting.

In the following days the division began to collect disquieting information according to which armed resistance was being organized and atroci-

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ties were planned in the areas to the east of Smyrna (Sketchmap 3), in Turbeli, a railway junction of the railroads running through the Cayster and Maeander Valleys to the south and in Menemen, north of Smyrna. These bands of irregulars, armed even with machine guns were preparing resistance.

Further to the east, in the city of Magnesia many irregulars comprising civilians and military personnel had banded together and a mass revolutionary organization was active there. No civic authority was functioning and the Muttesherif of the city had resigned his post, being incapable of controlling the Turkish mob.

According to new information 800 soldiers and 4,000 irregulars equipped even with machine guns and a Field Artillery Battery were gathered at Aydin. After having broken into army depots they took weapons and ammunition, and threatened to initiate a campaign of terror. They then occupied the heights to the south of the city and were prepared to attack it. The town of Odemish with its environs had rebelled with the encouragement and the participation of the *Kaymakam* and the Gendarmerie commander, as well as the officers of the demobilized Turkish Army. Approximately 8,000 looted firearms were distributed and funds sent from Constantinople were readily available. There were also rumors that the Italians had promised to assist. Finally, a significant number of irregulars, almost 1,000, had occupied the heights to the northwest of the Odemish and were preparing to launch an attack.

At Cydoniae (Ayvalik), following the Occupation of Smyrna by the Hellenic Army, there were only shadow Turkish administration and civic authorities. Armed bands of local Greeks who had sought refuge in Mytilene to escape persecution, returned to resettle and reclaim their property from the Turks. So, in this area anarchy prevailed, exacerbated by the presence of a force of 300 to 400 men.

Besides the aforementioned information concerning Turkish moves, more intelligence reached division Headquarters claiming that on 3 May, that is, the day following the landing of the Hellenic Army, Italian troops consisting of one regiment had landed on Kushadasi (Nea Ephesus), had occupied Agasuluk on the railway line connecting Smyrna with Aydin and Soke and had extended their occupation zone within the area of the Maeander River.

21. Confronted with such a situation, I Division informed the Greek prime minister, who was in Paris at that time, about the events. In the meantime, the division commenced preparations and awaited reinforcements in order to gradually advance to the interior and restore law and order. At any rate, the order given by the Supreme Council, dictated the occupation of the city with its hinterland.

On 5 May, in a discussion with the Supreme Council, the Greek prime minister requested the occupation of the whole coastal region from Cydoniae to Agasuluk, so as to implement the repatriation of 300,000 refugees, who had escaped to Greece proper. He stressed that in fact this area belonged to the *sanjak* of Smyrna, which extended from Aydin to the south and as far as Cydoniae in the north. Responding to a query by the Italian delegate, whether the status would remain the same in the areas south of Aydin and Agasuluk, United States President Wilson asserted that he regarded the occupation of Nea Ephesus by the Italian forces as illegal.

On 7 May, a telegram by Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos from Paris to I Division made known that they had the authority to occupy the countryside and arm the local inhabitants. They could also occupy Aydin, following the dispatch of fresh forces in the future, provided they did not extend their occupation further southwards so as to avoid any friction with the Italians. By means of a new telegram, he announced to Division Headquarters that in pursuance of the Supreme Council decision, they could deploy troops to Cydoniae and to the east of Smyrna for the restoration of order and to make the resettlement of refugees possible. Any dispatch of troops in Aydin would be implemented only in case of disturbances of order and after the consent of Admiral Calthorpe. Following this, the division, upon agreement with Admiral Calthorpe, decided to occupy the areas of Magnesia and Kasaba to the northeast and Aydin to the southeast. In the meantime, 6 Archipelago Regiment, 8 Cretan Regiment and a Gendarmerie battalion 500 strong were dispatched in early May to reinforce the division, to be followed in late May by 3 Cavalry Regiment, the Internal Security battalion of Smyrna and the Divisional 1 Rear Battalion. 5 Archipelago Regiment was also sent by the end the month.

Despite all these movements, the division forces were barely sufficient to maintain order and to confront the Turkish organizations, which day by day posed an even greater threat. However by means of diligent activities the division quickly extended its zone of occupation, moving forward into all surrounding valleys, as well as the Erythraea Peninsula, west of Smyrna. By the end of May the following areas were occupied:

In the Maeander River Valley: Aydin and further to the east Nazilli, by 4 Infantry Regiment. Their occupation marked the easternmost point of advance by Greek troops, stretching 120 kilometers deep into the interior.

In the Cayster River Valley: Odemish, Tire, Bayindir, Birgi (Pyrgi) and Adalar (Lygda) by 1/38 Evzone Regiment.

In the Hermus River Valley: Magnesia, Kasaba, Ahmetli and further north Axarium (Akhisar) by 5 Infantry Regiment.

In the Caïcus River Valley: Pergamum by I/8 Cretan Battalion. The rest of 8 Cretan Regiment sailed from Smyrna and occupied Cydoniae.

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The occupation of all the aforementioned inhabited areas was implemented with no serious incidents, with the exception of the occupation of Cydoniae on 16 May and the occupation of Odemish on 19 May, where the Turks put up resistance, subsequently neutralized by the Greek troops.

Of all these cities, Axarium and Ahmetli were evacuated following agreement between the high commissioner and British Admiral Calthorpe. The occupation of the area of Magnesia and Kasaba was limited to within the cities. Only movement of small detachments was authorized within a mere radius of fifteen to twenty kilometers around these cities, but under no circumstances any further to the east of Kasaba.

Moreover, the occupation of the area to the south of Maeander River by the Italians caused friction with the Greek Occupation Army. Satisfying a request of the Italians, Admiral Calthorpe recommended that the Greek troops withdraw a little west of Agasuluk and south of the railway line to Aydin. Only small guard posts would remain north of this line. So, the railway line lay at the mercy of gangs of irregulars, being organized unobstructed right before the eyes of the Italian authorities. The Greek Military authorities could not embark on their dissolution, since approval by British Admiral Calthorpe was a requisite.

The Occupation Army in June–July 1919

22. Intelligence had been coming from all directions concerning forced recruitment of Turkish reservists and requisitioning. Other information confirmed that looting of ammunitions dumps under British control had taken place, or, that Turks were being armed with machine guns and artillery pieces. Turkish officers were placed in command of the ever increasing bands of irregulars. These bands were being organized into regular military units and were advancing forward towards areas under Greek control. In the area to the east of Aydin (Sketchmap 3) assemblies and movements of organized troops were detected, which received aid and support from the Italians. The latter had landed fresh forces on the areas of Soke and Nea Ephesus and were extending their occupation towards said positions. Even more important was the information that recruitment and requisitioning took place with the consent or, at least, the toleration of the Constantinople government. They were conducted with the avid cooperation of Turkish military and civil authorities, as well as the leaders of the irregular bands. A significant part of the Turkish population, beyond the occupation zone, were armed and the Turkish nationalist propaganda found fertile ground for the recruitment of irregulars.

No disarmament of the Turkish population of the Occupied Zone was permitted by the Inter–Allied Committee in order to prevent unavoidable clashes and friction with the Turks. Therefore, almost all Turks, especially those discharged from the ranks of the Army, kept and concealed their arms.

Consequently, the Hellenic Army had to confront not only direct external Turkish aggression but also a coordinated threat behind its lines, by the organized Turkish population of the Occupied Zone, whom its adversaries continuously incited to open rebellion.

No censorship had been imposed, telegraph communications were conducted by the Turkish employees of the telegraph offices. The control of the merchandise and many times of the communication transported by railway was prohibited. Deportations were imposed on a limited scale. The Greek military authorities were limited in the initiatives they could assume due to the decisions of the high commissioner or the refusals of British Admiral Calthorpe, who approved all activities. Thus the Greeks were not allowed to take any decisive action.

Under those circumstances and taking into account the small number of troops comprising the Occupation Army relative to the area of the occupation, the Greek leadership began to feel uneasy. Because its aim was to make the prestige and the power of the Hellenic Army felt in Asia Minor, it decided to dispatch reinforcements as soon as possible. At the same time it ordered the commander of the Greek Expeditionary Force in Ukraine, Major General Konstantinos Nider, to depart immediately for Smyrna and to assume command of the Occupation Army.

Turkish Surprise Actions and their Neutralization by the Hellenic Army

23. This was the general situation when Major General Konstantinos Nider assumed the command of the Occupation Army on his arrival at Smyrna on 2 June 1919. On that very day, the first incident of the Greek forces took place at Pergamum (Sketchmap 3).

On 30 May a joint detachment from I/8 Cretan Battalion, one divisional cavalry unit and pack artillery platoon occupied Pergamum, a brilliant center of Ancient Greek civilization, located approximately ninety kilometers north of Smyrna, in the valley of Caïcus River. On the next day, a section of this detachment moved forward to Dikili, the seaport of Pergamum, where the supply of the whole detachment was to be conducted. The *Kaymakam* of the city vigorously protested, stressing that such an occupation was not provided by the terms of the agreement between the Turks and the Allies. At the same time information confirmed that there were strong irregular groups in the areas surrounding the city, headed by the Commander of the area of Soma Captain Omer Kemal.

Detachment sections had occupied several points around the city, especially the hill providing a vantage point northeast of the city and the bridge over Caïcus River, on the road leading out of the city to Smyrna. The Command of I/8 Battalion, two and a half Rifle companies, one unit of divi-

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sional Cavalry, three machine gun platoons and two Pack Artillery batteries comprised the total forces within the city and the surrounding area.

On 2 June 1919 numerous armed bands led by Captain Omer Kemal attacked the detachment from all directions, which engaged in a fierce defensive. On the same day other Turkish bands attacked a pack column going to Dikili to resupply, as well as the small guard on the bridge over Caïcus River on the carriage road between Pergamum and Smyrna. At the same time all telegraphic communications were cut off.

The detachment held positions until the evening hours. However, the seizure of the old city of Pergamum by the Turks, which constituted the main defensive stranglehold, led the detachment commander to decide to withdraw during the night. Armed civilians from the surrounding areas participated in the Turkish action, attacking the detachment from the rear. Disengagement began at approximately 2100 and was conducted unhindered. The noise of the pack column was detected by the Turks who fired upon it. Confusion and panic ensued. The greatest part of the pack column and equipment had to be abandoned, as its men retreated in disarray towards Menemen, where they arrived at 2200 of the following day after an eighty kilometer forced march.

During its withdrawal, the detachment was continuously assaulted by mounted Turkish troops and armed bands of civilians from neighboring villages, so instructed by the Turkish military authorities. The detachment was attacked anew in the city of Menemen, but the attack was repelled swiftly. The Turkish lieutenant commander of the Gendarmerie was killed in the fight. The casualties suffered during the attack of the Turks and the retreat of the detachment were significant, amounting to one officer and nine enlisted men killed, one officer and eight enlisted men wounded and eighty–six enlisted men missing in action.

The unfortunate event in Pergamum seriously altered the situation. For the first time organized Turkish groups appeared on the scene, conducting a combined offensive, managing to inflict significant casualties on the Greek forces, who in turn had to relinquish control of the city and to disorderly retreat. These resulted in remarkably boosting fallen Turkish morale.

Pergamum was occupied again on 7 June following combined operations by 6 Archipelago Regiment, who moved from Dikili and a detachment from 5 Archipelago Regiment, a Cavalry battalion and appropriate Artillery units, who moved in from Menemen. The Turks, numbering some 1,000 irregulars armed with four to six machine guns put up strong resistance on the southwest of the city, but they were overrun and subsequently retired in disorder eastwards. In the following days, mop–up operations were conducted by the Archipelago Division and order was restored to the areas of Pergamum and Cydoniae. The Archipelago Division completed its deployment in the above areas by the end of June 1919.

On their way to Pergamum and the city heights, the troops witnessed of a terrible sight, slaughtered corpses, many of them enlisted men of 8 Cretan Regiment, with their abdomens gored, horseshoes nailed to the soles of their feet, their genitals stuffed in their mouths and other unimaginable atrocities.

24. The city of Nazilli (Sketchmap 3) was the furthest point of advance of the Occupation Army to the southeast, but had to be evacuated by the Hellenic Army on 7 June, since it was located beyond the agreed occupation zone. During their visit there following the evacuation of the Greek forces, Italian Gendarmerie Major Carosini and British Naval Lieutenant Holtner expressed their horror regarding the atrocities perpetrated by the Turks in Nazilli as well as throughout the villages located between Nazilli and Aydin. Moreover, the former claimed that his presence contributed to the ending of any further atrocities. The victims of the massacres by the Turks were eighty–seven killed and twenty–three wounded, including a priest. The victims had been horribly tortured before they were murdered.

Information concerning assembly of significant Turkish forces around Aydin were confirmed following a raid on the city conducted by the Turks, a few days later. Aydin was occupied on 14 May by a detachment, comprised of 4 Infantry Regiment and an Artillery battery, without incident. The local Turkish force, numbering some 300 enlisted men and 4,000 irregulars retreated to the south and the southeast.

Although order was established within the Occupation Zone, Turkish reaction to the Greek occupation in the surrounding areas, carefully orchestrated by the agents of Kemal, soon became evident. Significant numbers of both regular and irregular troops assembled in the Maeander River Valley, aiming at the seizing of Aydin. At 0500 of 16 June, strong Turkish forces supported by artillery attacked the city from all directions. Fierce fighting ensued, which lasted until 1100 of the following day, when the commander of the detachment had to order the evacuation of the city. The withdrawal of the Greek forces to Bilejik was conducted under the cover of a strong rear guard, who fought fiercely, while the city of Aydin was engulfed in flames and thick clouds of smoke.

The Hellenic Army captured Aydin on 20 June with the same regiment, in combination with operations by a joint detachment of seven Infantry battalions and three and a half Pack Artillery batteries. The latter moved from Theira and were assigned with the mopping up of the Maeander River Valley. The Turkish forces withdrew from the city without any resistance prior to the entry of Greek troops.

The sight of Aydin following its recapture was horrific. The city was reduced to rubble full of horribly mutilated corpses. Major General Nider vis-

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ited Aydin immediately after its recapture and personally witnessed the situation. According to his report, hardly had the Hellenic Army departed from the city, when sections of the Turkish Army and hordes of irregulars invaded the city and with the collaboration of the local inhabitants looted and committed robberies, rapes, massacres and arson. Of the 7,500 inhabitants and 3,500 refugees from the surrounding villages, only 4,500 survived. The others were killed, many in a gruesome manner, burned alive or abducted as captives to the hinterland. Among those killed were also the youth comprising the local Greek Volunteer Scout units, slaughtered by the Turks for not denouncing their own country.

A great number of mutilated bodies of men, women and children were found at different locations. The following day the bodies of 125 men, ninety–two women and fifty–four children were buried by the Garrison Headquarters. The tragedy in Aydin profoundly grieved the Greek population of Asia Minor and the rest of Greece, awakening the sympathy of the civilized world. Only the foes of Hellenism ventured to exploit the events, in order to frustrate the establishment of Greek authority in Ionia.

Three days after the recovery of Aydin on 23 June 1919, a detachment from 3 Infantry Regiment, 1/38 Evzone Battalion and one and a half battery pursued the Turks to a depth of twenty kilometers into Italian controlled territory, after having cleared all passes of the Maeander River south of Aydin. The Italians demanded that Greek troops withdraw to the north of the Maeander River, but the demand was ignored. Armed Turkish gangs, who had attacked Aydin, used the Italian zone as an assembly area, where they had also deployed 105mm artillery pieces, with which they were able to strike the city itself. Finally, after the intervention by British Admiral Calthorpe, the Greek troops returned to their former positions. Only one guard post remained on the bridge south of Aydin. From that moment on, the Turks retreated into the interior and for many months thereafter never seriously harassed the Greek Forces in the area of Aydin.

25. As these events were unfolding on the two flanks of the Greek disposition, information reached the Hellenic Army Headquarters in Smyrna confirming that significant enemy forces were being assembled at Axarium, Salihli and Ahmetli. Their aim was probably an attack across the Hermus River intent on attacking the Hermus River Valley. As a preemptive measure, the commander of the Occupation Army reinforced the garrison at Magnesia, dispersing in numerous instances Turkish assemblies around Ahmetli, employing small detachments, among these sections of 3 Cavalry Regiment. The Turks had seized this village on 14 June, but were forced to evacuate it three days later. At the same time various minor concentrations of Turkish forces in the area northeast of Magnesia were dispersed and a Cavalry company was

forwarded to that area. Its mission was to make frequent reconnaissance towards the villages Mihalich and Papazli. Thus the threat of a Turkish offensive to the Hermus Valley was temporarily eliminated, although the general situation did not improve.

The Greek forces had been totally insufficient to maintain order and secure the Greek Occupation Zone from outside threat. After the request of the Greek Commander of Smyrna and in order to reinforce the Occupation Army so that it would be able to face the situation, it was decided to send to Smyrna from Rumania II and XIII Divisions of Army Corps A, the remaining units of the Archipelago Division, a regiment of Field Artillery and the non–divisional units of said army corps. The transportation of the above units had been completed by the beginning of July 1919.

The casualties of the Occupation Army in July numbered eight officers and 166 enlisted men killed, thirteen officers and 457 enlisted men wounded and one officer and seventy–seven enlisted men missing in action.

The disposition of the Occupation Army in Asia Minor at the end of the same month was as follows (Sketchmap 3):

Headquarters of Army Corps A under the Command of Major General Konstantinos Nider at Smyrna.

I Division (4 and 5 Infantry Regiments, 1/38 Evzone Regiment) under the Command of Colonel (Arty) Nikolaos Zapheiriou, in the Maeander River and Cayster River Valleys, with its Headquarters at Aydin.

II Division (1, 7 and 34 Infantry Regiments) under the Command of Major General Nikolaos Vlachopoulos in the area of Smyrna, with its headquarters in the same city. (Divisional Headquarters and 1 Infantry Regiment arrived in Smyrna in early July.)

XIII Division(2 and 3 Infantry Regiments and 5/42 Evzone Regiment) under the Command of Major General Iakovos Negropontes in the Hermus River Valley with its Headquarter in Magnesia.

Archipelago Division (4, 5 and 6 Archipelago Infantry Regiments) under the Command of Colonel (Inf) Charalampos Tseroules in the areas of Pergamum and Cydoniae with its Headquarters in Pergamum.

Smyrna Division under the Command of Major General Alexandros Mazarakes–Ainian, with its Headquarters in Smyrna comprised two regiments: 8 Cretan Regiment at Cydoniae and Agasuluk and 27 Infantry Regiment in the area of Smyrna, serving as a reserve unit of Army Corps A.

The boundaries of the Occupation Zone at the end of the same month, from north to south were as follows: Keremkoy – Pergamum – Zagnos – Kinik

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– Yenije – two kilometers west of Ahmetli – Sardich – Birje – Adalar to Aydin with surveillance posts as far as Maeander River. The summits between the Caïcus River – Hermus River Valleys, the Hermus River – Cayster River Valleys and Maeander River Valley were surveyed by mobile detachments.

The Commander in Chief in Smyrna

26. On 28 June the Greek Commander in Chief Leonidas Paraskevopoulos arrived at Smyrna, escorted by General Headquarters troops, and personally assumed command of the Occupation Army. He remained at this post until 29 July, when he returned to Thessalonica. The Commander of Army Corps A Major General Konstantinos Nider was assigned once again the command of the Greek forces in Asia Minor.

The one month stay of the commander in chief in Asia Minor, the completion of the arrival of II Division and its movement to the Cayster River sector, the arrival of the remaining troops and the non–divisional units of Army Corps A from Rumania as well as the dispatch of a Heavy Artillery battalion and a flotilla of three reconnaissance aircraft and one bomber to Smyrna, in tandem with the ten reconnaissance bombers and fifteen fighter aircraft of the Naval Aviation Division already in Asia Minor, all contributed to the consolidation of the occupation.

In mid–July 1919, the boundaries of the divisional zones of responsibility and the subordination of military formations were established. The commander of Army Corps A was restricted to the command of the organic division of the corps i.e. I, II and XIII Divisions. The commander in chief personally assumed command of the two other divisions, Archipelago and Smyrna, for the period he stayed in Smyrna. The newly established Smyrna Division remained in Smyrna as a Command reserve.

By virtue of the above deployment the four divisions on the front were distributed along valleys perpendicular to the frontline, separated by massifs, with no reliable communications between them. Their liaison had to be maintained by mobile detachments.

Military activity in July generally developed as follows (Sketchmap 3):

In the Cydoniae – Pergamum sector: Repeated reconnaissances in force; the activity of Greek troops, with Naval support, forced the enemy to a passive stance and prevented him from conducting operations.

In the Magnesia sector: Operations were conducted especially northeast of the city for the occupation of the village Papazli, dominating the area, but with no result.

In the Cayster River sector: Activity was intense. The efforts of the Turks were repeatedly directed against the inhabited areas of Birje and Adalar, but with no positive result

In the Maeander River Valley: In the beginning of the month a Turkish attack was launched for the recovery of Aydin, but was not successful. The Turks were pursued and dispersed. The Greek troops occupied the village of Omerli where the screening forces were deployed.

Under orders of British General Milne, Commander of the Inter–Allied Military Mission in Asia Minor, the Greek forces were under no circumstances to advance any further of the position already held by them, without his prior consent. This was to hold until the final establishment of the demarcation line between the Turkish Army and the Allies. An Allied Mission was established in Smyrna to determine the demarcation line, headed by British General Harbury with the participation of Colonel (Inf) Theodoros Pangalos as a representative of the Greek government. Due to the prohibitive order of General Milne, virtually no offensive operations were allowed by the Hellenic Army, which was obliged passively to observe the Turkish preparations close to the Occupation Zone border and, after repelling enemy attacks was not allowed to pursue him beyond the demarcation line.

27. During that period there were two strong enemy sections concentrated opposite the Hellenic Army on the two flanks of the front and a minor one in the middle. In the area of Axarium – Panormos (Sketchmap 1) Turkish XIV Army Corps was deployed comprising 61 and 56 Divisions along with 4,000 irregulars. 57 Division of the demobilized Turkish XVII Army Corps, along with 4,000 irregulars were deployed in the Maeander River Valley. The Turkish 23 Division with 3,000 irregulars were deployed in the area of Salihli – Philadelphia and to the east of Odemish The armament of the irregulars even included machine guns.

In the meantime bands of irregulars and regular sections of army were moving in the interior and were being reinforced by Kemal. Strong bands of irregulars were active in the Kutahya (ancient Cotyaeum) area under the leadership of Ethem Bey, while Turkish 1 and 10 Divisions were in the area of Bolu.

At the end of the July the Hellenic Army had one army corps Command and five divisions in Asia Minor, whose strength was as follows:

Formations	**Officers**		**Enlisted Men**		**% Absent Enlisted Men**
	STRENGTH	PRESENT	STRENGTH	PRESENT	
Army Corps A (I, II, XIII Divisions)	1,378	1,189	42,681	34,542	19.9%
Archipelago Division	340	302	8,421	7,628	9.5%
Smyrna Division	364	304	12,121	10,375	14.6%
Total	2,082	1,795	63,223	52,545	16%

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The Italian forces numbered approximately 18,000 men under the command of General Momfalconi. They comprised troops from all arms of the service and were distributed in the area of Iconium and the southwest coast of Asia Minor from Antalya up to Nea Ephesus, with advanced posts close to the positions occupied by the Hellenic Army.

The Situation in the Turkish Hinterland

28. Appointed by the Constantinople government as Turkish Army Inspector in the Turkish eastern provinces, Mustafa Kemal landed on 6 May 1919 in Samsun, unobstructed by the British. The Turkish military officers stressed in their reports, submitted to him, that the most serious issues were the landing of Hellenic Army troops on Smyrna, Armenian aggression and the overall tragic state of the country.

Furthermore, on 29 May a Turkish delegation arrived at Paris to participate in the conference. In a relevant memorandum, the delegation blamed the Young Turk governments for the war and the atrocities and formulated demands for the preservation of the integrity of European and Asiatic Turkey. They also claimed Thrace, Eastern Macedonia, the Archipelago Islands (the Aegean Sea) and the Eastern Provinces, while recognizing the autonomy of an Arab state, the formation of an Armenian Republic and requested the continuation of the Sultanate and the Caliphate.[3]

Sensing the disagreements among the Allies and observing the delays in the process of signing the peace treaty, the Turks anticipated that they would be able to achieve more favorable peace terms, if they applied more intense diplomatic efforts. In the meantime they had dissolved the Young Turk Commissariat and formed other nationalist organizations, the most important of which was "The Association for Eastern Province Rights," which sprang from the nationalist movement of Kemal.

Before embarking on his tasks, Kemal organized a secret conference of military commanders at Amasya on 9 June. At the meeting, a plan for combined action was drawn up. At the same time it was decided that the irregulars in the area of Smyrna be equipped, trained and assigned with the continuous harassment of Greek troops and the decreasing of their advance.

There were also plans to mobilize a new Army of regular forces with the employment of officers of the Turkish Army. To implement this objective, it was also decided that clandestine recruitment centers be established as well as depots with weapons looted from arm stockpiles under Allied control. All these forces would be subordinated to a unified command. Command of

3. The title, authority and sovereignty of the Caliph, i.e. the *locum tenens* of the Prophet Mohammed and the political-religious leader of Islam. The Sultans bore this title beginning with Selim I in 1516 until 1922, when it was abolished.

the regular military units in the west was assigned to the Commander of Turkish XX Army Corps and in the east to the Commander of Turkish XV Army Corps. All these activities were to be directed by Kemal. Furthermore the formation of a National Assembly in Sebastea was decided for the establishment of a new power center in Anatolia in the form of a civil government, since the Constantinople government was under British control. Thus Kemal managed to rally all the military commanders of the country around him.

On 20 June Kemal arrived at Erzurum (Theodosioupolis), capital of the Republic of Armenia, which had been created by the British on lands of former Czarist Russia. At Erzurum, Kemal ordered the cessation of the demobilization and the recall of all able–bodied men. He also prohibited the surrender of weapons to the monitoring commission.

29. In the meantime, the Turks had looted the arms warehouses, guarded by French and British detachments and concealed the stolen weapons in safe hideouts. The recovery of these arms was the first successful operation of the Kemalists.

Informed of the activities of Kemal in the eastern provinces, the Sultan recalled him and ordered his immediate return to Constantinople, seeking to avoid any friction with the Allies. Kemal never complied and the Sultan removed him from the Command and demoted him from rank. He also ordered all civil and military authorities not to obey him. Kemal then called a conference of his close collaborators, formulated his objectives, demanded absolute submission for the conduct of the struggle and relayed his faith in the nationalist movement for the liberation of Turkey to his own forces.

On 10 July 1919 the preliminary convention of representatives of the area was held in Erzurum and lasted fourteen days. Kemal's personality prevailed from the outset. During the convention, a telegram from the Sultanate Government reached the Commander of Turkish XV Army Corps ordering him to dissolve the National Assembly and to arrest Kemal. However, he did not comply, tore the telegram in pieces and went on to participate in the proceedings of the convention.

The debates in the Convention involved the drawing up of a *National Contract* and the establishment of a *Commission of Representatives*, presided over by Kemal himself. The Commission would present the decisions of the Convention to the National Assembly of Sebastea. According to these decisions, all parts of Turkey would comprise an indivisible entity. In case of dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the nation would resist with all its forces against any foreign occupation and interference. Since the Central Government was not in a position to preserve the independence and the integrity of Turkey, a provisional government would have to be formed, which would in turn appoint the *National Convention*, or, in case of a national emergency, *The*

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Commission of Representatives in order to attain the common objective. The organization of armed forces and the raising of national will to a supreme power were fixed as the main objectives. No privileges would be granted to the Christian elements, nor would it be possible even to debate the acceptance of *a* "mandate" or a "protectorate status." Finally it was decided that an emergency meeting of the National Assembly be called to check the activity of the government.

The Demarcation Line Between the Greek and Italian Occupation Zones

30. The frequent Turkish forays against the Greek outposts along the Maeander River Valley and around Aydin if they were not organized by the Italians, they were at least tolerated by them. No demarcation line was determined beyond which the Italians would be responsible for security, nor was the Hellenic Army authorized to advance into the Italian occupation zone in case of Turkish raids or for the liquidation of any Turkish forces assembled there. Therefore frictions with the Italians were inevitable.

The commander of the Occupation Army by means of repeated memoranda had presented this situation, requesting a final resolution of relations with the Italians. The Greek Prime Minister from the beginning of 1919 had sought to approach the Italians and had embarked on negotiations with them. Finally the Supreme Council accepted the *Venizelos–Tittoni* agreement of 16 July 1919 for the determination of a demarcation line between the Italian and the Greek Occupation Zones in Asia Minor. This agreement was temporary, and provided that each of the two governments should be committed to ensure the full and complete protection of each other's nationals living within occupied territory.

At the same time, directives were issued to the two military commands that the officers of the two Armies maintain mutual friendly relations. The effort of the Greek side towards this objective, brought satisfactory results and gradually the relations improved. This had a discouraging effect on the Turkish bands of irregulars that hoped to profit from the friction between the Greeks and the Italians.

The demarcation line set by the Venizelos–Tittoni Agreement coincided to a great extent with the positions held by the Greek troops. It lay a mere 600 meters from the Agasuluk – Omerli railway line (Sketchmap 3) and did not protect the Greeks from attacks launched against them from within the Italian occupation zone.

Besides his communications with British General Milne, the Commander of the Occupation Army addressed himself also to the Commander of the Italian forces in Asia Minor, proposing the establishment of the demarcation line on the spot in order to guarantee the railway line. The commission

appointed for this task never produced any positive result. The situation remained unchanged until 26 October, when the decision of the Peace Conference was made known, setting the boundaries of the Greek Occupation zone in Asia Minor. These new boundaries included territories to the south of Maeander River, within the Italian occupation zone.

British Consent to Limited Operations

31. In the beginning of August 1919 an order issued by British General Milne stated that the two opponents would not conduct any operations, on account of the anticipated determination of the demarcation line. The Hellenic Army complied. However, the Turks launched frequent raids against the Greek positions and then withdrew immediately. The Hellenic Army adopted a passive stance.

After repeated reports to as well as personal contacts with General Milne, the Commander of the Occupation Army was able to secure the authorization (27 August 1919) for the Greek forces to conduct counterattacks in a depth of 1,000 to 1,500 meters beyond their zone, in case of attacks by Turkish forces, on condition that they fall back to their initial positions afterwards. The counterattack had to be launched with General Milne's consent. The Greek forces were authorized to move forward as far as the outpost line and only in cases of urgent tactical necessity. They then had to report the reasons that had made such an operation imperative.

The limited freedom of action granted to the Greek units did not substantially alter the situation. Finally, and only after persistent protests of the divisional Commanders and concerted efforts of the commander of the Occupation Army, the Greek troops were granted the right on 28 September 1919 to conduct operations at their own discretion in case of Turkish offensives, to launch counterattacks and to keep the captured locations, provided that these counterattacks improved the line from the tactical point of view. Ten days later, a new order by General Milne clarified that the freedom of action granted did not involve strategic, but only tactical counterattack, which would have to be launched only within the zone of engagement. After having accomplished their missions, the troops employed would have to fall back to their initial positions along all sectors, with the exception of that of Aydin.

However, the commander of the Occupation Army never abandoned his efforts in order to secure the complete revocation of restrictions to his operations. Finally, on 16 October, General Milne authorized full freedom of operations within the occupied territory. All counterattacks launched would set objectives in depth up to three kilometers beyond the demarcation line, provided that the troops would then fall back to the original positions.

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Establishment and Occupation of the Outer Limit of the Occupation Line

32. During the same period of mid–October that freedom of operations in limited depths was granted to the Hellenic Army, the prime minister of Greece informed from Paris the Greek high commissioner in Smyrna that the Peace Conference had decided the fixing of the demarcation line between the Greek and Turkish forces. This line was drawn on an appropriate map also sent to the high commissioner.

As soon as he was informed of this event, the commander of the Occupation Army ordered his divisions to forward their troops to the new line, without the prior consent of General Milne. At the same time, a map was sent to each division, with the new line marked on it. The movement of the troops of the Archipelago Division was implemented immediately, while the movement of the other two divisions (I and XIII) was suspended following an order of General Milne, who requested that no further movements be conducted until 2 November, so that the Turks would have ample time to evacuate the territory within the Greek Occupation Zone.

The demarcation line, finally agreed upon and reported to the commander of the Occupation Army by General Milne on 26 October was the following, from north to south (Sketchmap 3): Keremkoy – Dushme – hill 590 – Yenije – Papazli – east of Ahmetli – Sardich – Boz Dag – east of Odemish – Bademlik – Omerli – north bank of Maeander River. From that point started the demarcation line between the Greeks and the Italians, which passing through Demirji, Aziziye and Agasuluk reached the estuary of Cayster River.

In compliance to the above order on 3 November the commander of the Occupation Army sent a map to all divisions, showing the new line that that they were to occupy. He also made known that the area of Aydin would remain under the control of the Greek troops and that the Turkish troops were ordered to withdraw three kilometers beyond the aforementioned line.

Executing the above order, a strong detachment from II Division advanced to the dominating line east of Odemish in the first third of November, where the enemy had made a stand from positions that had been well organized quite some time before. In the second third of November troops of XIII Division also moved forward.

Divisional Combat Operations

33. **In the Maeander River sector,** small groups of Turkish troops in August frequently harassed the outposts of I Division northeast of Aydin and east of Omerli. The Turkish troops made attempts to destroy bridges, attack supply columns and small moving detachments, disrupt telephone communications and engaged in brigandage.

The Turkish bands operating from within the Italian zone continued

their activities against the railroad line. In the following months until the end of the year attacks became more frequent along the railway line.

Attacks against the outposts continued unabated as before. The Turkish artillery conducted more frequent and intense bombings, not only against the positions of Greek troops, but also against the non–combatants of Aydin and the railroad station at Omerli.

The total casualties of I Division were four officers and twenty–four enlisted men killed and 178 enlisted men wounded. On the battlefield were found nineteen Turks killed and seventeen wounded.

In the Cayster River sector during August the Turks repeated their attacks against Birje, without result. Towards the end of the second third of September, sections of the Greek II Division occupied the town of Kula and two important heights further south, through which ran a pack trail from Koshk to Bademlik – Adalar. This operation was conducted with the authorization of General Milne for the liquidation of the local bands of irregulars. The occupation of the aforementioned locations ended the forays of irregulars into the valley of Cayster River. Other significant operations of the Greek troops included the mopping up of Mermer Dag massif, on the boundary between of II and XIII Divisions north of Odemish, in the last third of October, with two detachments from these divisions and the mop–up of the area of Kaymakchi, south east of Odemish in the first third of November.

The total casualties of II Division were four officers and fifty five enlisted men killed, twelve officers and 121 enlisted men wounded and two enlisted men missing in action. The Turkish casualties were 122 killed, 268 wounded and three prisoners.

In the Hermus River sector, the activities of the Turkish irregulars were reduced in August. Most major operations, conducted against Ahmetli, in the area north of Ahmetli and northeast of Magnesia, were repulsed by troops of XIII Division deployed there. Following the full authorization of operations granted by General Milne, XIII Division gradually extended the occupation zone, reaching the previously agreed upon limit by 22 November 1919.

The casualties of XIII Division were one warrant officer and nine enlisted men killed, twenty–three enlisted men wounded and one enlisted man prisoner.

In the Archipelago Division sector, east of Pergamum up to about ten kilometers northeast of Cydoniae, Turkish activities were very limited during August, mainly due to the presence of British troops close to the area and the misfortunes suffered by the Turks in the previous month.

The casualties of the Archipelago Division were minor and numbered two killed and fifteen wounded enlisted men.

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Smyrna Division in August made intense efforts to complement its organization, and the training of its personnel and to replenish its shortages. In the beginning of the second third of September, it was temporarily assigned the responsibility of security of the Interior Zone, from Pytichos River up to the mouth of Cayster River. In the last third of November began the transportation of 3 Infantry Regiment from Macedonia, which was to replace 8 Cretan Regiment, destined to be incorporated in the Cretan Division.

The inactivity imposed on the Greek Occupation Army in Asia Minor, the prohibitive orders by General Milne and the frequent attacks by Turkish bands of irregulars during the forced inactivity, made the need to organize the ground imperative and immediate. Organization of the ground began in August in the sectors of the divisions and accelerated in the following months until December, when it was finally completed. Simultaneous with the organization of the ground, works for the restoration of communications continued with the highest speed possible.

During the same period one the most important concerns for the General Headquarters was the organization and fortification of Smyrna and the surrounding area, with the objective to secure firmly the occupied zone in Asia Minor. The committee appointed for this task studied the establishment of a bridgehead to cover Smyrna. Subcommittees started to work on the ground, but only for a short period of time. The relocation of the front deep to the east of Smyrna, the necessary equipment, means and personnel needed for that task, as well as the required great expenditure for the implementation of such a major fortification, brought about the abandonment of this project.

The Overall Situation at the End of 1919

34. The disposition of the Occupation Army did not change by the end of 1919, with the exception of certain readjustments in the interior dispositions within each division. The strength of the Hellenic Army in Asia Minor was reduced, due to the discharge of the enlisted men of the class of 1910 in September, 1911 and 1912 in October and 1913 in November. To complement these vacancies, 3,241 enlisted men were moved to Asia Minor from the Zoned Interior in December.

No major incidents or changes were noted in the period between the beginning of August and the end of December 1919. Small bands of irregulars conducted limited activity on the front and the interior of the Occupation Zone with harassing infantry and artillery fire. Besides these bands of irregulars, there were also bands of Turkish civilians in the Occupation Zone who exploited every chance they had to attack Greek troops. The latter passed as farm workers, carried concealed weapons and as soon as they saw isolated enlisted men, individuals or small groups, they attacked. The Turkish population with

the instigation of civil and military authorities exhibited rebellious tendencies.

After some time, national Turkish organizations, formed by forced recruitment and the enlistment of irregulars and bandits, posed an even greater threat to the security of the area. The measures taken by these Turkish organizations fueled the fanaticism of the civilians. Whole villages were abandoned by their inhabitants and men fit to bear arms reinforced the ranks of these bands of irregulars.

There was a movement for the uprising of the civilian population in the city of Smyrna itself. According to rumors, the insurrection would be combined with a concerted Turkish offensive in the sectors of Magnesia and Aydin. The drastic measures taken by the Greek administration, such as the relocation within the city of six Infantry battalions for a few days, their review and parade with simultaneous overflight of the greatest possible number of aircraft deterred any further activities by the Turks.

Reorganization of the Occupation Army into a Field Army
12 December 1919–15 February 1920

35. On 12 December 1919 Lieutenant General Konstantinos Meliotes Komnenos arrived at Smyrna, and was assigned the command of the newly designated Occupation Field Army of Asia Minor, formerly the Occupation Army of Asia Minor.

Army Corps A comprising I, II, XIII Divisions under the command of Major General Konstantinos Nider.

Army Corps of Smyrna, comprising the Smyrna and Archipelago Divisions under the command of Lieutenant General Demetrios Ioannou.

The new organization was deemed necessary and imperative, since the command of the Asia Minor Army had been assigned so far to Army Corps A. The Headquarters of this corps, was not fit to command an army with strength exceeding that of two army corps. As soon as the Field Army Headquarters became operational, the Headquarters of Army Corps A relocated to Seydikoy.

In the beginning of January 1920, the strength of the Field Army of Asia Minor was 2400 officers, 62,743 enlisted men, of whom 5,705 belonged to classes 1913a and 1913b, about to be discharged and 22,285 pack animals. The actual combatant establishment was approximately 15,000 men less than that set by the tables of war establishment, while a further reduction in strength was expected, due to the failure of enlisted men to return to the front, after their leaves had expired and the upcoming discharge of the draftees of the 1914 class.

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Supply was conducted from the base at Smyrna and the supply centers and points. There were sufficient stocks of all military equipment except of those of Commissariat and telegraph service. Diet consisted mainly of meat from local production and legumes from the base at Smyrna.

In Smyrna there was an Air Force sector and a Naval Aviation Squadron. The first was based at Kazamir (Sketchmap 3) and included Squadron B and Squadron C as well as an Aviation Squadron Echelon. Based at Smyrna, the Naval Aviation Squadron included two flotillas, one at Kazamir and one at Halka Pinar (two kilometers east of Smyrna). Besides the airport at Kazamir, there were also auxiliary airports at Magnesia, Odemish, Pergamum, Bayindir, Karaagach, Kremmydonesion north of Cydoniae, Halka Pinar and Aydin.

The Topographic Service confronted enormous difficulty, due to lack of accurate maps for the conduct of tactical studies, the organization of the defense and the conduct of offensive operations.

In order to boost the combat effectiveness of the Field Army, its Commander requested the dispatch of reinforcements and proposed the suspension of leaves of absence and of the discharge of the 1914 class. The Prime Minister approved the request of the Field Army Command and issued an order that adequate explanations be provided to the reserves about the need that necessitated the taking of the measure of suspending any further discharges.

According to information collected by mid–December 1919, the Turks were reinforcing the front between Ahmetli and Philadelphia, probably aiming at launching an offensive in the direction of Kasaba and Nymphaeum. They also reinforced the front opposite I Division in the areas of Koshk and Nazilli. In the second third of January 1920, II Division occupied the passes around Golcuk Lake, which were then defensively organized.

Following information of General Headquarters at Thessalonica concerning an upcoming enemy offensive, a conference was called on Chios on 16 January 1920. The participants in this meeting were Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos, High Commissioner Aristeides Stergiades, Commander in Chief Leonidas Paraskevopoulos, The Commander of the Asia Minor Field Army Konstantinos Meliotes Komnenos and the Commanders of the two army corps Konstantinos Nider and Demetrios Ioannou. The overall situation in Asia Minor was examined at the meeting and it was decided to reinforce the Field Army with one more division, as well as urgently to reinforce the sector of Magnesia.

Following the aforementioned decision of 1920, the organization of a new division started in Thessalonica which was designated Cydoniae Division. Colonel (Inf) Alexandros Othonaios was assigned as commander of the

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new division. The division would be stationed in the area of Smyrna with its Headquarters at Buca. Three days later the volunteer battalion, 1,000 strong, arrived at Smyrna and was incorporated into the Greek Field Army.

The Military Situation, December 1919 through January 1920

36. Army Corps A, including I and II Divisions occupied the south part of the front, adjacent to the Italian zone of occupation (Sketchmaps 3, 4).

I Division in the valley of Maeander River was repeatedly harassed by the Turks. Small bands of irregulars launched frequent raids, from the massif northeast of Omerli. These were more intense along the railway line from Agasuluk to Demirji.

In the division's sector defensive works were improved with the complement of barbed wire fences, the construction of gun emplacements and observation posts. At the same time the Turks intensively continued their defensive organization, opposite the sector of the division. Total casualties of the division were five killed and thirteen wounded enlisted men.

II Division in the Cayster River sector seized through combined operations of two detachments the commanding range of heights west of Keles. In the remaining days of the month there was exchange of infantry and artillery fire, movements of small bands, engagements between patrols and organization of the ground by both opponents.

Total casualties suffered by the division were two officers and fourteen enlisted men wounded.


Smyrna Army Corps was established initially by Smyrna Division and Archipelago Division. On 17 January 1920 XIII Division of Army Corps A was incorporated in Smyrna Army Corps, while Smyrna Division was directly subordinated to the Field Army as its reserve, with Headquarters in Magnesia. Smyrna Army Corps was assigned the northern sector of the frontline zone. At the same time 3 Cavalry Regiment and 9 Field Artillery Regiment moved forward and reinforced the area of Magnesia and Kasaba.

In the sector of XII Division, in the second half of December there was activities by enemy patrols and for the first time the Papazli subsector was attacked with artillery fire.

During the early hours of 7 January 1920, enemy forces that had engaged Greek screening elements on the northwestern edge of Ahmetli, were dispersed following successful infantry and artillery fire. The Greeks suffered seven killed and sixteen wounded, whereas the Turks four killed and 150 wounded.

In the sector of Archipelago Division, in the second half of December 1919, there was exchange of sparse Infantry fire and employment of Artillery

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Sketchmap 4. The Disposition of the Opposing Forces in 1919.

by the Turks. There were also instances of banditry, looting and limited attacks on police stations by Turkish bands of irregulars. For the remaining time relative calm prevailed.

Smyrna Division, encamped since the middle of December 1919 in the area of Smyrna, assigned 27 Infantry Regiment to the southwest edge of Smyrna. 28 Infantry Regiment had been incorporated into I Division, its mission being to secure the railway line from Agasuluk up to Karapinar, while 30 Infantry Regiment complemented its establishment by the end of the same month and was forwarded to Nymphaeum. In January the division was assigned as reserve of the Field Army and forwarded to the north of the road linking Smyrna and Kasaba, due to the desertion of the French military forces.

Cydoniae Division comprised 31, 32 and 33 Infantry Regiments. The first of these regiments was assigned the surveillance of the border line in the area of Dorylaeum (Eskishehir) and was transported from Thessalonica. The second belonged to VIII Division and was transported from Preveza and the third was the Garrison regiment of Smyrna, redesignated as 33 Infantry Regiment. By mid–February 1920 the greatest part of the division had been transported to Asia Minor, assembled in the area of Smyrna and continued to complement its organization and training.

The Commander in Chief Assumes Command
(15 February–31 May 1920)

37. Greek General Headquarters arrived at Smyrna from Thessalonica on 15 February 1920 and the Commander in Chief Leonidas Paraskevopoulos assumed general command of the Hellenic Army in Asia Minor. The Occupation Field Army of Asia Minor was dissolved. On the same day General Headquarters was assigned the operation of surveillance of the Rear Zone, while command of the troops in Macedonia was assumed directly by the Ministry of the Army.

The main concern of the Commander in Chief was the reinforcement and complement of the army in Asia Minor. From mid–February until the end of May 1920, the remaining units and the formations of General Headquarters and Cydoniae Division, as well as filler personnel for the complement of existing vacancies kept arriving at Asia Minor, without ever managing to complement all vacancies. In order to confront the situation, all residents of the Occupation Zone by the Hellenic Army. of the classes 1910–1914, who had not served in the period from 1917 to 1920, were drafted. Moreover, all men of the class of 1910–1920, residents of Greek descent from the same area were called for volunteer enlistment.

The Infantry Depots of II Mytilene and Smyrna Divisions, that were under the direct orders of General Headquarters, were organized aiming at the intensive training of recruits. Furthermore, in order to fill the vacancies and the establishment of new units, new tables of reduced war establishment were issued, resulting in economies of forces, equipment and pack animals.

On 7 March the General Military Command of Smyrna was established, assigned with the security of Rear Area Zone. On 3 April the Railway Transportation Center was created for the control of transportation and the maintenance of order and discipline during the embarkation and disembarkation of personnel and equipment. On 6 May the Security regiment of Smyrna was established which by the end of June had been redesignated as 17 Infantry Regiment. On 22 May the Vehicles sector at Smyrna was developed to Area Vehicles Convoy of Asia Minor. From 24 February certain Engineers units were subordinated under a unified command for the repair and

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maintenance of roads. Finally, supply convoys were organized with 500 pack animals each for the resupply of the divisions. In mid–April, Smyrna Division was sent forward to the sector of Magnesia and assigned the security of this sector to one of its regiment.

Newly established Cydoniae Division, encamped around Smyrna, continued to fill its vacancies and was reinforced by the regimental depot of II Division.

The divisions, occupying sectors of the front during the period from the middle of February until the end of May 1920 conducted passive defense there throughout the aforementioned period.

Granting Freedom of Action to the Hellenic Army

38. As soon as he was briefed on the situation on the front, the commander of the Army requested from the Greek prime minister freedom of action in order to liquidate the enemy who day by day gathered in ever increasing numbers. At the same time he requested the intervention with regards to this matter of the British Commander in Chief General Milne. Prime Minister Venizelos, then in London, sent a telegram in reply and brought to the attention of the commander in chief the need not to allow any changes in the boundaries of the Greek Occupation Zone, through operations of the Hellenic Army conducted without the prior consent of General Milne, since this would be very harmful to the national interests.

The Greek prime minister inquired as to the possibility of dispatch of armed forces to eastern Thrace still under Turkish occupation and the strength of Turkish nationalist organizations opposing the Hellenic Army in Asia Minor. The commander in chief responded on 24 February that the Turks had three divisions with total strength 30,000 men, 120 machine guns and 60 Artillery pieces. Two of these divisions were deployed on the Magnesia front and the third in the area of Nazilli. Furthermore he pointed out that the Turks continued the recruitment in earnest, as well as the daily movement of troops to the front. As a result he anticipated a rapid and significant increase of Turkish strength. He therefore regarded the conduct of operations after fifteen days as imperative, with a great possibility of complete success and consolidation of the situation. Following this, he would be in a position to earmark forces for Thrace.

At the end of February the Greek prime minister by means of a new telegram to the commander in chief requested to be briefed on the possibility to deal a swift and decisive blow to the enemy, in case he was granted authorization for an offensive. The military objective was the outflanking and capture of enemy forces by means of an appropriate operation blocking their withdrawal further to the east. Such a withdrawal would make the position of Greek troops very adverse, due to their distance from their base of operations. In his response the commander in chief reported that he anticipated to capture a large number of prisoners and to seize difficult to replenish provisions. As a conclusion he expressed the belief that even if the operation would not accomplish the expected objectives, it would reflect adversely the morale of the Turks and would allow the assignment of two divisions to Thrace.

A few days later on 2 March 1920 the Greek prime minister informed General Headquarters that the British minister of the army had authorized General Milne to allow Greek troops, in case of Turkish attack, to continue their counterattack in a depth greater than three kilometers, on condition that they retire to their initial position. At the same time he suggested that the Chief of Staff Colonel Theodoros Pangalos go to Constantinople to secure this authorization.

Five days later the prime minister in another telegram informed them that the maintenance of six divisions in Asia Minor was just a waste of manpower, whereas only five divisions would suffice in securing the area of Smyrna and requested more information concerning the planned fortification works. On the same day the commander in chief reported that in fact only five divisions were sufficient at the time, but not for the future since the Turks transported more and more forces to the front day by day. He proposed as a possible solution the immediate movement of 6,000 men from the six divisions in Asia Minor to Macedonia. The men could be replaced with recruits from Asia Minor, who were enlisting en masse.

On 9 March the Greek prime minister touched the same issue of sending one of the divisions to Thrace, considered to be sufficient for the occupation of Thrace together with the forces already there. He finally asked the commander in chief's view on the possibility of establishing two new divisions in Asia Minor with reduced strength, taking away one company from each battalion. The commander in chief reported that the present military situation was being handled with calm and confidence, despite the existing difficulties. The establishment of the two new divisions was practically unfeasible, for technical reasons, but also due to the fact that the battalions had three companies and not four as they previously did.

On the next day, General Headquarters was informed that General Milne had authorized the extension of counterattacks of the Greek troops, beyond the three kilometer zone, on condition that they return to their line of departure. It was also made known that Commander in Chief Francois d'Esperay proposed at the Conference that they should grant full freedom of operations to the Hellenic Army, because according to the existing intelligence Kemal was ready to attack the Greeks, as soon as weather allowed. In another telegram Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos stressed that the impression should not be created that the Hellenic Army was advancing beyond the line of occupation. The main military objective for this would be to deceive the

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enemy and to prevent any further Turkish recruitment. Relevant orders were issued to the units for the maintenance of a passive stance throughout the front. It was furthermore emphasized that no operations would be conducted without prior authorization by the commander in chief.

39. In the meantime from September 1919, reaction against Kemal started to assume more substantial and intense forms. Officers and supporters of the Turkish government in Constantinople dispatched to the Asia Minor interior organized counter–revolts against the Kemalist regime in the name of the Sultan. This practice pitted the two Turkish parties against each other, but Kemal reacted each time resolutely and effectively with troops loyal to him personally and the nationalist organizations.

Among these counterrevolutionary activities, the most significant one was that of Anzavur, which broke out initially in the area north of Balikesir (Sketchmap 4) on 8 September 1919 and was repeated later in the beginning of February 1920. These efforts as well as the rest of the counterrevolutionary movements which broke out around the end of March 1920 in other provinces of Asia Minor were all put down successfully by Kemal.

These areas were located in the British controlled zone in the provinces of the Dardanelles, Constantinople, Nicomedia and more to the east. The liquidation of the counter–revolts made the Kemalist state prevalent, had a positive effect on the morale of troops and disengaged forces that moved forward to the Greek front. Following the crushing of the Anzavur forces, the Kemalists started to assemble all the available troops, approximately 16,000 men in the sector of Magnesia. Major reconnaissances in force were conducted there and an attack against Magnesia and Smyrna was prepared.

In the meantime General Headquarters was informed that Turkish forces had increased more than twofold opposite his front and gave up any plans to send Smyrna Division to Thrace. After this with a message to the advanced British Command Post he made known that there was serious evidence of an imminent Turkish attack, stemming from surveillance of urgent transportation of major Turkish reinforcements to the front opposite his troops, the great progress in the organization of Turkish positions, the dissolution of the bands of irregulars and their subsequent incorporation into the ranks of the regular Turkish Armed Forces.

On 23 May the Greek prime minister informed General Headquarters with a telegram that there was reliable information that confirmed the upcoming attack of Kemalist forces in Asia Minor and of a simultaneous attack by the Bulgarians in Thrace. Therefore the forces in Thrace had to be reinforced with as many troops as possible, dispatched from the Asia Minor army. He finally made known that the class 1921 would be drafted.

In its response General Headquarters reported that the situation in Asia Minor was very serious and could not allow movement of troops to Thrace. He also requested that a division be hastily established in the interior destined for Thrace. Afterwards it was proved that the assessment of the Greek General Headquarters in Asia Minor had exaggerated the military might of the Turkish army both in manpower and material, regarding the launching of a decisive attack against the Greeks as both possible and probable. When the Hellenic Army later conducted a major reconnaissance in force, the information of the Greek services proved to be totally inaccurate.

Operations from March to the End of May 1920

40. In March 1920, Army Corps A continued to occupy the south sector of the front (Sketchmap 3), bordering on the north by the line running through Mount Drakon and Artijak Yayla and boundary between the zones of responsibility of I and II Divisions, the line running through Nea Ephesus and the summit of Mesongis Mountain.

I Division confronted minor enemy activity in the period from February to April. Casualties suffered were two enlisted men killed and eighteen wounded.

II Division acting on orders of General Headquarters, conducted on 17 February a combined attack along with neighboring XIII Division of Smyrna Army Corps for the completion of the capture of the Boz Dag massif. The attack met with complete success and resulted in the dispersion of the Turkish forces there, that had been a persistent threat for both divisions. The liaison between I and XIII Divisions became closer and any communication of the enemy in the valleys of Hermus and Cayster Rivers was disrupted, as well as the communication from the interior of Smyrna through these valleys.

The casualties suffered by the division in the three month period from February to April were four officers and forty–five enlisted men killed and fifty–seven enlisted men wounded. The Turks abandoned on the battlefield 165 killed and three wounded, while eleven men were taken prisoner.

41. The Smyrna Army Corps occupied the northern section of the front. Its zone was divided in the sector of Pergamum occupied by the Archipelago Division and the sectors of Magnesia and Kasaba occupied by XIII Division. The boundary of the divisions was the summits of Yunt Dag. On 20 April Smyrna Division was deployed between the two divisions, assigned with the responsibility of the sector of Magnesia as its eastern boundary with Hylus River, whereas XIII Division was sent forward to Kasaba.

The strength of Smyrna Division was reduced from the end of the first third of May 1920, due to the movement to Thessalonica of 27 Infantry Regiment.

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Occupying the Magnesia sector, XIII Division conducted successful mop–up operations in the areas of Belen Dag, that had been infiltrated by enemy forces in mid–February. The casualties suffered by the division were one officer and seven enlisted men killed and five officers and twenty–four enlisted men wounded. The casualties for the Turks were eighty–five killed and thirteen wounded.

Archipelago Division at the northernmost sector of the whole Asia Minor front (sector of Pergamum) confronted relatively minor Turkish activity. Their casualties were one officer and thirteen enlisted men killed and twenty–four enlisted men wounded.

Smyrna Division following its movement forward to the sector of Magnesia confronted limited enemy activity and for the first time was tested under fire. Their casualties were two enlisted men killed and three wounded.

Cydoniae Division in the area of Smyrna continued the training of units and their complement in personnel, equipment and pack animals.

The Situation of Turkish Nationalist Forces in Early April 1920

42. The strength of the Hellenic Army in Asia Minor in the beginning of April 1920 was 3,248 officers, 91,063 enlisted men, 28,804 pack animals, 3,042 horse–drawn carriages and 937 motor vehicles.

During the same period the state of the Turkish Nationalist forces was as follows: (Sketchmaps 3, 4)

In the valley of Maeander River, Turkish 57 Division was deployed opposite Greek I Division. The Turkish divisions comprised three Infantry regiments, one 105mm Field Artillery battery, one 75mm Pack Artillery battery and four 37mm trench guns. The total strength of the divisions was 3,650 men. In addition the presence of 1,500 irregulars significantly reinforced the defense of its sector. Its positions were strongly organized with double rows of barbed wire and three successive lines of resistance before Koshk.

In the valley of Cayster River. An Infantry Brigade comprising three battalions, a rapid–fire Field Artillery battery and two rapid–fire Pack Artillery guns was deployed opposite II Division. Several bands of irregulars reinforced the brigade and its total strength was 5,000 men. Its positions were well organized and covered all passes in the valley of Cayster River, that linked it with the valley of the Maeander River and that of Hermus River.

In the valley of Hermus River, opposite to XIII Division, Turkish XII Army Corps was deployed with its headquarters at Iconium. It comprised Turkish 23 Division, the so–called National Defense Division, with its Headquarters at Afyon Karahisar. This division comprised three Infantry regiments, one Cavalry regiment, numerous bands of irregulars organized in a unified battalion, eight Field Artillery guns and sixteen 75mm rapid–fire Pack Artillery guns. The total strength of Turkish XII Army Corps was 20,000 men. The corps was deployed from Lake Marmara to the heights south of Salihli.

In the sector of Magnesia, opposite Archipelago Division, elements of Turkish 56 and 61 Divisions were deployed in depth along the railway line connecting Magnesia and Panormos. The total strength of those elements together with the local bands of irregulars was 10,000 men.

In the Italian zone, to the south of Maeander River, bands of irregulars headed by Yusuf Ali and totaling 2,000 men, equipped with three machine guns raided the area and occasionally threatened the Smyrna – Aydin railway line.

Turkish reserves of an estimated 5,000 men were at Balikesir and of 15,000 to 20,000 men at the Karahisar and Eskishehir (ancient Dorylaeum) area.

The Evolution of the Nationalist Movement in Turkey

43. The pronouncement of the Erzurum Convention and the National Contract were transmitted to all military commanders and adhering administrative authorities. With a telegram to the President of the Sultanate government Damat Ferit Pasha, following his utter failure at the Peace Conference Kemal chastised the weakness and the inactivity of the ineffective governments in Constantinople, which succeeded one another. At the same time he expressed his resolution to continue the struggle and pointed out to the Sultanate government that it should cease its reaction and instead ensure the formation of a new parliamentary body, that would declare the existence of the Nation and would embody its will.

At the same time, Kemalist efforts at Constantinople for the participation of governmental delegates to the National Assembly at Sebastea continued (Sketchmap 4), with which the Constantinople government disagreed. The National Assembly at Sebastea sought to ensure the unification of all Turkey.

The Erzurum Convention appointed a commission of delegates, who arrived at Sebastea on 20 August 1919. On 22 August, the proceedings of the Convention commenced, and lasted for eight days. The most important of all the issues raised was the expediting of parliamentary elections, announced by the Sultanate government. Kemal agreed, with great reservation, that these would be held in all the provinces under his control.

On 31 August the appointed delegates to the National Assembly from all the provinces assembled for the first time in Sebastea amid absolute secrecy. They had no political platform, beyond the will to prevent the partition of Turkey. As in Erzurum the personality of Kemal, prevailed completely, due to

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his clear conception of the immediate issues and his well articulated plan. He thus managed to get all decisions of the Erzurum conference passed with comfortable majorities. Those decisions, the backbone of the proceedings of the National Assembly, contributed to the consolidation of the views of the delegates. He also succeeded in getting many new resolutions passed, which ultimately set apart the Turkish Nation from the Ottoman Empire.

The aforementioned decisions did not conform with the policies of the Sultanate government and were therefore all turned down. Moreover, the government ordered Ali Galip, the Governor of Malatya (Melitene in Cappadocia) to mobilize many Kurdish battalions, to break up the National Assembly and arrest all its members. The danger was great and direct. Everybody turned spontaneously to Kemal, who assumed command of two Infantry regiments and dispersed the Kurdish forces even before they had a chance to organize. Returning to Sebastea, he dominated the National Assembly, which appointed an Executive Committee presided over by Kemal himself. The committee was vested with extraordinary powers and was turned into a provisional government, with power to act fully independently from the Constantinople government. Kemal immediately exploited the situation and severed all relations with the latter. In the interior he replaced all commanders opposed to him without ever declaring open war on the Sultan and without ever acting to depose him as Supreme Ruler. On the contrary, he stipulated that all power is exercised in his name and in accordance with all existing Turkish state legislation. The Executive Committee was appointed to exercise all state executive powers until the holding of the next elections. It must be noted that the National Assembly held in Sebastea had decided on the function of the Executive Committee with Kemal as president.

In the meantime a new government was formed by Ali Riza and announced the new parliamentary session, but also the preparations for the holding of elections. The elections were a triumph for the nationalist candidates, who decided to go to Constantinople, despite the objections of Kemal, to participate in the new parliament. Kemal refused to follow the rest of the nationalists and stayed put in Ankara, the new seat of the National Assembly since 14 December 1919.

Circumstances started to become favorable for the Sultan. Kemal remained in Ankara joined by a few young officers. He sent a telegram in the name of the *National Commission*, by means of which he announced that the new seat of the Commission would be located in Ankara. This announcement was the signal for the initiation of bitter contention between the two governments, the one in Constantinople and the other in Ankara, which vied to attract as many parliamentary delegates to one's own side as possible. Constantinople appointed military commanders, who were relieved immediately by Kemal. At the same time the Sultanate government instigated an

anti–Kemalist movement of the Circassians led by Anzavur in the *vilayets* of Bursa and Smyrna.

The National Assembly of Ankara came into session on 6 January 1920. Three days later, at the insistence of the British, Jemal Pasha, Minister of the Army at Constantinople and friend of Kemal's resigned. The latter retaliated with the arrest of all foreign officers in Eastern Turkey.

44. On 15 January the delegates who had escaped to Constantinople in a formal event accepted the text of a *National Agreement*, which emphasized the independence and integrity of Turkish territory occupied on the day of the armistice. Arab countries would decide their fate at their own discretion. The freedom of navigation through the straits would be permitted if the Allies secured Constantinople by the assignment of a sufficient Turkish military force. Finally there was provision for the abolition of all capitulations and foreign controls.

The delegates took heart by the failure of the Allies to react. In Cilicia and Syria hordes of irregulars launched attacks against the troops of French General Gourot, forcing them to retreat. The British started to withdraw from the Caucasus, Crimea, Merzifon and Samsun. The Turks were refusing to obey any orders of the occupation authorities. The officers of the Inter–Allied monitoring committees were ignored, denigrated and in many cases attacked. The armistice terms generally were not violated.

The Allies and particularly Greece were observing the development of the nationalist movement with increasing concern. The British soon realized that they could only react in Constantinople. For this reason they decided to act quickly and effectively to avert any undesired outcome. Within this framework, they apprehended and imprisoned the President of the Sultanate Government Hikmet Bey, for failing to bring the parliament into session. Fearing a possible collaboration of Kemal with the Young Turks, the Inter–Allied occupation authorities in Constantinople arrested 150 delegates, politicians and intellectuals, who were then transported and imprisoned in Malta. Turks from every quarter of the city waged armed resistance, but the British went on to impose martial law. The Minister of the Army Ismet Inonu and the Chief of the Army Staff Fevzi managed to escape to Ankara.

The British seized the main government buildings in Constantinople and the telegraph office and announced that this had to be done due to a rebellion in the east. They characterized the occupation as temporary, and tried as their objective to restore the prestige and power of the Sultan throughout the country. So, Great Britain was ultimately opposed to the Kemalist movement.

The intervention by the British filled the Sultan with enthusiasm. He immediately recalled former Prime Minister Damat Ferit from the Peace Con-

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ference and issued a decree by means of which Kemal and his associates were declared traitors and outlaws, were sentenced to death and a reward was posted for their arrest. The Sultan was thus openly siding with the British and against Kemal. The capital was in the hands of the British, the Parliament had been dissolved and most of its members had already been captured.

Kemal without any further hesitation announced new elections. The new delegates assembled in Ankara on 10 April 1920 and formed the Great National Assembly. They declared an Executive Committee and pronounced Kemal its president by unanimous decision. However, Kemal never requested to sever all relations with the National Assembly in Constantinople nor the deposition the Sultan. He merely assured the Turkish people and the Allies that only delegates appointed by the National Assembly at Ankara would be authorized to enter into negotiations and to ratify a peace treaty.

The Sultan at that point decided to put an end to this situation and ordered the minister of the army to organize a force to quell the rebellion and the *hoca* to encourage the people to take up arms against the Ankara rebels.

The ensuing events demonstrated the astuteness of the Sultan's judgment. All the peasants from the Bosporus to the Caucasus were mobilized and Turkey became a theater of a civil war with the expected consequences. Kemal's supporters defended fiercely, but the Sultan's partisan masses were closing in on Ankara. A division dispatched by Kemal from Nicomedia crossed lines and joined the Sultanate forces, while Turkish 24 Division was totally decimated and Turkish 15 Division at Samsun mutinied. Day by day Sultanate troops were gaining on the rebels in the provinces of Nicomedia, Prusa and Iconium among others. The few troops under Kemal's command started to lose their selfconfidence. Bands of irregulars refuse to take orders from Ankara. The Armenians in the east crossed the border with the objective to seize the provinces promised to them by the Allies. The Kurds in the provinces of Diyarbakir had rebelled. The French launched a counterattack in Cilicia and relieved their surrounded garrisons. The Greeks in the west were extending their zone of occupation. The civil war and the attacks of the foreign forces were tightening the noose around Ankara day by day. The Kemalist movement, only one year old was already in peril.

However, the Kemal nationalist revolution was to prevail in the end, due to the divergent policies of the Allies. So, the governments of France and Italy, each facing serious internal issues, were not in a position to maintain military forces in Asia Minor, were concerned about possible gains of the British in the Middle East and quickly turned to the Ankara government.

The ensuing events, not only stabilized Kemal's government, but also strengthened it in such a way that it managed to victoriously overpower the mutineers and confront the Greek forces in Asia Minor.

CHAPTER 2

Operations Towards Philadelphia, Prusa and Ushak

The Order to Advance

45. Following their final agreement at Paris in February 1920, the prime ministers of France and Great Britain met once again in March at London. The meeting was also attended by the prime minister of Italy. In this conference the prime ministers of France and Italy supported the Turkish claims and finally decided to cede Constantinople to Turkey.

On 5 April 1920 a new meeting with the same participants took place, in which the contents of a treaty outline with Turkey were agreed upon. According to this plan, the area of Smyrna would be ceded to Greece for a period of three years, with the option of a later final ratification. The Turks protested the terms of the future treaty, while the Allies warned the Greek government that they would not start a new war merely to enforce the terms of this treaty.

Turkish revolutionary activity in Thrace, but also in the sector of Nicomedia, whose security was the responsibility of the British, demonstrated the fact that the nationalist Kemalist movement tended to evolve into a great danger for the Allies as well. They faced the dilemma of whether to secure the signing and implementation of the treaty by the Turks by means of generous concessions, or, to insist on the initial agreed terms and enforce them even through the use of force, if necessary.

The French and the Italians opted for the first solution, whereas the British supported the need to dampen the severity of the terms. In these crucial moments, Greek Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos offered to make every possible effort to crush the Turkish reaction, which had manifested itself with the attack of Turkish forces against the British troops in Nicomedia. British Prime Minister Lloyd George accepted Venizelos' offer with great relief. The offensive activities of the Kemalist forces motivated the Allies, who were still in the stage of negotiations, to agree with the offensive of the Hellenic Army with the objective of the dissolution of Kemalists.

On 6 June 1920, following protracted deliberations among Lloyd George, Millerand (who, as of February of that year had succeeded Clemenceau as French prime minister), Venizelos and the Allied military representatives, the Supreme Allied Council finally allowed the Hellenic Army to advance and seize the railway line as far as Panormos, so as to ensure the freedom of the Straits of the Dardanelles.

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The following day, Venizelos disclosed the Allied Council decision to General Headquarters in Smyrna. He made clear that the operation should be conducted with the exclusive responsibility of the General Headquarters and on its own initiative, but nevertheless the representative of General Milne in Smyrna should be briefed.

The Allies would monitor the new Greek operations through their military representatives. The British and the Italian representatives were already in Smyrna, while their French counterpart had urgently left France on his way to Turkey.

Strength and Disposition of the Adversaries.
Preparation for the Advance

46. On the eve of the advance on 8 June, the Hellenic Army in Asia Minor comprised two army corps, one independent Infantry division, one Cavalry brigade and several Rear battalions.

Army Corps A, comprised of I and II Divisions, was deployed in the Maeander and Cayster River Valleys, while Smyrna Army Corps, comprising Archipelago and Smyrna Divisions and XIII Division, was deployed in the Hermus and Caïcus River valleys. The independent Cydoniae Division, along with the Cavalry Brigade served as General Headquarters reserves (Sketch-map 5).

All of the aforementioned forces, excluding the Rear battalions, comprised a total of fifty–two Infantry battalions, fourteen Cavalry companies, seventy–two Field Artillery, ninety–six Pack Artillery and thirty–six Heavy Artillery guns. Total strength of the Hellenic Army in Asia Minor was approximately 100,000 men, significantly outnumbering the Kemalist Turkish Army.

In June 1920, the Turkish Army was still suffering from the consequences of its defeat during World War I. Kemal's Nationalist movement had stirred up the military, but had limited impact on the Turkish masses.

On 8 June, the Turkish Army disposition opposite the Greek forces in Asia Minor was forty–two Infantry battalions, several bands of irregulars and fifty Artillery pieces, according to intelligence available at that time. Total strength was 42,250 men. However, these forces were smaller than they appeared in terms of enlisted men and guns. According to Turkish post–war sources, command of the western front was assigned to General Ali Fuat Pasha, prior to the Greek advance. The front was divided into three sectors. The northern sector was covered by Turkish 61 Division, with headquarters in Balikesir, Turkish 56 Division with headquarters in Prusa (in Turkish, Bursa), 175 Cavalry Regiment and an undetermined number of irregulars. The middle sector was covered by Turkish 23 Division, with headquarters in Afyon Karahisar and several bands of irregulars headed by Ethem Bey. The

southern sector was covered by Turkish 57 Division, with headquarters in Denizli and an undetermined number of irregulars led by Demirji Mehmet Efendi.

Opposite the Greek front in Asia Minor were thirty–six Infantry battalions, two Cavalry regiments, an undetermined number of irregulars and eighteen to twenty–four Artillery guns. Their strength did not exceed 20,000 men. Besides the forces mentioned above, the Turkish Army had six more army corps in Thrace and in the Asia Minor interior.

47. On 6 June, as he was waiting for the authorization for commencement of offensive operations, the Commander of the Hellenic Army issued a general order of operations, specifying the conduct of the advance of the Greek forces along two directions: One towards Philadelphia and other towards Axarium – Soma – Panormos. The first day of the advance the divisions of Army Corps A would operate as follows: I Division would advance having the line Koshk – Gelibolu as its objective in order to survey the passes from the direction of Nazilli and to cover the right flank of the II Division from the direction of Pazaryeri. II Division would operate towards Keles and from there onwards to Derekoy – Philadelphia.

The Smyrna Army Corps would advance to Axarium, its objectives as follows: The Smyrna Division would advance through the Hylus River valley. At the same time sections of II Division and the Archipelago Division would make an effort to encircle the Turkish forces deployed there. The main back of XIII Division would conduct operations towards Salihli, along with forces of Army Corps A. In the second day, these same forces of XIII Division were to be subordinated to Army Corps A and continue their advance to Philadelphia, cooperating with II Division.

The Cavalry Brigade would cover the left flank of XIII Division. Smyrna Army Corps would continue its advance in order to mop up in the areas of Axarium and Soma and would prepare further advance towards Balikesir.

Following the occupation of Philadelphia, General Headquarters had the intention to order an advance to Balikesir and from there on towards Panormos. This operation would be covered from the east by Army Corps A (I and II Divisions) and the Smyrna Division, which as of that day would be subordinated to Army Corps A on the front at Marmara – Adalar – Philadelphia. The Cydoniae Division would move forward to the area of Chambey, and would remain there as reserve of General Headquarters.

On 8 June, having in mind the possible capture of Panormos with a landing operation as well, the commander of the Hellenic Army ordered the immediate organization of the required landing force. This force was to comprise 27 Infantry Regiment from Thessalonica, one Infantry regiment and one Pack Artillery battalion from the Xanthe Division. Their transportation and

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landing would be implemented, subject to further orders by General Headquarters.

On the same day, General Headquarters set the following day (9 June 1920) as the day of commencement of advance. However, following a report of Army Corps A stating that the divisions were not ready yet, General Headquarters was obliged to postpone the advance by one day. Only Army Corps A and the main force of XIII Division would conduct operations in the morning of 9 June, without any support from II Division. For this reason 32 Infantry Regiment of Cydoniae was moved forward to Ahmetli, subordinated to XIII Division and assigned the protection of the division's right flank.

In executing the aforementioned General Headquarters order, the two army corps made all preparatory movements, assumed the required disposition and issued the appropriate orders.

The Attack on Axarium, Soma and Philadelphia

48. In the morning of 9 June 1920, the advance commenced, in accordance to the operations plan of General Headquarters. One detachment of XIII Division advanced eastwards to Philadelphia. Smyrna Army Corps, with the Smyrna and Archipelago Divisions and another detachment from XIII Division moved northwards to Axarium and Soma.

The detachment from XIII Division, which moved to Philadelphia occupied on that same day the town of Marmara. On 10 June, it neutralized weak enemy resistance and advanced up to the village of Adalar, where it deployed outposts. Smyrna Army Corps, which advanced to Axarium and Soma, occupied Axarium and by the evening it had reached the line Bozkoy – Palamut – Axarium. The following day it continued its advance and in the evening of 11 June it seized the towns of Soma and Elishler, after weak Turkish resistance. The Cydoniae Division seized the line Papazli – Ahmetli.

Army Corps A jumped off in the morning of 10 June. After crushing resolute Turkish resistance in a brief but fierce fight, it moved forward and deployed temporarily on the line Ovajik – Keles. On 11 June, with all three divisions in line formation, Army Corps A continued its advance eastwards and seized successively Derekoy, Mendechora and Philadelphia after brief battles. By the evening of that day it had deployed on the heights east of Philadelphia.

Confirmed Turkish casualties from the advance of the Greek forces to Philadelphia were 686 killed, abandoned on the battlefield and 808 prisoners. Greek casualties were three officers and fifty three enlisted men killed, twenty four officers and 165 enlisted men wounded.

Assessing that the continuation of their defense would be futile and dangerous against such superior Greek forces, the commander of the Turkish forces ordered their retirement to a new location. Turkish 23 Division and the

irregulars led by Ethem Bey fell back towards Ushak, Turkish 57 Division towards Saraykoy and Turkish 56 and 61 Divisions to Prusa.

Operations for the Capture of Panormos

49. Following the occupation of Philadelphia, the military objective of General Headquarters was to advance to Panormos (Sketchmap 5) with simultaneous cover from the east. In order to implement this objective, it issued the appropriate orders and took all required measures on time to secure communications and especially the railway line between Derekoy and Ahmetli.

On 13 June, following orders from General Headquarters, two groups of divisions were formed, the first one of which was to advance to the north and the other would cover it from the east. The first one, designated the North Group of Divisions directly under the command of the commander in chief himself comprised the Archipelago and Smyrna Divisions, XIII Division, the newly formed Cavalry Brigade (1 and 3 Cavalry Regiments) and 9 Field Artillery Regiment. The other group comprised the Cydoniae and Cretan Divisions under the command of Smyrna Army Corps.

The objective of the North Group was the dispersal of the Turkish forces in the areas of Giresun, Balikesir and Adramyttium, the capture of Panormos and then of Prusa. The occupation of Panormos would be combined with a landing operation by the Xanthe Division,which would be transported from Thrace. The third regiment (13 Infantry Regiment) of the Xanthe Division was to be transported to Chanakkale (Sketchmap 5) to support the British operation in the Dardanelles. Furthermore, 27 Infantry Regiment was allocated to the Smyrna Division, to relieve the organic 14 Infantry Regiment, which was assigned to the Field Army of Thrace. Commencement date for the operation was set for 16 June.

In the morning of that day the North Group of Divisions began its advance. By the evening of the next day (17 June), Balikesir, Mendechora, Koseler and the heights of Tash Pinar had been seized. The Turkish forces resisted briefly and then withdrew. 5/42 Evzone Regiment took 188 prisoners and approximately 500 were taken by 3 Cavalry Regiment, which also captured four Artillery pieces and an abundance of equipment.

After the capture of Balikesir, General Headquarters requested from the prime minister instructions for future operations, as it assessed that operations towards Panormos were expected to be quickly concluded. At the same time, it proposed the continuation of operations towards Eskishehir and Afyon Karahisar in order to stamp out the Kemalist nationalist movement completely. The prime minister responded to the General Headquarters request on 23 June, stressing that the occupation of eastern Thrace had an imperative priority before any other action.

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In the morning of 19 June, the North Group of Divisions moved forward to Demirkapi and Susurluk, while the Xanthe Division under the command of Major General Konstantinos Mazarakes landed on Panormos. The landing was conducted without any hindrance and the division then moved forward to the south. When it reached the railway station of Omerkoy (Sketchmap 6), it met the advance guard of the North Group of Divisions. These were followed by the occupation of Susurluk and Ahatkoy (west of Balikesir).

According to reports by the units, Turkish casualties about some 400 killed and 1250 prisoners. The casualties suffered by the North Group of Divisions were minimal, i.e. seven killed and fifty–four wounded.


The Occupation of Prusa

50. On 17 June 1920, seeking to crush the Kemalist forces, General Headquarters had proposed to the British Headquarters at Constantinople that the Hellenic Army occupy the area of Prusa (Sketchmaps 5, 6). Initially the British Headquarters did not approve the proposed plan. Only after the Kemalist forces attacked the British warships in the Bosporus did the British Headquarters start to adopt and to promote the idea of the capture of Prusa by the Greek forces. General Headquarters then decided to proceed, without any prior report of such a movement to the government. The Archipelago Division was assigned this operation, reinforced by an Infantry regiment, and one Field Artillery battalion. The division's operations would be conducted in conjunction with those of the Cavalry Brigade.

The Archipelago Division and the Cavalry Brigade advanced to Prusa on 23 June and by the evening had occupied Kremaste and Mihalichchik. The British had also occupied Mudanya through a landing operation on that day. The following day, on 24 June, the Greek forces continued their advance from the north and the south of Lake Artynia and gained contact with Turkish troops. In the morning of 25 June, the Cavalry Brigade, moving at the head of the column clashed with enemy forces. Its troops charging on foot made efforts to break through the Turkish defense positions of Minareli and Misikoy. The units of the Archipelago Division had started to arrive around noon, and its artillery opened up against the enemy positions.

Under pressure from the Greek forces, the Turks were overrun and withdrew hastily to Prusa. The Cavalry Brigade pursued them and at 1400 entered the city, still pursuing the enemy from there onwards to Kestel for fifteen more kilometers. The Archipelago Division moved to Prusa in three columns, overwhelmed the weak Turkish resistance and moved forward beyond the line formed by Kestel and Koru.

As soon as news reached him about the capture of Prusa, Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos reprimanded General Headquarters, because he



Sketchmap 6. The Landing at Panormos and the Occupation of Prusa, June 1920.

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had not been informed beforehand and had not authorized the operation. He also thought that Greek interests would be better served by the occupation of eastern Thrace instead.

In order to implement this objective, that is, the occupation of Thrace, it was decided that the Xanthe and Smyrna Divisions and the Cavalry Brigade be employed.

51. Following the capture of Prusa, it was assessed that the Asia Minor operations were concluded. Furthermore, new boundaries of the zones of responsibility for the army corps were fixed, as follows:

Army Corps A Zone (I, II Divisions and Cydoniae Division): Maeander River was the boundary to the south and the line formed by the villages Sidirji and Papazli (north of Kasaba) was the boundary to the north.

Smyrna Army Corps Zone (XIII Divisions and Archipelago Division): from the northern border of Army Corps A's Zone, with Propontis as its northern boundary.

At the same time, General Headquarters established five more Rear battalions, in addition to the two already existing in Smyrna for transportation and rear areas security. The Security Regiment at Smyrna was augmented to full combat regiment and was redesignated 17 Infantry Regiment. This regiment along with 18 Infantry Regiment and 9 Cretan Regiment, the Pack Artillery and other units of the Cretan Division established a new division, designated the Magnesia Division, under the command of Colonel (Inf) Antonios Papanikolaou and subordinated directly to General Headquarters.

Operations towards Demirji and Simav

52. At the end of June the Cydoniae Division assumed the mission of mopping up the area of Demirji (Sketchmap 5). The division assigned this task to one of its regiments reinforced with a Pack Artillery battalion. This mission was accomplished by 15 July. The intention of the division was to withdraw its forces to their initial positions. However, this withdrawal was suspended when intelligence was received according to which strong Turkish forces were moving forward.

Actually, on 18 July, Turkish forces of about 2,400 men with three Artillery pieces attacked the Greek battalion at the village Demirji. The battalion resisted resolutely but threatened by encirclement, it was forced to withdraw towards the village of Bolu, arriving there the next day. The casualties of the battalion were heavy: forty–seven enlisted men killed, four officers and eighty–nine enlisted men wounded and thirty–seven enlisted men missing.

When the division was informed of these events, it forwarded two more battalions to Bolu. In the morning of 19 July, the commander of the division arrived at Bolu too, and after he had estimated the situation he briefed General Headquarters about the events and proposed the deployment of an Infantry regiment on the Chatal Tepe heights, eight kilometers to the south of Bolu. He also proposed the recall of the other units in the area to Salihli. However the General Headquarters had already decided to recapture Demirji employing the Cydoniae Division, which was reinforced for that task with one detachment from II Division, 9 Cretan Regiment from Magnesia, one Cavalry platoon and one Artillery battery. On 20 July the detachment from II Division comprising three Infantry battalions and a Pack Artillery platoon, under the command of the commander of 1 Infantry Regiment moved forward to positions 15 kilometers north of Kula village. In the meantime the Cydoniae Division had assembled at Bolu and was tactically assigned to Army Corps A for the operations towards Demirji and Simav.

In the morning of 21 July the Greek forces began their advance towards Demirji in three columns. The central column comprising the Cydoniae Division moved from Bolu to Demirji and by the evening had reached Han Chatal Uluk, without meeting any enemy resistance. The following day it resumed its movement. Having overrun a 300–man Turkish force, it reached Demirji and recaptured it. In the engagement, Divisional Commander Major General Alexandros Othonaios was wounded.

The right column comprising the detachment of II Division advanced to Demirji as well. North of the village of Uzamish, it clashed with minor bands of irregulars and remained ten kilometers south of Demirji, instead of continuing its movement.

The left column comprising 9 Cretan Regiment advanced to Demirji, following a lateral route. On 22 July it was informed of the recapture of Demirji and temporarily suspended its movement. It entered the village the following day. During the operations towards Demirji conducted by the Cydoniae Division and the detachments subordinated to it, XIII Division covered the whole operation from the north and the northwest.

The recapture of Demirji was easily achieved, but the major part of the Turkish forces had retired to Simav on time.

On 20 July General Headquarters had decided along with the recapture of Demirji to conduct mop–up operations throughout the area between the line of occupation formed by Simav, Ushak and Buldan, in order to prevent the recurrence of events similar to those at Demirji.

Somehow misunderstanding this decision, Army Corps A ordered I Division to advance as soon as possible up to the line Maeander River – Saraykoy, in order to cover the effort of II Division to seize Ushak. Upon being

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informed of this decision, General Headquarters notified Army Corps A that its decision concerned the mop–up of said area and not its capture and subsequent occupation. Then on 22 July, following information that there was an assembly of Turkish forces of 1,000 to 1,200 men in Yenikoy, fifteen kilometers north of Demirji, it ordered the Cydoniae Division to invade the Simav Plateau. It would be aided in case of emergency by two battalions and the Artillery of XIII Division assembled in Sidirji.

53. In the morning of 23 July, I Division advanced to Ortanja. Due to a new decision of the General Headquarters for the suspension of operations towards Ushak, the division returned around midnight to Kogujak (Sketch-maps 5, 7).

On the following day, on 24 July, the Cydoniae Division at Demirji sent forward the detachment from 9 Cretan Regiment to Yenikoy. The command of the division was assigned to Colonel (Inf) Panagiotes Gargalides (who became Major General in 27 July 1920) that day, who suggested to Army Corps A to temporarily suspend the operation of the division, so that he may personally determine the manner of its conduct. His proposal was approved. Yenikoy, however, had already been seized by 9 Cretan Regiment. Army Corps A also ordered the return of the detachment of II Division from Demirji in order to join in the operations towards Ushak. The detachment departed on 25 July and arrived at Kula the following day. Since it regarded the capture of the Simav Plateau as indispensable for the conduct of operations towards Ushak, General Headquarters, in the meantime, ordered the Cydoniae Division to advance immediately to Simav on 28 July. Once again, however, the Cydoniae Division requested postponement, as it had to replenish its equipment. Army Corps A approved a postponement for a few days, but, nevertheless, ordered 9 Cretan Regiment to advance to Bigadich.

Despite the postponement of the operation for Simav, on 1 August 1920 the Cydoniae Division, upon receiving information that a Turkish force of 1200 infantry and two guns occupied the Simav Dag ridge line (southwest of Simav), launched an attack against it with a joint detachment of five Infantry battalions and a Pack Artillery battalion, and seized it. The operations of the detachment commenced in the morning from the direction of Demirji and around 1000, it gained contact with the Turkish force, occupying the Simav Dag range. A fierce attack was launched and by 1200 the detachment had completed the capture of the range. The casualties suffered by the Greek forces were five men wounded, whereas the Turks left ten killed on the field. The detachment then pursued the Turks, who put up a strong defense on the way out of the Asharkoy Defile, but finally were driven back beyond the village by the same name.

The Cydoniae Division organized a detachment from 32 Infantry Regiment with Artillery, which was assigned the mission to hold Demirji, while the rest of the forces returned to Salihli on 6 August. The range line of Simav Dag was abandoned, since supply was impossible, due to the great distance from Salihli (130 kilometers) and the lack of any road suitable for vehicles. At 0500 of 7 August four Turkish columns 500 strong each supported by Artillery, launched an attack along the whole front of the detachment of 32 Infantry Regiment. The fight was fierce and the detachment managed to check the day–long Turkish attack with a counterattack launched at 1500. The Turkish efforts continued throughout that day.

The Command of the division was located in Han Chatal Uluk. As soon it was informed of the events in Demirji, the division suspended the march of its columns to Bolu and reinforced the detachment at Demirji with one battalion and one Artillery battery. At the same time it ordered that all divisional forces located further to the south return to Han Chatal Uluk. The Turks were reinforced in the course of the night and at dawn of the next day resumed their attack. The detachment strongly resisted and managed to repel the Turkish attack and to hold its positions. In this two–day battle the casualties suffered by the detachment were eight enlisted men killed, three officers and seventy four enlisted men wounded. The Turks left 150 killed on the battlefield while five were taken prisoner. The latter yielded the information that the strength of the attacking forces was 3,600 men with three guns, Approximately 2,000 of these were under the command of Ethem Bey.

The Treaty of Sevres

54. On 22 July 1920, following the successful operations of the Greek forces in June and July 1920, the Turkish government in Constantinople agreed to accept the Peace Treaty terms, submitted on 11 May 1920 to the Turkish delegation in Paris. So, on 10 August 1920, the Peace Treaty of Sevres was signed in the Paris suburb by the same name, by virtue of which the state of war between the victors of the First World War and Turkey was terminated. This state of war already had ended formally and in a sense for all the Allies, except Greece, much earlier. The Prime Minister of the Sultanate Government Damat Ferit agreed to sign the Treaty of Sevres. Greece was in difficult position, since most of the terms of the Treaty, especially those involving Greek interests could only be implemented by force of arms against the Kemalists. Therefore, the implementation of this Treaty depended on the success of the operations of the Hellenic Army in Asia Minor. Furthermore, Greece was forced to face reactions by France and Italy. Although they had signed a treaty they essentially did not want, France and Italy each hoped quietly for its future annulment. As a consequence, while the British government and especially Prime Minister Lloyd George supported the Treaty of Sevres, the governments of France and Italy showed little sign of abiding by

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its terms. Overall the Allies judged the terms of this treaty unrealistic and forecasts about its implementation were inauspicious.

Other diplomatic treaties were signed at the same time with the Treaty of Sevres, including a Greek–Italian agreement on the status of the Dodecanese Islands, the agreement concerning the protection of ethnic minorities in the territories occupied by Greece and the agreement on Thrace. By virtue of the latter, all rights to the territory concerning Thrace were granted to Greece. These rights had been conceded by Bulgaria to the Allies, by virtue of the Treaty of Neuilly signed on 27 November 1919.

Eventually, no parliament in any of the Allied countries ever ratified the Treaty of Sevres, with the exception of the Greek Parliament. The Turkish Parliament followed suit and did not ratify the Treaty.

Pursuant to the Treaty of Sevres, new Turkish borders were drawn in Europe and Asia. Turkey conceded all rights to eastern Thrace, Imbros and Tenedos in favor of Greece, except for the areas of Constantinople and Chatalca. With respect to the Asia Minor lands, the area of Smyrna would remain under Turkish sovereignty. Turkey was to concede to Greece the exercise of its sovereign rights. Assuming the administration of this territory, Greece had the obligation to oversee the session of a local assembly, a form of local legislature, in which the various ethnic groups would be freely represented. After a period of five years, this parliament would be entitled to pass a resolution, requesting from the Council of the League of Nations the incorporation of this area into the Kingdom of Greece. At that time all Turkish sovereignty would end.

Turkey would also concede all rights on the Aegean Islands, under Italian occupation, including Kastellorizo, in favor of Italy. Arabia, Syria, Mesopotamia and Palestine would all secede from Turkey and become independent states under League of Nations mandate administration. Armenia would be recognized as an independent state, but its borders would be subject to a subsequent agreement. Constantinople would remain the capital of Turkey. The Hellespont and the Bosporus Straits were to be demilitarized and open to navigation, both in war and peace. The strength of the Turkish Armed Forces would have to be restricted to 50,000 men, including their cadre.

55. Two days after the signing of the Treaty of Sevres, an assassination attempt against Greek Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos by two Greek discharged officers took place at the Lyon railroad station on his way back to Greece. The prime minister narrowly escaped with light wounds. No sooner had the news of the assassination attempt reached Athens than it stirred the reactions of extremist circles, who retaliated by killing Ion Dragoumes, a notable member of the sixteen member committee of opposition parties.

A few days after his arrival at Athens, Prime Minister Venizelos announced the holding of elections. On 17 September, King Alexander of the Hellenes was bitten by a monkey and finally succumbed on 12 October 1920, despite the diligent efforts of the medical team. As a consequence, elections were postponed until 1 November. The Parliament offered the throne to Crown Prince Paulos, then residing in Switzerland. Paulos, however, never accepted the Crown. Parliament appointed Admiral Paulos Kountouriotes to the Viceroyalty of Greece.

In the meantime, the Allied Commissioners in Constantinople had submitted a communique to the Sublime Porte, requesting the immediate ratification of the Treaty of Sevres with an Imperial *Irade* (Imperial Order)

The Turkish government under Prime Minister Tefik Pasha expedited its negotiations with the Kemalist Nationalists and at the same time submitted the following response to the communique of the Commissioners:

> *The Sublime Porte expresses its regret at not being in a position to comply with the request by the High Commissioners, concerning ratification of the Treaty of Sevres with an Imperial* Irade, *since such an action is not expedient at the moment, due to ongoing peace negotiations in the East, for which so much effort is presently being expended, but assures that its ratification will be feasible only posterior to agreement with the executives in Ankara.*

At the end of August 1920, Greek General Headquarters was convinced the government of Mustafa Kemal in Ankara had no intention to honor the Treaty of Sevres. On the contrary, there was remarkable rise in the activities involving the organization of the resistance.

According to the view of General Headquarters, there was only one way to neutralize the nationalist movement and achieve the restoration of peace in Asia Minor: the advance of the Hellenic Army and the capture of the vital centers of Eskishehir, Afyon Karahisar and Ankara, even of Iconium, if need be. The reasons dictating such an advance were the following:

– The great military importance of the communication junctions of Eskishehir and Afyon Karahisar for the Turks.

– The great political significance and the effect on morale that the capture of such centers would entail.

– The enormous advantages for the Greek forces resulting from the capture of the said centers.

The advance to Iconium would also serve the general Allied interests regarding the freedom of operation of the railway line Constantinople – Adana – Cilicia, the furthest part of which was under French control.

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Operations towards Ushak and Gediz

56. Confronted with the prospect of conducting operations with the major part of its forces towards Afyon Karahisar and Eskishehir, General Headquarters reallocated its forces as follows: The Magnesia Division was transported by rail between 1 and 5 August from Magnesia to Balikesir to relieve XIII Division encamped there. The latter, with the exception of 5/42 Evzone Regiment which occupied the centers of resistance at Kremaste and Kepsut and one battalion at Sidirji, was transported during the same period to Salihli.

On 6 August XIII Division was subordinated to Army Corps A, in order to relieve the Cydoniae Division, which would assemble at Salihli for reorganization. The latter was subordinated to Army Corps B, whose first echelons started to arrive at Smyrna from Patras on 3 August. The transportation of Army Corps B Headquarters under the command of Major General Perikles Mauromichales Pierrakos was completed in the morning of 5 August. III Division, under the command of Major General Nikolaos Trikoupes, arrived also at Smyrna from Patras together with Army Corps B.

Following completion of its transportation, Army Corps B III Division and the Cydoniae Division from the day it would assemble at Salihli. The assembly of the division, however, did not take place, due to the Turkish attack on 7 and 8 August against its organic 32 Infantry Regiment at Demirji. As a result second thoughts prevailed for the final occupation of the area Simav, Ushak and Buldan, and thus the order for the relief of the Cydoniae Division was cancelled.

On 9 August General Headquarters ordered Army Corps A to capture Ushak and Gediz (Sketchmaps 5, 7), while at the same time the Cydoniae Division would maintain an active defense stance against the Turkish forces at Simav. For this reason XIII Division was ordered to relocate from Salihli to the area of Guney and Elvanlar and II Division to Elehen in order for both to move forward to Ushak. At the same time I Division would move forward to the west bank of the Maeander River, after having assembled at Kogujak.

On 10 August the reestablishment of the Cavalry Brigade was implemented in Smyrna which now comprised 1 and 3 Cavalry Regiments, one machine gun battalion and one Field Artillery battery. The following day the brigade relocated to the area of Kasaba and Ahmetli.

57. Prior to its advance to Ushak with the bulk of its forces, Army Corps A sent forward I Division to Ortanja to cover its right flank. From the morning of 13 August, the division advanced its two columns in line and reached Ortanja later in the evening without incident. The following day it resumed its movement in one column and occupied a line ten kilometers southeast of Ortanja on the western bank of the Maeander River.

The advance of the bulk of Army Corps A towards Ushak began in the morning of 15 August. Its headquarters had moved the previous day in Philadelphia. XIII Division advanced to Itejik Dag from the area of Elvanlar in two columns. The east column reached unhindered a position four kilometers to the east of Kirkoy at 2000. After a tedious march, the west column reached positions two kilometers southwest of Saraykoy at 2200.

I Division advanced to Karakuyu in two columns, each one of regiment strength. After reaching Gobek and deploying a battalion there, the east column advanced to Koseler. The west column moved almost immediately north of the railway line. After overrunning minor enemy resistance, it reached Kara Hasan.

The following day (16 August), Army Corps A continued its advance to Ushak with II and XIII Division, while I Division occupied Aydash. II Division advanced in two columns, as it had done the previous day. The east column moved from Koseler to Ortakoy. The west column moved forward to Ushak, marching along the railway line. Around the Karakuyu railroad station, the column received infantry and artillery fire from the area of Kirkoy. Following a brief engagement, the Turkish sections were overrun and retreated back to Ushak. Realizing that there were trains in the railway station about to depart, the commander of II Division ordered its immediate capture, which was implemented without hindrance. Later, around 0930, the Greek troops seized the city of Ushak and pursued the Turks, who retreated northwards.

In the meantime, the east column overran weak Turkish resistance and reached Hojalar. There it detected the withdrawal of the Turks and expedited its movement in order to intercept them. The pursuit continued as far as the village of Karlik, from where the column returned to Kapaklar. In the evening of 16 August, II Division occupied the line Kapaklar – Ortakoy – heights north of Ushak.

The east column in contact with the defensive position of Kirkoy moved to the direction of Ushak. Fighting against and overpowering several enemy centers of resistance it entered Ushak at 1000. The west column advanced towards the village of Mantash. North of Saraykoy, it met Turkish forces of battalion strength, attacked them and after a brief clash, the Turks took flight, abandoning guns. The column then advanced to Mantash, where it deployed temporarily.

The casualties of Army Corps A from this new operation to Ushak were two killed and nine wounded. The Turks abandoned on the battlefield 160 killed, 263 prisoners, seven guns and an abundance of equipment.

58. On 17 August II Division remained in Ushak, while XIII Division moved to and arrived at Inehan (Sketchmap 7), without a battle. The following day the division continued its advance in one column. South of Han, its

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advance guard gained contact with the rear guard of the Turkish column, withdrawing to Gediz and captured a number of prisoners. In the evening, the division encamped at Han, deploying outposts a little to the north.

On 19 August, XIII Division remained at Han while the detachment of 32 Infantry Regiment of the Cydoniae Division at Demirji was subordinated to it with mission to conduct operations from the west towards Simav and Gediz. The detachment moved in the morning of that day and around 1800 arrived at Simav, following a fourteen–hour march. The Turkish troops there ran the risk of being encircled, and so, they withdrew hastily.

The following day, 20 August, XIII Division maintained its position and established liaison with the detachment of 32 Infantry Regiment at Simav. The attack against Gediz planned for 21 August was postponed for the following day, due to the delayed movement of the aforementioned detachment from Simav to Derekoy.

In the morning of 22 August, XIII Division, in cooperation with the detachment of 32 Infantry Regiment, moved forward in two columns from Han to Gediz, while a flank guard covered the main force from the east. The flank guard initially overran a small Turkish mounted section and then another column of 300 cavalrymen, which had hastened to the aid of the first group. A short while later, it drove off approximately 500 mounted cavalrymen, who occupied the village of Gumush and then resumed its movement to the north of Kuzu Kolu.

Regarding the advance of the aforementioned two columns, the east one followed the carriage road and at 1300 it captured the saddle northeast of Gediz, after having easily driven back the Turkish troops there. The west one followed the route immediately left of the carriage road and at 1000 captured the junction on the Gediz – Idis road without resistance. The Turks hastily fell back to the north in order to avoid their encirclement.

After overrunning Turkish sections east of Idis and leaving a battalion there, the Detachment of 32 Infantry Regiment, which moved from Derekoy, attacked the Turks, who held positions southwest of Jonuslar and forced them to retreat to the north. Following the capture of Gediz, XIII Division deployed defensively there.

On 26 August, Army Corps A with headquarters at Philadelphia reallocated its zone of responsibility in three sectors, one for each division, with I Division headquarters at Buldan, II Division at Ushak and XIII Division at Gediz.

At the same time that Army Corps A was conducting operations towards Ushak and Gediz, Army Corps B conducted the organization of III Division and the non–divisional units. From 18 August it was assigned the surveillance of the zone bordered by the boundary of the Rear Zone, the line

Mendechora – Demirji Dag, the boundary of the British Occupation Zone of the Dardanelles and Lake Artynia (Apollonia). It was also reinforced with the Magnesia Division and three Rear Area battalions, that were stationed in its zone of responsibility.

On 25 August, Army Corps B was assigned the security of the railway line beyond the Rear Zone up to Panormos and Philadelphia. At the same it was reinforced with the Cydoniae Division, which was ordered to assemble at Salihli, in order to relieve the Magnesia Division, which would be transported to Nicomedia (Sketchmap 5). For this reason III Division was ordered to assemble at Soma. The latter left at Magnesia one of its regiments. After 26 August, the division gradually relocated the rest of its forces to the area of Soma – Susurluk.

From 29 and 30 August, the Cydoniae Division assembled from the area of Demirji to Bolu and Salihli. One battalion remained at Demirji and the detachment of 32 Infantry Regiment at Gediz. The supply of these units was conducted along the sole macadam road Ushak – Han – Simav or Gediz.

On 1 September the three Rear Area battalions were redesignated as three Rear Area regiments. The command post of 1 Rear Area Regiment was in Smyrna, of the 2 in Magnesia and of the 3 at Balikesir.

59. In June 20 the British had requested a Greek division from the Greek prime minister in order to secure the Nicomedia Peninsula and the southern coast of the Dardanelles. However, following the advance of the Hellenic Army to Panormos and Prusa, the Straits were secure. The Xanthe Division that had landed at Panormos minus one of its regiments that had landed at Chanakkale, returned to Thrace. In the first third of July, 16 Infantry Regiment of the Magnesia Division was transported to Nicomedia.

On 22 August, Greek Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos arrived at the port of Smyrna, to resolve certain civic and military matters. In a conference after his arrival among other matters, the dispatch of the Magnesia Division to Nicomedia was decided. Following its assembly at Panormos, the division commenced its transportation to Nicomedia on 3 September, and on 24 September relieved the British 242 Brigade encamped there.

On 10 September a few days after the declaration of the upcoming parliamentary election in Greece it was decided to transport the Cydoniae Division to mainland Greece and to dispatch from the interior to Asia Minor the Cretan Division under Major General Euthymios Tsimikales. From the Cydoniae Division, only its Headquarters, three Infantry regiments (without their pack transportation) and one machine gun company from each regiment would be moved. One battalion of the Smyrna Security Regiment was temporarily assigned the security of the zone of responsibility of the Cydoniae Division. All other men from the establishment of the regiments of the divi-

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sion were attached to this battalion. The transportation of this division was completed on 16 September 1920.

The Crete Division, then in Athens, comprised only 7 and 8 Cretan Regiments with reduced strength. It was transported on 21 September to Smyrna and then on 24 September to Salihli, where it was subordinated to Army Corps B. Upon its arrival at Smyrna, the strength of the division was fifty–two officers, 379 enlisted men and thirty–eight pack animals. Its war establishment was completed with the gradual induction of troops from the Cydoniae Division that remained in Asia Minor, from the battalion of the Security Regiment and 563 enlisted men of class 1921 from the Regimental Depot of II Division. Thus, on 3 October the total strength of the division was 165 officers, 6,017 enlisted men and 2,682 pack animals. The mission assigned to the division was that of the Cydoniae Division prior to its departure.

Turkish Attacks against Prusa and Gediz. The Battle of Han

60. Up to the establishment of Smyrna Army Corps Headquarters at Panormos on 16 October, Turkish activities in the sector of Kios (Gemlik) and Prusa were limited to the establishment of guard posts opposite the positions of the Smyrna and Archipelago Divisions. On 17 August the Turks began to mount raids against the Greek lines. This led to the decision to move IX Division from Thrace to Prusa, to establish outposts in a more advanced line and to conduct mop–up operations in the area of Kios and Prusa.

Although the movement of IX Division was cancelled in order to assist in the maintenance of order during Greek elections, on 25 and 26 August the Smyrna Army Corps moved its outposts forward thirty to forty kilometers east of Prusa.

On 19 September, three detachments comprising troops of both the Smyrna and Archipelago Divisions moved from the north and south of Lake Askoy, and reached Nicaea, after having overrun the weak resistance of approximately 200 Turkish irregulars. The detachments returned to their line of departure on 23 September unhindered.

Three days later, on 26 September, the Turks assembled sufficient troops opposite the Smyrna Army Corps. The following day a force of about 500 men launched an attack against the extreme right of the Archipelago Division, which was quickly repelled without any further serious problems.

On 4 October 5 Regiment of the Archipelago Division was transported to Patras in order to maintain order during the election period.

During the same period, the Turks moved 24 Infantry Division forward to the area Inegol and Yenishehir with the intention of conducting major offensive operations. Turkish 11 and 61 Divisions assembled in the areas of Eskishehir and Kutahya. While other Turkish forces were conducting offen-

sive operations against Gediz, in the morning of 11 October, there was intense Turkish activity with Artillery and Infantry fire against the Archipelago and Smyrna Divisions. Then the Turks launched successive attacks against the right sector of the Smyrna Division, but were all repulsed with timely and successful counterattacks. The Turks suffered heavy casualties in these attacks. Twenty–three were taken prisoner, including a battalion commander, who was carrying an attack plan of Turkish 24 Division for the capture of Prusa. Following this, Smyrna Army Corps decided to conduct mop–up operations in the area as far as the line Inegol – Yenishehir.

In the morning of 24 October, the Archipelago Division attacked. The Turkish forces opposite its front were overrun and forced to retreat. Sixty prisoners were taken and two artillery guns and two machine guns were captured. On the battlefield were found fifty–three Turks killed, including five officers.

In the meantime, the Smyrna Division moved to the east with three battalions, which managed to overpower the Turkish forces there and to capture fourteen men. Around 1800 the battalions returned to their initial positions.

The same day the detachment of the Smyrna Division at Karamursel was attacked by approximately 500 irregulars. The Turks retired, after being successfully repelled. The contribution of destroyer *Thyella* was decisive in her support of the Greek troops with her guns.

Intending to mop up the area, Smyrna Army Corps moved its divisions eastwards on 14 October. Smyrna Division advanced to Yenishehir, seizing it at 0830, after minor Turkish resistance and resumed its movement to Rustem. It had overrun all enemy resistance by the evening and had reached the line formed by Pabujak and Rustem. Approximately 100 Turks were taken prisoners.

The Archipelago Division moved with four battalions towards Inegol and seized it at 0830. The Turks put up minor resistance. On 19 October the divisions returned to their initial positions.

61. During September and the first third of October, no major operation was conducted in the zone of responsibility of Army Corps A, which had the following disposition (Sketchmap 7): Headquarters and most of the non–divisional units were encamped at Philadelphia. I Division was in the area of Buldan, with five battalions along the frontline and four others as reserves. I Division assembled in the area of Ushak with comparable disposition. XIII Division assembled in the area of Gediz and assigned five battalions along the frontline and another as reserve. The remaining three battalions (5/42 Evzone Regiment) were marching from Elvanlar and Philadelphia to Ushak.

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The gaps among the army corps divisions were tens of kilometers wide. The total width of the front from Nazilli to Gediz was approximately 120 kilometers on a straight line. The Turks, on the other hand, had 1,200 men opposite I Division, 5,000 men and sixteen guns opposite II Division and 2,900 men and eight guns opposite XIII Division. Furthermore Turkish 61 Division and almost 2,000 irregulars under Ethem Bey were encamped in the area of Kutahya.

In early October calm prevailed in the sector of XIII Division. However, at 0730 on 11 October, a major Turkish offensive was launched by two divisions and many bands of irregulars. The main effort was directed against Doshejik Dag and neighboring troops of the front. The thick fog at the time did not allow a precise assessment of the enemy force, but judging from the density of Turkish fire it was estimated as strong. Around 0900 the division ordered its battalion on the Simav saddle to return to Han, because communications between Simav and Ushak were cut off. Telegraphic communications between Gediz and Han were also interrupted after 0930. A little later two Turkish columns with 300 men each under Artillery support moved from the valley between Murat Dag and Gumush to the road linking Gediz with Han., where they deployed at 1100, cutting off communication between the two. The intensity of the Turkish offensive reached its peak at noon, when XIII Division launched a counterattack with two companies and managed to finally check it.

Around 1400 the division made the effort to restore communications between Gediz and Han, without success. Furthermore at 1700 its wireless failed to establish liaison with Army Corps A and its neighboring II Division due to weather conditions.

At 1800 the Turks resumed their assault against Doshejik Dag, with no success. Despite these events, the situation of XIII Division was distressing. There was a shortage of ammunition and the division ignored the situation in Han, due to lack of communications. At 2030 the Cavalry of XIII Division reconnoitered the road connecting Gediz and Han and discovered that it was still occupied by the enemy. It reported this intelligence to the division at midnight, immediately after accomplishing its mission. Under these difficult circumstances XIII Division started to withdraw from Gediz to Han. The retreating troops reached Han in the morning hours of 12 October without any harassment by the Turks. They deployed outposts approximately three kilometers to the north. XIII Division reported the events to Army Corps A and its casualties which amounted to one officer and twenty–five enlisted men killed, five officers and sixty–three enlisted men wounded and two enlisted men missing in action.

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62. Army Corps A, not having any liaison with XIII Division, on 11 October ordered 5/42 Evzone Regiment (of XIII Division) to expedite its movement to Ushak and II Division to conduct an offensive towards Han. As soon as it received the report by XIII Division from Han, Army Corps A cancelled this order and ordered XIII Division to fall back in the area of Inehan where the prospects for wintering were better. The troops of II Division, that had moved towards Han, returned to the line of departure on 13 October (Sketchmap 5).

On 12 October, XIII Division found out, through reconnaissance made by mounted troops, that the Turks had been assembling forces nine kilometers north of Han. The following day it sent forward one battalion and drove back the Turkish forces, comprising 500 mounted cavalrymen and two Infantry companies. That day II Division moved forward two detachments to secure the railway line running through Philadelphia and Ushak. The detachment north of the rail line captured the village of Karlik after minor resistance and took a few prisoners. The detachment sent south of the line clashed with a Turkish force of approximately 600 infantrymen at Kirka, and forced them to retreat.

At noon of 13 October, Army Corps A, following the orders of the General Headquarters cancelled the withdrawal of XIII Division and ordered it to recapture Gediz as soon as 5/42 Evzone Regiment arrived. On 14 October mounted troops of the division made reconnaissance and found that the heights along the road north of Han were occupied by strong Turkish forces. At 1600 of the same day the Turks launched an attack along the whole line of the outposts of 2 Infantry Regiment, northwest of Gediz. The attack was suspended two hours later without accomplishing any positive result.

A little later the Turks launched renewed successive attacks, that lasted until midnight. After being initially repulsed, the Turks succeeded in penetrating into the area between 2 Infantry Regiment and the positions of the battalion deployed, three kilometers east of Han and to advance up to a point one thousand meters away from XIII Division Headquarters, just south of Han. A reserve battalion counterattacked, supported by a charge of the entire left flank of the division's disposition. The Turks were overrun and suffered heavy casualties.

In the morning of 15 October the outposts of the division moved forward approximately nine kilometers north of Han, where they clashed with Turkish troops, which were dispersed, leaving fifteen prisoners, four machine guns and six pack animals. 5/42 Evzone Regiment (minus one battalion) along with an Artillery battery of II Division reached Han at noon, after a forced march during the night.

The casualties suffered by XIII Division in the Battle at Han were sixteen men killed, including one officer and forty–five wounded. Turkish casualties were 157 killed and 100 prisoners.

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The total forces participating in the Battles at Han and Gediz were a Turkish Group of Divisions under the command of Ali Fuat Pasha, which included Turkish 61 Division (2,000–2,500 men), Turkish 11 Division (2,500 men), 168 Infantry Regiment (800 men), one assault battalion as well as various bands of irregulars comprising 400 infantry and 1,500 cavalrymen led by Ethem Bey. The total strength of the Turks was 7,500 men, with twenty–nine machine guns and eighteen artillery pieces. It was the first large–scale well organized offensive by the Kemalist forces.

63. The Turkish attacks on XIII Division and the information concerning the assembly of major Turkish forces opposite II Division were a clear indication of the Turkish intentions to capture Ushak. To counter this, Army Corps A ordered the preemptive establishment of a detachment of three Infantry battalions and a Pack Artillery battalion of I Division led by the commander of 4 Infantry Regiment which would be forwarded to reinforce II Division.

On 15 October, upon the return of 5/42 Evzone Regiment to XIII Division, Army Corps A decided to reinforce the XIII Division with two batteries of the II Division and to combine the division's offensive operations towards Gediz with an offensive by II Division towards Banaz. II Division would be reinforced by the aforementioned detachment of I Division. The objective of this second operation would be mainly the pinning down of the Turkish forces at the front of II Division and the interdiction of their movement to Gediz, which was the main objective.

In the morning of 18 October both divisions launched their planned attack: XIII Division against Gediz and II Division against Banaz and Ahatkoy (Sketchmap 7). II Division moved to the east with three detachments. The left detachment of one regiment advanced to Banaz and following brief struggle reached the line Banaz – Islamkoy. The middle detachment, one Infantry battalion, initially assembled at Kapaklar and made an effort to engage the Turkish forces there, aiming at providing enough time for the right detachment to conduct a flanking movement. It then moved forward to Erjiyes. The right detachment (Detachment of I Division) advanced towards Ahatkoy, where it arrived after a brief clash, having captured a number of prisoners and a gun.

In this operation II Division faced Turkish 23 Division in the area of Derbent and Banaz, Turkish 8 Division at Ahatkoy and 7 Cavalry Division at Islamkoy. The casualties suffered by the division were one killed and ten wounded, whereas the Turks suffered 300 killed and 180 prisoners.

XIII Division, on the other hand, advanced from Han in three columns, each of regimental strength. It occupied Gediz without resistance and at 1200 the saddle to the northeast. The following day the whole area

around Gediz was covered by snow, which created serious problems for the further occupation by the division of such an advanced line.

On the same day, 19 October detachments from II Division returned to their initial locations of encampment under torrential rain, while the area of Banaz was also covered by snow.

On 29 October upon orders of General Headquarters, XIII Division moved to the area of Inehan, reaching it in the evening of the 31. On 4 November, informed that enemy forces were assembled opposite Ushak, Army Corps A requested its abandonment and the deployment of the army corps on the line Kula – Elvanlar – Aydash – Maeander River. The proposal was rejected by General Headquarters. On 6 November XIII Division was deployed on the line Selaoglu – Mantash, so that it would be aligned to the line of the outposts II Division which was deployed further to the east.

The operations in October 1920, almost two months after the large–scale operation by the Hellenic Army demonstrated that the Kemalist army was still weak, but certainly in much better condition in terms of organization and combat effectiveness. Through the June to August operations, it was assessed by the Greek officers and by the Allies that the Turks suffered such severe casualties in personnel and equipment, that a long time was needed to stand on their own feet again. However, news to the contrary soon came in. The continuous attack operations and engagement by the Kemalist Army against the Hellenic Army positions throughout the front and especially the well organized attack against XIII Division at Gediz proved how wrong the aforementioned assessment was.

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CHAPTER 3

The Strategic Reconnaissance in December 1920

The Political Shift in Greece

64. The elections announced right after the return of Eleutherios Venizelos from Paris to Athens, were held on 1 November 1920. The opposition won the elections and a new government was formed on 4 November under Prime Minister Demetrios Ralles. A few days later Queen Mother Olga was appointed as Viceroy.

The following day of the inauguration of the new government, Commander in Chief Leonidas Paraskevopoulos asked to be relieved. His request was satisfied and Lieutenant General Anastasios Papoulas was the government's choice for the post. The instructions given him primarily involved the execution of command, so as to imbue the army with calm, unity and discipline in an environment of equality and merit. Lieutenant General Papoulas assumed his duties on 9 November. On that day General Headquarters in Smyrna was redesignated as Field Army of Asia Minor.

A number of general officers rushed to turn in their resignations along with Commander in Chief Leonidas Paraskevopoulos. Many other officers were forced to resign. All three army corps commanders, most of the divisional commanders and the commanders of many regiments had been relieved by March 1921, when large–scale military operations started again.

Moreover, according to its pre–election commitments, the new regime implemented the recall into service of approximately 1,500 officers of all ranks, who had been discharged or forced to resign in the previous three years. Their recall and reinstatement to their initial rank and seniority on the army lists brought much turmoil and an atmosphere of personal contention, complaints and uncertainty in matters of promotions and transfers.

These changes resulted in the setting aside of more than 300 capable *Venizelist* officers. Moreover, many of the best known and most effective officers sharing the same beliefs left their units and escaped to Constantinople, where they formed a new *National Defense* or simply *Defense* supported by the Greek community of the city. The *Defense* was primarily a movement of colonels under the leadership of Colonel (Inf) Georgios Kondyles and the political representation of former Ambassador Perikles Argyropoulos. The military members of the *Defense*, officers from all ranks, numbered between 100 and 150.

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The total number of officers, who resigned, were discharged, transferred or otherwise took refuge in Constantinople did not exceed five hundred. Most of the officers from the rank of colonel and below remained at their positions. However, the sweeping changes in the commands of the Field Army, the army corps and most of the divisions resulted in a military leadership composition with no post–Balkan War (1912–1913) experience and no familiarity with the conditions at the Asia Minor front.[1]

Furthermore, the problems relegated to the new government from its predecessor were numerous and serious, demanding to be dealt with quickly. The most important ones were the following: The age–old animosity between the Greek population of Asia Minor and the local Turks, who were bent on exterminating the former; the deep internal political rifts stemming from the 1915 National Schism; the fact that the Treaty of Sevres was never ratified by either the Allies or the Turks; the need to occupy the areas of Smyrna, Ushak and Prusa (in Turkish, Bursa) with a force exceeding 100,000 men; and finally Greece's uncertain diplomatic situation in the east.

In more detail, the situation was as follows: The Soviet government renounced in 1917 all the concessions, negotiated by the Czarist regime and the secret agreements concluded in 1915. In autumn 1920, the Soviets ceded Turkey the areas of Ardahan, Kars and Batum in the Caucasus. Armenia was already under Turkish suzerainty. Italy and France had shifted towards the idea of appeasement with the Turks, aiming at protecting their interests in Turkey. The British officers, assigned to control the railway lines, arms depots and, in general, the compliance of the terms of the Moudros Armistice had already left the Turkish interior since February 1920.

65. Despite all these events, the Greek government decided to maintain the policy of its predecessor, concerning the Asia Minor issue. Its first concern was to assign the Command of the Field Army of Asia Minor to Lieutenant General Anastasios Papoulas and the evaluation of its capability of conducting offensive operations.

Upon the arrival of Lieutenant General Anastasios Papoulas on 9 November 1920, the Field Army of Asia Minor included the following:

Headquarters and the formations of the Field Army

Army Corps A with I, II and XIII Divisions.

Army Corps B with III Divisions and Crete Division.

Smyrna Army Corps with the Smyrna and Archipelago Divisions.[2]

The Magnesia Division at Nicomedia.

1. *Istoria Ellenikou Ethnous*, vol. XV. Ekdotike Athenon: Athens, 1980, pp. 155–156.
2. 5 Archipelago Regiment had been transferred to Greece for the elections.

The Cydoniae Division in Greece.[3]

The Cavalry Brigade.

The strength of the Field Army, along with the Cydoniae Division and 5 Archipelago Regiment was 3,805 officers present for duty, 111,861 enlisted men present for duty, 115 75mm Field Artillery and thirty–seven Pack Artillery guns, 109 65mm Pack Artillery guns, twenty–four 120mm Heavy Artillery guns and twelve 155mm howitzers.

The culmination of the combat effectiveness of the Field Army revealed the existence of enormous deficiencies in personnel and especially in equipment. In terms of personnel according to the establishment there was a shortage of 850 officers and 16,000 enlisted men. When the class of 1915 was discharged at the end of November, according to a decision by the previous government, the shortage in enlisted men reached 30,000.

The armaments of the Field Army were of divergent models and systems. Ammunition and artillery shells were in severe shortage, especially Saint Etienne cartridges and 65mm Pack Artillery shells. Moreover, there was a total lack of special Lembel cartridges for automatic weapons, as well as spare parts for machine guns and 65mm Artillery guns. Both the quality and the quantity of the Heavy Artillery were insufficient, since it had long heavy 120mm Debange Artillery guns and 155mm Armstrong howitzers, which were both slow–firing. There was also a severe shortage in transportation means, especially trucks and ambulances, as well as communications equipment.

The Turks and the Shift in Allied Policy
Sketchmap 8

66. Despite the unrelenting pressure by the leaders and the supporters of the Kemalist revolt, the Turkish population of Asia Minor initially refused to support this revolutionary movement.

As the forces of Kemal were confronting the Greek advance to Panormos and Prusa, on the one hand and to Philadelphia and Gediz on the other, during the period between June and August 1920, internal insurrections in Asia Minor and the political antagonisms in the National Assembly at Ankara continued unabated.

After the end of the twenty–day armistice negotiated in May 1920 on the Cilicia front, the French resumed hostilities aided by the Armenians.

In the Italian–controlled area of the Maeander River and Antalya, the relations of the Italians with the Kemalists were friendly, especially following the Italian evacuation of the area of Iconium (March 1920) in exchange for

3. Had been transferred to Greece for the elections.

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some trade agreements. Furthermore the Italians were in the middle of negotiations to supply Kemal with armaments, ammunitions and fuel, while the Kemalists had been using the port of Antalya as a supply center since March 1920.

In June 1920 on the front of Armenia and Georgia on the Caucasus, the Armenians had entered into the area of Alexandroupolis at Oltu but were driven back by the Turks. On 21 October the Turks seized Alexandroupolis and dragged the Armenians into negotiating and signing their first treaty with Kemal in this city on 19 November 1920.

67. Following the failure of the Turks in Gediz in October 1920, the Western Front, as the front opposite the Greeks was designated by the Turks, was divided in the north and south sections. The first section, the so–called North Section, which was assessed to be the most important retained the designation Western Front and was assigned to Ismet Inonu Pasha with headquarters in Eskishehir. The South Section, designated the Southern Front, was assigned to Rafet Pasha with headquarters in Iconium.

The Western Front extended from the Black Sea to Kutahya and the Southern Front from the south boundary of the former to Adana. The Western Front comprised three Infantry divisions, namely the 11, 24 and 61, one Cavalry division and the detachment of irregulars led by Ethem Bey, called the *Flying Column* with strength of 2,000 infantry, 1,800 cavalry and four Artillery guns (Sketchmap 8). The Southern Front comprised four Infantry divisions, namely the 23, 8, 57 and 41, two Cavalry divisions, which were in the process of grouping at Afyon Karahisar, as well as several bands of irregulars.

During the same period, according to the information reaching the Field Army there was one Turkish field army opposite its front, including Turkish Army Corps XII, XIV and XX and seven divisions, namely 23, 24, 41, 56, 57 and 61 with total strength 29,300 men. According to the same information there were three Turkish army corps in the remaining part of Asia Minor: Army Corps III in Sebastea comprising two divisions with strength 3,000 men, Turkish Army Corps XV in Erzurum comprising four divisions with strength of 9,000 men and Turkish Army Corps XIII at Diyarbakir comprising two divisions with strength 5,000 men.

On 1 December, according to the information gathered, the Field Army in Asia Minor estimated the number of the Turkish divisions opposite its front at ten. According to the same information, the Turkish Army included recruits drafted after the last mobilization born in the years between 1894–1899. The enlisted men of the combat units wore military uniforms, while others wore civilian clothes and earned commercial bags. Their armament consisted mainly of Turkish Hauser rifles but also of German, Russian,

Italian and British rifles, which were being modified in factories in Eskishehir and Ankara so that they could accept Mauser cartridges. The artillery was equipped with field and pack guns of 75mm as well as with Austrian Skoda pack guns of 105mm. The machine guns were mainly Maxime and Schwartzlose. For their communication they used Telefunken radios mounted on vehicles.

68. On 11 November 1920, the Greek government announced a referendum on 22 of that month, in order to decide on the restoration of King Constantine to the throne, who had been residing in Switzerland since 1917. On the eve of the referendum the Ambassadors of Great Britain, France and Italy to Athens submitted a communique to the Greek government, stressing their opposition to the return of Constantine to the throne. They regarded his policy as unfriendly to the Allies and called the attention of the Greek government to the unfavorable situation that could arise as a result of such an outcome.

The referendum gave an overwhelming majority in favor of the restoration of King Constantine to the Greek throne, who arrived at Athens on 6 December 1920. In his address to the Greek people the King stressed that he would follow the traditional course in his foreign affairs policy and would expend all effort to consolidate the best relations with the Allied Powers. Regardless of all this, French policy had already started to assume an unfriendly and hardline character, while the Italian propaganda in favor of Turkey intensified, much in line with their policy since the very first day of the Greek landing at Smyrna.

Following the downfall of Clemenceau in February 1920, France opposed the continuation of the war against the Ankara regime and had been seeking before and after the joint communique for a pretext to end the Asia Minor Campaign.

Finally, Great Britain had always been supportive of the Greek expedition in Asia Minor. Even though it was convinced to sign the unfavorable communique to Greece, Great Britain continued to maintain a positive stance towards Greece.

The Greek government tried with word and deed to demonstrate to the Allies that they were just pursuing its predecessor's policy in Asia Minor. In the meantime, the Ankara government was steadily augmenting its influence abroad, while Senator Franklin Boullion led the Turkish lobby in France, in an attempt to secure the financial interests of France in Turkey.

The position of the Allies, after the political changes in Greece and the collapse of the Armenian front encouraged the Constantinople government, who were led to hope for a more favorable revision of the Treaty of Sevres for Turkey. In its effort to present the Turkish people as united, the Sultanate

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government dispatched a formal delegation headed by Izzet Pasha to convince Kemal to come to terms with it, which was recognized only by the Entente Powers. Kemal's intransigence possibly urged by the terms of his alliance with the Bolsheviks resulted in the failure of negotiations.

Changes and Operations in the Front

69. During the period between 9 November, (Command of the Field Army of Asia Minor assigned to Lieutenant General Anastasios Papoulas) and 11 December 1920 (decision to conduct reconnaissance in force to Eskishehir), all action by both opponents was limited to the conduct of raids (Sketchmaps 8, 9). The Field Army was involved in the organization of the centers of resistance, the blockage of routes, through which irregulars moved and conducted operations against screening elements, the repulse of raids and the elimination of gangs that ravaged the Occupation Zone.

Following their success against the Armenians in October, the Turks sought to achieve a favorable turn in the military situation on the Western Front against the Greeks, in order to achieve a more favorable revision of the Treaty of Sevres. With the confrontation with the Greeks in view, the Turks were stocking equipment at Ankara, constructing fortifications and started to move significant forces from Ankara to the communication junctions of Eskishehir and Afyon Karahisar.

Regarding the Greek forces on the front of the independent Magnesia Division covering the Bosporus from the east deployed at Lake Sapanja area and on the front of the Smyrna Army Corps at Prusa covering Kios with the Smyrna Division and Prusa with the Archipelago Division from the east and the south, only the attack on Nicaea could be deemed a significant operation. This operation was conducted by the Smyrna Division with five battalions on 11 November. By 31 December, the Magnesia Division redesignated XI Division on 24 December, had deployed its forces just east and north of Nicomedia up to the Black Sea.

On 18 November, Smyrna Army Corps redesignated the zone under its control the Prusa – Kios Zone and allocated it between its two divisions, Smyrna and Archipelago. In the last third of November, 5 Archipelago Regiment of the Archipelago Division commenced its movement from Greece to Asia Minor. On 26 November following the arrival of the first battalion, the line of the villages Golbashi and Marmajik was set as boundary of the two sectors, the boundary under the responsibility of Prusa.

The Turks had four divisions and two independent battalions opposite the aforementioned Greek disposition, according to information of the Smyrna Army Corps. Turkish 24 Division was in the area of Bilejik and Yenishehir, Turkish 11 Division in the area of Inegol and Pazaryeri, Turkish 4 and possibly 61 Division in Eskishehir.

70. With Smyrna Army Corps to its north and Army Corps A to its southeast, Army Corps B at Magnesia (comprising III Division, Crete Division and 3 Rear Regiment covered the front from the Propontis and Lake Artynia up to Philadelphia and secured its zone of responsibility from the bands of irregulars. To the northwest its zone was limited by the British–controlled Dardanelles zone, and by the Rear Zone to the southwest, generally aligned along the line formed by Yaylaji Dag, Soma, Axarium and Andala. Army Corps B made no contact with regular Turkish troops. There were only bands of irregulars headed by Ethem Bey conducting operations opposite its zone of responsibility from Lake Artynia to the village of Bolu. Therefore, until mid–December 1920, the action of both sides was limited to minor clashes and the pursuit of Turkish and Circassian bandits, who ravaged the countryside, especially around Panormos, Gonen, Biga and Gortiz.

Headquarters of III Division was at Axarium, of the Crete Division at Salihli and of 3 Rear Regiment at Balikesir.

On 2 December, it was decided to merge the Cydoniae Division upon its return to Asia Minor with the Crete Division and to move the III Division to Prusa. The first units of the Cydoniae Division arrived at Smyrna from Piraeus on 10 December. Its transportation continued until 17of that month, when all troops assembled at Magnesia and were subordinated to the Crete Division. Its Headquarters merged with the Headquarters of the Crete Division at Salihli, 31 and 32 Infantry Regiments were disbanded and 33 Infantry Regiment became the third regiment of the Crete Division under the designation Cydoniae Regiment. This regiment relieved 2/39 Evzone Regiment on 15 December, which moved to Smyrna and then onwards to Mudanya by sea, assigned to Smyrna Army Corps.

In the meantime, following orders of the Ministry of the Army, IXa and IXb Pack Artillery battalions, IXa and IXb Surgical Hospitals, and IX Divisional Cavalry arrived at Asia Minor from Rhaedestus of Thrace. The Pack Artillery Battalions were merged with the Artillery of III Division and IX Divisional Cavalry with III Divisional Cavalry.

On 24 December, the Crete Division was assigned the zone of responsibility of III Division, with the mission of securing the occupied territory and safeguarding the front line from Lake Artynia to Gediz – Chay, a tributary of the Hermus River.

On 1 January, the Crete Division was redesignated V Division. 7 and 8 Cretan Regiments as well as Cydoniae Regiment were redesignated 43, 44 and 45 Infantry Regiments respectively. The formations received the insignia of V Division.

After having been relinquished from its sector, on 27 December 1920 III Division commenced its assembly in the areas of Kremaste, Panormos, Susurluk, which was completed on 9 January 1921.

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Army Corps A (comprising I, II and XIII Divisions) with its headquarters at Philadelphia covered a wide area around Philadelphia including also Ushak (Sketchmap 8). XIII Division at Ushak covered the northwestern sector of the front, while II Division covered the northeastern part with headquarters at Ushak. I Division secured the front south of the zone of responsibility of II Division with headquarters at Buldan.

According to the information of Army Corps A, the Turks had the 23, 41 and 57 Infantry Divisions, with a total strength of 11,500 men and twenty–eight guns, as well as 2,000 irregulars opposite the Greek lines. The width of the zone of responsibility of Army Corps A exceeded 200 kilometers. Where actions were more intense than in any of the other corps, particularly in the sector of the II Division where both sides launched repeated offensives.

Besides the three army corps and the independent XI Division, there existed the Military Command with headquarters in Smyrna, and mission to safeguard the Rear Areas Zone. Furthermore, the Field Army comprised of the Cavalry Brigade and various independent combat and combat support units.

Preparation for Strategic Reconnaissance

71. On 4 December 1920 the commander in chief departed with his chief of staff to Athens representing the Asia Minor Army at the welcoming ceremony of King Constantine, who arrived at Athens on 6 December 1920.

Commander in Chief Anastasios Papoulas visited Prime Minister Demetrios Ralles in Athens, and presented the assessment that reconnaissance in force would be opportune, so that the Field Army could be in a position to estimate more accurately the combat effectiveness of the Kemalist Army. In case the reconnaissance confirmed that the Turks had deployed only bands of irregulars and a minimal number of regular Armed Forces opposite the Greek Field Army, it would be possible for the Greeks to reduce the strength of the Hellenic Army. Both the prime minister and the minister of the army agreed with his proposal.

On 11 December, the commander in chief returned to Smyrna and immediately issued the order for preparations of a reconnaissance in force, with objective to estimate the strength of the Kemalist forces, opposite their positions on the front of the Field Army of Asia Minor. The area of Prusa and Eskishehir were selected as the zone of action of such a reconnaissance, since the city of Eskishehir was a military center and a communication junction. It was decided to conduct the operation with the greater possible number of troops, on condition that the operation would be over by the end of December 1920.

The same day 11 December, Smyrna Army Corps was ordered to assemble by 17 December the Archipelago Division at Kestel and one regiment from the Smyrna Division at Ermeni Selous (Sketchmap 9) in order to participate in the reconnaissance in force.

Two days later, on 13 December, Army Corps A was ordered to prepare an attack at a limited depth up to Banaz and north of Ushak, so that the enemy would not be able to transport forces from Afyon Karahisar and Kutahya to Eskishehir. For the achievement of more practical results from the operation Army Corps A proposed to conduct the attack only eastwards.

The proposal was approved and the tentative date for commencement of offensive operations was set for 23 December. Moreover, 18 December, the Field Army authorized Army Corps A independently of the operation to Banaz to conduct operations to the south of Nazilli in order to confirm intelligence concerning the existence of a strong Turkish detachment there.

On 20 December 1920, the operational plan of the Field Army was made known. The same day according to information, Kemal's Army intended to attack the sector of Prusa. According to the same information, the Turks had five divisions opposite this sector and five more opposite the zone of responsibility of Army Corps A.

Post–war Turkish sources confirmed that the numbers given by the aforementioned information were substantially different from the actual strength and disposition of the Turkish forces. According to these sources, only Turkish 24 Division at Bilejik was deployed opposite the sector of Prusa, reinforced with one Infantry regiment and one Cavalry company of Turkish 11 Division. Turkish 11 and 61 Divisions along with a Cavalry Brigade was in the area of Kutahya assigned with the quelling of an insurrection by Ethem Bey against Kemal.

There was only one battalion of Turkish 23 Division and sections of Turkish 8 Division, with headquarters in Alayunt opposite the sector of Ushak. Turkish 23 and 57 Divisions were located in the area of Gediz and conducted operations against the forces led by Ethem Bey. Turkish 56 Division did not actually exist, while Turkish 41 Division was at the Cilicia front. Actually, there were only six Turkish Infantry divisions, one Cavalry brigade and several other troops opposite the Greek front. Four of these divisions were conducting operations against Ethem Bey. Furthermore, two Infantry divisions were in the stage of establishment at Ankara and two Cavalry divisions at Afyon Karahisar. The regiments of the two latter divisions had just returned from Dinar, where they had quelled a revolt of Demirji Mehmet Efendi against the Kemalists.

72. In the autumn of 1920 having militarily and politically consolidated his position in Asia Minor, Kemal decided to dissolve the armed bands of irregulars, and especially those led by Ethem Bey and to induct them into the regular army. As a result, Demirji Mehmet Efendi, then operating in the areas

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of Sparta and Dinar (Sketchmap 8) revolted against Kemal with the approval of Ethem Bey. This insurrection was suppressed by the Commander of the Southern Front Rafet Pasha, who moved to Dinar with four Cavalry regiments, dispersing the Demirji Mehmet Efendi troops there. The leader himself narrowly escaped arrest with ten of his supporters, later conceding defeat to Kemal and being pardoned for his stance.

At the same time, Kemal assembled Turkish 11 and 61 Divisions and one Cavalry brigade southwest of Eskishehir, as well as Turkish 23 and 57 Divisions with seven cavalry regiments at Dumlupinar, in order to move forward to Kutahya against Ethem Bey. The latter objected to the dissolution of the bands of irregulars and became hostile to Kemal, especially after the dissolution of the irregulars led by Demirji Mehmet Efendi.

On 15 December the commanders of the front were ordered to attack Ethem Bey and his brothers, who, according to Kemal, were mere bandits. Ethem Bey, then at Gediz, asked for the cooperation of the Hellenic Army, only to be turned down.

The following day the abovementioned regular forces attacked Ethem Bey and seized Kutahya. Ethem Bey withdrew to Gediz, along with a part of his forces. Meanwhile, Kemal was informed of the imminent Greek offensive in the sector of Prusa and recalled to Eskishehir the major part of his forces that were conducting operations against Ethem Bey. The Southern Front troops returned to their initial positions at Dumlupinar and Turkish 11 Division assembled in the area of Eskishehir. Only two regiments of Turkish 61 Division remained at Kutahya to continue the struggle against the Ethem Bey forces. In an effort to exploit the opportunity, the latter launched a counterattack against the minor Turkish forces in the area, with no success. Thus the situation remained stable for the time being.

Advance to Eskishehir – The Battle at Akpinar and Kovalicha

73. On 20 December 1920, the Field Army ordered Smyrna Army Corps to move to Bozuyuk and, dictated by the situation, up to Inonu, to disperse the Turkish forces there. After accomplishing its mission, Smyrna Army Corps was to return to the initial line of departure (Sketchmap 9).

At the same time, Army Corps A would conduct offensive diversionary operations with all required forces up to the villages of Banaz and Sivasli east of Ushak, with the objective to engage the Turkish forces there and to impede Turkish Command from transporting these forces to the front of Smyrna Army Corps. The date for the commencement of the offensive was set on 24 December.

On 22 December Smyrna Army Corps (to be redesignated Army Corps C effective 24 December), fixed in great detail the composition of the columns and the rate of their advance for the first two days of operations. Archipelago

and Smyrna Divisions, redesignated VII and X Divisions respectively, fixed on the same day, 22 December, the composition, the assembly and the movement of their own units. The assembly of the Divisions was completed in the evening of 23 December. VII Division, reinforced by 2/39 Evzone Regiment of III Division assembled in the area of Tibos and Aksu. At the same time a joint detachment of X Division (four battalions) assembled in the area of Ermeni Selous and Prusa.

In the morning of 24 December, Army Corps C moved forward to Eskishehir with VII Division with 2/39 Evzone Regiment on its right (south), reinforced and on its left (north) the joint detachment of X Division. VII Division advanced with two detachments to the first echelon, the first one with strength of a regiment and the other with strength of three regiments.

The joint detachment of X Division followed the carriage road to Bilejik and at 1300 entered Yenishehir without incident. Resuming its track, it reached the heights west of the Kopruhisar bridge, after overcoming minor Turkish resistance. The north flank of the detachment was covered by a battalion. That same battalion jumped off from Hajilar, seized Pabujak at 1600 and from there surveyed the passes to Yenishehir.

The detachment of VII Division (one regiment), which advanced in the middle, followed the road connecting Tibos and Hamza Bey to Suverdi, under the cover of a battalion to its north. In the afternoon, it reached Suverdi, while the battalion of the flank guard moved to Ulukman, after having driven back a band of irregulars after a brief clash.

The detachment of VII Division (three regiments), which advanced on the right, followed the road connecting Aksu, Inegol and Hasan Pasha, under the cover of a battalion moving on the road connecting Seyfetiye and Ortakoy, to the detachment's south. The advance guard of the detachment, comprising an Infantry regiment and the VII Divisional Cavalry, crossed the bridge close to the village of Hasan Pasha. Under enemy infantry and artillery fire, it advanced to the east of the Gallus River. The main force of the detachment remained west of the river.

74. In the evening the Command of VII Division decided that the right detachment should resume its advance in the morning of the following day with two columns, with two regiments each, with the objective of capturing the Nazifpasha Defile and the envelopment of the Karakoy – Bozuyuk Defile, the ultimate military objective of the division.

In the morning of the following day (25 December), the right (south) column drove back minor Turkish Cavalry forces close to Yenikoy and moved east of Karajakaya. The left (north) column crossed the saddle at Nazifpasha and by the evening it had reached and encamped east of Bahche Sultan.

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In the middle, the Detachment of VII Division moved to the east of Gumush Deresi, after a brief engagement with minor Turkish forces.

At the same time on the left, the joint detachment of X Division tried to continue its movement from Yenishehir to Bilejik over the Kopruhisar Bridge. It encountered strong Turkish resistance and was pinned down. Army Corps C then ordered X Division tc continue its movement during the night through the bridge north of Akdere. The Commander of the Division moved forward an Engineer company, which seized the Akdere Bridge around 0200 of 26 December. At the same time he moved a battalion forward from Pabujak to Kopruhisar.

In the morning of 26 December, the Mixed Detachment of X Division found the bridge of Kopruhisar intact, crossed unhindered and resumed its movement on the carriage road to Bilejik. In the evening it reached and encamped close to Injirli. Undetected, the Turkish troops retired during the night.

That day VII Division resumed its advance eastwards in two columns. The left column under the command of the Commander of the Division Colonel (Arty) Polychrones Karakalos followed the carriage road up to the village of Gumush Deresi. From this location on, the column encountered successive enemy resistance and had to fight repeated brief engagements in order to neutralize it. In the evening it reached a point west of the railway station of Karakoy and encamped there.

The right column under the command of the Commander of 37 Infantry Regiment Colonel Demetrios Staurianopoulos moved to Muratlar saddle without any Turkish harassment. In the evening it encamped west of the aforementioned saddle. However, liaison with the Division was not possible during the day due to damage to its wireless.

The Deputy Chief of Staff of the Field Army, who was observing the left column of VII Division communicated in the evening with the Chief of the Army Staff. At that point he received an order from the Chief of Staff according to which the division should advance to the heights of Akpinar, where he anticipated assemblies of Turkish forces. However, he was not to be drawn into any operations towards Eskishehir.

As soon as the Greek advance commenced, the Turkish leadership ordered Turkish 4 Division in Ankara to move forward to Eskishehir and recalled Turkish 11 Division, which was assigned the operations against Ethem Bey. Moreover, assessing correctly that the action of Army Corps A was a diversion, it transported the Cavalry division from Afyon Karahisar to Inonu and ordered the transportation of Turkish 8 Division by rail from the area of Afyon Karahisar to Eskishehir, as well as the movement of Turkish 24 Division from Bilejik to Inonu. The units of Turkish 4 and 11 Divisions, which were moving forward to the front from Ankara and Kutahya were ordered to deploy on the heights of Akpinar and Kovalicha respectively.

75. In the morning of 27 December VII Division continued its advance in two columns. The right column, which moved to Ovajik passed this village at 1100. It was engaged by Turkish Artillery fire from the heights west of Akpinar, which were occupied by strong enemy forces. The column immediately attacked the enemy positions and stubborn clashes ensued before the heights of Kovalicha and northeast of Boz Alan. Following the turning movement of a battalion from 2/39 Evzone Regiment towards Chay (two kilometers northeast of Kapan Alan), the Turks were forced to fall back to the east to their fortified positions north of Karaagach. The attackers, supported also by the Artillery of the left column of VII Division, captured these heights, as well as the village of Karaagach. The Turkish forces fell back to a new line 1500 meters east of Karaagach. The Greek troops stayed overnight just north and northwest of the village.

The left column advanced along the carriage road as of first light. Upon arrival at the village Bozuyuk at 1400, the head of the advance guard came under artillery fire from the direction of Kovalicha. The Turkish forces had occupied the line from Avgin up to Kovalicha, with 24, 4 and 11 Divisions deployed in that order from north to south.

In the meantime the joint detachment of X Division reached Bilejik at 1330 and deployed outposts to its northeast.

In the evening of 27 December the commander of Army Corps C arrived at VII Division Headquarters approximately two kilometers north of Bozuyuk. He then requested from the commander of the Field Army to order Army Corps A to continue its operations towards Banaz, in order to impede the movement of forces from the south to the front of Army Corps C. The commander in chief however did not approve his proposal.

76. There was dense fog at dawn on 28 December, which impeded artillery fire. The right column of VII Division, comprising five battalions, which had gained contact with the Turks, resumed its attack with four battalions, keeping one battalion in reserve. Despite the strong enemy resistance, the column captured the summit of the height west of Akpinar. The Turks withdrew approximately 700 meters further east to a new organized defensive position. The left column of the Division comprising seven battalions continued its attack with three detachments. The detachment in the middle comprising two battalions under the command of Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Georgios Psarras launched an attack from Bozuyuk to capture the heights of Chiftlik and Yoruk. By 1230 it had managed to overrun the defending Turks and to capture the heights over the village of Poyra. Around 1000 the fog dissipated and support was made possible by the Artillery, deployed west of Bozuyuk. The two other detachments were also engaged in fierce battles.

In the meantime the Turkish forces at the defensive area of Kovalicha were significantly reinforced and at 1130 commenced sustained fire against

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the attacking Greek troops. From 1200 to 1400 they conducted seven forceful counterattacks, which were all successfully repelled.

The Commander of VII Division ordered the detachment in the middle led by Lieutenant Colonel Psarras to move from Poyra village to the south and attack against Kovalicha. This attack would be combined with a simultaneous attack by one reserve battalion that was to be moved there from Bozuyuk. Time passed by but the attack of the Psarras detachment was not launched although the struggle on the right flank of the Greek disposition went on as fierce as ever. The commander of the division then ordered the reserve battalion, that had moved 1500 meters to the south of Bozuyuk, to attack with the support of Artillery fire against the forces on the heights of Kovalicha. At the same time he also ordered the left detachment to attack with a part of its forces against the same heights, thus extending further to the north the attack of the Psarras detachment.

On 1430 the reserve battalion with the support of Artillery fire attacked the heights of Kovalicha, which were captured without firing a single shot. The Turkish forces withdrew towards Inonu. Around 1500 the capture of the Turkish positions was completed and the fighting ended. No pursuit of the enemy was conducted, since this would be contrary to the instructions given by the Field Army.

At the same time the detachment on the left captured the heights southwest of Avgin. From there it moved to Chepni and reached the heights to the northeast of the village of Poyra, where it deployed outposts.

The same day the joint detachment of X Division advanced from Bilejik to Sogut. At 1400 it passed through this village and without meeting enemy resistance moved northwest of Avgin.

The casualties suffered by Army Corps C in this reconnaissance in force were eight officers, forty–three enlisted men killed and six officers, 124 enlisted men wounded. The casualties of the Turks were not confirmed, but 211 prisoners were taken by VII Division, including a major and three sub–lieutenants. Two machine guns, seven light machine guns and 191 rifles were captured.

Following the end of the operation, the forces of Army Corps C having accomplished their objectives began to return to their lines of departure. The Turks had retired to the east and did not make an effort to gain contact anew. Thus the forces of Army Corps C returned to their initial positions unhindered.

VII Division began to retire in the morning of 29 December 1920, following the route it had followed in its advance. On 1 January 1921, the division redeployed at its initial positions in the area of Aksu, Tibos and Kestel. The joint detachment of X Division commenced its retirement on 30 December and returned to its initial positions the following day.

77. At the same time that Army Corps C was conducting the reconnaissance in force towards Eskishehir, Army Corps A conducted its diversionary operations towards Banaz and Sivasli. Commencement of operations was set for 24 December 1920. In order to implement this objective, the army corps organized a detachment from I Division comprising three battalions, which assembled south of Ushak on 21 December and was assigned to II Division. On 23 December, II Division organized two more detachments comprising three battalions and Artillery elements each, which were assembled east of Ushak. Furthermore, XIII Division assigned as reserve and moved to Ushak one battalion from 5/42 Evzone Regiment. The Detachment from I Division moved to Afghan, south of Ushak.

In the morning of 24 December, the aforementioned detachments of Army Corps A with a total strength of nine battalions, advanced without battle at a depth of ten to thirty kilometers and seized Sivasli and Chivril. However, on 3 January 1921, they returned and deployed to their initial positions.

As soon as he detected the suspension of the advance of Army Corps A, Kemal ordered the commander of the Southern Front to crush Ethem Bey. The latter employing two Cavalry Divisions and Turkish 8 Infantry Division, forced Ethem Bey to retire to the west and to request once again the support of Army Corps A, only to be denied one more time. Seeking to avoid the successive blows from the Kemalist Army, Ethem Bey dispatched a delegation on 8 January 1921 to Army Corps A Headquarters, in order to negotiate the entry of his followers into the Greek zone. The following day his forces started to surrender gradually to the Hellenic Army. Only one section comprising 200 men and four machine guns under the leadership of Pehlivan surrendered to Kemalist forces to continue their struggle against the Greeks.

The Hellenic Army conducting this reconnaissance in force as far as the line Akpinar – Kovalicha in December 1920, was able to implement its objective and gathered valuable information concerning the progress and the organization of the Kemalist Army, without however annihilating it. The overall conclusion from the reconnaissance operation was that the Kemalist Army had significantly improved in strength, armament, organization and discipline.

Despite the favorable effects of the small–scale battles, it became evident to the Greek forces that there were many inadequacies in army staff organization especially on the level of the divisions, the communications and the supply of offensive operations.

With regard to the general repercussions of the reconnaissance operation, it should be stressed that the effects were assessed to be very limited in the interior of Turkey It boosted the morale of the Turkish people, while public opinion in Europe became more favorable to them. There was increased distrust in the relations between the Allies. Antagonism became so intensified that there already was discussion about revising the Treaty of Sevres.

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CHAPTER 4

Operations of March 1921

The London Conference

78. After the operations of December 1920, the Allies (Great Britain, France and Italy) perceiving that Kemal's intransigence would perpetuate the hostilities in Asia Minor and wishing to accommodate their multiple interests in the east as soon as possible, rushed to arrange a new conference with the goal of ending the war with Kemalist Turkey. It was decided that the conference would take place on 21 February 1921 in London, and that representatives both from Greece and the two Turkish governments would take part. The Greek prime minister was informed of the above decision on 13 January 1921. That same day the Greek government accepted the invitation with the hope of ending the state of war.

On 22 January, the Prime Minister, the aged Demetrios Ralles (1844–1921), resigned because of his disagreements with Demetrios Gounares who was the de facto leader of the coalition party and the main claimant for the position of prime minister. On the next day Nikolaos Kalogeropoulos formed a new government and led Greece's representation to the conference in London. The delegation left Greece on 28 January and on 3 February the Greek prime minister met with the President of the French Republic, Millerand, in Paris to ask France's support for the Greek cause. The French president said, "France's main obligation is to protect its interests and to pursue a general pacification in the east." On 6 February the Greek representatives arrived in London. The Greek prime minister was immediately received by the British prime minister, who, expressing his friendly disposition towards Greece, wished to explore Greece's intentions regarding a partial revision of the Treaty of Sevres.

Both Turkish delegations had also arrived in London. Ankara's representatives arrived via Antalya and Rome with the assistance of Italy.

The Conference of London, which was convened on 8 February 1921, received the Greek delegation on the first day of the sessions and requested information about the Hellenic Army. The Greek prime minister replied that the strength of the Hellenic Army was 121,000 men and that it enjoyed high morale. According to the opinion of military advisors, this force was in a position to advance up to Ankara to destroy the Kemalist forces and to pacify the east within three months. Regarding Greece's economic position, the prime minister stated that the economic resources of the country had not been exhausted and if the Allies would permit Greece to freely use its credits, it would be able to bring the planned operation to a successful conclusion and to

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quickly reach its objectives. The French prime minister continued the discussion admitting that he was not as optimistic as his Greek counterpart when he considered France's continuing struggle in Cilicia. General Gourand added that if the Greeks advanced they would find themselves facing an enemy that was better armed and more battleworthy than the one they faced on the plains of Smyrna. He concluded that if he had been administering the forces in Smyrna and the French government would have ordered him to conduct the operation proposed by the Greek government, he would not have ignored the opinion of Marshal Foch, who considered a force of twenty–two divisions necessary to pacify the area. Colonel (Eng) Ptolemaios Sarregiannes, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Field Army of Asia Minor, challenging General Gourand's opinion, pointed out that the reconnaissance in force of December 1920 towards Eskishehir proved the low combat efficiency of the Turkish divisions.

79. On 10 February the conference reassembled Greeks present to hear the Turkish representatives without the presence of the delegation. The Constantinople delegation requested the abrogation of the Treaty of Sevres, while the representatives of Ankara asked for the independence of Turkish territories (in Thrace up to the Hebrus river), free passage for ships through the Straits and the nullification of the capitulations.

The British prime minister, closing the conference, asked the Turks to submit specific suggestions the following day, with the amendments they felt should be made to the Treaty of Sevres. In fact, the next day the Turks submitted a memo asking for the evacuation of eastern Thrace and Smyrna. The French prime minister asked on what they based their demand for the evacuation of Smyrna. The Turks replied that they considered these to be basic principles of nationality and economic interest. At the same time they submitted statistics which questioned the basis of the Treaty of Sevres.

At 1600 that day, the Greek delegation submitted statistics showing the ethnic composition of the lands adjudged to Greece in the Treaty of Sevres. It emphasized that the Greek Prime Minister, Eleutherios Venizelos, had provided these numbers to the Peace Conference and that they had been accepted. However, the conference decided to suggest to the interested parties that a fact–finding commission examine the ethnic composition of the population in the area, on the condition that both parties accept the remaining articles of the Treaty of Sevres.

On the morning of 12 February, before the session began, the British prime minister advised his Greek counterpart not to reject the mission of a fact–finding commission, but to declare that he must wait for the opinion of his cabinet. In the session which followed that day, the Turks declared that they accepted the committee's mission. They requested time to receive relevant instructions about the other points in the conference's suggestion. The

Greek prime minister declared that he would have to be advised by the parliament before answering, because such a concession could have serious consequences for the Hellenic Army which was ready to advance.

80. The Greek parliament debated in the session of 15 February 1921 the suggestion emanating from the London Conference, of sending a fact–finding commission to Smyrna and Thrace to determine the ethnic composition of the population. The suggestion was unanimously rejected.

On the morning of 16 February while the London Conference was still in progress, the Greek Ambassador, Lysimachos Kautantzoglou, and Colonel Ptolemaios Sarregiannes , members of the Greek delegation, visited the office of the British prime minister's private secretary together with the British Admiral Carr. They discussed the forthcoming resumption of the possibility of operations as well as the acceptance or not of the suggestion of the conference. The secretary asked Colonel Sarregiannes how the Hellenic Army could enforce the Allies' decision on Kemal. The Greek officer presented a study with the aid of maps for the advance to Ankara with the simultaneous landing of the Hellenic Army in the Pontus area, if that were to become necessary. It seemed that the secretary was not convinced that the occupation of Anatolia would force the Turks into submission and he asked for information on the operations up to Ankara. He then asked if the occupation of the line Eskishehir – Afyon Karahisar would have an effective outcome. Colonel Sarregiannes replied affirmatively, adding that the operation had already been prepared and it would be possible to begin it with a simple order from London. The secretary seemed pleased to accept the Greek response about the operation towards Eskishehir – Afyon Karahisar.

To the second question, the secretary declared that Greece should refuse to comply with the committee's suggestions. This would be tantamount to signing a blank check. Of course, it would be best for Greece if the Turks refused first, and he stated that he had information that they would refuse to comply with the remaining articles of the Treaty of Sevres.

The next day, 17 February, the Greek representatives were informed that the French has successfully concluded an agreement regarding the Ottoman public debt and that another agreement would soon follow for a military truce. Considering this contingency, the military advisors to the Greek delegation to the London Conference were of the opinion that the immediate implementation of the previously planned operation for the capture of Eskishehir, Kutahya and Afyon Karahisar was compulsory. The objective was to hit Kemal's forces before they could be reinforced from Cilicia. The director of the political office of the British prime minister agreed. The Greek prime minister adopted this opinion and that same day telegraphed the order to the Army via the Ministry of Defense to conduct the said operation.

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81. On 19 February the prime ministers of Greece and Great Britain met. The Greek prime minister announced the Greek parliament's rejection of the plan to send a fact–finding commission to Thrace and Smyrna. The British prime minister explained that as far as he was concerned there was no problem with Thrace and that the only difficult point concerned Smyrna. Greece should consult on this last question with the Allies. He added that Great Britain was not able to assist Greece because the Italian stance was unfavorable and the public opinion in France had changed with the return of King Constantine. In addition France wished to come to an arrangement with Turkey in order to restore peace to Cilicia. The Greek government, he continued, should aid the British government to reach a settlement. He recommended as a possible compromise that Turkey be offered the nominal suzerainty of Smyrna, while Greece would maintain the administration of the city. He even requested to be informed if the Greek government accepted such a proposal which he would introduce himself to Allied Council.

The Greek prime minister replied that he wasn't authorized to accept such a compromise. For that reason he decided to invite to London Demetrios Gounares, who was majority leader of the Greek parliament and the minister of the army. At 1605, following the morning meeting of the prime ministers of Greece and Great Britain, the conference convened. The Greek prime minister in mode of reply, read aloud the declaration that he had previously made to the British prime minister that morning; that the Greek Parliament had rejected the proposal for the mission of the fact–finding committee to Smyrna and Thrace. According to the Greek prime minister, this would be equal to abandoning rights internationally accorded to Greece by the Treaty of Sevres

At 1640 the Turkish representatives entered and announced that the Ankara government had accepted the suggestion for a fact–finding commission to the territories of Thrace and Smyrna. It was also ready to accept the remaining clauses of the Treaty of Sevres, on the condition that these be adjusted to the terms necessary for the existence of a free and independent Turkey.

In the meantime, behind the scenes of the conference, the delegation from Ankara held discussions with the representatives of England, France and Italy regarding various subjects and signed separate agreements with them, which Ankara eventually did not ratify. They signed an agreement with Lord Curzon to free prisoners of war; with France for the return of Cilicia to Turkey in exchange for economic concessions, and with Italy for the support of Turkish claims in Thrace and Smyrna, also with economic concessions.

These were the circumstances which greeted Demetrios Gounares when he arrived in London on 24 February. That same day, the director of the British prime minister's political office informed the Greek delegation that the prime minister had no objections to the assumption of offensive operations.

On the next day, 25 February, the British prime minister received Kalogeropoulos and Gounares and discussed with them Foreign Office proposals to settle the issue of the Smyrna area. At the same time, he confirmed a message transmitted by the director of his political office for the assumption of offensive operations. The recommendations of the Foreign Office, as opposed to the proposal to send a fact–finding commission, secured Smyrna for Greece and called for a neutral administration for the entire *sanjak*.

The Greek representatives perceived a certain coldness by the French and Italian. Also that Great Britain had avoided committing to active intervention or material support on behalf of Greece, limiting itself only to moral support and suggestions which would not ensure a successful end to the struggle. Perceiving that they would not achieve Britain's active involvement, they were required to reexamine the entire problem. Prime Minister Kalogeropoulos and Minister of the Army Gounares advocated continuing the struggle. On the other hand, the delegation members Demetrios Maximos, Director of the National Bank, and Georgios Vlachos (the founder of Kathemerini – editor's note), journalist, backed the evacuation of Asia Minor. This was the situation when the first reports arrived of a Franco–Kemalist agreement. Finally, the opinion to continue the war dominated and for that purpose three age groups of reserves were to be mobilized.

82. Facing Turkey's obstinacy about the evacuation of Greeks from Smyrna and Thrace, and the refusal of the Greeks to accept the fact–finding commission to Smyrna, the Conference of London decided to search for other solutions that could be accepted by the warring parties.

On 27 February the representatives of the Allies submitted to the Greek and Turkish delegations a plan which contained some amendments to the Treaty of Sevres and acknowledged the respective governments' responses. Along with other points, the Allies suggested that the *vilayet* of Smyrna remain under Turkish sovereignty. Hellenic Army troops would stay in the city of Smyrna, while order in the rest of the *vilayet* would be maintained by a Gendarmerie with Allied officers and forces proportionate with the numbers and distribution of the population. The League of Nations would appoint a Christian governor who would be assisted in his work by an elected council. The suggested means of administration would be reevaluated within five years.

The Turkish delegation protested the proposal regarding the presence of a Greek garrison in the city of Smyrna. The Greek delegation examined the suggestions but withheld any response.

On 6 March Kalogeropoulos and Gounares were received by the British prime minister who informed them that Turkey would require twenty–five days to reply. The Greek representatives stated that they did not,

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therefore, consider it necessary for Greece to respond earlier. Then they explained the military situation, and maintained that the attack should be launched before the front could be reinforced with Turkish troops from Cilicia. The British prime minister explained that he had already told the Turks that the deadline of twenty–five days did not mean the interruption of hostilities. Regarding the call–up of three age groups of reserves he said that "nothing should be left to luck because in the event of the failure of the military operations, Turkey would become unaccomodating!."

The conversation continued around the economic problems and the time the offensive operations should begin.

Preparations of the Adversaries – Proposals by Generals Gouveles and Dousmanes
Sketchmaps 8, 10

83. Following the December 1920 operations, which they had presented as a victory for Ismet Inonu, the leadership of the Turkish Army began to prepare to face operations by the Hellenic Army on a larger scale. The invitation to the London Conference by the Allies amounted to political recognition of Kemalist Turkey. This resulted in a massive turnout of Turkish Army officers to the ranks of Kemal's Army.

As regards the supply of military equipment, Kemal took over what had been abandoned by the Allies in the warehouses of Asia Minor and in Constantinople (Sketchmap 8). He was able to purchase freely any type of equipment from abroad, even airplanes, which were delivered to the interior of Turkey via the ports of Antalya, Aga Limani and Mersin. He continued to procure equipment from Bolshevik Russia, mostly Heavy Artillery. At the same time, under German supervision at the railway workshops at Eskishehir, the Kemalists were able to repair the breech locks of the guns abandoned there by the British after their departure in February 1920.

Kemal paid particular attention to the formation of a strong Cavalry. Against the Greek front, he had deployed ten divisions of Infantry and three of Cavalry, and a number of independent Infantry regiments and various other units which were organized in two groups of divisions and one independent division to the north designated the Kojaeli Group (Sketchmap 10).

After the operations of December 1920, the Turkish forces were deployed defensively to protect the two main directions, Prusa (Bursa) – Eskishehir and Ushak – Afyon Karahisar. Two defensive areas were organized for this purpose: Inonu facing north and Dumlupinar facing south.

The Turkish Army Staff always had accurate information regarding Greek movements from the officers of the Allies and other agents. Additionally, the Turkish delegation in London reported that the Greeks, with the support of the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, had decided to attack with

the aim to capture Eskishehir – Afyon Karahisar. Along with the rest of their intelligence, the Turks had one coming from a foreign source, according to which the Greeks would launch their attack on 10 March 1921. The events later confirmed this information. Consequently the Turks were waiting for the attack and were fully ready for the Greek forces. On the other hand, the information available to the Hellenic Army from the 2nd Bureau (intelligence) regarding Turkish forces after the December operations was inadequate.

84. After the conclusion of the reconnaissance in force of December 1920, Major General Konstantinos Palles, the chief of staff of the Field Army, examined the possibility of launching a major offensive to occupy the line Eskishehir – Afyon Karahisar. He concluded that for the conduct of such an operation the Field Army should be reinforced with 30,000 men. He submitted his assessment to the commander of the Field Army who ordered him to report to Athens to request the necessary reinforcements. It should be added at this juncture that the Greek government had not assessed the outcome of the operation of December 1920 as satisfactory. It considered therefore that an action against Kemal before the London Conference, through which the strength of the Hellenic Army could become apparent, would reinforce the diplomatic position of Greece in a conference for the settlement of the Eastern Question.

The minister of the army shared these thoughts with the chief of staff on 15 January 1921. The chief of staff said that, even though he felt the lead time till 8 February was too short, the Field Army would attempt to launch the major offensive on a more limited scale.

When the Field Army was informed of the above, it stated, in a report to the government on 17 January, that even though the suggested operation would be risky due to the lack of sufficient forces, it was still possible to carry it out within the time limit which had been given and continued thus:

> *Instead of capturing Eskishehir and Afyon Karahisar simultaneously, we first will proceed to capture at the same time Kutahya and Eskishehir. Subsequently, if the conditions of supplies permit, we will also capture Afyon Karahisar.*

At the same time the Field Army requested the dispatch of three battalions with a strength of 2,800 men from Thrace and 800 men from the interior as well as the shipment of various equipment, so that it would be prepared to launch the operation within the required deadline. Two days later, on 19 January, the chief of staff of the Field Army reported from Athens that only a part of the equipment requested would be sent, and also 100 Gendarmes. The next day the Field Army reported that it would undertake to conduct the operation with the means at its disposal and with the transfer of one Infantry battalion, from Army Corps A to Prusa.

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85. In January 1921, the Army General Staff in Athens took over the responsibilities for the entire Hellenic Army which had been granted to General Headquarters in Smyrna. On 12 January Major General Konstantinos Gouveles took over as head of the Army General Staff relieving Major General Aristoteles Vlachopoulos, who was transferred to Asia Minor. On 16 January, when discussion began about the possibility of a new offensive, the new chief of the Army General Staff presented himself to the Minister of the Army and presented his assessment regarding the Asia Minor operation.

Two days later, Gouveles submitted a confidential memorandum expressing his views. At the beginning of the memorandum he questioned the wisdom of undertaking the campaign in the first place,

> *The time it was taking place, the way it was handled and the diplomatic terms under which it was undertaken were not favorable. This overseas campaign, risky as it is and of doubtful outcome, placing heavy demands on the people, must be terminated in the most felicitous way. . . . although the present situation is unfavorable and a struggle is doubtful, success as result of military victory is still feasible on the condition that decisive measures be taken swiftly and decisively, because by unexpected good fortune the Turkish Army, so to say, does not exist at this moment.*

According to the chief of the Army General Staff, the options for the war in Asia Minor were: the evacuation of the Hellenic Army from Asia Minor; the pursuit of a policy seeking adjudication and securing for Greece the zone provided for in the Treaty of Sevres via the diplomatic route; or the continuance of the operations leading to the destruction and total annihilation of Kemal's army. The chief of the Army General Staff himself leaned towards the last solution, recommending the necessity for an offensive operation.

Regarding the planning of the impending operations, Major General Gouveles suggested that these should be conducted in two periods. During the first, the Greek forces would capture the railway line Eskishehir – Afyon Karahisar and would then advance to deploy in a position one hundred kilometers to the east. In the second period their objective would be to push back the Turkish Army towards Ankara and to completely destroy and disperse it. To implement the above plan he requested the mobilization of four age groups to be followed later by another two. He concluded, emphasizing that "the demand is for the fastest and the most immediate action possible. Any hesitation, delay or inactivity would be tantamount to complete disaster."

Demetrios Gounares, Minister of the Army, judged the plan to be excellent. However he faced two diametrically opposed opinions: that of the chief of the Army General Staff who recommended an immediate call to arms of strong forces to assume operations on a grand scale; and that of the chief of

staff of the Field Army of Asia Minor who assured him that an immediate assumption of offensive operation on a limited scale with the forces already available was possible, provided they be reinforced with three or four thousand men.

The government preferred to implement the plan proposed by the Field Army of Asia Minor. After this, Major General Gouveles submitted his resignation but remained in his position until 2 April 1921.

86. Thus when on 19 February the Field Army was notified of the prime minister's telegram from London ordering it to execute the planned operation, the Field Army reported that the commencement of the operation was not possible earlier than a fortnight hence due to the snowfalls and that 3,500 men were needed and 100 trucks were absolutely necessary. Two days later on 21 February the minister of the army informed the Field Army that the operation could begin as soon as weather permitted, and that the reinforcements would not exceed 2,900 men.

On 21 February, after freedom of action had been granted by Great Britain, the head of the Greek delegates, Nikolaos Kalogeropoulos and Demetrios Gounares, after consulting their military counsels, sent the following telegram from London to the commander of the Field Army through the Greek high commissioner:

> *The situation prevailing here today demands the immediate conduct of an operation aiming at the capture of Eskishehir and Kutahya. The Greek delegation, based on reliable intelligence provided by Sarregiannes here and Palles in Athens, repeatedly confirmed that it can commence forthwith, to the greatest and immediate advantage of the Nation's interests.*

The above telegram was also sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the request to the government to mobilize three age groups of reserves as soon as the commencement of the operation would be made known in order to avoid public reactions. Next day, 26 February, the Field Army reported to the Ministry of the Army that, "following an order sent by telegram from London through the high commissioner, operations will begin next week."

On 15 February Major General Viktor Dousmanes, General Adjutant of the King, upon learning the military situation and the intentions of the Field Army of Asia Minor, and deeming that the whole operation was not thoroughly reviewed, prepared a report which he submitted to the king. The king in turn forwarded the report to the Ministry of the Army. According to the report the operation was entirely faulty and served only the interests of Great Britain. He proposed communication with the latter so that Greece would not find itself isolated during the conduct of the operations.

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The Plan of the Field Army and the Activities of the Army Corps.

87. On 17 January 1921, when the government asked the Field Army's opinion about the immediate conduct of operations against Kemal, it reported its intention to the army corps and according to the plan it relocated Greek III Division, the Calvary Brigade and other units towards the attack positions.

According to that plan Army Corps C, reinforced with III Division, would operate towards Eskishehir while Army Corps A with the reinforced III Division would operate towards Kutahya. On 20 January the Calvary Brigade moved towards Smyrna, from where it was transported by ship to Mudanya and from there to Prusa (Sketchmap 10). III Division, being organic to Army Corps B, completed its assembly in the areas of Kremaste and Panormos. On 22 January it moved towards Kios and by 29 January it assembled east of Prusa. On 2 February the division was subordinated to Army Corps C. Furthermore Army Corps C was reinforced with various Artillery and Engineers units transported to Prusa in January.

On 8 January Military Command was established at Prusa where it assumed the responsibility of the security of Prusa and Kios areas. Until then the security of the area was the responsibility of 5 Infantry Regiment of I Division, which had been transferred there from Mudanya.

On 27 February 1921 the Field Army of Asia Minor communicated an operation order according to which:

> **Army Corps C** would advance towards Eskishehir with its entire force.
>
> **Army Corps A** would advance to Dumlupinar and attack the Turkish forces there. If the bulk of the Turkish forces withdrew towards Afyon Karahisar, the army corps would cover itself from the direction of Kutahya, pursue them towards Afyon Karahisar, which it would also capture, and then would cover itself in force from the direction of Iconium. Then, with whatever forces available, it would seek to establish liaison with Army Corps C towards Eskishehir. If however the bulk of the Turkish forces withdrew towards Kutahya, Army Corps A would capture Afyon Karahisar with part of its forces and cover itself from the direction of Iconium, while with the bulk of its forces would pursue the Turks towards Kutahya.

March 4 was chosen as the day to begin the operation. On that day the Field Army, wishing to protect the left flank of Army Corps C, requested and received approval from British Headquarters for XI Division (previously described as Magnesia), which had been at Nicomedia, to operate towards Geyve.

On 1 March, immediately following the arrival of the commander of the Field Army at Panormos, a telegram from the prime minister in London was received stating:

> *Following new proposals of the Supreme Council regarding Smyrna, we are preparing a reply which will be communicated to you. Request advice immediately. Commander in chief to be ready to commence operations, not to start before receiving the all clear from us by a new telegram.*

After that, the beginning of the operation was postponed. At 2200 on 7 March a new telegram from the minister of the army arrived stating:

> *With reference to the telegram sent today by Mr. Kalogeropoulos from London, it is imperative to commence the military campaign immediately. For your information the decree for the call–up of three age groups of reserves is being issued.*

In execution of this order, 10 March was designated as D–day. At the same time XI Division was ordered to advance to Geyve on 11 March, the day following the beginning of the operation.

Between 1–31 March, when the operation ended, the Field Army was reinforced by 14,900 reserves. It was also reinforced by 3/40 Evzone Regiment of IX Division (1,080 enlisted men), an independent battalion that had been at Constantinople (900 enlisted men) and 4,430 enlisted men from IV Division from Nauplion.

88. Army Corps C occupied the front from the southern shore of Lake Askoy to the slope of Mount Olympus, with X Division at Kios, III Division at Prusa and VII Division at Kestel, east of Prusa.

After the December 1920 operations, Army Corps C did not have accurate information of the order of battle of the Turkish forces facing it. Experience from recent operations towards Bozuyuk led it to expect that the Turks would try to defend the Kopruhisar – Nazifpasha line with minor forces to gain time, in order to assemble their main forces at another defensive area (Sketchmaps 9, 10).

Based on the above, Army Corps C submitted on 7 February a plan of action to the Field Army regarding the movement of its divisions up to Eskishehir. On 8 March Army Corps C issued its operation order designating the missions of its units for 10 March. However, on the eve of that date, due to the threat of interruption of communications, the corps issued another operations order through which it designated the mission of its units for the second day of the operation as well.

Army Corps B, after the detachment of its III Division to Army Corps C, maintained its sector, extending from the Propontis to Gediz Chay through Lake Artynia with the V Division and 3 Rear Regiment, without any contact with Turkish troops. In order to secure its zone of responsibility from the activities of irregular bands, it deployed III Division and 3 Rear Regiment between Panormos and Salihli.

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Army Corps A, after the December 1920 operations, continued to occupy the sections of the front from Gediz Chay to Malkach Dere east of Aydin, where was the boundary between the army corps and 18 Infantry Regiment of the General Military Command. Army Corps A had all its (three) divisions deployed across the front line. After the departure of 5 Infantry Regiment of I Division, the southern boundary of the army corps shifted slightly so that I Division could be able to cover its sector. At the same time, Army Corps A advanced 3 Infantry Regiment of XIII Division from Takmak to Ushak so that XIII Division could operate towards Kutahya.

Following these shifts, Army Corps A with its units deployed along a wide front, was ready to operate with a part of its force towards Kutahya. The army corps had no intelligence regarding the Turkish forces opposing if. On 28 February it issued a preliminary order announcing that the army corps would attack from 4 March to the direction of Afyon Karahisar with I and II Division. At the same time, I Division was ordered to assign two of its battalions to relieve the section of II Division and 3 Infantry Regiment which had been forwarded to Ushak to relieve the screening forces of II and XIII Divisions.

Forces and Disposition of the Adversaries

89. On 9 March, the eve of the advance towards Eskishehir and Afyon Karahisar, Greek forces were deployed on two separate fronts: the north (Prusa) and the south (Ushak) (Sketchmap 10). The two fronts were separated by the Olympus, Domanich and Murat Dag mountain ranges and directly to the west of the mountainous area of Simav Dag. There was not possibility of liaison between the two army corps. The distance between them was 150 kilometers in a straight line.

The Northern Front was allocated to Army Corps C. It comprised III, VII, and X Divisions, the Calvary Brigade and the Military Command of Prusa, the latter comprising 5 Infantry Regiment of I Division. Additionally, it had been reinforced with two Heavy Artillery battalions, a Bridging Construction battalion, a Railway battalion, and a Rear Engineers battalion.

From these forces, Army Corps C initially allocated twenty–seven Infantry battalions, of which one remained at Pabujak north of Yenishehir, and three sections of Engineers each of two–company size for the advance on Eskishehir. The total strength of these forces was 16,190 Infantry, 911 cavalry (671 of the Cavalry Brigade and 240 of the divisional 5 Cavalry), 228 machine guns and eighty–eight Artillery pieces (forty–eight pack, thirty–two field and eight heavy 120mm). The remaining forces comprising three Infantry and three Engineers battalions (totaling 2,800 men), twenty–four machine guns and sixteen Artillery pieces (four field and twelve heavy) remained in the Prusa area to secure the zone of responsibility of Army Corps C.

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The Southern Front was allocated to Army Corps A, which comprised I, II and XIII Divisions. It had been reinforced with two Artillery battalions, (one of these equipped with howitzers), a Rear battalion of Engineers and one divisional Cavalry section.

From these forces, Army Corps A initially allocated for the advance to Afyon Karahisar, sixteen Infantry battalions and two Engineers each of two–company strength. The total strength of the above was 10,550 Infantry, 210 Cavalry of the three divisional Cavalry sections, 120 machine guns and fifty–six Artillery pieces (thirty–two pack and twenty–four field). The remaining forces comprising eight Infantry and two Engineers battalions (4,900 men), a divisional Cavalry section (eighty Cavalry men), seventy–two machine guns and forty–eight Artillery pieces (sixteen pack, twelve field and twenty heavy) remained behind to secure the zone of responsibility of Army Corps A. Two battalions of Engineers (the one organic to I Division) and the Heavy Artillery were not used during the advance to Afyon Karahisar.

Army Corps B secured the zone between the two fronts. It was deployed on second line and comprised V Division, Prusa Military Command (with 3 Rear Regiment) and one battalion of Field Artillery. In total, Army Corps B fielded twelve Infantry battalions and a section of Engineers of two–company strength (7,565 men in total), with ninety–six machine guns and twenty–eight Artillery pieces (sixteen pack and twelve field). From these forces, four battalions had been assigned the security of the front and the rear zone. The rest were together with the Artillery assembled at Magnesia and Balikesir.

The General Military Command secured the rear zone and the Maeander front towards the Italian zone. It comprised two Rear regiments, 18 Infantry Regiment and various units. Its combat force was ten Infantry battalions (5,100 men), twenty–four machine guns and eight Artillery pieces.

The XI Division, was subordinated to the British Headquarters and secured the Nicomedia front. It comprised nine Infantry battalions and a section of engineers of two–company strength (5,130 men in total), one divisional Cavalry (sixty–six cavalrymen), seventy–two machine guns and sixteen Artillery. From 12 March it was placed tactically under the Greek Field Army.

90. On 9 March 1921 the combat forces of the Field Army including XI Division amounted to 52,235 Infantrymen, 1,267 Cavalry men, 636 machine guns and 260 Artillery pieces. On the evening of that day the order of battle of these forces was as follows:

Northern Front: Army Corps C with its Headquarters at Prusa and its divisions comprising, X Division in the area Ermeni Selous, Bayirkoy and Borjun; III Division in the area Tibos, Boshnak and Myloi (Milas); and, VII Division in the areas of Umentalaki and Aksu (Sketchmaps 10, 11). The Cal-

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vary Brigade, the 1 Rear Battalion Engineers and the Railroad battalion had assembled at Myloi. The remaining forces had been allocated for the security of the zone occupied by Army Corps C.

Southern Front: Army Corps A with its Headquarters, an Infantry battalion, the 2 Rear Battalion Engineers and the 1 Battalion Engineers at Ushak, II Division in the area of Bolgush and XIII Division immediately to the east at Ushak (Sketchmaps 10, 8).

The remaining forces, i.e. I Division comprising five Infantry battalions and one regimental command, one Field Artillery battalion and two Heavy Artillery battalions, was deployed as screening force in order to secure the zone occupied by Army Coups A. Of these forces, I Division covered the front south of Ushak up to Donek Dere and 3 Infantry Regiment of the XIII Division the direction from Kutahya – Gediz towards Ushak.

91. The Turkish forces opposite the Greek Occupation Zone had been distributed into three fronts, i.e. Nicomedia, Eskishehir and Afyon Karahisar – Iconium.


The Nicomedia Front was assigned to the Kojaeli Group, which comprised the 7 Infantry Battalion, a combat team, (two Infantry regiments) and various of irregulars and militiamen. In more detail, it fielded sixteen battalions of Infantry (4,126 men), sixteen machine guns and four Artillery pieces.

The Eskishehir or Western Front comprised four Infantry brigades (4, 8, 23 and the 41), 3 Cavalry Brigade, a Cavalry regiment, an Engineers regiment and various other units. In total it fielded forty Infantry battalions (12,341 men), twenty Cavalry companies (1,377 Cavalry men), ninety–eight machine guns and thirty–nine Artillery pieces.

The Afyon Karahisar or Northern Front comprised five Infantry divisions (4, 8, 23, 57 and 41), two Cavalry divisions (1 and 2), an Infantry regiment, a Model Cavalry regiment and various other units. It fielded a total of fifty Infantry battalions (19,285 men), forty–one Cavalry companies (3,405 Cavalry men), 143 machine guns and sixty–nine Artillery pieces.

In addition to the above forces on the three fronts there were in reserve the 5 Caucasus Division in Amasya, the National Assembly Battalion in Ankara and various other units. The total strength of the reserves was fifteen Infantry battalions (6,000 men), seven Cavalry companies (450 Cavalry men), thirty–nine machine guns and forty Artillery pieces.

92. The evening of 9 March, the combat forces of the Turkish Army numbered 31,752 Infantry, 5,232 Cavalry, 296 machine guns and 152 Artillery pieces and it was deployed in the following manner:



Sketchmap 10. The Disposition of the Opposing Forces on the Eve of 9 March 1921.

The Kojaeli Group (the Nicomedia Front) at Geyve, with 7 Division opposite Greek IX Division in the Geyve area, the combat team at Gol Pazar and the irregulars with the militiamen in the area of Ada Pazari – Tatarkoy.

The Western Front (Eskishehir) with its Headquarters at Eskishehir had the following forces available (Sketchmaps 10, 11). The divisions were deployed at the advanced defensive area of Kopruhisar – Nazifpasha: 1 Division reinforced with an Infantry regiment in the area of Yenishehir – Inegol and 3 Cavalry Division opposite the Greek VII Division. The remaining three divisions at the Inonu defensive area (61 on the right, 24 in the center and 11 on the left) were deployed.

The Southern Front (Afyon Karahisar) with its Headquarters at Iconium had: (Sketchmap 10) XII Army Corps (comprising 23 and 57 Divi-

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sions) deployed in the defensive area of Dumlupinar, 2 Cavalry Division in the area of Sandikli, 8 Division in the area of Bal Karahisar as reserve, 41 Division on a march from Iconium to Afyon Karahisar; 4 Division at Alayunt, 1 Cavalry Division at Kutahya and one Infantry regiment together with irregulars at Saraykoy, Chivril and Denizli. In the interim 5 Caucasus Division was on a march from Amasya towards Ankara, the National Guard Battalion in Ankara and two model regiments (one of them Cavalry regiment) at Iconium.

TABLE: THE OPPOSING FORCES COMPARED

Fronts	Riflemen		Cavalry (Sabered)		Machine Guns		Guns	
	Greeks	Turks	Greeks	Turks	Greeks	Turks	Greeks	Turks
Nicomedia	5,130	4,126	66	___	72	16	16	4
Eskishehir (Western)	18,990	12,341	911	1,377	252	98	104	39
Afyon Karahisar (Southern)	15,450	19,285	290	3,405	192	143	104	69
Interior	12,665	6,000	___	450	120	39	36	40
Totals	52,235	41,752	1,267	5,232	636	296	260	152

Advance of Army Corps C and Initial Contact with the Right Flank of the Inonu Area.

93. On the morning of 10 March, the Greek Field Army began to advance (Army Corps A and C) according to the operation plan.

Army Corps C moved eastwards with the X, III and VII Division in line and the Cavalry Brigade leading (Sketchmap 11). The Cavalry Brigade (minus a battalion) sent forward four reconnaissance sections and with the rest of its forces advanced following the carriage road Tibos – Yenishehir, overran a weak Turkish resistance at Koyunkoy and bypassed the advance guard of X Division, which had reached near Menteshe. At Yenishehir the advance guard of the brigade drove back a small enemy force and entered the town at 1300. Following that the brigade secured the bridges of Gallus River until the deployment of outposts by the X Division. Then the brigade retired.

X Division at 1700 advanced in a single column along the carriage road Borjun – Menteshe – Yenishehir. A small detachment covered the column from the north. The advance guard of the division with the assistance of the Cavalry Brigade easily overran the enemy resistance in the area Selimiye and Koyunkoy and continued its advance behind the brigade. At 1300 it entered Yenishehir, and from there it advanced about five kilometers to the east.

The battalion, which was operating as flank guard on the left of the position, advanced from Hajilar through Bolvadin towards the Pabujak saddle, which it captured at 1700 after a brief skirmish. The battalion remained at the saddle until the end of the operation. The rest of the forces of X Division arrived at Yenishehir.

III Division advanced in a single column on the Tibos – Bogazkoy Bridge – Bilejik pack track from 0630. The advance guard of the column easily overran small Turkish forces and, at 1000 arrived before the Bogazkoy heights, where a Turkish Infantry regiment with an Artillery battery was deployed. At 1050 the division's advance guard attacked the Turkish forces, overran them and captured the village at 1145. Afterwards they crossed the Bogazkoy bridge and at 1800 arrived north of Findikli where they established outposts. The rest of the division arrived and spent the night at Yeni Yoruk along with the division's Headquarters.

VII Division advanced in three columns on the carriage road Aksu – Inegol – Hasan Pasha – Pazaryeri from 0700. The left (northern) column, comprising two battalions, followed the route Aksu – Sivrili, easily repulsing light enemy resistance north of Abazlik, at 1600 reached Sivrili. The central column comprising five battalions followed the carriage road from Aksu to Hasan Pasha covered by the divisional Cavalry. Having overrun light enemy resistance at Akhisar, it entered Inegol at approximately 1100. At 1800, one of the battalions captured the Hasan Pasha bridge and deployed outposts. The remaining forces encamped four kilometers east of Inegol. The northern column comprising two battalions followed the route Seyfetiye – Ortakoy. Having easily overrun small enemy sections, it arrived and encamped at Ortakoy.

The Turkish forces of 1 Infantry Division, reinforced with an Infantry regiment and 3 Cavalry Division, withdrew the first day of the Greek advance to the line Injirli – Nazifpasha.

94. In the morning of 11 March, the same day that Army Corps A had begun its attack against the Dumlupinar position, Army Corps C continued its advance driving back the forward Turkish sections.

The Cavalry Brigade continue to move along the route Yenishehir – Akdere – Gok Su towards the carriage road Kopruhisar – Bilejik. Its objective was to cut off the withdrawal of the enemy forces defending the Injirli area. But by the time the Brigade reached the carriage road, these forces had withdrawn further to the east.

X Division continued its advance towards Bilejik in two columns, also aiming to cut off the Turkish forces defending Injirli. At 0800, the left column with the field and Heavy Artillery moved along the carriage road. Having left a company at Kopruhisar with two machine guns and two Artillery pieces to

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secure the bridge, it continued its advance without meeting any enemy resistance and arrived north of Bilejik. The right column moved at 0700 following the pack trail through the Akdere bridges towards Injirli. The advance was unhindered and at dusk the division deployed outposts on the heights four kilometers west of the village Pelit Ozu.

III Division continued its advance in a single column towards the Kintirli area from 0620. At 1700 it reached its objective unhindered and deployed outposts.

VII Division, after deploying a standing flank guard comprising one battalion with two guns at Makmaja, continued its advance at 0900 in three columns as per the day before. The left column advanced along the route Sivrili to Elmali Kebir. At 1730 it reached unhindered the heights northwest of Elmali Kebir where it deployed its outposts. The central column moved as of 0900 along the carriage road. Its advance proceeded smoothly and by dusk reached Bazi Sultan where it deployed its outposts. The right column advanced along the route Kinik – Gude. After overrunning slight Turkish resistance on the heights southwest of Kinik and another east of Uzunja, it reached Gude where it encamped.

When their positions at Injirli were seized, the Turkish leadership ordered 1 Infantry Division to withdraw behind the Kovalicha area and 3 Cavalry Division to secure the line Aksu – Teke – Boz Pinar. At the same time they ordered the divisions in Ankara to start moving towards Eskishehir.

Based on the tactical situation that had been created, Army Corps C decided to continue the advance the next morning with III Division up to Sogut, X up to Kurtkoy and VII up to Pazaryeri. The decision of Army Corps C to cross the routes of III and X Divisions at Bilejik aimed at shifting the stronger III Division to the left. Then, I Division together with the Cavalry Brigade would form the maneuver force of the army corps.

95. On 12 March, the third day of the advance, when Army Corps A moved towards Karahisar, Army Corps C continued its advance with its left flank preceding. The Cavalry Brigade, moving in front of X Division, entered Bilejik without battle and left a company there.

Then, it was put at the head of III Division and moved along the carriage road to Sogut, northwest of Yenikoy it attacked the Turkish 5 Infantry Regiment deployed there and pursued up to Sogut. At about 1500 the brigade clashed with advanced Turkish sections that occupied the heights of Yagisahlat south of Sogut. After an on the spot reconnaissance aiming to identify the extent of the occupied front, the Brigade returned to Yenikoy.

III Division began its advance at 0630 and arrived at 1030 at Bilejik where the first units of X Division had already entered. From there III Division continued its advance following the Cavalry Brigade moving to Sogut. At 1600 the advance guard of the division arrived at Yenikoy where it deployed outposts.

X Division advanced in a column from 0700 and at 0945 arrived at Bilejik where they interrupted their march to allow III Division to pass by. At 1600 the division, having left a company at Bilejik, resumed its march towards Kopru where it arrived unhindered at 1840 and deployed outposts to the north.

VII Division continued its advance towards Pazaryeri in two columns. The left column comprising five battalions moved at 0930 along the highway. By nighttime it had occupied Pazaryeri without fighting and deployed outposts just to the east. The right column comprising three battalions moved 0900 and occupied Arapdeli where it deployed outposts. At 1600 a battalion with an artillery battery was forwarded at Findikli.

The advanced Turkish forces, except for 3 Cavalry Division, withdrew to the defensive area Avgin – Kovalicha, occupied by three divisions (61, 24 and 11), while 4 Infantry Division, 1 Cavalry Division and a detachment from the Kojaeli Group had rushed to reinforce them. Following the battle at Dumlupinar on the southern front (Afyon Karahisar), the Turkish staff began to consider the transport of the largest part of the forces of that front to Eskishehir in order to achieve greater superiority and give the decisive battle there. For this reason, it decided to reinforce the Western Front (Eskishehir) with two divisions (4 Infantry and 1 Cavalry) and twenty Artillery pieces from the southern front.

96. On the morning of 13 March, while XI Division at the Nicomedia front had captured Ada Pazari, Army Corps C continued its advance with divisions III and X in executing its planned maneuver (Sketchmap 12).

The Cavalry Brigade continued its advance from the morning pushing back advanced Turkish sections and at 0930 arrived before the Turkish defensive area northwest of Sogut.

From 0630 in the morning, III Division moved in a column towards Sogut – Avgin following the Cavalry Brigade. At 0930 they reached the level of the advance units of the Cavalry Brigade, which had gained contact with the Turkish forces. At 1200 the Artillery preparation began and at 1330 the division overcame enemy resistance and captured the heights covering Sogut. The advance together with the Cavalry Brigade continued with Artillery support, under sustained fire from the Turkish Artillery. At 1730 they reached a point five kilometers southeast of Sogut where they gained contact with the organized Turkish defensive areas of Avgin – Hayriye. At 1800 the battle was interrupted and the division deployed outposts in the positions they had seized. The Cavalry Brigade encamped at Sogut for the night.

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X Division, aiming to move from the left to the center of the Greek offensive disposition began its movement in a single column at 1200 following initially the carriage road to Kuplu, and then the cart–road to Kurtkoy. The division arrived at this area where it encamped while 28 Infantry Regiment was forwarded to the village Domez.

VII Division remained in place and only one of its battalions with two Artillery pieces advanced to Ahmetler.

Because Army Corps C had not had by the evening of 13 March accurate information about the defensive area occupied by the Turks, it decided, based on air reconnaissance and the tactical situation that had developed up to that time, to continue the advance from 0600 next day. For that purpose it allocated all its forces to the first echelon, ordering the divisions to attack wherever they encountered resistance. On the contrary the Turkish Command having accurate information about the movement of the Greek forces was preparing to defend the right and the center of the Inonu area and to launch a counterattack against the right flank of Army Corps C.

On 14 March, when Army Corps A had captured Afyon Karahisar, the battle of Avgin began on the Northern Front. The organized defensive area on Inonu protected Eskishehir and began from the rocky heights of Chalti Dere immediately south of Avgin. The area generally faced southwest and included the heights of Kanlisirt, Metres Tepe and Izzettin Tepe to the south and southeast of Avgin. It continued following the heights west of Yenikoy and crossed the railway line Constantinople – Eskishehir at Akpinar. From there the area continued towards the west including the heights Topsu Tepe – Intikam Tepe. From there it turned to the southwest up to Boz Alan and ending at Choban Tepe (included). The front of the defensive area did not exceed the thirty kilometers in a straight line provided excellent observation extensive fields of fire and secured lines of communication.

The area Avgin – Kovalicha, which the Turks called the Inonu area, had been selected in June 1920 to confront a probable Greek offensive to Eskishehir. Since then it had been organized with many deep trenches and other field defensives, as well as barbed wire. Its flanks were anchored to the southeast the difficult terrain of the valley of Sakarya and to the south east on the massif of Chilkich Tepe. There was another area to the east of the Inonu area, that of the heights Beshkardesh to Oklubali village (Sketchmap 12).

97. At 0620 on 14 March, the Turkish Artillery in Avgin commenced firing against the first sections of III Division and then against the whole depth of the divisions disposition.

The Cavalry Brigade, which at noon had moved from Dudash followed the route Kishla – Ahirkoy immediately to the east of Riza Pasha, in order to secure the left flank of III Division. When its advance guard arrived four kilometers southeast of Avgin, it encountered Turkish troops, it pushed them back and with its machine guns fired against the flanks of the Turkish forces fighting with III Division. After this the Turkish troops were forced to withdraw from the battlefield abandoning many killed. The brigade remained in the occupied area, until 0200 hours of 15 March when it moved to the Dudash area.

III Division advanced towards Avgin with one regiment in first echelon, followed by the other two behind and to the left.


When the preceding 12 Infantry Regiment arrived before the heights of Avgin met strong enemy resistance and was forced to deploy its three battalions in order to continue its movement. At 1130, 6 Infantry Regiment, which followed with orders to attack against Kanlisirt hill southwest of Avgin village, was also engaged in the fighting. At 1400 while I Division was taking attack formation, a Turkish unit of regiment strength appeared to its left. To counter this threat the division deployed 2/39 Evzone Regiment that had not been engaged up to that time. At 1515 the two Greek Infantry regiments began their attack. The Turks occupied the heights of Avgin with thirteen battalions and resisted vigorously. Both sides struggled tenaciously into the evening hours without positive result. The Greek regiments held their positions throughout the night.

X Division continued its advance in two columns. The left (eastern) column, comprising an Infantry regiment, moved from Domez towards Poyra, and overran the Turkish troops at hill Chiplak Tepe, seized it and deployed to its south. The right (western) column, comprising two Infantry regiments, moved via Akchapinar towards Yenikoy under Turkish artillery fire. At 0930 the advance guard clashed with the Turkish forces occupying the heights from Akchapinar – Hamidiye. After a five hour battle the Turks were forced to withdraw towards Yenikoy to avoid being encircled. At 1500 the Greek column seized Akchapinar and deployed outposts four kilometers farther to the south.

VII Division reinforced with the Heavy Artillery battalion moved in two columns and forwarded more to the east the battalion at Karajakaya. The left column comprising two Infantry regiments left one battalion at Ahmetler and then moved from Pazaryeri towards Bozuyuk along the highway. At 0800 VII divisional Cavalry entered the defile there and arrived unmolested at Bekleme. While descending the spiral road towards Karakoy, the advance guard came under Infantry fire. At 1030 a battalion was ordered to move towards Hamidiye because it was assumed that breaking through the defile would be difficult. The battalion climbed the heights east of Karakoy and arrived to the west of Hamidiye with the support of the advance guard.

At 1300 the Turkish defenders of the defile were forced to withdraw, and thus the advance guard of the column entered it and continued its

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Sketchmap 12. Battle in the Region Metres Tepe – Avgin – Kovalicha, 15–18 March 1921.

advance under artillery fire. In the meantime another battalion passed through Karakoy and arrived unchallenged at Hamidiye where the first battalion had already arrived. From there the two battalions moved towards Bozuyuk but they were informed that the division had not reached the southern exit of the defile, then the battalion changed direction and entered the defile at midnight.

The advance guard of the left column exited the valley of Karasu at 0730 and continued its advance towards Bozuyuk. At 1800 overran light Turkish troops from the heights west of Bozuyuk and deployed outposts five kilometers to the northwest where the rest forces of the column assembled.

The right column comprising one regiment moved quickly from Arapdeli towards Ovajik from 0600. At 1400 while descending from Alajadag towards Ovajik, came under fire from the direction of Kizilja Pinar. In a lightening action, the column overrun the Turkish resistance and deployed outposts near the village Alajadag.

The Turkish forces who made a stand south of the railway line belonged to the left group of the Western Front comprising 11 Infantry Division and 3 Cavalry Division, that were moving to capture the Alajadag area. At 1330 the commander of the Western Front understood the situation of the above forces and ordered their withdrawal at the main defensive area. At the same time forwarded 4 Division from Karaagach – Bozuyuk to protect the left flank of 24 Division at the center until the arrival of the left group.

Attack against Inonu, and the Capture of Kanlisirt, Metres Tepe and Kovalicha

98. Army Corps C decided to continue its attack from the morning of 15 March (Sketchmap 12). After that the battle of III Division was renewed while further to the west X and VII Divisions were moving to gain contact with the Avgin – Kovalicha area (Inonu). The Cavalry Brigade reconnoitered further to the east.

III Division continued its attack from the first light with 12 Regiment reinforced with one battalion against Kanlisirt and 6 Regiment against Avgin village. The Kanlisirt Heights were captured after fierce fighting and the Turks retreated in disorder towards Hayriye. At 0820 a Turkish battalion counterattacked in the direction of Kanlisirt at the same time that 6 Regiment reached the northern edge of Avgin village. At the southern edge of the village five Turkish battalions were defending in trenches which were protected by double, and in some places triple, lines of barbed wire. Machine guns had been deployed in village houses to protect the entrenchment's flanks. On reaching the wire, 6 Regiment found itself under sustained Turkish fire from the front and the flanks and it was impossible to continue its

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advance. At 0930 the Greek forces at Kanlisirt were counterattacked fiercely by six Turkish battalions but they successfully repulsed the attack.

The battle on III Division's front continued fiercely when the third regiment (2/39 Evzone Regiment) was engaged and continued its attack towards Uch Shehitler (northeast of Hayriye). The Turks defended stubbornly and repeatedly counterattacked. Most officers of 2/39 Evzone Regiment became casualties. The commander of the regiment, Colonel (Inf) Demosthenes Zoitopoulos, was wounded, his replacement, Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Gregorios Stamatelakos was killed and at 1150 command of the regiment was assumed by Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Ioannes Drosinos, Deputy Commander of 6 Infantry Regiment. The battle continued in full force until 1300 when it abated for about an hour. At 1400 the Greek forces resumed the attack and succeeded in seizing Kanlisirt.

At 1420 the Turks blocked the advance of 2/30 Evzone Regiment after fierce bombardment. Then they launched repeated unsuccessful counterattacks with four battalions while at the same time a counterattack was launched against 6 Infantry Regiment at Avgin.

By 1800, when the combat ended, the Turks had launched twenty–two fierce counterattacks against the right flank of III Division which were repulsed in hand to hand combat. The consumption of ammunition was enormous due to the fierceness of the fighting and by the evening the shortage became evident. III Division's losses were heavy totaling twelve officers killed and forty–eight wounded and 800 enlisted men out of action.

From 0830 X Division continued its advance in two columns. The left column, comprising two battalions, followed the road towards Chepni, while the right column, comprising seven battalions, followed the path Kara Bakir – Chepni. At about 1130 the advance guard of the column clashed with forwarded enemy troops southwest of the Duz Dag Heights and pushed them back. Then, despite the Heavy Artillery fire, it advanced quickly and gained contact with the Turkish forces occupying the heights of Metres Tepe. At 1600 both columns began their attack. In less than two hours they seized the strongly organized positions of the heights of Metres Tepe. These heights, along with Kanlisirt, were the key to the defense of the Turkish right flank. The Turkish forces retreated towards Chepni leaving behind killed and prisoners, as well as eight Artillery pieces. After pursuing the Turks approximately 1,000 meters south of Teke, the Greek troops which had made the attack returned to Metres Tepe. The rest of the division's sections deployed between Duz Dag and Metres Tepe.

VII Division also advanced in two columns keeping two battalions in reserve. The left (eastern) column comprising three battalions supported by a battalion of Field and another one of Heavy Artillery and one Pack Artillery

battery advanced from 0600 under heavy Turkish Artillery fire. Despite this, the two battalions of the first echelon close to the barbed wire of the Turkish defensive area which stretched from Akpinar till the heights of Intikam Tepe where they were pinned down.

To the east, X divisional Cavalry covered the left flank of VII Division. At about 1900, when the attack was stalled, the Turks launched heavy Artillery and sustained Infantry fire. At the same time they attempted to retake the advanced Greek positions but were repulsed.

The right (western) column comprising three battalions and with another battalion which had been detached at Muratlar at its disposal moved out from the village of Alinja at 0600 and immediately came under Artillery fire from Kovalicha. Continuing it came under Infantry fire as soon as it passed the village of Kilich Pinar. However, it continued its advance toward Chay Dere where it met strongly organized positions of the Turkish 11 Division and was forced to remain on the heights between Sarayjik and Chay Dere. The detachment at Muratlar forwarded one company which joined the column while the remaining forces reached Bozuyuk at 2000.

On 15 March, Army Corps C confronted enemy forces amounting to fifty seven Infantry battalions, eight Cavalry regiments and fifty–six Artillery pieces, of which nine were heavy. The next day, 16 March, these forces were reinforced with seventeen more Infantry battalions, four Cavalry regiments and thirty–four Artillery pieces of which twenty–four were heavy. The Turkish troops awaiting reinforcements both from Ankara (National Assembly Battalion) and from forces of the Southern Front that were transferred towards Inonu (three divisions) deployed defensively in the morning of 16 March. The Greek forces that were to attack these Turkish forces on that day comprised twenty–six Infantry battalions, two Cavalry regiments and eighty–two Artillery pieces, of which forty–eight were pack, twenty–six field and eight heavy.

99. During 16 March, due to the expected maneuver of VII Division, the fighting was limited to a battle of attrition, pinning down the Turkish troops deployed at Inonu and an attack by a regiment of X Division aimed at supporting III Division.The Cavalry Brigade, having left a Cavalry battalion and the mounted battery with III Division, arrived at the village of Kepen and succeeded in establishing liaison between X and XIII Divisions.

III Division only engaged in a battle of attrition. X Division forwarded the reserve 30 Regiment through Metres Tepe towards Yoruk – Chepni. As it began its, the regiment came under Heavy Artillery fire from the front and the flanks as well as under Infantry fire from the area south of Hayriye. However the regiment passed Chepni village and attacked the heights to the north

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of it where sections of Turkish 4 Division were deployed defensively. The attack lasted until dawn without substantial results due to the sustained enemy fire. The regiment interrupted the battle and returned to the division's assembly area.

VII Division reinforced its right column with a detachment (one and a half battalions). The detachment arrived southeast of Chay Dere in the morning of 16 March and continued its advance towards Kapan Alan. As soon as it entered Chay Dere valley it was fired upon by Artillery and forced to move towards Cherkez Kaya. At 0900 it reached the ridgeline from where it repulsed the Turkish 3 Cavalry Division which had been heading for the same ridgeline. At 1325 the detachment reached the heights southwest of Dari Dere. It easily repelled a Turkish attack and pushed on towards the heights south of Karaagach which seized at 1600 after overrunning their Turkish defenders.

VII Division's attack against the Kovalicha Heights was postponed for the next day due to the delay of the execution of the maneuver by the above-mentioned detachment. However, the postponement of the attack made the regiment's position insecure. Threatened to be pinned down it was forced at 2300 to retire further to the west towards the heights of Cherkez Kaya.

100. By the evening of 16 March, Army Corps C had engaged all its reserves and decided to continue the attack with all its divisions next morning. At the same time it ordered the shift of the Cavalry Brigade from the left to the right of its disposition, that was threatened by forces of Ismet Inonu that were continuously forwarded towards this direction .

From 1100 on the 17 March the Cavalry Brigade advanced towards Bozuyuk which it reached at 1530. From there it advanced towards Sarayjik but because VII Division's struggle at Akpinar was not progressing favorably it turned to that direction. During the night, when the situation had improved, the brigade returned to Bozuyuk.

Until 1400, III and X Divisions had not succeeded in coordinating their action. At 1455, one hour before X Division's jump–off and after a five minute preparation, III Division began its attack with 6 Infantry Regiment and 2/39 Evzone Regiment in the first echelon. On the left, 6 Infantry Regiment seized the northern edge of Avgin and the heights immediately east of it. On the right, 2/39 Evzone Regiment, which had been reinforced with a battalion, after fierce fighting with the bayonet captured hill Uch Shehitler, 800 meters southeast of Kanlisirt. At 1700 it was fiercely counterattacked and, lacking Artillery support and ammunition, they were forced to withdraw to Kanlisirt. The Commander of the Regiment, (Inf) Philippos Samantas was killed during the attack.

X Division attacked the Topsu Tepe heights at 1400 with four battalions, of which two were in first echelon and two followed. Despite heavy losses, the troops steadily advanced towards their objective. At 1800 a battalion of the reserves was forwarded to the first echelon and Topsu Tepe was stormed and seized. But the Greek troops immediately came under sustained fire from the front and the left flank. A little later, they were counter attacked by six Turkish battalions. After fierce close combat the Turks were repelled and only succeeded in seizing one small hill on the left.

At 1830 the Greek battalions, of which all company commanders and most other officers had been put out of action, regrouped and consolidated on the positions they had captured. At this point an engineer company arrived.

While the above attack was taking place, Turkish 61 Division launched a counter attack against the right flank of X Division while Turkish cavalry attacked its forces at Duz Dag. Both Turkish attacks were successfully repulsed.

The commander of the Western Front been aware of the unfavorable development of the situation in the Kovalicha area and the Greek inertia at the central and right flanks of the front, he withdrew Turkish 4 Division and ordered it to move towards Oluklu. At about 1400 when III and X Division began their attack, Turkish 24 Division was ordered to withdraw and Turkish 4 Division to move immediately in order to take part in the Hayriye battle.

101. VII Division, having completed the required movements on the previous day, attacked with two regiments in first echelon on the morning of 17 March. After an intense ten minute bombardment, 22 Infantry Regiment on the left attacked, against the Turkish positions on the heights of Kovalicha at 0500. The Greek troops succeeded in breeching the barbed wire which was still intact after the bombardment and then to mop up the trenches at bayonet point. The Turks withdrew after fiercely defending every inch of the ground. At 0700 the Greek troops seized the heights east of Intikam Tepe and continued the attack to the east.

From 1300 the attacks of 22 Regiment alternated with continual Turkish counterattacks. The battle continued with the bayonets with stubbornness and courage exhibited by both sides until 2000, when the Greek troops finally captured a vital hill near Akpinar.

On the right, 37 Infantry Regiment jumped off simultaneously with 22 Infantry Regiment on the left, with two battalions in the first echelon. One of these attacked the Intikam Tepe and the other the heights to the south. The attacking battalions captured the first enemy trenches and, at 0800 the battalion to the right seized Karaagach and moved towards Kandilli.

At the same time, the attack of the left battalion towards Kovalicha grew difficult from the vigorous enemy resistance. From 1015, the advance of

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both battalions became impossible. A coordinated attack was launched at 1700 from the left by II/37 Battalion with 22 Infantry Regiment towards the heights immediately west of Akpinar. The battle was fierce. The Turks had twelve battalions and by repeated counter attacks managed to hold back the Greek troops.

Shortly afterwards II/37 Battalion launched a flanking attack, succeeded in repulsing a Turkish counterattack, and lifted the morale of the Greek fighters, who renewed their attack and forced the Turks to withdraw. In the meantime, a detachment of one battalion and a two–company force of 23 Infantry Regiment arrived at 1400 and captured the heights east of the Dari Dere stream.

The commander of the Western Front, noticing that Army Corps A at Afyon Karahisar had not moved towards the north, but remained south of the line Kazli Gol Hamam – Chatal Cheshme, assessed that the corps would not turn north. Based on this assessment, he requested that the 2 Cavalry Division, which was at Doger (Sketchmap 10), be transferred towards Eskishehir. At the same time, he ordered the reinforcement and redisposition of the forces on his left flank in order to face any possible envelopment on this side.

The General Staff in Ankara approved the request of the commander of the Western Front. After this, the commander of the Southern Front left 4 Brigade at Doger and at 2200, departed towards Alayunt with his Headquarters and 2 Cavalry Division, comprising five cavalry regiments, (three organic and two of 1 Cavalry Division).

102. At 2000 of 17 March Army Corps C, unaware of the restoration of the Turkish lines of defense and the reinforcements at the enemy front, ordered that the attack should continue on 18 March with II Division attacking towards Poyra and X and III Divisions towards Poyra – Riza Pasha. The Cavalry Brigade would secure the right flank. The forces that the Turks had gathered at the Avgin – Inonu – Kovalicha area comprised a total of seventy–seven Infantry battalions, seven Cavalry regiments, one Cavalry battalion and seven divisional Cavalry companies.

From the morning of 18 March on the front of III Division the battle of attrition resumed. Due to its losses on the previous day and the exposure of its right flank as a result of the withdrawal of 28 Infantry Regiment, X Division could not undertake offensive operations. At 1430, after repulsing the advanced 28 Regiment of X Division, the Turks attacked the right flank of III Division at Kanlisirt but they were repulsed. They then resumed their attacks against both its flanks until 1800 when the fighting was interrupted. III Division maintained its positions except for 6 Regiment on the left which withdrew to the heights immediately north of Avgin at 2000.

X Division having forwarded and reinforced 28 Infantry Regiment

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with a battalion at midnight 17/18 March, was informed about its situation. It was decided nevertheless that an immediate decision was not required and that they would take the necessary measures in the morning. At 0640, following an Artillery preparation, the Turks attacked the front and the unprotected left flank of the regiment mentioned above with seven Infantry battalions and one Cavalry company. The attack was supported by the entire Turkish Artillery deployed in the area Oluklu – Chepni. The Greek regiment stood its ground for twenty minutes. When it began to be outflanked the men lost heart and the soldiers began to retreat in disorder in various directions. They suffered heavy losses, especially in officers. Lieutenant Colonel Chrestos Chrestou, commander of the Infantry regiment, was among the casualties.

Following their success, the Turks continued their efforts towards Metres Tepe. At 1400, Turkish 4 Division launched the frontal attack while other units attacked the flanks from the heights northwest of Hayriye. The attack was repulsed by four battalions of X Division. However, after five days of battle and heavy losses, the men of the division began to show signs of battle fatigue and low morale. To this contributed significantly the debacle of 28 Regiment.

At 1300 the commander of Army Corps C reported the situation to the Field Army and requested permission to withdraw. His request was approved. After this, at 1240, orders were given to X Division to withdraw further to the west to the heights Duz Dag – Gunarik if it were not able to maintain Metres Tepe. III Division was to pin down the enemy forces opposite its sector and VII Division to attack towards Poyra.

The withdrawal of the sections of X Division which were at the front-line started at 1900 without being detected by the Turks. The division arrived and encamped south of Kara Bakir. Its advanced 28 Regiment reconstituted at Kurtkoy.

VII Division that had already received an order to attack towards Poyra, at 0900 received another similar order firing as its objective the relief of the pressure against X Division. After this, the division ordered 37 Infantry Regiment on the right flank to attack towards Poyra and the its flanking detachment (a battalion and a two–company force of 23 Infantry Regiment) towards Inonu. At 0945, the time the above forces were preparing for the attack towards Poyra, the flanking detachment was attacked from the front and flank by strong Cavalry troops supported by Artillery. The detachment defended decisively and, reinforced by an Infantry and a Cavalry battalion, disengaged successfully.

Due to the critical situation of its flanking detachment, VII Division postponed the attack towards Poyra, which was finally cancelled. Its sections remained in the occupied positions and only 37 Cavalry Regiment withdrew to the heights of Kovalicha – Akpinar during the night.

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Withdrawal of Army Corps C to the Prusa Area

103. In the early morning hours of 19 March Turkish 1 and 4 Divisions moved out towards the heights north of Avgin and towards Metres Tepe immediately north of Teke respectively (Sketchmap 11). They seized these positions at 0330 without resistance as the Greek sections had already withdrawn. At 0915 the commander of Army Corps C asked to return to its original positions in Prusa until the arrival of reinforcements from the interior of the country. The Field Army authorized the withdrawal the same day and assigned a Railroad battalion to dispatch a two–company force to Kopruhisar and the Independent Veikos Battalion to move towards Bilejik.

As soon as the Turks discovered the withdrawal of X Division towards Akchapinar and VII Division to the heights Akpinar – Kovalicha, they attacked against both flanks of Army Corps C. They also attacked the flanks of III Division immediately after they had occupied Metres Tepe which had been deserted by X Division, and the heights north of Avgin from which 6 Infantry Regiment of III Division had withdrawn. At 0630, III Division sent forward the Cavalry battalion of the Cavalry Brigade on the left and the divisional Cavalry on the right to protect its flanks. However the division's situation became critical and there was a danger of being overrun. At 0800, to avoid such a possibility the division issued an order of withdrawal to be conducted in the event of Turkish pressure.

At 1020, 2/39 Evzone Regiment of III Division was attacked in force. The attack was repelled after close combat with bayonets and hand grenades. At the same time, the left section of the division confronted other Turkish forces. The division repelled similar attacks. Its regiments, besides the enemy attacks, suffered also by the fire of the Turkish Heavy Artillery. III Division's Artillery (three and one half batteries) could not sufficiently support the Infantry due to the lack of ammunition and the range of the guns. At 1630 Turkish 61 Division attacked 2/39 Evzone Regiment at Kanlisirt in coordination with an attack of two battalions of 1 Division towards Avgin. III Division had no reserves and could not reinforce 2/39 Evzone Regiment. Fighting alone with incomparable courage, the regiment initially repelled the enemy attack in hand to hand combat. However, faced by the numerical superiority of the enemy (eight battalions and more than twenty Artillery pieces) the regiment bent and finally was forced to withdraw. The entire III Division was forced in that manner to withdraw immediately north of Sogut by 2100. From there the division continued its movement towards Yenikoy where the last sections arrived at 2030 on 20 March.

Having discovered the disadvantages of the Duz Dag – Gunarik line to which they had withdrawn, X Division, on its own initiative, withdrew to heights northeast of Kara Bakir at 0800 on 19 March. This action opened a gap between the division and the other two, neighboring divisions and exposed its flanks.

Having withdrawn on 18 March to the heights of Kovalicha with one battalion north of Sarayjik, VII Division decided to continue its withdrawal during the day to the line Akchapinar – Ovajik. Around noon, one battalion with a pack battalion moved towards Akchapinar and seized the southern exit of the Karakoy defile while maintaining liaison with the Cavalry battalion of the Cavalry Brigade which was west of Kara Bakir in order to cover the gap which X Division had created. In the meantime, however, the Turkish troops on the left flank were moving to cut off the withdrawal of Army Corps C. To avoid being cut off, VII Division ordered its battalion at Sarayjik to move to the heights of Kizilja Pinar. At 1930 upon its arrival there the battalion met an enemy cavalry company which it force to retire and deployed guard posts for the surveillance of the Ovajik defile.

At around sunset, 22 Infantry Regiment, which was holding the line at the heights of Akpinar – Kovalicha, was attacked from the Inonu Valley. The attack that followed lasted for two hours and was repelled along the entire front.

104. On the night of 19 March Army Corps C decided to temporarily deploy its divisions in a defensive area, and later to freely make final decision on their definite deployment. Following this decision at 2250 VII Division was ordered to occupy the line Akchapinar – Ovajik during the night 19/20 March, which it would defend from 20 March. The other divisions would remain in their positions and the Cavalry Brigade would cover the gap between X and VII Divisions. Later, however, at 0300 of the 20 March when the army corps was informed of the situation of III Division, it was forced to amend the decision and to order at 0415 the withdrawal of the divisions to their original assembly areas.

III Division moved from Yenikoy towards Bilejik at 0700. At around 1400 they arrived northwest of Bilejik and deployed outposts.

From 0800, X Division moved in one column along the route Kurtkoy – Damlar – Abazlik. By nightfall it reached the area of Suluz and encamped there. The Turkish forces on the right and at the center sent forward detachments which gained contact with the rear guard of III and X Divisions.

During the night VII Division disengaged its troops who were in contact with the enemy. At 0200 on 20 March, 37 Infantry Regiment withdrew from the heights of Kovalicha and under cover from the battalion at Kizilja Pinar moved to deploy on the line at Ovajik. During its movement, it received orders to continue through the Buratlar defile towards Bakmaja. After an uninterrupted march it arrived west of Nazifpasha where it encamped at 1700. Due to an engagement of the division's rear guard, one of the battalions was cut off from the column and continued its advance towards Bakmaja. This battalion took the wrong route and having wandered for eighteen hours,

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arrived east of the northern exit of the Buratlar defile. The remaining forces of III Division broke contact with the enemy at the Akpinar heights and moved towards Karakoy defile from 0200. From there they continued their march along the highway and arrived at Nazifpasha 15.00. The Cavalry Brigade (minus one battalion) initially preceded VII Division until the Karakoy defile and then formed its rear guard up to Nazifpasha.

105. In the morning of 21 March Army Corps C continued its movement. III Division, with the Cavalry battalion of the Cavalry Brigade covering its flank, began at 0630 to move from the area of Bilejik towards Kopruhisar, where its first troops began to arrive at 1300. The division stopped for the night on the western bank of the Gallus River. X Division moved in one column from Suluz towards Ihsaniye and arrived there at 1600.

From 0200, VII Division moved in two columns covered by the Cavalry Brigade. The southern column comprising one Infantry regiment reached the Kinik defile at 0500 and continued from there to Seyfetiye. The column's progress was steady even though it was harassed by the enemy from both sides until Yenije. At 0800 they arrived and encamped at their initial positions in Seyfetiye. The northern column comprising two Infantry regiments followed the carriage road towards Inegol from 0200. The Turkish 3 Cavalry Division followed the column and repeatedly attacked its rear guard. Approximately 1,000 meters east of Inegol the rear guard was attacked fiercely and this created disorder. Furthermore, the Turkish residents of the area took courage from the Turkish Cavalry presence in the area and fired upon the Greek troops from the windows of their houses. Order was restored west of Inegol with the arrival of a battalion of the main force. Then the column arrived at and encamped in their initial positions at Aksu.

On the morning of 22 March III and X Divisions continued their withdrawal while VII Division and the divisional Cavalry took defensive measures on the flanks of X Division. Before moving out, II Division sent forward the cavalry battalion of the Cavalry Brigade to link up with X Division. Then it moved towards Menteshe. During the withdrawal the Turks engaged the division's columns but to no effect.

X Division moved out of Ihsaniye at 0800 following the road towards the Tibos via Yeni Yoruk. During its march, residents of the villages of the area supported by troops of Turkish Cavalry attacked its rear guard. The rear guard was forced to fight and thus to separate from the main force of the division. In spite of all that, the rear guard crossed the Gallus River by the stone bridge at Bogazkoy and continued its march through the fields until Tibos.

VII Division and the Cavalry Brigade protected the southern flank of X Division, forwarding sections at advantageous spots along the entire route of withdrawal that same day.

106. After the return of X and VII Divisions to their defensive area, Army Corps C ordered the defensive organization of its zone of responsibility, and the continuation of movement III Division. After that III Division continued its withdrawal in the sector of Ermeni Selous the evening of 23 March.

The next day, 24 March, X Division assumed the responsibility of the central sector Tibos – Goljuk. On 25 March the Cavalry Brigade relocated from Kestel to Demirtash and the next day to Kios with a Cavalry battalion at Mudanya.

The losses of Army Corps C during the battle of Avgin – Kovalicha amounted to 4,285 men out of action, of which 211 were officers. Of those fifty–five officers and 652 enlisted men were killed, 149 officers and 2,926 were wounded and seven officers and 496 enlisted men were missing in action.

According to the information available, Turkish losses at the Western Front, not counting those of 11 Infantry Division, the 1 and 2 Cavalry Divisions, three Infantry regiments and the National Guard Battalion, amounted to 3,875 out of action, of which 156 were officers. Of these forty–four officers and 637 enlisted men were killed, 102 officers and 1,720 enlisted men were wounded, ten officers and 1,359 enlisted men were missing in action and three enlisted men were executed by the Turks themselves.

Operations of XI Division

107. XI Division at Nicomedia covered the Skoutari Peninsula from raids by the Kemalist Army and at the same time provided complete security for the bases of the Allied Occupation Forces at Constantinople (Sketchmaps 8, 10).

At 1530 on 11 March, the day after the operations of the Hellenic Field Army had begun, a detachment from XI Division two regiments strong moved through the southern shore of Lake Sapanja towards the town of the same name. They shortly came into contact with Turkish troops on the heights of Kirk Pinar. They forced them to flee, captured the heights and established outposts 1,000 meters to the east. The next day the detachment was reinforced with a two–company force and an Artillery platoon and moved towards Sapanja which it captured after brief fighting at 1030.

At 1200 the same day, XI Division was informed that it had seized to be under the control of the British Command and that it was free from that point to operate according to the orders of the Hellenic Field Army. Afterwards, the division ordered the continuation of its advance. The above detachment advanced from 1500 and, having overrun weak enemy resistance, occupied the line Ak Chay – Karagol and the heights southeast of Bozanjik by night time.

At 1100 on 15 March, having had no response from the Turks to its

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demand for the surrender of the city of Ada Pazari, the division ordered a battalion which was in Sartivan, east of Chubuklu, to advance and capture the city. The Turks put up weak resistance at Besh Kopru and then withdrew towards the bridge at Herenler, south of Ada Pazari. The Greek battalion entered the city at noon. At the same time, another battalion occupied Jontakoy, east of Kadras, without a struggle.

Two days later, on 15 March, the detachment was reinforced by another battalion and moved in two columns towards the southern exit of the Geyve defile. The height of the snow made the storming of the defile impossible and on 17 March it withdrew and deployed in the sector of Sangarius river up to Karagol.

On 25 and 26 March strong Turkish forces attacked the Greek forces at Bahchejik but they were repulsed. XI Division, after the operations described above, remained in its occupied positions with its headquarters at Nicomedia and the three regiments on the frontline.

Advance of Army Corps A and the Capture of Dumlupinar

108. On the morning of 10 March, Army Corps A moved with II and XII Divisions in line formation towards the fortified position of Dumlupinar (Sketchmap 13). It had left I Division (two regiments) and 3 Infantry Regiment of XIII Division in the Ushak – Bolvadin area to secure its zone of responsibility.

From 0700 II Division advanced in two columns astride the railroad line. The northern column, comprising an Infantry regiment, easily repulsed a Turkish battalion at Islamkoy and at 1400 captured the heights east of the line Samura – Islamkoy where it deployed outposts. The southern column, also comprising an Infantry regiment, seized the heights east of the village Erjiyes without a struggle and it deployed outposts in the afternoon. The third reserve regiment of the division moved to Derbent where it encamped.

XIII Division advanced in one column along the Kapaklar – Ahatkoy–Yatakli road beginning at 0700. At 1330 its advance guard of two battalions occupied the heights immediately east of Ahatkoy unopposed. The remaining forces of the division with the exception of one battalion which was directed from Kapaklar towards Banaz arrived at Ahatkoy.

The Turkish Command reinforced 23 Division in the area of Dumlupinar with 8 Infantry Division.

109. The defensive area of Dumlupinar began at the summit of Cede Tepe of Murat Dag, included the western ridges of Dumlupinar and crossed the railway line Smyrna – Ushak – Afyon Karahisar. Further to the south it included the ridgeline between the villages Buyukoturak and Kuchuk Oturak, east of the village Pazaryeri. In continuation it extended to the heights

of Akoluk, south of Pazaryeri and ended at the summit Toklu Tepe at Ahir Dagi. It was approximately eighteen kilometers wide and offered good observation and secure lines of withdrawal.

The defensive area of Dumlupinar had its north flank supported by the Hasan Dere Tepe summit of Murat Dag and its south by Akar Dag thus making impossible its envelopment. The Dumlupinar saddle and the surrounding heights dominated the Banaz valley to the west, blocked the defile from which the railway line passed and covered the routes from Ushak to Afyon Karahisar and to Altintash – Kutahya. East of the Dumlupinar area at a distance of thirty five kilometers there was another organized defensive area, defined by the line Resil Tepe ridges west of Yeshil Tepe village and Arapli Chiftlik heights east of Koprulu village – Yagjilar – Kalejik Dag. This area's flanks were supported by the foot of Resil Tepe to the north and Kalejik Dag to the south. Its width was approximately ten kilometers. In the middle of the area there was the Ushak – Arapli Chiftlik defile, through which passed the Akar River, the railroad line Ushak – Afyon Karahisar and the carriage road.

Finally, Kutahya was protected from the direction Ushak – Gediz by the heights immediately to the southwest and from the direction of Dumlupinar – Altintash by the heights Aba Dag and Elma Dagi to the north and northeast of the Porsuk River.

110. On the morning of 11 March Army Corps A continued its advance with the same formation. Its mission was to gain contact, attack and seize the Dumlupinar area.

II Division moved once again in two columns astride it. From 0900 the northern column (1 Infantry Regiment) advanced in the direction Halibad – Halijilar – Dumlupinar. They took a number of prisoners at Halijilar at 1530 it came under Artillery fire and later under Infantry flanking fire from the summit of Hasan Dere Tepe. It halted its movement until 1800 when the fire ceased and continued its advance. At 1900 it captured the heights northwest of Dumlupinar where it deployed outposts in contact with Turkish troops.

The southern column, 7 Regiment and 34 Regiment (minus a battalion), advanced in the direction Islamkoy – Karagozeli from 0800. At 1600, despite strong Turkish resistance, it captured the fortified heights south and east of Pashajik where it deployed outposts. The divisional Cavalry moved between the two columns following the railway line. The reserve battalion was sent forward to Banaz.

XIII Division continued its advance in one column from 0730. At 1100, the advance guard, following the cart road Ahatkoy – Emir Az – Ulukoy – Akar Dag, engaged in battle with a Turkish force of about 600 horsemen at

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the heights west of Chaltikoy. After an hour's fighting, the Turks fled. The advance guard continued its march and at 1700 reached the ridgeline of Akar Dag after a difficult march due to the depth of the snow. The forces of the division, forming the main body, encamped at Ulukoy.

On 11 March, the second day of the advance, II Division of Army Corps A took 304 prisoners, captured four Artillery pieces and equal number of machine guns and a significant quantity of military equipment. The exact number of the Turkish losses was never ascertained. The losses of Army Corps A amount to five enlisted men killed, two officers and fifteen enlisted men wounded.

The Turkish 23 Division, at the left of the area, realized in time the danger of being cut off by XIII Division and retreated towards Karagozeli.

111. On the morning of 12 March the advance of Army Corps A continued towards Afyon Karahisar.

II Division, unaware that the Turks had abandoned the heights east of Dumlupinar, captured them with its left column without resistance. Its right column remained at the occupied position east of Pashajik. The division moved also towards Buyukoturak and the heights north of Dumlupinar and captured them. As soon as it became aware of the withdrawal of the Turks to Altintash and Afyon Karahisar, it continued the advance in one column covered from the north by a flank guard.

At the same time II Division organized a detachment comprising 34 Infantry Regiment minus a battalion and a Field Artillery which deployed from 1400 to the hill immediately north of Dumlupinar. The remaining forces of the division continued their movement following the route to Chalishlar and arrived there at 1700 without meeting any enemy resistance. That evening it deployed outposts east of Chalishlar village.

XIII Division continued its advance in one column from the northern foothills of Akar Dag towards Elvan Pasha and from there to Sinan Pasha. The descent of the division towards Elvan Pasha and Tazler was very difficult due to the height of the snow, the steep paths and the muddy ground. Overcoming the difficulties of terrain and weather, the advance guard arrived at Guney at 1700 and deployed outposts on the line to the east of Guney – Tazler. The remaining forces of the division assembled during the night around Elvan Pasha.

The Battle of Afyon Karahisar

112. On 13 March Army Corps A continued its advance towards Afyon Karahisar under the cover of the detachment of 34 Infantry Regiment from

the direction of Altintash (Sketchmap 13). II and XIII Divisions advanced in line formation, with a total strength of thirteen battalions and an equal number of Artillery batteries.

II Division moved out in the direction Chalishlar – Bal Mahmut from 0630, covered by the flank guard until Ayvali. At 1200 its advance guard (7 Infantry Regiment) reached Ayvali unhindered and stopped for two hours before resuming its march. At 1600 the advance guard was forced to give battle to overrun Turkish troops holding the heights northeast of Bal Mahmut and to move forward, west of the villages Chatal Cheshme and Koprulu where it gained close contact with the defensive areas Koprulu – Kalejik Dag. The main body arrived two kilometers west of the railway station Bal Mahmut and deployed outposts.

XIII Division advanced in one column from 0700, following the route Guney – Sinan Pasha – Sinirkoy – Binali, In the afternoon its advance guard reached the line Binali – Sinirkoy and continued its movement towards the heights of Yagjilar, which constituted the right flank of the Turkish disposition. After a brief battle the advance guard succeeded in moving forward up to a distance of 500 meters before the main Turkish line of resistance and to consolidate there. The remaining forces of the division arrived at Sinirkoy at 1630. They dispatched a battalion to Kilich Arslan to protect the approach towards Sandikli. The battalion which had been at Banaz moved forward to Buyukoturak.

On the fourth day of operations Army Corps A gained close contact with the defensive area at Koprulu – Kalejik. The main line of resistance traversed from the heights west of the village Chatal Cheshme, to Koprulu and Kuchuk Jorja and extended until the heights immediately south of Yagjilar, constituting the left of the Turkish disposition. The Turks had deployed the 8 Division at the Arapli Chiftlik – Koprulu defile and the 57 Division south of the former to secure the defiles of the area leading to Afyon Karahisar. 23 Division, which had been tried at Dumlupinar, was kept at the right of the disposition near the village of Chatal Cheshme as reserve. 41 Division, which had reached Inas, as well as 2 Cavalry Division at Kuchuk – Karahisar were held in reserve to reinforce the divisions at the frontline. Apart from the above mentioned forces two model regiments had been forwarded to Afyon Karahisar.

On the morning of 14 March Army Corps A launched an attack to seize the Turkish area. The attack was conducted with two divisions in line. Their boundary was the line Bulja – Aksin.

II Division attacked from 0600 with both regiments in the first echelon keeping one of their battalions as reserves. To the left 7 Infantry Regiment attacked and seized the summit Resil Tepe (Hill 1522). Then it continued its attack to seize the heights north of Koprulu. These heights were occupied by

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strong Turkish forces. After a brief resistance the Turks retired towards Arapli Chiftlik. At 1015 a counterattack was launched by Turkish 23 Division reinforced with a Cavalry regiment against the battalion deployed on the summit of Resil Tepe, which constituted the left flank of the regiment's disposition. A fierce battle followed. Finally the Turks were repulsed and retreated, leaving two Skoda guns. After it had repulsed the counterattack, the regiment continued its attack and in the afternoon deployed outposts on the heights north of Arapli Chiftlik and to the east of Sipsin (not included).

On the right the attacking 1 Regiment (minus a battalion) at 0600 crossed the bridge east of Bal Mahmut under Turkish Artillery fire and attacked the heights southwest of Koprulu, which it seized after fierce battle. The attack continued to 600 meters from the Turkish lines where it was halted by the sustained fire of the Turkish defenders. Nevertheless, the effective Artillery support allowed the attack to resume. Such fierce fighting followed that the commander of 1 Battalion, and all his company commanders, were put out of action. At 1245 the regiment, supported by four batteries, succeeded in breaking through the enemy positions and advancing towards the railway station at Gejik Haman approximately two kilometers southeast of Chiftlik. The Turks retreated in disorder while the regiment advanced and deployed outposts at Sipsin and further to the south up to Aksin.

XIII Division attacked with only 5/43 Evzone Regiment, holding 2 Infantry Regiment in reserve. At 0530 the attacking Evzone regiment dispatched one of its battalions towards the heights southwest of Afyon Karahisar while it held down the Turks in its zone with the remaining forces. The battalion occupied appropriate positions and at 0700 launched a surprise attack against the Turkish left flank. The Turks resisted valiantly for an hour but when they realized that their rear was threatened from the left they began to disengage. At 0900 when 5/43 Evzone Regiment launched an all out attack, the withdrawal became general. At 1500 the Evzone regiment entered Afyon Karahisar and covered itself from the direction of Bolvadin and Chaltilar with outposts deployed on the line Aksin to the railway line southeast of Afyon Karahisar. 2 Regiment, held in reserve by XIII Division, followed 5/43 Evzone Regiment, reached Afyon Karahisar at 1500 and deployed outposts from the railway line to nearby Deper.

113. Army Corps A employed eleven battalions in the battle for Afyon Karahisar (six from II Division and five from XIII Division) and fifty–two Artillery pieces of which twenty were field guns. The remaining battalions, of the fifteen which took part in the operation, were assigned the security of the defiles and the lines of communication north of Dumlupinar.

With the above mentioned eleven battalions, with a total strength of approximately 5,000 Infantry and 240 cavalry men, Army Corps A confronted: Turkish 8, 23, and 57 Divisions (thirty battalions) with a total strength of 4,844 men and twenty–two Artillery pieces. Two regiments of 41 Division (six battalions) with a total strength of 2,000 men. 2 Cavalry Division, with a strength of 1,409 Cavalry men and two guns. Two model regiments of which one was Cavalry. Various other units of Turkish XII Army Corps and the Southern Front, totaling 5,883 men with twenty–five guns of which twelve were heavy.

The total forces facing Army Corps A amounted to thirty–nine battalions totaling 12,727 Infantry, 1,409 Cavalry men and forty–nine guns. Not included in these figures were two model regiments and twenty Heavy Artillery pieces which had reinforced the front during the battle of Dumlupinar.

Despite Turkish numerical superiority, II Division of Army Corps A succeeded in taking 466 prisoners and capturing two guns, ten machine guns and 500 rifles. XIII Division took 109 prisoners and captured a machine gun as well as railway cars and other munitions. The exact number of Turkish killed and wounded never was ascertained. Greek losses amounted to twenty–one enlisted men killed and eleven officers and eighty–three enlisted men wounded, all from II Division.

After the battle of Afyon Karahisar the Turkish forces at the Southern Front formed two groups: 8 Infantry Division and 1 and 2 Cavalry Divisions were designated as the Southern Group. To this group two more Infantry regiments (one from 5 Caucasus Division and one from 25 Infantry Division) and two Cavalry regiments were allocated. This group assumed the responsibility to secure the direction from Kutahya – Eskishehir.

57 Division, 23 Division (minus regiment), 41 Division (minus regiment) and the two model regiments were designated as the Southern Group, which undertook to cover the direction towards Iconium.

On 15 March a battalion from XIII Division attacked the rear guard of the withdrawing Turkish XII Army Corps at Chukurkoy. The Turks retreated leaving twenty–two killed on the field of battle as well as eighty–nine prisoners and camels loaded with equipment of every description. That night XIII Division deployed outposts on the line of heights west of Chaltilar, east of Chukurkoy and north of Deper.

The same day Army Corps A reported to the Field Army that the greatest part of the Turkish forces had withdrawn towards Iconium and as a result it considered it advisable to forward one of the divisions the north. It also judged that there was no reason to maintain the entire detachment of 34 Infantry Regiment north of Dumlupinar and thus ordered that only one battalion with the battery should remain in this position. The remaining forces of the regiment relocated the next day to Arapli Chiftlik.

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Over the next two days Army Corps A relocated its headquarters from Buyuk to Afyon Karahisar and limited itself to conducting reconnaissance by cavalry detachments towards the east and north. The fact that Army Corps A did not advance further to the north beyond the line Kazli Gol Hamam to Chatalshehir until 17 March allowed the Turks to move their 2 Cavalry Division forwards to Chatalshehir.

The Advance of I Division towards Chivril and of XIII Division towards Chay – Bolvadin

114. On 14 March, in order to cover II and XIII Divisions from the south, Army Corps A ordered I Division to move forward its screening forces deployed north of Guney on the right bank of the Maeander River to Chivril (Sketchmap 13). On 18 March, I Division complying sent forward one of its regiments with an Artillery battalion to Yayalar. A battalion of the regiment drove back the Turkish forces at Haskoy and deployed there. The next day the regiment (minus the battalion at Haskoy) moved out to Chivril overran the Turkish forces there and deployed outposts along the line Kochak – Panterler – south east edge of Chivril. The rest of the forces deployed on the heights northwest of Chivril.

In this operation the Greek casualties were one officer and two enlisted men killed and twenty–four wounded. The defending Turkish forces were 2,000 men with six machine guns and two guns. The retreating Turks left twenty killed and fifty–four prisoners on the battlefield.

115. Army Corps A intended to disperse the Turkish forces in the Chobanlar area. On 18 March ordered XII Division to advance up to the line Hamidiye – Ilija Hamam. The evening of the day XIII Division, reinforced by 1 Regiment of II Division, assembled in the area Chukurkoy – Deper. The next day, 19 March, the division advanced towards its objectives in two columns.

The northern column comprising three battalions passed through Chobanlar and reached Hamidiye without a battle.

The southern column comprising six battalions moved along the route Deper – Ishiklar towards Ilija. The advance guard clashed with Turkish troops at the line of Chobanlar heights northwest of Mihalich, which it overran after a three–hour battle. During their withdrawal the Turks were attacked at Ferit Pasha by the northern column and forced to turn to the direction of Chay via Yusuk Dag where they were raked by a battalion's fire from the southern column and suffered heavy casualties. During this battle XIII Division lost one officer and three enlisted men killed, and two officers and six enlisted men wounded. Exact Turkish casualties were never ascertained. Approximately one hundred prisoners were taken.

The next day, 20 March, XIII Division continued its advance towards Chay in the same formation. The northern column followed the route Hamidiye – Bolvadin – Mandra and arrived at Eberkoy without meeting any enemy resistance. The southern column moved from Ilija Hamam towards Chay repulsed enemy forces of 2,000 Cavalry men west of Chay captured this town and covered itself from the east. On 21 March, the division returned along the same routes to Afyon Karahisar, destroying the railway line and the works onit along the way.

Evacuation of Afyon Karahisar and the Battle of Dumlupinar
Sketchmaps 13, 14, 15

116. At 1840 on 21 March, Army Corps A received an order from the Field Army in Prusa dated 20 March while XIII Division was still in the area of Hamidiye – Ilija Hamam. This order also informed that Army Corps C had halted its advance, thus Army Corps A had to,

> . . . *organize defensive areas north of Dumlupinar hold them and keep strong reserves, while in case of enemy pressure should employ aggressively. Also to provide for the defensive organization of an appropriate area between Afyon Karahisar and Dumlupinar facing to the east* (Sketchmap 13).

The commander of Army Corps A faced the danger of his forces at Afyon Karahisar being cut off by the Turkish forces assembling in the area of Kutahya and to the south and decided to withdraw to the Dumlupinar – Banaz area and at 0010 of 22 March asked the Field Army to grant him freedom to respond to whatever situation developed. He also requested authority to evacuate Afyon Karahisar. At 1000 the same day, the commander of Army Corps A received at his headquarters at Afyon Karahisar the commanders of II and XIII Divisions, and notified them of his decision to withdraw his forces to Dumlupinar as soon as the Field Army approved his request. That night the order for the withdrawal was issued with the proviso that a subsequent order would set the day it would begin.

On 23 March the headquarters of Army Corps A was relocated to Islamkoy and 34 Infantry Regiment (two battalions) to Dumlupinar where it joined its battalion there. Waiting resolutely for the day of withdrawal, XIII Division took the optimal disposition, while II Division destroyed the railway line between Hamamalti and Kazli Gol Haman.

At 2030 of 23 March Army Corps A received the Field Army's reply to the above report. The Field Army made known that it had ordered that Army Corps A be reinforced with two battalions from V Division and that it considered it expedient for it to assemble its main force at Dumlupinar, leaving only a small detachment in Afyon Karahisar, which should not be completely evacuated without a serious reason. After receiving the above order, Army Corps A sent the following report to the Field Army:

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Following your first order notifying us about the return of Army Corps A to its initial positions, I issued an order of assembly in Banaz area. My intention was to begin the necessary movements tomorrow (27 March); while at the same time I moved to Ushak today. After your new orders, I have already suspended the execution of my aforementioned order, but I request from you to take once more into account that the distance between Ushak and XIII Division is 150 kilometers and that communications, already in deplorable conditions, have been made worse due to the continuous rainfall since yesterday. As a result every change in the disposition in case of emergency is impossible.

Occupation of Afyon Karahisar and its screening by a light joint detachment, isolated 70 kilometers beyond the main forces at Dumlupinar, greatly exposes the detachment to the danger of being cut off, diminishes its strength, which is necessary to cover the direction to Gediz and Dumlupinar and leaves the army corps without reserves necessary for maneuver. Issue your orders as soon as possible given that the divisions need four days to relocate to the new positions. Notice also that any telegraphic order from you is not received less than 24 hours later.

In the meantime 33 Infantry Regiment of V Division was put under the orders of Army Corps A and began to relocate to Ushak beginning in the morning of 23 March.

Army Corps A, whose Headquarters had relocated to Ushak, ordered II and XIII Divisions to remain in their positions. At 2000 of 24 March, while the forces of Army Corps A continued to remain in their positions, the Corps received the following order from the Field Army, "Based on your report N.515/3 I approve evacuation of Afyon Karahisar, if tactical situation dictates." After this, Army Corps A fixed the commencement of the withdrawal of its forces for 25 March.

The evacuation of Afyon Karahisar was conducted in an orderly manner from 1400 till 1800 on 25 March. XIII Division, in contact with Turkish Army Corp XII, assembled late that night in the Bal Mahmut – Prusa area. II Division , which was supposed to remain in the already occupied positions during the first day of withdrawal, considered that its advanced line of outposts was not safe after the withdrawal of XIII Division; thus it withdrew from the valley and occupied the line formed by the heights of Resil Tepe heights east of Koprulu heights of Kuchuk Jorja.

When the withdrawal of Army Corps C from the front at Avgin had started, the Turkish Command decided to attack the flank and the rear of Army Corps A at Afyon Karahisar (Sketchmap 14). After this, on 21 March, it removed three divisions (4, 8 and 11) and a regiment of 5 Division from the front at Avgin and assembled them at Eskishehir. On 22 and 23 March they

were transported by train to Alayunt with the Headquarters of the Southern Front at Chukerler. At the same time began the transportation by railroad of the other two regiments of 5 Division from Ankara to Alayunt. On 24 March 4 Division was relocated to Yalniz Saray, 11 Division to the area of Aykirikchi and 8 Division to Kutahya. In the meantime, 5 Division had completed its transport to Alayunt.

On 25 March, the day the evacuation of Afyon Karahisar began, 4 Division reached Karaagach, 11 Division reached Altintash, the 8 Division Derbent, the 5 Division Karajaoren. 1 and 2 Cavalry Divisions from Kutahya reached Hajikoy via the Gediz – Kutahya road, while 24 Division was ordered to assemble at Kutahya.

117. The withdrawal of XII and II Divisions began from the morning of 26 March. XIII Division followed the route Bal Mahmut – Duzagach – Guney. At 1700 the division had assembled in the Guney – Elvan Pasha area with outposts up to Tazler.

II Division moved towards Ayvali covered by rearguard and flank guards. At 1115 the head of the division's column reached Ayvali where, from 1300 they began to receive intelligence on the tactical situation of 34 Infantry Regiment on the heights of Dumlupinar. At 1400 the division assembled in the Ayvali area with outposts to its east.

From the afternoon of the same day, Army Corps A began to receive telegraphic reports from 34 Infantry Regiment about Turkish movements and the development of the tactical situation. The reports from 34 Regiment were also sent to II Division, which estimated that by that afternoon XIII Division would be at Guney. Therefore it decided to remain at Ayvali. At 1645 after new reports from 34 Infantry Regiment that enemy columns were appearing from every direction and that it required reinforcement, II Division ordered its forces to be ready to move out and at 1700 radioed XIII Division the following message:

34 Infantry Regiment requests reinforcements tonight. You are asked to reinforce it. I am moving immediately to Guney.

At 1730 the division began to move and at 2300 arrived at Guney via Duzagach. There assembled all its forces.

Army Corps A ordered 34 Infantry Regiment, in response to its reports, to link up with XIII Division which was on its way to Guney and at 1850 it sent the following order to II and XIII Division:

Enemy forces attacked 34 Infantry Regiment from the direction of Kalkoy – Altintash ordered the regiment to link up with XIII Division tonight at Guney in order to be supported in case of emergency.

In continuation, at 2350 after further reports that the Turkish attack

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had already begun, XIII Division was ordered to urgently intervene with its entire force if necessary to reinforce 34 Infantry Regiment.

In the meantime, at 1200, XIII Division heard sporadic fire while marching towards Guney. An officer was sent to 34 Regiment to investigate. After the telegraphic communication from II Division, 34 Regiment was supplied with Artillery shells. The division deployed one of its battalions to move towards Dumlupinar and be put at the disposal of the regiment. However the battalion's movement was delayed and it came under fire from the friendly outposts. It only reached twenty–two kilometers northwest of Guney. Then, the division assigned 5/42 Evzone Regiment that occupied the heights between Chalishlar and Oturak Chiftlik where it deployed outposts at 2200.


On 26 March 34 Infantry Regiment confronted Turkish 4 and 11 Divisions as well as an additional Infantry regiment which moved to its left towards Dumlupinar. The regiment occupied positions about three kilometers northeast of Dumlupinar and astride the macadam road from Kutahya to its railway station. From occupied positions, the ground descended towards the forested gulches of the village Buyuk Aslanar. The small valley of Kalkoy is slightly to the north. To the west, south of Goljuk, rise the inaccessible heights of Hasan Dere Tepe (Sketchmap 15), which were covered by thick pine forests. 34 Regiment secured its left on this mountain while its right was secured by a major natural obstacle. The regiment had been reinforced with three batteries and it had deployed a battalion to the left of the road and another to the right, holding the third in reserve.

The Artillery began to fire against the advanced Turkish troops at 1130 of 26 March, and pinned them down at 1700 before the village Buyuk Aslanar. The Turks launched a fierce attack against the entire front of 34 Regiment at 2000. The attack was repulsed after hard struggle that included hand to hand combat. At 2300, even before the troops had recovered and regrouped from the first attack, the Turks again attacked in force, but were once again successfully repulsed.

At about midnight the commander of II Division who was marching at its head, met with the commander of XIII Division and asked him, based on the army corps' order, to reinforce 34 Infantry Regiment, even with his entire division if needed. The commander of XIII Division disagreed, particularly as regards night movement, which he considered risky. The commander of II Division left and decided to move at dawn with all his forces in order to reinforce 34 Infantry Regiment.

During the night, the commander of Field Artillery Regiment A, Colonel (Arty) Ioannes Papaioannou, realized the difficult situation of 34 Infantry Regiment and reinforced 7 Battery with the other two batteries of the III/A Battalion under Major (Arty) Ioannes Spirakopoulos.

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Sketchmap 14. Retreat of Army Corps A towards Dumlupinar, 25–27 March 1921.


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118. From 0500 of 27 March the troops of the outposts of XIII Division north of Guney realized that Turkish troops had infiltrated the rear of 34 Infantry Regiment. At 0600 7 Infantry Regiment of II Division attacked the flank of Turkish 11 Division at the heights north of Guney. The troops on the left of the Turkish division were surprised and retreated in disorder. In a short time however, their leaders reorganized them and, reinforced by reserves, they counterattacked and succeeded in repelling 7 Infantry Regiment. The battle lasted four hours, then the Turks withdrew to the heights north of Kuchukkoy.

7 Infantry Regiment then captured the ridges southwest of Buyuk Aslanar and linked up with 34 Infantry Regiment. The regiment's right remained at the heights of Arapli, southwest of Kuchuk, surveying the Turkish forces from this direction. For the same reason, during the evening hours 7 Infantry Regiment captured the line from the ridge of Kizilkoy to the Chalishlar – Oturak Chiftlik road, always maintaining liaison with 34 Infantry Regiment.

During the course of the battle between 7 Infantry Regiment and Turkish 11 Division, Turkish 4 Division attacked 34 Infantry Regiment. The battle was fierce, especially at the center and on the right where Turkish pressure constantly increased. At about noon Turkish 4 Division launched a vicious onslaught against the center of 34 Infantry Regiment. The attackers reached a distance of thirty meters from the Greek trenches and at many points the men fought hand to hand. After a while, the Greek troops bent and 34 Regiment's front faced the danger of breaking. At that critical moment the commander of the regiment, Colonel (Inf) Demosthenes Dialetes assembled the personnel of his staff, the cooks and the mule drivers, with the regimental priest by his side and the regiment's battle flag flowing in the air, and led a fierce counterattack against the Turks pushing them back to their jump–off area. The battery of III/A Field Artillery Battalion contributed effectively with its accurate fire. It is worth mentioning that the commander of 7 Field Artillery Battalion, Captain (Arty) Nikon Demetropoulos, deployed a completely unprotected platoon that, despite fire by Turkish Heavy Artillery, contributed significantly to the outcome with direct fire from close range.

After Turkish 1 Division had been pushed back by 7 Infantry Regiment of II Division, XIII Division began to move towards Buyukoturak and arrived at Oturak Chiftlik around noon. The division's commander understood how serious the situation of 34 Regiment was, and sent a battalion reinforced by a battery with orders to attack the Turkish troops pressuring the regiment's left. At 1400 the battalion reached its destination and quickly pushed back the Turks and with a quick attack seized dominant positions on Hasan Dere Tepe south of Askoy. At the same time, II Division ordered 1 Infantry Regiment (minus battalion) to rush to reinforce 34 Infantry Regi-



Sketchmap 15. The Battle of Dumlupinar, 28–31 March, 1921.

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ment. 1 Regiment reached the position of 34 Regiment at 1400 and assigned a battalion to reinforce its left, where the battalion of XIII Division was deployed. The other battalion of 1 Regiment was held in reserve. Despite the reinforcement of the left of the Greek disposition with two battalions, the battle lasted until the early evening hours.

119. On 27 March Army Corps A sent forward 33 Infantry Regiment of V Division from Ushak to Banaz to protect the Divisional Supply Center there, from the north. (Sketchmap 15). At the same time, for even greater security it ordered XIII Division to transfer a regiment with a battery to Alabag. The regiment arrived that same day at 1700 and deployed outposts on the heights to the southeast.

At 2400 on 27 March Army Corps A ordered its divisions to attack the Turkish forces on the next morning at 0600. II Division decided to attack with five battalions from 1 and 34 Infantry Regiments while 7 Regiment would hold the Turkish forces operating from the east. XIII Division held a joint detachment comprising 5/42 Evzone Regiment, a Pack Artillery battalion and the battalion plus the battery that had been assigned to the left of the 34 Infantry Regiment. These would move out from 0400 from Buyukoturak towards Goljuk, via the saddle Hasan Dere Tepe.

At around 0800 on 28 March Turkish forces seized the heights opposite the right flank of 34 Infantry Regiment and they fired against the flanks of 7 Infantry Regiment from these positions. At the same time, a strong Turkish column with four Artillery pieces was moving from Guney towards Oturak Chiftlik. 7 Regiment, which had assigned its battalions to Kizilkoy to guard the gap between itself and 34 Regiment, attacked with its other battalions and pushed the Turks beyond the outposts. 7 Regiment was supported in this clash by the reserve battalion of 5/42 Evzone Regiment from the hill southeast of Buyukoturak to the south of 7 Regiment.

At the center and the left of II Division's disposition, the chief of the divisional Infantry ordered the two battalions to the left, one of 34 Regiment and one of 1 Regiment, to attack at 1000. Immediately after the jump–off the above battalions met stubborn resistance by superior enemy forces, they were pinned down and were forced to a battle of attrition. While the battle continued and the Greek troops waited for the joint detachment of 5/42 Evzone Regiment to move against the right flank of the enemy, other Turkish forces attacked unsuccessfully against the center and the right flank of the Greek disposition at the heights northeast of Dumlupinar.

At 0930 the Evzone joint detachment reached the saddle of Hasan Dere Tepe and ordered the battalion there to attack towards Askoy. From there, following a concealed gate it reached Goljuk at about 1130 and assembled unopposed on the saddle, approximately 1,000 meters east of the village.

From this position it assessed the tactical situation of the moment and ordered an immediate attack at 1215. The sustained and accurate Artillery fire of the detachment created great confusion in the Turkish ranks. The enemy cavalry at Ali Veran scattered and their two Heavy Artillery batteries ceased fire and retreated towards Salkoy.

A regiment of Turkish 5 Division moving towards Goljuk, it sustained Artillery fire and a surprise attack by a battalion of the Joint Evzone Detachment and was dispersed. At the same time, the Turkish troops at the extreme right of their disposition suddenly abandoned the struggle and began a disorderly retreat towards the valley Askoy – Ali Veran. Turkish 8 Division, which had been marching to Salkoy changed direction and moved towards Ali Veran.

Between 1200 and 1400, the joint detachment of 5/42 Evzone Regiment succeeded in seizing the height two kilometers northwest of Ali Veran and in attacking the Turkish Cavalry on its right. As pressure was lessened on the battalion of XIII Division on the left of II Division it was able to advance up to the heights south of Askoy. The two battalions of the division that had been fighting since 1000 renewed their frontal attack, overrunning whatever Turkish troops held out defensively and forced them into disorderly retreat. Later, at approximately 1630, the troops of II Division, at the center and the right of its disposition northeast of Dumlupinar, advanced until the line formed by the heights at the village of Buyuk Aslanar to Kuchuk Aslanar on to Kizilkoy. During the night all of the above troops returned to their initial positions at the line of departure.

On 28 March the losses of II and XIII Division totalled four officers and sixty one enlisted men killed and seven officers and 184 enlisted men wounded. Turkish losses were never ascertained. 5/42 Evzone Regiment took seventy–one prisoners and II Division took 185, while they captured four Artillery pieces and 100 rifles. The three–day battle of Dumlupinar ended on the night of 28 March, with the repulse of the Turkish forces including five divisions (4, 11, 5, 41 and 57) on the frontline and three (8, 23, and 24) in reserve.

The Last Turkish Efforts

120. The Turkish forces facing II Division continued to withdraw northwards as of 29 March. Having eliminated the threat, II Division disposed 7 and 34 Infantry Regiments at 1330 to occupy the line Hasan Dere Tepe – Akoluk (Sketchmap 15) within the day. II Division turned the front towards the east with complete success even though it was executed during daylight. 7 Regiment occupied the subsector of Hasan Dere Tepe up to the railway line and 34 Regiment occupied the southern subsector up to Akoluk. During the afternoon Turkish 1 and 2 Cavalry Divisions in the Ovajik and Samura areas attacked the village of Banaz. This attack was supported from the southeast

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by small Turkish Cavalry sections that had captured the heights above Islamkoy and attacked Greek supply columns. The two Turkish divisions attacked at 1600 and for three hours pressured 33 Infantry Regiment. Finally, however, they were repulsed back to the north.

In order to confront the threat in the Banaz area, Army Corps A ordered XIII Division to assemble there. The division left one regiment (minus battalion) in the heights of Alabag and on 30 March relocated to the Banaz – Islamkoy area. The same day the Turks gained contact with II Division while the two Turkish Cavalry divisions in the Ovajik – Samura area withdrew further to the north.

The Turkish 4 and 11 Divisions descended from the heights northeast of Dumlupinar on the morning of 31 March towards the left of the position occupied by II Division. At the same time, Turkish 41 and the 57 Divisions moved between the valleys of the Akar River towards the center and the right of the above area. Around noon a battalion–size force unsuccessfully attacked the center of the division from the heights north of Dumlupinar.

Later on the same day, at about 1600, a Turkish force of about 1,000 men reached a distance of about 700 meters from II Division's front but they were pinned down by Greek fire. At 2045 a fierce Turkish attack was launched against the hill southwest of the Dumlupinar railway station occupied by a battalion of 34 Infantry Regiment. After an hardfought battle which lasted more than an hour the Turkish forces withdrew with significant losses. Other Turkish night attacks followed against different points of the left of II Division's disposition but were also successfully repulsed.

After they had been repeatedly frustrated the Turks withdrew on the morning of 1 April and occupied an area of two to five kilometers from the lines of II Division. The same day, II Division extended its right flank occupying Toklu Tepe (Hill 1872), the highest summit of Akar Dag.

The Battle of Asilhanar, as it was named by the Turks (also known as the Battle of Dumlupinar), was a great Greek victory. Eight Turkish Infantry divisions were repulsed by four Greek Infantry regiments. The Commander of the Western Front, Rafet Pasha was so certain of victory that even though he had been defeated and retreated on 28 March, the next day he mistook the change of front by II Division as a withdrawal. He didn't hesitate to telegraph Ankara the following day that, "Following a five day battle, the enemy was mortally wounded." This explains the strong Turkish attacks against the new Greek front on 30 and 31 of March. On Kemal's orders Rafet Pasha was relieved and was replaced by Ismet Inonu.

Conditions during the Conduct of the Operations of March 1921

121. The Hellenic Field Army of Asia Minor was divided into two battle groups during the operations of March 1921. Army Corps C in the Prusa area

and Army Corps A in the Ushak area. The two groups were separated by mountain massifs and the distance between them was over 200 kilometers in a straight line.

On the other hand, the Turkish forces were assembled in the neighboring areas of Eskishehir, Kutahya and Afyon Karahisar and had at their disposal the 160 kilometer long railroad line Eskishehir – Afyon Karahisar as well as other roads that permitted the rapid transport and assembly of forces to a threatened area.

Of its eight divisions, the Hellenic Field Army employed only five for these operations, viz. III, VII, and X Divisions of Army Corps C and II and XIII of Army Corps A, as well as the Cavalry Brigade. Army Corps A also was required to leave a regiment each of II and XIII Divisions in order to protect Ushak and Dumlupinar from the north. The Field Army as a result had available thirteen Infantry regiments, i.e. thirty–one battalions, to seize the line Eskishehir – Afyon Karahisar. Out of these, twenty seven and the Cavalry Brigade moved from the area of Prusa towards Eskishehir and twelve from the area of Ushak to Afyon Karahisar. The forces deployed were half of the total available.

To oppose the Greek forces the Turks deployed twelve Infantry divisions, three Cavalry divisions and one Cavalry brigade and three independent regiments (one Infantry and one Cavalry).

To achieve the objectives specified in its plans, the Greek leadership fixed as main operational direction that of Army Corps C, i.e. from Prusa to Eskishehir. As secondary operational direction was fixed that of Army Corps A to Dumlupinar. From there, Army Corps A would operate towards Afyon Karahisar if the bulk of the Turkish forces would retreat in that direction, and then they would turn towards Eskishehir. On the other hand, if the bulk of the Turkish forces withdrew towards Kutahya then Army Corps A would operate towards Kutahya – Eskishehir.

The Command of the Field Army determined therefore that the secondary direction at the end would converge towards Eskishehir. However, Army Corp A did not have enough forces to execute this convergence. While the intention of the Field Army had been that the directions of the two groups ultimately should converge to Eskishehir, the missions assigned to each, viz. one towards Eskishehir and the other towards Afyon Karahisar, in fact were divergent. Thus the two groups operated self–sufficiently and independently without possibility of mutual support.

On the other hand the Turks taking advantage of the divergent directions of the Greek combat groups, and having at their disposal suitable internal communications, transported the bulk of their forces to Eskishehir in order to face Army Corp C. After its withdrawal they moved significant forces against Army Corp A, which operated in the area of Afyon Karahisar.

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This last Turkish effort failed due to the delayed assembly and simultaneous intervention of five Infantry and two Cavalry divisions, which had moved from Eskishehir to Dumlupinar and engaged in battle in stages. The heroic defense by 34 Infantry Regiment at Dumlupinar also played a significant role in the Turkish defeat as well as the timely withdrawal of the forces of Army Corps A from Afyon Karahisar to reinforce 34 Infantry Regiment that was engaged in hard fighting.

It may be concluded that the operations of March 1921 represented the Hellenic Army's first failure on the Asia Minor front. This failure, which was not significant from a military point of view, had a psychological impact. Officers and enlisted men became aware that they were confronting a serious and organized opponent whose strength continuously increased. It was also recognized that it was due only to the heroic resistance of 34 Infantry Regiment at Dumlupinar that the Greek forces were able to avoid a major defeat, which would have resulted in unknown consequences for the Southern Front. This would have been a defeat much greater than the tactical withdrawal of Army Corps C to Ushak.

Part II

Large Scale Operations to Destroy the Turkish Army

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CHAPTER 5

Offensive Operations of June–July 1921

Decision, Preparation and Plan of Operations

122. The operations of March 1921 not only failed to provide a Greek solution to the Asia Minor problem, but acted adversely to the Greek cause. The Greek government faced the dilemma, to undertake new operations with all the military might the country could muster in order that a military solution prevail, or withdraw from Asia Minor. After the Ankara government had rejected the compromise proposals of the London Conference (27 February 1921) for the cessation of hostilities, and after the British government's advice to continue the struggle, the Greek government decided to adopt the first option.

At the end of the March 1921 operations, the Field Army of Asia Minor reported to the Ministry of the Army and to the Army General Staff that the enemy had made significant progress regarding the composition, the organization and the increase of its strength during that last two months. Its military forces were well organized with many officers and high morale as a result of its successes in the two battles of Inonu. The Field Army explicitly stressed the risks the Hellenic Army would confront in the future in Asia Minor without reinforcements. The Greek government informed the Field Army that it intended to undertake operations of larger scale than those of March, and asked the Field army's views on this issue.

On 15 April, Prime Minister Demetrios Gounares (whose government had succeeded that of Kalogeropoulos on 26 March 1921) and Minister of the Army Nikolaos Theotokes arrived in Smyrna. The Field Army presented the situation report of the Turkish forces. According to the Field Army's estimates, the Turks were fielding a total of 88,000 men with 250 Artillery pieces and 316 machine guns. After the conscription which had started, by 10–15 May Kemal could assemble 70,000 men with 200 Artillery pieces facing the Field Army's front. The Field Army estimated that three army corps with seven divisions, totaling 100,000 men with 238 Artillery pieces, would be sufficient to defeat the Turkish forces.

The strength and distribution of the Hellenic Army on 1 April 1921 was as follows:

	Formations	Officers	Enlisted Men
1.	Field Army of Asia Minor	4,364	122,164
2.	Field Army of Thrace/Macedonia	1,525	54,036
3.	Army Corps E (Epirus)	422	14,632
4.	Zone of Interior	1,782	34,161
	Total	8,093	224,993

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The Field Army of Asia Minor had been divided in two groups that were separated by the very large mountainous Simav area, which lacked communications. and it faced great difficulties in terms of securing the 780 kilometer wide front.

The Northern Group of Divisions was east of, and close to Prusa (in Turkish, Bursa), while the stronger, Southern Group was in the area of Ushak. There was also one division (XI Division) in the north near Nicomedia, and other screening forces of approximately the same strength (one division) were deployed in the south, along the Maeander River. The occupation and security of the wider Rear Zone had been assigned to the forces of the Rear Regiments, of the troops responsible for the security of the railway lines and of the Gendarmerie.

The above disposition of the Field Army was very disadvantageous as discussed above. The Turks, on the other hand, used the railway line from Karakoy via Eskishehir to Ankara and from Eskishehir via Kutahya to Afyon Karahisar and Iconium. They were thus able rapidly to transport the bulk of their forces against either of the groups, assuring for themselves local superiority of forces.

There were two possible courses of action to eliminate the disadvantage of the Greek disposition, i.e. a linking of the Greek forces either by withdrawing to the area of the Sevres Agreement, or, conversely, by advancing eastward to the line Eskishehir – Kutahya – Afyon Karahisar. The first course of action was deemed not advisable as it left the areas of Constantinople and the Straits unprotected; both of vital importance for the British. The implementation of the second course of action called for large scale operations with the objective of a decisive engagement with the Turkish forces.

123. After having been briefed by the commander of the Field Army of its needs for personnel and equipment necessary for renewed operation, the prime minister and the minister of the army inspected the front. They were left with the impression that the morale of the men was excellent. They wished to fight in order to be able to end the campaign as quickly as possible. When they returned to Smyrna they informed the commander of the Field Army that they had definitely decided to conduct operations to capture Afyon Karahisar, Kutahya and Eskishehir. The primary objective would be the destruction of the enemy's forces. They left for Athens on 22 April having delegated to the commander of the Field Army absolute authority for the direction of the operations.

The morale of the Field Army's men was generally good on the eve of the assumption of operations. The Field Army assigned an adequate number of officers to reinforce the units, especially Army Corp C. Those who returned

after having been dismissed following the political change–over of November 1920 and were reinstituted fully regarding rank and seniority, despite their attempts,were unable to live up to the duties of their new ranks. All the officers were possessed of deep patriotic feelings but the prevailing conditions and the events that had taken place in the recent past prevented the development of spirit of camaraderie and esprit de corps between them, both extremely essential elements in a period of war operations.

On 30 May 1921 King Constantine arrived in Smyrna responding to the call of the National Assembly to assume the position of the nominal commander in chief; he landed and settled at Kordelio. In the interim, the Field Army had been reinforced with IV and IX Divisions which had been transported to Asia Minor from Nauplion and Piraeus respectively.

At 1700 on 3 June the Royal Council assembled at the palace at Kordelio. Among the participants were King Constantine, the commander of the Field Army, Lieutenant General Anastasios Papoulas, the Chief of Staff of the Field Army, Colonel (Eng) Ptolemaios Sarregiannes. Also present at this meeting were: Chief of Staff Army Services, Major General Victor Dousmanes and Major General Xenophon Strategos. The chief of staff of the Field Army unfolded the plan of operations verbally as well as the dominant opinions of the Field Army Staff regarding it.

Everyone agreed with the plan as presented. The plan aimed to encircle the enemy with wide envelopment of both flanks while at the same time Army Corp B would launch a frontal attack with a joint detachment from XI Division from the area south and southwest of Kutahya.

124. The preparation of the operation began immediately at an intense pace. The Field Army's first concern was to replenish the units with personnel and equipment. Additionally it sought to relieve its combat units from missions of secondary importance so that they could be employed in the forthcoming operations.

To complete the combat strength of the Field Army's units, the Ministry of the Army called to arms five classes of reserves in two series: 1913, 1914 and 1915 of March and 1912 and 1913a of April. That same month, two classes of the series of reserves (1904 and 1903) were also called up for the internal security of the country. In total, the above classes yielded about 58,000 men. Apart from the above, Greeks born in Asia Minor of the classes1910–1921 (approximately 12,000 men) were also drafted.

Great efforts were also undertaken to supply the Field Army of Asia Minor with the required equipment. To light weapons were added machine guns, rifles and Infantry ammunition. In addition captured Artillery pieces of various calibers were delivered to the Field Army and shells were procured

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from abroad. After this, the Field Army's Artillery had superiority as regards the number of guns, although those guns were inferior to those of the Turks in terms of range and curvature of trajectory.

The Field Army was also supplied with trucks. By the middle of June, 1,000 heavy, 500 light trucks and 250 ambulances were delivered. At the same time the remaining pack transportation were reinforced with pack animals, requisitioned horses, as well as camels. The railway transport capacity was considerably improved by the delivery of steam engines and other rolling stock from Mainland Greece. The Engineers also built a twenty–two kilometer, narrow gauge railway line (Decovil) in the Prusa area, connecting Prusa with Milas.

In the general reorganization, the Aviation Corps was also included. It comprised three squadrons of planes and a naval aviation flight. A major effort was undertaken for the reorganization and development of the Medical units of the Field Army with the establishment of new hospitals and the delivery of the required medical equipment.

Finally, the General Military Administration of the Middle Zone was organized with headquarters at Magnesia and assumed the responsibility for the security of the regions occupied by the Hellenic Army included between the Rear Zone, the Sea of Marmara, the British Zone of the Dardanelles, and the Zone of Operations of the conflict army.

The total strength of the Field Army of Asia Minor on 11 January 1921 amounted to 6,159 officers, 193,994 enlisted men, 63,639 pack animals and 318 Artillery pieces of various calibers.

125. The terrain where the operations of June and July 1921 would be conducted is crossed by a mountain range with an average altitude of 1,500 meters. This range extends from Kush Dag (Olympus) continues to the south through Domanich and Murat Dag (Twin Mountains), it then turns to the east and the south through Akar Dag and Sultan Dag and ends at the summit of Lycian Taurus (Sketchmap 16). The dominant massifs of this mountain range are located south of Murat Dag and north of Kush Dag. From these massifs, smaller ranges begin in every direction, creating a complex of high plateaus and an extremely broken ground, where access and communications pose major problems.

The Simav area is a type of high plateau. To this converge ridgelines stretching from Murat Dag and other high ranges from the south and the north. It lacks communication and as it is located between the areas of Prusa and Ushak impedes communication between them.

The railway communication in the theater of operations included:

The **Bagdad Railway** line from Karakoy through Eskishehir to-

wards Ankara and from Eskishehir through Kutahya towards Afyon Karahisar, Iconium and Adana. This line served the Turkish Command.

The **Smyrna – Afyon Karahisar Railway** line which served the Greek Command up to Ushak, and the Turkish Command from Dumlupinar towards Afyon Karahisar and to Iconium.

The road network included:

In the **Northern Section** the macadam road from Prusa to Eskishehir through Inegol and Karakoy was the primary line of operations and supply. This road was supported by a secondary macadam road further south leading from Kios through Yenishehir up to Avgin. Another road led from the Prusa area through Tavshanli towards Kutahya. The first section was macadam road and went on as carriage road, following a very difficult route.

In the **Southern Section** there was the macadam road from Ushak towards Kutahya though Gediz and the macadam road from Afyon Karahisar also towards Kutahya though Altintash. East of Ushak towards Afyon Karahisar there were no other macadam roads, only carriage roads and pack trails.

The interposition of the high plateau of Simav, the configuration of the terrain of the Theater of Operations and the communication network forced the Field Army to organize its units into two groups separated by 200 kilometers; One group was assembled in the area of Kios – Prusa and the other in the Ushak – Banaz area. Movement along internal lines was not possible for the Command of the Field Army. On the other hand, the Turkish Command could exploit the rail and road networks to easily transport forces from the interior to the front and also from one flank to the other. The configuration of the Theatre of Operations influenced seriously the decisions of the Field Army while drafting the plan of operations for the capture of Afyon Karahisar and Eskishehir.

126. On 4 July the Field Army of Asia Minor formed the following two Field Army Sections to conduct the impending operations:

The **Southern Field Army Section** comprising Army Corps A (I and II Divisions, two Field Artillery battalions and one Skoda 105mm battery), Army Corps B (V and XIII Divisions and two Field Artillery battalions), The Southern Group of Divisions (IV and XII Divisions and a Pack Artillery battalion) and joint detachments of XI Division (5 Infantry battalions, one Pack Artillery battalion and divisional Cavalry).

Furthermore subordinate to the Southern Field Army Section were the Cavalry Brigade, the Heavy Artillery regiment, Aviation Squadrons B and D, the Naval Aviation Flight, one Rear Engineer battalion, the Bridge Construction company of the Field Army, one section from the Railway regiment and the Military Command of Ushak.

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The **Northern Field Army Section** comprising Army Corps C (VII and X Divisions and an Infantry regiment from XI Division) and the Northern Group of Divisions (III and XI Divisions less one Field Artillery battalion and a Heavy Artillery 120mm battalion).

The Field Army would have under its immediate command the Southern Field Army Section. The command of the Northern Field Army Section was assumed by Major General Georgios Polymenakos, Commander of Army Corps C Major General Demetrios Gidas was appointed Commander of the Southern Group of Divisions and Major General Nikolaos Trikoupes, the Commander of III Division commanded the Northern Group of Divisions. Major Generals Alexandros Kondoules and Aristoteles Vlachopoulos commanders of Army Corps A and B respectively retained their positions.

The operations plan of the Field Army of Asia Minor was approved by the King at the council of Kordelio on 3 June 1921 and next day was forwarded to the units. The same day, the Field Army issued general directives and letters of instructions to the commanders of the army corps and other formations regarding the implementation of the operation plan.

The Field Army's intelligence regarding the Turkish dispositions and intentions indicated that they would defend the line west of Eskishehir – Kutahya – Afyon Karahisar where they had been intensely constructing multiple fortifications. According to the same intelligence, the Turks had been organizing the following defensive lines (Sketchmap 17).

At the **Northern Front**, the old defensive area Avgin – Kovalicha which was extended towards Sulukoy.


At the **Center and South of Kutahya**, the general line Ak Tepe – Yalinja Dag – Akche Dag – Omer Baba Dag – Southern Evlak and possibly a line between Eskishehir and Kutahya.

At the **Southern Front**, the old area west of Afyon Karahisar on the heights Bal Mahmut – Kuchuk Jorja and further to the west.

The disposition of the Turkish forces indicated that they were awaiting the main Greek attack from Ushak against the area of Kutahya, where the bulk of their forces were assembled.

The general objectives of the operation was designated by the Field Army to be the destruction of the Turkish forces, the capture of Eskishehir which was their major supply center, and their relentless pursuit. The Field Army's main attack would be launched against the bulk of the Turkish forces in the defensive area at Kutahya with the convergence of the Northern and Southern Sections of the Field Army, avoiding thus a frontal attack.

The objective of the attack was to hold the bulk of the Turkish Army at Kutahya while at the same time the right wing of the Field Army would operate east of the railway line Afyon Karahisar – Kutahya towards Seyitgazi and Eskishehir to cut off the retreat to the east.



Sketchmap 17. The Field Army of Asia Minor Plan of Attack of 4 June 1921.

In the event that the Turks abandoned the defensive area of Kutahya and withdrew in the area around Eskishehir, the plan provided for the joining of efforts of the northern and southern Field Army Sections at Kutahya. From there an attack would be launched by the entire force against the area of Eskishehir, following new orders by the Field Army.

127. Regarding the timing of the beginning of the operation the Field Army designated:

– For the **Southern Field Army Section** (minus the joint detachment of IX Division) the morning of day H.

– For the **joint detachment of IX Division** the afternoon of day H–1.

– For **Army Corps C** the morning of H–3

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– For the **Northern Group of Divisions** the morning of day H–1.

Each of the large units was equipped with wireless to organize the radio–telegraph network of the Field Army.

The resupply of the units of the Southern Field Army Section was assigned to General Supply Center of Ushak which would also undertake the supply of Army Corp C, after the tactical link–up of the latter with the Southern Field Army Section. The resupply of the Northern Field Army Section was assigned to the Prusa Base, using the railway line from Prusa to Kestel and 101 heavy and light trucks. For the evacuation and hospitalization of the casualties a significant number of Medical formations and hospitals had been deployed at regular intervals from Ushak to Smyrna. For the medical support of the North Field Army Section the Hospitalization Center of Prusa had been established with a capacity of 2,400 beds.

The offensive disposition of the units of the Field Army offered a good probability to cut off if not the entire Turkish Army, at least a significant number of its forces. The correct choice of the time and the place for the conduct of operations of the different sections and the deception of the enemy as regards the direction of the main effort of the offensive, would oblige him to keep his forces engaged. In that way the outflanking of the enemy's extreme right could be achieved and would certainly lead to the successful conclusion of the operation. This goal required that the movements of the bulk of the Field Army's forces be conducted and served so that the Turks would discover the maneuver as late as possible and the Field Army would achieve strategic surprise. Successful outcome of the Field Army's maneuver would result in the destruction of the Turkish Army and therefore in the resolution of the Asia Minor issue.

Diplomatic Activities Before the Offensive

128. During the time that the Field Amy of Asia Minor was preparing new operations, the Allies obviously worried about the Greek preparations to launch a major offensive, began to make diplomatic moves. On 4 June 1921 the Greek Ambassador to Paris, Andreas Metaxas, telegraphed the Greek government that the British government was sending their Minister of Foreign Affairs, Curzon, to Paris to try to arrange a conciliatory intervention by the Allies.

After this, the Greek government sent a memorandum to the Greek Embassy in London which underlined that a new offensive was necessary as a result of Turkish intransigency and the significant reinforcement of the Kemalist Army, which had proved itself in the March operations. Nevertheless, the Greek government was willing to study any suggestion by the British government about the Asia Minor issue.

On 8 June the Allies addressed to the government of Greece and Ankara a note requesting a suspension of operations and new discussions between the belligerents to seek a compromise solution. The Greek government asked the opinion of the commander of the Field Army who replied that he considered postponement of the attack was against the national interest and therefore dangerous.

The Ambassador of the Allies in Athens were personally notified of the Greek government's decision by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Georgios Baltatzes. The government in Ankara rejected Allied mediation, declaring that it would continue the war.

Turkish Preparations

129. The Commander of the Western Front, General Ismet Inonu, continued with intensive pace to fill, reinforce and regroup his forces, to complete and extend the defensive organization around Eskishehir as well as the defensive organization in the areas to the west, southwest and south of Kutahya. To this end there was a universal conscription and reinforcements were sent from the interior of Asia Minor.

The Turkish disposition aimed to cover the junction of Eskishehir as follows: from the direction of Prusa with the occupation by strong forces of the area fortified since the beginning of 1921 Sogut – Avgin – Kovalicha (Sketchmaps 16, 20) from the directions of Ushak – Gediz – Kutahya and Dumlupinar, with the fortification and occupation of the area west and south of Kutahya. According to the Field Army's intelligence, from 1 June 1921 the Turkish Army comprised two groups which had available the following units:


– The **Northern Group**: 1, 3, and 61 Infantry Divisions, 3, 11 and 15 Caucasus Divisions, 3 Cavalry Division, 5 Independent Cavalry Regiment, and other smaller units. The total strength was 33,190 infantrymen, 3,400 Cavalry, fifty–seven Artillery pieces, 116 machine guns and in addition to the above Engineer Regiment and 2,600 irregulars.

– The **Southern Group**: 41, 23, 11, 4, 24 and 3 Infantry Divisions, the 5 Caucasus Division, the 1 and 2 Cavalry Divisions, one Independent Infantry Regiment, 41 Artillery Regiment, two Batteries of 105mm Skoda howitzers, three Heavy Artillery pieces of 150mm and other smaller units. The total strength was 46,340 infantrymen, 3,970 Cavalry, eighty–three Artillery pieces, 184 machine guns and 5,800 irregulars.

– In the **English Zone of the Dardanelles**: 100 infantrymen and approximately 350 irregulars.

The total strength of the Western Front was 79,630 Infantry, 7,370

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Sketchmap 18. The Disposition of the Northern Section of the Field Army of Asia Minor of 1 June and 24 June, 1921.

Cavalry and 8,750 irregulars with 140 Artillery pieces and 300 machine guns. To the above force must be added 14,000 infantrymen, 1,200 Cavalry and twenty–eight Artillery pieces which could be rapidly transported for the reinforcement of the front from the coasts of Black Sea, the Cilicia front (Kilich in Turkish) and the regimental depots.

Apart from the Kemalist Army there were many bands of irregulars which harassed the troops of the Field Army of Asia Minor in the occupied territories. The areas where the irregulars were active were mainly southwest of Prusa, around Nicomedia, northwest of Lake Askoy, the peninsula of Kios, the mountainous area of Simav, the Maeander sector between Chivril and Aydin, Messongis northwest of Aydin and the English Zone of the Dardanelles.

Deliveries of military equipment from Russia continued at a more intense rate during May. The smuggling of personal gear and clothing items from Constantinople also continued. When the Greek Navy tried to enforce a blockade of the Straits in the spring of 1921 to prevent the reinforcement of the Kemalist Army with men fleeing from European Turkey, the Allies didn't hesitate to declare the neutrality of Constantinople, the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. This measure opened the road to Turks from Europe to travel to Asia Minor, while officially prohibited Greece to use Constantinople as a base of supply of its troops at the Nicomedia and Prusa fronts.

Regarding the enemy's conscription, according to the Field Army's intelligence the classes 1907–1922 had been called to arms but it remained unclear if the classes 1903–1906 had also been called. It was however certain that the Kemalist conscripted all capable of carrying arms regardless of age.

Enemy military factories were operating in Eskishehir, Ankara and Iconium, repairing weapons, and even breech locks for guns abandoned by the British. The morale in the Kemalist Army was high and had been raised even more after the operations of March 1921.

Assembly of the Field Army at the Areas of Departure

130. After the end of March 1921, Army Corps A (Sketchmap 19) left II Division in the area of Dumlupinar and assembled XIII Division in the Banaz – Derbent area to secure the line Kizil Dag – Kapan Dag – heights north of Banaz – heights south of Alabag – heights southeast of Islamkoy. After V Division had been transported to Ushak and assumed the responsibility of the above line, XIII Division assembled in April near Banaz area and from 4 June had been subordinated to Army Cops B.


XI Division was transported from mainland Greece to Smyrna on 10 May and by 18 May had assembled in the Ushak area. By the end of May, the division had assumed the screening of the sector Kizil Dag – Selaoglu, of Chivril and of Buldan, where it relieved I Division. IX Division was placed

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under the command of Army Corps A. According to the Field Army's operation order, since early June, IX Division organized a joint detachment under the direct command of the Field Army for the forthcoming operations.

During early June, Army Corps B relocated from Magnesia to the area of Ushak and was temporarily subordinated to the Army Corps A. IX Division assumed the responsibility of V Division's sector. The latter by the end of May assembled in the Ushak area. During early June, V Division was once again subordinated to Army Corps B, as had been XIII Division from 4 June.

Sketchmap 19. The Disposition of the Southern Section of the Field Army of Asia Minor, 23–28 June 1921.



IV Division which had remained at the Balchova area to fill its establishment, in early June was moved to the Sodzos – Dutlucha – Kalikurt area.

Until May, Army Corps B was responsible for the security of its zone. Then this responsibility was assumed by the newly organized Military Command of the Middle Zone. In this manner the Field Army of Asia Minor divided the occupied territory into the following zones: Rear Zone, Middle Zone, Independent Zone of Aydin and the Operation Zone which comprised the areas of Nicomedia, Northern Group and Southern Group Sectors.

After the operations of March 1921, Army Corps C divisions had assembled in the following areas: III Division in Prusa, VII Division in Kestel and X Division in Kios.

XI Division continued to stay in the area.

The Cavalry Brigade remained in the Kestel area, relocated to Smyrna on 15 April and stayed there until the end of May. Then it relocated in sections to the area of Kirkoy (southwest of Ushak), finishing the relocation by 8 June 1921.

131. The Field Army put into effect a mechanism for the transition of the Southern Field Army Section from its assembly area to its attack position. It also designated the routes for the movement of the units from their positions occupied at H–5 to the positions they should have occupied on the eve of the attack (H–1).

On 23 July (D–5) the Southern Field Army Section had taken up the following disposition after the movement of its units (Sketchmap 19):

– **Army Corp A**, with its Headquarters at Ushak comprising I Division in the areas of Kapaklar, Yatalar, Gubetli and II Division in the area of Buyukoturak as screening force.

– **Army Corps B**, with its Headquarters also at Ushak, comprising XIII Division in the areas Alabag, Islamkoy and Derbent and V Division in the areas Sorkan and Kesenler.

– **Southern Group of Divisions** had its Headquarters at Karakoy and IV Division in the areas Koseler and Kalikurt.

– **XII Division** in the area Ine and Gobek.

– The **joint detachment of IX Division**, having been reinforced with two battalions of 5 Rear Regiment and one Artillery battery of 120mm, had its Headquarters at Ushak and its units screening the defiles Selaoglu – Kizil Dag.

– The **Cavalry Brigade** was at Kirkoy.

– The **Heavy Artillery Regiment** was at Ushak (minus the sections that had been dispatched to the screening division).

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– The **Aviation Squadrons B** and **D** were at Ushak.

– The **Naval Aviation Flight** was at Ushak.

– The **Military Command of Ushak**, based at Ushak, comprised a battalion of 5 Rear Regiment to the defiles Elma Dagi – Karajashehir – Kalas, section of IX Division to the Buldan – Chivril sector and sections of the Regimental Depot of Army Corps A to guard the area of Ushak, Buyukoturak and Dumlupinar if indicated.

On 27 June (H–1), the eve of the attack, the Southern Field Army Section relocated in echelons from the assembly area to the attack positions determined by the Field Army with the following order:

– Army Corps A to Buyukoturak, with I Division in the Oturak, Buyukoturak and Pashajik areas, and II Division in the area Belche Dag and Yenije.

– Army Corps B immediately north of the railway station Buyukoturak, with XIII Division in the area of Halijilar and Alabag and V Division between XIII and II Divisions.

– The Southern Group of Divisions at Kelenderes with IV Division in the Kelenderes, Bash Agach and Gonuk areas and XII Division at Akar Dag (Hill 1611).

– The joint detachment of IX Division as screening force at the defiles Selaoglu – Kizil Dag, north of Ushak.

– The Cavalry Brigade behind the outposts of II Division.

– The Heavy Artillery Regiment in the area between Banaz and V Division, in the same area as Army Corps B.

– The rest of the units (B and D Aviation Squadrons, the Naval Aviation Flight and the Military Command of Ushak) remained at their positions in Ushak.

Six Infantry divisions and the Cavalry Brigade would attack towards Kutahya and Afyon Karahisar and one strong joint detachment of Division would attack from the southwest against the front at Kutahya. At the same time the Northern Field Army Section would operate from the northwest from the area of Prusa towards Kutahya and Eskishehir.

132. At the beginning of June 1921 XI Division held the ground of the Sangarius River in the Northern area of the Greek front near the Black Sea. The width of the front of the division screened was approximately 150 kilometers. The division was obliged to deploy its forces with great dispersion and not to keep any reserves (Sketchmap 18).

Counting on its participation in future operations, the Field Army ordered XI Division to move towards Kios and Derbent from the morning of

10 June. The Turkish forces opposite the division, observed the preparations for movement and began to harass its outposts seriously. At 1000 7 June 1921 the first troops of 47 Infantry Regiment reached Nicomedia, relieved the troops of XI Division and assumed the responsibility to secure the area.

There had been no Greek troops between the southern shore of the bay of Nicomedia and Lake Askoy. The gap thus formed with a width of thirty five kilometers could be exploited by the Turkish forces interposed between XI Division and the remaining forces of Army Corps C in the area of Prusa.

At 0600 of 10 June XI Division moved from its area towards Prusa covered to the east by strong flank guards. Having repulsed repeated Turkish attacks, at 1030 it attacked the village of Yenikoy from two directions. Approximately 2,000 Turks had been dug in defending the area. After an eight hour battle the division seized the Turkish positions and the heights in the vicinity of Yenikoy, suffering heavy casualties.

The same day, 10 June, the commander of 47 Infantry Regiment at Nicomedia asked XI Division to send reinforcements because the Turks had attacked his troops in strength and were threatening the city. When the Field Army was informed of the crucial situation in Nicomedia by the Military Mission in Constantinople, it ordered all the ships in the Sea of Marmara and the Bosporus to speed there to take the refugees gathered in the area.

At 0900 the next day XI Division, assembled in the Yenikoy area, received another message from the commander of 47 Infantry Regiment insistently requesting reinforcements. That caused concern to the division which immediately organized a joint detachment of regimental strength reinforced with Artillery that hastened towards Nicomedia. As soon as the Turks were informed of the presence of the detachment they withdrew towards Sapanja under the detachment's heavy fire. The detachment remained in Nicomedia until 0100 on 15 June covering the evacuation from the city of 47 Infantry Regiment and the refugees. Then the Turks occupied the city.

XI Division began to move on the morning of 16 June. At 2000 it assembled on the eastern edge of the village Karamursel. The next day it continued to move under unbearable heat and arrived at Pazarkoy on 19 June. They encamped there without having been harassed by the Turks.

On 21 June, after an order by the Northern Group of Divisions to which it had been subordinated, the division relocated to the area Borjun, Bayirkoy and Ermeni Selous in order to be employed as screening force.

On 11 June 47 Infantry Regiment reinforced with a naval landing party relocated from Nicomedia to Kios. Under orders from the Field Army, it was subordinated the Prusa Military Command for cover missions and to secure lines of communication during the operations.

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133. The Northern Field Army Section assembled its forces at the attack areas (Sketchmap 18):

– X Division relocated at night from the area south of Kios and Derbent and Tepejik, arrived at the battle area near the village Chugu, south of Prusa, on 23 June.

– VII Division, marched at night until and including the 24 of June, assembled from the area of Kestel to the area south of the village Chugu ready for the jump off.

– XI Division assembled in the areas Bayirkoy and Borjun on 24 June

– III Division completed its assembly at the attack area of Aksu on 26 June 1921.

On 24 June the forces of the Northern Field Army Section had the following disposition:


– Army Corp C at Prusa, with X Division in the area of the village Chugu and further to the north, and VII Division in the area south of Chugu.

– The Northern Group of Divisions at Aksu with III Division in the area of Aksu, and XI Division in the area Bayirkoy – Borjun.

Following the reinforcement of the Field Army of Asia Minor and reconstruction, its combat strength was 2,526 officers and 107,476 enlisted men with 106,007 rifles, 908 machine guns, 1,469 sabers (cavalrymen) and 344 Artillery pieces of various calibers.

In late June these forces, not counting those assigned with the security of the interior were distributed as follows:

	Formations	Officers	Enlisted Men	Artillery
1.	Protection of Maeander and General Supply Center Ushak	254	11,076	10
2.	Military Command of Prusa	140	5,000	14
3.	Southern Field Army Section	1,438	58,567	212
4.	Northern Field Army Section	694	32,833	108
	Total	2,526	107,476	344



Sketchmap 20. The Disposition of the Turkish Army in June 1921.

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Disposition of the Turkish Forces

134. The entire Turkish Army which from the end of May had been under the orders of the commander of the Western Front, Ismet Inonu, comprised of the following units (Sketchmap 20):

– **I Group of Divisions** (1, 11, 23 and 61 Infantry Divisions), 3 Caucasus Division, 3 Cavalry Division, and a Cavalry Brigade on the line Metres Tepe – Kovalicha – Karsak with 3 Cavalry Division forwarded at Inegol.

– **III Group of Divisions** (4, 24, and 41 Infantry Divisions and 1 Cavalry Division) on the line Karlik – Yalinja Dag – Koja Dag not included with the advanced 1 Cavalry Division forwarded at Gediz.

– **IV Group of Divisions** (5 Caucasus Division, 7 and 8 Infantry Divisions and 2 Cavalry Division) on the line running from Koja Dag – Akche Dag – Nasuh Chal (Hill 1799).

– **XII Group of Divisions** (57 Division, Group Division and 4 Cavalry Division) in the area at Bal Mahmut. Later, it relocated to the north and occupied the line from Ayranjik Genizi to the heights of Karabuyu Dag.


In addition, 6 Infantry Division was deployed from the left of the Group Division up to the area of Aydin and along the Maeander Valley. The 15 Infantry Division and 14 Cavalry Division were in the area southwest of Eskishehir. Group of Army Corps (17 Infantry Division and several Independent Detachments) in the area south of Nicomedia up to Sangarius river.

The adversaries had completed their disposition. The Hellenic Field Army would operate in order to occupy the line Eskishehir – Kutahya – Afyon Karahisar. The battle would mainly take place in areas well organized by the Turks. The Greek fighters had high morale, aggressive spirit and were confident of their victory.

The Advance of the Northern Group of Divisions towards Eskishehir

135. On 19 June 1921 the Commander of the Northern Group of Divisions, Major General Nikolaos Trikoupes, forwarded the operation plan of the group to the division including his directives and their missions.

On 27 June the divisions' advance began and developed according to the plan. III Division (Sketchmap 21) jumped off at 0600 and advanced in two columns. The left column followed the carriage road Bahche Dere – Koluje – Suverdi and the main column followed the road Aksu – Inegol – Hasan Pasha. The advance guard of the main column clashed with strong enemy forces holding the summit of Inegol. The division immediately deployed and attacked. Despite fierce enemy resistance it seized Inegol and the Hasan Pasha Bridge. The enemy withdrew to the east of the Gallus River and the Greek troops advanced up to its left bank.



Sketchmap 21. The Advance of the Northern Group of Divisions.

XI Division also moved from 0600 on 27 June along the carriage road Bayirkoy – Menteshe – Yenishehir. It only faced minor Turkish harassment during its advance and thus managed to reach Yenishehir where it encamped. The Turkish Cavalry Brigade opposite the division withdrew towards the east having destroyed three wooden bridges over the Gallus River.

After the repair of the Hasan Pasha bridge, III Division resumed its advance from 1000 on 28 June and reached the area of Nazifpasha and encamped there. That same day XI Division reached Kopruhisar unmolested and encamped there.

On 29 June the Northern Group of Divisions remained in its positions to rest. The next day, 30 June, III Division advanced to Pazaryeri. Turkish 1 Division opposite it withdrew towards Karakoy: XI Division advanced towards Bilejik which it entered at 1800 and deployed outposts at the Kopru Defile. Turkish forces put up weak resistance, were overrun by the division and withdrew towards Sogut.

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On 1 July III Division stayed at Pazaryeri while XI Division headed towards Daglar through the Kopru Defile. As the Turks had destroyed all the bridges in the area, the division had to march extremely slowly through the defile. As the division's advance guard was exiting the defile was hit by effective Artillery fire from the area north of Kurtkoy that caused losses and confusion. The division remained there, spending the night in the defile.

136. The evening of 1 July the Northern Group of Divisions occupied the area of Damlar with XI Division and the area of Pazaryeri with III Division. For the next day III Division was ordered to remain in its positions and XI Division to move southward in line with III Division so that together they could force the Karakoy defile. The protection of XI Division communications was assigned to a battalion based at Kopruhisar.

As a diversion to the Greek attack against the front Kutahya – Eskishehir, the commander of the Western Front ordered the group army corps which was at Guve to employ one division to cut off the lines of communication between Bilejik and Yenishehir in order to tie up Greek forces in that direction. Thus on 1 July when XI Division was headed to Damlar, sections of the group army corps that had been reinforced by the Cavalry brigade of the Turkish I Group of Divisions, attacked the communication security elements along the Kopruhisar – Bilejik road and moved towards Bilejik.

When the Northern Group of Divisions was informed that enemy troops had attacked and cut off the carriage road Kopruhisar – Bilejik, it ordered XI Division to remain in place on 2 July and to take measures to restore communications. That same day III Division deployed outposts southeast of the village at Ahmetler, and sent a battalion forward from Pazaryeri to Inegol to cover its communications.

At the same time, the Field Army ordered the Northern Group of Divisions to continue its advance towards Eskishehir. Following this on 3 July III Division organized a joint detachment and ordered it to seize Alajadag. The detachment moved during the night, reached Alajadag at first light and engaged the Turkish forces there. The Turks were surprised and retreated in disorder. The detachment advanced and captured Alajadag.

XI Division that was to move towards Kurtkoy – Akchapinar on 3 July, was ordered by the Northern Group to suspend the attack because strong Turkish forces had captured Yenishehir and Kopruhisar. The joint detachment which the division has sent the previous day to reinforce its battalion at Kopruhisar was attacked as soon as it exited the Kopru defile by Turkish troops attempting to seize its northern exit and requested to be reinforced. The division reinforced it with an Infantry battalion with Artillery.

In the afternoon XI Division was ordered to turn back the north and the next day, 4 July, to attack the Turkish forces in the Bilejik area in order

to mop up the area east of Prusa and ensure its unhindered resupply. The division began it march at 2300 of 3 July, passed the Kopru defile and at 0400 of 4 July assembled south of Bilejik.

On the saddle north of Akkoy, the joint detachment was under pressure from strong Turkish forces occupying the Bilejik summit and the neighboring hills. The division attacked with two detachments at 1500, and forced the Turks to withdraw with losses. The division's losses were nine killed and sixty–eight wounded, of which five were officers.

XI Division spent the night in the area of Bilejik and over the next days moved towards Daglar and Karakoy and from there to Pazaryeri where it arrived at 1500 on 7 July. III Division remained in its position until 6 July, conducting reconnaissance up to the southern exit of the Karakoy defile.

137. On 7 July III Division relocated to Bozuyuk while its joint detachment at Alajadag arrived at the southern exit of the Karakoy defile which was not held by the Turks.

That same day XI Division at Pazaryeri was informed that its joint detachment which was deployed at the northern entrance of the Damlar defile had been attacked by Turkish troops of approximately regimental strength from the direction of Bilejik. The division reported the event to the Northern Group of Divisions who ordered them to turn again and chase the enemy towards the north.

III Division was ordered to suspend its advance towards Eskishehir and remained till 8 July at Bozuyuk with its joint detachment at Chay Dere. At 1800 the division received a message from Army Corps C asking it to hurry to Eskishehir to reinforce the corps. The division immediately moved out along the route Bozuyuk – Chukur Hisar and, marching all night reached Poyra at 0500 on 9 July where it encamped temporarily to rest. At 0630 it moved out again towards Eskishehir. However after a while, it received another message from Army Corps C informing it of the Turkish withdrawal from Eskishehir. The division halted and encamped at Inonu where it waited until 11 July. On 12 July, following an order from the Field Army, it continued its march on the highway to Eskishehir where it paraded before the commander of Army Corps C on 13 July. That night the division reached the area of Sidikli Kaya. From the time it arrived at Eskishehir, III Division was subordinated to Army Corps C.

XI Division turned back for a second time and at 1200 on 8 July began to move towards Bilejik, initially along the carriage road from Pazaryeri – Kopru – Ahmetler and then the highway towards Bilejik. Its joint detachment which had been at the northern entrance of the Damlar defile, retired towards the south and linked up with the division. The division continued its march unhindered, pushing weak Turkish sections at the heights between Bilejik

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and Kopru and spending the night astride the carriage road Ahmetler – Kopru. The next day it continued onwards taking strict security measures because intense activities of Turkish sections were observed on the heights of Kopru and Bilejik. After an exchange of fire at noon, the division's advance guards pursued mounted Turkish troops that withdrew towards Leukes. At dusk the division encamped northwest of Bilejik covering itself from the direction of Sogut by a detachment. The division was ordered to remain in the same positions the next day.

At 0400 on 11 July XI Division moved towards Kopruhisar covered by flank guards. At 1200 the head of the column reported the appearance of a Turkish column of unknown strength on the carriage road from Kopruhisar to Bilejik, six kilometers east of Kopruhisar. A section of the advanced guard deployed on the heights and began to fire against the Turks who were surprised by the effectiveness of the fire and withdrew in disorder towards Kopruhisar and Leukes. The division continued to move and reached Kopruhisar at about 1800 where it encamped on the right bank of Gallus River.

On 12 June XI Division organized three joint detachments and employed them to restore its communications. Then it assembled its forces in the area Menteshe – Yenishehir – Kopruhisar. From 14 July the Northern Group of Divisions withdrew and the division came under the direct orders of the Field Army. Their total losses till this date totaled two officers and fifty–one enlisted men killed and ten officers and 311 enlisted men wounded.

The Northern Group with its two divisions (III, XI) was not able to take part and thus to accomplish its mission i.e. to threaten the lines of communication of the enemy towards Kutahya and Eskishehir, during the struggle of the bulk of the Field Army in Kutahya. Neither did it take part in the crucial and decisive battle of 8 July at Eskishehir – Seyitgazi. By attacking the weak detachments covering the lines of communication of the Northern Group with Prusa, the Turkish leadership managed to win a serious tactical success with relatively minor force and without significant losses.


The Advance of Army Corps C towards Kutahya

Sketchmaps 17, 22, 23, 27

138. The Field Army chose 28 June 1921 as the day to begin the operations towards Kutahya, Eskishehir and Afyon Karahisar.

Army Corps C was to jump off on 25 June. Its mission was to attack the fortified Turkish forces at Kutahya in concert with the other Greek forces ,which were to move from the south, specifically from the area of Dumlupinar and Ushak. To accomplish this it had to traverse a distance of about 200 kilometers from its assembly area to Prusa in order to gain contact with the eastward turned section of Kutahya's fortified positions (Sketchmap 17). The

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Sketchmap 22. The Advance of Army Corps C, 25–29 June 1921.

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corps would follow the Adranos River valley moving on an extremely long and inaccessible carriage road. The terrain for the greatest part was very rough and steep. The lack of parallel and cross routes made the passage slow and difficult for such a large unit. On the main and only road from Prusa through Chokkoy towards Tavshanli and up to Kutahya, only the segment from Prusa till Beyseki was macadam.

For the first day of the week Army Corps C ordered VII and X Divisions to move in one column along the route Chugu to Akchekoy without crossing the line of hills Akchekoy – Findikli Tepe (Sketchmap 22).

At 0300 on 25 June VII Division moved in one column along the carriage road and sent a detachment of battalion strength towards Bagli to seize the heights Findikli Tepe. At 0945 the advance guard met with Turkish troops 500 meters south of the bridge over the Nilufer River and forced them to withdraw to the south. Later it advanced and captured the village of Akseki. VII Division encamped at the area of Akseki and the Nilufer Bridge while X Division, which was following, encamped between Huseyin Alan and Marashlar.

On 26 June VII Division advanced in two columns. The main column on the right followed the macadam road from Akseki to Beyseki while the column on the left followed the mule track Bagli – Kinik – Velen – Mire. The division's mission was to outflank every Turkish defensive line east of the Adranos River. According to the intelligence at hand, the Turks held the heights above the bridges immediately south of the village of Adranos on the river of the same name. At 1400 a joint detachment was assigned to push them back. The detachment reached the village of Burma via Akchebuk. At 1200 the left column seized the heights west of Beyseki and launched flanking Artillery fire against the Turkish forces in the Burma area which withdrew to the south. At 1900 VII Division encamped north of the Adranos bridges having deployed outposts from the area east of Mire up to hill 865. At 2100 X Division encamped north of the Adranos River straddling the carriage road.

The next day, 27 June, VII Division again moved in one column following the pack track Adranos – Beyseki – Belen Oluk. The march on the pack track was extremely difficult and laborious. That night the division encamped in the area of Agach Hisar. At 2000 X Division encamped between Karasu and Kara Oglan.

The lack of communications and the inaccessibility of the few available routes contributed to the delay of Army Corps C's advance. Perceiving the difficulties, the Field Army informed the army corps that for this reason the Southern Group of Divisions' jump–off was postponed for a day. At the same time it ordered the advance to continue on 28 June, which the army corps had fixed as a day for the rest of its extremely exhausted units.


After that, on 28 June VII Division moved out in two columns which often stretched more than thirty kilometers, due to the inaccessibility of the

pack trail routes. The division encamped for the night at the line Avdan – Enkopru. X Division which had also moved in two columns encamped northwest of Harmanjik.

On 29 June VII Division, having been ordered to seize the Bozbelen plateau by night fall, marched along the route Eshenkoy – Kara Kaya and arrived unhindered in the area Elma Agach – Kara Kaya at the end of the day X Division where it encamped at the end of the day. X Division, moving in three columns, pushed off a Turkish Cavalry section which withdrew towards Tavshanli. At 2000 the division encamped at the Derbent line, four kilometers northwest of Yenikoy – Tashman.

During the night, the Turkish Command of the Western Front moved 14 Infantry Division forward to Tavshanli and 15 Infantry Division to Agizoren and Dukakoy (Sketchmap 23). These two divisions and the National Assembly Guard Battalion composed the Turkish V Group.

Sketchmap 23. The Advance of Army Corps C on 1 June 1921.



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For 30 June Army Corps C's orders were to deploy, complete their supply and cover themselves from the directions of Domanich and Tavshanli. VII Division moved its line forward to the plateau Bozbelen while X Division reigned in its encampments. From the intelligence gathered the army corps, it gained that the Turkish forces intended to defend the fortified line Chobankoy – Kukurt – Arsanli.

139. On 1 July VII Division moved in three columns. The first column advanced through Kara Kaya – Fundujak and captured the ridgeline of Arifler at approximately 1700. The second column, which started moving two hours later, reached Fundujak by the same route. The third column, following the route Bozbelen – Yenikoy, assembled at the Fundujak gorge as reserve of the division.

X Division moved out in two columns. The left one of regiment strength plus Artillery, followed the route from Derbent – Guragach and reached the ridge line of Kizil Tepe. The right column moved along the carriage road Tavshanli – Chobankoy and arrived at Shah Melik where it encamped. 30 Infantry Regiment of X Division which had been subordinated to the army corps arrived at Chukurkoy and remained there. The same day, the army corps took measures to secure the lines of communication of VII Division from the direction of Domanich and ordered the construction of bridges over the Tavshanli River.

In order to meet the situation, Turkish V Group of Divisions ordered 1 Cavalry Division, which had been assigned to the group, to relocate from Esachlar to Yenikoy and Rushen, 14 Cavalry Division to relocate from the area of Oblun to Yenikoy during the night of 1/2 July and 15 Infantry Division to defend the line Arsanli – Kepes. It also requested its reinforcement with sufficient forces.

On the next day, 2 July, Army Corps C was to continue its advance towards the general direction of Kutahya and ordered the following dispositions:

Jumping off from its positions in Yenikoy, VII Division was to attack the front Arsanli – Kepes and attempt to cut off the Turkish withdrawal towards Eskishehir.

Jumping off from its positions in Jibanikoy and Kizil Tepe, X Division was to gain contact with the enemy aiming to pin him down in his positions. The area south of the line Kizil Tepe – Abalar – Chal Dag (Sketchmap 27) was designated as the division zone of action.

30 Infantry Regiment was to remain in its position east of Chukurkoy.

The joint detachment of 17 Infantry Regiment (of XI Division that had been detached to Army Corps C on 20 June until the end of the operations) was to move to Yenikoy and cover VII Division from the north.

The defensive area against which Army Corps C would operate was, in fact, the right wing of the entire Turkish defensive area, which directly secured the lines of communication towards Eskishehir. The Turkish defensive lines were strong and the whole area in general was extremely suitable for defense.

VII Division jumped off in two columns. One column followed the route Fundujak – Egrioz – Yenikoy with orders to advance towards the east and drive back the Turkish forces there. The other column marched along the route Fundujak – Kepes with orders to attack. The reserve of regimental strength followed the first column. The joint detachment of 17 Infantry Regiment moved towards the village of Arifler.

The division advanced without harassment and gained contact with the Turks at the heights immediately west of the line Arsanli – Kukurt. As night fell the division encamped in the Kepes area, east of Egrioz, in contact with X Division operating further south.

X Division also advanced in two columns. The northern column departed at 0930 and followed the route Kizil Tepe – Kizik northeast of Agizoren. At 1630 it came under Infantry fire from the heights in the area of the village of Kizik and halted. The southern column moved along the route from Shah Melik – Antik – Kopruoren. At 1415 it clashed with Turkish troops occupying the heights Boz Tepe, east of Kopruoren. The engagement lasted until the early evening hours. 30 Infantry Regiment returned to its division at about 2030.

140. In the afternoon of 2 July Army Corps C ordered X Division to forward its northern column to capture heights east of Kepes and to advance towards Kukurt to the southwest ridges of the Gumush heights.

Shortly afterwards it ordered its divisions to increase the pace of the offensive towards Chal Dag, from where the Turkish forces, according to intelligence, had already begun to withdraw. For the next day, 3 July, the Army Corp ordered VII Division, reinforced with 17 Infantry Regiment, to move forward up to the line Chal Dag – Seydikoy (northeast of Kutahya) and X Division to advance up to the line Bayramshah – Chal Dag. That same day the Field Army informed the army corps of the occupation of Afyon Karahisar and ordered that the attack be hastened.

On 3 July VII Division advanced in two columns and by 1000 completed its contact with the enemy along the entire front. At 1550 the left column attacked and was able to seize the forward trenches of the enemy area despite fierce Turkish resistance. Two Turkish counterattacks were successfully repulsed after fierce struggles. The division's troops remained in contact with the enemy during the night. The division's right column attacked at 1400 and captured the Turkish positions after a fierce battle. The Turks, however,

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after being reinforced, launched repeated counterattacks and forced the Greek troops to withdraw to new positions. During the night the troops linked up with sections of the left column.

The Turkish forces, although having put up fierce resistance, withdrew from the front of the VII Division during the night of 3/4 July. The division's losses on 3 July amounted to nine officers and ninety enlisted men killed and fifteen officers and 282 enlisted men wounded.

X Division attacked in three columns on 3 July. The northern column attacked along the axis Kizik – Chatalca – Chal Dag. Shortly before noon it clashed with Turkish troops occupying fortified positions northeast of Dentik in terrain extremely favorable for defense, and it pinned down the enemy. At 1430 having been reinforced with Artillery it launched a new attack but this was also repelled by effective Turkish fire. At 1815 the northern column, reinforced by troops of the central column, which having marched along the axis Verankoy – Antik – Ulukoy, attacked the flank of the Turks, overran them and pursued them to the east. The enemy abandoned on the battlefield a wealth of equipment including four Artillery pieces. The pursuit was halted as night began to fall. The southern column attacked in order to seize the fortified heights immediately east of Kizilja Kaya and only captured Boz Tepe Hill at 0950.


X Division encamped for the night east of the line Kizilja Kaya – Boz Tepe. The division's losses amounted to three officers and fifty–seven enlisted men killed and seventeen officers and 250 enlisted men wounded.

According to Turkish sources, the Turkish forces opposing Army Corps C consisted of 15 Infantry Division and 14 Cavalry Division, reinforced with two Infantry regiments and one Cavalry regiment.

On the night of 3 July, a crucial day for the Field Army's combat at Kutahya, the right flank of Army Corp C was fifteen kilometers in a straight line from the city and the left twenty kilometers from the massif of Chal Dag. The capture of this massif was VII Division's objective and if achieved would certainly cut off a part of the Turkish forces defending west of Kutahya. Army Corps C's maneuver, which was intended to outflank the extreme right of the Turkish dispositions at Kutahya, failed due to the clash with the forces of the Turkish V Group.

Advance of the Joint Detachment of IX Division – The Capture of Kutahya

141. The joint detachment of IX Division, comprising seven battalions and four batteries, with a proportionate number of smaller units, assembled on the night 25/26 June behind the center of resistance at Kizil Kaya near Ushak. Following an order it jumped off on the morning of 27 June and by night had seized the line Karaduman Dag – Chakmak Tepesi – Goljuk Dag, (Hill 1017) without giving battle (Sketchmap 24).



Sketchmap 24. The Advance of the Detachment of IX Division, 27 June–1 July 1921.

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The next day it remained in these positions till it received an order from the Field Army at 0430 of 27 June to seize the saddle northeast of Gediz and to secure the road Gediz – Ushak. On 29 June it advanced towards Kutahya in two columns. It overran a small number of troops at Sandikli and Kavak where it deployed. The Turkish troops who offered weak resistance belonged to the Turkish 1 Cavalry Division.

The detachment remained in its positions on 30 June. The next day the Field Army ordered it to advance and seize the forward enemy positions at Susuzkaya. The Turks put up only a limited resistance in their positions at Susuzkaya which the detachment captured easily and joined with Army Corps C. Having consolidated these positions, in close contact with the enemy, the corps awaited orders to move forward.

Then, following an order by the Field Army to attack on 3 July against Alagol via Kares Dag, it organized two columns. The one column to the left would operate with the capture of Pular saddle and the outflanking of the Kiraz Dag ridge line as its objectives. The second column to the right would attack Kiraz Dag.

Both columns moved from 0500 on 3 July (Sketchmap 27). At about 1130, when the head of the left column reached the Gokcheada village, it was fired on by Artillery from the direction of Arap Dere Tepe. After advancing for five hours the column gained close contact with Turkish sections defending the Pular saddle. A fierce struggle ensued, and an assault of the Greek fighters with bayonets. As a result the Turks abandoned their trenches and at 2100 the column captured the saddle where it deployed. The column's losses were heavy.

The right column attacked the ridgeline of Kiraz Dag – Agin Tepe but faced strong resistance. However after the Turks were overrun and withdrew from the Pular saddle the forces holding Kiraz Dag and Agin Tepe were forced to retreat towards Kutahya during the night to avoid being encircled.


Following an order by the Field Army, the detachment moved to Kutahya at 0800 of 4 July, and its right column entered the city at 1430. Before that, at about 1300 the divisional X Cavalry had entered the city unhindered. The Greek forces were welcomed by the Greek and Armenian population with enthusiasm. The detachment encamped outside the city.

Advance of the Southern Group of Divisions – Occupation of Afyon Karahisar

142. On 26 June the Field Army Headquarters relocated to Ushak. The same day the Southern Group of Divisions was ordered by the Field Army to begin its movement on 28 June in the general direction Kelenderes to Akar Dag and to attack the Turkish areas Bal Mahmut – Kuchuk Jorja. Its mission would be to push back the enemy forces defending that area and turn its

southern flank. XIII Division would operate through Sinan Pasha and Pashakoy while IV Division would operate further south through Savran and Teke Yayla (Sketchmap 25). The Southern Group of Divisions would seek to

Sketchmap 25. The Advance of the Southern Group of Divisions, 29–30 June 1921; and of XII Division on 1 July 1921.



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cut off the withdrawal of Turkish forces towards Iconium. The next day the Field Army postponed the attack of the Southern Group for one day because of the outcome of Army Corp C's night advance.

The Turkish leadership awaited the Greek attack and launched sporadic assaults against the Field Army's communication lines employing advanced troops, especially Cavalry.

By an exhausting five–day march IV Division arrived at its attack area in the region of Kale Deresi – Bash Agach – Gonuk at night of 28 June. The division jumped off in one column at 0430 of 29 June. It followed the route Bash Agach – Savran – Teke Yayla and, after brief enemy resistance at Savran, captured its objective, the heights of Teke Yayla at 1930. Turkish prisoners informed the division that the Turkish Army had evacuated Afyon Karahisar.

On 24 June XII Division moved from the Ine Gobek area and reached its attack area near the line Belche Dag – Ulukoy on the massif of Akar Dag the night of 27 June. It jumped off at 0430 of 29 June in two columns. The northern one followed the route Gonik – Pashakoy and the southern the road Dokuzlar – Sinirkoy. The northern column gained no contact with the enemy. The southern column was engaged by Infantry and Artillery fire from positions southeast of Sinirkoy which it captured without serious resistance. Towards midday, the division's columns reached Pashakoy and Sinirkoy. The division continued its march without meeting any resistance and by dusk it had captured the heights of Kuchuk Jorja where it spent the night.

Having left a weak rear guard to delay the Southern Group of Divisions, the Turkish division group evacuated Afyon Karahisar and retreated the south up to the line Mihalich – Kara Aslan.

The Field Army ordered IV Division to capture Afyon Karahisar, to leave a joint detachment there and to be ready to move forward to Hamamalti. XII Division was assigned to move on the same day to Hamamalti where it would remain at the disposal of the Field Army.

On the morning of 30 June IV Division reached Deper without battle. From there it forwarded a two–company force which captured Afyon Karahisar at 1700 without meeting any Turkish resistance. The division deployed outposts on the line Deper – Chukurkoy – Kumartash.

XII Division, having not received the order to move to Hamamalti but also due to the fatigue of its men, moved at 1000 from Pashakoy towards Elperek in two columns. Acting on his own initiative, the commander of the right column moved towards Afyon Karahisar, entered it in the morning, and moved to Sipsin only after the intervention of the division. That night the division encamped in the area Sipsin – Elperek, where it received the order to advance towards Hamamalti at 1930.

The Turkish Command of the Western Front (Sketchmap 27) moved from the evening of 30 June the 4 Infantry Division to the left wing of IV Group in order to reinforce XII Group in case of emergency. The 3 Caucasus Division assembled at Sasuh Chak, while the 2 Cavalry Division and the 4 Cavalry Brigade would merge to cover the left wing of XII Group.

For the next day, 1 July, the Field Army ordered the Northern Group of Divisions to organize a joint detachment from IV Division to secure the direction from Iconium and then move forward with the rest of its forces towards Bayram Tashi. XII Division would move from Elperek towards Beykoy (Sketchmap 25).

143. At 0930 on 1 July screening elements at Deper (Sketchmap 26) reported that they had seen Turkish forces moving from Salar towards Afyon Karahisar. Similar intelligence was provided by screening elements at Chukurkoy. Shortly fire was exchanged between the Turkish forces advancing towards Afyon Karahisar and screening forces of IV Division. From 1100 the battle spread and all the divisions were engaged. Despite close Artillery support, the Turkish Infantry operated hesitantly. At about 1500 the Turkish attack was repulsed on the left and center of the division's disposition. On the right however, the Turks continued their efforts.

The situation already developed did not permit IV Division to execute the Field Army's orders to organize a joint detachment to secure Afyon Karahisar from the direction of Iconium. The division organized the joint detachment but did not order its relocation until the situation had become clearer. The Field Army's counterattack on the right succeeded in temporarily pushing back the attackers. At 1700, however, the Turks were reinforced and launched a new, fierce attack on this sector.

At 1630 the Southern Group ordered the immediate deployment of non–combatant troops of the division towards Islahiye, about thirty kilometers northwest of Afyon Karahisar. On the right the battle continued and at 1830 it reached great intensity because the Turks mistook the withdrawal of the non–combatant troops for the withdrawal of the division.

The commander of the newly established joint detachment of IV Division met the commander of the Southern Group and persuaded him to keep temporarily their position and to recall non–combat troops. In the meantime the battle continued fiercely and the Turks managed to penetrate briefly the Greek line. Reinforcements counterattacked at 0430 on 2 July and managed to dislodge the enemy and reestablish the defensive line after fierce battle.

During the night the division reorganized, and redisposed its forces and prepared the attack for the next day. It began at first light on 2 July. By 0500 the Turkish forces had been overrun and withdrawn with Greek troops in pursuit.

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The Turks left 300 killed on the battlefield. The division took 163 prisoners. Its own losses amounted to twenty–two killed and ninety wounded. The attacking Turkish forces belonged to the Division Group and comprised one Infantry regiment and two Cavalry regiments. At dusk the troops of IV Division returned to the positions from which they had launched the attack.

On the morning of 1 July XII Division reached Belchemizi after a long and arduous march through Kazli Gol, Hamam and Akoren (Sketchmap 25).

On 3 July the Field Army's order reached the division according to which the Southern Group would cease to exist. Henceforth IV Division would be directly under the Field Army and XII Division under Army Corps A.

Advance of Army Corps A

144. Army Corps A, according to the Field Army's orders, would jump off in the morning of 29 June 1921. Its divisions were assembled at the attack areas about ten kilometers southwest of Dumlupinar.

The missions they had been assigned were as follows (Sketchmap 28):

I Division, arriving in the Egret area, would turn northeast in order to capture Karabuyu Dag until 30 June.


II Division would seize the heights Yeshil Tepe and Kiviljim Derbent and then would conduct a sweeping maneuver through Bayram Tashi towards Sipsin aiming to out flank the Turkish defensive area Kopru – Arapli Chiftlik in communication with the Cavalry Brigade.

I Division moved out at 0400 of 29 June and advanced in one column to Selvisaray. From there it continued in two columns with the, main column to the right along the route Olujak – Egret and the left on the route Derekoy Yenije. After it had overrun a weak Turkish resistance at the heights of Derekoy and west of Egret, it captured the villages Egret and Yenije at 1900.

II Division also jumped off at 0400 and advanced in two columns; the right along the route Karagozeli – Duzagach – Ayvali, and the left on the route Akche Hisar – Bashkimse – Yeshil Tepe summit. The division moved forward to the line east of Ayvali to Resil Tepe without meeting serious Turkish resistance.

From first light the Cavalry Brigade sent reconnaissance sections towards Resil Tepe, Hamamalti – Ayvali – Bal Mahmut – Sipsin and Sinan Pasha – Afyon Karahisar. The sections reported that the Turks had abandoned the area Bal Mahmut – Kuchuk Jorja and the city of Afyon Karahisar. The Cavalry Brigade encamped for the night at Ayvali.

For the next day the Field Army ordered Army Corp A to seize Karabuyu Dag and to support Army Corp B's attack against Elma Dagi. The Cavalry Brigade was ordered to move to Beykoy to support the attack of Army Corps B.



Sketchmap 26. Counter–offensive by the Turks towards Afyon Karahisar.


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II Division moved at 0340 of 30 June from the encampment area and followed the route from Ayvali – Egret – Belchemizi. At 1100 Army Corps A ordered it to move in the direction of Beykoy and Karabuyu Dag and to assist I Division in its effort to occupy Karabuyu Dag. At 1700 the division arrived at the Beykoy – Chukurca Kale – Karabuyu Dag area.

The Battles of Karabuyu Dag and Ruklu Dag

145. At 0600 on 30 June I Division moved in two columns for the occupation of Karabuyu Dag (Sketchmap 28). The left column, comprising 5 Infantry Regiment and Artillery, followed the route Yenije – Chakir Tepe – western ridge of Karabuyu Dag. The right column, comprising the remaining forces of the division, moved along the route to Beykoy – Chukurca Kale – Karabuyu Dag. At 1415 it came under Artillery fire north of Beykoy and at 1520, the

Sketchmap 28. The Advance of Army Corps A and the Capture of the Fortified Area Karabuyu Dag – Ruklu Dag on 1 July 1921.



division ordered 4 Infantry Regiment to attack the eastern peak of Karabuyu Dag and 1/38 Evzone Regiment west of 4 Regiment. At 1815 these regiments jumped off under effective Turkish Artillery fire. At 1900 began the attack against the organized enemy positions south of the ridge of Karabuyu Dag. After a fierce struggle, the two regiments seized the advanced Turkish positions and encamped there for the night.

In the meantime, the left column, comprising 5 Regiment, which had also come under Artillery fire at the village of Leyenkoy, deployed and moved towards the western ridge of Karabuyu Dag which was strongly occupied by the enemy. 5 Regiment reached a distance of about 200 meters from the Turkish positions but as night set it was forced to withdraw further west.

Having no orders from the Field Army for operations on 30 June, the Cavalry Brigade moved on its own initiative from 0600 and followed the route Resil Tepe – Egret – Doger – Malatya, arriving at 1400 in the area of Belchemizi where it came under Artillery fire. It assembled at Egret where it spent the night.

The next day the Field Army ordered Army Corps A to resume its attack east of Army Corp B, in order to occupy Egik Tepe, Ayranjik Genizi and Hill 1799 (Nasuh Chal) (Sketchmap 27). The Cavalry Brigade was ordered to cover the right of Army Corps A.

At 0430 of 1 July II Division moved against Ruklu Dag (Sketchmap 28). At about 0620 the advance guard engaged in a fierce battle with Turkish forces occupying naturally fortified positions. After a three–hour struggle the Greek troops reached the enemy positions and launching a strong assault succeeded in dislodging the Turks and pursued them towards the north. At 1700 the division encamped in the area of Cherkezkoy.

II Division's losses amounted to one officer and twenty–seven enlisted men killed and 104 enlisted men wounded. The Turkish forces opposing the division belonged to the 7 and 57 divisions.

At dawn of this same day I Division ordered its regiments which were in close contact with the enemy to attack at 0700 with the objective of capturing Karabuyu Dag. At about 0500 Turkish forces with Artillery support launched a fierce counterattack against 1/38 Evzone Regiment at the center of the division's disposition. It was successfully repulsed. At 0800 the Greek attack was launched against the two flanks of the Turkish disposition. A close combat with bayonets ensued and the Turks were forced to abandon successively their organized positions. The battle continued with unrelenting vehemence until 1230. After a storm of Greek Artillery, the Greek troops assaulted and by 1630 completed the seizure of the peak of Karabuyu Dag. The Turkish troops were pursued towards the northwest. I Division consolidated and encamped for the night at Karabuyu Dag.

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I Division's losses in the two–day battle to occupy Karabuyu Dag amounted to nine officers and 113 enlisted men killed and twenty–one officers and 440 enlisted men wounded. The Turkish troops defending that area belonged to 57 Division.

On 1 July the Cavalry Brigade moved through Egret and Akoren and arrived at Agizoren at 1800 where it stayed, surveying the routes to Yapildak.

Advance of Army Corps B

146. In the first phase of the operations the Field Army had assigned Army Corp B to capture the massif of Elma Dagi as soon as possible. After this for the first day of operations Army Corps B ordered V Division to advance along the highway Dumlupinar – Salkoy – Altintash (Sketchmap 29). XIII Division (minus joint detachment) was ordered to advance on the carriage road Dumlupinar – Ayazkoy – Kaynak. The joint detachment of XIII Division, comprising 2 Infantry Regiment with Artillery and operating as flank guard, would move along the pack track Donlu – Oyuluk – Kizil Dag.


The divisions would attempt to overrun and pursue the Turkish forces up to the line Kizil Dag – southeast of Abazlik. The army corps allocated Heavy and Field Artillery to the divisions.

At 0530 of 29 June V Division advanced in one column towards Salkoy. During its advance it pushed back reconnaissance elements of the Turkish Cavalry division. After that, at 0830 it came under Artillery fire and engaged Turkish troops occupying the heights north of Salkoy which it overran relatively easily. From there it resumed its advance in two columns, of which the right comprised an Infantry regiment with Artillery and followed the route Derekoy – Besh Karish Egik, while the left with the remaining forces of the division moved towards Salkoy and Altintash. In the afternoon the left column reached the area south of Altintash and the right northeast of Besh Karish Egik where it encamped for the night.

XIII Division moved in two columns at 0800 the same day. At 1800 the division's main column occupied the line Kurtkoy – south Karaagach – northwest of Agizoren. The joint detachment, operating as flank guard, was on its west till Kesenler.

For the next day the Field Army ordered Army Corp B to deploy the joint detachment of XIII Division at the heights southeast of the village Abazlik and to move towards the northeast with the objective of attacking and capturing the massif of Elma Dagi.

From 1030 of 30 June V Division advanced along the route Osmankoy – Elma Dagi initially in one column and from the village Osmankoy onwards in two. The left of these columns moved against Elma Dagi and the right\ towards the saddle between Elma Dagi and Jelal Baba Tepe. At about 1900



Sketchmap 29. The Advance of Army Corps B, 29 June–1 July 1921.

the right column's advance guard overran the Turkish troops there and captured Jelal Baba Tepe, the saddle and the southern heights of Elma Dagi.

The joint detachment of XIII Division deployed from 1100 on the heights southwest of Abazlik which it organized defensively in order to secure the left flank of Army Corp B and the lines of communication towards Salkoy.

XIII Division's main column followed the road east of the Kaynak saddle towards Altintash, crossed the Porsuk river at Altintash and at 1500 clashed with the Turkish forces occupying the heights south and southeast of Altintash. The position was a natural fortress, was organized and dominated the plain towards Altintash. The division launched repeated attacks but all were repulsed by the defenders. A section of the division attempting to attack the left of the Turkish defensive area north of Chakirsaz was also repulsed. That night the division remained in its positions on the right bank of the Porsuk river. The Turkish forces opposite Army Corp B belonged to the 2 Cavalry Division reinforced with an Infantry regiment.

For the next day the Field Army ordered Army Corps B to continue the attack between Porsuk and the road from Doger to Malatya.

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147. On 1 July Army Corps B fixed the axis of advance for XIII Division to be the highway from Altintash to Kutahya and for V Division from the summit of Elma Dagi – Chavush Chiftlik – Yenikoy. The joint detachment was ordered to remain in its positions.

V Division did not receive the above order in time and moved its troops forward to the of Elma Dagi massif without meeting the enemy. From 1600 it moved in one column towards Chavush Chiftlik through Kadimursel saddle. At dusk the division halted its advance and encamped three kilometers south of Chavush Chiftlik.

XIII Division having forwarded its troops since morning north of Chakirsaz, at 0600 seized the opposite heights without encountering enemy resistance. From there it resumed its advance until it came under fire of Heavy Artillery north of the village Aykirikchi at 1320. Immediately after its Infantry troops clashed with the organized at Akche Dag. It was not possible for heavy and field Artillery to support the troops because the terrain before Akche Dag was flat, provided no cover and the Artillery would have been exposed to great danger. The troops of the leading 5/42 Evzone Regiment remained in their positions within rifle shot of the Turkish trenches. During the night the Greek Artillery moved forward and deployed near the village of Aykirikchi. At the same time the division prepared the attack for the next day with the objective of occupying Akche Dag.

The Disposition of the Adversaries on the Night of 1 July 1921

148. The evening of 1 July the disposition of the forces of the Field Army was as follows (Sketchmap 27):

Army Corps C was thirty kilometers northwest of Kutahya on the line Arifler – Kizil Tepe – Shah Melik.

The joint detachment of IX Division was thirty kilometers southwest of Kutahya in the area of Susuzkaya.

Army Corps B was north of Altintash at Akche Dag and from Guzeljeoren up to Malatya astride of the railway line.

Army Corps A in the area of Karabuyu Dag and Ruklu Dag.

XII Division was further south in the area of Belchemizi – Beykoy.

The Cavalry Brigade was in the area of Agizoren.

The Northern Group of Divisions (III and XI Divisions) had moved forward to the Damlar – Pazarjik area, while V Division I at the far right faced the counterattacks of Turkish forces in the Afyon Karahisar area (Sketchmap 26).

The Turkish disposition was as follows:

The newly constituted V Group of Divisions, comprising 14 Cavalry Division and 15 Infantry Division was opposite Army Corp C. In addition two

Infantry regiments were headed heading the one towards the left wing and the other towards the center of V Group.

II Group of Divisions, comprising 24 Infantry Division (minus one regiment) at Arap Dere Tepe and 41 Infantry Division (minus one regiment) at Kiraz Dag, were holding a position south of V Group opposite the joint detachment of IX Division.

IV Group of Divisions occupied positions from Koja Dag to Nasuh Chal (Hill 1799) opposite Army Corp B and Greek I Division. It comprised 5 Caucasus Division at Omer Baba Dag and Akche Dag and 4 Division which had been dispatched from III Group's front at the heights of Chavush Chiftlik and Nasuh Chal. 23 Infantry Division and 3 Caucasus Division were transported from the area of I Group of Divisions to reinforce that group.

XII Group of Divisions opposite the remaining forces of Army Corps A with the 7, 57 and 8 Divisions in the area of Beykoz, Oluk and Kirka. 4 Cavalry Brigade secured the group's left north of Gubet and 2 Cavalry Division covered the rest of the groups area to the south.

I Group of Divisions, comprising 1, 11, and 61 Infantry Divisions and 3 Cavalry Division, was northwest of Eskishehir opposite the Northern Group.

The Division Group , 6 Infantry Division and the Group Army Corps, were far from the area of Kutahya and did not take part in the battle.

The Battles of Chavush Chiftlik and Hill 1799

149. On 2 July Army Corps B would resume its attack between the Porsuk river and the road Doger – Malatya – Akoluk. Army Corps A, to which XII Division had also been assigned, would operate east of Army Corps B with its main effort directed towards the height Kizil Sivri and from there towards Seyitgazi (Sketchmap 27).

Army Corps B ordered XIII Division to attack from 0630 against Turkish positions in the opposite area and V Division to advance from 0600 in the direction of Elma Dagi – Chavush Chiftlik and Yenikoy in order to threaten the rear of the Turkish forces defending in the sector of XIII Division.

V Division began to advance in one column at the appointed hour. As it began to move it was fired upon by Artillery from the heights northwest of Chavush Chiftlik and from Evlak. At 0715, 33 Infantry Regiment gained contact with the enemy and at 0815, after a stubborn battle, captured the heights around Chavush Chiftlik pushing back the Turks at bayonet point. The Turks launched repeated counterattacks but all were successfully repulsed. 44 Infantry Regiment attacked on the division's right against the strongly occupied heights of Ismijikoy at 1230. At approximately 1500 33 Infantry Regiment on the division's left continued its move Agalar while 44 Infantry Regiment on the right met with strong resistance and advanced with great difficulty.

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At 1900 44 Infantry Regiment was fiercely counterattacked and pinned down. 33 Infantry Regiment, considering its further advance precarious, returned at 2030 to the ridgeline north of Chavush Chiftlik. At 2100 44 Infantry Regiment, after having been reinforced with troops from 43 Regiment, attacked and overran the defending Turkish forces on the summit Ismijikoy Tepe. That evening V Division, occupying the line hill north of Haymane Kale, Chiftlik Saddle ridgeline northeast of Chavush Chiftlik, reported the situation to Army Corp B and requested reinforcements. The division had both its flanks exposed because XIII Division on its left had not advanced at all and I Division of Army Corps A on the right had stayed behind.

At 2300 the Turks launched a strong counterattack committing 7 Division to the battle against the right of V Division and 23 Division against Chavush Chiftlik. During that hard nighttime struggle the ridge line of Chavush Chiftlik changed hands many times between the Greeks and the Turks. Finally, at 2400, it remained in Turkish possession.

That day, 2 July, XIII Division remained inactive in its positions before Akche Dag and limited itself to bombarding the heights with Heavy Artillery. The division considered that attacking the naturally strong trenches and fortified Turkish positions would cause it to suffer heavy losses. It therefore decided to wait for the advance of the neighboring V Division, when the Turks would have to abandon Akche Dag in order to avoid being encircled. In contrast Army Corps B was of he opinion that the division exaggerated the risks of launching the attack and that it should have attacked from the morning. In fact, as soon as it was informed that V Division had captured Chavush Chiftlik, it ordered XIII Division to attack immediately to capture Akche Dag at 1630. The chief of staff of the army corps brought the order to XIII Division. He also made a reconnaissance and discovered that the saddle of Akche Dag (Hill 1210) was accessible to the Infantry and therefore an attack against it was possible.

The fact that a battalion of the B's Field Artillery Regiment was deployed in an area northeast of Pushan village without meeting serious Turkish resistance, supported that assessment. At the same time troops from the 5/42 Evzone Regiment were moving slowly and with some hesitation towards the Turkish positions.

After a while, 5/42 Evzone Regiment's advance was halted and the attack that had been ordered was not launched. But during the night XIII Division remained inactive along its entire front despite the repeated orders of Army Corps B and the threat hanging over V Division's left. By the evening the advanced Infantry troops of XIII Division were about 1,500 meters from the peak of Akche Dag. Its left wing was the more advanced.

The inaction of XIII Division permitted the Turkish Command to move that day five battalions from the Caucasus Division deployed opposite

XIII Division in order to reinforce the Turkish 4 Division facing the Greek V Division.

150. On 2 July Army Corps A ordered I Division to resume its attack towards Egik Tepe – Nasuh Chal (Hill 1799) and II Division to advance towards Erikli to assist I Division in its successive efforts to capture the heights of Teper Oglan Genizi and Ayranjik Genizi. XII Division was ordered to advance to the right of II Division to the line Goger – Karaoren (Sketchmap 27).

I Division moved in two columns; the right advanced in the direction of Egik Tepe (Hill 1799) Kizil Pinar and arrived at Ayranjik at 1300 unhindered. The left moved in the direction of Etgermez – Malatya Gokseri hill Akoluk (Hill 1320) and east of those heights.

From 1000 the Command of the division realized that V Division from Army Corps B on the right was engaged in a fierce battle at Chavush Chiftlik and the western ridges of Hill 1799. I Division, aiming to assist the struggle of V Division and after receiving permission, decided to launch an attack against the east summit at Hill 1799 that was the key terrain of the whole Turkish area. At the same time it would launch a secondary attack against the west summit of the hill in order to cover the gap between the two divisions.

The division attacked with 4 Infantry Regiment and 1/38 Evzone Regiment in first echelon while 5 Infantry Regiment extended the attack to the left with the final objective being the ridges of Hill 1799, south of Akoluk.

4 Infantry Regiment had been engaged in the battle from 1700 and dislodged the Turks from their advanced positions. During the evening hours it clashed with the main Turkish lines of resistance which it seized in a headlong assault with bayonet. The Turkish troops withdrew to the strongly organized summit of Hill 1799. The regiment engaged all its forces in the combat for the seizure of the summit, that went on until the first hours of the night.

When 1/38 Evzone Regiment reached the eastern ridges of Hill 1799, it attacked at about 1900 against its saddle to the northeast. The Turkish troops withdrew initially towards their main line of resistance. They were reinforced, however, and counterattacked the Evzone regiment. A tenacious battle ensued which finally resulted in the Turks being repulsed.

5 Infantry Regiment (minus one battalion assigned to the division's reserves) advanced and reached the southwest ridges of Hill 1799 unhindered. There it restored liaison with the troops of V Division to its west, which were engaged in battle there. The regiment fought against Turkish forces entrenched in strongly organized positions and its progress was slow. At 1930, after a fierce battle, it seized a hill which was the key terrain of the area. Having repulsed repeated Turkish counterattacks it was finally forced to withdraw and stubbornly resume the fight from new positions.

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At dusk I Division ordered its forces to reorganize and remain in the positions they had already occupied. At 2300 the division reinforced 5 Regiment with a two–company force from the reserves due to the heavy losses it had suffered. During the night the division received repeated requests for reinforcements from V Division, due to the critical situation of its 44 Regiment. I Division, with no units available, asked Army Corps A at 0200 of 3 July to order II Division to attack Hill 1799 before dawn.

151. The same day, 2 July, the activities of the rest of Army Corps A's forces were relatively limited. II Division began moving at 0600 and at 1530 engaged the Turkish forces on the heights northeast of Erikli. After a brief battle the heights were captured and at 2000 the division encamped in the area of Erikli.

XII Division moved from Belchemizi to the village of Kirka. At about dusk its divisional Cavalry came under Infantry fire as it exited the Goger defile and was forced to withdraw. After that, and because night had fallen, the column's advance guards encamped in the defile while the division's main force encamped in the area of Goger – Chay – Karaoren.

The Cavalry Brigade advanced from Agizoren the north and reached the area Ine Yayla where it encamped for the night.

152. In the evening of 2 July 1921 the Field Army was not fully informed of the situation on the entire front. It had not received till then the report of the military situation of Army Corps C and the joint detachment of IX Division. Neither did it have a clear picture of the continuing fierce battles of Army Corps A and B during the night 2/3 July. At 0045 of 3 July it issued an order to Army Corps A and B informing them that the Turks had assembled significant forces in the area of Chukurlar and Evlak (Sketchmap 27) and were putting strong pressure on V Division. At the same time it ordered Army Corps B to resume its attack and to seize the Karajaoren area as soon as possible. It ordered Army Corps A to resume its attack east of Army Corps B and to attempt to envelop closely the enemy. The Cavalry Brigade should have moved forwards Akin in order to cover the Field Army's right flank.

Meanwhile Army Corp B had ordered for 3 July V Division to remain in its position and XIII Division to resume its attack from 0400 to capture Akche Dag and then to continue its advance towards Evlak.

At 0545 of 3 July the Turks launched a fierce attack along the entire front of V Division with units from the 4 and 25 Divisions and the 5 Caucasus Division. The main effort was directed at the division's left. The Turkish attack was repulsed after a fierce battle. A vehement counterattack followed from the division's left, as a result of which were the Turks were overrun and

withdrew to the heights northwest of Chavush Chiftlik. At the division's right flank repeated counterattacks were launched against the left flank of Turkish 23 Division. As a result 23 Division resistance bent and it was forced to abandon the Ismijikoy heights at about 1000. By 1350 V Division, reinforced with troops from I Division, completed the occupation of Ismijikoy Tepe.

V Division encamped for the night in the area of Chavush Chiftlik and covered itself from northeast up to Yenikoy. It had suffered heavy losses during the two–day battle (3 and 4 July) amounting to thirteen officers and 198 enlisted men killed, thirty–four officers and 1,030 enlisted men wounded and ninety–one enlisted men missing.

At 0450 of 3 July XIII Division attacked the sections of 5 Caucasus Division at Akche Dag. Having arrived that morning at the division's observation point and perceiving the slow progress of 5/42 Evzone Regiment's frontal attack, the commander of Army Corps B decided on a maneuver for the occupation of Akche Dag. For this purpose a joint detachment was organized which moved in the gap between XIII and V Divisions.

At about 1700 V Division reported that strong Turkish columns were withdrawing towards Gokseri and Akoluk. That evening XIII Division encamped in roughly the same positions it had held the previous day. Its losses on 2–3 July totaled twenty–two enlisted men killed and four officers and 101 enlisted men wounded.

In the battles of 2–3 July the resistance to XIII Division was initially 5 Caucasus Division and then only some of its sections. Opposite V Division were 23, 4 and 7 Divisions as well as sections of 8 Division, all of which had been dispatched successively from Army Corps A's front. In addition to the above forces there were five battalions plus Artillery of 5 Caucasus Division which had been dispatched from the front of XIII Division.

153. In compliance with the mission assigned by the Field Army, Army Corps A issued an operation order for 3 July but it reached the divisions belatedly. I Division which continued the struggle before Hill 1799 ridgeline during the night of 2/3 July, perceived that the situation of 5 Infantry Regiment to its left was difficult due to the withdrawal of the right flank at the neighboring V Division. The situation was also difficult for 4 Regiment deployed on the right flank of the division. Having no reserves available, I Division ordered 1/38 Evzone Regiment (minus battalion) to retire from the battle line and be kept as reserve. At the same time it subordinated the battalion of the regiment to 4 Infantry Regiment.

At 0415 on 3 July, II Division informed I Division that it intended to attack from the east against Hill 1799 ridge line with the objective of outflanking it from that direction. The two divisions agreed to launch a simulta-

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neous attack to capture Hill 1799 ridge line at 1200. Also, V Division ordered 44 Regiment on its right to operate simultaneously and in contact with the forces of I Division.

From the morning, I Division's Artillery fired effectively against the Turkish positions on Hill 1799. At about 1015 it was observed that the Turkish troops had begun to withdraw slowly towards the north. Then 5 Regiment attacked and as a result the Turks accelerated their withdrawal. 4 Regiment launched its attack at 1130 and reached Hill 1799 ridge line discovering that it had been abandoned by the Turks. 1/38 Evzone Regiment pursued the withdrawing Turkish troops and around 2000 reached Akoluk and encamped. The rest of the division encamped in the same area except 4 Infantry Regiment which moved forward to Damlar.

I Division's losses during this two–day battle totaled ten officers and 154 enlisted men killed and twenty–one officers and 515 enlisted men wounded. Turkish losses were significant, especially as a result of the successful Artillery fire as was discovered by the great number of killed abandoned on the battlefield.

I Division had engaged with forces of Turkish 7, 4 and 3 Divisions as well as two battalions of the 24 Division. The heroism and self–sacrifice of the men of the division for the capture of the naturally fortified and strongly organized Hill 1799, the critical point of the extreme left of the Turkish defensive area at Kutahya, was exalted the next day in Army Corps A's order of the day.

154. At 0500 on 3 July II Division attacked the east and southeast ridges of Hill 1799 to support I Division. After a fierce struggle its troops captured the ridges at 0900 and at 1145 seized the summit of Hill 1799. At 1300 the division moved in one column along the route Erikli – Beykoz – Oluk – Sidik Ozu. During its advance the division dispersed a Turkish column which withdrew towards Turkmen Dag. That night the division encamped in a village south of Sidik Ozu. Its losses amounted to five officers and eighteen enlisted men killed and six officers and 171 enlisted men wounded. The Turkish forces opposing II Division consisted of 3 Caucasus Division and troops from 23 and 24 Divisions.

At sunrise XII Division attacked troops of the Turkish 2 Cavalry Division which it pushed back through the Yener defile towards the plain. The division resumed its movement towards Akin with the Cavalry Brigade in the lead. South of Akin the Cavalry Brigade came under Infantry fire and discovered that the Turks strongly held the surrounding heights. A short while later XII Division received the Field Army's order to move through between Kizil Sivri and Gullu Dere towards Yalniz Tepe. The Cavalry Brigade was ordered to organize a mixed detachment comprising 14 Infantry Regiment and one Artillery battery from XII Division and move towards Akin.

XII Division moved towards Gullu Dere and at 23.00, reached the area of Churdan where it encamped. The Cavalry Brigade clashed with Turkish forces on the heights of Akin and after a brief engagement captured the village at 1600. Half an hour later the Turks counterattacked in strength with Artillery support. The attack was repulsed with the intervention of the 14 Infantry Regiment and the Turks were pursued to the north to a depth of about four kilometers.

155. For 4 July the Field Army ordered:

– **Army Corps C** to continue to pursue the withdrawing Turkish forces towards the east and the northeast, blocking the direction from Kutahya towards Eskishehir.

– **Army Corps A** to forward XII Division (minus the joint detachment) as soon as possible to the Ine – Kargin area to block the withdrawal of the enemy towards Eskishehir. Also to pursue the enemy with I Division towards Kara Tepe – Alagol and to direct quickly the joint detachment of XII Division (14 Infantry Regiment with battery) Besh Saray – Supuren towards Eskishehir to block the withdrawal of Turkish forces.

– **Army Corps B** to pursue the enemy up to the line Yukari – Porsuk – Kaynarja and then to turn to the right, move as fast as possible along the route Chukular – Akoluk – Akin towards Seyitgazi in order to block the withdrawal of the Turks from Eskishehir towards Ankara.

– The **Cavalry Brigade** to precede the joint detachment of XII Division and attempt to block the railway line east of Eskishehir.

The Command of the Field Army, expecting that significant Turkish forces would remain in the area around Kutahya, attempted to encircle them through close envelopment of Army Corps A, which had been directed to the northwest. Simultaneously in order to execute a double envelopment the Field Army forwarded Army Corps C to the east. Army Corps B was assigned the frontal pursuit the north. Then it would turn towards Seyitgazi where it would intersect with Army Corps A.

The Withdrawal of the Turkish Army and its Pursuit Towards Eskishehir

156. The fierce attacks by Army Corps A and B forced the Turkish IV and XII Groups of Divisions to withdraw from the fortified area Chavush Chiftlik (Hill 1799), disorganized, their units randomly mixed. The Greek forces pursued the Turks towards the north and northwest and threatened to cut them off in the area of Akin and further to the north, but finally the Turks succeeded in escaping but with significant losses in personnel and equipment.

The Turkish leadership then hurried to order the general withdrawal of the Turkish Army (Sketchmap 27): I Group from Inonu towards Eskishehir,

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V Group from Kutahya towards Eskishehir and then towards Seyitgazi, III Group towards the heights of Ulu Chayir, IV Group towards Chil Hannar Dag – Tahtali Baba, and XII Group towards Seyitgazi.

At 0930 of 3 July the bulk of Turkish III and V Groups in the area of Kutahya withdrew in many columns along the general axis of the railway line from Kutahya to Eskishehir. Their withdrawal was not detected by Army Corps C, the joint detachment of IX Division or XIII Division.

On 4 July the Field Army was informed by II Division that the Turkish divisions (7, 4, 23, 3 Infantry and 5 Caucasus) which had defended the Turkish IV Group's front had escaped the night of 3/4 July through Latifiye towards Eskishehir. By the timely withdrawal of its forces, the Turkish leadership frustrated the Field Army's intent to cut off and outflank their withdrawal.

157. For the 4 July Army Corp C ordered VII Division encamped west of Arsanli to advance up to the line Bardakchi – Kopru Hamam Dere – Almajik – Gazal Yakup and X Division to seize the height of Chal Dag (northeast of Kutahya) and then to advance up to Seydikoy village (Sketchmap 30).

At 0830 on 4 July VII Division moved in two columns in the general direction of Almajik, pursuing the rear guards of the withdrawing Turkish forces. At 1900 the division reached Hamam Dere, deployed covering forces to the north and northeast and encamped there.

X Division also moved in two columns in the general direction of Eskishehir. At 1300 its divisional Cavalry entered first Kutahya without meeting enemy resistance. The division encamped at 2000 in the area of Chal Dag and Ak Kopru.

On 5 July the Field Army informed its units that the Turks might withdraw to Sultan Dag massif in order to cover Eskishehir better from the south and ordered (Sketchmap 27):


– Army Corps C, which was subordinated to the Southern Field Army Section, to continue vigorously the pursuit of the enemy towards Eskishehir.

– Army Corps A to organize a group of divisions from Divisions II, XII and the Cavalry Brigade under the command of the commander of XII Division. This force would move to capture the Sultan Dag area and pursue the enemy towards Eskishehir.

– Army Corps B to move in forced marches towards Seyitgazi.

– The joint detachment of IX Division to remain in Kutahya at the disposal of the Field Army.

After the above order Army Corps C continued its pursuit of the enemy on 5 July (Sketchmaps 30, 31).



Sketchmap 30. Pursuit by Army Corps C Towards Eskishehir.

VII Division moved from 0900 in two columns. The one on the right moved through Eski Veran – Sofran Mollaoglu and the left through Hamam Dere – Yenikoy to the ridgeline west of Cherkes Kartal. The columns encamped in the above positions, covering themselves from the north and east.

X Division moved towards Seydikoy. It overran successfully weak Turkish sections from the heights northeast of Seydikoy and Kalburju and arrived west of Mush Ozu at evening.

On the next day, 6 July, the Field Army ordered:

– Army Corps C to subordinate the joint detachment of IX Division and move as fast as possible to Sabunju Boran. In continuation to attack west of the Porsuk river in order to capture the heights of Dutlucha Tepe – Kala Tepe and to pursue the enemy towards the northeast.

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– Army Corps A to subordinate the Cavalry Brigade and attack east of the Porsuk river in order to capture Kizil Kaya (southeast of Eskishehir) and to block the withdrawal of Turkish forces towards Eskishehir.

In continuation Army Corps C ordered VII Division to mop up the mountainous region of Dutlucha Tepe – Kala Tepe and to advance hastily towards Eskishehir, covering itself towards the north and northeast.

X Division was ordered to advance through Haji Mustafa – Chiftlik towards Eskishehir and to capture the city. After that to move further to the east and cover itself from the direction of Ankara. Finally, the joint detachment of IX Division was to follow the left wing of VII Division and move forward up to Yusuflar.

The Occupation of Eskishehir

158. At 1200 of 6 July VII Division moved out and by the early evening hours had occupied the mountainous area of Kutluja Tepe – Kala Tepe. At 2100 it encamped in the area around Chukur Hisar taking covering measures from the east (Sketchmaps 30, 31).

X Division also advanced towards Eskishehir from 1200. The commander of Army Corps C with his staff preceded X Division and arrived first in the city at 2000, establishing its headquarters in the Mayor's offices. X Division passed through the town and encamped about ten kilometers to the east covering itself from the east and northeast.

The joint detachment of IX Division moved towards Sabunju Boran and arrived at 1800 in the area Sobran Sofcha where it encamped.

On the 7 July the Field Army ordered the following (Sketchmap 34):

– Army Corps C to advance until the general line Tanishman – Orycheia – Veran.


– Army Corps A to occupy the plateau Chil Hannar Dag and to forward one division up to the carriage road east of Akchali.

– Army Corps B to resume its advance towards Seyitgazi.

– The joint detachment of IX Division to move forward from Sobran to Eskishehir.

On 7 July VII Division of Army Corps C moved forward between the railway station of Eskishehir and Cherkezkoy and X Division the area of Sultan Dere (Sketchmap 32). The first came under fired from Boz Dag ridgeline as it was passing through the village Muttalip while the second came under Artillery and Infantry fire from the heights northwest Sultaniye. The joint detachment of IX Division reached the area of Mollaoglu and encamped.

The advance of Army Corps C towards Eskishehir threatened the rear of Turkish 1 Group of Divisions which withdrew the 1 Infantry Division from



Sketchmap 31. Continuation of the Pursuit by Army Corps C until 7 July 1921.

Boz Dag at 1700 on 6 July and transferred 1 Calvary Division with which it had been reinforced, to the Gok Dere – Chiftlik area. At 2115 on 6 July the Command of the Western Front ordered the Turkish forces to withdraw east of Eskishehir and occupy the line east of Eskishehir – Seyitgazi.

The Pursuit by Army Corps A

159. On the night of 3 July, Army Corps A was in the Akoluk – Sidik Ozu (Sketchmap 32) area. The Field Army ordered it to pursue the withdrawing Turks relentlessly from 0400 the next morning. Specifically, I Division would assume the pursuit towards Kara Tepe – Alagol, II Division towards Findik Erenler Tepe, and III Division towards the Eskishehir area, in order to cut off the Turkish withdrawal from Kutahya towards Eskishehir.

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
On 4 July the divisions of Army Corps A began their movements according to the above order.

I Division moved in one column towards Kara Tepe – Sogut which it reached at about 2000 without meeting resistance.

II Division moved in one column along the route Sidik Ozu – Inli.

At 0630 it met Turkish forces withdrawing to the north of Sidik Ozu and forced them to flee in disarray towards the north abandoning weapons and two Skoda Artillery pieces. At 1700 the division's advance guard engaged

Sketchmap 32. Pursuit by Army Corps A until 7 July 1921– The Battle of Uchsaray, 5 July 1921.



Turkish rear guards holding the heights northwest of Dutlucha and overran them. At about 1800 the division encamped in the area of Inli – Findik – Erenler Tepe.

From 0500 XII Division (minus the joint detachment) moved from the Churdan area in one column. It followed the route from Gullu Dere – Bashoren – Kargin. Via Yalniz Tepe the division reached the Bashoren defile. The defile's exit was held by troops of the Turkish 7 Division withdrawing towards Kirka. The advanced guard as soon as it entered the defile came under effective Infantry fire and halted.

For the next day's operations (5 July), Army Corps A was ordered to organize a group of divisions from XII and II Divisions under the orders of the commander of XII Division. The group would assemble in the Ashagulija – Kayajik area, would be reinforced by the Cavalry Brigade, and would operate to capture the of Sultan Dag – Chil Hannar Dag massifs.

On 5 July I Division remained in its positions at Sogut, II Division remained in the Inli – Findik – Erenler Tepe area without liaison with the army corps, and in the morning XII Division moved through the Bashoren defile on its own initiative. The Turks had retired from the defile during the night and, while exiting the defile, the division found eight abandoned Artillery pieces and took sixty prisoners. At 2100 the division reached the Kargin area.

The Battle of Uchsaray (5 July 1921)

160. On 4 July the joint detachment of XIII Division with the Cavalry Brigade, which occupied the right of the Field Army's dispositions, was in close contact with the Turkish 8 Division north at Akin. The Turkish troops held positions at Cham Tepe covering the routes to Seyitgazi (Sketchmap 32).

Around 1730 the Detachment moved out under orders to head towards Eskishehir via Besh Saray. Following the carriage road towards Uchsaray, the Detachment was covered by flank guards. The march was conducted along the entire Turkish front and therefore the detachment's right flank and rear were exposed.

After an arduous march under constant Turkish fire the column arrived around midnight at Uchsaray and encamped there. According to the order, outpost were not deployed on the Fundujak Genizi heights because they were occupied by the Turkish II Divisions. The detachment's entire encampment area was exposed to Turkish fire.

At 0530 on 5 July the detachment's encampment area began to be hit by intense enemy fire. Simultaneously, its outposts deployed a short distance away were engaged by the enemy. The Turkish attack surprised the outposts causing confusion.

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The battalion of 14 Infantry Regiment which was manning the outposts was reinforced almost immediately with another battalion. while the third battalion of the regiment was held in reserve. Upon request of the commander of the regiment, the Cavalry Brigade extended the left of the Greek disposition with one battalion of foot soldiers and with another battalion closed the gap between the two battalions of the front line.

A bit later Turkish troops assaulted the heights to the north and northwest of Uchsaray with the obvious objective of surrounding the village. The Turkish attack was successfully repulsed by 3 Cavalry Regiment stationed there.

From the start of the battle the Turks escalated their attempts to capture the hill which dominates Uchsaray from the southeast, where 14 Infantry Regiment had been deployed. The Greek Infantry bravely resisted and succeeded in repelling all the attacks of the numerically superior Turkish forces. At about 0800 Turkish Cavalry appeared and threatened the right of 14 Infantry Regiment. The Cavalry Brigade immediately sent the II/1 Mounted Battalion to deal with the Turkish Cavalry. The commander of the battalion, Major Spyridon Markopoulos, misunderstood the order given him and conducted a daring charge against the Turkish Infantry.

The intense Turkish fire decimated the Cavalry battalion which suffered the loss of four officers (including the commander) and seventy horsemen killed. Sixty horses also were lost. The horses of the men killed returned to the Greek Infantry frontline without their riders and spread confusion and panic. The battalion on the extreme right of the Greek disposition retreated in disarray causing the other battalion to follow it. From this minute the commander of 14 Infantry Regiment lost control of his sections. The Greek troops under pressure continued their confused and uncoordinated retreat to the west of the village of Uchsaray. At 0830 the Turks seized the key hill southeast of the village and at 0930 completed the capture of Fundujak Genizi.

3 Infantry Regiment on the left of the Greek disposition also began to withdraw towards the heights northeast of the village at 1000, as the attackers turned against it creating great pressure. The Cavalry Brigade occupied the line of heights that favored the conduct of defense, but after a new attack of the Turks it ran the risk of being encircled. For this reason it withdrew to the central heights of Dayakli Dag. The Turks diverted their efforts against the new Greek positions. A Greek counterattack was launched with the commander of 14 Infantry Regiment at its head. This succeeded initially in repulsing the Turkish action. However, the Turks finally succeeded in seizing the Greek position after repeated and more fierce attacks.

Withdrawing in disarray, the troops of 14 Infantry Regiment were directed to Latifiye where the Cavalry Brigade also arrived around 2200. The losses of 14 Infantry Regiment totaled four officers and fifty–seven enlisted

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men killed, ten officers and 212 enlisted men wounded and eighty–seven enlisted men missing. All the guns of the joint detachment of XII Division and the Cavalry Brigade were saved.

The Turkish forces attacking at Uchsaray included 11 and 57 Infantry Divisions and 4 Cavalry Brigade. which did not pursue the withdrawing Greek troops.

The remaining forces of 14 Infantry Regiment assembled and were reorganized at Latifiye by V Division of Army Corps B, which had been headed towards Uchsaray.

161. On 6 July Army Corps A continued its advance (Sketchmap 32). I Division arrived at Hajikoy without battle

II Division moving towards Ashagi Chaglan clashed at about 1135 with Turkish sections, pushed them to the ridgeline of Sultan Dag – Chil Hannar Dag and captured it after a four–hour combat. The casualties of the division were three enlisted men killed and fifteen wounded. The opposing Turkish forces belonged to 15 and 24 Divisions.

XII Division relocated from the area of Kargin to Kirka. The Cavalry Brigade and the joint detachment of XII Division remained in the area of Latifiye regrouping and reorganizing their troops. The same day the group of divisions that was under the commander of XII Division was dissolved.

The next day, 7 July, Army Corps A was ordered to complete the occupation of he Chil Hannar Dag plateau up to the village of Derbent and to forward one of its divisions up to the carriage road Eskishehir – Sivrihisar east of Akchali. I Division having not received newer orders moved on its commander own initiative from Hajikoy to Eskishehir and encamped on the heights south of the city.

II Division advanced to the Ashagi Chaglan – Supuren area. There at 2230 it received an order from the army corps to move to the east of Akchali. At the same time the army corps subordinated the Cavalry Brigade to the division.

XII Division having been ordered to assemble next day at Derbent arrived at Ashagulija and encamped there. The Cavalry Brigade after it had been reorganized at Latifiye moved via Inli – Kargin and arrived at Karashehir at 2400 and spent the night there.

The Maneuver by Army Corps B

162. Army Corps B, which had encamped in the area of Altintash and Chavush Chiftlik the evening of 3 July, was ordered to pursue next day the enemy forces up to the line Yukari – Porsuk – Kaynarja. In continuation to turn the east and head at speed via Chukurlar – Akin to Seyitgazi to cut off the Turkish withdrawal.

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On 4 July the army corps moved to the north in three columns. The right column, comprising V Division, followed the axis Chavush Chiftlik – Kirat – Sakakoy. The central column, comprising a joint detachment (3 Infantry Regiment with a Pack Artillery battalion from XIII Division) moved along the axis Karajaoren – Evlak. The left column, comprising the remaining forces of XIII Division, followed the highway Altintash – Kutahya.

At 0530 V Division began its march reached Bel Kavak at 1600 and encamped there. The detachment from XIII Division relocated to Evlak and the remaining forces of XIII Division headed to the heights of Yukari – Porsuk where it deployed outposts.

On the next day, 5 July, Army Corps B ordered its divisions to turn to the east and to advance to Seyitgazi.

XIII Division, with the forces of the joint detachment once more under its orders, after an arduous and continuous march through mountainous terrain, assembled in the area of Akoluk at about 2400.

V Division headed to Sidik Ozu and arrived there at 2200. During its march it meat and gathered officers and enlisted men of the Cavalry Brigade and 14 Infantry Regiment in the area of Latifiye, and was informed by them of the events that had taken place at Uchsaray.

On 6 July Army Corps B ordered the continuation of the advance with the objective of breaking through the Seyitgazi defile and cutting off the withdrawal of the Turkish forces towards Ankara.

XIII Division moved in the general direction of Seyitgazi in two columns. The main column followed the route east of the Seydi River while the other, comprising 5/42 Evzone Regiment and a Pack Artillery battalion (the joint detachment of 5/42 Evzone Regiment), moved east of that river with mission to cover the division's right flank.

At about 1200 the division's main column clashed with a Turkish section occurring the heights around Akin and overrun them. The column continued its advance and at 1700 clashed with strong Turkish forces dug in on the Cham Tepe ridge. After a four–hour battle the column captured the ridge at 2100, forcing the Turks to withdraw towards the saddle near the village of Gok Nebi. The joint detachment of 5/42 Evzone Regiment moved very slowly and did not take part in the battles of Akin and Cham Tepe. That night the division's main column remained near Akin, having seized the Cham Tepe ridgeline with two battalions. The joint detachment of 5/43 Evzone Regiment deployed on the heights north of Akin. The Turkish forces which had faced XIII Division belonged to the 8 Infantry Division.


V Division moved towards Yukari – Sogut. At 2045 it halted and deployed outposts southwest of Uchsaray which, according to existing intelligence was being held by Turkish 2 Division.

The Battle of Cham Tepe and the Second Battle of Uchsaray

163. On 7 July Army Corps B ordered XIII Division to attack the Turkish forces opposite its front, to overrun and pursue them, seeking to cut off their retreat with the joint detachment. V Division was ordered to assist the combat of XIII Division (Sketchmap 33).

At about 0400 of 7 July strong Turkish forces attacked the sections of XIII Division on the ridgeline of Cham Tepe. Exploiting the darkness and the early morning mist, the Turkish forces succeeded in surprising the Greek forces and penetrating their dispositions. A fierce combat ensued with alternating Greek counterattacks and Turkish attacks and the battle wavered for many hours. The Turks made desperate efforts to seize of the Cham Tepe ridgeline, continuously throwing new forces into combat. At 1030 two of the division's battalions attacked the left of the Turkish troops and forced them to withdraw to the northwest after a persistent battle. The joint detachment of 5/42 Evzone Regiment did not take part in the attack.

Sketchmap 33. Pursuit by Army Corps B, 4–7 July 1921; The Battles of Uchsaray and Cham Tepe, 9 July 1921.



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That night XIII Division encamped southeast of Seyitgazi and in the heights north of Kesenler and Gok Nebi. The joint detachment encamped on the southeast edge of Seyitgazi. The division's losses that day amounted to four officers and ninety–three enlisted men killed and sixteen officers and 407 enlisted men wounded.

The Turks had extremely heavy losses and abandoned 560 killed on the battlefield, among them the commander of a regiment of 57 Division. The Turkish forces who had attacked belonged to 8 and 57 Divisions as well as a part of 11 Division. 3 and 14 Cavalry Divisions of the Turkish V Group also took part in the battle.

164. That same day, 7 July, V Division moved towards Uchsaray from 0430. The heights to the northeast of Uchsaray were held by strong Turkish forces which from 0830 launched Artillery and Infantry fire against the troops of the division.

At 1400 V Division launched an all out attack against the Turkish positions. After a brief but fierce battle the defenders were overrun and pursued for about four kilometers to the northeast of Uchsaray. That night the division encamped south of the Ahmet Ihsan Baba – Fundujak Genizi – Sheyhseddin Teke area. Its losses amounted to five officers and seventy–two enlisted men out of action.

Army Corps B regulated with an order the occupation of the town of Seyitgazi and reported to the Field Army that the Turkish forces in front of VII Division were withdrawing towards Ayvali. On 4 July the Field Army had ordered Army Corps A and B to cross their axis of advance due to its impression that the bulk of the Turkish Army was still located in the area around Kutahya. This not only gave the Turkish leadership more time and room to withdraw its forces with relative order, but also the possibility to study, prepare and execute a counter–offensive with all its forces on 8 July.

The Turkish Counter–Offensive in the Eskishehir Area (8 July 1921)

165. Having succeeded in escaping encirclement, the Turkish leadership, withdrawing and reorganizing its forces east of Eskishehir, decided to conduct a counter–offensive with the objective of outflanking from the north and south the Hellenic Field Army in the Porsuk valley between the mountains Boz Dag, Sultan Dag and Turkmen Dag. It estimated that the Hellenic Army had been greatly fatigued due to the continuous battles and marches. Also that its strength had been considerably reduced due to losses and that the morale of its troops would be low for it had failed to neutralize the adversary. In addition it assessed that the resupply of the Hellenic Field Army, particularly with ammunition, would be very difficult due to the fact that it had advanced more

than 200 kilometers away from the Ushak supply center, and the lack of routes for wheeled vehicles.

The Turks hoped to surprise the Hellenic Field Army attacking it with superior forces south of Porsuk from Seyitgazi up to Akpinar (south of Eskishehir), to overrun its forces there and cut off its lines of communication. At the same time they would try to cut off the communications to Eskishehir by means of another operation north of Boz Dag during the time that the Hellenic Army would be engaged by a frontal attack. For this purpose the commander of the Turkish Western Front issued an order on the evening of 6 July. According to this order the Turkish Army would give the decisive battle on the line Boz Dag – Yoruk Dere Chiftlik – Sultaniye – Tahtali Baba – Sari Baba – Seyitgazi. The V Group (comprising 3 Infantry Division and 14 Cavalry Division) was ordered to move to the direction of Doger and to strike the supply channel of the Hellenic Field Army from Altintash (Sketchmap 29). Following the above order the Turkish groups relocated by the evening of 7 July in the area east of Eskishehir and deployed I, III, IV, XII and V Groups of Divisions from north to south (Sketchmap 34).

The Command of the Field Army which had stationed at Kutahya did not anticipate the possibility that the Turks would reorganize and launch a large scale counterattack. On the contrary, it believed that they were in a state of disintegration. The Command had no intelligence about the Turkish activities and thought that Army Corps C's struggles to the east of Eskishehir were battles against rear guards. It did not even care to detect the exact direction of the Turkish forces' withdrawal so that it could assess their intent. On the night of 7 July it only issued an order to Army Corps A directing it to take appropriate measures to cut off the Turkish forces withdrawing east of Seyitgazi pursued by XIII Division.

166. The evening of 7 July the disposition of the adversaries were as follows (Sketchmap 34):

Greek Forces:

– **Army Corps C:** Headquarters at Eskishehir, VII Division the heights north of Eskishehir, X Division the stream Sultan Dere and Sultaniye, and the joint detachment of IX Division the area Mollaoglu, twenty kilometers southwest of Eskishehir.

– **Army Corps A**: Headquarters at Ulu Chayir, I Division in the heights immediately south of Eskishehir, II Division the area of Ashagi Chaglan Supuren, and the Cavalry Brigade in the area of Karashehir.

– **Army Corps B**: Headquarters at Akin, V Division in the area of the Fundujak – Sheyhseddin heights northeast of Uchsaray, and XIII Division in the heights southeast of Seyitgazi – north of Kesenler.

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Turkish Forces:

Headquarters of the Western Front at Kara Tokat.

– **I Group of Divisions** (I Infantry Division, I Cavalry Division) on the line Boz Dag – Yoruk Dere Chiftlik – Porsuk River.

– **III Group of Divisions** (15, 41, and 24 Infantry Divisions) from east of Seviskoy to east of Heybekoy.

– **IV Group of Divisions** (23, 4, and 61 Infantry Divisions and the 5 Caucasus Division), from east of Gubekoy up to the heights of Tahtali Baba and Sari Baba.

– **XII Group of Divisions** (8, 11, and 57 Infantry Divisions, the 2 Cavalry Division and 4 Cavalry Brigade), from south of Sari Baba up to southeast of Seyitgazi.

– **V Group of Divisions** (3 and 14 Cavalry Divisions), at Seyitgazi and further to its south. In addition 7 Cavalry Division and 3 Caucasus Division were at Kara Tokat as reserves.

All told the total Turkish force facing the Greeks on the front from Eskishehir to Seyitgazi amounted to thirteen Infantry divisions of which nine were on the front line and four on the second, as well as four Cavalry divisions and one Cavalry brigade.

On the night of 7/8 July the commander of the Western Front issued the following orders regarding the execution of the counter offensive against the Greek front at Eskishehir on 8 July 1921:

– **I Group of Divisions** to attack in the direction Muttalip – Eskishehir flank of the Greek forces which would operate against III Group.

– **III Group of Divisions** to defend its front and to take part in the IV Group attack with its left wing.

– **IV Group of Divisions** to attack with objective the line Ashagi Chaglan – Supuren. To accomplish this mission it should employ 23 Infantry Division in the direction Akpinar – Ashagi Chaglan and the 5 Caucasus Division towards Supuren, Derbent and Karapazar. 61 Infantry Division would follow 5 Caucasus Division in second echelon.

– **XII Group of Divisions** to keep the left (south) wing of the Turkish disposition at the line Sari Baba – Kizil Tepe.

– **V Group of Divisions** to attack with its two Cavalry divisions against the rear of the Greek right wing operating towards Seyitgazi.

167. Army Corps C had ordered VII Division to cover the city of Eskishehir from the south in the heights of Kizil Kaya and from the north in the heights between Muttalip and Eskishehir. X Division had been ordered to attack and capture the ridgeline Porsuk – Bogazi – Yoruk Karaja Veran (Sketchmap 34).

The night of 8 July troops of VII Division, moving to occupy positions close to Muttalip, came under intense Artillery fire from the heights to the northeast and were forced to withdraw immediately to the south.

At 1230 Army Corps C was informed by the Cavalry Brigade that strong Turkish columns were moving through Derbent and Akpinar towards Eskishehir. VII Division, except for its troops at Muttalip, was therefore ordered to turn towards the south with front to the heights of Kizil Kaya and the Makmaja area to cover the city. At 1300 VII Division moved to the south while strong Turkish columns of Infantry and Cavalry advanced from the direction of Muttalip towards Eskishehir.

The army corps already facing a threat against the city from the north, ordered VII Division, except for one regiment, to turn back again and move to Muttalip – Boz Dag to repulse the attacking Turks. At the same time, the corps' chief of staff, acting on his own initiative, ordered the joint detachment of IX Division to move from its positions at Mollaoglu with forced march to Eskishehir.

At about 1500 the battle had spread to the entire front of VII Division the troops of which were under great pressure from the repeated Turkish attacks. The detachment of IX Division reached Eskishehir at 1430 after eight and a half hours of continuous march. There it was tactically subordinated to VII Division and was held as reserve on the hill northwest of the railway station.

In the meantime, the divisional Cavalry brigade which had passed through Eskishehir and headed to the south, was informed of the development of the situation by the chief of staff of Army Corps C. The brigade was ordered by him to move forward to Derbent, the extreme left of the Turkish disposition, and to strike the flank of the Turkish forces attacking X Division. At 1300 the divisional Cavalry moved towards the above direction with the objective of exploiting every opportunity to threaten the flank of the Turkish dispositions.

In addition the army corps ordered III Division, already heading towards Inonu, to rush to Eskishehir.

Around 1615 VII Division launched a counterattack and overran the Turks after a hard battle, forcing them to withdraw. The division continued the pursuit and seized successively Muttalip at 1750 and the Boz Dag ridge at 2130, capturing two Turkish Artillery pieces. That night VII Division encamped in the area of Muttalip and at Boz Dag, keeping one of its battalions on the line of heights Kizil Kaya – Makmaja. Its losses amounted to twenty–nine enlisted men killed and six officers and 166 enlisted men wounded.

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The Turks abandoned 250 killed and sixty wounded on the battlefield. The Turkish forces which attacked VII Division belonged to I Group of Divisions.

168. At 0500 on 8 July X Division attacked to capture the ridge line Porsuk Bogazi – Yoruk Karaja Veran, keeping one of its regiments in reserve at Sultan Dere. The effectiveness of the Turkish fire, however, pinned down its attacking troops on the heights west of Sultaniye. Until 1230 all the division's efforts to capture its objectives failed. At about 1330 the division observed Turkish movements to outflank its right and immediately engaged troops from its reserves which succeeded in capturing the heights south of Makmaja. The combat continued fiercely till 1700 without a significant change. From this time, however, a strong Turkish counterattack was launched along the division's entire front.

The Turks succeeded in penetrating the left of the Greek dispositions where the Infantry withdrew in disorder leaving unprotected the Artillery deployed there. The attackers reached the Artillery positions and a fierce, hand to hand battle ensued between them and the artillerymen led by the division's chief of Artillery himself. A company of sappers was dispatched for reinforcements as the division had no Infantry available. The sappers fought hard, competing with the artillerymen in courage and self–sacrifice. One officer and fifty enlisted men from the sappers were put out of action. Finally the Turks were pushed back without being able to seize the Artillery. At 1800 the division launched a counterattack employing one of its battalions against the left wing of the Turkish forces which were forced to withdraw. Half an hour later the Turks launched a new fierce attack against the entire front of the division. In the meantime, X Division had succeeded in gaining liaison with the left of II Division of Army Corps A and at 1800 launched a general counterattack, overran the Turkish forces and pursued them eight kilometers east of Eskishehir.

That night the division deployed outposts on the ridgeline of Yoruk Karaja Veran. Its losses amounted to four officers and seventeen enlisted men killed and two officers and 227 enlisted men wounded. That same night Army Corps C reported the overwhelming victory of the Greek forces to the Field Army.

169. For 8 July Army Corps A ordered I Division to move from the south edge of Eskishehir and to assemble at the village of Supuren. It subordinated the Cavalry Brigade to II Division and ordered the latter to move forward east of Akchali. XII Division was ordered to assemble in the area of Derbent.

I Division moved out at 0600 and at 1145 its advanced guards reached Supuren where the Cavalry Brigade informed it that strong Turkish columns

had appeared east of Derbent moving towards Akpinar. The commander of the division then decided on his own initiative to attack the enemy columns and block their advance. For this purpose he assembled the 4 Regiment on the height southeast, 5 Regiment on the heights northeast of Supuren and 1/38 Evzone Regiment to its north.

At 1220, as the Turkish columns were approaching the left flank of the still moving 1/38 Regiment, it turned to the left, launched a surprise attack against them and captured the heights northwest of Derbent. Due to its rapid advance, the regiment exposed both its flanks and sustained repeated Turkish attacks. The other regiments of the division also engaged quickly into the battle, attacking furiously and suddenly against the enemy.

Across the division's entire front the Turks under the momentum of the Greek attack were overrun and pursued relentlessly. A Turkish section of ten officers and 840 enlisted men which had taken refuge in a ravine southeast of Akpinar were encircled and forced to surrender. On the division's left, between it and II Division, the Cavalry Brigade was also encircled in combat. It charged through the Turkish disposition, struck the Turkish reserves rushing to reinforce the battle lines. The Turks were completely surprised and dispersed in panic under the hoofs of the Greek riders. The charge continued for four kilometers causing significant losses to the enemy and shocking the morale of the troops fighting in the front line.

By night I Division had seized Derbent and Karapazar, capturing an abundance of military equipment including two Artillery pieces. I Division's losses totaled one officer and fifteen enlisted men killed and four officers and eighty enlisted men wounded. The approximately 1,000 prisoners taken by the division belonged to Turkish 5, 23, 41, and 61 Divisions of III and IV Groups.

170. At 1010 the same day, 8 July, II Division was ordered by Army Corps A, to move along the route Eskishehir – Orhan Baba Teke and cut off the retreat of the Turkish forces withdrawing to Ayvali pursued by XIII Division. The division issued an order of movement determining that the head of its advance guard should reach Akpinar at 1400. At about 1035 its outposts informed it that strong Turkish columns had appeared heading from Derbent towards Supuren and Akpinar. Shortly afterwards, Turkish Artillery began to bombard its units' positions.

At 1130 the Turkish columns clashed with the right of II Division's disposition with a particular fierceness. Shortly afterwards the battle extended to the center. The division's troops resisted resolutely and repelled repeated Turkish attacks.

From 1230 the Turks attacked with even more vigor also against the division's left in the Kizil Kaya area. 7 Infantry Regiment deployed there not

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only repulsed the Turkish attack but at 1330 launched a sweeping counterattack and succeeded in stopping and then pursuing the attackers.

This action threatened the left flank of the Turkish forces who were operating against the right wing of X Division and forced them to withdraw. This relieved X Division of the heavy pressure it had been under until then.

At 1530 the Turkish forces attacking the division's center also gave in and began to withdraw relentlessly pursued by the Greek sections. Already the enemy withdrew in disorder along the entire front of II Division. The pursuit continued up to the east of Akpinar where it was halted due to the dark. The division encamped in that area, covering itself with combat outposts deployed on the heights west of Gubekoy.

The division's losses totaled two officers and twenty–nine enlisted men killed and ten officers and 194 enlisted men wounded. The Turks suffered significant losses and left many killed on the battlefield. 100 prisoners were taken and a gun was captured. The Turkish forces that attacked II Division belonged to 41 Division of III Group and 23, 61, and 5 Caucasus Divisions of IV Group.

171. On the morning of 8 July XII Division moved from Ashagulija towards Kayajik. There, it established liaison with V Division of Army Corps B and was informed that the Turkish resistance had been overcome and the V Division was advancing unhindered Kizil Tepe. After this XII Division turned towards the northeast and headed to Kivjik – Derbent. At around 1300 the advance guards reached Kivjik and gained contact with Turkish forces. A short while later it clashed with the main Turkish defensive area on the ridgeline northwest of Alpakoy.

At 1600 the division's Infantry launched a fierce attack against the enemy defensive area and by 1700 had seized the greater part of the ridgeline. Launching a coordinated frontal and flanking attack, it seized Tahtali Baba Hill and established liaison with the V Division attacking further south.

As a result XII Division's attack, liaison between Turkish IV and XII Groups of Divisions was broken. That night the division encamped in the heights immediately northwest of Alpakoy between the villages Karapazar and Kivjik.

XIII Division's losses amounted to two officers and nineteen enlisted men killed and four officers and 100 enlisted men wounded. The Turks abandoned 200 killed on the battlefield while 201 prisoners were taken and abundant military equipment was captured.

On 8 July Army Corps A's divisions (I,II and XII) faced the main effort of the Turkish attack assigned to the IV Group of Divisions (the 23, 61 and 5 Caucasus Division). The group was reinforced during the battle from the left

wing of III Group of Divisions (24 and 41 Divisions). Army Corps A's command which was at Ulu Chayir, far from the battlefield, was not informed of the Turkish counter–offensive and did not get involved in the direction of the battle. Around midday fierce cannonade was clearly heard at Ulu Chayir. The commander of the corps was concerned and sent by car some of his staff officers to Ashagi Chaglan.

The officers were informed by the II Division's staff about the progress of the ongoing battle and so informed their commander. When the commander of Army Corps A discovered that all his three divisions had been engaged in combat and assessed as successful in the progress of the battle he did not want to intervene. Thus the combat continued with the division commanders' initiative. To those division commanders is owed the immediate reaction of the Greek forces and the glorious victory of 8 July.

Army Corps B's Attack towards Seyitgazi.

172. Army Corps B had planned for 8 July to continue its advance from 0400 to capture the line Akchali – Hamidiye (Sketchmap 34). However, due to the delay in receiving the order and the difficulty in finding the route, V Division only began its movement to Ayvali – Akchali at 0950. At around 1100, when the advance guards exited the village of Ayvali, it came under Infantry fire from the heights of Kizil Tepe. A resolute battle ensued and lasted till 1400 when the Turks were overrun and withdrew towards the valley. The division completed the capture of Kizil Tepe and from1830 established with XII Division of Army Corps A which was operating further north against the heights northwest of Alpakoy.

The division deployed outposts and encamped in the positions it had captured. Its losses amounted to eleven killed and thirty–three wounded enlisted men.

XIII Division (minus the joint detachment of 5/42 Evzone Regiment) began its march at 0400 from its positions southeast of Seyitgazi towards the general direction of Hamidiye. Its joint detachment moved since 0700 from Chichegiz. Its task was to follow the ridgeline Malyabashi Tepe Kirgiz Dag (Duz Tepe) and to execute an outflanking maneuver operation towards Hamidiye.

At about 0700 the division's advance guard exiting the Seyitgazi defile came under Infantry and Artillery fire from the high ridgeline to the northeast where strong Turkish forces were deployed. After a four hour battle the advance guard captured the ridgeline with the supports of the Artillery of the joint detachment.

As of 1130 strong Turkish reinforcements started to arrive whose retreat caused the remaining Turkish troops also to retreat in panic on the

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battlefield and to launch fierce attacks against the ridgeline. The combat continued fiercely into the afternoon hours but the attackers were unable to dislodge the tough Greek defenders.

At 1750 the division prepared and launched a counterattack against the left flank of the Turkish disposition with a wide, sweeping maneuver. The counterattack succeeded in overrunning the Turkish troops there, whose retreat caused the remaining Turkish troops also to retreat in panic. Since 1900 the whole Turkish line withdrew east of the village Orhan Baba Teke. XIII Division pursued the Turks till dusk.

In the meantime the joint detachment of 5/42 Evzone Regiment, having assisted the rest of I Division in the capture of the ridgeline northeast of Seyitgazi, continued its advance and captured Malyabashi Tepe after a battle at 1400 and Duz Tepe at about 1800. In the early night hours the Turks attacked the detachment at Malyabashi Tepe. The attack was successfully repulsed.

That night XIII Division encamped northeast of the line Seyitgazi – Avdan and the joint detachment north of Malyabashi Tepe. The division's losses amounted to forty–two officers and enlisted men out of action.

There were 140 Turkish prisoners taken. The rest of their losses were never made known. The Turkish forces which opposed XIII Division belonged to 11 and 57 Infantry Divisions and to 3 and 14 Cavalry Divisions.

173. The Turkish counterattack offensive of 8 July had, by the evening hours, not only failed utterly, but also resulted in an important victory for the Hellenic Army. Despite the engagement of all their reserves and their decisive action, the Turks were shattered as a result of the obstinacy and adamant fighting spirit of the Greek soldiers.

The heavy losses suffered by III and IV Groups at the center, the shock to their morale and the looming threat of the Turkish left wing being turned following the Greek capture of Malyabashi Tepe led the Turkish command to order a general retreat which ended 300 kilometers to the east up to the Sangarius River with the objective of occupying a new defensive line to cover Ankara. To that end from midnight on 8 July the Turkish Army broke contact with the Hellenic Army and retreated hastily all night, so that at first light on 9 July they would be far from their enemies.

The Turkish counterattack offensive of 8 July had not been expected by the Hellenic Field Army and thus took it completely by surprise. Having its headquarters at Kutahya more than 100 kilometers from the battlefield, the Field Army was only informed in the afternoon. For this reason the Field Army made no intervention during the battle, not even during the late afternoon hours, with the result that the enemy was allowed to retreat without its

pursuit being properly organized. The Field Army was informed of the outcome of the battle only at midnight. It then issued orders of operation for 9 July.

The battle of 8 July was the most important battle in Asia Minor till then because it took place in open terrain and the total forces of both opponents took part. From the Greek side, the battle was directed almost exclusively by the commanders of the divisions who assumed the initiative to take the required decisions, which resulted in the crushing of the enemy as soon as they became aware of the launching of the Turkish counteroffensive. Nevertheless it must be emphasized that the great victor of the battle of 8 July was the Greek fighter who showed unflinching courage, unparallelled drive, admirable fortitude and perseverance.

The Pursuit of the Turkish Army

174. At 0440 on 9 July the commander of the Field Army issued an operation order for that day fixing the following (Sketchmap 34):

> **Army Corps C** to pursue the enemy towards the general direction of Ereipion Mintaion.
>
> **Army Corps A** to attack in the zone Ereipion Mintaion – Heybekoy Ayvali.
>
> **Army Corps B** to attack in the general direction of Hamidiye – Kismet Tepe. The joint detachment of 5/42 Evzone Regiment would cover the right of the army corps and attempt to outflank and cut off the enemy's extreme left.

In executing the above order in the zone of Army Corps C, VII Division, after it had completely mopped up the Boz Dag ridgeline, advanced to the east and pushed small sections of Turkish Cavalry. That evening it encamped on the Dere Tepe ridgeline and covered itself from the north and east.

X Division after it had forwarded sections and captured the ridgeline of the village Yoruk Karaja Veran at 0300 of 9 July advanced from 1300 to a depth of twenty–five kilometers without encountering the enemy. In the evening it encamped in the Ereipion Mintaion area along the Porsuk river.

The joint detachment of IX Division relocated to the area between Yaka Kaya and Sidikli Kaya.

In the zone of Army Corps A, II Division advanced from 1030 to a depth of thirty–two kilometers. It encamped for the night in the Luftiye area.

I Division moved from 0800 without encountering the enemy. By dusk it had reached the area southeast of Hamidiye and encamped.

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XII Division assembled in the Alpakoy area in the afternoon hours of 9 July as reserve of Army Corps A.

Cavalry Brigade arrived at Luftiye and spent the night there.

Army Corp B began its pursuit of the enemy towards the general direction of Alpakoy from the morning of 9 July. V Division moved towards Alpakoy through Yenikoy – Luftiye from 0630. At about 2100 it halted its advance and deployed outposts northeast of Yenikoy without encountering the enemy.

Only XIII Division gained contact with withdrawing Turkish forces on 9 July. At 0900 the joint detachment of 5/42 Evzone Regiment on its right attacked Turkish troops occupying the heights northeast of Duz Tepe, which it captured after a brief battle. The division began its advance at about 1200. As soon as its movement became obvious, Turkish columns were noticed hurrying from the village in an easterly direction. At 1700 the division encamped in the Hamidiye area after taking security measures to cover every direction.

175. On 10 July Army Corp C forwarded VII Division southeast of Kemikli Maden and northeast of Chukur Hisar. It turned X Division southeast of Chukur Hisar. The joint detachment of IX Division remained in its positions.

That same day in Army Corps A's zone, II Division deployed on the line east of Alpakoy, east of Sari Kovanja Dag, I Division on the line Aziziye – Kishla east of Luftiye, XII Division remained at Alpakoy and the Cavalry Brigade reached Alpakoy.

Army Corps B remained in the positions that it held on 9 July.

On this day, 10 July, the Command of the Field Army suspended the pursuit at the Turkish forces with whom they had lost contact anyway. This allowed the Greek forces to reconstitute, rest and organize their supply.

The Hellenic Army losses during the operations June–July 1921 were large and amounted to 8,073, of which there were seventy–five officers and 1,416 enlisted men killed, 208 officers and 6,264 enlisted men wounded and 110 enlisted men missing.

The results achieved were mainly territorial. The capturing of the railway junction of Afyon Karahisar, Kutahya and Eskishehir insured the Hellenic Field Army's resupply. The Turkish forces were able to escape despite the Greek tactical successes and the losses suffered in men and equipment. The Asia Minor problem remained unsolved from a military point of view as long as Mustafa Kemal continued to control a strong and well organized army.

CHAPTER 6

Operations to Ankara

The Political–Military Situation after the Operations of June–July 1921
Sketchmap 35

176. The operations of June–July did not produce the results the Greek side expected, i.e. to crush the enemy's military might and to force him to seek the conclusion of a peace treaty. The retreat of the Turks from their fortified positions around Kutahya and the occupation of the vital transportation junctions of Eskishehir and of Afyon Karahisar (Sketchmap 35) undoubtedly constituted a great victory for the Hellenic Army. The seizure also of the parallel to the front railway line, which joins these two centers, disrupted the railway connection between Ankara and Iconium. Nevertheless, the Greek victory was limited to the tactical field, while the main objective of the above operations and the termination of the war as a result, was not achieved.

The heavy casualties that were inflicted on the enemy, and the quantity of arms and every kind of equipment that was abandoned by him, were exaggeratedly reported in announcements by the Field Army of Asia Minor, and created such an optimistic impression, that for the moment it was believed, even by the Greek government, that the objective of war in Asia Minor could be considered completed. The report of the government's liaison to the Field Army, Plenipotentiary of Corfu Major General (Ret) Xenophon Strategos contributed significantly to create this impression. According to his report, which was drawn up immediately after the end of the operations, the attrition of the Kemalist Field Army was estimated to be at least one third of its power, while the disintegration of its remaining forces would not take long to come.

The Turkish Army however, neither was crushed, nor disintegrated. It was defeated in the tactical field, but its morale and material damage was not irreparable. Its counter–offensive towards Eskishehir furthermore, proved that it maintained its combat effectiveness. It withdrew before being encircled by the Hellenic Army in Kutahya, and with its counter–offensive on 8 July it facilitated the withdrawal of the bulk of its forces and the transportation of its munitions.

The Turkish Field Army retired unhindered to a great depth, following the axis of the railway line from Eskishehir to Ankara, where it assembled after crossing the Sangarius river (Sakarya in Turkish). The area of Ankara comprised the end of the railway line and was connected with the remaining Asian Turkey only by a poor road network. Consequently, it constituted the last foothold beyond which it could not survive and act as an organized army. If it were deprived of this area too, it would be forced to seek other bases and other lines of supply and operations in the south regions of Asia Minor.

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The War Council at Kutahya

Sketchmap 35

177. After the first impressions and enthusiasm from the outcome of the operations were over, and it was ascertained that premature and exaggerated optimism were unjustifiable, the Greek government was forced to study the political view of the Asia Minor issue, on the basis of the real military situation that was created after the operations. Since the basic objective was not achieved, namely the crushing of the enemy, the Asia Minor issue had not at all been promoted and remained at the same point it was before the operations.

A conciliatory settlement of the issue with the intervention of the Great Powers was excluded since the government had rejected the note it had been handed on 8 June 1921, with which the suspension of hostilities and the intervention for pacification was proposed. Thus, the solution to the Asia Minor issue had to be found the soonest possible by the government itself, because Greece, a poor country, could not financially endure a lingering war.

On 14 July 1921, the Greek Prime Minister Demetrios Gounares arrived in Kutahya to examine personally the military situation. For this purpose the next day, 15 July, a Council of War was convoked, in which participated, except for the prime minister, the Minister of the Army Nikolaos Theotokes, Field Army Commander Lieutenant General Anastasios Papoulas, the Chief of the Army Staff Service Lieutenant General Victor Dousmanes, the Field Army's Chief of Staff Colonel (Inf.) Konstantinos Palles, and Major General Xenophon Strategos.

After the prime minister explained the purpose of calling the Council, he asked if the Field Army's Command believed that the Turkish Army's annihilation had been achieved to the extent that enabled the government to declare the war ended, and in the event the Turks expressed no interest in negotiations proceed to a unilateral settlement of the situation, with a simultaneous transition to a state of semi–formal peace and demobilization. The Field Army's reply was given by its chief of staff, who stated that the Turkish Army had suffered significant casualties and was almost in a state of disintegration, which however could not be considered annihilation.

The prime minister then asked about the possibility of military action in order to achieve the desired outcome, and that action could be. Everybody agreed that this could be achieved, if not entirely at least adequately, by the continuation of the operations and the pursuit of the Turks up to Ankara and further east up to the Halys River (present–day Kizil Irmak, i.e.Red River).

Since there was no other way of resolving the Asia Minor issue than to take recourse to arms again, the continuation of the operations in the direction of Ankara was agreed upon unanimously. Preparation time was estimated at about twenty days, and twenty to forty days for execution.

The Field Army delivered the following memorandum to the Council, developing its views about the new operations (Sketchmap 35).

> *By occupying Dorylaeum and seizing the enemy front Dorylaeum – Afyon Karahisar, the first period of operations has ended. The following period's objective is the dissolution of the Kemalist forces or their removal from the front of Eskishehir in such a way, that their assembly before it, either to be impossible or require the maximum period of time and the greatest means, which, for the time being, the enemy at no rate affords. In order to achieve this, the Field Army has to make a raid towards Ankara, to crush, were it to meet, the enemy forces, to destroy the enemy supplies in Ankara, and if the enemy after this does not yield, because it is disadvantageous to remain in Ankara, return to Eskishehir, totally destroying the railway line. After this raid it is improbable that Kemal would be able to keep a significant number of forces. However, who are not able to move away from the railway line because of lack of transport, will not be able to approach the front of Dorylaeum with significant forces. The operation towards Ankara presents difficulties due to the great distance (Eskishehir – Ankara through Sivrihisar 265 kilometers, through Chifteler – Inler more than 300 kilometers), the condition of the roads, the crossing of the rivers Sangarius and Porsuk only over bridges, and the coming season of rains in September. Due to these disadvantages, the major difficulty would be that of supply. Regarding the study of the operation up to this point, the Field Army concluded that it can advance until the easternmost part of the Sangarius, namely until the line Beylik Kopru – Kavak. If during this time it meets the enemy and crushes it, then the pursuit towards Ankara by a section of the Field Army will present no difficulties. If, on the contrary, the enemy withdraws beyond the Sangarius, the Field Army will advance or stop, according to the conditions that will arise until that time. If, that is, these conditions are favorable, for example the seizure of intact railway line, roads and tracks in good condition, etc, the march towards Ankara is possible to continue, otherwise the Field Army will assume the return to Eskishehir, totally destroying the 100 kilometer railway line from Beylik Kopru to east Eskishehir*

An offensive aimed at Ankara was studied and proposed to the Ministry of the Army by the then General Headquarters for the first time in August 1920. It held that, in order to annihilate the Kemalist movement, the advance of the Hellenic Army towards the east until Ankara was imperative, indeed even past it up to Iconium. On 20 February 1921, the Field Army of Asia Minor repeated the same proposal in its report to the Ministry of the Army. At first the advance was expected until the line formed by Eskishehir – Afyon Karahisar and afterwards up to Ankara or possibly Iconium.

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Strength and Situation of the Hellenic Army

178. The Greek Field Army, despite its losses incurred during the operations of June–July 1921, had excellent morale and was inspired by an offensive spirit and decisiveness for the final victory. Despite this, it seemed obvious that everyone desired the war to end as soon as possible to return to their hearths, since Greece had been in a state of war since October 1912 and the reserves, which belonged to the old classes, had been serving in the army for almost a decade. The decision to continue the operations found the army ready for new sacrifices, with the hope the war would soon end, at which point everyone's desire for demobilization would be fulfilled. An important morale factor also was the presence of King Constantine and of the chief of the Army Staff Service in Asia Minor from 30 May 1921, because of the former's prestige as commander in chief and victor of the Balkan Wars 1912–13.

Certain commanders of large units deemed the decision to continue operations towards Ankara hazardous and their outcome precarious. These included Major General Alexandros Kontoules, Commander of Army Corps A, and the King's brother, Prince Andreas, Commander of XII Division and later of Army Corps B. Both men knew well the condition of the Field Army because of their positions, and believed that in order to succeed in an operation of such scale, there had to precede a significant reinforcement of the army in men and munitions, as well as thorough organization and training. Without this preparation, they considered the operation doomed to failure.

The issue of supply was most important among the concerns of the Command of the Field Army of Asia Minor, because of the great distances between the combat troops and their bases of supply. In a meeting it was made clear that with the Field Army's available transportation, supply was possible as far as the east branch of the Sangarius river. In the event, however, that the Field Army was obliged to conduct operations further east, it would face serious difficulties of supply. The army corps' Headquarters however hoped to overcome these difficulties, relying on the possibility to use the railway line from Eskishehir towards Ankara, for the restoration of which it had all necessary means.

179. The available forces the Field Army had for the operations towards Ankara, were those with which it conducted the operations of June–July, that is eleven Infantry divisions and a Cavalry Brigade. In the main operations however towards Ankara, it used only nine Infantry divisions and the Cavalry Brigade. The remaining two divisions were employed for the security of its flanks and rear. The casualties of the troops during the operations of June–July were filled by the regimental depots of the army corps. After filling the vacancies, the present strength of the Field Army amounted to 5,500 officers, 178,000 enlisted men of the classes 1912–1921 and 48,900 pack animals. This strength was allocated as follows.

	Formations	Officers	Enlisted Men	Pack Animal
1.	Army Corps A, B,C	3,515	113,380	35,310
2.	Field Army Units	265	6,620	2,840
3.	Front Zone Units	765	28,000	7,650
4.	Rear Units	955	30,000	3,100
	Total	5,500	178,000	48,900

The main force of the Field Army that would be employed for the offensive included three army corps of three divisions each, an Infantry regiment, a Cavalry brigade, a Heavy Artillery regiment, two Skoda Artillery battalions and three aircraft squadrons. The combat troops totaled approximately 1,860 officers, and 75,200 enlisted men, with 50,000 rifles, 2,084 submachine guns, 684 machine guns, 296 guns of various calibers, 1,380 sabered Cavalry and eighteen aircraft.

The combat troops of the two divisions that did not participate in the main operations totaled approximately 290 officers and 14,000 enlisted men, with 10,000 rifles, 368 sub–machine guns, 120 machine guns, 130 sabered Cavalry and thirty–two guns.

The Military Situation in Turkey
Sketchmap 35

180. The Western Front Field Army, as the Turkish forces facing the Greek Field Army were destroyed, withdrew east of the Sangarius after the operations of June–July 1921. Its objective was to block the road towards Ankara in case of a possible advance of the Hellenic Army. There, it deployed in the most suitable defensive area, which it hastily started organizing, while at the same time it proceeded with the regrouping of its units. The withdrawal of the Turkish Army, which started on the night of 8/9 July, was completed on the night of 12 July when its bulk had crossed the Sangarius

To the west of the river remained an Infantry and a Cavalry division in the area of Mihalichchik (Sketchmap 35), between the north branch of the Sangarius and its tributary Porsuk. In the area between the rivers Porsuk and Seydi Su remained two Infantry regiments and two Cavalry regiments. In the areas Aziziye and Eshref Pasha Han, south of the south branch of the Sangarius remained the V Group of Divisions (Cavalry). These units were assigned the mission to keep contact with and delay the enemy in case of its advance.

The Turkish Army Staff and the Supreme Defense Council, which had then been constituted, cooperating under the guidance of Kemal, turned all

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the powers and resources of the country towards the front of the Sangarius. General mobilization was declared, and those born between the years 1881–1920 were called to arms. Simultaneously, forces were transported from the eastern provinces and from Cilicia, where hostilities with the French Army had ended. Thus, within a short time (from 13 July until 10 August, the day the Greek offensive began), the regrouping, reinforcement and training of the Western Front Field Army as well as the defensive organization of the area, progressed significantly.

After the withdrawal of the Turkish Army beyond the Sangarius and the abandonment of the territories to its west, Turkish public opinion was shaken and the opposition groups expressed criticism. In order to restore discipline, the Great Turkish National Assembly introduced the institution of commander in chief, so that every authority, political and military, was concentrated in the hands of one capable man, the organizer of the revolutionary movement, Mustafa Kemal.

He immediately started to take all measures that would contribute to the restoration of peace within the country and to the prompt utilization of the army. With a series of circulars that had the force of law, he regulated the most urgent issues and constituted special courts of law to enforce their application. These courts were called "Courts of Independence" and had the right to impose strict sanctions on those who did not comply, even the death penalty. Finally, he took a particular interest in organizing the commissariat and supply of the army, by promoting war equipment procurement from abroad, mainly from Italy, France and the Soviet Union.

181. By the beginning of the operations, the Turkish Western Front Field Army included the following formations and units:

The **Newly–Formed Army Corps** (17 Infantry Division and one Cavalry regiment).

I Group of Divisions (1, 24, 41 Infantry Divisions, and 1 Cavalry Division).

II Group of Divisions (5, 8, 9 Infantry Division)

III Group of Divisions (4 and 23 Infantry Divisions).

IV Group of Divisions (7, 61 Infantry Divisions and 5 Caucasus Division).

V Group of Divisions (2, 14 Infantry Regiment, and 4 Cavalry Brigade).

XIII Group of Divisions (11, 57 Infantry Divisions and the 3 Caucasus Division).

6 and **15 Independent Infantry Divisions**.

3 Independent Cavalry Division.

The **Muretep Division** (of special composition).

Three independent Infantry regiments.

Of these, 5 and 9 Divisions came from Cilicia. The number of divisions assigned to each group was not stable, but changed according to the tactical situation.

The Turkish forces that finally confronted the Hellenic Field Army east of the Sangarius, included sixteen Infantry divisions, four Cavalry divisions, one Cavalry brigade, and three independent Infantry regiments. The remaining two Infantry divisions were outside the area where the main operations were conducted. Of these, 6 Infantry Division was in the area south of Afyon Karahisar, and the Muretep Division at the rear of the Hellenic Field Army.

The total of these Turkish forces amounted to about 90,000 men with 60,000 rifles, 200 submachine guns, 545 machine guns, 167 guns of various calibers and 6,000 sabered Cavalry.

The Opposing Forces Compared

182. The forces of the Hellenic Army, which were employed in the area where the main operations were conducted, amounted to 120,000 men. The Kemalist Turkish Army that opposed these forces totaled 90,000 men, giving the Hellenic Army an advantage 30,000 men. This was not overwhelming, because of the different organization of the Greek and Turkish divisions. The former had a heavy composition, with more auxiliary formations and a large number of pack animals. The Turkish divisions were light, including only the absolutely essential formations and small numbers of pack animals. Thus, almost all of the forces of a Turkish division could be considered as combat effective.

The Greeks deployed nine divisions and one Infantry regiment east of the Sangarius, i.e. eighty–four battalions, compared with sixteen Turkish divisions and three Infantry regiments with 164 battalions.

The Greek Infantry had 50,000 rifles (or about 200 rifles per Infantry battalion), 2,052 light machine guns and 672 machine guns, compared to 60,000 Turkish rifles, 205 light machine guns and 515 machine guns. Thus, the Greek Infantry was inferior in the number of rifles, but superior in automatic weapons.

The Greek Cavalry was greatly outnumbered. Against the only Greek Cavalry brigade comprising two regiments with 750 sabers and thirty–two light machine guns, twelve machine guns and four guns, the Turks had four divisions and one Cavalry brigade with fifteen regiments, 6,000 sabers and thirty light machine guns.

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The Greek Artillery outnumbered the Turkish in guns, with 296 guns of various calibers compared to 167. It was inferior however in quality of equipment and caliber. Its equipment was antiquated except for a few slow–firing heavy guns, it was generally light and consisted of 65 and 75mm pack guns and 75mm field guns, all with short range. On the contrary, the Turkish Artillery consisted mainly of Skoda guns and included about seventy guns of medium and large caliber.

The most modern equipment of the Greek Artillery comprised sixteen Skoda guns of Turkish origin, formed in two independent battalions. A third battalion was organized comprising eight Skoda guns as well, but it did not participate in the operations, except for one battery during the last days of August.

The Preparation Period

Sketchmap 35

183. After the end of the operations of June–July 1921 the Field Army of Asia Minor dissolved the combat groups that had been organized for these operations and allocated three divisions to each army corps. XI Division remained independent, under the immediate orders of the Field Army, while IV Division came under the command of the newly established South Sector. After suspending its advance to the east of Eskishehir, the Field Army occupied the general line Dede Tepe (in Boz Dag) – Orta Tepe – the heights of Jevizli, deployed as follows (Sketchmap 35).

– **Army Corps C** under the command of Major General Georgios Polymenakos, with its Headquarters in Eskishehir, deployed to the east of this city, on either side of the Porsuk, with two divisions in the front line. III Division under Colonel (Inf) Georgios Nikolaides deployed itself in the north, and X Division under Colonel (Inf) Petros Soumilas east of the Porsuk up to the Seydi River. VII Division (Colonel (Inf) Andreas Plates) assembled east of Eskishehir and comprised the army corps' reserve.

– **Army Corps B** under the command of Prince Andreas, with its Headquarters in Seyitgazi, deployed in the east of this town, from the Seydi river up to the heights of Jevizli, with two divisions in the front line. XIII Division under Colonel (Arty) Kimon Digenes to the left, and V Division Colonel (Inf) Ioannes Trilivas to the right. The Army Corp's reserve comprised IX Division under Colonel (Inf) Vlasios Tsirogiannes (who served until 26 July 1921 and was replaced by Colonel (Cav) Andreas Kallinskes), which encamped southwest of Seyitgazi. This division was reduced by four battalions and a Pack Artillery battalion, which were in the areas of Chivril and Bolvadin, south of Ushak.

The following army corps had the mission to secure the occupied line,

– **Army Corps A** commanded by Major General Alexandros Kontoules, comprised I Division under Colonel (Inf) Athanasios Frangou, II Division under Colonel (Eng) Georgios Valetas and XII Division under Colonel (Inf) Perikles Kallidopoulos. The corps encamped directly south of Eskishehir and comprised the Field Army's reserve.

– **XI Division** commanded by Colonel (Arty) Nikolaos Kladas, encamped in the area of Kopruhisar southeast of the lake of Askoy. Its mission was to cover the left of the Field Army.

– The **South Sector Command** commanded by Major General Nikolaos Trikoupes with its base in Ushak, covered the right of the Field Army with IV Division under Colonel (Eng) Demetrios Demaras, which encamped in Afyon Karahisar.

The Field Army, in order to remain undistracted from problems that could arise from the rear during the operations towards Ankara, organized in Smyrna the Supreme General Military Command to replace the General Military Command of Smyrna, which was dissolved. The new Command's mission was to keep order and security, as well as to secure communications throughout the whole occupied section of the Asia Minor territory, except for the area where the operations were conducted. As boundary of the zone of responsibility of the Supreme General Military Headquarters was fixed the line that started at the bay of Kios, passed east of Bursa (through Gediz and Ushak) and ended in the Maeander river. All military command and units that were in its area of responsibility came under the orders of the Supreme General Command.

184. XI Division, with its headquarters in Kopruhisar, and with the mission to cover the left of the Field Army, remained during the time the operations towards Ankara were conducted in the same area without confronting significant Turkish forces. It faced only light Infantry forces, reinforced on certain occasions with a small number of guns and groups of irregulars, which it easily dissolved or pushed beyond its zone of responsibility.

On 20 July 1921, the Field Army of Asia Minor dissolved the South Sector, and in its place, under the same commander, organized a static tactic headquarters in Afyon Karahisar designated Southern Group of Divisions. To this were assigned IV Division, 49 Infantry Regiment, 1 Rear Regiment, the Naval Air Squadron and all the non–divisional formations in the area of Afyon Karahisar. The group was assigned the mission to cover the right flank of the Field Army, to secure communications, and to maintain the occupation of Afyon Karahisar.

The Field Army had been informed that Turkish forces were trans-

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ported by railway from Cilicia, through Iconium, towards the west. Anticipating an attack against the communication junction at Afyon Karahisar, the Field Army reinforced the Southern Group of Divisions with IX Division. This division, which was temporarily detached from Army Corps B, arrived in Inje Karahisar on 27 July, northeast of Afyon Karahisar, and remained there until 31 July.

Organization of Supply, Transportation and Evacuation
Sketchmap 35

185. The Field Army of Asia Minor had gathered the necessary supplies for the operations June–July 1921 in the areas Ushak and Dumlupinar (Sketchmap 35). It was possible to gather part of the supplies in the northern areas of Mudanya or Bursa in case the advance from Eskishehir to the Sangarius continued. The stock of supplies however, and especially that of ammunition, were limited and if scattered, there was a risk of shortages during the combat in Kutahya. For this reason it considered its first concern should be to ensure sufficient supplies in order to conduct the decisive battle in Kutahya.

After the occupation of Eskishehir and Seyitgazi and the assembly of the bulk of the Field Army in these areas, started the intense transportation of supplies with tracks from Dumlupinar to the new supply centers in Eskishehir and Kutahya. Simultaneously, other quantities were transported by railway from Dumlupinar and Ushak to Smyrna and from there by ship to Mudanya.

When the continuation of the operations towards Ankara was decided, special attention was given to the most efficient organization of resupply of the combat troops, because of the great distances that separated them from the supply bases. For this purpose the supply station of Eskishehir, developed into a supply center, with the title General Supply Center of Eskishehir. This comprised the general depot where all necessary supplies were gathered. Priority was given to create an ammunition depot, to gather maintenance supplies, and finally, to ensure the necessary medical supplies. Supplies were transported by ship to Mudanya and from there by rail to Bursa and from the base of Smyrna. From Bursa to Karakoy the transportation continued with tracks and then by railroad until Eskishehir. The section between Karakoy and Eskishehir of the railroad line from Constantinople towards Ankara and Iconium, had been restored by the Military Railroad Service within a few days.

The Command of the General Supply Center of Eskishehir became especially active and succeeded in limiting the transportation of the maintenance supplies from Smyrna to the minimum by taking full advantage of the local resources. With this measure, it gathered large quantities of wheat and other grain, and ensured a daily production of bread, which exceeded 100,000 rations.

For the efficiency of ammunition supply, mobile depots were formed by local horse–drawn vehicles, which were requisitioned with their drivers. These mobile depots followed the army corps keeping a distance of one day's march. Besides, in order to save transportation means, the Field Army limited the transported foodstuff to bread, salt, sugar and tea only. The troops would obtain meat, barley and hay from local resources.

The transportation means the Field Army had on the eve of the operations towards Ankara were the following:

– **Railroads**: The regular gauge lines of Smyrna – Dumlupinar (357 kilometers long), the section Karakoy – Eskishehir (fifty–eight kilometers long), the section Eskishehir – Alpakoy (thirty–five kilometers long) and the narrow line Mudanya – Bursa (twenty–six kilometers long). The Field Army attached great importance to the restoration of the line beyond Alpakoy, and for this reason it assigned all the necessary personnel and means to repair it during the advance to Ankara.

– **Vehicles**: For the operations, the Field Army had 600 heavy trucks of three tons, and 240 light trucks of one ton. The vehicles were organized in battalions, each equipped with sixty to one hundred trucks.

– **Animal–drawn vehicles and pack animals**: There was a wagon supply column, with the capacity to transport two–day rations for three divisions, and two more supply columns, each of which could transport one–day rations for two divisions. There were also three camel supply columns, each of which could transport two–day rations for each army corps.

On the eve of the advance, the General Supply Center of Eskishehir established in Alpakoy a Terminal Supply Center, from which Army Corps A and C would be resupplied during the first days of their advance. Army Corps B would continue its resupply from the supplies center organized in Seyitgazi.

The organization of the evacuation was based on the casualty estimates of the Field Army's Staff of about 2,500 to 3,000 wounded. The Field Army's Medical Service, in order to respond to the hospitalization needs of this estimate, organized in Eskishehir the General Infirmary Center of Eskishehir, of a 2,000 bed capacity, and the Infirmary Center of Seyitgazi, of a 400 bed capacity.

An advanced evacuation station for the wounded was deployed in Alpakoy. The station would be successively moved to the terminal railway station defined each time. The evacuation up to there would be made with ambulances. The evacuations from the General Infirmary Center of Eskishehir, would be made to the Infirmary Center of Bursa, the General Infirmary Center of Smyrna. and the hospitals in Greece.

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The Theater of Operations
Sketchmap 35

186. The operations of the Hellenic Field Army in the direction of Ankara were conducted in the central Asia Minor high plateau, of average height about 1,000 meters above sea level. (Sketchmap 35). This central Asia Minor area is surrounded from the north by the Pontic Mountains and is blocked to the west by a high mountain range that connects the western Taurus with the western section of the Pontic Mountains. To the south and northeast it is limited by the large mountain range of Taurus. In this huge basin, whose center is 600 kilometers in straight line far from the shores of the Aegean, there are three characteristic areas. The river basin of the Sangarius to the northwest, the river basin of the Halys river to the northeast, and the Almyra Desert to the south.

The Almyra Desert extends up to the south branches of the rivers Sangarius and Halys. It forms an endless plateau with an average height of 1,000 meters above sea level and has hard soil, covered by a layer of sand. Water is scarce and there is a lack of vegetation and life resources. To its north fringes, the continuation of the ground becomes uneven, and slightly wavy, gradually developing into elevations of the ground as for example those of Kale Gozu, Ardiz Dag and Chal Dag, to develop further north near Ankara into mountains.

The area, which extends southeast of Elma Dagi, is ideal for defense. The hillsides, which descend to Sangarius and the tributary Gok, have a smooth slope, are uncovered and ideal for the laying of defensive fire. A special characteristic of the area, where the operations were conducted, was the total lack of macadam roads. There was however a dense network of carriage roads that was passable for heavy trucks as well, but only during the summer period of draught. After the rains started, during September, trafficability continually decreased, while during winter, the roads became impassable for the heavy trucks, and generally for the cars.

The Sangarius springs from the mountainous area between Eskishehir and Afyon Karahisar, flows to the southeast and, after forming a wide bend that surrounds Boz Dag from south and east, turns to the north. At the confluence of the tributary Porsuk, the river turns northeast up to the bridge Kopru Bashi. From there, it initially turns towards the west and from the height of Eskishehir to the north, finally flowing into the Black Sea. Its total length is about 700 kilometers, its average breadth forty meters and its depth three meters. The section from Chifteler until the southeastern bend (110 kilometers long) constitutes the south branch of the Sangarius, while its section from the bend until the junction of the Egrisu (seventy–five kilometers long) constitutes its north branch.\

The most important tributaries of the Sangarius are: the Porsuk, which springs from the mountainous area northeast of Ushak, passes through Eskishehir, and from there, turns to the east until its confluence with the Sangarius, near the ancient Gordium. The railroad line towards Ankara runs parallel to the river from Eskishehir and beyond. The Egrisu, which springs from the mountainous area north of Ankara and joins the Sangarius about twenty kilometers north of Gordium. The torrent Katranji Dere, which from the village Inler Katranji and further west, turns into the river Gok, and joins the Sangarius south of Yildiz Dag.

The area the Turks chose for their defensive deployment, was the territory surrounded by the southwest ridges of Elma Dagi, and Chilek Dag, and the rivers Sangarius and Gok. For their defensive organization the Turks developed significant activity and proved to be efficient in choosing defensive positions and exploiting naturally strong locations, which they reinforced even more with their organization. Within this territory, three distinct defensive areas were organized. The first anchored its right on the Sangarius near Gordium, went on parallel to the right (eastern) bank of the Sangarius and Gok, crossed the Katranji torrent and ended in Kale Gozu. The second hooked its right on Chilek Dag, passed about five kilometers west of Polatli, and including Chal Dag and Ardiz Dag, ended in the southwest ridges of Elma Dagi. The third hooked its right on Chilek Dag as well, included Polatli, the heights of Sarigol and Chulluk and ended as well in the southwest ridges of Elma Dagi. Among these positions were other intermediate lines of defense that enhanced the strength of the defensive disposition.

The first frontal defensive line, of about ninety–five kilometers width, formed a corner that projected towards the southwest. One of its legs, about forty kilometers long, extended along the eastern branch of the Sangarius and faced to the west. Its other leg, fifty–five kilometers long, had a northward and parallel to the Gok river direction and faced to the south. These two legs joined at Yildiz Dag.

Sangarius' section in front of the western leg of the area was unfordable its only crossing points being the bridges thus comprising a serious obstacle to whoever launched an attack against this area.

The Turkish works consisted generally of field fortifications including communications trenches, entrenchments fortified with barbed wire, observation posts, hasty gun emplacements and machine gun pits.

The Plan of the Hellenic Field Army
Sketchmap 35

187. On 25 July, the Field Army of Asia Minor issued its operation orders against Ankara. These orders were based on intelligence, according to which the Turks had entrenched themselves on the eastern bank of the Sangarius,

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with the bulk of their forces in the area of Polatli. To the west of the river they had two to three divisions in the area of Mihalichchik. Cavalry forces kept the contact with the adversary along the rest of the front (Sketchmap 35).

The Field Army's orders consisted of two basic documents of the operation plan and the litter of instructions. With the second document, which was forwarded only to the commanders of the large units, the Field Army informed them of its intentions to attack in order to crush and pursue the enemy forces until their total disintegration. It would then occupy Ankara and destroy its military establishments there in order to deprive the Turks of their valuable base. Since the enemy forces occupied the organized area behind the impassable obstacle of the Sangarius, outside the bridges, the Field Army decided to engage their front with small forces and act with its bulk east of the Sangarius, enveloping and encircling this defensive area from south and southeast.

The development of the operation from the jump off until the beginning of the main attack, was divided in two periods. During the first period, the army corps would reach as far as the line: passes of the Sangarius northeast of Mihalichchik – Dumur Tepe – Gunyuzu Mountain – Ak lake. Army Corps C's III Division, which occupied the eastern wing of the Field Army's disposition, reinforced by 16 Infantry Regiment of XI Division, would push the Turkish forces from the area of Mihalichchik beyond the Sangarius. After this, it would leave in the area a joint detachment from the above regiment and a Pack Artillery battalion for the surveillance of the fording points of the river, and with its remaining forces would be ready to cross the Sangarius and move to the north.

For the second period the plan provided for a crossing of the southern branch of Sangarius by Army Corps A and Army Corps C (minus division). This division would cover initially from the east the southward flanking movement of the two corps and then it would launch a frontal attack against the enemy simultaneously with the main attack. A gradual deployment of the three army corps would follow towards the east, between the Sangarius and Ak lake, the launching of the main attack east of the river, and of a secondary one against the remaining front of the enemy's position.

188. The operation plan defined as its general objective the annihilation and dispersal of the Turkish forces east of the Sangarius. It also included the units that were under the immediate command of the Field Army, their disposition in the line of departure and the zone of action of the army corps. The latter should have assembled by 30 July in the line of departure that the Field Army defined and included the heights Dagjilar, the village Alpakoy, the heights Orta Tepe and the heights west of Jevizli, with the following deployment:

– **Army Corps C** on the left, from the heights Dagjilar until Orta Tepe with all three divisions in line formation, one of them in the north, and the other two south of the Porsuk, ready to advance along the river.

– **Army Corps A** in the center, from the heights of Orta Tepe up to the river Bardakchi, with at least two of its divisions deployed in line formation with general direction to southeast.

– **Army Corps B** to the right, from Bardakchi Su and to the south up to the heights east of the village Jevizli, with two of its divisions deployed in line formation, ready to advance through the corridor south of the Sangarius river. XI Division, which was in Inje Karahisar, had to move timely and through Bayindir and Aziziye , arrive at the right of Army Corps B and deploy there. The Cavalry Brigade would move from its encampment area, to the northwest of Eskishehir, in the area of Seyitgazi and would lead Army Corps B's advance.

The operation plan was completed by special plans concerning liaison, communications, supply evacuation and tasks that had to be done.

Advance to the Sangarius River
Sketchmap 35

189. The movement of the army corps, in order to occupy the line of departure, started on the morning of 28 July and was completed on 30 July. Army Corps C (Sketchmap 35), with its Headquarters in Alpakoy, had III Division between Dagjilar and the Porsuk, VII Division from the Porsuk up to Uyuzhamamkoyu, and X Division between Uyuzhamamkoyu and Orta Tepe (exclusive). Army corps A was between Army Corps C and B, and had two divisions in first echelon, II Division on the left in the area of Seydi Su, and I Division on the right until Bardakchi Su. In the second echelon it had XII Division, immediately south of the village Yahnikapan, where the Army Corp's Headquarters was also located.

Army Corps B was covered east of Seyitgazi only by V Division, after the interposition of Army Corps A, which assumed the whole sector of XIII Division, as well as the part of the sector of V Division north of Bardakchi Su. XIII Division, after its relief, assembled northeast of Seyitgazi, where the Army Corp's Headquarters was also located.

The Army Corp's units began their advance towards Sangarius on 1 August. Of the Turkish forces west of the Sangarius, 1 Infantry Division and 1 Cavalry Division were in Mihalichchik, north of the Porsuk. Two Infantry regiments and two Cavalry regiments, with two batteries, were in the pocket of the Sangarius, in the areas of Sarikoy and Kaymaz. South of the Sangarius, in the area Aziziye – Eshref Pasha Han, was V Group of Divisions (Cav-

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alry), which covered Army Corp's II movement. This army corps, comprising the 5 and 9 Infantry Divisions, was redesignated II Group of Divisions. It came from Cilicia with the defensive area east of the Sangarius as its destination, and had already arrived at the lake of Eber Golu.

The three Hellenic army corps advanced deployed in line, according to the operation plan and successively occupied, the line formed by Don Tepe – Kaymaz – Bel Pinar – Kandikoy on 1 August; the line formed by the west accesses of Kartal (Hill 1644) – Sivrihisar (exclusive) – Zilekulak Oba on 2 August; and the line formed by the eastern ridges Kartal – heights east of Mihalichchik – Bozan – Dumur Tepe – Gunyuzu mountain (exclusive) – Amorium on 3 August.

On 4 August, the advance continued only on the right of the Field Army. On the left, III Division conducted a mop–up of the area in the north and east of Mihalichchik up to Sangarius. VII Division, which extended its zone south of Porsuk River, deployed its left in the heights north of Bicher. The disposition of Army Corps A and the remaining section of Army Corps C was unchanged, except for the forward deployment of a detachment, of Infantry regiment strength, and a Pack Artillery battalion of I Division , in the passes of Musluk Bogaz. South of the Sangarius, Army Corps B advanced unhindered to a depth of about fifteen kilometers and arrived at the line formed by Polat Hisar – Ashagi Piribeyli. On 2 August, the Army Corp's Headquarters moved forward to Hamidiye.

190. The resistance the Turkish forces put up west of the Sangarius during the Army Corp's four–day advance was negligible. Their greatest part was comprised of Cavalry forces, and they tried to delay the advance of the Greek troops by making a retrograde maneuver and avoiding being engaged in serious combat. The Turkish action was more intense in the wings of the Field Army, where they put up successive resistance with strong sections and the support of Artillery. However, they were also overrun relatively easily. Turkish 1 Division, which was in the area of Mihalichchik, had withdrawn east of Sangarius.

On 1 August, the Cavalry Brigade preceding Army Corps B, moved from the route that detoured from south of the mountain Bel Pinar, in order to position itself at the rear of Turkish forces, which according to information occupied positions on this mountain and further north in the area of Chifteler. Towards noon, a powerful Turkish Cavalry column was observed southeast of Kandikoy, which moved from the opposite direction. It was the Turkish 14 Cavalry Division, which the Cavalry Brigade Artillery attacked and one of the brigade's sections threatened to outflank it. The result was that the Turks were surprised, turned about and retreated in disorder towards Aziziye.

IX Division, which had temporarily been assigned to the Southern Group of Divisions, moved on 1 August from Inje Karahisar in order to return

to Army Corps B. Its move was covered from east and south by IV Division (minus regiment), which advanced with the help of the Southern Group of Divisions up to the line Gombechiler – Chobanlar – Ishiklar. IX Division, following the route through Bayat and Aziziye towards Amorium, arrived at noon of 3 August at the heights near Amorium. There, it clashed with a strong Cavalry force that was estimated at about 2,000 horsemen and three guns. The division attacked with two battalions and, with the Artillery's accurate support, pushed back the Turks, who fled in disorder, also dragging along a Cavalry column that had hurried to reinforce them. IX Division moved and deployed in the heights east of Amorium where it established liaison with V Division and comprised the right of Army Corps B.

The troops of IX Division that were in Chivril and Bolvadin were relieved by units of the Southern Group of Divisions, with aim to move and join their division. These units, which comprised 3/40 Evzone Regiment, 26 Infantry Regiment (minus II/26), IXb Pack Artillery Battalion and various non–combat formations, assembled in Afyon Karahisar, where they comprised the Joint Detachment of IX Division under the Commander of the Evzone Regiment Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Alexandros Edipides. The detachment departed on 5 August to meet its division, following the same route, with the cover of IV Division which occupied the line formed by Gombechiler – Ishiklar.

Deployment of the Bulk of the Hellenic Field Army East of the Sangarius
Sketchmaps 35, 36

191. On 4 August, according to the Field Army's information, the situation of the Turks remained unchanged. Their forces, which came from Cilicia, were reported to continue their movement from the corridor between the Sangarius and the lake of Ak, heading towards the Gok River.

The Hellenic Field Army, continuing the implementation of its plan, realized on 5 August the necessary preparatory movements for the deployment of the bulk of its forces south of the Sangarius. Simultaneously, it forwarded Army Corps B to the east (Sketchmap 35).

On the morning of 5 August, Army Corps C, acting according to the contents of the Field Army's orders, moved III Division up to Dumrek. In the area of Mihalichchik, there remained only a small detachment called the Mihalichchik Joint Detachment, comprising 16 Infantry Regiment and IIIb Pack Artillery Battalion. VII Division extended its front further south into the section of X Division as well, and by evening it occupied a line of about forty kilometers from the Porsuk river up to the Gunyuzu mountain (exclusive). After its relief, X Division assembled south of Sivrihisar. Of Army Corps A's units, II Division seized the passes of the Gunyuzu mountain, I Division deployed in the area of Musluk Bogaz, and XII Division arrived at the Sangarius and encamped in the area of the Balikesir bridge. Army Corps B, south

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
of the Sangarius, continued its advance towards the east, seized the line Chakir Han – Gok Pinar – Ak Lake with two divisions and kept IX Division as reserve behind V Division on its right.

On the night of 5 August, with the army corps' arrival at the general line crossings of the Sangarius – northeast of Mihalichchik – Dumur Tepe – Gunyuzu Mountain – Ak Lake, the Field Army's first period of operations provided its plan ended. The Turks' reaction, during this period, was very limited. The conditions, however under which the long and arduous marches were executed under the unbearable daytime heat and bitter nighttime cold, on terrain that was in large part sandy and dry greatly fatigued the troops.

Following to the Field Army's orders, Army Corps C assigned the Mihalichchik Joint Detachment to the command of VII Division, which remained west of the Sangarius. The army corps reinforced this division with a Field Artillery battalion and the I Heavy Artillery Battalion, 120mm of the Heavy Artillery regiment. Simultaneously, it detached VIIa Pack Artillery Battalion to III Division, replacing IIIb Pack Artillery Battalion, which remained with the Joint Detachment of Mihalichchik.

From the morning of 6 August, the flanking movement of Army Corps C and A continued, under the cover of VII and II Divisions, and began the deployment of the Field Army's bulk, with the crossing of the river by I and XII Divisions. The next day, 7 August south of the Sangarius, II and X Divisions crossed Sangarius, and III Division remained west of the river, in the area of Musluk Bogaz. The assembly of the divisions that had crossed the river, and their movement to the territorial zone south of the Sangarius was covered by Army Corps B, which continued its advance to the east. On the evening of 6 August, Army Corps B occupied the line Sangarius northeast Chakir Han – Uzunbey – Sakizagi. On 7 August it occupied the line that included the villages Kirpoglu and Haji Musaoglu, after the guards of XIII and V Divisions had pushed back the Turkish Cavalry force that was deployed there. IX Division encamped assembled in Yusukbashi. The Cavalry Brigade, which was tactically assigned to Army Corps B, encamped behind XIII and V Divisions. Of Army Corps A's divisions, which crossed the Sangarius I Division arrived north of Kirpoglu, and deployed on the left of XIII Division. II Division encamped west of Uzunbey and XII Division near Yusukbashi. Army Corps C's X Division encamped northwest of the village Yusukbashi, where the Field Army's Headquarters also deployed at noon of 7 August.

After a seven–day continuous march, the Field Army remained on 8 August in its occupied positions for its troops to rest and to resupply. It only moved III Division (minus one regiment that remained in the area of Chakmak), which crossed the Sangarius and deployed in the heights east of Chakir Han.



Sketchmap 36. The Disposition of the Hellenic Field Army on the Eve of 9 August 1921.

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192. The Field Army of Asia Minor, having received intelligence gathered by the Aviation Corps, that the Turks extended their defensive deployment north of the Gok river up to Mangal Dag, ordered the advance of VII Division towards the Sangarius and its deployment to a broad front, to give the enemy the impression that significant forces remained west of the river (Sketchmap 36).

The division was assigned the mission to prepare the bridging of the river, between its confluence with the Porsuk river and the bridge Beylik Kopru, to cross it and attack towards Polatli, with 11 August as possible D–day. From then on, VII Division would act independently, under the immediate Command of the Field Army. On 9 August, the division started to advance towards Sangarius and by the same evening, occupied the last ridgeline parallel to the river, and deployed there with its left (north) in the Sangarius near the confluence of Egrisu and its right (south) in Boz Dag. The division manned this front line with two regiments, keeping the third as a reserve in the area of Demirjikoy

South of the Sangarius the Field Army forwarded the three army corps up to the line Turk Tahazir – Ala Haji. During the advance a strong force of Turkish Cavalry attempted to block the movement of V Division, on the right of the Greek deployment. However, after an attack of the division's advance guard and a simultaneous wide maneuver of the Cavalry Brigade to the Turks' left and rear, their effort failed. The Turkish sections were forced to abandon their positions and withdraw.

On the evening of 9 August, the Field Army, which was southeast of the Sangarius, had a front parallel to the Gok river, with the following deployment: The three army corps, deployed in line with the same initial order, had in the front echelon from left to right III, II, I, XIII and V Divisions, with one regiment of III Division west of the Sangarius, in the area of its big bend. Army Corps C's X Division was held in reserve, behind III Division. XII Division, comprising Army Corps A's reserve, encamped east of Uzunbey, and Army Corps B's IX Division in Haji Musaoglu. The Cavalry Brigade encamped southeast of this village, covering the right of the whole disposition.

193. After Army Corps A and C crossed the Sangarius, and the deployment of all three army corps southeast of the river, two out of the three actions provided by the Field Army's operation plan during the second period of the operations were accomplished. The third action, which included the main attack from the south, and the secondary frontal attack against the Turkish forces east of the Sangarius, would begin on 10 August. The passing of the Field Army through the north fringes of the Almyra Desert was the special phase of the second period. The march through this dry and inhospitable area, which is covered by layers of sand and is deprived of trees and vegetation, was

a terrible trial for the troops. The units were obliged to remain in the desert area from three to seven days, according to their position in the Field Army's disposition. Army Corps B, which occupied the right of the disposition and moved south of Sangarius from the beginning, had the longest stay in the desert.

In order to cover its communications from the direction Aziziye – Bolvadin, the Field Army ordered the Southern Group of Divisions to advance a part of it forces towards Bolvadin and Chay (Sketchmap 35). The Southern Group of Divisions employed IV Division for this purpose, minus 35 Infantry Regiment, which was encamped in Afyon Karahisar and was responsible for the security of the town. IV Division, having, since 1 August occupied the line Gombechiler – Chobanlar – Ishiklar, advanced on 7 August along the railway line Afyon Karahisar – Iconium and after pushing small Turkish sections, captured the towns Bolvadin and Chay.

The joint detachment of IX Division, which moved to meet its division, on 6 August encamped in Aziziye and next day continued to Amorium. However, when its advance guard approached Amorium, the rearguard and the main forces of the column were attacked by the Turkish Muretep Division and caught by surprise. After a three–hour battle, the detachment repelled the attack, pushed the Turks towards the village Chugu and continued its advance. During the battle a Turkish section entered Aziziye, took prisoner and massacred twenty unarmed enlisted men of IX Delivery Platoon that had gone there unprotected for provisions.

The Muretep Division, ignorant of the advance of IV Division, moved on the morning of 8 August from Chugu to return to its previous positions east of Chobanlar. On its arrival however to Bolvadin it was successfully attacked by troops of IV Division, was surprised, disorganized and fled in disorder towards the mountainous area northeast of Bolvadin.

Disposition of the Turkish Field Army

Sketchmaps 35, 37

194. By the time the Field Army of Asia Minor started moving the bulk of its forces south of Sangarius, the Turkish Western Front Field Army had information from its advanced troops that at the Porsuk river (Sketchmaps 35, 37) and further north were significant forces, which amounted to three divisions, while an equal number of divisions were south of the Sangarius. This information misled the Turkish Field Army, which assessed wrongly that an action against both its wings was possible. New information, as of 7 August indicated that there were: one Greek division between the Porsuk and Gunyuzu Mountain, two divisions between this mountain and Sangarius and four divisions south of the river. After this, the Turkish Field Army reinforced its left flank by assigning three divisions in the area Mangal Dag – Turbe Tepe,

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without however reducing the strength of its right flank. The information of the next two days, according to which almost the total of the Greek forces crossed the south branch of Sangarius and moved towards the Gok – Katranji front, totally revealed the Hellenic Field Army's intentions. The Turks then proceeded to the reinforcement of the front's south section, as well as to the creation of a strong reserve force, with the hasty transportation of forces from other areas. After these transports, on the morning of 10 August, the Western Front Field Army had the following disposition:

The north section was occupied by three Infantry divisions and one Cavalry division, which were deployed along the right bank of the Sangarius. In the far right end 1 Cavalry Division, which extended its zone towards the south up to and including the bridge Hamam, surveyed the crossings of the Sangarius. Between the bridge Hamam and the Egrisu was 17 Division and immediately further south up to the railroad line to Ankara was 41 Division. These divisions, with 1 Infantry Division in reserve in Choban Ozu, belonged to the Newly–Formed Army Corps, former Kojaeli Group. South of the railroad line up to and including Yildiz Dag were deployed the 11 Division and two Infantry battalions of XII Group of Divisions.

The front's south section, parallel to Gok – Katranji, was occupied by three divisions. On the right (west), between Yildiz Dag and the torrent Sapanja, was IV Group, which comprised 61 Infantry Division and 5 Caucasus Division both deployed on the front line. In the center, west of the torrent Sapanja up to Turbe Tepe was III Group with 8 and 15 Divisions in front line and 7 Division as reserve in Evliyafaki. On the left (east), from Turbe Tepe including Mangal Dag was II Group with 9 and 5 Divisions in front line and 4 Division as reserve, northeast of Mangal Dag. 2 and 3 Cavalry Divisions covered widely the left of the disposition, under the command of II Group of Divisions.


The Field Army's reserve forces comprised I Group of Divisions (23 and 24 Divisions) in the area Yapan Hamam, 3 Caucasus Division east of Evliyafaki and 57 Division in the area of Sivri.

V Group of Divisions (14 Cavalry Division and 4 Cavalry Brigade) was southeast of the Hellenic Field Army's right.

The Western Front Field Army's and the Commander in Chief's Headquarters had deployed in Alagol, about 35 kilometers north of Yapan Hamam.

Commencement of the Attack and Occupation of Mangal Dag
Sketchmap 37

195. The offensive began on 10 August, when the Hellenic Field Army jumped off from the line Turk Tahazir – Ala Haji and moved with the three army corps deployed in line towards the south section of the Turkish front (Sketchmap 37). According to information from the aerial reconnaissance the



Sketchmap 37. The Beginning of the Attack, 10 August 1921.

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Turkish forces to the left of their disposition and to the north of this amounted to 20,000 men. Another force of about 3,000 men was observed south of the Gok River, in Hill Gok Bayir. The Field Army estimated this hill to be an advanced position of the defensive area.

The Field Army fixed as the main effort during the attack, the breakthrough of the Turkish front in the area Inler Katranji – Ilija, with its simultaneous envelopment from the east. For this purpose, by the night of 10 August, it would occupy the ridge immediately south of Gok – Katranji that went on parallel to the river and estimated that it was occupied by the enemy's screening elements. It would use this line as a jump–off base for the attack the next day, 11 August, against the defensive area north of Gok – Katranji. The missions that the Field Army assigned the army corps for the accomplishment of its task were the following:

– **Army Corps B** to attack east of Injirli and seek to envelop the Turkish position from the east, then to advance towards the north, east of Ardiz Dag.

– **Army Corps A** to advance to the zone, whose right (eastern) boundary was the line Yusukbashi – Mangal Dag – Injirli and the left (west) the line Uzunbey – Inler Katranji – Sivri. To attack against the enemy position, directing its main effort west of Tamburoglu, in combination with Army Corps C's main effort. If the ground was not suitable, the army corps could, according to its assessment, shift its main effort to the right. The Heavy Artillery regiment was placed at its disposal, with the order to employ it concentrated.

– **Army Corps C** to attack between the left boundary of Army Corps A and the Sangarius, with the main effort to its right. In the remaining sector of the front it would operate to pin down the opposite Turkish forces, being prepared to repel a possible attack against its left.

On the morning of 10 August, began the advance towards the ridgeline south of Gok – Katranji, which had been fixed as the objective for the first day of the attack. Army Corps B, reinforced also with B Artillery Battalion (Skoda), arrived in line with Mangal Dag, and occupied the line Kuchuk Yatsi – Saatli to its south. It deployed there with V Division on the right and XIII Division on the left. IX Division encamped and assembled near Ala Haji, behind V Division, as reserve of the army corps, covering at the same time its right flank. The Cavalry Brigade occupied the heights Karpuzlu and made reconnaissance in order to observe the movements of the Turkish Cavalry.

Army Corps A, advancing within its zone of action, had in first echelon two divisions, each of which it reinforced with a Field Artillery battalion and with a Skoda battery. On the right was I Division, and on the left II Division. XII Division followed the route of I Division on the right, as second echelon.

I Division, whose mission was to occupy the heights south and southeast of the village Kirazoglu, moved in two columns in line formation. Each column was of Infantry regiment and a Pack Artillery battalion strength. The reserve regiment with the Field Artillery battalion and the Skoda battery followed the right column. Beginning at 1000 the enemy Artillery started firing against the first troops of the columns from the direction of Kirazoglu. When the heads of the columns came in line with the village Haspiro, it was discovered that the heights south and southeast of Kirazoglu were strongly held. The division then halted to prepare the attack against them.

The height Mangal Dag (Hill 1409), southeast of Kirazoglu, is a naturally strong position. Dominating the area, it provides its defender with significant advantages, such as extensive observation, large and unobstructed fields of fire and covered positions for the deployment of troops and means of fire. The Turks appreciating its advantages based on it the left of their defensive deployment and assigned an entire division for its defense.

196. I Division launched its attack at 1445 with 1/38 Evzone Regiment towards the Mangal Dag mountain and on the left, with 4 Infantry Regiment towards the south heights of Kirazoglu. The attack was supported, except for the pack battalions, by I/A Field Artillery Battalion and by the Skoda battery. 4 Infantry Regiment easily captured its objective, but 1/38 Evzone Regiment, upon arriving at a distance of 500–600 meters from the enemy's main line of resistance and coming under Infantry fire, noticeably reduced its rate of advance. Then the division intervened, turning 4 Infantry Regiment towards east (minus battalion that remained in the captured positions) and reinforcing the Evzone regiment with a battalion of the reserve 5 Infantry Regiment. As soon as this battalion began to ascend the southwest ridges of Mangal Dag, torrential rain and hail started falling. A dense fog followed the storm, which reduced visibility to the minimum. The attacking troops, taking advantage of the rain and covered by the fog, approached the Turkish positions and at about evening seized with a dashing assault the southwest section of Mangal Dag, while the eastern section was still occupied by the Turks.

The Command of the Turkish 5 Division defending Mangal Dag with the approval of the chief of II Group of Divisions, evacuated the whole mountain area and retired further north during the night. The loss of this area had a critical effect on the left of the Turkish disposition. The Command of the Western Front Field Army, attaching special significance to Mangal Dag, had ordered that it be held at all costs. When it was informed of its loss, it relieved the commander of 5 Division and ordered an investigation to discover those responsible. On the morning of 11 August, the occupation of Mangal Dag by I Division was completed. The division's casualties during that day amounted

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to one officer and seventeen enlisted men killed and twelve officers and 209 enlisted men wounded.

The position of Mangal Dag was the extreme left of the Turkish defensive disposition, which was breached at this point. But both Army Corps A and the Field Army, considered Mangal Dag an advanced screening position, and not part of the main Turkish defensive area. As a result they did not exploit the favorable situation created after its occupation.

II Division, ordered to capture the heights at Yarindam, advanced on the left of I Division in two columns. At about 1700, when the heads of the columns were approaching their objective, they came under Infantry and Artillery fire from these heights, which were occupied by an Infantry battalion with one gun. The columns, which consisted of 34 and 7 Infantry Regiments with a Pack Artillery battery each, moved immediately and taking advantage of the storm which broke out suddenly and the dense fog, approached unobserved the Turkish positions, which they overran after a surprise attack. By 1900, the division had occupied the section of the ridgeline immediately south of Katranji Dere and established liaison with the right of I Division. The Headquarters of II Division deployed south of the village Yarindam. The reserve XII Division encamped in the area of the village Kokar.


Army Corps C advanced towards the Gok River, with its two divisions deployed in line formation. A battalion of the left III Division, which moved parallel to the west bank of the Sangarius, surveyed the area to its west. At about 1530, the divisions, without meeting resistance, arrived at the last heights towards the Gok, where they deployed themselves.

The Field Army's Headquarters, deployed on 10 August near the village Uzunbey.

The Battle of Tamburoglu

Sketchmaps 36, 38, 39

197. After the capture of the heights south of the Gok River, the army corps would use them as a line of departure and would attack, according to the Field Army's orders, at the first light of 11 August against the defensive area north of this river (Sketchmap 38). The Field Army however, with a new order, which was issued at 2330 on 10 August, postponed the attack for the day after (12 August), with the purpose to be better prepared. After this, Army Corps A, to which the main effort of breaking the Turkish front had been assigned, deployed its Headquarters in the area of Haspiro and began from the morning of 11 August to prepare for the attack. It ordered reconnaissance to be made and forwarded the Heavy Artillery regiment near the village Yarindam. This regiment would support with fire II Division, in its effort to break



Sketchmap 38. The Battle of Tamburoglu, 11–14 August 1921.

through the front in the area of Tamburoglu. As its reserve the army corps kept XII Division, which encamped at the village Kokar and was oriented to the front of II Division.

At 1230 of 11 August, the Field Army forwarded an intelligence report from the aerial reconnaissance of that day, according to which the Turks withdrew forces from the front Gok – Katranji and moved them towards the east. Simultaneously, it ordered Army Corps A to attack west of Tamburoglu with its left, to breach the enemy front there and advance to the line Evliyafaki – Kirazoglu. Army Corps C would attack the front in its zone, with its main effort on the right and would then head towards Eskichalish. Army Corps B

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would remain in its position and would be involved in its defensive organization.

The Field Army based its decisions only on the aerial reconnaissance information and did not take into account the information from the units' reconnaissance patrols and the front line observation posts, which reported the presence of strong enemy forces there. As a result, it made a false estimate of the enemy forces and their intentions, changed its initial plan and decided immediately to attack with Army Corps A and C, keeping the entire Army Corps B immobilized. The events that followed, proved the inaccuracy of the aerial information or at least of their most important part which concerned the evacuation of forces from the area north of Gok – Katranji. The Western Front Field Army moved forces towards the east in order to confront a possible Greek envelopment of its left, but allocated them from its reserves, without removing any troops from this defensive area. The troops, who were transported, consisted of I Group of Divisions and 3 Caucasus Division.

I Group of Divisions, with its 23 and 24 Divisions, moved from Yapan Hamam southwest of Kale Gozu and 3 Caucasus Division from Evliyafaki north of the village Katranji. The Greek aerial reconnaissance obviously considered that these forces, which were on the march in the morning of 11 August, came from the defensive area.

After these movements, II and III Group of Divisions remained facing Army Corps A. II Group with 5 and 9 Divisions occupied the line Kara Tepe (exclusive) – the torrent Katranji near the village Kanli Gol (exclusive). To II Group of Divisions was allocated 3 Caucasus Division, which comprised its reserve north of Katranji. III Group of Divisions had deployed between the torrents Katranji and Sapanja, with its three divisions in front line. On its left, 7 Division reinforced with two Infantry regiments and an assault battalion, occupied Turbe Tepe (Hill 1322). In the center, the 15 Division occupied Didymoi Lophoi (Hill 1105) and, on the right, the 8 Division occupied Hill 1015, which was included in Army Corps C's zone of action. 57 Division, which encamped in Sivri and belonged to the Western Front Field Army's reserve was also oriented to the sector of III Group. On the left of II Group on the heights Kara Tepe, 4 Division of I Group of Divisions had deployed.

198. **Capture of Turbe Tepe**. On the morning of 11 August, Army Corps A received the order to attack immediately. However the army corps was aware of the Turkish defensive organizations and the density of their deployment, through intelligence gathered by reconnaissance made by the front line units. The army corps had submitted this intelligence to the Field Army and requested persistently the postponement of the launching of the attack in order to prepare it better. The Field Army however did not approve the

request, insisting the attack should begin immediately. Then, the army corps despite its opinion to the contrary, ordered I Division to attack in the valley of Katranji Dere in order to capture Kanli Gol and II Division to attack towards the direction of Tamburoglu, with the ulterior objective for both divisions to capture the line Injirli – Evliyafaki. Reserve XII Division, which was at the heights east of Yarindam, would follow the two front echelon divisions.

When I Division, which occupied Mangal Dag, received the above mentioned order, it assigned 4 and 5 Infantry Regiments, which were in the first line to attack. 1/38 Evzone Regiment would comprise its reserve in Mangal Dag, the occupation of which it would simultaneously secure. The division's entire Artillery deployed in Mangal Dag would support the attack, except for 1a Pack Artillery Battalion, which was attached to 4 Infantry Regiment. However, before the regiments were able to take attack formations, night had fallen and the attack was postponed for next day.

II Division occupied the hilltops immediately south of Katranji Dere, in line with the village Haspiro up to the village Inler Katranji. As soon as it received the operation order, it hastened to deploy its units with the appropriate formation and at about the end of the day attacked with two regiments, each supported by a Pack Artillery battalion. On the right 34 Infantry Regiment attacked towards Turbe Tepe and on the left 7 Infantry Regiment towards Didymoi Lophoi and Evliyafaki. The division kept as reserve the 1 Infantry Regiment in the village Yarindam. The attack was supported, except for the two pack battalions, which were attached to the regiments, by II/A Field Artillery Battalion, a Skoda battery and the Heavy Artillery regiment as well.

The attacking forces, under the cover of darkness moved unobserved towards the Turkish positions. However, when they approached, the Turks noticed them and began firing with Artillery. The troops, taking advantage of the great darkness, continued their advance until they came up against continuous and dense barrage. Surprise had already been lost and every attempt to advance further during the night would end in failure and useless sacrifices. After this, it was decided to suspend the attack and continue the next morning. Nevertheless, the troops remained in their positions, at a distance of 300–600 meters from the ridgeline of Turbe Tepe and 800–1,000 meters from the Didymoi Lophoi, maintaining liaison to the west with the right of X Division, which conducted operations towards Hill 1015. Reserve XII Division, which moved from 1800 of the same day, passed through the torrent Katranji under the fire of the Turkish Artillery and encamped in the rear of II Division.

On the morning of 12 August, the attack was resumed, with the simultaneous jump–off of the regiments, but was repelled on its onset by the

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dense and accurate fire of the defense. 7 Infantry Regiment, after successfully repelling a series of local counterattacks of Turkish 15 Division, attempted a new jump–off, but was once again pinned down. 34 Infantry Regiment directed all its efforts towards Turbe Tepe. The tenacious Turkish resistance however demonstrated that the enemy was determined to hold his positions. Nevertheless, 34 Regiment did not abandon its objective. Despite its casualties, it strongly persisted in its effort, and in combination with simultaneous concentrated Artillery fire against Turbe Tepe succeeded in overrunning the Turkish 7 Division and occupying the cone–shaped peak. Immediately after the consolidation of 34 Regiment in Turbe Tepe, almost the entire Artillery of II Division concentrated its fire on the Didymoi Lophoi. Despite all this, 7 Regiment did not succeed in its effort because of strong and accurate fire of the enemy defense.

199. Turkish Counterattack against I Division. The Commander of I Division, who spent the night at his observation post in Mangal Dag, upon hearing at 2330 on 11 August the gunfire from the direction of Tamburoglu, understood that his neighboring II Division had been involved in a serious battle and hasten to help. In order to do so, he ordered the immediate jump–off of the regiments according to the orders he had already received fixing the directions of attack and the objectives. The regiments moved unhindered and under the cover of darkness came very near to the Turkish positions. With the first light the attack was launched under favorable conditions. Even though 5 Infantry Regiment to the right was under effective fire, it kept moving pushing back the Turkish troops facing it. 4 Infantry Regiment advanced courageously and captured the heights of Injirli.

The penetration of Greek I Division between the Turkish II and III Groups of Divisions threatened to separate them and then break their entire disposition. This caused great anxiety to the Turks. The Chief of the General Army Staff Fevzi Pasha, who closely watched the battle of these groups, was informed in the meantime of the loss of Turbe Tepe, and ordered II Group of Divisions to counterattack with all forces at its disposal, for the recapture of Turbe Tepe and the village Bahchelik, as well as the mop–up of the valley of Katranji Dere. II Group assigned for this purpose 3 Caucasus Division, deployed north of the village of Katranji, which it forwarded to the west. Simultaneously, it withdrew 5 Division from the battle line and assembled it in Katranji as a reserve. 3 Caucasus Division, upon crossing the torrent Katranji Dere, at 1100, launched a fierce attack against 4 Regiment, at the heights Injirli. The Greek regiment put up a sturdy resistance but was forced to withdraw since it was strongly pressed, had suffered heavy casualties and ran the risk of being cut off from its division. The regiment was pursued by enemy forces and, with some difficulty, finally was able to hold its ground

near the village Bahchelik and the heights north of Kanli Gol, with the help of an Evzone battalion and Ib Pack Artillery Battalion, which were assigned for its reinforcement.

4 Regiment succeeded in consolidating in its new positions and repelling the first attempt by the Turks to break its lines. However, the situation that developed caused anxiety because the regiment's combat effectiveness was reduced due to the casualties. After this, the division reinforced it with one more battalion of 5 Regiment, which was deployed to its right, where the strongest pressure was exerted. At about 1600, 14 Infantry Regiment of XII Division arrived in Bahchelik, and with its two battalions covered the gap between the left of I Division and the right of II Division. 14 Regiment's intervention in the battle helped to slow down the pace of attack of the Turkish 3 Caucasus Division which was definitely checked at the end of the day. At night II Heavy Artillery Battalion of 120mm arrived at the sector of I Division, and deployed in the northwest side of Mangal Dag.

200. Recapture of Turbe Tepe by the Turks. I Division, holding its positions steadily in the area of Bahchelik, kept the entire 3 Caucasus Division busy, and interdicted the extension of its attack towards Turbe Tepe. Because of this, the Turkish Western Front Field Army was forced to employ its reserve 57 Division to III Group of Divisions, with the order to recapture Turbe Tepe within the same day. 57 Division launched its attack at 1500 on 12 August, simultaneously with 7 Division, which operated further east.

When the enemy attack began, Greek II Division, with its reserve 1 Infantry Regiment (minus battalion), hastened to close the gap that had been created between 34 and 7 Regiments. An attack of great momentum, supported also by sufficient Artillery was directed against 34 Regiment and the right flank of 1 Regiment, which had just occupied positions north of Tamburoglu village. 57 Division's main effort was directed against Turbe Tepe, while its neighboring 7 Division attempted to envelop the right of 34 Regiment, which defended its positions with tenacity and unrivaled heroism.

57 Division, reinforcing the attack with new forces, repeatedly attempted to seize the cone–shaped peak of Turbe Tepe, but did not succeed in its attempts before the decisiveness of 34 Regiment to keep its positions. IIb Pack Artillery Battalion contributed very actively to the regiment's struggle inflicting serious casualties on the attackers. At about 1530, the battle was at its most heated phase. The cone–shaped peak where the Turkish Artillery had concentrated all its fire seemed to be ablaze due to the density of the explosions and its further maintenance was no longer possible. The troops withdrew further south and occupied relatively covered positions. At about 1800, 34 Infantry Regiment was reinforced with a battalion of XII Division

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and attempted a counterattack, which finally failed despite its initial progress. After this, the regiment resumed its initial positions, near the line of departure and remained there.

During the time the bloody battle was being fought at Turbe Tepe, all efforts of 7 Regiment on the left of II Division for the occupation of Didymoi Lophoi failed, because of the intensity of the defensive fire. Entire lines of skirmishers were literally reaped by the machine guns, without the regiment managing to move. However, a local counterattack too, which was launched by the Turks, did not prove more successful, since it was effectively repelled and inflicted serious casualties on them.

Relative calm prevailed after 1900 in the entire section of II Division. Outposts were deployed and liaison was restored with the neighboring divisions. 28 Infantry Regiment of X Division, in the rear end of Army Corps C, all day of 12 August remained pinned down, northwest of the village Inler Katranji.

201. Counterattack by the Turkish I Group of Divisions. I Division, in order to freely use 1/38 Evzone Regiment that was pinned down at the heights of Mangal Dag, asked its neighboring XII Division of Army Corps B to extend its disposition further north including those heights too. At the same time however, at about 1200 of 12 August, strong Turkish columns moved from the direction of Kara Tepe against Mangal Dag. These troops belonged to the Turkish I Group of Divisions, which conducted operations to recapture Mangal Dag and to separate Army Corps A and B. I Group with three Infantry divisions and two Cavalry divisions directed 4 Division, which was reinforced with an Infantry regiment and 23 Division towards Mangal Dag. Further south, 24 Division reinforced with 3 Cavalry Division, would conduct operations towards the direction of Kuchuk Yatsi, occupied by XIII Division, while 2 Cavalry Division would hold the forces of V Division.

1/38 Evzone Regiment (minus battalion) in Mangal Dag was shaken by the pressure of two Turkish divisions and started to bend after a brief resistance. The gravity of the situation, as well as the consequences from the loss of Mangal Dag, was noticed by the commander of XIII Division, who decided to intervene in the battle, though the position that was being threatened and the troops there that were holding their ground belonged to I Division. Thus, before any action was assumed against his division, he launched an attack against Mangal Dag with four battalions, which belonged two each to 3 Infantry Regiment and 5/42 Evzone Regiment. Firstly, the two battalions of 3 Regiment were engaged in the battle against which the Turks launched effective fire and fierce counterattack. The two Greek battalions faced critical situation, but the timely arrival of the two battalions of 5/42 Evzone Regiment

helped them to overcome it. The four battalions then courageously assaulted with bayonet and overran the Turks, who started withdrawing and then fled in disorder because of the Infantry's strong pressure and the accurate Artillery fire.

24 Infantry Division and 3 Cavalry Division, which conducted operations towards Kuchuk Yatsi, were late in attacking and were successfully confronted by the two battalions of these regiments, which had remained in the area. These two battalions, after having repelled the attackers, counterattacked and pursued them to a great depth. The Turkish divisions, which participated in the attack, continued their withdrawal until late evening.

202. Capture of the Tamburoglu Defensive Area. Throughout the night of 12 August the adversaries exchanged fire. During that night, the disposition of Army Corps A was as follows: I Division, plus 14 Infantry Regiment occupied the line from southeast of Kanli Gol and north of Bahchelik up to the southeast ridge of Turbe Tepe. II Division, plus two battalions of XII Division, occupied the south section of the cone–shaped peak of Turbe Tepe and the heights in the north of the village Tamburoglu, with its left immediately south of Didymoi Lophoi. XII Division, minus 14 Infantry Regiment and two other battalions, continued to remain as a reserve south of Tamburoglu.

Of the Heavy Artillery regiment, II Battalion of 120mm was assigned to I Division. III Battalion of 120mm, after having exhausted its ammunition retired from the battle and only the 6 inch Howitzer Battalion remained in the sector of II Division. Of the divisions on either side of Army Corps A, XIII Division occupied Mangal Dag, and X Division the heights northwest off the village Inler Katranji.

The Field Army of Asia Minor, having identified the strength of the above defensive area and been sure that there was not any threat against its right flank, decided to apply its initial intentions. After this it ordered on the night of 12 August that the attack should continue with the first light of the next day. Army Corps A would conduct operations within the zone, which had as eastern boundary (right) the line immediately east of Mangal Dag – Kizil Koyunlu, and as western boundary (left) the line Inler Katranji – Yapan Hamam. On the right of Army Corps A, Army Corps B would attack towards Kale Gozu, attempting to envelop left of the defensive area to the direction of Kizil Koyunlu. On the left of Army Corps A, Army Corps C would attack towards Eskichalish. VII Division would continue its attack towards Polatli (Sketchmap 36) and further east. With the above order the Field Army continued its basic maneuver plan from which it had diverted because of the inaccurate aerial information. In the meantime however, valuable time, two day s and nights, had been lost, during which Army Corps B remained inert.

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Army Corps A ordered the attack to be resumed with the first light of 13 August. However, both I Division as well as II Division did not move. I Division offered the excuse that it was being pressed, and if the occupation of Turbe Tepe did not precede, it could not advance. In its sector the Turks since morning had shown aggressive intentions and at about 1040 launched running Artillery fire against the division's left. The battalion there was surprised, abandoned its positions and fled in disorder towards Bahchelik, where it was regrouped. I Division succeeded in closing the gap that was created. At 1500, after the Field Army's new order to assume the offensive, it attacked with its right and seized the heights east of Katranji Dere.

With this action I Division improved its frontal line and supported the attack of its neighboring XIII Division towards Kara Tepe. The Turks attempted three counterattacks to recapture their lost positions, but all of them were successfully repelled. Towards night, throughout the entire front of I Division, the combat had slackened.

In the sector of II Division the situation until the afternoon remained stagnant. After communicating with X Division, it was agreed upon for both divisions to synchronize the attack. II Division would attack as soon as the 28 Infantry Regiment, occupying the right flank of XII Division would launch its own attack. The regiment however did not move, and so the division remained in its positions, too. When II Division was informed of the Field Army's new order for developing an aggressive stance, it ordered at 1730 its regiments that were deployed in line to attack. In the center and the left the attack developed slowly and after a while was interrupted. On the contrary, the situation on the right was totally different. 34 Infantry Regiment, which was also reinforced with a second battalion of XII Division, jumped off to recapture the cone–shaped peak of Turbe Tepe. The regiment's attack was supported by the division's entire Artillery and the three pack battalions of XII Division. After a fierce battle, the regiment succeeded in bending the Turks' tenacious resistance and recapturing the cone–shaped peak. The latter attempted with repeated attacks to recapture this foothold, which comprised the key to the position, but failed suffering heavy casualties (Sketchmap 38).

After the consolidation of 34 Infantry Regiment in Turbe Tepe, II Division turned its attention to the left, where the Turks steadily held Didymoi Lophoi and had foiled all efforts of 7 Infantry Regiment against them. This regiment regrouped in two battalions because of the heavy casualties it had suffered. The attack, after a suggestion proposal of the regiment's commander, would be launched at night and after a brief Artillery bombardment of the Turkish positions. III/C Field Artillery Battalion assumed a reinforcing mission for the support of the attack. The commander of 7 Regiment deliberately repeated the bombardment three times, with a two–hour lapse in between. The complete inaction of the Greek Infantry after the first two bombardments

misled the Turks, who considered it harassment fire and did not man their area after the third, but remained in their waiting positions. The two battalions of 7 Regiment then jumped off and under the cover of darkness approached the Turkish positions. At 0300 of 14 August, they occupied Didymoi Lophoi at a bound. The Greek casualties were only five men. The Turks were surprised and withdrew in disorder towards the north, leaving the commander of the Turkish 5 Infantry Regiment, seven more officers and fifty enlisted men, to be taken prisoner and abandoning the regiment's flag.

With the occupation of Didymoi Lophoi the battle of Tamburoglu ended. The victory of the Hellenic Army was total. The Turks withdrew undisturbed from the entire front of Army Corps A, without being pursued, because of the men's fatigue, the many casualties and the lack of reserve forces.

Army Corps A then advanced north, up to the line Katranji Dere – Eski Kishla – Injirli – Kirazoglu – the northern foot of Didymoi Lophoi. On its right, Army Corps B occupied Kale Gozu, its left located north of the village Katranji. On the left, Army Corps C occupied the line Hill 1015 – Kizil Tepe – south fringes of the plateau Tendemir – Yildiz Dag (Sketchmap 39).

The battle of Tamburoglu was one of the bloodiest of the Asia Minor Expedition. The Turks abandoned on the battle field many killed and prisoners. Army Corps A's casualties during the three–day battle totaled twenty–four officers and 415 enlisted men killed, 115 officers and 2,452 enlisted men wounded and 169 enlisted men missing.

The Raid against the Hellenic Field Army's Headquarters
Sketchmap 35

203. On the evening of 11 August 1921, when the battle of Tamburoglu started, the Cavalry of the Turkish V Group of Divisions was about thirty kilometers east of Ak lake (Sketchmap 35), with mission to harass the Hellenic Field Army's rear. The next day, 12 August, the group of divisions moved northward and successfully attacked a column of loaded vehicles and a camel convoy. Simultaneously it was informed of the existence of aviation formations and other significant establishments in Uzunbey, which it took for a large supply center. After this, the group of divisions decided to attack Uzunbey, with 14 Division and 4 Cavalry Brigade, on the morning of 14 August.

The Hellenic Field Army had at Uzunbey its Headquarters, the Aviation Corps Command, two surgical hospitals and various formations. On the morning of 14 August, and while its Headquarters was ready to move and deploy in Kort Tahazir, the Turkish attack was launched with the main effort towards the heights east of Uzunbey, which were occupied by a battalion of IX Division. 14 Division attacked the battalion's positions, with its three regiments deployed in line and fighting as Infantry, while 4 Brigade attacked against Uzunbey, where there were no combat troops. The officers were forced


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to assemble the armed men of the various formations and the lightly wounded from the surgical hospitals, with whom they succeeded in repelling the Turkish attack.

The Field Army's command was surprised and, unaware of the extension of the attack, ordered the aircraft to take off, the village to be evacuated, and all the equipment, which could not be transported, to be destroyed. Meanwhile, the attack started to slacken and in a while ended. The Turkish forces did not achieve the results they sought and withdrew to the south.

According to the Commander of V Group of Divisions, General Fahrettin Pasha, the interruption of the attack was due to an order by the Western Front Field Army to head to its left, in order to participate in the battle of Kale Gozu.

Sketchmap 39. The Battle of Sapanja, 11–16 August 1921.



The Battle of Sapanja

Sketchmaps 35, 38, 39

204. Army Corps C, with two divisions at its disposal, had occupied since the night of 10 August 1921 the ridgeline immediate south of the Gok river, from the east of the village Inler Katranji up to the Sangarius river (Sketchmap 39). The Turkish forces facing the army corps comprised three divisions and three battalions, plus six guns more than those provided by the table of equipment. Of these forces, 8 Division of III Group of Divisions occupied Hill 1015 and Kizil Tepe. Of the other two divisions, which belonged to IV Group of Divisions, 5 Caucasus Division (minus regiment) occupied the heights west of Sapanja Dere up to and including the eastern section of the plateau of Tendemir. 61 Division, reinforced with six battalions and six guns, occupied the western section of the plateau of Tendemir including the height Tarla Bashi. The Turks attached special significance to this position, where the west and south leg of their defensive area joined, and had strongly organized Tarla Bashi. That is why IV Group of Divisions too, assigned for its manning one regiment and six guns of the neighboring 11 Division, which belonged to XII Group of Divisions, one regiment of 5 Caucasus Division and one regiment of 61 Division. It assigned the Command of these forces to the commander of 61 Division, while it assigned the command of the same division's units in Tendemir to the Infantry commander.

At about 1300 of 11 August, Army Corps C received the Field Army's order, according to which, it should immediately attack the opposite enemy positions, with its main effort to the right. After the breach of the Turkish front, the entire army corps, covering itself from the north, would head towards Kizilkoy (Sketchmaps 38, 39), ten kilometers east of Eskichalish. On the right Army Corps A would attack, with its left flank west of Tamburoglu. The commander of Army Corps C, having confidence in the readiness of his divisions, ordered X Division to attack, in combination with Army Corps A's left, to occupy the salient Sapanja – Ilija – Inler Katranji, with the main effort on the right. III Division would attack in order to occupy Yildiz Dag, whose south ridges did not seem to be held strongly. Time of departure was set for 1400 of 11 August 1921.

The divisions jumped off at the appointed time. X Division on the right attacked with 28 Infantry Regiment towards the direction of Hill 1015, and with 27 Infantry Regiment against Kizil Tepe. 30 Infantry Regiment comprised the division's reserve southwest of the village Inler Katranji. III Division also attacked with two regiments. Of these 12 Infantry Regiment attacked the eastern peak of Yildiz Dag, and 2/39 Evzone Regiment towards the west. As its reserve the division had one battalion of 6 Infantry Regiment. This regiment encamped in the north ridges of Gok Bayir and remained at the

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disposal of Army Corps C. To each of the attacking regiments was assigned a Pack Artillery battalion.

The attack by both divisions developed in a slow pace and hesitation especially on the right, where the units of X Division were hit by effective Artillery fire and halted their advance in line with Inler Katranji, south of Ilija. On the left, 2/39 Evzone Regiment overran light screening elements and occupied the western peak of Yildiz Dag. The attack was repeated in the morning of the next day, 12 August, but once again continued at the same slow pace. The only exception was 27 Infantry Regiment, which scored a great success by the occupation of the south section of Kizil Tepe after a fierce battle. X Division was then ordered by the army corps to exploit 27 Regiment's success by forwarding Infantry and Artillery forces. However, the barrage of machine gun and Artillery fire paralyzed the division's efforts and forced it to remain pinned down the rest of that, and the next day. On the left, III Division, with 12 Regiment, easily captured the eastern peak of Yildiz Dag and continued towards Tarla Bashi, in front of which it was pinned down because of effective defensive fire.

205. Army Corps C, upon discovering the strong organization and occupation of the Turkish position and the difficulty of occupying Tarla Bashi by frontal attack, decided to direct its efforts from the east in the direction of Sapanja Dere (Sketchmap 39). It then ordered X Division to continue its attack on 13 August, using the reserve 30 Infantry Regiment as well, which it directed west of Katranji Dere, towards the eastern section of the plateau of Tendemir. III Division, holding with a detachment the Turkish forces at Tarla Bashi, would maneuver with its remaining forces from the south slopes of the plateau of Tendemir and would arrive east, as far as the village of the same name. From there it would turn to the north and would attack to seize the west section of the plateau, in combination with 30 Infantry Regiment, which would attack towards its eastern section.

On 13 August, X Division attacked only with 30 Infantry Regiment. The other two regiments remained in their positions throughout the day, pinning down the Turkish forces there. 30 Regiment passed through the torrent of Sapanja Dere and moved towards the eastern section of the Tendemir plateau. At about dusk, it seized advanced enemy positions near Alikoy. III Division left in the area of Tarla Bashi 2/39 Evzone Regiment (minus battalion) and a Pack Artillery battalion, with the order to pin down the Turkish forces there, without getting involved in a serious battle. With its remaining forces, comprising 12 Infantry Regiment, II/6 and II/39 battalions, VII Pack Artillery Battalion and III/C Field Artillery Battalion formed a column, which it directed towards the east from 0445 of 13 August. With the first light of the day the column was observed and the Turkish Artillery, which had marked

the entire area, launched against it accurate fire. The column continued its move, under the effective fire of the enemy Artillery until it arrived at the village Tendemir, where it took cover and joined 30 Regiment of X Division.

The Field Army seeing that the combat on its left lingered, at noon of 13 August ordered Army Corps C to accelerate the pace of the offensive and capture by evening the Turkish positions opposite to its front, stressing that they had not reserves available in that sector. Nevertheless, despite the army corps' insistent orders, the divisions could not move. The Turks in the meantime noticed the transportation of the mass of III Division towards east and reinforced the section between Sapanja Dere and Tendemir with four battalions from Tarla Bashi, reducing the forces there to five battalions.

According to the order, which the Field Army issued on the night of 13 August, Army Corps C would continue the attack with the first light of the following day, with general direction towards Eskichalish. After this, Army Corps C ordered its divisions to attack from 0530, and after seizing the organized enemy positions opposite them, to advance until the line Sapanja – Eskichalish. III Division was temporarily assigned 30 Infantry Regiment as well, which had operated west of Sapanja Dere. On the morning of 14 August, X Division captured the organized positions opposite it, namely Hill 1015 and the northern section of Kizil Tepe. The Turkish 8 Division abandoned these positions during the night following III Group of Divisions to which it belonged during its withdrawal from Tamburoglu.

On the contrary, III Division, despite the pressure Army Corps C exerted on it, did not succeed in moving. Thus, the situation in its sector remained stagnant until night. On the same day, 14 August, 6 Infantry Regiment of III Division was assigned to the Field Army. This regiment, with a field battery and divisional X Cavalry, was organized into a detachment and was assigned to secure the military formations and the supply line in the area of Uzunbey (Sketchmap 35).

The Field Army, wishing to clear the situation on its left as soon as possible, sent its Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel (Eng) Ptolemaios Sarregiannes there, so that together with Army Corps C's Commander could decide on the appropriate action. After reconnoitering the area and estimating the situation, it was decided that the entire X Division turn to the left and attack against the heights west of Sapanja Dere and the eastern section of the plateau of Tendemir (Sketchmap 39). Simultaneously, III Division would attack against the western section of the plateau. The operation would begin at 0500 of 15 August. However, this was not accomplished because of the delay by the units of X Division to assemble east of Sapanja Dere.

The army corps, anxious about the delay, demanded the prompt launching of the attack and the capture of the plateau of Tendemir, within the

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same day. X Division placed the attacking units under the unified command of the commander of the divisional Infantry, reinforced them with a battalion of the reserve 28 Regiment and ordered them to attack immediately. 27 and 30 Regiments jumped off simultaneously at about 1700 and attacked the Turkish positions. 27 Regiment passed through Sapanja Dere and headed towards the heights west of the village Sapanja, while 30 Regiment advanced from the positions of Alikoy, towards the eastern section of the plateau of Tendemir. Despite the Turks' tenacious resistance and the casualties they suffered, the attacking units, which were reinforced with a second battalion as well, seized after hand to hand fighting one trench after another. By night, the greatest part of the heights west of the village Sapanja and the avenue of access to Gymne Koryphe had been captured.

On the left III Division did not achieve satisfactory results during the day. Further west 2/39 Evzone Regiment, to which one of the two battalions of the Tarla Bashi Detachment returned, seized after an attack the first Turkish entrenchments. At night the Turks launched strong counterattacks against X Division and succeeded in recapturing the south section of Gymne Koryphe.

206. The Field Army of Asia Minor ordered the continuation of the attack from 0500 of 16 August, forbidding the execution of preparatory fire of the Artillery before the Infantry's jump–off. The prohibition was due to the lack of Artillery ammunition which was the result of the interruption of the only supply line, starting at the Supply Station at the bridge of Balikesir and necessarily passing through the Almyra Desert, which was controlled by the Turkish Cavalry.

With the first light of 16 August, X Division, having been ordered to continue the attack with general direction towards Karsakli, jumped off with the two regiments that had deployed in line formation since the previous day, keeping 28 Infantry Regiment as a reserve. The troops attacked with great momentum and at 0650, 30 Regiment succeeded in occupying Gymne Koryphe, while 27 Regiment on the right steadily continued its advance towards the northwest heights of Sapanja. X Division then advanced its reserve 28 Regiment on the right of 27 Regiment against the eastern (left) flank of the Turkish 5 Caucasus Division. This division, having failed to recapture Gymne Koryphe by counterattack, and being pressured in its front and flank, eventually bent. Thus, beginning at 0900, it started withdrawing northward. The Greek troops, continuing their advance, captured the ridge northwest of Sapanja and the eastern section of the Tendemir plateau.

At first light on 16 August, III Division also attacked. 12 Infantry Regiment, with the support of the Artillery, decisively moved towards the complex of fortified positions south of Tendemir village, having all three of its battal-

ions in first echelon. After a fierce and bloody fight, mainly with bayonets and hand grenades, the regiment seized the centers of resistance one after another. The Turks were pursued up to the heights north of Tendemir, which were captured. 2/39 Evzone Regiment, which operated on the left towards Hill 1073, could not launch its attack and remained pinned down, not having sufficient Artillery support.

As soon as the Field Army was informed of the withdrawal by the Turkish 5 Caucasus Division, it ordered Army Corps C to begin actively pursuing the withdrawing forces, and fixed the line Chal Dag – Kerim as the right boundary of its zone of action. The army corps however, did not exploit the success, on the pretext of lack of intact reserve forces. Thus, the Turkish IV Group of Divisions succeeded in holding its forces and organizing a new defensive line on the northern side of the plateau of Tendemir. In this line the positions that were kept in Hills 1073 and Tarla Bashi were also included. In this area IV Group of Divisions was reinforced with 1 Cavalry Division and four Infantry battalions, but after the withdrawal of its neighboring III Group of Divisions, whose right was north of the village Sagunjali, was forced to retire further north. From 0500 of 17 August, it deployed in a new line, which included the villages Sari Halil and Karakuyu.

After the Turks' retirement from the plateau of Tendemir and Yildiz Dag, the Hellenic Field Army had two significant advantages (Sketchmap 35):

Firstly, the establishment of liaison between Army Corps C and VII Division, which conducted operations towards Polatli.

Secondly, the restoration of the three army corps new supply line, through the Kavuju Kopru bridge over the Sangarius. The new line was shorter than the one that was necessarily used until then, and provided full security to the supply column in comparison to the old one, which passed through the Almyra Desert, which was under the control of the Turkish Cavalry.

The casualties of both sides in the battle of Sapanja were heavy. Army Corps C from 11 August until the night of 16 August, when the battle ended, had thirty officers and 416 enlisted men killed, eighty–three officers and 2,151 enlisted men wounded and fifty–three missing.

207. On the night of 16 August, the commander of the Field Army, after the appeal of Army Corps A's commander for the immediate necessity to supply the units with ammunition, ordered Chief of the IV Army Staff Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Georgios Spyridon to secure the transportation of ammunition by all means. The latter went over himself with three armed cars to the Supply Station at bridge Balikesir and took 120 trucks with ammunition. On the morning of 17 August, he moved to return to Inler Katranji. During its course however, the column was attacked by the Turkish Muretep Division, and split.

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The first ninety trucks managed to escape towards east, the twenty last ones returned to Balikesir and ten remained in the hands of the Turks. The units were partly replenished with the cargo of the ninety trucks, which arrived on the afternoon of 17 August in Inler Katranji. On the next day, 18 August, the Supply Station of Balikesir was dissolved and the replenishment continued from the new line through the bridge Kavuju Kopru.

The Turkish Muretep Division, after the above action, assembled in Yusukbashi. There it was successfully attacked by the Greek detachment, which encamped in the area of Uzunbey and had the mission to secure the Field Army's communications.


This detachment, comprising 6 Infantry Regiment (minus battalion), divisional X Cavalry and an Artillery platoon, arrived the first hours of 18 August north of Yusukbashi and attacked the Turkish Muretep Division. The latter was surprised and withdrew in disorder towards north, abandoning in the Greeks' hands two pack guns, weapons and various equipment.

The Battle of Kale Gozu
Sketchmap 40

208. While Army Corps A and C were involved in the battles of Tamburoglu and Sapanja, Army Corps B was busy, according to its orders, with the organization of its section. After the successful intervention of XIII Division, for repelling the attack of Turkish I Group of Divisions against Army Corps A's right on 12 August, Army Corps B had the following deployment (Sketchmap 40):

On the left, XIII Division occupied Mangal Dag, reaching towards south until Kuchuk Yatsi. On the right, V Division occupied the line formed by Kuchuk Yatsi – Saatli. IX Division, which comprised one regiment and two Infantry battalions and a Pack Artillery battalion, encamped further west in the village Ala Haji. The mixed detachment of IX Division, which included its remaining forces, was moving to meet its division. The Cavalry Brigade was in the area Haji Musaoglu and observed the movements of Turkish V Group of Divisions (Cavalry).

Against Army Corps B the Turks had positioned I Group of Divisions, which comprised four Infantry divisions, two Cavalry divisions and the National Assembly Guard Battalion. Of the Infantry divisions, 24 Division occupied the line formed by Kutluhan Camii – Mudanya – Cheltik and 23 Division the heights Kara Tepe (plateau Kaltakli). The other two Infantry divisions comprised the reserve of I Group. 4 Division was north of Kara Tepe and 5 Division in Kaltakli. This division had been detached from II Group of Divisions and would move on the morning of 13 August towards the left of the deployment of I Group. 2 and 3 Cavalry Divisions covered the left of I Group, whose right was connected to 9 Division of II Group, facing Army Corps A.



Sketchmap 40. The Battle of Kale Gozu, 13–18 August 1921.

The Field Army of Asia Minor, after returning as mentioned before to its initial intentions, ordered the frontal attack against Army Corps A and C to be continued on 13 August. Army Corps B would attack towards Kale Gozu and would outflank the Turkish position east of Kaltakli, heading towards Kizil Koyunlu.

After this, Army Corps B reinforced its V and XIII Divisions with a Field Artillery battalion and a Skoda battery and ordered them simultaneously to attack at 0600 on 13 August. V Division would attack towards Kutluhan Camii – Guzelje – Kalkoy and XIII Division towards the left and parallel to V Division. IX Division would follow V Division, whose right would cover a detachment of one battalion plus a battery of IX Division, and it would also follow the divisional Cavalries of the three divisions. The Cavalry Brigade would secure the army corps' rear.

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V Division departed at the fixed hour with two regiments deployed in common front and the third following behind the right regiment. At about 1300 it gained contact with the Turkish 24 Division and decisively attacked. The impetus of the Greek Infantry and the accurate fire of the Artillery forced the Turkish division to withdraw, abandoning to V Division the entire range of heights in the line formed by Kutluhan Camii – Mudanya Cheltik and further north. XIII Division, which was closer to the Turkish positions, departed later (at about 0800), with two of its regiments deployed in common front. 3 Infantry Regiment advanced without obstacles until the village Kose Abdullah, but the left 5/42 Evzone Regiment got involved in a hard and dubious battle in Kara Tepe, whose smooth and uncovered slopes were being reaped by the Turkish machine guns.

Intervening towards noon, XIII Division improved the Artillery's positions and coordinated the activities of its regiments, by pushing them towards a new attack, which developed with climaxing intensity. The Turks in order to check the advance of 3 Infantry Regiment that moved more easily assigned an Infantry regiment with a battery from 23 Division's left. 3 regiment then came into a very difficult situation, due to the threat of its right. However, the timely and on its own initiative intervention in the battle of 2 Infantry Regiment, which was assigned to Army Corps B and followed by 3 Regiment, changed the situation and forced the Turks to withdraw, while in Kara Tepe the battle continued to be tenacious. But the Turkish 23 Regiment that was defending itself there, even though it was reinforced with forces of 4 Division, had exhausted every remaining power. Simultaneously it was in danger of being disengaged because of revealing its flanks, and was strongly pressed by 5/42 Evzone Regiment, which resulted in its disorderly withdrawal towards north. 4 Division, which was further north, after covering the withdrawal of 23 Regiment, withdrew to the north, too. XIII Division advanced and completed the occupation of Kara Tepe. IX Division, after a new order, remained with the Cavalry Brigade near the village Kerpich, to cover the rear of Army Corps B,whose Headquarters established itself in the village Kuchuk Sinanli.

Turkish I Group of Divisions decided to defend the following day on the line formed by Kale Gozu – Sherefli, having 24 Division in Kale Gozu and 5 and 4 Divisions on either side of it. 23 Division reconstructed and established itself south of Sherefli, where it joined towards the west 9 Division of III Group of Divisions.

209. The next day, 14 August, Army Corps B repeated the attack towards the same directions. V Division, after occupying during the morning hours the hilltops north of Kutluhan Camii, advanced 43 Infantry Regiment towards the main heights of Kale Gozu.

43 Regiment attacked towards noon with the support of 44 Infantry Regiment and all the division's Artillery, succeeding in seizing one after the other the ridges of the rocky complex. The Turks put up a sturdy resistance, claiming the territory step by step, but were finally bent before the impetus of 43 Regiment. The Greek troops continued the attack and at about 2100 seized the highest peak of Kale Gozu. The Turkish troops of 24 Regiment, who defended themselves there, were overrun and withdrew towards north in disintegration. After the regiment consolidated in the positions it seized, the remaining forces of V Division assembled in the area of the village Buyuk Gok Goz.

XIII Division, to which 2 Infantry Regiment returned as well, started to move aggressively at just 1300, with two regiments in first echelon. At about 1600 its first forces received drastic Infantry and Artillery fire and the movement continued at a slow pace until 1700, at which point it was checked because of the intense defense fire and the heavy casualties. The division advanced its Artillery and repeated the attack with greater impetus. The attacking forces, taking advantage of the Artillery's sustained fire from the new positions, seized by storm the first entrenchments. The division, after successfully repelling repeated Turkish counterattacks, managed by 2200, when the battle was stopped, to seize the northwest heights of Sherefli.

On the left of Army Corps B, I Division advanced, after the Turks' withdrawal, before the front of Army Corps A and occupied the line formed by Eski Kishla – Alajik.

IX Division moved from Kerpich to Kutluhan Camii, where the mixed detachment from Afyon Karahisar also came. The Cavalry Brigade, after watching all day Turkish V Group of Divisions (Cavalry), which moved on the left of the Turkish deployment, encamped at night in the area of the village Sinanli.

The progress of the Greek attack alarmed the Turkish Command. With the objective to reinforce the fighters, Commander in Chief Mustafa Kemal, who demanded the maintenance of the occupied positions until even the last man was sacrificed, went over to the section that was under threat, stressing that soon the enemy would be annihilated. Simultaneously, Chief of the Army Staff Fevzi Pasha took over the direction of the battle, and the section was reinforced with 7 Regiment from the area of Evliyafaki. Also from the front of Greek VII Division was detached XII Group of Divisions (11 and 41 Divisions), which assembled in Yapan Hamam and was oriented towards the section of I Group of Divisions.

After the loss of Kale Gozu and the positions south of Sherefli, I Group of Divisions occupied the line formed by Guzelje – Kalkoy – Uludag – heights north of Sherefli, having 5 Division in the area of Guzelje – Kalkoy, 7 Division

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in Uludag, 4 Division in the southwest declines of Uludag and 23 Division north of Sherefli. 24 Division, which disintegrated during the battle of Kale Gozu, withdrew from the battlefield. 2 and 3 Cavalry Divisions withdrew towards Gurbek and widely covered the left of the deployment.

According to the order, which the Hellenic Field Army issued on the night of 14 August, Army Corps B would continue its enveloping movement towards the direction of Kara Hoja the next day. On its left, Army Corps A would conduct operations towards north, with the line formed by Eski Kishla – Kizil Koyunlu as its right border. With the same order the army corps were notified that on 15 and 16 August they would not be supplied with ammunition.

Army Corps B, in order to continue its enveloping movement, ordered V Division to secure its right by occupying Kale Gozu and to attack to occupy the saddle three and a half kilometers southeast of the village Kizil Koyunlu. XIII Division would advance on the left of V Division, with general direction towards Kara Hoja. IX Division, having reinforced these divisions with three battalions, would move with the remaining forces between and behind these divisions.

V Division, after securing the occupation of Kale Gozu with 43 Infantry Regiment, attacked with 44 Regiment to occupy Uludag, which dominates north of Kale Gozu. Five batteries supported the regiment's attack. Nevertheless the matching of the forces was uneven, which resulted in the lack of progress and the obligation of the attacked troops to withdraw with many casualties indeed.

Only towards night, after the intervention of the right of XIII Division and after a fierce battle, was the occupation of the lowest peak of the rocky mountain range of Uludag achieved. In the section of XIII Division the battle continued all day, with the succession of attacks and counterattacks from both sides. Towards night, the Turks after strong pressure they received were forced to withdraw to new positions, north and northeast of Sherefli. XIII Division advanced and occupied the southeast ridges of Uludag and the village Sherefli.

210. The night of 15/16 August went by with the exchange of sparse Infantry and Artillery fire from both sides. On the same night, the Turkish Western Front Field Army distributed the section of I Group of Divisions between this group and XII Group of Divisions, which arrived there from the area of Yapan Hamam. To XII Group was assigned the eastern part of the section, which had 5 Division in the area of Guzelje – Kalkoy and 7 and 41 Divisions in Uludag. I Group of Divisions kept its western section, having in common with the 4 and 23 Divisions the line formed by Uludag (exclusive) until north of Sherefli, and 11 Division as a reserve, behind the center of its deployment. 2 and 3 Cavalry Divisions, which covered the left, came under the command of XII Group of Divisions.

Army Corps B, having decided to occupy Uludag to open up the direction towards Kizil Koyunlu, assigned this operation to V Division, while XIII Division would continue its frontal attack towards the general direction of Kara Hoja. IX Division, to which the Cavalry Brigade was also assigned, would secure the army corps' right and rear.

V Division organized the attack with forces from two battalions of 3/40 Evzone Regiment, which were assigned for this purpose by IX Division, and the two battalions of 33 Infantry Regiment, under the command of the Infantry divisional commander. 44 Infantry Regiment would assemble at the south slopes of Uludag, ready to intervene in the battle. 43 Infantry Regiment would steadily keep its positions in Kale Gozu.

The attack started at about 1500 of 16 August, with the support of the entire Artillery of V Division, which was reinforced with fire from the Artillery of XIII Division. The latter, simultaneously moved one battalion from the west towards Uludag. The attacking Greek troops moved from southwest, where there was suitable ground, and moved steadily, with the accurate support of the Artillery that was literally hammering the enemy positions. The Evzones climbed the inaccessible rocky bulges and with bayonets succeeded in driving the Turks out of their fortified positions. There followed a succession of attacks and counterattacks, during which the same position repeatedly changed owners, but finally the Evzone battalions overran the Turkish 41 Division and, in the early afternoon hours, seized three enemy strongholds.

The Evzone battalions, continuing their dashing attack, occupied by 2000 the entire rocky complex Uludag, forcing the Turkish 7 Regiment to withdraw to Trapezoeides. 33 Infantry Regiment deployed in Uludag, while the two battalions of 3/40 Evzone Regiment, which were the main factors of the victory, withdrew to reconstitute because of their heavy casualties, which amounted to half of their officers and 350 enlisted men out of action. XIII Division continued the frontal attack and reached as far as Uludag. IX Division with the Cavalry Brigade deployed since the morning in suitable positions in the area of Mudanya Cheltik and secured Army Corps B's right and rear. On the left, Army Corps A broke the Turks' in between defensive position, towards the direction of Yapan Hamam, and by the night of 16 August, advanced with its right to the heights north and northwest of Yamak. Between the two corps a gap was formed, which was surveyed by a company of the Cavalry Brigade.

On the morning of 17 August after the loss of Uludag and the withdrawal that followed, the Turkish deployment was as follows: XII Group of Divisions occupied with the 5 Division Guzelje – Kalkoy, with 7 Regiment Trapezoeides and with 41 Division the heights south of the village Buyuk Cha-

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lishlar. I Group of Divisions occupied with 23 and 4 Divisions the heights south and southeast of Kara Suleyman and had 11 Division as a reserve behind the center of its deployment. In the west 9 Division of II Group of Divisions occupied positions south of Kizil Koyunlu, with its left in Katranji Dere. On the same morning, V Group of Divisions (Cavalry), which took under its command 2 and 3 Cavalry Divisions that were there, arrived at the left of the Turkish deployment

211. On 17 August, the Hellenic Field Army was for a second time misled by the information of the aerial reconnaissance, according to which the Turks withdrew along the entire front. Judging by the developments of the operations this information proved once more to be inaccurate because the Turks did not complete a general withdrawal, but withdrew towards the second defensive position, which started at Buyuk Chalishlar and included Ardiz Dag and Chal Dag.

As a result, the Field Army changed its decision and at 1000 of 17 August ordered Army Corps B's direct general attack towards Chulluk and Army Corps A towards Yapan Hamam. On the contrary the previous night it had ordered Army Corps A to continue the attack on the day after the next (18 August) and Army Corps B, after three different and controversial orders, to leave one division in the area of Kale Gozu and move on the night of 17 August towards the left of the deployment.

Army Corps B, after this last order of the Field Army, suspended the preparation for the move and started organizing the attack. Simultaneously it reported that because of its untimely supplies in ammunition and the big number of the wounded, who were to be transported, it was unable to attack within 17 August, but the next day. Furthermore it provided the piece of information that within a distance of eight kilometers before the front, the Turks organized themselves defensively. For the attack the army corps designated V Division to advance towards Chulluk. IX Division would move left and in parallel to V Division. XIII Division would follow in second echelon and the Cavalry Brigade would continue to cover the army corps' right and rear.

The time during which Army Corps B was busy with the preparation of its move, according to the Field Army's prior order, V Division occupied Trapezoeides. This last stronghold of the Turks in the area of Kale Gozu was occupied by the Turkish 7 Division, which was surrounded on either side by 5 and 41 Divisions. V Division attacked with 43 Infantry Regiment, with the support of its entire Artillery, while the mixed detachment of Army Corps B (Infantry battalion plus battery of IX Division and the divisional Cavalries of the three divisions) covered from the east the regiment's attack. 43 Infantry Regiment departed at noon and by 1600 occupied its objective, forcing the Turks to withdraw towards Buyuk Chalishlar. After occupying Trapezoeides,

the Mixed Detachment dispersed and its troops returned to their divisions. On the night of 17 August, V Division occupied with 43 Regiment Trapezoeides, with 33 Regiment Uludag and with 44 Regiment Kale Gozu.

212. The night of 17/18 August passed in absolute calm. The Turks kept withdrawing and organizing in the second defensive position north of the villages Buyuk Chalishlar and Kara Suleyman.

On the same night, the Field Army informed the three army corps that the Turks were in a state of general withdrawal, under the cover of strong rearguards in the line formed by Chulluk –Ardiz Dag – Chal Dag and further west. Simultaneously, it ordered them to attack from 0500 of the next day 18 August and reach as far as the line that passes through the heights northeast of Kizil Koyunlu and north of Chal Dag, having strongly secured the occupation of Guzelje – Kalkoy. In this line the army corps would defensively deploy for reconstitution and replenishment.

In order to execute this, Army Corps B ordered IX Division to attack on the morning of 18 August to occupy the heights in the area of Kizil Koyunlu and then to advance as far as the heights at about eight kilometers northeast of Yapan Hamam. IX Division, after arriving at the predetermined time behind XIII Division, attacked at 1000 with 25 Infantry Regiment towards the direction of Kizil Koyunlu. The attack was supported as well by the Artillery of V and XIII Divisions and scored a success. Despite the sturdy Turkish resistance, 25 Infantry Regiment advanced steadily and occupied by noon the Turkish positions south of Kara Suleyman.

After the occupation of these positions the attack was discontinued. On the night of 19 August, IX Division withdrew from the battlefield and headed towards the left of the Field Army's deployment to reinforce Army Corps C.

The attack towards Kizil Koyunlu was the last offensive of Army Corps B east of the Sangarius. On 21 August, the army corps withdrew V Division from the frontline, minus 33 Infantry Regiment and the Pack Artillery battalion in Uludag, which it established as a reserve in the Headquarter area in Sherefli. It ordered the frontal defense of the entire section to XIII Division, reinforced with these units. The Cavalry Brigade continued to cover the army corps' rear.

The Turkish Field Army took advantage of Army Corps B's defensive stance and consecutively reduced the forces facing it, which it finally limited to 4, 5 and 7 Divisions. These divisions came under the command of I Group of Divisions and occupied the line, which passes immediately through the north of the villages Buyuk Chalishlar and Kara Suleyman until Katranji Dere. The left of the Turkish deployment continued to be covered by V Group of Divisions (Cavalry), which encamped in the area of Gurbek.

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The casualties of both opponents, during the six–day battle of Kale Gozu were very heavy. Army Corps B had 142 officers and 3,266 enlisted men out of action, from which thirty–five officers and 529 enlisted men were killed and 107 officers and 2,737 enlisted men wounded. The Turks' casualties, according to their own official sources, were heavier and exceeded 176 officers and 3,640 enlisted men killed, wounded and missing in action.


Offensive towards Polatli
Sketchmap 41

213. VII Division, reinforced with 16 Infantry Regiment, a Field Artillery battalion and a Heavy Artillery battalion, arrived west of the Sangarius. Its mission initially was to cover the flanking movement and the transfer of Army Corps A and C south of the river and then to launch a frontal attack towards Polatli, in combination with the main offensive effort against the area north of the Gok River.

On 9 August 1921, VII Division, having accomplished the first part of its mission, was deployed in a broad front, of about fifty kilometers long, in the ridgelines immediately west of Sangarius. On the left, in the area of Mihalichchik, directly under its command was the so–called Mihalichchik Joint Detachment (comprising 16 Infantry Regiment and 2 Pack Artillery Battalion), surveying the crossings of the Sangarius with fixed and mobile sections. The second part of the mission of VII Division, the frontal attack against Polatli (Sketchmap 41), would be executed in two phases. The first phase included the bridging of the Sangarius, and the establishment of a strong bridgehead. In the second phase, the entire division would cross east of the river and attack towards Polatli. According to the Field Army's orders, instead of the night of 9 August, the bridging and crossing of the Sangarius by VII Division would be conducted on 11 August, the day on which the main attack would begin. The point of the bridging and the way the operation would be conducted would be fixed by the division.

After the tactical and technical reconnaissance, had been made, the point of bridging was fixed 1,500 meters south of the destroyed railroad line, Beylik Kopru. The crossing was decided to take place at night with the construction of a floating boat bridge within a short time, with the objective to reduce as far as possible the tactical and technical difficulties that would arise. For this purpose the division assembled its units at dusk, except for the Mihalichchik Joint Detachment between Beylik Kopru and Boyalik, assigning 37 Infantry Regiment to cross the Sangarius first and establish a bridgehead east of the river. Besides, in order to deceive the enemy, it ordered the simultaneous execution of demonstration, with Artillery support, immediately south of the junction of the Porsuk and against the bridge Kavuju Kopru.

At about midnight on 10/11 August, the bridging equipment arrived



Sketchmap 41. The Offensive Towards Polatli, 10–18 August 1921.

at the valley of the Sangarius and was forwarded towards the bridging point. Despite the measures that were taken, the movement of the bridging equipment was noticed by the Turks, who started firing from the opposite bank against the probable bridging post, but with no result. At about 0400, a ferry was established between the two banks and at the same time the construction of the pontoon bridge began, and finished within twenty–three minutes. The construction of a second bridge followed, about 1,000 meters further south, which was completed around 0700.

As soon as the ferry was established, the crossing of the troops of the 37 Regiment began. I/37 and III/37 Battalions preceded and the remaining force of the regiment followed by 0500. At 0600, the regiment had completed its assembly east of the river and immediately attacked against two Turkish battalions, that were deployed on either side of the railroad line towards

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Ankara. The Turks, under the strong Infantry pressure and the effective Artillery fire, abandoned their positions and withdrew, pursued by the Greek troops. At about 0700, the strongly fortified hill, south of the railroad line was captured, which, because of its shape, was called the cone–shaped peak (Turbe Tepe).

In the meantime, communication with the Field Army was interrupted and just at 0600, when the crossing of the Sangarius had successfully been accomplished, the wireless of VII Division received quite by accident the Field Army's order to postpone the main attack for 24 hours. After this the division suspended the attack until the next day and ordered 37 Infantry Regiment to stop in place and proceed with the defensive organization of the bridgehead. The latter had already deployed to a four–kilometer depth and with its north flank on the Sangarius and its south on the cone–shaped peak. VII Division surveyed supervised the area between this hill and the river. On the same day the bridgehead was reinforced with two battalions of 22 Infantry Regiment and was divided in two sub–sectors, with the railroad line as boundary between them. The command of the bridgehead was assigned to the Commander of divisional Infantry Colonel (Inf) Ioannes Striphtos.

214. In the section of the front that ran parallel to the Sangarius the Turks had the Newly–Formed Army Corps army corps north of the railroad line, comprising three Infantry and one Cavalry divisions, and to the south of the railroad line XII Group of Divisions, comprising one division and two battalions of the 23 Division which had moved since 7 August eastwards. Of the army corps' units, 17 and 41 Divisions were deployed parallel to the Sangarius, the 1 Division was kept as reserve in Choban Ozu, where the army corps' Headquarters was, and 1 Cavalry Division surveyed the crossings of the Sangarius. XII Group of Divisions had two battalions of 23 Division south of the railroad line and 11 Division in Tarla Bashi, with its 48 Regiment kept as reserve in the village Karahamzali, where the groups' Headquarters was. The group of divisions was timely informed of the crossing of the Sangarius by the Greek forces and immediately moved the reserve regiment towards Beylik Kopru. The Newly–Formed Army Corps was informed of the event at about 0800. Both formations were ordered by the Turkish Field Army to counterattack with all their forces. After this the army corps moved the 1 Division towards Beylik Kopru, while XII Group of Divisions moved 11 Division towards the same direction minus two battalions, which remained in Tarla Bashi.

The two Turkish divisions, upon arriving in the area of the bridgehead, attacked from 0830, but were checked in front of it. At about 2030, strong forces of 11 Division launched a surprise attack against the right of the bridgehead, overran the Greek section on cone–shaped peak and penetrated

the interior of the bridgehead, creating a critical situation. The timely intervention of a battalion of 37 Regiment averted the danger, however, and pushed back the Turkish forces. In order to recapture the cone–shaped peak a battalion of 22 Regiment attacked, but its repeated efforts produced no results.

VII Division, in order to prevent a new Turkish counterattack, decided to attack first. After reinforcing the south sub–sector, on the morning of 12 August, it attacked south of the railroad line with three battalions, while actively defending north of it. The division assigned as reserve 23 Infantry Regiment (minus battalion) and one battalion of 16 Regiment, which encamped on the west bank of the Sangarius. After the Artillery's accurate fire and the Infantry's successful attack, Turbe Tepe was recaptured. The section of 48 Regiment that was there fled in disorder, dragging along with it the remaining forces of the regiment as well. The disorderly retreat of 48 Regiment had an unfavorable effect on the morale of 11 Division's units, which occupied the heights Kara Elias Tepe, and then the division was forced to withdraw its units to the heights of Besh Tepeler. The Greek troops advanced and occupied the heights Kara Elias Tepe, and spent the night there. In the north sub–sector of VII Division the Turks attacked only with 1 Division, but the attackers were disorganized by the effective Artillery fire, and from 0900 the attack was halted.

On the night of 12 August, the Turkish Field Army ordered that the line Dua Tepe – Kartal Tepe – Besh Tepeler – Belidede Tepe should be held at all costs. Simultaneously it assigned the 17 Division to XII Group of Divisions and ordered the 41 Division to assemble in the area of Ezineli.

On the night of the same day, VII Division had available east of the Sangarius seven battalions and its Artillery. The Heavy Artillery battalion supported the battle from positions west of the river. As a reserve it had three battalions on the left bank. On the morning of 13 August, it repeated its attack along the entire front with its main effort on the right, trying to envelop the Turkish position from the south. North of the railroad line, 37 Infantry Regiment, reinforced with a battalion, succeeded in overrunning the Turkish 1 Division, which withdrew to the line Chekirdek – Ezineli, that covered Dua Tepe. South of the railroad line the attack was not successful because of the effective enemy fire.

215. The day of 14 August was given to the regrouping and rest of the units of VII Division, and to the preparation for the next day's attack. During that day the Turkish Artillery was especially active, its objective being to disorganize a possible attack and to cover the movements that the Western Front Field Army had ordered. The Turkish Field Army withdrew XII Group of Divisions, which it directed with 11 and 41 Divisions to its left, to check the

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advance of Army Corps B. It also withdrew the 1 Cavalry Division (minus regiment), which it assembled in the area of Polatli. The Turkish Field Army assigned the responsibility of the entire western section of its front to the Newly–Formed Army Corps, comprising two Infantry divisions, one independent Infantry regiment and one Cavalry regiment. Of these units 1 Division remained in the sector of Dua Tepe, north of the railroad line, 17 Division occupied the section Besh Tepeler – Belidede Tepe, south of the railroad line, 49 Independent Infantry Regiment, which had just arrived from Ankara, encamped as a reserve in Uchpinar and the Cavalry regiment covered the right of the disposition.

On 15 August, VII Division attempted to open the defile west of Polatli, with the capture of the south side. The attack was launched from the south with four battalions, supported by one heavy and three field batteries. After a fierce battle, during which two battalion commanders and many other officers and enlisted men heroically fell in action, the heights of Besh Tepeler were captured.

On the next day, 16 August, VII Division remained in the occupied positions, with five battalions on each of the north and south side of the railroad line. The division had the support of its own Artillery, except for two batteries of 1 Heavy Artillery Battalion, which exhausted their ammunition and remained inactive west of the Sangarius. As a reserve the division had the Mihalichchik Joint Detachment, comprising the Command and only one battalion of 16 Infantry Regiment.

VII Division, having received the order from the Field Army to continue the pressure against the Turkish forces facing it, attacked from 0500 on 17 August south of the railroad line, with two columns, which were connected with a battalion. The right column (22 Infantry Regiment minus battalion, plus battery) jumped off from the far right, moved towards northeast and captured without any serious resistance the heights Belidede Tepe and the village Tirnakchi. Simultaneously it succeeded in establishing liaison with the left of Army Corps C, which advanced towards Korsakli. The left column (23 Infantry Regiment plus battery) attacked against the village Injiler. However, it met a dense barrage of Infantry and Artillery fire and was pinned down before the village. It was not able to move until dusk despite the support of two more field batteries and a Heavy Artillery platoon.

The attempt to open the pass continued the next day, 18 August, once more south of the railroad line by the same columns, which confronted the Turkish 17 Division deployed on the heights of Kartal Tepe and Kara Dag (Hill 972), with its left in Ada Tepe. The right column jumped off at 0500, and after capturing Kara Tepe and leaving a battalion there to hold the Turkish forces in Kara Dag, turned northwards to assist 23 Infantry Regiment's battle in Kartal Tepe. This regiment jumped off at about 0615 from the positions

immediately west of Injiler, captured after a hard battle the heights of Kartal Tepe and arrived pursuing the Turks at a four–kilometer distance from the railway station of Polatli. The remaining forces of the division, retired to the heights west of Polatli and Eskishehir, and followed the withdrawal of its right. After the withdrawal of 17 Division and the daring penetration of 23 Regiment towards the direction of Polatli, the Turkish 1 Division, north of the railroad line, in fear of being encircled and cut off from the south, evacuated the fortified position in Dua Tepe and withdrew to the heights Basri Kale Tepe.

37 Infantry Regiment deployed opposite, noticed the withdrawal moved immediately, overran the Turkish rearguards and at about 1900, occupied Dere Tepe and the surrounding heights of the defile meeting almost no resistance. With the occupation of the line Dua Tepe – Kartal Tepe – Kara Dag, VII Division secured a strong base for the future offensive operations, cover of its movements west of the ridge and observation of the interior of the Turkish position. Simultaneously, the capture of Polatli, which was a terminal railroad station, was achieved and the enemy was deprived of a valuable supply center.

After liaison with Army Corps C was restored, VII Division stopped conducting operations as an independent large unit and from 18 August, returned to the command of the army corps. The division's casualties, from the moment it crossed the Sangarius until 18 August, amounted to seventeen officers and 260 enlisted men killed and sixty–five officers and 1,631 enlisted men wounded.

Attack towards Ardiz Dag and Chal Dag
Sketchmaps 40,42

216. After Army Corps A's heroic victory in Tamburoglu, the facing Turkish II and III Group of Divisions withdrew during the night of 13/14 August to the section of the intermediate defensive line between the torrents Katranji and Sapanja, which passes through the village Yamak, Dikilitash (Hill 1253) and the village Ordek Golu (Sketchmap 42). The withdrawal and the deployment in the new line was conducted unhindered, since Army Corps A did not assume their pursuit because of the men's extreme fatigue, the many casualties and the lack of reserve forces. I and II Divisions, which moved from the early afternoon hours of 14 August, arrived without encountering the enemy in the line Eski Kishla – Alajik, and deployed there, with the left of II Division in Didymoi Lophoi (Hill 1100). XII Division, the largest part of which had been attacked during the battle to I and II Divisions, encamped with 46 Infantry Regiment and II/41 battalion south of Tamburoglu.


Of the other two army corps, Army Corps B, after the seizure of the highest peaks of Kale Gozu on 14 August, occupied with XIII Division the line

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of Sherefli until Katranji Dere. Army Corps C, continuing the attack towards Tendemir, occupied with the right of X Division Hill 1015.

On 15 August, despite the Field Army's order for the continuation of the attack, no significant activities were noticed in the sector of Army Corps A. The army corps Headquarters had ordered its divisions to attack simultaneously since morning, the X Division towards Yapan Hamam (Sketchmap 42) and the XII Division towards Eskishehir. II Division, after XII Division had passed through its outposts, would assemble and interpose between it and Army Corps C. However, XII Division was late in assembling, and this resulted in the delay of the attack by I Division. The division launched the attack finally at 1430. After overrunning the advanced Turkish forces, it arrived before the main line of the Turkish resistance in Hill 1329. There the attack

Sketchmap 42. The Battle Ardiz Dag and Chal Dag, 15–20 August 1921.



was interrupted because of night. XII Division advanced from Tamburoglu south of the village Karapinar, where it awaited the arrival of its detached forces. At about dusk it captured with 46 Infantry Regiment the south accesses of eastern Dikilitash (Hill 1253). II Division, after deploying forces on Hill 1015, from where X Division had withdrawn, because of its turn towards northwest, stayed on with its remaining forces in Didymoi Lophoi, awaiting the attack of XII Division.

For the next day, 16 August, Army Corps A ordered its divisions to attack from 0500 along the already fixed directions. I Division jumped off having two regiments in the frontline, each one accompanied by a Pack Artillery battalion. However, it met a dense barrage of fire and was pinned down. At about 1430, following a new attack, only 5 Infantry Regiment moved, deployed to the left attacked with extraordinary ferocity, overran the Turkish 35 Infantry Regiment facing it and pursued it towards the ridgeline of Ardiz Dag. The bold advance however, exposed it to the enemy's flanking fire, which resulted in heavy casualties with even its Commander Colonel (Inf) Evangelos Trakas being killed. At 1530, after the division's intervention, 1/38 Evzone Regiment also jumped off, on the right of 5 Infantry Regiment, with the same fierceness. 7 Infantry Regiment of the Turkish 3 Caucasus Division facing the Evzone regiment was overrun and withdrew causing also the retreat of the right of the 8 Regiment of the same division. The Turkish line had already been broken through and the Turks hastily withdrew towards northeast, pursued to a great depth by the Greek forces.

XII Division attacked from 0645 of 16 August with two regiments, reinforced with a Pack Artillery battalion each, and after combat 14 Infantry Regiment captured hills northeast of Karapinar village, and 46 Infantry Regiment the eastern section of Dikilitash (Hill 1253). The Turks however launched a fierce counterattack at 0800. After heavy bombardment, they overran 46 Regiment and forced it to withdraw in disorder towards the line of departure. The Turkish counterattack advanced further east and threatened to encircle the left of 14 Regiment. However, the timely intervention by the Command of the regiment eliminated the threat. 14 Regiment continued the attack towards Hill 1329 in combination with the attack of 5 Infantry Regiment of I Division, which was further east. After a fierce battle it launched an assault and seized Hill 1329, as well as the section of the ridgeline that extended westwards. On the left XII Division after relieving 46 Infantry Regiment with its reserve 41 Regiment, recaptured at midnight eastern Dikilitash, from where the Turks had already started withdrawing.

II Division attacked from 0500 of 16 August towards western Dikilitash with 1 Regiment, but its forces met accurate defense fire and were pinned down. The division then ordered 7 Infantry Regiment, which was at Hill 1015 to attack towards Ordek Golu in order to threaten the right of the

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Turkish force in Dikilitash. The regiment seized the heights south of Ordek Golu after a fierce battle, but after a while was lost them, to recapture them again at 2200.

The Field Army and Army Corps A did not take advantage of the breach, which was created in the Turkish defensive line, between the village Yamak and Hill 1329. This oversight gave the Turks time to withdraw and deploy undisturbed in the line formed by the villages Horhor – Sogulja.

217. On 17 August, Army Corps A remained in its positions, according to the Field Army's order to prepare the attack on the next day. The Field Army however, after information from the Aviation Corps of the Turks' general withdrawal, ordered at 1000 Army Corps A to advance as soon as possible. The army corps however, having ascertained the strong occupation of both Ardiz Dag as well as Chal Dag, did not move. Only II Division conducted two reconnaissances in force with one regiment. The two regiments advanced and captured unopposed the heights west of Sogulja village.

On the left of the Greek disposition, after the occupation of the high plateau of Tendemir and the withdrawal of Turkish IV Group of Divisions towards the line Sogulja – Sari Halil – Aji Dere, Army Corps C, acting according to the Field Army's order, attacked on 17 August with X Division to the direction west Chal Dag – Baba Yakup. X Division initiated the attack in the morning with two regiments and two Pack Artillery battalions in first line and 3 Regiment as reserve. 28 Infantry Regiment attacked Sivri and western Chal Dag, but came under dense fire from the direction of Sivri and its move was slow. At the same time the left of 30 Infantry Regiment seized Sari Halil, and continued with great momentum towards north. The Turkish force, which occupied Sivri and belonged to the Turkish 1 Cavalry Division, upon noticing the impending threat on its right, abandoned its positions and started withdrawing towards north. Its withdrawal relieved 28 Regiment of the flanking fire it received up to that point, and then accelerated its move, bypassed the village Sivri launched an assault and captured the west peak of Chal Dag. The Turkish 1 Division was surprised, abandoned its sector between Sogulja and Sapanja Dere and without being pressed withdrew to a great depth.

From this withdrawal a gap of more than six kilometers wide was opened between III and II Groups of Divisions. However, the timely intervention of IV Group of Divisions averted the danger. With vigorous action it recaptured with the reinforced 190 Infantry Regiment the west peak of Chal Dag and during the night it closed the gap that had been created.

After losing this peak Greek X Division occupied with 28 Regiment the southwest ridges of Chal Dag and Sivri and with 30 Regiment the heights northwest of Sivri. Its reserve 27 Infantry Regiment encamped about three miles south of Sivri.

III Division was slow in assembling and started at about 1300 to advance towards the direction Tendemir – Karakuyu. By the last light it arrived and encamped three kilometers south of Karakuyu village.

The Field Army of Asia Minor announced on the night of 17 August the false information, according to which the Turks withdrew, having left strong rearguards in the line Ardiz Dag – heights of Kara Hoja – heights of Chulluk to secure the withdrawal of its right towards east. Simultaneously it ordered Army Corps B for the next day to advance towards north and reach the line Kale Gozu – southeast Temkoy. Army Corps A to capture Ardiz Dag and east Chal Dag and advance up to the line southeast Temkoy – Karajakaya. Army Corps C to advance towards the direction Sivri – Baba Yakup and reach the line Samutlu – Kayabashi. The army corps upon arriving at these lines would deploy defensively.

Army Corps A, with its Headquarter in Evliyafaki, did not achieve its objective. I Division, which attacked at 0500 of 18 August against the direction of Kizilkoy, was engaged in a fierce battle. 1/38 Evzone Regiment and 5 Infantry Regiment, which was in the first line, were pinned down before the ridge of Ardiz Dag, which Turkish II Group of Divisions strongly occupied. A Turkish counterattack followed against the right of II Division and resulted in driving back further north the Evzone regiment deployed there.

XII Division, which attacked in the direction of Yapan Hamam, arrived with 14 Infantry Regiment on its right as far as the village Abchi. Its left 41 Infantry Regiment captured a section of the strongly occupied height west of Gedik, which it did keep despite the Turks' repeated counterattacks.

II Division attacked at 0630 to capture the saddle Chal – Ardiz, but did not achieve its objective. After a battle, it arrived with 34 Regiment about two kilometers south of the saddle and with its left 7 Regiment in line with Eskichalish, where its move was checked.

218. Army Corps C continued the attack on the morning of 18 August (Sketchmap 42). X Division overran with 28 Infantry Regiment the Turkish 190 Regiment and recaptured the peak of Chal Dag. 28 Regiment, continuing its offensive towards northeast through the ridge of Chal Dag, was engaged in battle with 39 Infantry Regiment, which comprised the advance guard of the Turkish 15 Division, moving in the opposite direction. The Turkish advance guard was shaken by the sudden fire of 28 Regiment and retreated in disorder, while 15 Division could hardly hold its positions. Some time later, it was reinforced with 24 Division and together they tried to push 28 Regiment back, which, however, successfully confronted the force of the Turkish attacks and kept its position. The Pack Artillery battalion accompanying the regiment and the timely deployment of I/C Field Artillery Battalion in a suitable position from where it could effectively support the regimental attack, greatly contributed in repelling the Turkish attack.

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III Division continued since morning the move towards Karakuyu, with its two regiments, supported by the Artillery. However, due to the lack of adequate ammunition, only one field battery of III/C Field Artillery Battalion was deployed, to which all remaining shells of the other two batteries were delivered. The right of 2/39 Evzone Regiment, after displacing troops of the Turkish 5 Division from their successive positions, at about 1530 seized after hand to hand combat the enemy's fortified stronghold, on a hill northeast of the village Karakuyu. The Turks fled abandoning four guns and a number of machine guns. On the left 12 Infantry Regiment, immediately after its jump–off, was pinned down by effective Infantry and Artillery fire. At 1430, it repeated its attack and succeeded in overrunning, after a fierce battle, the left of Turkish 61 Division and capturing Karakuyu. Towards evening, the Turks launched a fierce counterattack against the organized hill northeast of Karakuyu, with troops from the 61 Division and 5 Caucasus Division, supported by a large number of guns. The Evzone company that was there put up a tenacious resistance, but before the enemy's numerical superiority was overrun and withdrew in disorder to Sari Halil, leaving a gap between the regiments, which the division hastened to close in time. The Turks limited themselves to this local success and to the freeing also of 220 prisoners out of 250, which2/39 Evzone Regiment had taken during the same day. They also withdrew their guns and machine guns they had abandoned on the hill. At night they attempted to capture the village Karakuyu. They failed and so III Division kept the line at the heights 1,500 meters northwest of Sari Halil – Karakuyu and further west.

VII Division, which conducted operations towards Polatli, occupied on the night of that day, 18 August, the line Dua Tepe – Kartal Tepe – Kara Dag – Aji Dere.

Capture of Ardiz and Chal Dag
Sketchmap 35, 42

219. The Command of the Turkish Western Front Field Army, attaching special significance to the direction of Yapan Hamam (Sketchmap 42), assigned the responsibility of this area to III Group of Divisions, which comprised its 8 and 57 Divisions and one regiment of 23 Division. It assigned the responsibility for the area of Chal Dag to 15 Division, to which it subordinated 24 Division as well. The two commands had the mission to mop up and keep these areas at all costs. Simultaneously, the Turkish Field Army reduced the forces, which were opposite Army Corps B.

Army Corps A, acting on the Field Army's orders, attacked on the morning of 19 August, with the three divisions deployed in line, to capture the mountain range Ardiz – Chal. I Division on the right attacked in the direction of Kizilkoy at 0430 and fought a tenacious battle before the strongly occupied

ridgeline of Ardiz Dag. The Turks, determined to keep the ridgeline, put up a sturdy resistance, but the attacking 1/38 Evzone Regiment and 5 Infantry Regiment, despite their heavy casualties, continued their advance steadily. At about 0600, they captured the first line of trenches, which the Turkish 11 Regiment of 3 Caucasus Division abandoned. A local counterattack, which was launched by the reserve 8 Regiment of the same division, was disrupted by the accurate fire of the Artillery.

Then I Division, seeking a swift outcome, extended the attack towards east also, engaging the reserve 4 Infantry Regiment. After intense bombardment of the Turkish positions, the three regiments deployed in line, captured by assault, at about 0930, the entire ridgeline of Ardiz Dag, except for the easternmost peak. This was captured by 4 Regiment, after a brief but fierce battle. An unsuccessful Turkish counterattack followed in the gap between 1/38 Evzone Regiment and 5 Infantry Regiment. The Turkish troops came under effective crossfire of the two Greek regiments and disintegrated. On 19 August, XII Division attacked to occupy the saddle of Ardiz Dag with 14 Infantry Regiment, which 41 Infantry Regiment covered from the left (west). 46 Infantry Regiment comprised the reserve of the division, in the area of the village Tabakli. 14 Infantry Regiment, reinforced with a Pack Artillery battalion and a field battery, jumped off at 0500 and fell upon the Turkish positions with such momentum that the Turks were taken by surprise and abandoned any idea of resistance. Few of them escaped, while the rest were taken prisoner. They belonged to a battalion of 176 Infantry Regiment of 57 Division, which suffered the brunt of the attack and surrendered almost entirely with its commander, many officers and 355 enlisted men. 14 Infantry Regiment, after capturing the saddle, attacked the heights to its east, which it occupied, after overrunning at bayonet point the troops of the Turkish 8 Division, who were defending it. Thus the occupation of Ardiz Dag was completed.

The commander of III Group of Divisions, to which II Group was also subordinated, after the loss of Ardiz Dag, withdrew its divisions to the line that included the villages Kizil Koyunlu and Bosnakoy and passed about 1,000 meters south of Yapan Hamam. The Western Front Field Army Headquarters still attaching special significance to the junction of Yapan Hamam, employed its last reserves and ordered that the new positions should be kept at all costs. Simultaneously, it reinforced this section of the front with the 11 Division, which it removed from the forces opposite Army Corps B.

220. II Division repeated from 0630 of 19 August the attack against eastern Chal Dag, according to the orders of Army Corps A. However, it engaged in a hard battle, and despite the fact that it used all its forces, did not achieve significant results, until dusk. The inertia of Army Corps C, whose divisions

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remained in their positions for regrouping, supply and rest, largely was responsible for the unsuccessful outcome of the operation.

The Field Army of Asia Minor ordered the army corps to continue its advance from the morning of 20 August, reaching as far as the lines that had been defined since the night of 17 August, southwest of Temkoy – Karajakaya (Osmaniye) with Army Corps A, and Samutlu – Kayabashi with Army Corps C.

Army Corps A then ordered II Division to capture eastern Chal Dag and observe the advance of Army Corps C, reaching as far as the heights of the village Karajakaya. XII Division, after assisting II Division in its effort to capture the saddle Chal – Ardiz, would advance as far as the heights north of Kandikoy. I Division was ordered to advance so as to extend the deployment of the army corps as far as the heights southwest of Temkoy. II Division, awaiting the attack by XII Division in the direction of the saddle Chal – Ardiz, remained inert. Nevertheless, XII Division advanced to the direction of Kandikoy from 0900 of 20 August, without succeeding in assisting the attack against the saddle because of the great distance.

II Division, awaiting in vain the aid of XII Division, finally jumped off at about 1715 with its entire force. The Turkish 15 Division facing it could not withstand its dashing attack and was overrun. By 2200, II Division had captured eastern Chal Dag, including the saddle and the highest peak, where it consolidated and established liaison with neighboring units. XII Division to its right arrived and deployed in a suitable defensive line, two kilometers south of Yapan Hamam. I Division, improving its positions, forwarded its left in line with XII Division.

The battles for the occupation of the mountain range Ardiz Dag – eastern Chal Dag, were the last offensive attacks of Army Corps A east of the Sangarius. During the five–day period that followed until 24 August, stagnation prevailed in the front of Army Corps A, with the exchange of sporadic fire by both sides. Both opponents were involved in the organization of their defensive positions.

On 25 August, the Turks conducted two reconnaissances in force each by a battalion force, against I Division, with the objective to find out to what extent Ardiz Dag was occupied. Both were repelled and the forces employed withdrew, confirming its occupation by strong forces. During the next few days calm prevailed in the sector of Ardiz Dag. Army Corps A took advantage of it and withdrew XII Division from the first line. Its positions were occupied by troops of I and II Divisions, while XII Division assembled in the area between Horhor and Karapinar as a reserve.

Army Corps C, exacting the Field Army's order to advance as far as the line Samutlu – Kayabashi, ordered X and III Divisions to jump off on the

morning of 20 August and to advance to the axis Bayburt – Kargali – Samutlu. X Division attacked on the morning of 20 August, with 28 Infantry Regiment deployed to its right against the positions the Turkish 24 Division continued to occupy in west Chal Dag, which it overran. 28 Regiment, after pursuing the Turks, who were withdrawing to the direction of Erif, descended the north ridges of the mountain and moved towards north. After the occupation too, of the west section of Chal Dag, the entire massif was already in the hands of the Greeks.

On the left, 27 Regiment jumped off in the morning from its positions in the area of Sivri and attacked the Turkish 190 Regiment facing it. After pushing the Turks to the north, it penetrated the interior of the defensive area and occupied certain points in the area of Karayafsan. Nevertheless X Division, considering the stay of its troops in such advanced positions dangerous, brought back 28 Regiment to west Chal Dag and 27 Regiment northwest of Sivri.

221. III Division, jumping off at 0600 of 20 August from the line northwest Sari Halil – Karakuyu, which had been recaptured by the Turks after a fierce counterattack, attacked with its two regiments, supported by the total of its Artillery (one field and two pack battalions), against the organized hill northwest of Karakuyu and the rocky ridge west of the same village. The division captured these positions and then pursued the Turks, who retreated in disorder towards north. However, 2/39 Evzone Regiment advanced uncovered and came under sustained Artillery fire from the direction of Bayburt. There followed a stormy counterattack by significant forces. As a result the regiment was surprised and withdrew in disorder towards the line of departure. This in turn caused the withdrawal of 12 Infantry Regiment deployed to the left, towards Karakuyu. 2/39 Evzone Regiment, after being regrouped and reinforced, launched a new attack and recaptured for the second time the organized hill, to abandon it after a while. Around the hill. which was being claimed, a hard battle raged, with successive attacks and counterattacks, during which this position changed occupants four times, to remain finally under the occupation of 2/39 Evzone Regiment. The price, however, was very high. The regiment suffered heavy casualties in officers and enlisted men. Among those killed in action, was its Commander Colonel (Inf) Vlasios Karachrestos. The rest of the day, III Division remained in its positions, which included the above hill and the village Karakuyu.

VII Division of Army Corps C attacked north of the railroad line on 19–20 August, to capture Basri Kale Tepe, but did not achieve its objective. Thus, it continued occupying the line Dua Tepe – Kara Tepe – Kartal Dag – Aji Dere, with its Headquarters in the area of the village Injiler

The Western Front Turkish Field Army, after the loss of Chal Dag and

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the bold penetration of X Division towards Karayafsan, withdrew its forces west of Yapan Hamam and deployed its forces in the third defensive area. This included the heights of Kandikoy, the heights north of Bayburt, Polatli and Basri Kale Tepe. According to a relevant order of the Turkish Field Army this position should definitely be held, including Yapan Hamam, since the situation on its left, where the attack of Greek Army Corps B was interrupted, had already been stabilized. The area north of Chal Dag, which was reinforced with 11 Division, was placed under the command of XII Group of Divisions, which had been moved from the left of the Field Army. 15 and 24 Divisions, having suffered heavy casualties during the battle of Chal Dag, withdrew to regroup, the former west of Kandikoy and the latter in Erif. IV Group of Divisions opposite Army Corps C, after its withdrawal, occupied by the morning of 21 August with a mixed detachment (6 battalions plus battery) the heights of Karayafsan. With 5 Caucasus Division it occupied the heights Sheyhali and with 61 Division the heights northeast of Bayburt.

As soon as Army Corps C was informed of the withdrawal of the opposite Turkish forces, forwarded III Division during the afternoon of 21 August as far as the village Korsakli. From the night of 21 August, IX Division, which was detached from Army Corps B and transported to Sari Halil, was assigned to Army Corps C.

The casualties on both sides during the battle of Ardiz Dag and Chal Dag were heavy. The Hellenic Field Army had forty–nine officers and 613 enlisted men killed, 145 officers and 3,434 wounded and seventy–two enlisted men missing.

222. During the time the Hellenic Army crossed the Sangarius to attack the front north of the Gok River, the Turkish 6 Division, jumped off dashing from Sadikli (Sketchmap 35), and attacked Dumlupinar on 7 August. In the area of the railway station of the same name various auxiliary formations and a supply center were deployed. Even though the Turkish raid was conducted by strong forces, it was repelled by the numerically inferior guard, which was reinforced by armed enlisted men of the auxiliary formations. The Turks made another unsuccessful attack the next day, and then withdrew towards the jump–off point.

The Southern Group of Divisions, which was constantly harassed by the Turkish 6 Division, after the attack described above, decided to mop up the area south of the railroad line. For this purpose it organized two detachments, one comprising three battalions plus a pack battery of IV Division, which arrived on 18 August in Guney, and one from 49 Regiment (minus battalion) plus a pack battery in Dumlupinar. Both detachments were placed under a unified command, with mission to mop up the area south of the railroad line and to capture Sadikli. The detachments jumped off on 21 August

and after a three–day advance arrived unhindered, on the morning of 24 August, before Sadikli. There they clashed with a strong force of the Turkish 6 Division, which covered the town and included four Infantry battalions and one regiment of Cavalry foot soldiers with four machine guns and two guns.

The detachments deployed and attacked against the Turkish positions. At about 1245, the Turks' right flank bent and started to withdraw. In a while the withdrawal became general with the hasty departure of the Turkish troops towards the south of Sadikli, which was captured by 1730. The Turks abandoned sixteen killed in the battlefield, while they carried off, according to information provided by the villagers, eighteen more killed and about sixty wounded, among them the commander of 50 Infantry Regiment.

The detachments remained in Sadikli until 30 August. Then they were recalled, after the situation that was created in the front of the Sangarius and resulted in the general retirement of the Hellenic Army, to its initial areas of departure. The Detachment of IV Division returned to the division and 49 Infantry Regiment deployed in Pashakoy.

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CHAPTER 7

Suspension of Operations and Return to the Line of Departure

Proposal of the Field Army for a Suspension of Operations
Sketchmap 35

223. The Field Army of Asia Minor, having failed both in its initial aim of turning the Turkish left flank with Army Corps B, and in its later efforts to open the route to Ankara in the direction of Yapan Hamam, found itself already committed to a battle under difficult circumstances, which grew progressively more difficult (Sketchmap 35). The constant, and dedicated enemy resistance contesting every meter of ground, the significant reduction in strength due to losses, the inability to replace them, as well as the problem of supply, finally provoked serious concern. The supply problems had not been entirely solved despite restoration of the line of supply through Kavuju Kopru and the progress of repairs on the railway line from Eskishehir towards Ankara, which functioned as far as Sazilar, about five kilometers west of the Sangarius (Sakarya) river. Difficulties continued to exist as nearly half of the Field Army's trucks were immobilized either awaiting repair or because of shortage of tires. Moreover, the rainy season was approaching and the lack of macadam roads would cause severe problems for vehicle movement beyond the Sangarius.

In reviewing the situation as it had developed up to that time, the Field Army began to consider how worthwhile it would be to continue the effort to capture Ankara, which demanded ever greater sacrifices. At the same time, it was decided to report these considerations to the government and seek guidance for further operations. Thus, on 22 August 1921, a detailed report was composed that reviewed operations and made comparison of the Greek and the Turkish forces, reckoning them of equal strength after losses incurred by the former. In contrast with the Turks, the Army retained the advantage of offensive initiative and, consequently, superior morale as well. Nevertheless, progressive reduction of combat strength would make further offensive operations impossible, which in turn would certainly erode morale in the ranks. Moreover, any farther advance would lengthen the lines of communication at a time when the number of serviceable motor vehicles was reduced daily without being replaced. For the foregoing reasons the Field Army asked the government to make a decision quickly while there was still time. The report also referred to the memorandum that had been submitted by the Field Army to the Council of War of Kutahya, according to which the Army was either to advance beyond the Sangarius or to halt its advance before the river, according to circumstances. The Army had already advanced

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beyond the Sangarius and, with a new effort, it was possible that Ankara would fall; however it was equally possible that some accident might turn success into failure. In addition, ignoring the political situation, the Army was not in a position to judge whether the political advantages of occupying Ankara warranted the risks of moving forward to the city, or whether the outcome of the campaign was considered already sufficient for the conduct of successful negotiations. The Field Army asked to be apprised of the government's decision as soon as possible because the Turks were continually bringing up reinforcements and intensively completing their defensive organization. Finally, due to the season of the year, it was probable that operations would soon become exceptionally difficult.

This report was delivered to the minister of the army at Prusa on 23 August by Major General Xenophon Strategos, who was familiar with the thoughts and opinions of the Field Army. On the same day, the Army sent a telegram to the minister of the army proposing that the prime minister come to Prusa to assess on the spot the value of a further advance. However, due to obstacle the prime minister was not able to visit Asia Minor, and the general officer carried the report in person to Athens.

Efforts to Widen the Bridgehead to the East of the Sangarius River
Sketchmap 43

224. In planning its retirement west of the Sangarius, the Field Army of Asia Minor decided to widen its bridgehead to the east in order to secure more effectively its forces during the withdrawal and recrossing the river. Then, Army Corps C, reinforced with IX Division, was ordered to attack on the morning of 22 August with the objective of seizing the line western Karajakaya ridges heights of Kizilja Kishla – Yusuk Kurtlu Tepe (Hill 1119), Basrikoy heights, and the line between Kayabashi and Kargali which was the ultimate objective (Sketchmap 43). Support in the operation would be provided by Army Corps A which was ordered to attack with its left wing towards the village of Karajakaya and with its center towards the village of Kandikoy.

Army Corps C, occupying the line west of Chal Dag – Korsakli village, Kara Dag (Hill 972) Dua Tepe (Hill 1100), ordered its divisions to launch an attack in line formation on the morning of 22 August with the objective of seizing the ridgeline designated by the Field Army. That ridgeline was held by the Turkish IV Group of Divisions and the Turkish newly formed army corps, which held positions opposite Greek VII Division.

On 22 August, the attack was launched belatedly due to unpreparedness of the divisions. At about 1200 hours, X Division on the right jumped off with two regiments in the front line and seized the southern outskirts of Karayafsan village as well as the heights to the northeast of it. IX Division arriving from Sari Halil behind the outposts of III Division at 0930 launched

an attack, also with two regiments in front line. By passing Bayburt, its right regiment captured the important Tashlik Tepe hill, while the left regiment pushed forward as far as the southern approaches of Yusuk Kurtlu Tepe.

III Division had attacked with one regiment in the direction of Eski Polatli at 0930, while the remaining forces of the division assembled round Korsakli. The attacking 12 Infantry Regiment, coordinating its movements with the left flank of 22 Regiment of VII Division, occupied Eski Polatli without encountering resistance. VII Division attacked only to the south of the railway line. The attacking 22 Regiment jumped off at 0800 and seized the ridgeline between the villages of Eski Polatli and Menteshe.

Army Corps A did not move towards Karajakaya and Kandikoy on 22 August as it had been ordered to do. Instead, it approved a proposal of II Division according to which the division would be able to support operations of Army Corps C if it remained in the dominant positions it already held on Chal Dag.

At Prusa the minister of the army was informed that Army Corps A had not taken part in the attack and that the designated objectives had not been achieved. He then instructed the Field Army to report on the extent to which its orders had been executed on 22 August, on the results achieved, and on the reasons why its orders had not been executed in whole or in part. The Field Army limited its reply to reporting that Army Corps C had failed to complete its operations because of strong enemy resistance.

Besides the foregoing, the minister of the army had earlier issued an admonitory order regarding the Field Army's failure to submit a military situation report for the information of the King and the government on the course of war operations.


The Commander of the Field Army, Lieutenant General Anastasios Papoulas, considered the content and admonitory tone of the order insulting to him personally, and raised the question of his relief in the event that he should cease to enjoy the confidence of the government. The minister then put an end to the debate, recognizing that if there were no confidence in the commanders of what was almost the entire armed forces of the country during that dire time, the government would assign command of the combat forces to others.

Next day, 23 August the attack for the capture of the predetermined objectives continued. Again the jump–off was delayed, because each division waited for the neighboring units to move first. With the intervention of Army Corps C the simultaneous jump–off of the IX and X Divisions was achieved at noon. X Division operating in the direction of Kayabashi, captured with its left wing a defensively organized hill northwest of Karayafsan at 1400, while its right wing advanced to about two kilometers south of Karajakaya village.

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IX Division captured Kirechli Tepe hill. This put in a difficult position the right flank of the Turkish IV Group of Divisions, which anchored its defense on this hill. However, IX Division did not hasten to exploit this success and to capture by a rapid movement Yusuk Kurtlu Tepe. Thus Turkish 61 Division gained time and reconstituted the continuation of the front line further to the north. VII Division, having its right wing advanced south of the railroad line, did not move, awaiting the capture of Yusuk Kurtlu Tepe by IX Division.

Sketchmap 43. Efforts to Widen the Beachhead East of the Sangarius River, 22–23 August 1921.



Transition of the Hellenic Field Army for Defense
Sketchmaps 41, 44

225. Following its unsuccessful effort to widen the bridgehead, the Field Army of Asia Minor decided to suspend offensive operations and assume defensive stance while waiting for the decisions of the government in response to its report of 22 August. It therefore ordered the army corps to remain in their positions on 24 August, to regroup and replenish supplies. Another order, issued on the evening of 24 August, directed the various army corps to proceed with defensive organization of their sectors and, while holding the front line with necessary force, to build up a strong reserve comprising one full division. At the same time, in order to blunt the impression that might be created by this transition to defense, it explained that its objective was to economize forces for the conduct of offensive maneuvers.

In executing the orders of the Field Army, Army Corps B assigned the screening of its sector to XIII Division, while V Division was held in reserve in the Sherefli area, except for the 44 Regiment which was withdrawn from the frontline and encamped together with the Pack Artillery Battalion that escorted it to the Buyuk Gok Goz area (Sketchmap 44). The Cavalry Brigade, deployed to the south of this village, continued to cover the right and rear of Army Corps B, whose headquarters remained at Sherefli.

Army Corps A built up its reserve from XII Division, which was withdrawn from the front line and assembled in the area between the villages of Horhor and Karapinar. The sector it had occupied until then was now allocated to I and II Divisions. The Headquarters of Army Corps A was deployed at the village of Tabakli.

Army Corps C, in order to align its front with that of Army Corps A, pulled back its advanced X Division to the line west of Chal Dag north – west of Sivri. IV Division extended its front westward to the heights south of Eski Polatli while continuing to hold its forward position of Kirechli Tepe. VII Division, with its eastern boundary now limited to Kara Dag, withdrew its advanced units to its east and was limited to the occupation of the line Dua Tepe Kara Dag. Following an order from Army Corps C, it extended its front line to the northwest through Gordium, as far as the heights of Sazilar, west of the Sangarius (Sketchmap 41). III Division from the area south of Eski Polatli arrived and encamped to a position northeast of the village of Chanakchi, as reserve. Army Corps C established its headquarters at Chanakchi.

These movements were completed on 27 August. Headquarters of the Field Army had been deployed since 25 August at the bridge of Kavuju Kopru.

226. Meanwhile, on 23 and 24 August, the Turkish Field Army of the Western Front had built up a strong reserve comprising four divisions (the 15, 23,

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41, and 57) in the triangle bounded by Kerem – Derekoy – Hamam. Twelve divisions remained on the front line. In particular the 5, 7, and 4 Divisions of the I Group of Divisions were deployed opposite Army Corps B. The 9 and 3 Caucasus Division of the II Group of Divisions, the 8 Division of the III Group of Divisions and the 11 Division of the XII Group of Divisions were deployed opposite Army Corps A. Finally, the 24, 61, and the 5 Caucasus Divisions of the IV Group of Divisions as well as the 17 and the 1 Divisions of the newly formed army corps were deployed opposite Greek Army Corps C. The right flank of the Turkish disposition was covered by the Turkish V Group of Divisions (Cavalry).


Beginning 25 August the Turks began offensive action along the entire front. Probing attacks of large scale were conducted in the zones of Army Corps B and C, where the enemy engaged a force of one to two regiments with strong Artillery support. All these probing attacks were repelled, giving the attackers the impression that the Greeks strongly occupied their positions.

Initiative Taken by Army Corps B
Sketchmap 44

227. The Field Army of Asia Minor, having received intelligence that the Turks were assembling strong forces opposite its left flank with the probable intent of attacking Army Corps C, decided to respond to this contingency by employing Army Corps C in a dedicated defense and Army Corps A and B in a simultaneous diversionary attack. Consequently, on 26 August, Army Corps B was ordered to attack, as soon as the enemy offensive began, in the direction of Boyalik – Chayirli, forty and fifty kilometers, respectively, north of Kale Gozu. Army Corps A was ordered to capture the line Sarigol – Karajakaya, (Sketchmap 44) with the ultimate objective the ridgeline Kuchuk, At the same time, Army Corps C, conducting active defense, would seek to launch an attack towards the north or northeast with X Division. The Field Army specified in its orders that a shift of forces from the right to the left would definitely give the enemy the initiative and that forces undertaking such a maneuver would arrive at their destination too late.

Army Corps A was surprised by the Field Army's orders, as much for their disparagement of Army Corps C's defensive capabilities as for the unrealistic objectives they set. The Turkish forces opposing Army Corps A exceeded four divisions and held well organized positions. It was therefore doubtful to what degree the army corps would be able to seize the enemy defensive area and overrun the forces occupying it. Nonetheless, Army Corps A issued its divisions an order to prepare an attack that would be carried out on subsequent orders.

The Commands of both Army Corps A and B disagreed with the disposition maintained by the Field Army. Army Corps B in particular held the



Sketchmap 44.
The Disposition of the Hellenic Field Army on 27 August 1921.

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view that, following the suspension of the offensive, it was imperative that Army Corps B move from Kale Gozu, where it was idle, to positions closer to Army Corps C. With the consolidated force of these two corps the Field Army would be able to successfully attack the Turkish right flank, covered on the east by Army Corps A, which occupied the fortified position Ardiz Dag. The Chief of Staff of Army Corps B, Colonel (Inf) Alexandros Gavalias, conveyed these thoughts unofficially in a letter to the commander of the Field Army, who was a friend of his. The views of the Field Army did not coincide entirely with those of the corps. If Army Corps B was to move to the west, it was judged safer for it to leave one division in its sector. However, because the army corps considered it too dangerous to leave only one division in the Kale Gozu area, its chief of staff sent another letter to the chief of staff of the Field Army on 24 August. In this letter he proposed a compromise solution whereby the division would remain behind the corps' right flank as a Field Army reserve force.

This is how things stood when Army Corps B received the order to begin its diversionary action as soon as the left flank of the Field Army was attacked. The Command of the army corps then concluded that it had not been ordered to move westward solely because of the likelihood of a delayed arrival at its new position, as expressed in the Field Army's earlier orders. Believing that its action would be approved, the Command of the corps decided to move its entire force during the night, estimating that it would arrive in the Sivri area by noon of the next day, 28 August. Non–combatant elements and pack transportation where then ordered to move out immediately. The Command reported this to the Field Army, explaining at the same time the reasons that compelled it to take the action. The Field Army, however, countermanded the movement, pointing out that the only officer competent to make such assessment and decision was the commander of the Field Army. Thus Army Corps B remained in its positions and recalled the units that had already departed.

The Field Army, ascribing the action of Army Corps B to the proposal of its chief of staff, proceeded to relieve him and assigned Colonel (Inf) Panagiotes Nikolaides, until then Commander of the Cavalry Brigade, in his place. Prince Andreas considered this action of the Field Army to be an insult and immediately asked that he be relieved of duty, but his request was denied.

Turkish Attack against Army Corps A

228. The High Command of the Turkish Army and the Command of the Turkish Field Army of the Western Front, finding a connection between the westward movement of Greek IX Division and the suspension of offensive operations, as well as the abandonment of certain forward positions, concluded that the Greek forces had begun pulling back towards the west with the


intention of withdrawing from their positions beyond the Sangarius. In light of these assessments, the Turks decided, on 25 August, to launch a powerful and simultaneous attack on the center and left of the Hellenic Field Army employing strong forces (Sketchmaps 43, 44). The attack on the left flank would have as its first objective the capture of the ridgeline Dua Tepe – Kartal Tepe – Kara Dag, which covered the valley of the Sangarius from the east. Next, the Greek forces would be driven back from the area to the west of Beylik Kopru. Then the Turkish forces would turn south to cut off the withdrawal route of the bulk of the Hellenic Field Army towards Kavuju Kopru. The attack on the Greek center would aim to occupy the line between Yamak and Dikilitash. At the remaining sectors of the front, to occupy demonstrations would be launched to hold the opposing Greek forces.

Following this decision, the Turkish Field Army of the Western Front assigned the missions for the first phase of the attack as follows. The Turkish newly formed army corps, reinforced with two divisions, would operate astride the railway line with its main effort in the direction of Dua Tepe. Supporting this attack would be the IV Group of Divisions, which would employ its right flank to capture the heights of Eski Polatli. The III Group of Divisions, having under its command the I and II Groups and the 41 Division, would operate from the area north of Yamak with Dikilitash as its objective. Meanwhile, the V Group of Divisions (Cavalry) would first secure control of communications south of Katranji Dere and then advance northwards. 28 August 1921 was fixed as the day of the attack.

During 27 August the Turks prepared the attack and assembled their units in the attack positions. On the left, the I Group of Divisions, leaving behind only its 4 Division opposite Greek Army Corps B, moved toward the upper Katranji Dere valley and arrived with its 5 and 7 Divisions to the north of Kizil Koyunlu where it encamped. The 41 Division moved into the same area from Yapan Hamam. The 15 and 23 Divisions destined for the area of the newly formed army corps moved from Derekoy and Kerem to Karapinar. The 57 Division, also moving from Kerem, arrived in position east of Karapinar where it remained as a reserve of the Field Army of the Western Front.

In Army Corps A's zone the day and night of 27 August passed quietly. The morning of the next day, 28 August, strong columns were observed moving against the corps' positions from the direction of Kara Hoja and farther east. The bulk of the enemy force, comprising the Turkish I and II Group of Divisions, supported by strong Artillery, moved against I Division which occupied Ardiz Dag. Farther to the left, II Division occupied the saddle Chal Ardiz. The Turkish I Group of Divisions, whose mission was to capture the village of Yamak, exploited the gap between I Division and the left flank of Army Corps B (approximately six kilometers wide) to penetrate the line through the Katranji Dere valley to the south, thus threatening the right flank of I Divi-

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Sketchmap 45.
The Turkish Offensive Against Army Corps A, 28 August 1921.

sion, covered by two battalions of 1/38 Evzone Regiment. At the same time, the Turkish II Group of Divisions, attacking frontally with its 9 and 3 Caucasus Divisions, exerted strong pressure on the Greek 4 Regiment and the right flank of 5 Regiment, in the northern approaches to Ardiz Dag. These two regiments held their positions firmly and checked the momentum of the Turkish attack, succeeding finally in pinning the attackers down. However, the 5 and 7 Divisions of the I Group moved rapidly towards the heights east of Yamak and already threatened the south flank of Greek I Division, which was now in a difficult position. At this moment Army Corps B committed V Division to the battle. The division launched a counterattack with four battalions from the direction of Sherefli. At about 1640 these battalions came into contact with Turkish forces on the heights east of Yamak and charged. Under the momentum of the attackers and the accurate Artillery fire, the Turks bent and began to withdraw.


At this opportune moment, a second counterattack was launched against the Turkish right flank by two Evzone battalions of I Division. The great pressure thus brought to bear on both sides of the attacking Turks increased their confusion and turned their withdrawal into a disorderly flight. In a short time the upper valley of Katranji Dere was teeming with disorganized groups of men, pack animals, and vehicles, all scurrying northwards in great confusion under Greek Artillery fire, while battalions of I and II Divisions continued in hot pursuit as far as Kizil Koyunlu. There the Greek sections clashed with the Turkish 41 Division, which covered the Turkish retreat.

The flight of I Group of Divisions affected adversely the II Group as well. As a result its offensive failed and the divisions retired during the night to its jump–off position. Farther to the west, Turkish 11 Division attacked with two battalions against Chal Dag in order to pin down the Greek forces there. It succeeded in capturing an advanced position of the II Division, but the latter was able to repulse the Turkish sections and recaptured this position during the day.

In the morning of 28 August, the Turkish V Group of Divisions (Cavalry), in accord with its mission, moved from the area east of Kale Gozu towards the rear of the Hellenic Field Army. Its 3 Cavalry Division captured Mangal Dag, and its 2 Cavalry Division the heights south of the village of Gungormez. 14 Cavalry Division encamped at Kerpich. The Greek Cavalry Brigade, reinforced with an Infantry battalion, moved to the heights round Mudanya – Cheltik, where its activity was limited to observing the movements of the Turkish divisions. In the evening, the brigade returned to its positions south of Buyuk Gok Goz, and then it moved towards Kanli Gol.

In the afternoon of 28 August, the Command of Army Corps B was extremely surprised by an order from the Field Army to make a forced march to Karahamzali. Only twenty–four hours earlier, the corps itself had under-

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Sketchmap 46.
The Turkish Offensive Against Army Corps C, 28–29 August 1921.

taken this maneuvre on its own initiative but the Field Army had then countermanded it. However the corps was now engaged in combat and, following approval of the Field Army, moved after dark. At about midnight of the following day, 29 August, it arrived in the rear of Army Corps C and encamped in the area of the villages of Sari Halil and Yenimehmetli. The Cavalry Brigade remained in the Kanli Gol area until Army Corps B had completed its movement; then it relocated near the village of Karapinar.

Turkish Attacks on Army Corps C
Sketchmaps 44, 46

229. The Turkish army corps forwarded the 15 and 23 Divisions, which had been placed under its command, from the area of Karapinar to the front line. On 28 August 1921, at 0800, these divisions together with the corps' own 1 Division attacked to the north of the railway line to capture Dua Tepe Hill (Sketchmap 46). The right flank of the attack formation was covered by 1 Cavalry Division, operating in the direction of Gordium. On its left, south of the railway line, 17 Division of the Turkish IV Group of Divisions operated with the mission to pin down the opposing Greek forces.

Greek VII Division, confronting the Turkish army corps, had divided its sector into three sub–sectors (Sketchmap 41): the northern, including centers of resistance at Sazilar and Gordium, each managed by an Infantry battalion and an Artillery platoon; the center of Dua Tepe, occupied by 23 Infantry Regiment supported by one Pack Artillery battery, one Heavy Artillery platoon, and three Field Artillery platoons; and the southern, south of the railway line, occupied by 22 Infantry Regiment supported by three Heavy Artillery platoons and one Field Artillery platoon. VII Division kept 37 Infantry Regiment in reserve near the village of Ezineli.

Despite strong Artillery support, the Turkish attack progessed slowly and, after a short time, was checked by a barrage of defensive fire. Only 1 Division, operating north of the railway line, succeeded in capturing some higher ground northeast of the village of Uchpinar.

At about 1100, following intense preparatory Artillery fire, the Turks jumped off anew. 15 Division, in the center of the attack formation, threw all its weight against the central battalion of the sub–sector. Under strong pressure, the battalion was forced to withdraw west of the ridgeline. 15 Division then captured the Twin Hills summits on Dua Tepe. At the same time, 1 Division seized that part of the ridgeline that descends towards Uchpinar. Greek VII Division intervened and reestablished the integrity of its front line deploying 37 Infantry Regiment on the heights west of Dua Tepe, towards which the left flank of 23 Regiment had withdrawn as well. A local counterattack then recovered the part of the ridge running down to Uchpinar and held it until evening when it was again captured by the Turks.

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230. As soon as the Turkish attack began, Army Corps C put III Division, already encamped near the village of Chanakchi, on combat alert. When the corps received the faulty information that a force of 3,000 men was moving in attack formation towards Gordium, it assigned the northern sub–sector to III Division and ordered it to reinforce with four Infantry battalions and Artillery. These sections moved in time but stopped in line with the Beylik bridge since calm prevailed in the Gordium area. Army Corps C then assigned three of these Infantry battalions to VII Division, to operate accordingly with the Field Army's orders and to recapture Dua Tepe. Strong and continuous pressure from the Turks, however, prevented the launching of a counterattack. Later, to ensure unity of command, Army Corps C assigned the remaining units of III Division to VII Division, except one battalion of Evzones that was attached to its Headquarters. Thus, VII Division now had the strength of two divisions, minus one regiment. The 23 Infantry Regiment, which had withdrawn from the front line, assembled west of Ezineli to regroup.

Following the capture of Dua Tepe, the Turkish army corps, shifted its efforts to the south of the railway line and attacked, with its 17 Division towards Kartal Tepe, and its 57 Division towards Kara Dag. These divisions jumped off simultaneously at 1530, but had not progressed by evening. The battle was particularly fierce and continued round Kara Dag without pause until late at night. Successive attacks by 57 Division, reinforced by one regiment, met the stubborn resistance of one Greek company which defended that vital hill with exceptional resolve, repulsing repeated assaults with bayonets and hand grenades. Although the position had been reinforced with two companies of 2/39 Evzone Regiment, towards midnight the Turks seized the eastern ridges of Kara Dag, but shortly afterwards a Greek counterattack forced them to withdraw. The battle went on with unrelenting intensity until the morning of 29 August when it began gradually to abate. At about 1100 the Turks broke off the attack and began to withdraw towards their jump–off areas.

To assist the efforts of the Turkish army corps, the IV Group of Divisions, on the morning of 28 August, sent two divisions to attack the center of Army Corps C. Of these, 61 Division, despite the fact that it was reinforced with two Infantry regiments, failed in its effort to capture the heights south of Eski Polatli. The neighboring 5 Caucasus Division captured Tashlik Tepe position to the east of Bayburt, but after a counterattack by Greek IX Division, it was forced to abandon it.

231. In an effort to reduce the activity of the adversary, Army Corps C assumed the offensive employing X Division and sections of the right flank of IX Division in the direction of Sheyhali. X Division jumped off from the line west of Chal Dag north of Sari Halil, broke through the inner flanks of the

Turkish 25 and 5 Caucasus Divisions and captured the positions southeast of Sheyhali and south of Karayafsan. The right flank of IX Division, following the recapture of Tashlik Tepe, moved forward in the direction of Sheyhali.

The next day, 29 August, the Turks did not continue the attack, because except for limited local successes in Dua Tepe, all their efforts had failed. Moreover, the attack by X Division in the Karayafsan sector and the looming threat on their right flank by the redeployment of Greek Army Corps B in the direction of Sari Halil, had made the Turks unwilling to continue with the attack until they could assemble sufficient forces. For this reason, they left four divisions facing Greek Army Corps A, and moved the remaining three towards Polatli. The 4 Division, which had held positions opposite Greek Army Corps B in the area north of Kale Gozu, was also moved towards Polatli.

On 29 August, the Hellenic Field Army ordered Army Corps A to actively defend the Field Army's right flank, holding Chal Dag at any cost. Army Corps C was ordered to to keep its positions at all costs and recapture Dua Tepe.

Army Corps A, following the failed attacks on its positions, was not harassed by enemy units, and organized a joint detachment to protect its southern flank from possible attacks, and because of the forward movement of the Turkish V Group of Divisions (Cavalry) in the valley of Katranji Dere. This joint detachment comprised one Infantry regiment and one Pack Artillery battalion from XII Division. In the early morning hours of 29 August, it deployed in the Karapinar area, north of Kanli Gol (Sketchmap 44). The Cavalry Brigade encamped in a position farther east of the village. The brigade had already been placed under the command of Army Corps A, and had been assigned to cover the corps' right flank, which was exposed following the redeployment of Army Corps B towards the west. The presence of the joint detachment of XII Division and the Cavalry Brigade in the Karapinar area forced the Turkish Cavalry divisions to remain inactive south of the Katranji torrent.

Army Corps C began its offensive for the recapture of Dua Tepe on the morning of 29 August. The attack was assigned to VII Division and was carried out by four Infantry battalions supported by a Pack Artillery battalion. The battalion jumped off from the Ezineli area at 0700, with the support of the remaining available Artillery. The forces on the left of the attack line were engaged in a fierce struggle for possession of a small hill north of Ezineli, which they eventually secured. The units operating farther south moved forward slowly and with difficulty due to the effectiveness of enemy fire, and were finally pinned down. As night fell, all efforts to continue the attack were abandoned.

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South of the railway line, the Turkish 57 Division continued the withdrawal it had begun after its failed attack on Kara Dag. At about 1100 the units of 17 Division on either flank of the 57 began to withdraw as well. As soon as he became aware of these withdrawal movements, the commander of the southern sub–sector launched a counterattack employing three battalions. These battalions jumped off from the Kartal Tepe – Kara Dag line, first overran the Turkish rearguard, and then pursued the enemy as far as the villages of Menteshe and Eski Polatli. They remained there until evening, when they returned to their initial positions, bringing with them 124 prisoners and their weapons.

At noon, X Division resumed its attack in the direction of Sheyhali. However, its units were pinned down by effective enemy fire. At about 1730, the division jumped off again, simultaneously with the right flank of IX Division, and finally succeeded in capturing an organized enemy position northwest of Karayafsan. 25 Infantry Regiment, on the right of IX Division, suffered heavy losses in its effort to capture an enemy stronghold southwest of the village of Sheyhali, and was forced to fall back to its jump–off positions.

Suspension of Offensive Operations Against Ankara and Recrossing of the Sangarius River
Sketchmaps 46, 47

232. Having suspended offensive operations, on 24 August, the Field Army of Asia Minor changed to a defensive mode of operation while awaiting the decisions of the government in response to its report of 22 August. On the evening of 26 August, the Field Army reported to the minister of the army at Prusa that it considered any extension of operations to be dangerous and that, in view of military successes up to that time, the optimum solution would be an armistice. The minister, however, held a different view. He believed that the suspension of offensive operations would have adverse effects either within Greece or abroad. He was therefore surprised at the Field Army's characterization of the situation as dangerous. The minister then reported to the prime minister that the Field Army had exhausted his patience with a flood of telegrams. At the same time, he conveyed a proposal by Lieutenant General Dousmanes that the Field Army Command be summoned clearly to declare how capable the Army was of pursuing the struggle to victory.

The prime minister, apprised of the Field Army's reports and subsequent telegrams, informed the minister of the army by telegram at 0300 on 28 August, that the Field Army must not be influenced nor bound by any consideration of the political situation, but must strive to regulate its decisions and actions in accord with military expedience. On the same day, the minister of the army received the response of the prime minister dated to the Field Army's report of 22 August. This response dealt with the political objectives

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of the war operations and emphasized that an appeal by Greece to Kemal, or to the Allies, would give the impression of defeat. Furthermore, it left to the judgment of the Field Army the decision whether to continue the offensive operations or not. It did, however, specify that, in the event that operations were suspended due to unforeseen contingencies, it was imperative to control, as far as possible, more territory than was anticipated to be finally possessed, so as to increase political pressure on the adversary. The Field Army should have been able to determine the territorial line offering this advantage. Then it would occupy and secure it with the smallest possible forces so that the reduction of the Army establishment would have been possible.

When the Field Army Command received the above response of the prime minister, having already decided to suspend offensive operations and return to its jump–off positions east of Eskishehir, hastened to report, on the evening of 29 August, that the Turks had seriously been reinforced and assumed the offensive. As a result the Field Army would no longer be able to remain east of Sangarius, and it was now obliged to cross the river under difficult circumstances. Its further decisions would be determined by the development of the situation after the river had been crossed. At the same time it also asked that reinforcements be sent, and that conscripts of the class of 1922 be called into service, proposing an increase rather than a reduction of the Army's establishment.

The evening of the same day, 29 August, the Field Army informed the army corps of its intention to deploy a defensive line immediately to the west of Sangarius. For this purpose, the following orders were issued: to Army Corps A to withdraw during night from Ardiz Dag and Chal Dag to the line Sari Halil – Ilija; to Army Corps C to maintain its positions, turning its right flank slightly to the south to establish liaison with Army Corps A; and to Army Corps B to reconnoitre the line it would occupy west of the Sangarius, between the Porsuk river and the Kavuju Kopru bridge (Sketchmap 47).

Army Corps A withdrew from Ardiz Dag and Chal Dag at about midnight without the Turks' becoming aware of the divisions' departure from the front line. The corps reassembled in the area of Sari Halil – Yenimehmetli – Toydemir. II Division occupied the heights east of the village of Sari Halil. XII Division deployed on the ridges that run down to the Sapanja torrent. I Division encamped assembled near the village of Yenimehmetli, where the Headquarters of Army Corps A was located.

The units in the Karapinar area began moving since 0100 of 30 August. The Cavalry Brigade arrived at Sari Halil, and the joint detachment of XII Division in the Ilija area, to cover the left flank of Army Corps A. On the morning of 31 August, the units of the joint detachment of XII Division encamped to the east of Ilija came under Artillery and Infantry fire from the Turkish 2 and 3 Cavalry Divisions, and engaged them in combat. When the

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detachment was informed that its division was at Toydemir, disengaged and withdrew in that direction.

The Turkish forces discovered the withdrawal of Army Corps A at about 0800 of 30 August, and moved immediately to pursue. Their movement, however, was slow, and by dusk they had not crossed the line Sivri – Ordek Golu.

233. Following the successful disengagement of Army Corps A and its approach to the Sangarius river, the Field Army decided to withdraw during the night of 30/31 August to the west of the river and deploy on the Gozleyik Tepe – Boyalik saddle – Boz Dag line. The fording of the Sangarius would be covered by Army Corps C, which would cross last but during the same night. The Field Army's order, issued at 1330 on 30 August, specified that Army Corps B would make the crossing first, using the Tepekoy and Kavuju bridges; that Army Corps A would cross the river by way of the Kavuju and Besh Kopru bridges; and finally Army Corps C would cross at the Kara Elias and Tepekoy bridges. The movement of Corps A and C was to begin at 1900.

At 1830 on 30 August, Army Corps B began moving towards the Sangarius, and crossed the river at the prescribed points. It then moved on to its new positions and deployed V Division from the Porsuk river up to the Boyalik saddle (inclusive), and XIII Division from south of Boyalik up to Chardakozu Dere.

Army Corps A began its movement towards the river at 1600, crossed over the Kavuju and Tepekoy bridges, and assembled to the right (south) of Army Corps B. XII Division, to which the joint detachment had been reattached, deployed defensively on the eastern and southern skirts of Boz Dag, covering the Field Army's right flank. I and II Divisions encamped in the Merjan area and north of Kurtlar, respectively.

During the night of 29 August, Army Corps C had X Division moved from the Karayafsan area to the heights north of Sari Halil, and moved the right flank of IX Division from Tashlik Tepe to the heights southeast of Bayburt (Sketchmap 46). All these movements were conducted according to the aforementioned orders of the Field Army, and aimed at the establishment of liaison between Army Corps C and left flank of Army Corps A.

On 30 August while all was quiet on the right flank of Army Corps C, and in the center, IX Division successfully repulsed Turkish reconnaissance in force, the left flank was subjected to fierce attacks. From 1630, the Turkish army corps launched an attack employing 1 and 23 Divisions with the capture of Kartal Tepe and the southwest heights as its objective. The Turkish forces attacked two battalions of 22 Infantry Regiment, which were defending these positions. The battalion on the right held fast, but the other battalion, on Kartal Tepe, was forced to withdraw. However, a timely intervention by VII Division restored the integrity of the defensive line. Further south, the Turkish 17 Division attacked in the direction of Kara Dag, but was repulsed by the Greek sections there.

Two hours later, the Turkish army corps launched another fierce attack, this time employing its 15 Division, towards Beylik Kopru and Kara Elias. The determined resistance of the Greek soldiers and the accuracy of Greek Artillery fire successfully met and frustrated every Turkish effort until the late afternoon. At about 1930, the right flank of the forces holding the Gordium sub–sector was overrun by the enemy, and the involved units pulled back towards the bridge at Kara Elias. The remaining units held their positions until 2100 when they also withdrew in the same direction and deployed about two kilometers north of the bridge. The battle continued into the night and, at 2320, the Turks attempted to breach the front line southeast of Ezineli. The Turkish assault was exceptionally fierce, but was nonetheless repulsed with bayonets and hand grenades by troops of 37 Infantry Regiment. When this last enemy offensive petered out the battle came to an end.

234. After 1800 of 30 August, Army Corps C units began moving towards the Sangarius. X Division moved first, from the Sari Halil area to Tepekoy, (Sketchmap 47) crossed the river on the bridge north of the village, and continued on to Demirjikoy, where it encamped at 1100 of 31 August. At 2100 of 30 August, IX Division also moved to Tepekoy. Then it crossed the Sangarius on the bridges there, and arrived by dusk at Demirjikoy, where it encamped. Upon its arrival at Demirjikoy IX Division was again subordinated to Army Corps B. The departure of these two divisions from their sectors and their movement to new positions across the river were covered by rearguard units and were accomplished without incident. VII Division plus the attacked troops of III Division simulated combat activities until midnight of 30 August, retired in small sections towards the Kara Elias bridge an started crossing it by 0130 of 31 August. After its unhindered withdrawal and crossing of the river it continued to Demirjikoy and remained there. III Division encamped farther north at Ahmet Teke.

When the last elements of Army Corps C had crossed to the left bank of the Sangarius, the relocation of the Field Army with all armament and equipment to the west of the river was complete. The bridges that had been constructed by the Engineers were dismantled and the bridging equipment transported. The remaining bridges, except the Fethioglu bridge, were destroyed. This important operation was well coordinated and executed unhindered and without any pressure by the enemy.

According to the Field Army's orders of 30 August, Army Corps C was

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to occupy the left flank of the disposition, from the Porsuk river northwards. For this purpose III Division, on 1 September, deployed on the line between Gozleyik Tepe and the Porsuk river. At the same time, the joint detachment of Mihalichchik was reinforced with the two battalions of 16 Infantry Regiment that had been attached to VII Division, as well as with three divisional Cavalry units. This was done because of the presence of strong enemy Cavalry forces in the areas of the Balikchi and Hamam bridges. VII and X Divisions moved from Demirjikoy to Bicher, crossed the Porsuk river on 2 September, and encamped north of the river.

Army Corps B completed its defensive deployment in the sector between the Porsuk and Chardakozu Dere, and continued to improve the positions of its units and their defensive organization.

On 2 September, Army Corps A moved with II Division towards Dumrek. I Division, with the Cavalry Brigade, were in the Sivrihisar area. XII Division was temporarily placed under the command of Army Corps B, retaining its positions on Boz Dag, covering the right flank of the Field Army.

Offensive Operations by the Turks
Sketchmap 47

235. On the morning of 30 August, the Turkish Muretep (Raiders) Division with the area of Yunak roughly forty–five kilometers to the southeast as its base ridge attacked with particular ferocity and captured the Fethioglu bridge (Sketchmap 47). The 1 Engineer Battalion, guarding the bridge, was taken by surprise and quickly retired to Uzunbey. From there the battalion moved to Kozagach, where it joined to the non–divisional units of Army Corps A. The Muretep Division remained in the area all that day, and moved north after nightfall. At 1100 the next day, 31 August, it attacked and captured the town of Sivrihisar. In this action, the Turkish division met no obstacle because there were no Greek combat units stationed in the town, but only Medical units and various formations whose men fled to the surrounding heights.

As soon as the Field Army was informed, in the afternoon of 31 August, of the capture of Sivrihisar, it immediately dispatched the Cavalry Brigade there, and on the following day the whole of I Division, with orders to mop up the area as far as Sangarius. In the evening of 1 September, I Division arrived at dusk at the village of Kojas where it encamped. Then it linked up with the command of the Cavalry Brigade, which had gained contact with the Turkish division on the heights around the village of Kizilja Mese.

On the morning of 2 September, I Division employed its 5 Infantry Regiment in an attack against Sivrihisar, which was captured without particular difficulty. Meanwhile, its 1/28 Evzone Regiment drove back the main force of the Muretep Division from the heights of Ada Tepe. The Turkish division under the accurate Greek Artillery fire and the pressure of the Evzone regiment began to flee in disorder towards the Fethioglu bridge. The pursuit was not, however, continued as far as the Sangarius. Consequently, the Turkish division crossed the river and deployed south of the bridge. Its fire from these positions hindered the joint detachment in approaching the bridge it had been sent to destroy. Thus, the Fethioglu bridge remained intact and under the control of the Turks.

The next day, 3 September, I Division assembled in the Sivrihisar area, covering the Field Army's right flank. The Cavalry Brigade took up positions farther south, with the mission to survey the routes from the river to Sivrihisar.

236. The activities of the Turks along the Sangarius front on 2 and 3 September were particularly intense. They launched attacks at various points. North of the Porsuk, the Turkish 1 Cavalry Division pushed back a small unit of the joint detachment of Mihalichchik and seized the heights dominating the Balikchi Kopru bridge. Farther south, Turkish 23 Division established a bridgehead immediately west of the village of Koseler. The Turks attempted to establish another bridgehead in XII Division's sector, in line with the village of Yenije, but failed.

On the morning of 23 September, the Turks continued their effort to penetrate the line north of the Porsuk. 1 Cavalry Division moved forward to the south and captured Kartal Tepe. Then Greek Army Corps C moved its X Division towards Mihalichchik. The division drove the Turkish raiders back across the Sangarius. In the Koseler area, the Turkish 23 Division strengthened its bridgehead, assigning a full regiment to man it. In the early afternoon, the entire III Division launched a counterattack, overran the Turkish sections and pursued them towards the river. To avoid being taken prisoner, many Turks leapt into the Sangarius and were swept away by the current.

At noon of 3 September, units of Turkish 57 Division crossed the Sangarius south of the Porsuk river and, attacked IV Division with the support of light and Heavy Artillery. At about dusk the Turkish sections were driven back across Sangarius following a successful counterattack. Of the attacking Turkish sections the greatest losses were sustained by the regiment of 5 Division. This regiment had crossed the river at night and in the morning of 3 September attacked XII Division. The division counterattacked fiercely and pursued the Turks towards Sangarius. Meanwhile the Artillery had destroyed the bridge hastily constructed by the Turks. When the Turkish troops discovered that, they began leaping into the river in groups and many drowned, while the less daring preferred captivity.

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Retirement of the Field Army from the Sangarius River
Sketchmap 48

237. The Hellenic Field Army, intending to deploy on the line between Dagjilar – Chevisli – east of Eskishehir, (Sketchmap 48) informed the army corps in this regard on the evening of 3 September. Retirement from positions west of the Sangarius would begin on the evening of 4 September, and the movement would continue westwards with the occupation of successive lines on the ground. The first line was fixed at the heights of Mihalichchik – Koltan – Teke Veran.

In compliance with the Field Army's orders, Army Corps B and C moved, and reached unhindered the above and deployed there. Army Corps C deployed north of Porsuk, with the joint detachment on Kartal Tepe and the heights around Mihalichchik, and III Division on the line between Hamam Tepe and the Porsuk. As for the remaining two divisions, III Division encamped near the village of Dinozu, and X Division near the village of Korju. Army Corps B deployed south of the Porsuk, with V Division on its left between the village of Igdejik and Chal Dag , not included, and XII Division on Chal Dag (Hill 1190) and on the heights east of Teke Veran. IX Division assembled and encamped near the village of Karkin.

Having had not been able to harass the Hellenic Field Army during its crossing of the Sangarius, the Turks retained the bulk of their forces east of the river and conducted only Cavalry operations. 1 Cavalry Division was restricted to the harassment of the northernmost units of the Greek disposition. In contrast, the Turkish V Army Corps, as the V Group of Divisions (Cavalry) was redesignated, moved to the south of the Hellenic Field Army in an effort to cut off its withdrawal.

On 4 September, the Turkish V Army Corps (Cavalry), reinforced with 8 Infantry Division and the Muretep Division, arrived in the area of Chifteler via the southern branch of the Sangarius where it deployed 8 Division and the Infantry units of the Muretep Division on the right bank of the Seydi Su. The next day, 5 September, it forwarded its 2 and 3 Cavalry Divisions in the direction of Eskishehir, and its 14 Cavalry Division towards Sivrihisar. The latter, however, clashed with Greek I Division and was forced to return by the same route to Chifteler without having accomplished anything.

When, on the morning of 5 September, the Hellenic Field Army was informed of the movements of the Turkish Cavalry, it assigned their pursuit to Army Corps A, which it reinforced with IX and X Divisions. According to its new mission, Army Corps A moved westwards from 6 September. X Division moved from Korju to Aziziye Kishla. II Division, which had arrived on 5 September at Balchik Hisar via Yayikli and Halilbagi, moved forward on 6 September towards Hamidiye. When the division's advance guard appeared,

some units of Turkish Cavalry that had been observed in the Sulker area retired towards the south.

While moving from Karkin towards Kaymaz, IX Division drove back an enemy force that had occupied the heights around that village. I Division, with the Cavalry Brigade, moved from Sivrihisar to the heights round the village of Yaveroren.

At the same time as Army Corps A was moving westwards, the Independent Division,[1] under the command of Lieutenant General Georgios Leonardopoulos, was moving eastwards in the opposite direction. On 3 September this division arrived at Eskishehir from Kios, and on 5 September moved on to Derbent, except for one Infantry regiment which moved to Alpakoy to secure the bridges there. The next day, 6 September, the division deployed a detachment as a standing flank guard on Kizil Tepe Hill. This detachment comprised one Infantry battalion, one Artillery platoon, and a small force belonging to the Military Command of Seyitgazi. The division then moved on towards Hamidiye, while at the same time its regiment deployed in the direction of Alpakoy, occupied positions on Sari Kovanja Dag.

As soon as the Turkish Cavalry divisions, which had penetrated the rear of the Hellenic Field Army, observed the converging movement of the Greek divisions they rushed to evade the pincer. 2 Cavalry Division withdrew to Chifteler, and 3 Cavalry Division towards Chichegiz area through the Sultan Dere Valley and the upper valley of Bardakchi Su. The results of this daring penetration were meagre. Except for causing slight disturbances in the movement of the Hellenic Field Army, they succeeded in disrupting only temporarily the wire communications between the Field Army and Eskishehir, and attacking a supply convoy, destroying twelve loaded trucks.

238. Army Corps B and C continued to pull back without hindrance. By midnight on 6 September, they had occupied the predetermined line Kartal Tepe – Yayikli – Kinik.

Army Corps C, holding Kartal Tepe with the joint detachment of Mihalichchik, now deployed III Division between Kartal Tepe and the Porsuk, near the Yayikli bridge. VII Division encamped in the area of Ashagi Dudash. South of the Porsuk river, V, XIII, and XII Divisions of Army Corps B deployed from north to south along the Porsuk – Karkin – Kinik line.

1. The Independent Division was first formed at the beginning of June 1921, in Athens and in Eastern Thrace. It comprised three Infantry regiments (51, 52, and 53), one Field Artillery battalion and one Pack Artillery battalion, a divisional Cavalry unit, an Engineer company, a Headquarters company, and other units. It was stationed in the areas of Rhaedestus, Tyroloi, and Luleburgaz in Eastern Thrace. It was under the direct command of the Ministry of the Army.

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On 7 September, the Independent Division deployed on the heights Malyabashi Tepe. From the units of Army Corps A, X Division deployed on the heights of Orta Tepe, IX Division arrived at Mahmudiye, II Division remained at Hamidiye, and I Division with the Cavalry Brigade deployed on the heights of Cherkes Chal (Hill 1136).

After the Turkish Cavalry divisions withdrew towards the south, the Hellenic Field Army of Asia Minor ordered the Independent Division to return to Derbent. The division moved from Malyabashi at noon of 8 September, towards its destination, following the road through Seyitgazi. It was, however, into this area that the Turkish 8 Division had already been forwarded earlier the same day. This division moved from Chifteler under orders to occupy the heights between Mejidiye and Seyitgazi. Sections of this division attacked the small force of the Military Command of Seyitgazi, no larger than two companies, which was then at the outskirts of the town. The divisional Cavalry of the Independent Division preceding the main force joined the engagement and warned 53 Infantry Regiment that formed the division's advance guard. 53 deployed immediately and began moving towards the heights southeast of Seyitgazi. Turkish 8 Division, in occupying vantage points, reacted swiftly and began, as of 1300, to press 53 Regiment, whose right flank was faltering. A timely intervention by the Independent Division's Command first checked the Turkish attack with Artillery fire, and then assumed the offensive employing its other regiment, 51. The Turks, under heavy pressure from accurate Artillery fire, and from the Greek Infantry, began, at 1545, to withdraw towards the south. Around 1700 the combat was over and further contact with the Turkish division was lost. Having detected the movement of Greek II Division from Hamidiye towards Chichegiz, the Turkish division hastened its withdrawal to avoid having its escape route cut off. After the engagement, the Independent Division assembled and encamped at Seyitgazi.

Deployment of the Field Army in the Defensive Area East of Eskishehir
Sketchmap 48

239. The Field Army of Asia Minor issued an order in the afternoon of 7 September 1921, fixing the timing of further movement of its units until their arrival in the defensive area they were assigned to occupy. This area, about forty–five kilometers east of the city of Eskishehir, included, from north to south, the heights of Dagjilar (Hill 1160), Yurek Pinar Tepe, Jemeli Tepe, Orta Tepe, Duz Tepe, Malyabashi Tepe, and the heights around the village of Chevisli (Sketchmap 48). It was planned that two army corps would occupy this defensive area: on the left, Army Corps C from the heights of Dagjilar to Seydi Su, and on the right, Army Corps B from the Seydi Su up to the heights of Chevisli, inclusive. The reserve of the Field Army, comprising Army Corps A, the Independent Division, and the Cavalry Brigade, would assemble in the

Eskishehir area. The Headquarters of the Field Army was established in that city on the evening of 7 September.

Movement towards the defensive positions and assembly areas began on the morning of 8 September. Of the Army Corps A divisions, the II moved from Hamidiye to Chichegiz area. The X, which was already deployed on the Orta Tepe heights, extended its disposition farther north through Jemeli Tepe up to the right sector of Army Corps C. IX Division moved from Mahmudiye and deployed on the left sub–sector of Army Corps B on the heights Duz Tepe and Malyabashi Tepe. I Division remained on the Cherkes Chal heights, surveying the Turkish forces in the Chifteler area. The Cavalry Brigade moved to Eskishehir independently from I Division.

According to the orders of the Field Army, on 8 September Army Corps B and C withdrew from the line Kartal Tepe – Kinik, and occupied the line Don Tepe – Uzun Burun – Buyuklu Tepe – Cherkes Chal (not included).

The next day, 9 September, IX and X Divisions were detached from Army Corps A and returned to their parent corps. I Division arrived at Hamidiye, where Army Corps A Headquarters was also located. Army Corps B and C, continuing their movement to the west, entered the defensive area. Army Corps C completed the defensive disposition, deploying III Division in the sector north of Porsuk, and reinforcing it with an Infantry regiment from VII Division. The VII Division minus the above mentioned regiment, encamped at the village of Bahchejik as a reserve force of Army Corps C. The joint detachment of Mihalichchik was dissolved, and the 16 Infantry Regiment, which was its main force, moved to join its parent XI Division, in the area southeast of Askoy Lake.

In the evening of 9 September, Army Corps B encamped in the area of Aksakli. The next day, the corps forwarded V Division southeast of Seyitgazi to the right of the defensive area, from Malyabashi Tepe (not included), to Chevisli, (included). XIII Division encamped in the area of the villages Yenikoy and Urban.

The disposition of Army Corps B and C in the defensive area of Eskishehir was completed on the evening of 10 September, while the assembly of the Field Army reserve was completed on the evening of 11 September. Army Corps A established its Headquarters at Eskishehir, and I and XII Divisions encamped in the area between the village of Sultaniye and the Sultan stream. The next day, 12 September, XII Division relocated to Muttalip, north of Eskishehir. II Division, moved from the Chichegiz area to Seyitgazi on 10 September, and then relocated to Afyon Karahisar to reinforce the Southern Group of Divisions. The same day, the Independent Division moved from Seyitgazi to Eskishehir and three days later advanced to the Avgin – Sogut sector in order to cover Eskishehir from the direction of Boz Dag. Its regiment

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that had remained at Sari Kovanja Dag joined the division there. Finally the Cavalry Brigade, arrived and encamped at Eskishehir on 10 September.

Following a proposal of Army Corps C, the Field Army approved the shift of the corps' defensive disposition farther west, with the heights of Orta Tepe as pivot point. The new areas which were judged more advantageous, had been occupied by Army Corps C before the offensive operations against Ankara. The left of this new area anchored on Boz Dag and included the heights of Dede Tepe, Sidikli Kaya, Sari Kovanja Dag, and Orta Tepe. The boundary between Army Corps B and C remained the Seydi Su. Deployment on the new positions was completed on 14 September. III Division occupied the sector north of the Porsuk, and X Division the sector south of the river. VII Division encamped, as reserve, in the area of the villages Hasan Bey and Karahoyuk. Army Corps C Headquarters was established at Eskishehir.

As it withdrew westwards, the Field Army destroyed the railway line. The eight–kilometer section of track east of the Sangarius was destroyed on 30 August by VII Division, and the 130–kilometer section west of the river was destroyed by 2 Rear Area Engineer Battalion, which had been reinforced with an Engineer company from VII Division. The destruction of the railway line, as well as that of every sort of technical and mechanical installation, was thorough, and accomplished to a degree that precluded the possibility of repair for many months.

240. The Field Army of Asia Minor, withdrawing westwards from its positions on the Sangarius to deploy in the defensive area east of Eskishehir, neglected to report its intention to the government, although it had received an order to propose the line it was planning to occupy. On 1 September therefore, the minister of the army asked the prime minister to approve the order, according to the opinion of the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Viktor Dousmanes, that the Field Army should remain in its positions on the west bank of the Sangarius. The objective aim was to maintain morale and to increase political pressure on the enemy. The prime minister, however, considered it advisable to wait for the relevant proposal of the Field Army, according to the orders that had been issued up to that time and the views of the government, as they were expounded in its telegram of 2 September.

The military situation, needed by the government for political reasons, should have placed the opponent in such a position where the threat posed by his operations should be as limited as possible. Priority was therefore given to the destruction of transportation lines and removal of resources from all territory evacuated by the Greek forces. If the line of defense that would be occupied by the Field Army met the foregoing prerequisites, and permitted a reduction of forces, there would then follow an appropriate organi-

zation of the occupied territory and exploitation of its resources to cover a part of the war expenses. In the new circumstances, the government foresaw a basis for secured activity on the political front. It was certainly necessary that the defensive line to be occupied should be located at the greatest possible distance from that which would be finally claimed, and that it should be extended northwards to the Black Sea, so as to cut off Constantinople. The minister of the army communicated the foregoing views and concerns of the government to the Field Army by telegram on 4 September 1921. At the same time, he ordered it to propose the most appropriate line of withdrawal. The Field Army did not receive the telegram until the night of 7 September, three days after the withdrawal, when the divisions had already begun to retire from the Kartal Tepe – Kinik line. Meanwhile, the minister of the army had been apprised of the Field Army's intention to deploy to the east of Eskishehir, and he ordered that the withdrawal be suspended, since there was no pressure from the enemy. The prime minister, although he was surprised by the action taken by the Field Army, ascribed it to pressure from the Turkish forces and did not consider it advisable to intervene. He recommended only that the Field Army be reminded that the order of 28 August was still in effect, i.e., to take its decisions and act in accordance with military expedience. When the commander of the Field Army received the order to suspend the withdrawal, he reported that he acted on the basis of his memorandum, which had been approved by the Council of War of Kutahya and provided for the reestablishment of the Field Army at the line east of Eskishehir in case of its return. He also expounded his reasons for preferring this line, and raised again the question of his replacement in the event that he should cease to enjoy the confidence of the government.


The minister of the army, in compliance with the prime minister's recommendations, reminded the Field Army that it must regulate its decisions and actions in accordance with military expedience, and that there was no question of replacing its commander.

The Battle of Afyon Karahisar

Sketchmaps 48, 49

241. After the Hellenic Field Army crossed the Sangarius, the Turkish Field Army of the Western Front continued to maintain the bulk of its forces to the east of the river, proceeding with the reorganization of its units and the replenishment of its supplies. The five Turkish groups of divisions were redesignated I to V Army Corps comprising three divisions each. The III and XII Groups of Divisions were dissolved, as were 5, 9, and 24 Divisions. The newly organized army corps was designated the III Army Corps. In addition, the Kojaeli Group was established again, comprising 17 Division and a Cavalry regiment. 8 Division and the Muretep Division were attached temporarily to V Army

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Sketchmap 49. The Battle Afyon Karahisar, 17–25 September 1921.

Corps (Cavalry) in the area of the village of Bordi, while 6 Division continued to be independent and remained in the area south of Afyon Karahisar.

The Turkish Field Army, after its V Army Corps' unsuccessful raid on the southern flank of the Hellenic Field Army, sent its II Army Corps, comprising 4, 7, and 3 Caucasus Divisions, forward towards Afyon Karahisar (Sketchmap 49). The corps, moving along the routes south of the Sangarius, would reach Afyon Karahisar area and join V Army Corps and 6 Division. The abovementioned forces comprised nine divisions, six Infantry and three Cavalry, and would operate to isolate and crush the Greek forces, capture the city of Afyon Karahisar, and cut Greek communications to Smyrna.

The Hellenic Field Army of Asia Minor received timely intelligence from the Aviation corps of the movements of the Turkish forces, and reinforced with the II Division its Southern Group of Divisions, which was responsible for the security of the southern sector. On 12 September, II Division moved from Seyitgazi and, on 14 September, reached the Hamamalti railway station. On the morning of 15 September, Turkish columns were observed moving from Amorium towards Aziziye. It became evident that their destination was Afyon Karahisar. Then I Division moved from Derbent towards the threatened area, and XII Division moved from Muttalip towards Derbent (Sketchmap 48). In the evening, the Field Army took a new decision and ordered the relocation of the entire Army Corps A, including XII Division, towards Afyon Karahisar. On reaching its destination, the corps would assume command of all forces in that area.

On 16 and 17 September, Turkish Cavalry detachments were actively seeking engagement with the Greek units in II Division's sector. To expel them, on 17 September, II Division forwarded its 7 Infantry Regiment forward to Abanaz, where it seized the heights east of the village. The Turkish forces there, approximately 1000 cavalrymen and an Artillery platoon, retreated eastwards after a brief engagement (Sketchmap 49).

On 14 September, IV Division withdrew from the areas of Bolvadin and Chay to the Gebejiler – Chobanlar – Ishiklar line, and assembled at Afyon Karahisar on 17 September. 49 Infantry Regiment (minus battalion) of the Southern Group of Divisions that had retired from Bal Mahmut arrived at Inas.

On 18 September, the Command of II Division with its 1 Infantry Regiment moved forward to the Chikrik – Abanaz line, and completed its occupation. To achieve this it became necessary to engage and overrun strong Turkish Cavalry units which were accompanied by an Artillery platoon. On the same day, enemy forces were located in the Inje Karahisar area. These comprised approximately 8,000 troops that had come from Aziziye. Another force,

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of approximately 1,000 men, was observed moving in column from Kalejik Dag towards Muttalip Dag.

242. At noon of 18 September, the Commander of Army Corps A, Major General Alexandros Kontoules, accompanied by a part of his Staff, arrived at Afyon Karahisar and assumed command of the military forces in the area, while the Southern Group of Divisions was dissolved as a separate command. The next day, I Division arrived at Hamamalti, at which time 34 Infantry Regiment and the Pack Artillery battalion, which had remained there, returned to II Division.

Army Corps A, comprising thus sufficient forces, decided to take the initiative of beginning on 20 September. It ordered on the following day I Division to capture the line heights northeast of Hayram Baba, heights northeast of Ayazini – Sinvirli Tepe – In Tepe, and II Division to capture the heights east of the villages of Kozluchay and Chikrik, as well as those around the village of Chaltilar. IV Division was ordered to capture the village of Chaltilar, with joint detachment supporting II Division.

The attack began in the late hours of 20 September. I Division operated in two columns, each comprising an Infantry regiment and a battery. The left column comprising 4 Infantry Regiment captured after combat the heights northeast of Hayram Baba and Ayazini. The right column comprising 1/38 Evzone Regiment captured the heights of Agin Tepe, moved along the ridgeline up Sinvirli Tepe and arrived up to its southwest fringes. II Division's 7 Infantry Regiment captured after fierce struggle highest summits of Gozelim Dag (Hill 1326), that dominated the lower valley of Koru Dere. The Turks tried to recapture those heights but they failed and withdrew to positions on lower ground. II Division forwarded 1 Infantry Regiment to the left of 7 Infantry Regiment. 1 Infantry Regiment jumped off from Chikrik and captured the northern ridges of Gozelim Dag. IV Division's detachment, comprising four Infantry battalions and a battery, jumping off from Afyon Karahisar, after a fierce battle, captured the heights east of the line between Susuz – Chukurkoy.

As the attack by Army Corps A developed, a strong force of Turkish 6 Division attacked a battalion of 35 Infantry Regiment on Muttalip Dag, overran it, and began advancing quickly towards the villages of Erkmen and Chakir, west of Afyon Karahisar. At the same time, the Turkish Artillery began shelling the city. IV Division now intervened in combat and dispatched a battalion of 8 Infantry Regiment, its only unit available in the city, towards Chakir. As it moved out, this battalion was augmented by sections of 35 and 49 Regiments, and launched a particularly fierce attack against the Turks' left flank, who were thus obliged to withdraw towards Kalejik Dag. 35 Regiment's battalion that had been overrun earlier, now deployed again on Muttalip Dag. In the evening, 41 Infantry Regiment of XII Division arrived and encamped at Afyon Karahisar. This division had departed from Derbent on 16 September and reached Inas on 20 September.

At 0500 on 21 September, the offensive was renewed. I Division, covering the left flank with its 4 Infantry Regiment, easily captured Sinvirli Tepe with its 1/38 Evzone Regiment. They continued the attack, with the same regiment towards Kara Arslan Tepe, and 5 Infantry Regiment towards In Tepe. Despite the strength of the enemy forces occupying these heights and their support with dense fire, the Greek troops had made considerable progress by nightfall and succeeded in seizing certain important vantage points near the ridgeline. Farther south, II Division forwarded its left flank and organized defensively on Gozelim Dag. IV Division, which had been reinforced with 49 Infantry Regiment as well, carried out offensive operations against Kalejik Dag, seizing it with the above regiment. After a struggle, the Turkish 6 Division retreated southwards.

The following day, 22 September, the attack continued without positive results. The units of I Division remained pinned down by heavy enemy fire. Only the battalion of 5 Infantry Regiment that held the extreme right flank seized after a storming attack and close combat with bayonets, a heavily fortified hill southeast of Bostanli. II Division employed its 1 Infantry Regiment in an attack against Olya Tepe, but it came under machine gun and Artillery fire, and was pinned down with heavy casualties.

Coordinating the operations of its divisions, Army Corps A, early on the morning of 23 September, ordered I Division to hold the opposite Turkish forces in check until II Division could seize Olya Tepe. Then the two divisions would operate in concert to capture the ridgeline Kara Arslan Tepe – In Tepe. II Division attacked at 0800, and its 1 Infantry Regiment, after a bloody engagement, seized the wooded hill of Olya Tepe. However, the unit had suffered heavy casualties and was unable to withstand the enemy's fierce local counterattack. Thus the hill fell again into the hands of the Turks. IV Division was ordered to complete the defensive line by seizing the heights around the village of Mihalich. The division's 35 Regiment captured the heights north of Seylet, which dominate Mihalich, but did not attempt to extend towards the latter, following approval of this tactic by Army Corps A.

On 24 September, Army Corps A maintained its occupied positions with the aim of combining its operations with those of Army Corps B, which was moving from the Seydi Valley towards the village of Bordi, to reinforce the engaged units.

243. Urgently needing to resolve the situation in Afyon Karahisar area, the Hellenic Field Army, decided to commit Army Corps B as well. On 22 Sep-

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tember, it assembled the corps in the Seyitgazi area, except IX Division, which occupied the corps' entire sector, from Seydi Su to the Chevisli heights (Sketchmap 48).

On the morning of 23 September, Army Corps B moved via the upper Seydi Su Valley towards the village of Bordi, under orders form the Field Army to attack the Turkish right flank in the direction of Inje Karahisar or farther east. The corps moved in two columns. The left (east) column comprised V Division, reinforced with an Infantry regiment and one Pack Artillery battalion of XIII Division. The right (west) column comprised the remaining units of XIII Division and the non–divisional units of the corps. Also following the right column was Major General Nikolaos Trikoupes, replacing Prince Andreas since the latter had gone on leave on 18 September. The columns arrived unhindered on the evening of 24 September, the first south of Yapildak, and the second at the Korsoglu saddle on Karabuyu Dag. Throughout the day, V Division's advance guard drove off the small enemy Cavalry units, which avoided battle and only kept contact. At night, the division was obliged to encamp in a defile, fifteen kilometers long, whose south exit was approximately four kilometers from Bordi (Sketchmap 49).


On the morning of 25 September, V Division exited the defile without encountering resistance and moved towards Bordi. At about dusk, the division overcame weak resistance and seized a small hill northeast of the village, and encamped in the area. The right column of XIII Division moved, via Ayazini and Kizil Veran, towards Bordi. That night, it encamped three kilometers west of the village. Because the route taken by the division was mountainous, its field formations remained with the non–divisional units of Army Corps B at Ayazini, where the Headquarters of the corps was also established.

Army Corps A informed the divisions of the arrival of Army Corps B north of Bordi, and its impending advance to the south and issued the necessary orders for coordination of the attack. However, it was not necessary to carry out the operations specified, because with the approach of Army Corps B to Bordi, the Turks hastened to abandon their positions and withdrew during the night of 24/25 September beyond the Bordi – Inje Karahisar line. When the withdrawal was discovered on the morning of 25 September, the entire disposition of Army Corps A advanced eastwards without any enemy resistance. I Division occupied the Kara Arslan Tepe – In Tepe line, II Division occupied the ridgeline dividing the Koru Dere valley from the plain of Afyon Karahisar, and IV Division occupied the heights west of the villages of Gebejiler and Chavdarli.

Casualties sustained in the battle of Afyon Karahisar were nine officers and ninety–six enlisted men killed, thirty–three officers and 470 enlisted men wounded, and twenty–two enlisted men missing in action.

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
HELLENIC ARMY GENERAL STAFF
ARMY HISTORY DIRECTORATE



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SKETCHMAP 54: THE DISPOSITION OF THE OPPONENTS (ZONE OF ARMY CORPS A AND B)
28 February 1922

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Sketchmap 50. Mopping up of Boz Dag, 22–23 September 1921.

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Mopping up of Boz Dag
Sketchmaps 48, 50

244. Simultaneously with their operations against Afyon Karahisar, the Turks were intensely active in the mountainous area of Boz Dag to the north of Eskishehir, where a strong Cavalry force was observed (Sketchmap 50). On 18 September, VII Division's 22 Infantry Regiment, which had relieved XII Division at Muttalip, sent a reconnaissance detachment of one battalion and battery towards Kuplu, twenty–five kilometers northwest of Eskishehir. Before reaching the village, the detachment encountered superior enemy forces and was forced to retire on the same day to Muttalip. Two centers of resistance were established for the control of Boz Dag: one at Atalan Tepe with a battalion of 22 Regiment and a battery, and the other south of the village of Buldak, on Hill 1355, with a battalion and an Artillery platoon of the Military Command of Eskishehir.

When the Field Army of Asia Minor was informed of the assembly of strong enemy forces on Boz Dag whose probable objective could have been an offensive against Eskishehir, it decided to conduct large–scale mop–up operations. For that purpose, on the morning of 22 September, the Field Army ordered the Independent Division, encamped in the Sogut – Avgin area, to operate in the direction of Kargil on the Sangarius river, and Army Corps C to move north, pacify Boz Dag, and push the Turkish forces it encountered north of Sangarius.

The Independent Division organized a detachment of two battalions and battery which moved out the same day and by nightfall had occupied the heights north of the village of Chalkara without encountering any resistance. Army Corps C employed VII Division, which after relieving 22 Regiment at Muttalip with 37 Infantry Regiment, moved towards Boz Dag with the 22 and 23 Regiments. During this movement, the two columns of the division gained contact with the Turkish 1 Cavalry Division, overran them easily, and continued their advance. The next day, 23 September, they occupied the ridgeline between Atalan and Kazan Kaya, and pursued the Turks to the Sangarius.

After completing the mop–up of Boz Dag, during which operation it was found that no significant Turkish forces were in the area, the Field Army assigned XI Division and the Independent Division to the Command of Army Corps C. XI Division remained as it was, in the area south of Askoy Lake. The Independent Division was assigned to the center of resistance on Atalan Tepe, and assembled in the Muttalip area, with one of its regiments in the Sogut – Avgin area. VII Division returned to its encampment in the Hasan Bey – Karahoyuk area, except 37 Infantry Regiment which reinforced X Division. This division extended its zone of responsibilities southwards to the heights of Chevisli, ten kilometers south of Seyitgazi (Sketchmap 49), occupying IX Division's sector as well. IX Division assembled at Seyitgazi and, on 24 September, began moving towards Bordi to rejoin Army Corps B. However,

because the battle of Afyon Karahisar had meanwhile come to an end, the division was ordered to remain farther north, in the Akin area. After these redispositions Army Corps C occupied the entire line east of Eskishehir, from Boz Dag to Chevisli.

245. Thus ended the campaign to capture Ankara. This resulted in the Hellenic Army suffering 23,613 officers and enlisted men out of action. More specifically, according to the official data, casualties of the Hellenic Field Army of Asia Minor for the period from 1 August to 30 September 1921 were: 234 officers and 3,392 enlisted men killed, 750 officers and 18,594 enlisted men wounded, and three officers and 640 enlisted men missing in action. The drafting of the class of 1922, which followed, yielded approximately 30,000 conscripts. These, together with the lightly wounded who meanwhile had recovered, brought the Field Army's strength to the level of June 1921, i.e., before the major Greek offensive towards Kutahya.

According to the *Historical Archive of the Turkish Army*, total casualties of the Turkish Army of the Western Front, which opposed the Hellenic Army, from 1 August to 17 September 1921, were: 743 officers and 18,072 enlisted men out of action. Specifically there were: 145 officers and 2,704 enlisted men killed, 571 officers and 9582 enlisted men wounded, and twenty–seven officers and 5,043 enlisted men missing in action. These numbers do not include Turkish casualties sustained in the battle of Afyon Karahisar.

Such was the cost of the offensive operations against Ankara. Both of the belligerents had reason to be satisfied with the outcome of the operations. The Turks celebrated the salvation of Ankara, while the Greeks took pride in their victories at Tamburoglu, Kale Gozu, Sapanja, Chal, and Ardiz Dag. The failure to achieve the strategic objective of the operations, which was the capture of Ankara and the defeat of Kemalism, in no way dims the brilliant tactical successes of the Greeks.

Unquestionably the Hellenic Army dominated the battlefield of the Sangarius and, in almost every instance, put the enemy in a critical situation. The Army was obliged to return to its line of departure not because it had been defeated, but chiefly for lack of reserves, and because of the thorny problems of supply and maintenance created by the overextension of its lines of communication. It demonstrated an aggressive spirit, decisiveness, combat effectiveness, discipline, valour and heroism in adverse circumstances, but the coveted final victory did not come.

From this point on, diplomacy mainly could offer a solution to the problem of Asia Minor. Certainly Greece needed a solution as soon as possible, so as to avoid bankruptcy which would have catastrophic results in the field.

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PART III

The Turkish Offensive and the Evacuation of Asia Minor

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CHAPTER 8


Political and Military Developments after the Operations Against Ankara

Defensive Deployment of the Field Army

246. After the conclusion of operations against Ankara, the Field Army of Asia Minor directed its attention to the serious task of securing the transportation center of Afyon Karahisar because of its particular military importance at that time. In that area there was a salient in the front line. The one side of this salient running southwest covered from the east the areas of Seyitgazi and Eskishehir. The other side, running east–west, covered the transport lines towards Smyrna, the areas of Afyon Karahisar and Ushak, and the Maeander Valley. The salient of Afyon Karahisar was the weakest point of the front. Nearby and parallel to its sides ran the railway and telecommunications lines from Afyon Karahisar to Eskishehir and Smyrna (Sketchmap 51), serving the southern part of the front. These lines were vital for the supply and communications of the troops. Their protection and maintenance was a serious concern of the Field Army. It was therefore imperative to occupy and appropriately organize defensively the area on the ridgeline Kumalar Dag – Kuchuk Kalejik Dag – Muttalip Dag and the heights of Chaltilar and Karahisar. The forward center of resistance was to be either in the area of Bordi, or along the ridgeline between Kilich Arslan and Kuchuk Kalejik Dag and further south. The Field Army forwarded its intentions to Army Corps A, to which it left the choice of the appropriate defensive line, with the standing precondition to strongly cover the vital junction of Afyon Karahisar. Army Corps A chose the second area, judging the position both strong and better suited for the resupply of the units deployed there.

The Command of the Field Army was also greatly concerned with the problem of the inadequacy of its forces following the campaign against Ankara. It was obliged to hold a front of immense width while at the same time maintaining order in the interior of the occupied territory. The width of the front from the Kios Gulf to the Maeander estuary via Eskishehir and Afyon Karahisar was more then 700 kilometers, encompassing an occupied territory of 800,700 square kilometers. To accomplish its mission the Field Army had under its command twelve Infantry divisions, the Cavalry Brigade, and a number of rear area and Gendarmerie regiments. The strength of the Infantry units was significantly reduced due to very heavy losses of officers and enlisted men suffered in the battles of the Sangarius. Their replacement was possibly feasible as regards numbers but not quality, because those killed and wounded were experienced combat soldiers, difficult to replace. Also, the

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Sketchmap 51.
The Choice of the Area to Cover the Afyon Karahisar Junction.

morale of the troops had diminished due to the unsuccessful outcome of the operations. In contrast, the morale of the enemy had been raised by its successful defense and the withdrawal of the Hellenic Army. The number of Turkish Infantry divisions had grown from sixteen to twenty–three, with a combat strength of approximately 69,000. The five Cavalry divisions could field 5,000 horses. In the same period, the strength of the Hellenic Army came to a total of 177,000 men, of whom only 69,500 were combat troops.

After fixing and occupying the defensive area covering Afyon Karahisar, the Field Army was organized, as of 29 September, into groups with the following general disposition (Sketchmap 52):

The Headquarters of the Field Army, at Smyrna.

The **Northern Group**, under the command of Army Corps C, with Headquarters at Eskishehir, with five divisions occupying the northern part of the front, from the Kios Gulf to the Beloren heights, not included. To the extreme left i.e. the Kopruhisar sector deployed XI Division. To its right, Karakoy – Sogut sector, deployed the Independent Division, and farther south was Army Corps C, with Headquarters at Eskishehir. This Corps deployed its III Division in the Boz Dag sector, north of the Porsuk River, and X Division, reinforced with a regiment from VII Division, in the Kara Tokat sector, south of the river. VII Division (minus regiment) encamped at Hasan Bey as corps reserve. The reserve of the Northern Group comprised IX Division in the upper valley of the Seydi River, and the Cavalry Brigade at Eskishehir.

The **Southern Group**, under the command of Army Corps A, had its Headquarters at Afyon Karahisar and occupied, with four divisions, the southern part of the front, from the heights of Beloren to Akar Dag. On the left of its disposition was Army Corps B, with Headquarters at Kazli Gol Hamam, its XIII Division in the Agizoren sector, and, V Division to the XIII's right in the Kozluchay sector. To the right was Army Corps A, with XII Division in the Inje Karahisar sector, and IV Division, reinforced with 49 Infantry Regiment, in the Kalejik Dag – Savran sector. The former sector included the ridgeline west of Koru Dere up to the Akar River, and the latter Kalejik Dag and Akar Dag. Farther west, the remaining part of the front was secured by four battalions, two each in the Chivril and Buldan subsectors. I and II Divisions of Army Corps A, which encamped, respectively, at the villages of Buyuk Jorja and Erkmen, comprised the reserve of the Southern Group.

Security in the Rear Area Zone was the responsibility of local military commands, which had a total force of 18,800 men at their disposal.

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At the beginning of October 1921, intelligence reports referred to the movement of significant enemy forces from the Akshehir, Bolvadin, and Chay areas southwestwards to the Sandikli area, (south of Afyon Karahisar). The same reports said that Kemal was seeking a major military success before winter, that is, before the beginning of peace negotiations, which was expected in late winter or early spring. Kemal's intentions were confirmed both by energetic recruitment aimed at increasing the numerical strength of the Turkish Army, and by continuous shipments of military equipment from Italy and Russia. The Field Army believed that a Turkish attack on Afyon Karahisar, with simultaneous coordinated operations against Ushak and Philadelphia (Alashehir), was highly probable. Such an attack would have the objective to disrupt the Hellenic Army's lines of communication. To meet this contingency the Field Army asked for reinforcements.

According to the Field Army's intelligence reports, of the total of twenty–three Turkish Infantry and five Cavalry divisions, three Infantry divisions were in the Nicomedia (Izmit) area, five Infantry and three Cavalry divisions were in positions opposite the Northern Group, ten Infantry and two Cavalry divisions were deployed opposite the Southern Group, one Infantry division was at Sandikli, and two Infantry divisions were on the Maeander River. The positions of the remaining two Turkish divisions were not known.

Changes in the Disposition of Greek Forces in Order to Counter Turkish Offensive Actions

247. On the morning of 4 October 1921, the Turks attacked, employing limited forces, in the Burgaz and Chivril areas and were easily repulsed. The Field Army continued to expect a general Turkish attack against the front. The Turks had at their disposal only the Iconium railway line leading from the south towards the Greek positions. The Field Army therefore assumed that the main Turkish effort would be directed against Afyon Karahisar, where it was possible to assemble significant forces.

To meet this contingency the most advisable course of action, according to the Field Army, was a preemptive general attack before the launching of the Turkish offensive. However, such an operation was not possible due to the season of the year and troop fatigue. Thus, the strengthening of the defensive organization on the front continued. In addition, the Field Army Command decided to move its center of gravity farther south (Sketchmap 52). In accordance with this decision, on 16 October, the Cavalry Brigade moved from Eskishehir to the Ine – Gobek area south of Ushak, and on 18 October, IX Division moved from Akin to the Buyuk Jorja area northwest of Afyon Karahisar, both attached to the Southern Group. Following the relocation of IX Division, the units of I Division that were in the area moved to the area of Erkmen – Bal Mahmut.

Towards the end of October, I Division moved to the Tazler – Guney area south of Dumlupinar, and IX Division to the Bal Mahmut area. At the same time, VII Division assembled in the Ihsaniye area, also attached to the Southern Group. On 3 November, the Field Army reorganized the Cavalry Brigade to a division. By 3 January 1922, the Cavalry Division had assembled in the Magnesia – Salihli – Kasaba area, about 100 kilometers west of Ushak.

On 9 November, the Turks attacked the Chivril subsector, at the southwest bend of the Maeander, and succeeded in capturing the heights immediately north of Sogut, thirty kilometers southwest of Chivril. The weak Greek force there offered limited resistance and then withdrew towards Chivril. II Division then intervened, overran the attacking Turkish section and restored the integrity of the front line.

At the end of 1921, intelligence reports on the Turkish Army cited the same number of enemy divisions facing the Greek front line, i.e., twenty–three Infantry divisions, five Cavalry divisions and one Cavalry brigade, with a total strength of 91,000 men and 220 Artillery pieces. These forces were organized in three Field Armies: one occupying the section of the front line from the Kios Gulf to the sources of the Sangarius; another from that point to the Akar River; and the third from the Akar to Denizli, about forty kilometers southeast of Ortakchi.

Opposing these Turkish forces, the Hellenic Field Army had twelve Infantry divisions, the Cavalry Division, and seven independent Infantry regiments, with a total combat strength of 85,000 men and 370 Artillery pieces. In numbers, the Hellenic Army was therefore inferior to the Turkish Army by 6,000 men, but superior by 150 Artillery pieces. The Northern Group comprised four divisions and three Infantry regiments. The Southern Group comprised eight divisions and four Infantry regiments, as well as the Cavalry Division.

The Field Army was particularly concerned with the security of the southern part of the front, its most vital strategic area. It therefore kept a close watch on the activity of the Turkish forces, and continually transferred forces there from the Northern Group. The result was a loss of flexibility.

248. The disposition of Greek forces on 28 February 1922, after the various transfers and modifications, was as follows (Sketchmaps 53, 54):

Northern Group. Its defensive area was organized into the following four sectors and two independent subsectors:

The Kios subsector, with 47 Independent Infantry Regiment, from the Kios Gulf to the southwest shore of Askoy Lake.

The Kopruhisar sector, with XI Division (minus 16 Infantry Regiment), from the right of the Kios subsector to the Pelit Chay River.

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The Bilejik – Sogut subsector, with 16 Infantry Regiment of XI Division, to the right of the Kopruhisar sector.

The Porsuk – Boz Dag sector, with III Division, from the right of the Bilejik subsector to the Porsuk River.

The Kara Tokat sector, with X Division, from the right of the Porsuk sector to Malyabashi Tepe.

The Seyitgazi sector, with the Independent Division, from the right of the Kara Tokat sector to Kirka Yayla, the boundary of the Northern Group's area.

The strength of the Northern Group was 1,671 officers and 53,756 enlisted men, with 119 Artillery pieces. Its Headquarters remained at Eskishehir.

Southern Group. Its front had been divided into two zones, assigned to Army Corps A and B respectively. To the north was Army Corps B's zone, from the southern boundary of the Northern Group's area to the Akar River and to the south the zone of Army Corps A. Corps B's zone included two sectors:

The Bozhuyuk – Agizoren sector, with V Division, from the left boundary of the Southern Group's area in line with Kazli Gol Hamam.

The Inje Karahisar sector, with XII Division, from the right of the Bozhuyuk sector to the Akar River.

XIII Division remained in the Karajaahmet – Egret area as a reserve force for Army Corps B's zone. Army Corps B's Headquarters remained at Kazli Gol Hamam.

Army Corps A's zone was to the south, from the Akar River to the Feslik Chay River, a tributary of the Maeander (Sketchmap 55). Corps A's zone included three sectors:


The Kumalar Dag sector, with IV Division, from the Akar River to Akar Dag.

The Akar Dag sector, with I Division, from Akar Dag to the distance of the village of Sivasli, not included.

The Chivril – Buldan sector, with II Division and two independent Infantry regiments, from the right of the Akar Dag sector to the Feslik Chay River. IX Division remained in the Gobek area as a reserve force for this sector.

The reserve force of the Southern Group comprised VII Division, in the Bal Mahmut area.

The strength of the Southern Group was 2,381 officers and 103,483 enlisted men, with 244 Artillery pieces. Its Headquarters was established at Afyon Karahisar.



Sketchmap 53. The Disposition of the Opposing Forces, July 1922.

249. On 23 December 1921, the Commander of the Southern Group, Major General Nikolaos Trikoupes, forwarded a study according to which the Turkish offensive operation would most probably be directed either against the area west of Afyon Karahisar, or against the area of Banaz, with a simultaneous diversionary attack against the northern part of the same Group's front. The Southern Group held the view that, should these attacks succeed, they would bring the attacking units to the group's rear and would cut off the railway line to Smyrna and Eskishehir, and also communication between the Northern and Southern Groups impeding the launching of counterattacks by the forces of the Southern Group. As a measure for this contingency, the general counselled the launching of counterattacks separately in each sector.

Subsequently, Army Corps B was ordered to plan counterattacks towards Bolvadin – Chay, employing its three divisions north of the Akar River and, probably, the Independent Division of the Northern Group. Army

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Corps A's divisions (IV, VII, I, II, and IX), that were south and west of the Akar, were to formulate plans for counterattacks for the support of each by their neighboring divisions.

On 3 January 1922, Army Corps B submitted a plan in which it advised the occupation of the mountainous junction of Bordi, which constituted a fortified position, before launching the counterattack against the main objective, i.e. the Bolvadin – Chay line.

At the same time, the Northern Group ordered the Independent Division to prepare a rapid assembly at Akin, in order to launch a counterattack against Doger and farther east, on the left flank of the Southern Group. It also apprised the Southern Group that, in its view, the Independent Division should have moved farther south only in case of absolute necessity i.e. in the event that the enemy failed to launch a serious attack in the Northern Group's area. The Southern Group concurred with this view.

Similar studies for counterattacks were submitted to the Southern Group by I, II, IV, and VII Divisions deployed south of the Akar. IX Division would operate according to the plan of II Division, to which it was tactically subordinated.

Measures Taken by the Greek Government

250. Following the termination of operations against Ankara, the Kemalist government, having been delivered from the threat of the Hellenic Army, announced that it had achieved significant success. On its side, the Greek government was persuaded that the operations had secured the long–term occupation of Asia Minor without serious danger from the Turkish Army. The only causes for concern were the fatigue of the Greek combat troops due to their long service to arms, and the economic exhaustion of the country.

It was therefore imperative that a diplomatic solution to the Asia Minor question be sought quickly. To this end, it was decided that Prime Minister Demetrios Gounares and Foreign Minister Georgios Baltatzes, accompanied by technical advisors, would visit the capitals of the Allies. On 4 October 1921, they departed for Paris, with the sole mission of ascertaining the intentions of the Allies and the possibility of initiating peace negotiations. As for the solution of the economic problem, the government decided to make efforts in London to contract a loan, while it would proceed with exploitation of resources in the occupied territories of Asia Minor.

The Greek diplomatic delegation in Paris met with the French Prime Minister, Aristide Briand, who promised to make efforts to halt supplies of French equipment to the Kemalists. He was, however, opposed to the economic exploitation of occupied territories in Asia Minor. The delegation then went to London where it met repeatedly with the British Foreign Secretary,

Lord George Curzon. The latter expressed the sympathy of the British government for Greece, but pointed out that Greece must take public opinion in the Muslim world into serious account, noting that many millions of Muslims were British Commonwealth subjects. Also to be considered were the positions of the other Allied Powers, France and Italy. Finally, Curzon urged the Greek government to entrust the conclusion of a new peace treaty with Turkey to the Powers, since the Treaty of Sevres could no longer be implemented. In his view, if the new peace treaty were to be acceptable to all parties, it would have to be based on the autonomy of the Smyrna area under Christian local authority, yet still under the sovereignty of the Sultan. The Hellenic Army would remain in Asia Minor until the organization of a joint Gendarmerie by officers of the Allied Powers.

The so–called Curzon Plan had already been put forward in the proposals of March 1921. On 17 October 1921, the Greek delegation telegraphed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Athens that it was persuaded that if Greece failed to accept the terms of the Curzon Plan, it could hope for nothing more from Great Britain. The British desired the swift restoration of peace and the preservation of their ties to the other Allied Powers. Accordingly, the delegation proposed that the Curzon Plan be accepted. On 20 October, following the unanimous approval of the Greek cabinet, the delegation announced in London the Greek government's consent to the terms of the Curzon Plan.

The following day, 21 October 1921, the Greek delegation was received by the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, whom they informed of the military situation in Asia Minor. The prime minister declared to the delegation that he was unable to provide any positive assistance, but he promised that, in the course of the peace negotiations, he would put forth every effort to support Greece. He emphasized, however, that the Hellenic Army must not fail to maintain its positions in the occupied territories; otherwise, negotiation would be impossible.

251. While the Greek delegation was awaiting the expected peace conference, Prime Minister Demetrios Gounares was making efforts in the London financial market to contract a loan for the economic benefit of the country. In February of 1918, Britain, France, and the United States had issued credits to Greece in the total amount of 850 million drachmas. As of November 1920, France had made no payments at all on its share, nor had it paid any of its outstanding debt for the maintenance of its troops in Macedonia. Britain had remitted six and one half million of it its twelve million pound share, and the United States had sent only fifteen million of the agreed upon forty–eight million dollar share.

About one year later, on 22 December 1921, following efforts of the Greek government, the British government approved a loan of fifteen million

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pounds, on condition that Greece waive its rights to the remainder of the previous credits, which amounted to five and one half million pounds. However, this loan was never counted and Greece was forced to continue the war with its own economic resources.

The economic condition of Greece was truly tragic. National debt for the year 1921 exceeded 1600 million drachmas, and any new issue of currency would devalue the drachma. In the face of the economic difficulties in the maintenance of the army, the prime minister considered the evacuation of Asia Minor a last resort, but was deeply concerned about the fate of its Greek population. The government's military advisor, Major General Xenophon Strategos, whose opinion of the situation was sought by the prime minister, advised the abandonment of Asia Minor in the event that the economic problem remained unsolved. The Greek government was already on the horns of a dilemma: either demobilization and abandonment of Asia Minor, or a compulsory loan.

The economic solution was achieved by the Minister of Finance, Petros Protopapadakes, with his ingenious, original, and successful effort to contract a compulsory domestic loan. The currency in circulation at that time amounted to more than 3 billion drachmae. The minister's idea was to divide it in two, leaving in the bearers' hands just half of its value. The other half would be covered by the issue of interest–bearing government bonds, to be redeemed at par after twenty years. The relevant legislation was adopted on 24 March 1922. All bank notes then in circulation were to be cut in half. The half bearing the portrait of Georgios Staurou would have one half the face valued of the note, while the other half would represent one bond on deposit with the National Bank at six and one half per cent interest. Payment of the interest was to be assured generally by increases in direct and indirect taxes, by the liquidation of public real property, and by funds from other sources as provided by the law.

By this simple, innovative, and rapid method a domestic loan was secured, the proceeds of which strengthened the government's economic position by the sum of 1,5 billion drachmae. This significant financial help allowed Greece to continue the campaign, and was a signal to Europe and Turkey of its continuing policy in Asia Minor.

French and British Policy Shift

252. For long time France had sought release from its obligation to maintain a military force in Cilicia. Moreover, the Kemalist government was happy to entertain an agreement that would allow it to move Turkish troops from Cilicia to reinforce the Army of the Western Front. Towards the end of May 1921, the French government dispatched the former Minister Henry Franklin Boullion to Ankara. On 13 June (NS), Monsieur Franklin Boullion met with

Kemal and discussed a peace accord. After four months of negotiations, on 20 October 1921 (NS), the French government, represented by Franklin Boullion, signed an agreement with the Kemalist government ceding Cilicia to the Turks. The agreement comprised thirteen articles and provided for the cessation of hostilities, the exchange of prisoners, and the manner of evacuation of the territory by French troops and administrative apparatus in the Alexandretta area. This Franco–Kemalist Pact was ratified by the French government at the beginning of November 1921, and implemented immediately.

On 2 November, the Turks occupied Aydap[1], and there began an exodus of Greeks and Armenians from the region of Cilicia. The refugees moved towards the coast to escape the Turkish yoke. Because the British government had forbidden the transport of refugees to Cyprus, the Greek government sent ships which carried approximately 8000 Greeks and Armenians to the Greek Aegean Islands. On 4 September 1922 (NS), the Adana region was ceded to the Turks, at which time the new Kemalist commander prohibited the further emigration of Christians.

News of the Franco–Kemalist Pact distressed the Allies and strained relations between France and Britain. As a result, the conference for the resolution of the Asia Minor question was postponed. It was at this time that the French journalist Gauvain revealed the transfer of military equipment worth 200 million francs to the Kemalists from France. The disclosure inflamed public opinion, even in France itself, despite excuses offered by the French government that the equipment was intended for the organization of gendarmerie units in Cilicia. Nevertheless, relations between France and the Kemalists continued to be cordial.

Towards the end of December 1921, the unresolved question of German reparations was raised again, and this induced an accommodation of the Franco–British differences that had arisen over the Franco–Kemalist Pact It was agreed to resolve the problem of the German reparations at a conference of the Allied Powers at Cannes. The Greek representatives were notified to attend the conference for the purpose of examining the Asia Minor question.

The Conference of Cannes began its work in early January of 1921, and a separate agreement was struck between Britain and France. Britain gave guarantees of assistance against any German attack on France. In return, France agreed to support the British positions on the Asia Minor question, which was scheduled for discussion on 9 January. The British positions included the creation of an autonomous administration for Smyrna and its

1. Turkish city (modern Gaziantep), occupied in World War I by the French, marching from Syria, and ceded to Turkey in 1921.

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hinterland under the protection of the League of Nations, with an administrative committee of two indigenous Greeks, two Turks, and a president from another ethnic group, as well as a minor adjustment of borders in Thrace. French Prime Minister Briand agreed to support these proposals. When, however, Raymond Poincarré succeeded him, he postponed the Conference session of 9 January. New, fruitless, negotiations ensued, and the Conference was postponed again.

253. The fall of the Italian government, in the middle of January 1922, was the occasion for another, now indefinite, postponement of discussion of the Asia Minor question. In the face of this situation, the Greek prime minister, who was still in London, decided to state the Greek case to the British government in unequivocal terms. Before taking this step, the prime minister, on 23 January, asked for the opinion of the Field Army of Asia Minor regarding the military situation.

The response came on 26 January. The morale of the troops appeared to be high, and it was reported that the Turks held a slight superiority in Infantry and a large one in Cavalry and air power. In the same report the Field Army asked for reinforcement troops and additional funds. It also rejected the idea of pulling back to a new defensive line farther west of that currently occupied, because it considered such a move both militarily inexpedient and potentially erosive to morale. It expressed the view that the evacuation of Asia Minor would result in great discontent in the Army and would cause problems for the indigenous Greek population. In the event that the government would not be able to send the necessary reinforcements and funds, the evacuation of Asia Minor would be inevitable.

On 10 February, the Greek prime minister, having decided to return to Greece, composed, and conveyed to British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon a detailed memorandum on the Greek question. In it, he expounded the poor economic condition of the country and the reduced morale of the Hellenic Army due to the protraction of the war. He referred as well to the growing strength of the Kemalist Army, particularly of its Cavalry and aviation, due to shipments of equipment from France, Italy, and Russia. In conclusion, he emphasized that without assistance from the Allies in the form of money and military equipment Greece would be compelled to withdraw its Army from Asia Minor.

The prime minister arrived in Athens on 22 February, determined to order the evacuation of Asia Minor, but four days later his government fell. Then an attempt by Nikolaos Stratos to form a government failed, and the Gounares government was reconstituted. The new government awaited the reply of Lord Curzon in order to make its final decision on Asia Minor. The reply, which was delivered to the Greek chargé d'affaires in London on 6

March 1922 (NS), stated that the situation in Asia Minor was not considered to be as critical as was represented in the Greek memorandum. It recommended speeding up the efforts for a peace agreement by way of diplomatic channels, and expressed the view that, at the forthcoming conference, in Paris, the Asia Minor question would be the first to be considered. Following this, the Greek government deferred its decision on the evacuation until the conference, which was expected to convene in Paris near the middle of March 1922.

Meanwhile, Britain was influenced by the pro–Turkish sentiments among the Muslim populations of its various possessions around the world. When it realized France's efforts to appear as a protector of Muslims, Britain changed stance and began to be more moderate towards Turkey, with the aim to protect its own interests. Its policy had always sought to preserve its colonial empire and its supremacy on the seas. The British government followed events in Asia Minor with great interest, and by seeking accommodation with its Allies on issues that divided it from them, attempted to achieve a common allied effort to end the war in Asia Minor, the protraction of which would be harmful to British interests.

The Conferences of Paris and Genoa

254. On 9 March 1922, the foreign ministers of the three Allied Powers, Britain, France, and Italy, at last met in Paris to discuss the terms of peace. In the first official session, the representatives agreed to convey immediately to the belligerents their proposals for an armistice which would give the Allies the necessary time to work out the details of the general terms of peace.

The next day, 10 March, the French ambassador in Athens conveyed to the Greek government a diplomatic note urging the belligerents to accept a three–month ceasefire, with the purpose of preparing for the Hellenic Army's evacuation of Asia Minor. The adversaries would maintain their occupied positions with the bulk of their forces, while mutually withdrawing their outposts so as to form a neutral zone of ten kilometers breadth between the armies. Greece accepted the ceasefire with certain reservations regarding the question of military movements.

On 15 March, the French ambassador conveyed a new note with a full statement by the Allies containing an outline of peace proposals and expressing their desire to begin the conference within three weeks. Reference was made to the Greek government's acceptance of the ceasefire proposal, which aimed to ensure the Hellenic Army's peaceful evacuation of Asia Minor. The necessary steps to be taken were elaborated by a committee of military experts led by Field Marshal Foch. The time required for the evacuation was reckoned somewhat longer than four months. Further proposals included:

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various measures for the safety of minorities; terms of free maritime access through the Dardanelles; the security of Constantinople; definition of the international boundary in Thrace such that Rhaedestus would be in Turkish territory and Adrianople be ceded to Greece as compensation for the loss of Smyrna. Reference was also made to matters of the Turkish armed forces, to financial independence, and to the modification or elimination of capitulations (preferential agreements). The note concluded with the assertion that its proposals were subject to the judgement of the two interested parties, as well as that of the entire civilized world.

On 8 April (NS), the Turkish government in Constantinople responded that it was prepared to send representatives to the conference within three weeks, to negotiate a peace agreement. It asked, however, that neither the Greek forces that would evacuate Asia Minor, nor other Greek forces, be transported to Thrace. This response displeased the Ankara government, where two currents of opinion had formed in the National Assembly. One held the view that the terms of ceasefire should be immediately accepted, while the other sought to make alternative proposals that the Greco–Turkish question be separated from the larger Eastern Question, and that the ceasefire be preceded by the evacuation of Greek forces from Smyrna and Thrace.

On 5 April 1922 (NS), the Ankara government responded to the diplomatic note with its acceptance of the ceasefire terms, on condition that Turkish territory be evacuated simultaneously, so that the ceasefire might not allow the possibility of renewal of hostilities to the advantage of the Greeks, as had occurred in March and July of 1921. In addition, it was proposed that the duration of the truce be fixed at four months, with an automatic extension of three more months in the event that the preliminary peace negotiations had not been completed. As for the manner of the evacuation, it was considered necessary that the general line from Eskishehir, through Kutahya, to Afyon Karahisar be evacuated in the first fifteen days. The remaining territory, including Smyrna, would be evacuated within four months under the supervision of the Allies. If its proposals were accepted, the Ankara government agreed to send representatives within three weeks to the city designated for the initiation of the examination of the Allies' peace proposals.

255. On 15 April (NS), the commissioners of the Allied Powers in Constantinople conveyed their answer to the proposals of the Ankara government to its representative there. They declared that it was not possible to include the immediate evacuation of Asia Minor as a condition of the ceasefire, because the Greeks would refuse to accept it before commencing negotiations. The Allies were, nevertheless, prepared to accomplish the evacuation, as soon as the Nationalist government in Ankara accepted their proposals for the terms of peace.

On 24 April (NS), the Ankara representative in Constantinople declared to the High Commissioners that the Ankara government insisted on its demand for the evacuation of Asia Minor immediately after the treaty was signed. The imposition of this condition was a consequence of the destruction that the Turks maintained was caused by the Hellenic Army in Asia Minor, and which was likely to be repeated if the Greek forces did not immediately abandon the country. Finally, in order to gain time, the declaration claimed that representatives of the Ankara government were prepared to meet at Nicomedia with the plenipotentiaries of the Allies to initiate preliminary peace negotiations, in the event that common ground for understanding were found.

The Allies did not reach a decision on the foregoing diplomatic notes from Ankara, due to their attendance at another conference at Genoa, beginning on 10 April (NS), with the objective of studying the economic recovery of Europe. On 2 May (NS), and while the Conference of Genoa was still in session, the Nationalist representative in Constantinople received a telegram from his government which threatened to sever relations with Europe if the Allies did not agree to meet with Ankara's representatives at Nicomedia. At the same time the Ankara government with a second telegram protested alleged acts of violence committed by the Hellenic Army at the beginning of April.

The Greek government, in a lengthy demarche to the Allies, three days after it had been informed of the Turkish accusations, hastened to deny these as groundless. At the same time, it postponed its response to the Allies' proposals for a ceasefire and terms of peace, since the Turks had refused the ceasefire terms.

Meanwhile, as the Conference of Genoa neared its end, there was a denunciation of Kemalist atrocities committed against the Christians of Asia Minor, Cilicia, and Syria. These acts were confirmed by impartial American citizens, producing a strong impression in Allied circles, and inflaming public opinion in France, Italy, and Britain against the Nationalists.

On 13 May, Lord Curzon resigned his office as foreign secretary for reasons of poor health. His successor was Lord David Balfour, who moved energetically to solve the Asia Minor question, seeking a common effort by Britain and France to reach a rapid settlement. France then proposed convening a conference at Nicomedia on board a French battleship. Britain refused, demanding that the Ankara government first accept the decisions of the Conference of Paris. British policy had already turned more unfavorable towards Turkey because of the Kemalist atrocities committed against the Christians, while the British press attacked the Turks and published detailed accounts of American eyewitnesses describing the horrifying situation in Anatolia.

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Efforts to Create an Autonomous State in Asia Minor

256. In June 1921, the first movements had been reported of the formation of a secret organization for the defense of Asia Minor and the creation of an autonomous state. These movements came from circles within the political opposition in concert with the *Amyna* (National Defense) organization, formed by officers who had fled Constantinople after the political changeover. In December of the same year, a representative, Dr. Giankos Siotes, of *Amyna* met repeatedly with the Commander of the Field Army, Lieutenant General Anastasios Papoulas, to whom he propounded a plan for the autonomy of the occupied region of Asia Minor, and to whom he offered the leadership of the new state. Lieutenant General Papoulas answered that the plan would likely succeed, but would require the support of the Greek government. The same representative also visited High Commissioner Aristeides Stergiades, who utterly opposed the planned coup d'ètat. Towards the end of December, Lieutenant General Papoulas came to Athens where he reported the incident to the minister of the army.

On 7 February 1922, the representative of the *Amyna* organization returned to Smyrna and delivered a memorandum to Lieutenant General Papoulas wherein were expounded the necessity of realizing the autonomy movement, its structure, activity, and hopes for British support and economic sufficiency. Lieutenant General Papoulas, after carefully weighing the situation, decided to send to Constantinople his Deputy Chief of Staff, Colonel (Eng) Ptolemaios Sarregiannes and Major (Inf) Theodoros Skylakakes, instructing them to discuss the proposals with the *Amyna* committee, and to verify the feasibility of their realization. On 10 February, the lieutenant general reported his decision to the Ministry of the Army, which then asked to be apprised of the *Amyna* organization's proposals, before the departure of the two officers. In response, Papoulas reported, on 12 February, that the officers would depart that same day to seek clarification of the *Amyna* proposals, and that he personally would not discuss them before receiving pertinent instructions from the government.

Meanwhile, the Greek Commissioner in Constantinople, Nikolaos Triantaphyllakos with a telegram informed the prime minister that the autonomous organization *Amyna* was scheming against the government in Greece.

Colonel Sarregiannes arrived in Constantinople. On 15 February, he met with the *Amyna* committee and the Ecumenical Patriarch Meletios, who clarified the contents of the memorandum. The following day, the *Amyna* committee sent a negatory letter to Lieutenant General Papoulas, leaving it to his judgment whether the support of the Greek government was necessary to the enterprise. The government, however, would have to obtain the favor of the Allies. At the same time, Patriarch Meletios telegraphed Venizelos informing

him that Lieutenant General Papoulas was preparing to be placed at the head of an army of the Asia Minor Greeks, who would proclaim a struggle for freedom, regardless of the position officially taken by Greece. He therefore sought Venizelos' support, which was also sought by Lieutenant General Papoulas himself. Venizelos replied that since the High Commissioner did not endorse the movement, "no good will come of it save ruins and new disasters."

On 21 February Colonel Sarregiannes and the *Amyna* representative returned to Smyrna and reported to Lieutenant General Papoulas on what had been agreed to in Constantinople. The next day, they departed for Athens where they met with the minister of the army and presented the *Amyna* proposals to him. On 3 March, the minister sent a note to the commander of the Field Army in which he pointed out that, since the nation was fighting the "paramount struggle," there was no ground for common understanding, but every patriotic Greek was obliged to aid the common effort. As long as the struggle was still going on, it was not possible to think of what might happen in case of failure. The idea of an unofficial organization taking over the struggle, if the National Army should fail, was void of any seriousness.

On 6 March, the *Amyna* committee of Asia Minor sent a letter of remonstrance to the Allies, calling for their assistance for the freedom and ethnic integrity of Hellenism in Asia Minor. Moreover, it said, the indigenous Greeks of the region should not be held in any way responsible for the shift in policy in Greece, which was held up as the cause of the Allies hostility.

Being of the opinion that the *Amyna* proposals merited greater attention, Lieutenant General Papoulas submitted, on 8 March, his resignation. He was subsequently summoned to Athens where, on 13 March, he presented himself to the minister of the army. Before the minister and the Chief of Staff of the Field Army, Major General Konstantinos Palles, he reported that most of the senior officers had signed a protocol against the government. Their intention was to submit the protocol to the King, but by his personal intervention they had relented in this plan. Regarding the question of autonomy, he declared that, since the government had shown a lack of confidence in him, he would persist in his decision to resign. The resignation was not, however, accepted.

257. On 16 March, Lieutenant General Papoulas was summoned into the presence of the cabinet where the prime minister asked his opinion of the situation in Asia Minor. In reply, the general submitted a note stating that, after the sacrifices made by the Greek state in Asia Minor, it would be impossible to abandon it. If, however, by reason of the impasse that had arisen, it were forced to evacuate the region, then he asked permission to proclaim its autonomy, or otherwise to be replaced.

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The following day, 17 March, Lieutenant General Papoulas and the *Amyna* representative went together to the Ministry of the Army, where Prime Minister Gounares was also present. The *Amyna* representative then propounded the plan for the autonomy of Asia Minor. He was not able, however, to prove that recognition and support from the Allies was assured, nor that the strength of the volunteer army would exceed 50,000 or 60,000 men. As for arms and equipment, he confessed that their timely provision was impossible. Regarding the officers, he expressed the hope that a secret but genuine recognition of the autonomy movement by the Greek state would prompt many of them to join the volunteer army. Regarding economic resources, he would rely on campaigns for contributions to be held in Europe, Egypt, and America, and on the hope of contracting an internal loan. When the prime minister commented that contributions would be entirely insufficient and a loan impossible, the representative replied that economic assistance must come primarily from the Greek state.

The prime minister, refuting the aforementioned arguments, said that the entire independence scheme presented was based on the erroneous idea that since 1 November 1921 the Allies stance on Greece had become unfavorable. Politics is not based upon sentiment but upon interest, he said, and there has always been some conflict between the policies of France and Britain. The granting of a loan to a revolutionary state was impossible, and the proceeds from private contributions would not suffice even for a week. As for the Army he maintained that, the troops were fatigued, and if a demobilization were ordered there was no power on earth that could restrain them. Consequently, if a coup d'ètat materialized, the army would disintegrate and Greece would not be able to resist Turkish aggression. In conclusion, the prime minister assured them that Greece was determined not to abandon Asia Minor before it had exhausted the last financial means at its disposal. It was therefore the obligation of all Greeks to support the government in its efforts. Apparently persuaded by these arguments, the *Amyna* representative departed.

On 23 March, Lieutenant General Papoulas returned to Smyrna and announced the decision of the Greek government to maintain the Army in Asia Minor. A few days later, he submitted a memorandum to the government proposing that the front be pulled back. In his opinion such a redeployment was necessary, since it was considered impossible to undertake new operations and the evacuation of Asia Minor had been excluded.

In the middle of April, a committee of the *Amyna* organization of Asia Minor arrived in Athens, met repeatedly with the Greek prime minister, reported the activities of the organization and asked him to explain what the government had decided. The prime minister responded that there was no

decision to evacuate Asia Minor. On 24 April, a communiqué was published simultaneously in Athens and Smyrna which declared that:

> *The government, in complete accord with the universal conscience of all Greeks regarding the utter impossibility of evacuating the territories in Asia Minor before the situation there is settled in a manner that satisfies to the greatest possible degree the national aspirations of the people of Asia Minor, has declared to the Committee of the Organization of Asia Minor, at the conclusion of three successive interviews, that it will not withdraw its Army from the occupied region before the attainment of this goal by conclusion of a peace treaty. Until the enemy assumes military action, the government, as the sovereign authority commanding the struggle, accepts the contribution of the Asia Minor Organization (recognizing its patriotic and politically impartial efforts) towards increasing the number of combat troops from Asia Minor, whether they be found among those already present there or abroad. In seeking means to achieve this goal, the government reassures the committee and, through it, the people of Asia Minor, that its perceptions coincide with those of the Greek population of Asia Minor, in the mutual struggle for the establishment of a genuine status that guarantees, far from any yoke of slavery, absolute security in free political life for them and the other people living with them.*

Following the publication of the foregoing communiqué efforts to establish an autonomous entity in the occupied region of Asia Minor were temporarily suspended.

The Protopapadakes Government and the Resignation of Lieutenant General Papoulas

258. On 29 April, the Gounares government was voted out of power in parliament, and was replaced, on 2 May, by the Stratos government, which in its turn, fell after two days in office. A coalition government was then formed by Petros Protopapadakes. Nikolaos Stratos succeeded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Nikolaos Theotokes remained at the Ministry of the Army. The new government took the oath of office on 9 March 1922.

On 12 March Lieutenant General Papoulas submitted his resignation, which was accepted on 21 of the same month. Command of the Field Army of Asia Minor was assigned to the Commander of the Field Army of Thrace, Lieutenant General Georgios Chatzanestes.

Because of the general turn of events the new government decided to proceed with the creation of an autonomous entity in Asia Minor. Greece, occupying this territory, would grant autonomy to the regions inhabited by Greek populations, with the simultaneous declaration that the Army would

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remain there for the protection of the Ionian State and its populations. On 15 July, the High Commissioner, Aristeides Stergiades, published the decision for autonomy and asked the *Amyna* organization of Asia Minor to assist by organizing public demonstrations of support for autonomy in Smyrna and other cities of Asia Minor on 17 July.

On the day of the demonstrations, the High Commissioner published two proclamations, one issued by the Greek government, and the other by the commission, by which it was made known that the Greek government had decided to apply the necessary measures for the administrative organization of western Asia Minor in such a way as to secure for all, equally and regardless of race or religion, the benefits of the new state, and the participation of all in the public administration. This manner of constituting the new state would contribute to the reestablishment of peace between Greece and Turkey, and would prove to be a cohesive link between them.

These proclamations had the result that, on 2 August 1922, the Allied Powers sent an identical demarche to the Greek government which warned it that it could not claim the establishment of a permanent state in Asia Minor, because the status of those territories would be determined by the peace treaty between the Allies and Turkey. At the same time, the Allied commissioners in Constantinople were directed to prepare for a preliminary peace conference, in which Greece and Turkey would jointly participate. Greece did not respond to this demarche, nor did it suspend the autonomy program.

After this precipitous development, the Allies decided to call their Commissioners in Constantinople to Venice for an exchange of views, and it there were ground for agreement, the conference would be given broader authority. It was decided to convene the Venice Conference on 18 August, but the military events of the latter half of August forestalled it.

Reorganization of the Field Army and Organization of Strategic Reserves

259. The commander of the Field Army, foreseeing that the solution of the Asia Minor question through diplomacy would be protracted, held the view that the Field Army would be obliged to engage in combat operations during the year 1922, whether on its own or on Turkish initiative. The Field Army considered it impossible that it might initiate large–scale operations on its own. Nonetheless, it assessed that it would eventually be obliged to undertake limited activities, to deter Turkish operations, or to secure the occupied territory. In any case, the Turks if they had sufficient forces, they could launch a general offensive, or limited offensive operations with the objective of assisting their diplomatic efforts.

However the great width of the front did not allow the Field Army to occupy strongly all the sectors where a Turkish offensive was probable. As a result it would not conduct a static defense. Therefore it adopted a form of active defense which foresaw counterattacks against the flanks of the enemy forces attacking against any sector. This in turn called for strong highly mobile reserve which would surprise the adversary, so that it would not have the time to react. Because it was impossible to take troops from the front for the reserve, the Field Army judged it necessary to keep entire divisions in reserve, and fixed the necessary number to approximately half of the available divisions.

The forces comprising the general reserve had to be at notice to move at any time, and if possible, under a unified command. Also, the forces in sectors most likely to receive enemy attacks had to be sufficiently strong to maintain firm and effective resistance until the arrival of the general reserves. In view of the foregoing, and for the economy of forces, the entire defensive region had been organized into two strong areas of resistance east of Eskishehir and Afyon Karahisar, and two weaker areas on the flanks, one north of Kopruhisar and Bilejik, and the other to the south at Chivril and Buldan (Sketchmap 55). For the intermediate areas the plan provided for the occupation of the main passes by secondary centers of resistance. In the view of the Field Army, the presence of the general reserve behind the gaps between Chivril and Afyon Karahisar, and between Afyon Karahisar and Seyitgazi was sufficient to secure them.

After having confirmed that the intelligence reports of a concentration of Turkish forces in the Denizli area were inaccurate, the Field Army ordered, on 10 March, the redeployment of IX Division from the Gubek area to the Dumlupinar area. This action was taken in response to the latest intelligence which reported a concentration of the bulk of the Turkish forces in the valley of the Akar River, opposite the Afyon Karahisar salient. That was an indication of a probable offensive against the Kumalar Dag – Inje Karahisar front.

In the second half of March, significant forces were observed moving northwards from south and southwest of the Akar River, and from the reserve forces east of Afyon Karahisar. The Field Army ignored the reasons for these movements. It did, however, assess that, due to the difficulties of supplying large Turkish forces so far from the railway lines, the movements were aimed at meeting a presumed Greek attack from the Seyitgazi area eastwards, or at the launching of a Turkish attack against Seyitgazi or towards Sarija Dag Kutahya.

In view of the foregoing the Southern Group was ordered to occupy with sections of XIII Division the saddle Korsoglu Kale and secure the Bahche defile northeast of Karajaahmet. Also to consider the relocation of IX Division to the Doger so that the greater part of XIII Division, could be employed as a local reserve. It was further ordered to assign the Ahatkoy subsectors to II Division so that I Division could remain available as reserve of the Southern

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Group. It was later judged expedient to relocate VII Division to the Doger area, where IX Division would also assemble.

260. On 27 March, VII Division moved from Bal Mahmut to Egret, and IX Division was transported by rail to the Doger area.

On the morning of 30 March, the Turks attacked on the front of IV Division in the Savran subsector of the Tilki Kiri Bel center of resistance (Sketchmap 56). The attack lasted until the next day when a counterattack was launched against the flank of the attacking sections. The Turks were forced to withdraw having suffered heavy casualties.

On 31 March, after the redeployment of VII and IX Divisions, the Southern Group divided the front south of the Akar River, in the Ushak zone, into two independent sectors: Kumalar Dag and Akar Dag. The former was assigned to IV Division, and the latter to I Division, which was reinforced with 49 Infantry Regiment. II Division was assigned to the Ushak zone. Beginning on 6 April, the Cavalry Division was assigned to cover the Susuz Dag, Sivasli and Medele gaps, to establish liaison with the screening sections on both sides, and to repulse or delay infiltrations of Turkish forces into these gaps (Sketchmap 55).

On the same day, 6 April, the Field Army of Asia Minor formed a group of divisions comprising VII and IX Divisions, which had assembled at Doger and Egret, under the Commander of VII Division, Major General Andreas Plates, who retained simultaneous command of his own division. The group was under the immediate orders of the Field Army, and its mission was to reinforce the Northern and Southern Groups. The Cavalry of X Division and the Independent Division were put at its disposal.

On 8 April, the group of divisions organized a mixed detachment comprising a two–company force from IX Division, one Artillery platoon and all four divisional Cavalry units from VII, IX, X, and the Independent Division. This detachment deployed at Kirka Yayla and farther south; its mission was the surveillance of the gap between the two groups in the Sarija Dag area, and to block any penetration by Turkish forces through it.

While the Southern Group was taking measures to meet a probable Turkish operation against Afyon Karahisar, the Northern Group ordered the deployment of surveillance sections in front of the defensive area, and the organization of a network of observation post to secure it from any surprise action by the Turks. On 2 April, the Northern Group, with the aim of keeping a full division in reserve, ordered the relief of X Division's screening sections with those of III and the Independent Division. The relief was accomplished on 11 of the same month.

Completion of the Field Army's Defensive Plans

261. Intelligence gathered by the Field Army during April 1922, showed that the Turkish forces opposing it, two armies and the Kojaeli Group, comprised a total of twenty–one Infantry divisions, four Cavalry divisions, three Cavalry brigades, one independent Infantry regiment, and two independent Cavalry regiments. Specifically, the 1 Field Army comprised the I Army Corps, the V Cavalry Corps, 6 and 14 Independent Infantry Divisions, the 3 Infantry Division, and one Infantry brigade. The 2 Field Army comprised the II, III, IV, and VI Army Corps. All of these forces were under the command of the Commander of the Western Front, Ismet Inonu Pasha.

These forces were allocated opposite the Greek front as follows:

Opposite to the Northern Group: the Kojaeli Group comprising XI Army Corps (18, 19 and 20 Infantry Divisions) of the 2 Field Army and an independent Infantry and an independent Cavalry regiment.

Opposite to the Southern Group: the 2 Army minus III Army Corps i.e. II Army Corps (3 Caucasus Division and 4, 7 Infantry Divisions), VI Army Corps (10, 16, 17 Infantry Divisions) and IV Army Corps (5 and 12 Caucasus Divisions and the 11 Infantry Division). The 1 Field Army comprising, the I Army Corps (the 8, 15, 23, and 57 Infantry Divisions), the V Cavalry Corps (the 1, 2, and 14 Cavalry Divisions and the 4, 5, and 12 Cavalry Brigades), 6 and 14 Independent Infantry Divisions, the 3 Cavalry Division, and the 5 Cavalry Brigade.

The total strength of the above forces of the Western Front was 103,970 Infantrymen (of whom 19,780 were non–combatants) and 9,840 cavalrymen, with 740 machine guns and 197 Artillery pieces.

During April and May of 1922, new defensive plans were elaborated by the formations of the Hellenic Field Army, to replace those of December 1921.

On 27 May, the Southern Group assigned the planning of corresponding counterattacks, contingent on Turkish offensive activity, to the following units:

to Army Corps B, for a counterattack towards Bolvadin and Chay, employing the forces of V, XII, and XIII Divisions stationed north of the Akar River. This counterattack would be launched only with these forces or in conjunction with forces of the group of divisions (VII and IX Divisions), which would operate from the northeast;

to IV Division, for a counterattack launched eastwards from its sector, employing all its forces, and reinforced with one independent regiment and possibly with an additional regiment from I Division;

to I Division, for a counterattack towards Sandikli, with objective to

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block a possible Turkish attack on the left flank of II Division, and for a counterattack, employing the largest possible forces, for the relief of the right flank of IV Division in the event of heavy enemy pressure;

to II Division, for a counterattack towards Sandikli, in the event of a major Turkish attack against the Akar Dag sector of I Division.

In addition, on 26 May, the Northern Group issued instructions regarding operations of its forces in the event of a Turkish attack. It was the view of the group that attacks would most probably be directed either towards Eskishehir or Bursa, or towards both simultaneously. At least that was the conclusion drawn from the enemy's concentrations. The Northern Group held X Division and one regiment from the Independent Division in reserve. In case of Turkish offensive directed south of the Porsuk River or through the Karasu and Gallus Valleys, or both the group had planned to defend the fortified line of resistance and to assemble rapidly its reserves for counterattack.

In the first case, the plan provided for active defense and a counterattack launched at the appropriate time to overwhelm and disintegrate the enemy. In the second case, the available forces of XI Division were judged insufficient to repel the enemy effectively. In the event of a general Turkish attack against the Northern Group, the defending units would initially exhaust the enemy in front of the defensive line. Then, a counterattack would be launched with objective to push the enemy southwards, in order to cut him off from his bases of supply and encircle him from the north with units of the group and from the south with the group of divisions of the Southern Group.

In the event that the enemy directed his efforts towards Kutahya, through the gap between the two groups, the right wing of the Northern Group would move southwards with objective to cut off and encircle Turkish forces that had possibly penetrated. Simultaneously, its III and X Divisions would exert intense pressure on the attacking enemy.

The Situation in the Occupied Zone and on the Front

262. The security of the Rear Area Zone of the Higher General Military Command, particularly the existing lack of communications in the central mountainous area between Simav and Kutahya (Sketchmap 55), was precarious. Bands of Turkish irregulars acting in small groups, attacked convoys of the Field Army, and carried out predatory raids. During January and February of 1922, these bands began presenting themselves as detachments of the Nationalist Army, and in this guise were warmly received by the local villagers. These bands were sufficiently supplied and were distinguished by their fanatical hostility towards the Hellenic Army.

The forces at the disposal of the Higher General Military Command to deal with these bands of irregulars were three rear area regiments, the Gendarmerie Regiment, and the Railway Security Regiment. It was estimated that, during the last months of 1921, there were about 800 irregulars in the area, divided into groups of twenty–five to 200 men. The strongest of these were operating in the coastal district of Adramyttium under the leadership of Ali Barmay and Gazi, and in the Simav area under Pehlivan, whom the Turks revere as a national hero.

Despite their limited strength, the Military Commands inflicted serious losses on the bands of irregulars through the continuous employment of highly mobile detachments and special pursuit sections. During February and March of 1922, large scale special operations were conducted by stronger elements with the objective of a general mopping up of the occupied zone. These were not successful, however, due to the fact that the irregulars' bands dissolved at the approach of Greek forces, and individual members returned to their villages in the guise of ordinary working and peace–loving citizens.

At about the middle of April 1922, there occurred a serious armed uprising of the inhabitants in the Emet area north of Simav. This was organized by some of Kemal's officers, who had infiltrated the area. The revolt was quickly contained by detachments of XIII Division and the Cavalry Division. Until the evacuation of the Hellenic Army from Asia Minor, these bands of Turkish irregulars constantly harassed the Greek forces and weakened the morale of the troops.

Following the agreement between the Italian government and the Sultan's government in Constantinople, the Italian troops occupying the lower Maeander Valley evacuated that area between 7 and 17 April 1922. The Hellenic Field Army then forwarded three Infantry battalions and 2 Infantry Regiment towards that zone. By 18 April, it had occupied the Soke area south of Smyrna, as well as the coastal district of Nea Ephesus.

The occupation of the lower Maeander Valley by the Hellenic Army distressed the Kemalist government. Nevertheless, it confined itself to lodging a protest by the commissioner for foreign relations with the Italian member of the Allied Commission in Constantinople, deploring the Italians' evacuation of the lower Maeander Valley without first advising the Ankara government.

263. The front occupied by the Field Army of Asia Minor had great width. It stretched through mountainous areas cut by deep ravines, running both parallel and perpendicular to the occupied defensive line, which created gaps as large as ten kilometers wide. Due to the configuration of the ground the distance between the lines of the adversaries ranged from two to five kilometers. Through the gaps of the Greek line of defense small enemy detachments conducted raids and laid ambushes.

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Throughout the period from October 1921 to August 1922, there were no important operations on the front. The monotonous and boring life at the front was broken periodically by various minor local probing actions by one or the other of the adversaries with the objective to improve the integrity of the occupied line, raid outposts, or take prisoners. Artillery fire was also directed against ground and airborne targets. The Hellenic Army also conducted raids into enemy territory for the procurement of food and fodder from local sources. The above activities, however, were not sufficient to alleviate the inertia that prevailed on the front, which had a deleterious effect on the morale of the troops.

Turkish Military Preparations

264. After the Greek operations against Ankara, the Turks considered that the Hellenic Army was not in a position to threaten them seriously. Therefore they assumed the task of reorganization and reinforcement of their forces. They also moved the bulk of their Army to the south. This relocation was necessary mainly to meet the needs of resupply, since the districts of Iconium and Adana had greater resources, the condition of the road network was better, and the railway line was intact. Other, equally serious, reasons for the southward movement were the need to cover the approach to Iconium against any Greek operation and the wintering of the Turkish Army under more favorable conditions. Finally, the movement of the bulk of the Army southwards ensured the capability of launching an attack against the most vulnerable point in the Greek front line, the salient of Afyon Karahisar.


At the same time, preparations for war were accelerated and drastic measures taken to improve the offensive capabilities of the Turkish Army, with intensive training and conduct of exercises on the divisional and army corps levels. The relatively large distance separating the front lines of the adversaries permitted the gradual unhindered assembly of Turkish Army units for rest and training.

An Artillery officers' training center was established at Iconium with the chief object of teaching the methods of firing, as these had been developed from the experiences of the First World War. In the Turkish Rear Area seven regimental Infantry depots and one Artillery and machine gun depot were established for training recruits.

Particular importance was given to the intelligence service. Besides the Intelligence Bureau at the front, an intelligence office was established in each field army. Specially trained officers were attached to the army corps and the divisions. At the same time, the general staff formulated a broad plan for intelligence gathering and espionage both in Constantinople and abroad. These measures resulted in the Turkish general staff being always well informed of the situation and the movements of the Hellenic Army.

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HELLENIC ARMY GENERAL STAFF
ARMY HISTORY DIRECTORATE



J.P.

SKETCHMAP 55. THE DISPOSITION OF THE OPPOSING FORCES (July 1922)

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The shortage of officers of the Kemalist Army was now gradually made up by the enlistment of large numbers of officers with combat experience from Constantinople. Many hundreds of these came from those graduating from the military academy of Ankara. In addition, all reserve officers who had participated in the First World War were called to arms and assigned to units. All of the aforementioned officers, including reserve officers, had excellent morale.

The required number of troops was met by drafting of the classes of 1919, 1920, and 1921, as well as all those who had deferments. Clothing was procured by the purchase of large quantities from Constantinople, France, and Italy, through the harbors of Mersin, Alexandretta, and Antalya.

In the months preceding August 1922, the Turks procured 1500 light machine guns from France. Domestic munitions factories increased their production of sabers, bayonets, and ammunition. They also manufactured breech–blocks for Artillery pieces to replace those surrendered to the Allies, and modified Artillery shells and Infantry ammunition to conform with the existing weaponry. Telephone equipment was acquired from the Soviets and France.

Aviation was organized on a new basis. Airforce inspection and a technical supervision services was established and fifty fighter aircraft were procured.

The Medical service was augmented by the enlistment of doctors from Constantinople and the drafting of those in Anatolia. The Red Crescent offered important assistance. Thus, from the beginning of 1922, until the day that Commander in Chief Chatzanestes assumed command of the Hellenic Field Army, the Turkish Army, in contrast with the Greek, was continuously reinforced, improved on a daily basis. In addition to the Soviet support with money and military equipment transported by ship from the Black Sea port of Alissos, French and Italian support had become evident. Agreements for the provision of military equipment were signed in Paris by Ankara's representative there, and the French established an ammunition factory at Adana, to which all the procurement orders for ammunition in France were placed. French troops in Alexandretta loaded military equipment for shipment to the Kemalist Army, and laden French steamships sailed freely to Mersin. Additionally, 400 three–ton Berlier trucks were procured from France.

Representatives of the Italian *Fiat* factory signed an agreement for the provision of 150 trucks, while Italian steamships brought supplies unhindered to the Kemalists at the port of Antalya. After the explicit declarations of the governments of France and Italy, the Greek Fleet was not able to execute ship inspections to prevent the resupply of Kemal's forces.

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The bulk of the Turkish Army was concentrated opposite Afyon Karahisar, in the Sandikli – Inje Karahisar – Chay area. These forces were supplied through the railway line from Iconium.

Units located in the Sandikli area were able to resupply from the railway station at Dinar, through the macadam road Dinar – Sandikli – Afyon Karahisar. The problem of road transport in this area was solved by the purchase of the aforementioned trucks, most of which were employed here. As for the units on the right bank of the Akar River, they were supplied from the railway stations at Chay and Chobanlar, on the Iconium – Afyon Karahisar railway line, located at a distance of twenty to forty kilometers from the supply centers. However, the supply routes in this area had the serious disadvantage of passing parallel to and within fifteen to twenty kilometers of the front line, and were therefore quite vulnerable to attack by the Greek forces. To avoid such a contingency, the Turks created the supply centers of Shuhut (Chifut Kasaba) and Efe Sultan and a second supply route through Egridir Lake using navigable transportation means. This route could be used safely in case the main one was cut off ensuring thus the resupply of the Turkish 1 Field Army despite any Greek operations.

Changes of Command and Task Organization of the Field Army

Sketchmaps 8, 55

265. In the middle of May 1922, the Commander of the Field Army of Thrace, Lieutenant General Georgios Chatzanestes, arrived in Athens to be assigned command of the Field Army of Asia Minor.

In the course of consultations with the government, Lieutenant General Chatzanestes proposed pulling back the front in Asia Minor so as to make troops available for reinforcement of the Field Army of Thrace. He held the view that the solution of the Asia Minor question did not lie in Asia Minor but in the development of the situation around Constantinople and the Straits. Thus, he proposed that the front in Asia Minor be withdrawn to a line running from Kios to the Gulf of Adramyttium, based in the north at Askoy lake and on the east at Olympus Mountain (Sketchmaps 8, 55). He also proposed occupation of a line that would encompass Smyrna, with the sole objective of holding it as a bargaining chip until a final settlement of the issue could be reached. This settlement, in the general's view, should be limited to securing the minority populations in Asia Minor, with no further considerations.

Moreover, the general declared his acceptance of command of the Field Army of Asia Minor, on the condition that the Field Army of Thrace be attached to it with the designation Army Corps D. The government held the view that withdrawal of the front was not expedient because, the situation did not make it necessary and imperative. However, even in that case, the government wished the new line to encompass the territory established in the Treaty of Sevres, and to extend northwards up to the Sea of Marmara.

Lieutenant General Chatzanestes considered it highly doubtful that the withdrawal could be achieved on this condition, because he judged that it was fundamentally necessary to reduce the number of troops in Asia Minor by 50,000, so as to make possible the discharge of older classes of conscripts. Nevertheless, he accepted command of the Field Army, so as to be able to examine the situation on the spot. Apart from that, the ministers of the army and of finance held the view that the economy of the country would not permit protraction of the campaign beyond another four months.

The new commander of the Field Army arrived at Smyrna on 23 May, and assumed his command the same day. He immediately perceived the weaknesses of the Greek disposition and asked the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Palles: "How can you sleep calmly with such a disposition of the troops, and without having a second line prepared beforehand?"

When Lieutenant General Chatzanestes assumed command, the following officers requested reassignments to mainland Greece: Lieutenant Generals Alexandros Kontoules (Commander of Army Corps A) and Georgios Polymenakos (Commander of Army Corps C), and Major General Konstantinos Palles (Chief of Staff of the Field Army). The commander of the Field Army then made the following changes of command: As Commander of Army Corps A he assigned Major General Nikolaos Trikoupes, until then Commander of Army Corps B. He was replaced by Major General Kimon Digenes, Commander of XIII Division. The Command of XIII Division was assigned to Colonel (Inf) Miltiades Kaimpales. Command of Army Corps C was assigned to Major General Petros Soumilas, Commander of X Division, and Command of that division was assigned to Colonel (Inf) Demetrios Papanikolaou. Major General Georgios Valetas, Commander of II Division, became the new Chief of Staff of the Field Army and was replaced by Colonel (Inf) Stylianos Gonatas. In the position of Deputy Chief of Staff and Director of Bureau III of the Field Army was placed Colonel (Inf) Michael Passares, replacing Colonel (Eng) Ptolemaios Sarregiannes, who was assigned to a new post in mainland Greece.

Then, the commander in chief ordered his staff to study the withdrawal of the front to each of the following two lines, without having yet decided which of the two he would finally choose. The studies of the alignment of the two lines was assigned to two committees. The first of these would work on the basis of the plan for a broad front along the line: Kios – Olympus – Mania Lake – Artynia Lake – Adramyttium Lake. The second would study the line drawn by the Treaty of Sevres. The transport office submitted a memorandum with the estimate that the transport of equipment to the new lines would require eighteen days for the Southern Group and twelve for the Northern Group. At the same time, Office III made studies regarding the possible ways of conducting the redeployment.

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266. On 26 May 1922, the commander of the Field Army departed for an inspection of the front which lasted fifteen days. The commander in chief inspected the entire front from Ushak to Bursa, visited every division, and returned to Smyrna via Mudanya. In the course of this inspection, the commander in chief assessed on the spot the defensive organization of the front and the requirements of the various units. Regarding the appearance and bearing of the troops his impressions were quite satisfactory, because the commanders of the formations had presented the better dressed and more robust units.

Moreover, they assured the commander in chief that the strength of the front rendered it unshakeable, and that the morale of the Turkish Army was very low and did not allow it to undertake any offensive action. Regarding the morale of their own troops, they reported that it was satisfactory, and, despite the troops' fatigue and desire to return home, they were determined and dedicated to defending their positions.

As a result of this inspection, the commander in chief formed the impression that, although there had been great progress in defensive organization of the front, insistence on the occupation of such an extended line, with such limited force, amounted to a criminal act. His attention in particular had been called to the fact that the salient of the frontline at Afyon Karahisar, which was six to seven kilometers distant from the enemy positions, was the weakest point in the disposition and did not provide complete security for the junction of Afyon Karahisar.

Nevertheless, the commander of the Field Army estimated that he could safely dispatch troops from Asia Minor for the reinforcement of Army Corps D in Thrace. His estimate was based on the strong defensive organization of the front, and the assurances of his subordinate commanders regarding the determination of their troops and the low morale of the enemy.

267. In the first ten days of June, while the commander in chief was on his inspection tour of the front, Colonel Michael Passares arrived at Smyrna and assumed the duties of deputy chief of staff of the Field Army. On the basis of the data then available, he concluded that the views of the previous Command of the Field Army were onerous both in regard to the enemy's capabilities and to the Field Army's defensive disposition. Consequently, he composed a lengthy memorandum in which he first expounded his thoughts about the forces of the adversaries and their dispositions, and then drew the following conclusions:

The Afyon Karahisar sector was the only area with a railway line. This line linked the Turks' rear areas with the front, provided means for the supply of units there, and facilitated the transport of equipment sent by way

of the ports of Cilicia. This was therefore the most critical area and was the Achilles' heel of the Greek disposition.

If the Turks were to capture Afyon Karahisar, they would isolate Eskishehir, and then would be able to maneuvre through interior lines, effectively separating the Greek forces. The proximity of the junction of Afyon Karahisar, which was used by the Hellenic Army as supply center to the front, made it vulnerable to the enemy Artillery.

The Greek forces assigned to the Afyon Karahisar sector were disproportionate to its importance and should be reinforced with troops from the Ushak – Chivril sector. Moreover, the Field Army's general reserve should be reinforced by moving II Division from Bal Mahmut.

On the basis of the foregoing views and assessments, Colonel Passares submitted the following proposals:

Regarding the Northern Front: The front occupied by XI Division should remain unchanged. III Division should occupy the front north of the Porsuk River as far as the Kara Tokat River, with two regiments on the front line and one in reserve. The remaining section of Army Corps C front, up to Akin, should be held with one regiment of the Independent Division, under the orders of III Division. X Division and the remaining forces of the Independent Division should assemble as reserves in the Malatya and Akin areas, respectively.

Regarding the Maeander front and the Ushak zone: A brigade should be organized of two rear zone regiments, which should cover the front from the mouth of the Maeander to the village of Medele. The Cavalry Division should be reinforced with one rear zone regiment (in addition to the battalion that had already been attached to it) and be assigned to cover the remaining section of the front in the Ushak zone, from Medele to Akar Dag, employing the bulk of its forces in the Sivasli area. II Division should assemble in the Bal Mahmut area as reserve. In this way the superiority of the Greek forces would be assured in all areas, with the capability of timely intervention by significant reserves in the event of Turkish offensive.

The strategic reserves of the Field Army i.e. VII, IX, and XIII Divisions would comprise twenty–seven Infantry battalions and 108 Artillery pieces and would be able to operate offensively, whether against the right flank of the Turkish concentration east of Afyon Karahisar, in the direction of Bordi and Bolvadin, or against the left flank of Turkish forces that might be moving towards Eskishehir from the south, or in the direction of Dumlupinar against Turkish forces that might be attacking towards the right of the Afyon Karahisar salient.

The aforementioned strength of the strategic reserve did not include twelve battalions and sixteen Artillery pieces from II Division, and six bat-

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talions and eight Artillery pieces from the Independent Division. Consequently, all available forces would be concentrated in the Afyon Karahisar area and would be able to move fresh and en masse to intervene in a timely manner in combat.

268. On returning from his inspection tour of the front, Commander in Chief Chatzanestes took note of Colonel Passares' foregoing memorandum but did not accept his proposals, being of the opinion that the disposition of the Army ought to remain as it was. He wished, moreover, a more definite solution of the Asia Minor question, because, despite the assurances of the commanders of the formations that the front was unshakeable, and despite the reaction against the idea of withdrawal, he intended finally to pull the Field Army back to a new line. For this reason he did not accept, as a first precautionary measure, the proposed redeployments, influenced as he was by his obsession of capturing Constantinople and by the statements of the commanders of the army corps that they considered certain the successful check of any Turkish offensive.

On 12 June 1922, Lieutenant General Chatzanestes issued an order dissolving the Northern and Southern Groups, as well as the group of divisions (VII and IX Divisions). He subordinated all forces to Army Corps A, B, and C. Army Corps A now comprised I, IV, V, and XII Divisions; Army Corps B II, VII, IX, and XIII Divisions; and Army Corps C III, X, and XI Divisions and the Independent. To the army corps he assigned the following missions:

> Army Corps C: to secure the section of the front from the Gulf of Kios to Sarija Dag.
>
> Army Corps A: to conduct active defense on the front occupied by its divisions.
>
> Army Corps B: to conduct active defense on the Ushak front with its II Division; to assume the missions of the (former) group of divisions, i.e., probable reinforcement of the North and South Front with its other three divisions.

In the event of a Turkish attack against the area of the former Southern Group, the senior commander of the two Army Corps (A and B) would assume command of both until the intervention of the Field Army Command.

The Operation for the Occupation of Constantinople

269. At the beginning of May 1922, following Turkey's rejection of the armistice proposal, the Greek government judged that there remained only one solution to the Asia Minor question: the occupation of Constantinople by the Greek forces of Thrace. Only then would the Turks be obliged to accept the terms of peace and to implement the Treaty of Sevres. The action would prompt the Allies to make swift decisions to impose peace in Anatolia.

From the military point of view it was judged necessary to assemble an adequately large force before Chatalja, (Sketchmap 8) the presence of which would be a cause of concern for the Turks as well as for the Allies regarding the safety of Constantinople. Therefore consideration was given to the reinforcement of the Field Army of Thrace, already comprising two divisions, with one more, organized with troops from mainland Greece. Nevertheless, this reinforcement was insufficient for the simultaneous security of the Bulgarian frontier and the occupation of Constantinople.

In middle June 1922, Commander in Chief Chatzanestes went to Athens. In a conference with the government he reported that he could reinforce the Thracian front with forces from the Asia Minor front, without pulling it back or weakening it. The government then decided to launch the campaign against Constantinople and ordered the commander in chief to proceed with its preparation. For his part the commander in chief declared that, according to his reckoning, it would be possible to begin the operation on 15 July. On 23 June he departed for Smyrna.

The government hoped that by capturing Constantinople and holding it as a bargaining chip it would oblige the Allies to take more effective measures to reach a peace agreement with Turkey. Even if the Allies did not permit the occupation of the city, the threat against it would oblige them to make decisions quickly. With the reinforcement of the Field Army of Thrace, which had been redesignated Army Corps D since 1 June, 1922 and subordinated to the Field Army of Asia Minor, complete security was provided against any Bulgarian threat as well.

On 16 June, Command of Army Corps D was assumed by Major General Aristoteles Vlachopoulos, who was ordered by the Field Army to organize two new divisions, one from his own units, and one from units to be moved from Asia Minor. These two divisions would be employed in the future in the operation against Constantinople.

The division that was formed from units in Thrace was designated Division B (under Colonel (Inf) Chrestos Papanikolaou) with headquarters at Saranta Ekklesies. The other two divisions of the corps were the Adrianople Division (under Major General S. Koureveles) opposite the Turkish frontier, and VI Division (under Major General Epaminondas Zymvrakakes), which was screening the Bulgarian borders from the Hebrus River to the heights of Kula, west of the Nestos River.

Towards the end of June, the units from Asia Minor began successively to arrive in Thrace for the formation of the fourth division, to be designated Division A (under Major General Konstantinos Skarlatos) with headquarters at Tzouroulon (Chorlu). These units were 56 Infantry Regiment from Army Corps A, 3/40 Evzone Battalion and II/1 Cavalry Battalion from Army Corps B, and 28 and 55 Infantry Regiments, 1/39 Evzone Battalion, and 3

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Pack Artillery Battalion from Army Corps C. In addition, 62 and 63 Infantry Regiments, one 150mm Skoda Artillery battalion, and one independent 65mm battery were arrived

The departure of these units did not substantially weaken the Field Army of Asia Minor for the following reasons: 63 Infantry Regiment was recalled before completing its relocation because of an imminent Turkish attack, and returned to the Maeander sector. 62 Infantry Regiment was also recalled but remained at Smyrna and did not take part in operations. The Field Army was therefore deprived, during the Turkish attack of August 1922, of a total force of eleven battalions and five batteries. Of these, four battalions and three batteries had been detached from Army Corps A and B, which bore the brunt of the Turkish attack. In other words, the absence of these forces from the battlefield had no significant consequences.

On 10 July 1922, Division A and the Adrianople Division, which had been earmarked for the operation against Constantinople, received the relevant order and moved nearer the frontier.

270. On 10 July, Commander in Chief Chatzanestes arrived secretly at the Keratsini harbor of Piraeus where he had a lengthy consultation with the prime minister and the minister of the army on board the battleship Averoff, which was anchored there. In the course of these meetings the details of the Constantinople operation were worked out and 16 July was fixed as the day of its initiation. The commander in chief then departed for Rhaedestus, so that he could direct the operation from there.

On 13 July, the government sent the commander in chief the original of a diplomatic note which he was ordered to sign and convey to the Commission in Constantinople for presentation to the Sultan's government at the moment when the Hellenic Army crossed the frontier.

The following day, the Foreign Minister, Georgios Baltatzes, conveyed a diplomatic note to his British, French, and Italian colleagues, which stated that: 'Greece finds herself obliged to seek more effective measures for the termination of the armed conflict.' In the meantime the Allied Commissioners in Constantinople were apprised of the Greek troop concentrations in Thrace, and they hastened to inform their governments and ask for instructions. On the day following the conveyance of this note, the Allied Powers, realizing the Greek intentions, made strong representations to the Greek government through the British ambassador in Athens asking that the imminent advance of the Hellenic Army into the neutral zone be forestalled until the presentation of a collective policy statement which was being prepared by the Allies.

Commander in Chief Chatzanestes then ordered the suspension of all operations pending further orders. On the next day, 16 July, the foreign minister sent another note to the Allies which stated that: "... only the occupation of Constantinople, capital of the Ottoman Empire, by the Hellenic Army will compel the conclusion of a peace treaty."

On 18 July, the French ambassador in Athens conveyed a diplomatic note to the foreign minister informing him that the Allied governments refused to allow the advance of the Hellenic Army towards Constantinople and that orders had been given to the commander of the Allied Forces, 'to repulse by force of arms any military movement against the zones occupied by Allied troops. Furthermore, General Sir Charles Harrington, Commander of Allied Forces in Constantinople, went to Chatalja where he made a similar categorical declaration to Commander in Chief Chatzanestes. This categorical declaration of the Allies resulted in the frustration of the plan to capture Constantinople. On 21 July, Greece, in a new note, lodged a vigorous protest with the Allies denouncing their decision.

The Allied stance inflamed the British press, which, as a body, attacked the decision and commented most unfavorably on the unjust abuse of Greece. In their articles the British commentators pointed out that Allied occupation of Constantinople placed the capital under their protection, yet French and Italian ships passed freely through the Dardanelles carrying profuse quantities of military equipment to the Kemalist Army. They insisted, moreover, that if the Allies were not inclined to allow the Greek government to take the necessary steps to win the war, they ought at least to allow them to end it.

On 23 July 1922, the British Prime Minister Lloyd George, speaking in the British parliament on the latest events, gave a detailed account of the Turkish declaration of war on the Allies and Allied approval for the Greek occupation of Smyrna. He recalled that the return of King Constantine to Greece had unfavorable repercussions in France, although that was a matter that concerned only the Greeks. He then spoke of the proposals of March 1922, and the refusal of the Kemalists to accept a peace agreement, and of atrocities committed by the Turks in Pontus. He declared that Britain could not agree to a peace that abandoned hundreds of thousands of Christians to the mercy of the Turks.

Regarding Constantinople, he said that the Allies were supporting the capital of one of the two opponents against the operations of the other, and if they withdrew that support the Greeks could easily capture the city in a few days. In any other circumstances the Greeks would have had the right to blockade the coasts of Asia Minor and to conduct ship inspections, but the Allies had unjustly prohibited this. The British prime minister concluded his speech thus: "We cannot tolerate the indefinite protraction of this situation, and the population must be given genuine protection." The British press con-

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tinued to publish articles condemning the unjust treatment of Greece, a fact that obliged Lloyd George, on 4 August, to return to the question with a sharp rebuke for the Allies' stance towards Greece.

The harm, however, had already been done. Allied intervention had decisively quashed the Greek campaign for Constantinople. Greece was deprived of an international political and military achievement. Had the Queen of Cities been captured, which had been the dream of Greeks everywhere for many centuries, the effect on the spirits and morale of the Greek people and the Hellenic Army would have been enormous. In the diplomatic arena, the ability of the country to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the Asia Minor question would certainly have been augmented. The material gain, moreover, would have been significant because, following the occupation of the city, a considerable force would have become available for reinforcement of the Asia Minor front in the face of the Turkish attack that followed in August of 1922.

CHAPTER 9

The Launching of the Turkish Offensive and the Breach of the Front

Disposition, Mission and Morale of Asia Minor Field Army

271. On 1 August 1922, the Field Army of Asia Minor comprised Army Corps A, B and C and the Higher General Military Command of Smyrna. Its front extended from Kios on the Propontis, to the southeast, east of Eskishehir, Seyitgazi and Afyon Karahisar. It then turned westwards and through the Akar Dag massif reached the upper Maeander river valley, following its right bank to its estuary (Sketchmaps 53, 54).

– **Army Corps C** under the command of Major General Petros Soumilas, with its headquarters at Eskishehir, occupied the northern section of the front and comprised II, X and XI Divisions and the Independent Division, as well as the Military Command of Eskishehir.

– XI Division under the command of Lieutenant General Nikolaos Kladas occupied the thirty–five kilometer wide sector from the Gulf of Kios to Bilejik (not included). Furthermore, from the end of July 1922, it was assigned the twenty–five kilometer wide Kios subsector of the Military Command of Prusa.

– III Division under the command of Colonel (Inf) Georgios Gortzas occupied the fifty–five kilometer wide sector of Boz Dag – Porsuk. 16 Infantry Regiment of XI Division, directly subordinated to Army Corps C, was assigned the Bilejik sector between the aforementioned divisions.

– X Division under the command of Colonel (Inf) Demetrios Papanikolaou occupied the fifty kilometer wide sector of Kara Tokat.

– The Independent Division under the command of Colonel (Inf) Demetrios Theotokes occupied the thirty kilometer wide sector of Seyitgazi. Following the despatch of seven battalions to Thrace, Army Corps C had a total of thirty–eight battalions, twenty of which were on the front line and the rest kept as reserve.

– **Army Corps B** under the command of Lieutenant General Kimon Digenes, with headquarters in Kazli Gol Hamam, comprised II, VII, IX and XIII Divisions, as well as the Military Commands of Kutahya and Ushak. The greatest part of its forces were assembled in the area of Egret and Doger, as Field Army reserve, while other troops secured locations on both sides of the Afyon Karahisar salient, occupied by Army Corps A. Four Infantry battalions of IX and XIII Divisions and three divisional Cavalry units were assigned the coverage of the

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forty–two kilometer gap between the south boundary of Army Corps C and the north boundary of Army Corps A. The entire II Division, reinforced with two Infantry regiments was assigned the coverage of the southern section of the front.

– IX Division under Colonel (Inf) Panagiotes Gardikas secured with two battalions the thirty–two kilometer wide gap of Sarija Dag between Army Corps B and C. The rest of the division's force was kept as reserve.

– XIII Division under Colonel (Inf) Miltiades Kaimpales secured the ten kilometer wide subsector of Demirjiler with one Infantry regiment. 5/42 Evzone Regiment under the command of Colonel (Inf) Nikolaos Plasteras and Pack Artillery Battalion XIIIa were assigned to Army Corps A as reserve.

– VII Division under Colonel (Inf) Vasileios Kourousopoulos was kept in reserve in the area of Egret.

– II Division under Colonel (Inf) Stylianos Gonatas, reinforced with five battalions, secured the Ushak Zone, with total width of approximately 170 kilometers.

– The Cavalry Division under the command of Lieutenant General Andreas Kallinskes, cooperating with II Division in securing the Ushak Zone was under direct order of the Field Army. After the movement of one battalion and one Cavalry battalion to Thrace, Army Corps B comprised forty–one Infantry battalions, fourteen of which were deployed as screening elements and the rest kept as reserve.

– **Army Corps A** under the command of Lieutenant General Nikolaos Trikoupes with headquarters in Afyon Karahisar, included I, IV, V and XII Divisions and secured the Afyon Karahisar salient. V and XII Divisions were located north of the Akar river and IV and XII Divisions to its south. Army Corps A was reinforced with two regiments, of which, 43 Infantry Regiment had been assigned to I Division and 5/42 Evzone Regiment was kept as reserve at Chakirsaz.

– V Division under the command of Colonel (Inf) Nikolaos Rokas occupied the fifty kilometer wide Bordi sector.

– XII Division under Colonel (Inf) Perikles Kallidopoulos occupied the sector of Inje Karahisar, south of the thirty kilometer wide sector of Bordi.

– IV Division under the command of Lieutenant General Demetrios Dimaras occupied the sector of Kumalar. One section of this sector was in the plain and one on the mountain on each side of the Akar river. The plain section included the Akar river valley, along its right bank, bordering on hill ranges inaccessible from the south, but lower

and more accessible from the north. The mountainous section included the Kalejik Dag massif, connected to the south with the Danak Yayla and Kumalar Dag ranges (Sketchmap 56). Both these mountain ranges were under Turkish control and dominated both the Kalejik massif and the plains of Afyon Karahisar and Bal Mahmut. The right flank of the area of IV Division was located six kilometers (on a straight line) behind and to the east of the left flank of the sector of I Division. Thus there was a gap between these two divisions (of comparable width) through which two pack trails led out of enemy territory to the rear of I Division.

– I Division under the command of Lieutenant General Athanasios Frangou, reinforced with 43 Infantry Regiment, occupied the fifty kilometer wide sector of Akar Dag. This sector bordered on the south by the Akar Dag, Hasan Bey, Kilich Arslan and Tilki Kiri Bel chain of mountains, which formed a range stretching from west to east running between the Sandikli and Bal Mahmut valleys. A ridge stretched from the Akar Dag ridgeline down to the northwest, forming the Chay Hisar defile with the western ridges of Ahir Dagi (massif six kilometers northwest of the Akar Dag summit).

Army Corps A had forty–two Infantry battalions in total, of which twenty were assigned to the frontline and the rest kept as reserve.

The Higher General Military Command of Smyrna under the command of Lieutenant General Andreas Plates covered the sector of the Maeander river along with the Military Command of Odemish and secured the transportation and the interior of the Rear Zone from raids by the irregulars.

272. By virtue of this disposition, the units of the Field Army occupied a front extending about 738 kilometers distributed as follows:

Army Corps C

Military Command of Prusa:	twenty–five kilometers.
XI Division:	thirty–five kilometers.
III Division:	fifty–five kilometers.
X Division:	fifty kilometers.
Independent Division:	eighty kilometers.

Army Corps B

IX Division:	thirty–two kilometers.
XIII Division:	ten kilometers (Surveillance of the Sarija Dag gap).
VII Division:	Reserve.
II Division:	170 kilometers.

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Army Corps A

V Division:	eighty kilometers, including the ten kilometer gap between III and V Divisions.
XII Division:	thirty kilometers.
IV Division:	twenty kilometers.
Kayadibi Gap (under no surveillance)	six kilometers.
I Division:	fifty kilometers, including a fifteen kilometer gap between the Karagozeli and Sinan Pasha subsectors.

Higher General Military Command of Smyrna

Military Command of Odemish140 kilometers.

The table on page 355 includes those of the above forces that bore the brunt of the main Turkish effort.

An air fleet comprising fifty–five aircraft (forty reconnaissance aircraft with bomber capabilities and fifteen fighters) should be added to the above forces. Only twenty–five to thirty aircraft were combat ready, while the rest were under repair.

273. There was insufficient density of forces almost everywhere along this exceedingly wide Field Army's front, even though most of its forces were assigned to the front line: nine divisions out of twelve with the other three kept as reserve, in close proximity to the front line. Of the nine aforementioned divisions of the front line, the II was deployed on a front of approximately 170 kilometers, a fact that rendered that division a token force. Of all reserve divisions, only the VII had all its forces assembled. The others had assigned one third of their forces to the security of the front. The other divisions participated in the security of the front with one third of their total force.

The communication network of the front was insufficient. Neither the Field Army nor Army Corps A and B dealt with the maintenance and the improvement of this network, even though the Greek forces constantly occupied the area of Afyon Karahisar and Dumlupinar for the whole duration of the previous year. Furthermore the routes from the positions of the army corps and division reserves to the occupied areas had not been opened, so that more convenient, safe and quick movement could be secured to the threatened locations. This was the reason why movement of truck–drawn Artillery was not possible during the Turkish offensive especially in mountainous sectors, resulting in its inertia in sectors unaffected by enemy pressure.

Table of Large Units	Infantry			Artillery							Cavalry Sqds
				Light		Medium		Heavy		Totals	
	Frontline	Reserves	Total	Mtn 65/75	Field 7.5	Skoda 105	Long 120	6" Howtzr	Skoda 150		
Army Corps A											
V Division	5	4	9	16	8	-	4	2	-	30	0.5
XII Division	4	5	9	16	12	8	4	2	-	42	0.5
IV Division	4.5	4.5	9	18	12	-	8	4	-	42	0.5
I Division (1)	6	6	12	16	12	-	-	-	-	36	0.5
Detachment of											
XIII Division (2)	-	3	3	8	-	-	-	-	-	8	-
Total	19.5	22.5	42	74	44	8	24	8	-	158	2
Army Corps B											
IX Division (3)	2	6	8	16	8	-	-	-	-	24	1.5
XIII Division (4)	2	4	6	8	-	-	-	-	-	8	0.5
VII Division (5)	-	9	9	16	-	-	-	-	-	16	-
II Division (6)	9.5	4.5	14	20	8	-	4	4	-	36	1.5
I/B FAB (7)	-	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	-	12	-
B Group Skoda (7)	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	8	-
MC of Kutahya (8)	4	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	17.5	23.5	41	60	28	8	4	4	-	104	3.5
Cavalry Division	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	13
Grand Total	37	46	83	134	76	16	28	12	-	262	18.5

Notes

(1) Reinforced.

(2) Comprising 5/42 Evzone Regiment and XIIIa Mountain Artillery Battalion

(3) Reinforced by VII Divisional Cavalry and the Mounted Detachment of 5/42 Evzone Regiment

(4) Minus 5/42 Evzone Regiment and XIIIa Mountain Artillery Battalion

(5) VII Divisional Cavalry was detached to IX Division

(6) Reinforced by 31 Infantry Regiment and two battalions of 54 Infantry Regiment; 1/54 Battalion, one Cavalry company of 3 Cavalry Regiment and one horse–drawn battery remined in Simav.

(7) Was detached to the command of Army Corps B

(8) Comprising four battalions from 32 Infantry Regiment; it secured railroad and highway communications.

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The corps of Engineers of the divisions dealt mainly with the construction of military quarters aiming at a more convenient accommodation of the units, as well as the construction of bombing shelters and the installation of barbed wire. However, no alarm drills had ever been conducted by the units, nor any rehearsal movements towards any prospective points of intervention. With respect to the routes outside the zone of the responsibility of each division that were leading to the flanks or the rear, there was either lack of familiarity with or no information of their condition after the operations of 1921.

Studies and plans of withdrawal, especially under enemy pressure, had not been worked out by the army corps, particularly by Army Corps A that occupied the most vital section of the front. All plans of action provided only for the defense of the one and only fortified position at all cost, the reinforcement of the frontline units, and the reaction with flanking counterattacks from neighboring divisions against attacking Turkish forces.

Communications of the army corps with the Command of the Field Army in Smyrna and the Rear Zone was secured by a sufficient number of uncoated wire networks alongside railway lines from Afyon Karahisar to Smyrna, Eskishehir and Kutahya. The radios of the army corps and the Field Army complemented the signals network, but were rarely used in periods of inactivity.

Communications of the divisions with the army corps and their units was secured mainly with overhead telephone lines on poles. This network reached the lines of the trenches and was an easy target for enemy Artillery. For this reason the telephone lines of the combat zone were disrupted from the very beginning of the operations by the initial destructive fire from the Turkish Artillery. The Greek maintenance crews repaired the damage. However, once again the communication was disrupted by enemy Artillery. Thus the Greek commanders could not intervene to direct the operations.

Added to the aforementioned disadvantages in communication and signals was the small distance between the front and the railway line to its rear, that ranged from six to twenty kilometers. There was therefore no ample space for organization in depth and for flexible defense, with the objective to secure unhindered operation of rail transportation. Furthermore, in case of breach in the front in any location and infiltration of Turkish forces into the Greek defensive area, the vital junction of Afyon Karahisar would be in great jeopardy.

274. The mission of the Field Army was to cover and defend the front against any Turkish action (Sketchmap 53). The pertinent order dated 25 December 1921 by the Field Army stated that a Turkish attack against the organized front, both north and south of the Akar "appears to have no chance,"

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adding that "the most vulnerable point in our main disposition is the primary communication means to Smyrna, namely the railway. Therefore, the most probable option for a major Turkish action appears to be one directed against Pashakoy and Banaz (II Division sector and I Division right flank), and at the same time a diversion against the extremity of our disposition (in the Doger area)."

Since the opinion of the Field Army and of the Commands of the army corps, was that the Turkish attack would be launched in the sector of the front between Afyon Karahisar and Eskishehir, the greatest part of the available Greek forces were assembled there. Therefore the timely intervention of the neighboring sections forward of that point was easy. However, in case the Turkish attack were conducted further to the south, it would be countered by a smaller Greek force and the arrival there of the available reserves from the north would require such a long time, that their intervention probably would be belated.

In this latter case, which of course was regarded as highly unlikely, the Greek plans of defense provided for the implementation of an attack from the north to the south of XII, V, XIII, VII and IX Divisions, towards the general direction of Chay and Bolvadin. At the same time, it provided for a movement towards the south of both divisions of Army Corps C and simultaneous attack by II Division against Sandikli.

275. The morale of the Hellenic Army was high at the outset of the Asia Minor Expedition. As time progressed, it started to wane. Despite some instances of improvement, it reached a very low point in August 1922. All in all, the Army was physically and morally exhausted and a severe blow could lead to disaster.

The dispute between King Constantine and Eleutherios Venizelos during World War I, regarding the policy to be followed by nation, deeply polarized the Greek people and extension the Army as well. The exile of King Constantine following the dynamic intervention of the Allies deepened the *Ethnikos Dichasmos* (National Schism). Greece under Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos terminated the policy of neutrality and sided with the Allies, participating in the operations in Macedonia. The Venizelos Government, therefore, had to take some harsh measures in order to achieve success in the operations, which it had undertaken. Discharge and exile to remote islands of many officers were some of these measures. These events affected the morale of the Army, and especially that of the officers, who were split in two opposite factions, namely those siding with the *Ethnike Amyna* (National Defense) Movement and those who were dismissed.

The detrimental effects of the *Dichasmos* persisted throughout the Asia Minor Expedition. The political and military change in November 1920

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had serious repercussions throughout the Army as well. Faithful to their party affiliations, many officers handed in their resignations and others (including four senior officers) violating any sense of duty and discipline, sought refuge at Constantinople, abandoning their posts on the frontline. Furthermore, certain leaflets criticized the continuation of the military expedition in Asia Minor, and undermined the task of the new government. Because of all the aforementioned events combined with the prolongation of the expedition, despite the preelection promises by the new government, the morale of the Hellenic Army was undermined and reduced significantly.

Following the operations towards Ankara, the morale of the Army was even more adversely affected, due to the failure to crush the Kemalist Army and the heavy losses. The best officers and the bravest soldiers were put out of action. The Field Army of Asia Minor lost on the battlefield approximately one half of its manpower. Struggling hard for almost a month against a very experienced, courageous and brave enemy, forced to confront hunger, thirst and the nature of the terrain, without sufficient ammunition, without supplies and lacking in appropriate transportation, the Army showed admirable endurance. The results of this state of affairs soon appeared. Day by day discipline was corrupted and morale dropped even further.

Furthermore agitation among the officers started to appear and a certain number of revolutionary proclamations against the government circulated among officers. This act rekindled the political and party politics disagreements among officers, who naturally influenced the soldiers under their direct command. There were also cases, in which officers affected by their party affiliations rejoiced with the turn of the events, without ever realizing the severity of their unpatriotic behavior. All these naturally led to insubordination, undermining of morale, and the concomitant reduction of combat effectiveness.

In addition to the above, the leniency in the prosecution of thousands of draft evaders and deserters in the interior of the country contributed to the disappointment of the enlisted men serving on the frontline. From correspondence with their kin they were being constantly informed of their family's disheartening financial situation, as well as to what was happening with the draft evaders and deserters. The applications of soldiers for short leaves were no longer being approved, due to the fact that those on leave never returned. Furthermore, the communist propaganda in Greece significantly fueled the resentment of the enlisted men. This propaganda was spread through correspondence, aiming at undermining and disintegrating the army.

In the monthly reports submitted to the Field Army concerning the state of the morale of the troops, it was stressed that the army was in no position to conduct an offensive. The fighters in Asia Minor had already formed the opinion that the prolongation of their service was in vain and that all their

hardships, dangers, pains and sacrifices were finally to no avail. They felt that Greece, isolated from Allied protection, was alone and helpless to bring this struggle against the Turks to a successful end.

The new Command of the Field Army took some measures, succeeded in improving the food, replenished many deficiencies, prosecuted corrupt suppliers and advanced thousands of enlisted men from the Rear Zone to the frontline to relieve men from older classes. However, these measures were not enough to boost troop morale to the necessary level and the prevalent wish among the soldiers was to return to their homes.

Disposition and Operation Plans of the Turkish Army

276. Around the end of July 1922, the Turkish forces opposite the Greek front had the following disposition from north to south:

– **The Kojaeli Group** comprising the Turkish 18 Division, reinforced with Infantry and Cavalry troops, occupied the line Yalova – Aksu (Sketchmap 53).

– **2 Field Army**, under the command of General Yakup Seyfi Pasha with headquarters at Bolvadin comprised II Army Corps (1, 61 and 41 Divisions) deployed in the area of Sivrihisar (Sketchmap 55); II Army Corps (3, 4 and 7 Divisions with the bulk of its forces in the area of Aziziye. VI Army Corps (16 and 17 Divisions) on the line Bordi – Chobanlar. IV Army Corps (5, 11 and 12 Divisions) as reserve in the area of Bolvadin.

– **1 Field Army**, under the command of General Nureddin Pasha with headquarters at Chay comprised: I Army Corps (15, 23 and 57 Divisions) as reserve in the area between Akshehir and Kumari. Three independent divisions: 8 Division in the area between Akar and Koja Tepe, 6 Division in the Sandikli valley and 14 Division at Boz Dag. The Dinar – Chivril Area Command and the 3 Cavalry Division in the area of Denizli, southeast of Ortanja. Furthermore, it surveyed the line along the Maeander river as far as the Aegean Sea with certain Gendarme detachments.

– **V Cavalry Army Corps**, under the command of General Fahreddin Pasha, comprising 1, 2 and 14 Cavalry Divisions in the area of Akshehir and Ilgin.

Of all the aforementioned forces, 1 and 2 Field Armies comprised the so–called Western Front under the command of Ismet Pasha, whose headquarters were in Akshehir. The Turks had organized three successive defensive areas at a depth of fifty to sixty kilometers, while the bulk of their forces was assembled opposite the salient of the Greek front at Afyon Karahisar.

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277. As early as May 1922, Kemal and his collaborators started to seriously consider the prospect of conducting an offensive by the Turkish Army, mainly because of their information of the collapse of the morale of the Hellenic Army. In the beginning of July 1922, the delegate of the Ankara Government to Paris stressed in a telegram to his government that after his contacts with members of the French government, he was of the opinion that the Turkish offensive was necessary before the upcoming conference to bolster the Turkish position. This telegram strengthened the views of Kemal and his colleagues and led them to decide definitely to launch the offensive.

The first task after this would be the determination of the exact point of the Greek front against which the attack would be directed. Judging from the allocation of the Greek forces and their deployment, the Turkish Staff estimated that three sectors favored an offensive:

The first sector was the one between Kopruhisar and Seyitgazi which was divided by the Porsuk river. The attack could be launched either to the north or the south of the river or simultaneously on both banks. Its objective would be the Eskishehir sector. However, communications were at this point restricted and did not permit the supply units required for the offensive. Furthermore, the configuration of the ground was not conducive to the concealment of the assembled forces from air reconnaissance and no appropriate positions could be secured for the Turkish Artillery. On the other hand, the Greek forces occupied dominating heights which provided excellent observation. Therefore, an attack against this sector was not advisable.

The second sector was the one between Seyitgazi and Afyon Karahisar, where communications were sufficient. An attack on this sector would strike at the same time the Greek front west of Seyitgazi and south of Doger. In both cases the attacking forces would expose their flanks, which in turn could easily be attacked by the Greek reserves at Doger. Furthermore, the mountainous, inaccessible and forested terrain would impede the deployment of the attacking forces, while the effects were not regarded as significant.

The third sector was Afyon Karahisar, where the existing railway line allowed the assembly of the Turkish forces with great ease. The terrain was optimal for the concealment of assembled troops and provided the appropriate positions for Artillery and observation posts. The offensive against Afyon Karahisar could be conducted either from the east, or from the south and the southwest. In the first case, the Turkish forces would conduct their assault through the relatively uncovered valley of the Akar river. In the second case, they would attack the right flank of the Greek disposition, neutralize the defense around Afyon Karahisar, disrupt communications with Smyrna and shake the whole front with a single blow. The Greek forces would be forced to withdraw to the north or make an effort to assemble at the Dumlupinar area.

In the first case they would leave Smyrna uncovered. Then the bulk of the Turkish Army would conduct the operation to pursue them, while light detachments would speedily advance towards Smyrna. In the latter case, the attacking Turkish forces would force the Greek troops to engage in combat on an open battlefield, preventing their deployment in the organized area of Dumlupinar.

For the aforementioned reasons, in a meeting of Kemal with the Chief of the Army Staff Fevzi Pasha and the Commander of the Western Front Ismet Pasha, it was decided to launch the offensive against the salient of Afyon Karahisar, which was the most vulnerable point in the Greek disposition. For this reason, the assembly of the Turkish forces would have be conducted to the south of the right flank of the Greek disposition, which was located in the area between the Akar river and Dumlupinar.

278. The anticipated concept in the attack plan was the following: (Sketchmaps 53, 56)

Turkish 2 Field Army, comprising only two army corps (with a total strength of five divisions) and one Cavalry division would assume in the few initial days the mission of pinning down Greek Army Corps C and B, as well as Greek V and XII Divisions, east of Afyon Karahisar and disrupting the communications between Afyon Karahisar and Eskishehir.

Turkish 1 Field Army, reinforced with II and IV Army Corps of Turkish 2 Field Army along with the necessary Heavy Artillery, would conduct the main offensive in the area between the Akar river and Toklu Tepe, south and southwest of Afyon Karahisar, aiming at the encirclement of the Greek forces.

Infiltrating the Greek zone through the passes of Akar Dag, which were impassable and not covered by the Greek forces, Turkish Cavalry V Army Corps would cut off railway as well as telegraphic and telephone communications and attack the rear of the Greek disposition.

For the deception of the Greek command, offensive probing actions would be conducted towards Bilejik in the northern sector and towards Saraykoy in the Maeander river Valley a few days prior to the main Turkish attack.

Following the aforementioned decisions, the Turkish General Headquarters relocated from Ankara to Akshehir. A meeting was held there on 10 July with Fevzi Pasha and Ismet Pasha, in which all the details of the operations were determined, setting the date at 2 August for the initiation of operations. The problems of supply of the Turkish forces during their advance

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were specially considered and settled. It was decided to conduct the assembly of the required forces in secrecy, because it was deemed a necessity to achieve surprise.

The movements of the Turkish troops to the determined assembly areas had already started in the previous week (9 July) and were conducted only at night. Approximately one week prior to the attack all outside communications were disrupted. By 12 August all units had arrived at their destinations and occupied the positions provided by the plans. The wireless radios of the Field Armies and army corps had not been moved until the eve of the attack, still transmitting from the old positions in order to deceive the Greek command.

On 7 August, Mustafa Kemal went in total secrecy to Akshehir, where he gave the order for attack on 13 August. One day before the attack the Headquarters of Commander in Chief Mustafa Kemal and of the Western Front relocated to Kalejik Dag (Koja Tepe), from where they would direct the operations.

By implementing the aforementioned measures, the Turkish command succeeded in the strategic, but not the tactical surprise of the Greek Field Army. The first was successful, because the forces of the Field Army and Army Corps A did not detect the volume of the Turkish assemblies south of the Akar river. The deficiencies in intelligence contributed to this effect. The information from air reconnaissance and Turkish deserters to the Greek side were not sufficient to illustrate the situation and the extent of the threat.

279. According to the Commander of the Western Front Ismet Pasha, the Turkish Army had the following disposition, without ever being hindered by the Greek forces (Sketchmaps 54, 55 and 56):

– **1 Field Army** established its Headquarters south of Buyuk Kalejik and comprised:

– **IV Army Corps** with its headquarters at Efe Sultan, 8 and 5 Divisions on the frontline (opposite the Greek IV Division) and 11 and 12 Divisions in second line. The Artillery of the army corps included four 120mm guns and fourteen 150mm howitzers.

– **I Army Corps** with headquarters south of Duvak and all its divisions (23, 14 and 57) on the frontline, opposite the gap between Greek I and IV Divisions and the sector of responsibility of Greek I Division. The Artillery of the army corps included three 120mm guns and sixteen 150mm howitzers.

– **II Army Corps** with headquarters three kilometers south of Chivit Kasaba and all its divisions (3a, 4 and 7) on reserve in the area of Sandikli, Duzagach and Efe Sultan. The Artillery of the army corps included nine 120mm guns and sixteen 150mm howitzers.

– **V Cavalry Army Corps** with headquarters at Kelenderes had 1, 2 and 14 Cavalry Divisions in the area of Chukurja – Sandikli and 6 Cavalry Division on the frontline opposite the right flank of Greek I Division and the left flank of Greek II Division.

– **2 Field Army** with its headquarters at Doglat comprised:

– **II Army Corps** with headquarters at Baglija: the Porsuk Detachment (an Infantry regiment with Artillery) opposite the front of Greek III Division and partly X Division and 41 Division to the southwest of Seyitgazi, opposite Greek Independent Division.

– **61 Infantry Division** on the frontline southwest of Hosref Pasha, ready to attack Greek V Division.

– **1 Infantry Division** in the area southwest of Chifteler as reserve of the Field Army.

– **VI Army Corps** with headquarters at Seyitli: 16 Division opposite Greek V Division and 17 Division opposite Greek XII Division. The special Cavalry Division was located in the area of Yapildak, assigned with operations towards Doger.

– **Kojaeli Group** (18 Infantry Division) on the line Yalova – Nicaea – Leukes.

– **Maeander River Command**, along the Maeander river.

– **3 Cavalry Division**, assembled in the Chal area, assigned to attack against Gobek, on the right of the Greek disposition.

By the evening of 12 August 1922, the Turks had assembled in the area of Afyon Karahisar fifteen Infantry divisions and four Cavalry divisions, that is, 5/6 of their Infantry and 4/5 of their Cavalry. They had assigned twelve Infantry divisions and four Cavalry divisions to the front south of the Akar river, i.e., to their main effort, supported by 200 light and sixty–two heavy guns. Their first mission would be to overpower the resistance of Greek I and IV Divisions.

Comparison of the Opposing Forces

280. In general, the army corps of the Turkish Army comprised three Infantry divisions, one heavy Artillery regiment and one Cavalry company. For the conduct of the offensive some army corps were reinforced with a fourth division. The composition of the Infantry division included three Infantry regiments (of three battalions each), one assault battalion, one Artillery regiment (of four batteries each), one of engineers, one Cavalry company, one Telegraph Operator detachment, one Medical company and one bakers platoon. The strength of each Turkish division was 7,500 men on average, of which 4,500 were armed, the rest being unarmed, ready to relieve those who were put out of action, taking their weapons. The forces of Turkish

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1 Field Army, that is, the forces assigned with the main effort against the salient of Afyon Karahisar, were 76,500 armed and 32,500 unarmed. Of these forces 13,500 men and 9,000 unarmed were the Field Army reserves and the rest the striking force against the Greek troops.

The Turkish forces, participating in the attack, appear in detail in the following table:

Major units	Frontline		Reserves	
	Battalions	*Companies*	*Battalions*	*Companies*
Turkish I Army Corps				
15 Infantry Division	10	1		
23 Infantry Division	10	1		
14 Infantry Division	10	1		
57 Infantry Division	10	1		
Turkish II Army Corps				
3 Infantry Division			10	1
4 Infantry Division			10	1
7 Infantry Division			10	1
Turkish IV Army Corps				
5 Infantry Division	10	1		
8 Infantry Division	10	1		
11 Infantry Division	10	1		
12 Infantry Division	10	1		
Turkish VI Army Corps				
16 Infantry Division	10	1		
17 Infantry Division	10	1		
Turkish V Army Corps				
1 Infantry Division		16		
2 Infantry Division		16		
14 Infantry Division		16		
Turkish Field Army				
6 Infantry Division*	10	1		
Special Cavalry Division*		12		
3 Cavalry Division		12		
Total	**110**	**83**	**30**	**3**

[* These units were subordinated tactically to VI Army Corps]

Comparing the Turkish forces with the corresponding Greek in the area of Afyon Karahisar, the Turkish forces were superior by fifty–seven Infantry battalions and sixty–seven Cavalry companies, as appears from the table below:

Greek Forces				Turkish Forces			
Infantry Battalions		Cavalry Companies		Infantry Battalions		Cavalry Companies	
Frontline	*Reserves*	*Frontline*	*Reserves*	*Frontline*	*Reserves*	*Frontline*	*Reserves*
37	**46**	**18**	–	**110**	**30**	**83**	**3**

Specifically, the Turks were superior by fifty–seven Infantry battalions in a sector of the front, where the major battle was conducted and where the Turks succeeded in breaching the front. The Greek forces in this sector of the front comprised Greek IV Division (reinforced with 5/42 Evzone Regiment), Greek I Division (reinforced with 49 Infantry Regiment) and VII Division, a total of thirty–three Infantry battalions. In the same area the Turks had I Army Corps (15, 23, 14 and 57 Divisions), IV Army Corps (5, 8, 11, 12 Divisions) and Turkish 6 Infantry Division, a total of ninety Infantry battalions. Therefore, the Turks attacked against this position with ninety battalions against thirty–three Greek battalions.

Actions by the Adversaries Prior to the Turkish Offensive

281. The period up to the beginning of August 1922 was completely calm. No confirmed information had reached the Greek Command concerning an imminent Turkish attack. The only sign was the assembly of the bulk of Turkish forces opposite the Afyon Karahisar salient. This situation in combination that the most appropriate period for operations (April–August) was over, reinforced the belief held by the commanders of the Field Army that no major operation would be conducted until the end of 1922.

Following the abandonment of the operation at Constantinople, the Commander in Chief Chatzanestes returned to Smyrna and was notified about the studies that the two committees as well as the director of Bureau IV had submitted concerning the lines of withdrawal. It was the intention of the Commander in Chief to depart on 6 August to Athens to brief the government about these studies, so that the final decisions about the withdrawal of the front could be made.

This was the situation at the time when the Turks conducted the feints they had decided upon, according to their plan. The first one was conducted on 6 August 1922 against the sector of Buldan which was subordinated to the Ushak zone of responsibility of Greek II Division. On 0430 of the same day Turkish forces comprising 800 Cavalry and 600 Infantry, with four guns attacked the bridgehead at Ortanja (Sketchmap 55), south of the Maeander river. At the same time, another force of about 100 irregulars descended from the heights northwest of Ortanja and aided by inhabitants of the area attacked from the rear the local Greek units.

The engagement lasted for two hours and the Greek forces at the

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bridgehead were forced to withdraw to another position four kilometers to the north, while the Turks seized the bridgehead as well as the village of Ortanja. Quite a number of officers with their families lived in Ortanja, where they felt secure despite the fact they had been living within firing range from enemy positions. The surprise of the attack was complete and certain housewives were captured by the Turks, who in turn seized the local supply station along with a great amount of military equipment. Although the Turkish attack did not continue any further, Greek II Division was taken by surprise and started to move its reservists to the south. It also requested the support from the Cavalry Division as well as reinforcements from the Field Army, without ever establishing the precise situation in Ortanja.

On 12 August the reserves of II Division arrived at the area of Ortanja and planned the execution of a counterattack for the next day. However, on 13 August the Turkish attack was launched against the Afyon Karahisar salient. Consequently, the counterattack was postponed for the next day. On 0430 of 14 August the Greek counterattack was launched. By 0600 the Greek units managed to recapture the bridgehead. The retreating Turks set Ortanja on fire. The Greeks suffered three killed and six wounded, while the Turks thirty killed and three prisoners. In the meantime due to the unfavorable turn of events in the sector of the front around Afyon Karahisar, the units engaged in the counterattack were ordered to return to their initial positions in the area of Ushak.

On 11 August 1922 another feint was conducted by the Turks exploring two Infantry battalions with Artillery, in the subsector of Bilejik in the zone of responsibility of Army Corps C. The Turkish attack was repelled by the local Greek forces, who pursued the Turks until dusk and then returned to their positions.

282. On 7 August 1922, the Field Army issued an order stressing that "everybody from the commanders of large units to the last man must be on alert," adding that "all should understand that the enemy offensive could not be repelled by the forces already deployed, but only by reserves kept by all commands at the rear on road junctions." This necessarily would involve a thinning of the occupied front line.

Meanwhile on 9 August, Army Corps A forwarded in order to its divisions, which, after pointing out the disadvantages of the occupied defensive line, that was close to the line of communication and so did not have the required depth, ended as follows: "If the enemy attempts to attack and instead of surprising us, he is surprised by us, by running into a barrage of well coordinated fire from Infantry, automatic weapons and Artillery, it is certain that he will fail."

In the meantime, according to information provided by deserting

Turks to the lines occupied by Greek I and IV Divisions and by air reconnaissance, dating as early as 1 August 1922, it became clear that the Turks had been assembling significant forces south of the Akar river. The aforementioned information was further enhanced by that of a Turkish agent of Army Corps A who on 8 August reported as imminent a Turkish attack against the sector of the Greek front south of the Akar river by the bulk of the Turkish Army. Following the above, on 10 August, Army Corps A submitted a report to the Field Army, describing the situation that was developing at the front, and requested to be reinforced with the reserve VII Division of Army Corps B.

Anticipating the Turkish attack, on 11 August, Greek I and IV Divisions took measures to strengthen their front and issued orders for more strict alert measures in the frontline units. Following repeated requests by Army Corps A, Army Corps B ordered VII Division to organize a joint detachment (comprising one Infantry regiment and one Pack Artillery battalion), with mission to move to the frontline and be assigned to I Division. Army Corps A reported to the Field Army this movement, requesting at the same time the assignment of the entire VII Division for the reinforcement of the sector of I Division. The Field Army communicated an order by which among other things it authorized the assignment of the joint detachment of VII Division to I Division. It also ordered II Division and the Cavalry Division to assemble all their available sections east of Ushak in order to conduct a joint attack against the left flank of the Turkish forces at Sandikli in case of an emergency.

The same day, 11 August, the Turks seized the main ridgeline of Kalejik Dag, which dominated the whole area around Afyon Karahisar and the Akar river valley. This operation as well as the unusual movement around the neighboring ridgelines left I Division no doubts about an imminent Turkish attack.

283. At 0800 on 12 August, the joint detachment of VII Division moved from Egret and arrived at Boyalik at 2300, where it was subordinated to I Division. (Sketchmap 56) On the same day air reconnaissance confirmed the assembly of fresh Turkish forces opposite the Greek lines south and southeast of Afyon Karahisar. At the same time, the observation posts of I and IV Divisions noted increased activity at the Turkish positions. Everything indicated that the Turkish Army was preparing for a rapid, large–scale offensive against the sector of the front to the south of Afyon Karahisar.

At noon of 12 August, Army Corps A, against which the main Turkish effort seemed to be directed, having received no response to its request to move from the Field Army VII Division to the south, requested from Army Corps B to order this movement. Sharing the view as Army Corps A, Army Corps B ordered VII Division to move on the morning of 13 August in order to

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reinforce the sector of I Division. Furthermore, Army Corps A ordered the concentration of as many rail vehicles as possible at the rail station of Afyon Karahisar for probable transportation and the execution of those being hospitalized in the Hospitalization Center there on to Smyrna for the next day 13 August.

284. During the night 12/13 August, Turkish 1 Field Army moved its divisions opposite the Greek lines, assigned with attacking against the Afyon Karahisar salient. Turkish IV Army Corps would conduct operations against Greek IV Division with three divisions from the Akar river to Kayadibi gap between Greek I and IV Divisions, as follows: Turkish 8 Division would operate against the left extremity of IV Division, Turkish 5 Division against the right extremity of the same division and Turkish 11 against the gap between Greek I and IV Divisions. Turkish 12 Division would serve as reserve.

The main effort of the Turkish IV Army Corps was assigned to 5 and 11 Divisions, which in the initial phase of the attack would capture the Greek advanced line of resistance. Then they would launch a coordinated attack for the capture of the Kuchuk Kalejik ridgeline that was the major defensive foothold of IV Division.

Turkish I Army Corps would operate against the sector of responsibility of Greek I Division with five divisions between the Kayadibi and the Chay Hisar gaps. The Turkish divisions were aligned from east to west in the following order: 23, 15, 14, 57 and 6. The Turkish leadership expected a decisive outcome from the attack of Turkish 57 Division against the Hasan Bey massif and its combined operations with Turkish Cavalry Army Corps.

During the night 12/13 August, Turkish V Cavalry Army Corps would infiltrate the Chay Hisar gap, in order to attack the flank of Greek I Division,

Turkish II Army Corps (3, 4 and 7 Divisions) would remain as a reserve in the area of Efe Sultan in a state of readiness for decisive intervention at the appropriate moment.

Specifically, the mission assigned to Turkish V Cavalry Army Corps was the following:

To support 1 Turkish Field Army during the attack, operating against the flanks and the rear of the Greek forces. Additionally, to protect the left flank of the attacking units from any possible Greek counterattack.

To interdict the Greek forces located in the area of Ushak from linking up with the main bulk of Greek forces and to destroy the rail line.

To reconnoiter and delay the Greek forces in the area of Doger, as well as those that might be transported from the north.

The reconnaissance by Turkish Cavalry Army Corps confirmed that the pack trail running through the Chay Hisar gap was not guarded by Greek

sections. As a result of this, it moved all its divisions during the night 12/13 August towards this trail, with the objective to exploit the opportunity and to accomplish its mission, in adherence to the aforementioned orders.

The Beginning of the Turkish Offensive

285. The Greek front at Afyon Karahisar, as already mentioned, was divided in two sectors: Kumalar and Akar (Sketchmap 56). IV Division secured the Kumalar sector, with main footholds to the north of Buyuk Kalejik, the Forked Rock and the Jagged Rock (Hill 1450) and to the northwest Kuchuk Kalejik and Hill 1310, which was the key terrain of the zone of responsibility of IV Division. I Division secured the Akar sector, with main footholds the Tilki Kiri Bel north of the Savran village, Hasan Bey southwest of Sinan Pasha village and Toklu Tepe at the right flank of its sector.

There were two vulnerable points in the front of these two divisions: the Kayadibi gap between I and IV Divisions and the Chay Hisar gap in the sector of I Division between Ahir Dagi and the northern ridges of Akar Dag. Another vulnerable location was the deep Sinirkoy ravine, on the left of the front of I Division, which ran between Belen Tepe and Tilki Kiri Bel. The steep walls of this ravine allowed the undetectable and safe infiltration of the enemy.

IV Division had deployed all its three regiments to the frontline, with only two of their battalions as reserve. I Division also assigned its three regiments to the frontline, with each regiment keeping one of its battalion as reserve. The fourth regiment served as reserve, with the exception of a battalion which was assigned to the frontline. Thus the division had deployed a total of seven battalions to the frontline and kept five as reserve. Furthermore, the joint detachment of VII Division (one Infantry regiment and one Pack Artillery battalion) was in the area of Boyalik from the morning of 13 August.

At 0500 on 13 August 1922, Turkish Artillery launched sustained fire against the Greek front. In the sector of I Division the enemy fire concentrated mainly on Tilki Kiri Bel and Kayadibi, while in the sector of IV Division on the forward positions of the defensive area. The intensity and accuracy of the Turkish fire was such, that the advanced Greek trenches were completely demolished and their defenders decimated. The bombardment spread throughout the front of IV Division. Never up to that day had the Greek forces in Asia Minor experienced such sustained and accurate Artillery fire.

Broken up in batteries and platoons throughout the front, the Greek Artillery could not react effectively. The Field Artillery batteries deployed in the plain section of IV Division sector could not move to the mountainous section that was under Turkish fire, due to lack of proper routes.

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286. The attack of the Turkish Infantry against the front of I Division began at 0600. By 0630, the Turks had succeeded in seizing many points on the front, including Tilki Kiri Bel, the defenders of which retreated in disorder.


At 0700 the commander of I Division ordered his reserve regiment (two battalions) to conduct a counterattack in order to recapture Tilki Kiri Bel and at 0720 the joint detachment of VII Division located at Boyalik to send a battalion to Kayadibi. At the same time he reported the critical situation to Army Corps A.

In the meantime the commander of IV Division, assessing from the development of combat that the right flank of his division was the main objective of the enemy and that the intention of the Turks was to seize the gap between I and II Divisions, requested from Army Corps A, to dispatch XIII Division Detachment (the Plasteras Detachment) in order to cover the aforementioned gap. The commander of Army Corps A authorized this request and detached the Plasteras Detachment to the division. He ordered also VII Division to expedite its march towards the sector of I Division, subordinating it to the latter in order to conduct the operations more effectively.

IV Division assigned to Colonel Plasteras the command of all the forces in Kalejik, under orders to conduct operations for the recapture of the forward positions, that had been seized by the enemy. By 1030 the Plasteras Detachment (minus battalion) had assembled at Kalejik and actively dealt with the regrouping of the local forces and the conducting of the counterattack he had been ordered to launch. The forces in Kalejik were fired upon and attacked with exceptional intensity by the Turkish Artillery. Their morale was low and the units at the right flank abandoned their positions. At the same time strong Turkish forces assembled opposite Kuchuk Kalejik posing a new threat for the right flank. Under these circumstances, Colonel Plasteras gradually had to commit all his forces, in order to keep the front which was dangerously bending.

287. While the situation was developing thus in the Afyon Karahisar salient, complete calm prevailed in the sector of XII Division further to the north. At dawn of 13 August in the Bordi sector of V Division, the Turks launched sustained Artillery fire against the Wooded Summit (northeast of Sanjak) which comprised a strong point of this sector. (Sketchmap 57) Shortly after this, strong Turkish forces that had assembled in Salmanli Dag forest opposite the Greek position during the previous night, launched a surprise attack against the Wooded Summit. The attack had momentum and the defending forces withdrew without offering serious resistance

The commander of V Division, assessing that the sections that bore the brunt of the Turkish attack on the Wooded Summit needed to be rein-



Sketchmap 57.
The Turkish Offensive in the Sector of V Division, 13 August 1922.

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forced in order to stop their withdrawal rushed to direct all his available reserves forward that area. At the same time following a request submitted through Army Corps A, Army Corps B assigned to V Division one battalion of XIII Division – this division was to the left of V Division.

II Division (Sketchmap 55) confronted the Turkish feint at Ortanja with its forces dispersed. Specifically, the employment of 34 Reserve Infantry Regiment in the counterattack operations made II Division temporarily incapable of any reaction. In accordance to the defense plans this regiment was expected to conduct counterattack operation towards Sandikli, in combination with 7 Infantry Regiment and 1/38 Evzone Regiment, in case of a Turkish attack against the sector of IV Division. At 1200 II Division was ordered by Army Corps A to prepare an attack operation with its own forces, employing 1/38 Evzone Regiment of I Division and Cavalry troops of the Cavalry Division against the left flank of the attacking enemy, with overall direction towards Chukurja village (northwest of Sandikli) (Sketchmap 56).

288. At 0830 Army Corps A subordinated V Division to Army Corps B. This division occupied a front about forty kilometers wide with no sufficient reserves. At the same time it ordered the divisions to prepare counterattacks to recapture of positions on the front seized by the enemy. Army Corps A also reported the situation to the Field Army and informed it that its intention was to move troops of IX Division to Afyon Karahisar.

Shortly before 1000, Army Corps A requested from Army Corps B to be assigned one regiment from IX Division, which would be transported by rail to Afyon Karahisar, due to the adverse development in combat. Following order of Army Corps B, IX Division assigned 26 Infantry Regiment for this purpose, which assembled at the rail station of Doger at 1300 and started to entrain in order to move to Afyon Karahisar.

The first information about the Turkish attack reached the Field Army Headquarters in Smyrna at 0815, via a telegram by Army Corps A. At 1230 the Field Army telegraphed the following order: Army Corps C to expeditiously prepare a strong divisional force, at notice to attack towards Bordi. V Division to be tactically subordinated to Army Corps B. The despatch of IX Division sections not to be implemented without prior Field Army approach.

The Field Army received at 1200 an information copy of order of Army Corps A's to II Division, regarding the preparation of a counterattack in the direction of Chukurja and at 1330 report of the same army corps regarding the counterattack ordered for the recapture of those points already at the hands of the enemy. After this the Field Army waited for the outcome of the aforementioned actions.

According to divisional reports, the situation around midday was as follows: In the sector of I Division, the Turks had seized the strong point of

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Kayadibi, as well as the first line of resistance at Tilki Kiri Bel. Further to west they strongly pressed Hasan Bey, while Cavalry forces had infiltrated through Chay Hisar to Duzagach. The division was preparing a counterattack with its reserves and the detachment of VII Division for the recapture of Tilki Kiri Bel.

In the sector of IV Division, the forces at the right flank defended on the second line of resistance, which they held with great difficulty. No Turkish attack had been conducted against the middle and the left flank of the division.

In the sector of XII Division calm prevailed. In the sector of V Division the Turks had seized the Wooded Summit and the Greek forces were preparing a counterattack for its recapture.

The commander of Army Corps A had already assessed that the major Turkish operation was directed against I and IV Division and especially against the gap in between them. Following this, he decided to conduct the immediate transportation of IX Division to Afyon Karahisar and requested from Army Corps B to issue an order for the preparation of their movement.

The Greek Reaction

289. At 1330 the reserve regiment of I Division comprising two battalions and one battalion from the Detachment of VII Division launched a counterattack against Tilki Kiri Bel according to orders and succeeded in recapturing the whole ridgeline (Sketchmap 56). The losses suffered by the Greek forces were heavy. Among the wounded was the Commander of the detachment from VII Division Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Georgios Psarras. By evening I Division ordered the defensive deployment at the recaptured line and the organization of reserves, preferably from the detachment of VII Division.

Following the completion of the mop up operation at Tilki Kiri Bel, the intention of the division was to move forces for a counterattack in the gap between it and IV Division. The lightning development of the events did not allow its implementation.

During the period that the above events were unfolding at Tilki Kiri Bel, no counterattack was launched for the recapture of Kayadibi, despite the orders of the division to this effect. Besides a serious threat arose against Hasan Bey, which started to bend by Turkish pressure. The intervention of the reserve battalion allowed the defending forces to hold their position, but only after suffering heavy losses. At the same time, information from Kuchukkoy reported that a force of about 2,000 Turkish cavalrymen was observed to advance towards the rail line. These events alarmed the command of I Division, whose right flank and the rear had already been threatened.

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In the meantime, VII Division rushed with the two columns to the area of Boyalik. At 1430 the Division Commander Colonel Vasileios Kourousopoulos, who had preceded the division with his car, met with the Commander of I Division Lieutenant General Athanasios Frangou. The latter ordered him to assume the command of one of his regiments and to reinforce the forces fighting at Hasan Bey. He was also ordered to survey the Turkish Cavalry that had infiltrated the Chay Hisar gap, so as to cover from the rear the sector of Akar Dag. The rest of VII Division would remain assembled in the Boyalik area.

At approximately 2000 the situation was as follows: no serious effort had been made to recapture the positions around Kayadibi. Hasan Bey was being tightly encircled by the Turkish forces and it was doubtful whether the defending forces could hold on until the intervention of the troops of VII Division. From 1800 all rail transportation and telegraphic communication with Smyrna had been cut off and at 2330 I Division was informed that Turkish Cavalry forces had encircled the rail station at Kuchukkoy, while its guard was desperately defending its position.

During the night 13/14 August of the forces deployed on the Akar Dag section, the situation of those belonging to I Division was serious due to the heavy causalities, particularly in officers and incessant heavy bombardment of the enemy Artillery that went on throughout the day. Those of VII Division, though not engaged in combat, had reached the limit of their endurance due to the continuous and exhaustive forced march under unbearable heat.

290. At 1500 strong Turkish forces attacked the center of the disposition of V Division. They were repulsed however by the intervention of the reserve. Furthermore at 1610 the Turks launched a new fierce attack against Kalejik, which was repulsed by a counterattack launched by the Plasteras Detachment. Fearing a renewed nighttime Turkish attack against his positions, Plasteras requested from Army Corps A and IV Division the return of the third battalion of 5/42 Evzone Regiment, which had stayed to garrison Afyon Karahisar.

At 1700 the Turkish Artillery concentrated its fire against the Jagged Rock and at 1800 an assembly of two Turkish divisions close to Buyuk Kalejik village was noticed. The Command of IV Division assessed that this assembly had as its objective an attack against Jagged Rock and Forked Rock.

In order to confront the new threat, IV Division assigned the remaining reserve force for the defense of all positions that were directly threatened and assigned the third battalion of 5/42 Evzone Regiment to Colonel Plasteras, following authorization by Army Corps A. This battalion departed from Afyon Karahisar at 2300 and arrived at Kalejik at 0500 on 14 August. At the same time the division informed Colonel Plasteras that they regarded the

recapture of the forward positions at Kalejik as extremely significant and that he could conduct operations at his own discretion. At 2100 Colonel Plasteras reported that he regarded such an operation too risky during the night. He would therefore begin operations at dawn of the following day.

During the night 13/14 August the Turks attempted to capture the Jagged Rock with a night attack, but were repulsed suffering heavy losses.

The counterattack that was ordered for the recapture of Wooded Summit was launched at 1330 in the sector of V Division. Until 1730 all positions that had been seized by the enemy were recaptured and the Turkish forces retired towards Salmanli Dag, pursued by Greek sections. (Sketchmap 57). The Turks conducted only certain limited attacks, without success in the remaining front of the division.

Towards dusk following a request by V Division of Army Corps B, XII Division, since total calm still prevailed at its front, moved one of its reserve battalions to the right of V Division's sector, so that it could be on notice to intervene in case of a Turkish attack against that sector.

No serious Turkish operations were conducted in the sector of II Division. Around midnight the commander of the guard of the Dumlupinar railway station, reported via a telegram that a force of about 300 Turkish cavalrymen dispersed the guard posts along the railway line, destroyed two bridges and interrupted telegraphic communications.

291. At 1610 Army Corps A submitted a report of the situation to the Field Army. It was also reported that the transportation by rail of one regiment from IX Division had been ordered and the approval of the transportation of its remaining force, regarded as absolutely necessary, was requested. the report furthermore added that depending on the development of the situation, the corps intended to conduct offensive operations north of Akar with Army Corps B, assigning V and XII Divisions and the greater part of XIII Division. He also intended to operate towards Chukurja (Sketchmap 56) with II Division, sections of the Cavalry Division and 1/38 Evzone Regiment of I Division. Finally, V Division recaptured the Wooded Summit with a counterattack.

Army Corps A was informed later through a report by I Division about the deep infiltration of strong Turkish Cavalry forces through the Chay Hisar gap and the disruption of telegraphic communication with Smyrna and Ushak. At 1815 it ordered II Division to subordinate 5/42 Evzone Regiment, due to disruption of liaison with I Division. One battalion of this regiment, as well as one section of the Cavalry Division had to move towards Dumlupinar, in order to contain the invaders and to clear the situation At the same time it was ordered to take security measures for its rear in order to repulse a possible attack by the Turkish Cavalry.

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Towards evening following the arrival of VII Division at the sector of the I, Army Corps A ordered I Division to employ VII Division as a whole "avoiding the distribution of the units to various locations and the mixing of the two divisions." However, as mentioned above the VII Division was not employed in accordance to the aforementioned order. On the contrary, its forces were dispersed by battalion throughout the entire sector of I Division.

At 1615 Army Corps A received an order of the Field Army, prohibiting all movement of IX Division without prior approval. In its response, Army Corps A reported that the movement of the IX Division regiment was necessary, since it did not have any reserves left. All of its forces had already been engaged in combat. The first battalion of 26 Regiment of IX Division arrived at Afyon Karahisar by rail in the early evening hours and was immediately assigned to Army Corps A. At 1930 Army Corps A reported to the Field Army that Tilki Kiri Bel had been recaptured by I Division.

At about 1230 Army Corp A and B received an order of the Field Army expressing the view that the enemy had not yet applied its main offensive effort. It also ordered Army Corps A to hold the front west of Akar river and assigned to this corps II, VII and Cavalry Divisions. Army Corps B was ordered to operate offensively initially to Bordi and then to Hamidiye and Chay (Sketchmap 55). For this mission Army Corps B would be reinforced with V Division and the units Army Corps C could muster, and IX Division as its reserve. The assemblies had to be conducted during the night and the jump–off at least of V, IX and XIII Divisions by the morning of 15 August at the latest.

In executing the above, Army Corps B ordered the suspension of any further transportation of 26 Regiment of IX Division and informed Army Corps A accordingly. At the same time it requested via a telegram to Army Corps C to be informed of the time by which the assembly of the forces assigned to it should be completed.

The commander of Army Corps A requested in turn from Army Corps B not to delay for any reason the movement of 26 Infantry Regiment, due to the immediate threat posed at Afyon Karahisar. At the same time he reported by a telegram to the Field Army that the suspension of the transportation of 26 Regiment of IX Division jeopardized the defense of Army Corps A, adding that any possible breach in the front at Afyon Karahisar would have made the attack of Army Corps B impossible. Later at approximately 2400, Army Corps A transmitted via telegram a situation bulletin to the Field Army describing in detail the seriousness of the situation and stressing once again the necessity of transportation of the regiment of IX Division.

After that the commander of Army Corps B, to whom the report had also been transmitted for information on his own initiative ordered the

resumption of the movement of 26 Regiment to Afyon Karahisar. At 0300 on 14 August the transportation of the regiment resumed and was completed in the morning of the following day.

Having received neither of these two telegrams of Army Corps A during the night 13/14 August, the Field Army believed that the front remained unshaken and the counterattack by Army Corps B would be conducted the following day, that is, 14 August or the day after 15 August, at the latest. That is why it wired to the Greek government in Athens that "the combat is progressing smoothly".

292. During the first day of the Turkish offensive, the I Turkish Field Army operated as follows (Sketchmap 56):

– **IV Army Corps** (8, 5 and 12 Divisions) attacked from the Akar river up to Kayadibi, that is, against the sector of Greek IV Division. 8 Division attacked from the Akar river up to Kuchuk Kalejik (not included). 5 Division attacked Kuchuk Kalejik with the objective to seize the summit of Kalejik (Hill 1310). II Division would launch two simultaneous flanking attacks. Turkish 12 Division remained at Sarikoy as reserve.

The attacks of 8 Division against Forked Rock did not score any success despite the fact that it continued throughout the day. 5 Division succeeded in capturing Greek forward positions before Kalejik at 0650. However it did not succeed in capturing Hill 1310, despite the fierce attacks it launched against it in cooperation with II Division, due to the stubborn resistance by the Greek forces.

– **I Army Corps** (23, 15, 14 and 57 Division) attacked from the Chay Hisar gap between Greek IV and I Divisions against the greatest part of the sector of I Division. Turkish 15 Division attacked Tilki Kiri Bel, with 23 Division on its right and 14 Division on its left. The Turkish forces seized the advanced Greek lines along with Tilki Kiri Bel, but the latter was recaptured by the Greeks after a counterattack. 57 Division attacked against Hasan Bey, following orders by Commander in Chief Kemal to seize it within that day. Despite repeated fierce attacks until late into the night, the Turks did not succeed in capturing the aforementioned summit. The commander committed suicide in desperation, assuming the responsibility for this failure.

To the west of Turkish I Army Corps, 1/38 Evzone Regiment of I Division was attacked by Turkish 6 Independent Division, but succeeded in repelling it.

– **II Army Corps** (3, 4 and 7 Divisions) remained in the area of Chivit Kasaba as reserve.

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– **V Cavalry Army Corps** (Turkish 1, 2 and 14 Cavalry Divisions) during the night 12/13 August conducted a strenuous march along the only pack trail leading to Chay Hisar. (Sketchmap 58) At daybreak on 13 August it reached its objectives. Despite the impossible terrain, the preceding 1 Division passed Chay Hisar at 0800, followed by 14 and 8 Divisions successively. Continuing its march towards the rear of the Greek disposition, the Turkish Cavalry succeeded in seizing the railroad line towards Smyrna within the same day and to disrupt telegraph and telephone communications with Smyrna and Ushak.

Turkish 2 Field Army assumed the offensive in the northern sector of the front astride Porsuk river, simultaneously with Turkish 1 Field Army. This offensive was of a smaller scale, succeeding only in fixing the forces of Greek Army Corps C. At any rate, this was its military objective.

The Breach of the Front

293. With all its units and those of VII Division attached to it committed to combat by the early hours of 14 August, I Division had limited itself to the defense of the occupied area. The division was in critical position due to the tactical situation on its front. The situation was made even worse by the infiltration of the Turkish Cavalry to the rear of the division northwest of Bal Mahmut and the significant casualties especially in officers. The losses in particular affected adversely the morale of the troops.

Around 0200, an order by Army Corps A reached the division, which set for the 14 August defense on the occupied positions and efforts to recapture with counterattacks those positions that had been lost to the enemy. Assigned with the attack towards Chukurja (Sketchmap 56), the forces of II Division and the Cavalry Division would also assume the responsibility of security north of the railroad line. The suspension of the attack towards Chukurja made worse the position of I Division, which anticipated this attack in order to be relieved from the intensified enemy pressure.

The Turkish attack resumed at daybreak on 14 August. The forces occupying the east section of Tilki Kiri Bel bent under the strain and at 0830 withdrew to the positions of the Artillery. The units to the west managed to hold their positions. At 0900 a new fierce Turkish attack was launched against the Greek sections on the western slope of Tilki Kiri Bel, which held their positions though with great difficulty.

In the sector of IV Division the Turkish Artillery launched sustained fire against the Greek positions on the Jagged Rock and the surrounding area. The Turkish Infantry attacked repeatedly since dawn and by 0600 had succeeded in seizing the Jagged Rock. The defending forces retired to the second line of resistance, approximately 600 meters behind the first. The fall of Jagged Rock jeopardized the integrity of the front of IV Division.

The Turkish Artillery had concentrated its fire against Kalejik to the west section of the front of the division from the dawn on 14 August. At 0500 the commander of 5/42 Evzone Regiment responding to a telephone call of the commander of IV Division, replied that the counterattack, ordered the previous day, was impossible to launch due to the strong enemy pressure against the front.

At the same time, strong Turkish Infantry forces attacked with exceptional momentum against the aforementioned sector and particularly against Kuchuk Kalejik. At 0800 the Turks succeeded in seizing Hill 1310. Decimated by sustained Artillery and Infantry fire, the defending forces retired in disorder. At that point, Colonel Plasteras ordered the third battalion of 5/42 Evzone Regiment, that had arrived at that area at 0500, to launch a counterattack in order to repel the Turkish forces. The battalion immediately complied but being under dense and effective fire from the left flank and confronting superior forces, it was checked and eventually retired, suffering casualties that surpassed half of its strength. The greatest part of 5/42 Evzone Regiment followed the battalion in its retirement, while the Pack Artillery pieces on Kalejik were abandoned. Only the breeches were removed.

By 0900 the right flank of IV Division had collapsed, unlike the middle section which continued its stubborn defense. All units requested reinforcements, but the division could not satisfy their requests.

Army Corps A was seriously concerned with the reports on the negative developments in the operations of IV Division. It was especially worried about the widening gap between IV and I Division and the infiltration of Turkish forces through this gap, which were continuously gaining ground. At 0700 Army Corps A reported via telegram to the Field Army the adverse developments in the sector of IV Division and requested reinforcements.

At 0830 Army Corps A assigned to IV Division 26 Infantry Regiment, which had arrived at Afyon Karahisar rail station at 0500. The division assigned the aforementioned regiment to Muttalip Dag (southwest of Afyon Karahisar), with the objective to check the movement of the Turkish forces towards the valley and the city of Afyon Karahisar.

Approximately at 0900, Army Corps A assigned 46 Infantry Regiment of XII Division to IV Division, which never had the time to arrive there, since the situation unfolded rapidly. At the same time, Army Corps A transmitted the following telegram to the Field Army:

The enemy attacking south of Akar with ten divisions and very strong Artillery support, exerts great pressure on our front. The front being under pressure and shaken needs urgently to be reinforced with all available forces of Army Corps B and C, since planned action of Army Corps B would not produce the required outcome in time. Request your appropriate order.

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294. Meanwhile Army Corps B was preparing the counterattack towards Bordi, ordered by the Field Army, when it received the reply of Army Corps C stating that the assembly of the forces that were to participate in the counterattack could not be accomplished before the evening of 14 August. Accordingly, Army Corps B reported with a telegram to the Field Army that it would not be able to launch the counterattack prior to the morning of 16 August.

At 0930, Army Corps B received by telegram the following order of the Field Army, issued immediately after the delivery of the report from Army Corps A concerning the severity of the situation and the faltering front.

IX Division is subordinate to Army Corps A in its entirety, which will transport this division as appropriate under its own order. Army Corps A should keep its sector at all costs since it has already had more than enough forces at its disposal. Army Corps B should definitely launch the counterattack assuming under its command XII Division."

However at approximately 1000, the commander of Army Corps A decided to order the withdrawal of his forces, convinced that any resistance would be impossible. Then, at 1030 he issued the order to this effect to I, IV and XII Divisions, which was made known to Army Corps B. By virtue of this order, the forces of Army Corps A would fall back to the line heights Duzagach – Ayvali – Bal Mahmut – Koprulu and Buyuk Jorja (Sketchmap 58). IV Division would be deployed on the Koprulu heights, with I and VII Divisions on its right flank and XII Division to its left. Kazli Gol Hamam was designated Headquarters of Army Corps A. At the same time the army corps also reported to the Field Army that it had ordered the evacuation of Afyon Karahisar since noon of the same day.

The order of withdrawal was transmitted to IV and XII Divisions, but never reached I Division, due to the disruption of telephone and wireless communications and the disappearance of the mounted messengers, with whom it was dispatched to the division.

294. In the meantime, the situation at the front of I Division had become extremely critical. The sections at Tilki Kiri Bel defended desperately against repeated Turkish attacks. Around 1130 they were and at 1300 were overrun and retired in disorder, surrendering the whole Tilki Kiri Bel area to the Turks. Its fall weakened the whole left flank of I Division, whose forces fled in complete confusion towards the valley of Bal Mahmut at 1330. Only the forces on the right flank of the division at Hasan Bey succeeded in holding their positions despite strong enemy pressure.

Confronted with the aforementioned situation, I Division ordered the withdrawal of its forces at 1430 to the line heights north of Duzagach – north of Ayvali – north of Bal Mahmut – south of Koprulu, in order to prevent the encirclement and the capture of the units still defending the right flank. The

forces of I and VII Divisions were distributed along his line. The detachment of Colonel Charalampos Louphas (23 Infantry Regiment of VII Division plus two Infantry battalions and one Pack Artillery battalion) would seek to maintain liaison with IV Division, which would fall back probably to Koprulu. The withdrawal would be conducted successively from left to right of the division's disposition. The intention of the division was to cover the regrouping of the forces on its left, that were retreating in disorder, and presented a disheartening spectacle, in terms of morale, integrity and organic links.

When the command of I Division issued the order of its withdrawal, it was not aware of the Army Corps A order since all communications with the corps were cut off and the mounted messengers who were to deliver the order to the division had disappeared. At some point, only the switch central of the Bal Mahmut rail station was informed by the one of Afyon Karahisar that the evacuation of the Greek forces from the city had already started. This fact and the calm that had prevailed since 1000 on the right of IV Division caused great concern to the command of I Division.

At 1430 on 14 August, telephone communication between Kuchukkoy and Dumlupinar were cut off in the sector of II Division. That day throughout the front of II Division as well as opposite the positions of 1/38 Evzone Regiment of I Division the Turkish activities were limited to small scale attacks with Cavalry forces, without any significant effect. At 0530 II Division received the order by Army Corps A for quick assembly of their available forces as well as those of the Cavalry Division southeast of Dumlupinar in order to cover and secure the railroad line from any activity of the Turkish Cavalry that had infiltrated the rear of the Greek disposition. At 0800 II Division ordered the movement of a battalion from 34 Infantry Regiment together with a regiment from the Cavalry Division towards Dumlupinar in order to assume the aforementioned mission.

The other divisions (XII, V and XIII) did not confront any significant enemy operation that morning. Following the withdrawal ordered by Army Corps A, XII Division moved to its new position, while V and XIII Divisions following orders by Army Corps B started to prepare their withdrawal to positions west of those they already occupied. At 1100 IX Division started a forced march towards Hamamalti following a telephone order by Army Corps B.

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CHAPTER 10

Retrograde Operations of Army Corps A and B

The Withdrawal of the Greek Forces

296. Two additional orders followed the initial order for withdrawal of Army Corps A. The first fixed the movement of all non–divisional units of Army Corps A in one single column towards Arapli Chiftlik (Sketchmap 58), and the second the evacuation of all patients and hospital equipment from Afyon Karahisar and their transportation by rail to Eskishehir.

As soon as the order for withdrawal was made known at Afyon Karahisar, disorderly turmoil erupted among the local population. The city's Christian population of 5,000 Armenians tried to get a place aboard the last trains leaving the city. As a result, the refugees interfered with the movement of the Greek forces as they followed the troops in their withdrawal.

An event with great consequences for the forthcoming operations must be mentioned at this point. Around 1230 the wireless of Army Corps A was loaded on a train to be transported to Kazli Gol Hamam, the new location of the Headquarters of Army Corps A. This was the result of damage to the motor vehicle that carried the wireless. However, due to a misunderstanding the wireless was unloaded at Eskishehir. Thus Army Corps A remained without wireless throughout the withdrawal. No communication was possible between Army Corps A and the Field Army or its divisions until the afternoon of 15 August, when the wireless of Army Corps B also served Army Corps A. The failure of Army Corps A to communicate with the Field Army and its divisions contributed to the subsequent adverse outcome of the operations, since after midday of 14 August all communications to the west were cut off.

Around 1330 the Headquarters of Army Corps A encamped at a guard post on the railway line, from where Lieutenant General Nikolaos Trikoupes sent a telegram to the Field Army, reporting the withdrawal of the army corps forces to the line formed by Duzagach – Ayvali – Bal Mahmut – Koprulu and the establishment of the Headquarters at Arapli Chiftlik. The initial order for withdrawal designated Kazli Gol Hamam as the new Headquarters. Lieutenant General Trikoupes then reported to the Field Army that Arapli Chiftlik would be the new location of the Headquarters and finally he established it at Bayram Gol (north of Koprulu). These repeated changes brought confusion to the liaison of Army Corps A both with its divisions and Army Corps B.

Due to the lack of a wireless, the aforementioned telegram was sent to Army Corps B with the adjutant of Army Corps A, who also had orders to be informed of the intentions of the commander of Army Corps B. Additionally, two more officers from the Army Corps A Staff were sent in order to meet the commander of I Division, so that they might be informed about the situa-

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tion of the division and in turn brief its commander about the withdrawal of the divisions of the army corps and the intentions of its commander.

Shortly afterwards an officer of XII Division staff delivered to Army Corps A the order of the Field Army assigning to the corps the entire IX Division. At 1600 the Headquarters of Army Corps A arrived at Arapli Chiftlik. However, this location was not deemed appropriate by its commander who decided to continue towards Bayram Gol.

In the afternoon hours on 14 August, the Command of Army Corps A encamped at Bayram Gol and at 1640 composed a report to the Field Army, in which it expressed the opinion that the enemy would direct its effort towards Dumlupinar. It also reported that its intention was to occupy the old fortified line in the aforementioned area and requested that two Army Corps A and B to be subordinated under a unified command. The report was sent with an officer to Army Corps B in order to be transmitted with its wireless.

Shortly thereafter Army Corp A's adjutant returned from Army Corps B reporting that the latter would withdraw during the night to the heights west of the railway lines, establishing its Headquarters at Egret.

297. By 1700 I and VII Divisions under the Command of Major General Athanasios Frangou had completed their withdrawal without serious harassment by the Turks, who were advancing with increased caution. At approximately 1830, two officers who had been sent by the commander of Army Corps A met Major General Frangou at his headquarters on the heights north of Bal Mahmut. He informed them that he had not received the order from Army Corps A to withdraw and that the withdrawal of his division was conducted on his own initiative, due to extreme enemy pressure. The two officers did not carry a copy of the order for withdrawal of Army Corps A, and related its contents orally. Furthermore, they informed the commander of I Division that IV Division was ordered to deploy on the heights of Koprulu, east of I Division and that the Headquarters of Army Corps A spend the night at Arapli Chiftlik. They recommended that he should seek to restore liaison by all means available. However, they failed to provide information about the general situation.

Major General Frangou briefed them about the situation of his forces and showed them on the map the position they would occupy, reporting the heavy casualties he had suffered (about 2,000 men). He particularly stressed that due to the low morale of his troops no positive results from the operations to follow could be expected. Responding to the question by Major General Frangou concerning orders for the following day, they said that these orders would be delivered to him later. Then the liaison officers left for the Headquarters of Army Corps A, where they arrived in the evening and reported to their commander what had transpired.

Although the commander of I Division was informed orally about the order for withdrawal from Army Corps A, the lack of a written order caused misinterpretation, which significantly contributed to the creation of a gap between I and IV Divisions, with devastating consequences. Furthermore, the Command of I Division did not make the necessary effort to establish liaison with the Headquarters of Army Corps A. Since this liaison was imperative this failure had serious consequences for the further operations.

As it withdrew in three columns to new defensive lines, VII Division confronted Turkish Cavalry units that had infiltrated to the rear of the Greek disposition and had seized the heights north and southwest of Ayvali. Assessing that the division confronted significant enemy forces, late at night its commander taking into account the low morale and the extreme fatigue of its men, suspended the division's movement and waited south of Ayvali until the morning, in order to conclusively assess the tactical situation and to assume appropriate action thereafter. In the meantime, the Louphas Detachment had seized before sunset the positions that had been ordered on the heights north and south of the railway line close to Bal Mahmut.

The forces of I Division also moved from the positions of encampment at the rail station at Bal Mahmut to Bashkimse in order to occupy the line that had been fixed. At the entrance of the defile, however, to the west of the rail station at Bal Mahmut, they came under fire from the heights to the east of Ayvali and so halted their march. The units lost their cohesion and troops started to flee *en masse* towards the slopes north of the Akar river. At 2200, after strenuous efforts of the staff officers of the division, the flight was checked and the march resumed towards Bashkimse, where the column arrived at approximately 0100 of 15 August.

The situation of the forces of I and VII Divisions during the night 14/15 August was in all respects tragic and hardly reversible.

298. The disengagement of the units of IV Division from the defensive area was an extremely difficult operation, since it was conducted at daytime and under enemy pressure. At 1430 the division troops started to abandon their positions, while the enemy Artillery fired effectively against them and the Infantry launched a fierce attack. However, these units withdrew in an orderly manner and with relatively few casualties.

According to the order of the withdrawal, the Plasteras Detachment was to occupy the heights south of Koprulu and 26 Infantry Regiment of IX Division the heights of Inaskoy. These two units had to coordinate their movement south of the Akar river, so that they could secure the movement of the rest of the division north of the river.

The units of the division arrived at the location of encampment at 0200 on 15 August, without being pursued by the Turks. During the night and

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before the arrival of the Headquarters of IV Division at Koprulu, the commander of the division sent an officer to the Plasteras Detachment and 26 Infantry Regiment to confirm whether they had occupied the designated areas and whether they had succeeded in establishing liaison between them.

Until 1600 the Plasteras Detachment at Kalejik had not managed to establish liaison with the Command of IV Division, nor had it received an order of withdrawal. However, the situation of the detachment had in the meantime become extremely precarious. For that reason, Colonel Plasteras decided to withdraw to the heights of Bel Tepe. At approximately 1800 he received the order of withdrawal by IV Division from his liaison officer, who reported inaccurately to his commander that no Greek unit was located to the east of his position. Following this Colonel Plasteras ordered the withdrawal of his detachment to the heights south of Koprulu. The withdrawal began at 1830 and was conducted through a mountainous and impassable route.

At 2200 on 14 August, the detachment arrived at the heights south of Koprulu, where troops of the Louphas Detachment of VII Division had already deployed. He thus continued his march, crossed the bridge south of Koprulu and spent the night along the railway line, three kilometers west of the rail station at Bal Mahmut. The men of the detachment were completely exhausted from two days fierce combat and their morale was not in a good state, mainly because of the heavy casualties. Under these circumstances, the Plasteras Detachment was not able to deploy on the positions that had been fixed. Nor was it able to establish liaison with the Command of IV Division at Koprulu in the night between 14/15 August, although the distance separating the two encampments areas never exceeded four kilometers.

Of the remaining divisions, VII Division withdrew in order and at 0300 on 15 August it deployed on the heights east of Arapli Chiftlik (Chakir Tepe). V Division withdrew to the line Belche – Yukari Dag Dere – Asay Dag Dere and at 2300 it occupied the eastern heights. XIII Division moved towards the heights north and northwest of Belchemizi, where it had deployed by 2400. IX Division arrived at the area between Egret and Susuz, where it encamped at 1800. At 1900 the Headquarters of Army Corps B along with its non–divisional formations arrived at Egret. All the aforementioned units moved without any enemy harassment.

The right flank of the forces of Army Corps A and B held their positions in the afternoon hours of 14 August, from the heights of Karagozeli up to the Maeander river (Sketchmap 55). At daybreak on 15 August, following an order by II Division, 2 Cavalry Regiment and a battalion from 34 Infantry Regiment deployed on the old fortified line of Dumlupinar.

299. At 1730 of 14 August, prior to the departure of the Headquarters from Kazli Gol Hamam, Army Corps B received through its wireless an order from the Field Army, assigning the following missions (Sketchmap 58):

> *Army Corps A to recapture its positions, or in case it was forced to retire, to challenge the terrain step by step, covering the line to Smyrna. In case of extreme emergency to fall back to the line Resil Baba – Akar Dag*
>
> *Army Corps B to launch a counterattack towards Chobanlar as soon as possible.*
>
> *Army Corps C to cover Eskishehir with a joint detachment and to move as quickly as possible towards Bordi in order to cover Army Corps B.*

Judging that the implementation of the aforementioned order was unfeasible due to changes in the tactical situation, Army Corps B reported in a telegram to the Field Army that it had ordered withdrawal, and added that after the withdrawal of the divisions of Army Corps A, the conduct of a counterattack towards Chobanlar was impossible. As soon as it arrived at Egret, it sent the aforementioned order of the Field Army to Army Corps A with a staff officer. At 2030 the commander of Army Corps A received it and immediately ordered his divisions to continue their withdrawal next day, up to the following areas: XII Division to the heights east of Bashkimse from the railway line to Resil Baba, where it would deploy defensively; IV Division in the area of Kuchukkoy to serve as reserve; I Division with VII Division subordinated to it to hold its position until the of the movement of IV Division, north of Bal Mahmut. Then the division would withdraw so that its left flank would be north of Kumari, establishing liaison on its left with XII Division and to the right with forces deployed in Karagozeli. Its headquarters would move to Kuchukkoy.

The aforementioned order was issued following erroneous assessment, due to the lack of reliable information, concerning the military situation in the night between 14/15 August. The Command of Army Corps A was ignorant of the fact that the forces under Major General Frangou had not occupied the line, which he himself had designated and suggested on the map to the liaison officers of Army Corps A. Moreover, he did not know that these forces had been separated into three groups with no liaison among them, resulting in each one not knowing the precise position of the other. The first of the groups, the Louphas Detachment occupied the heights north of Bal Mahmut. The group led by the commander of VII Division was on the heights southeast of Ayvali and was surrounded by Turkish Cavalry forces, waiting to assess the precise situation at daybreak and to decide accordingly. Finally, the greatest part of I Division under the Command of Major General Athanasios Frangou spent the night in he area of Bashkimse in complete disorder and with very low morale. It also did not know that the march of IV Division would be conducted the following day under no cover, since the Plasteras

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Detachment had not occupied the designated positions on the heights southwest of Koprulu, but had instead spent the night close to the rail station of Bal Mahmut. At the same time 26 Infantry Regiment had occupied positions two kilometers to the east of the designated area, resulting in an unsurveyed gap six kilometers in width. Ignorant of this latter event, the Command of IV Division was to be surprised the following day by Turkish forces that infiltrated the zone of its responsibility through this gap.

300. Around midnight the chief of staff and the director of G3 of Army Corps B arrived at Bayram Gol, and conferred with the commander of Army Corps A. The latter informed them that his forces would occupy on the following day the line designated by the order of the Field Army. Similarly, the Chief of Staff of Army Corps B reported to Major General Nikolaos Trikoupes that the following day the forces of the army corps would occupy the line of the heights Resil Baba – Egret, thus extending the front of Army Corps A.

Prior to the departure of Army Corps B's Chief of Staff, Major General Nikolaos Trikoupes handed him the situation report in order to transit it to the Field Army via the radio of Army Corps B. With this he reported that I and II Divisions were under strong pressure and withdrew, before the delivery of the order, to the heights north of Bal Mahmut, that the morale of the men was low, and that the line designated by the order had been occupied. The latter was inaccurate, since I and VII Divisions had not yet deployed the designated positions.

During the night on 14 August 1922 the forces of the Field Army of Asia Minor were deployed as follows:

– **Army Corps A** northwest of Afyon Karahisar with I and VII Divisions in the area Duzagach – Ayvali – Bal Mahmut; IV Division in the area of Koprulu and II Division in the initial positions from Karagozeli to the Maeander river.

– **Army Corps B** north of Afyon Karahisar with XII Division on the frontline at Chakir Tepe; V Division on the heights west of Hamamalti and XIII Division east of Belchemizi. IX Division served as reserve in the area of Egret.

– **Army Corps C** remained on the initial occupied line Seyitgazi Eskishehir. Only the Independent Division was assembled as reserve in the area of Akin, following orders of the Field Army.

301. On 14 August the attacking Turkish Forces operated as follows:

– **IV and I Army Corps** resumed their attacks against the Greek front (Sketchmaps 56, 58 and 59).

– In the zone of **IV Army Corps**, 5 and 11 Divisions succeeded with a combined operation at 0642 in seizing the summit of Kuchuk Kalejik (Hill 1310). The entire defensive area was abandoned by the Greek

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troops and was in turn occupied by the Turks. Furthermore at 0430, 8 Division seized the Forked Rock. In the other areas of its sector IV Division continued to defend until 1530 and then withdrew. On Kuchuk Kalejik 500 killed Greek soldiers were found. The casualties suffered by Turkish IV Army Corps were thirteen officers and 273 enlisted men killed, seventy–eight officers and 1,616 enlisted men wounded, a total of 1,980 men. Since 1900 Turkish 8 Division was subordinated to II Army Corps, whose 3 Division was ordered to move towards Akoren, in order to be subordinated to I Army Corps.

– **Turkish I Army Corps** succeeded in capturing by noon of 14 August the entire area occupied by the Greeks south of Ayvali – Bal Mahmut, with 23, 3 and 14 Divisions. Only the forces occupying Hasan Bey (Jekil Tepe) continued to defend until 1400, when they were ordered to withdraw. The Turkish 57 Division seized this area.

– **II Army Corps** (4 and 7 Divisions) was ordered to forward its forces to Arapli Chiftlik. The Independent 6 Division continue to harass the sector of Karagozeli.

– **V Cavalry Army Corps** advanced towards the general direction of Bashkimse – Olujak. 1 Cavalry Division arrived in the area of Ayvali and spend the night there. 2 and 14 Cavalry Divisions moved throughout the night 13 /14 August. 2 Cavalry Division passed through Olujak around midnight.

During the night between 14 /15 August the Turks had the following forces opposite the Greeks:

– **1 Field Army** comprising IV Army Corps with its divisions northeast of Chakirkoy as far as north of Geyslar in contact with the Greek forces, with the exception of 12 Division which was kept as reserve at Kuchuk Kalejik; I Army Corps with all its divisions on the frontline, occupying the front from Koprulu to south of Dokuzlar. Of the divisions of II Army Corps, the 8 spent the night at Afyon Karahisar and the 4 and 7 Divisions in the area of Kuchuk Jorja as reserve.

– **2 Field Army** had forwarded VI Army Corps (16 and 17 Divisions) which comprised its left flank, on the heights of the ravine at Kazli Gol Hamam.

The leadership of the Turkish Army issued the following orders for the following day, 15 August:

– **1 Field Army** to engage the opponent, impeding him to retreat towards Smyrna.

– **2 Field Army** to fix the Greek forces from the north, in order to impede them to retreat towards Kutahya.

– **V Cavalry Army Corps** to continue its attack from the rear against the Greek forces.

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The Break–up of the Greek forces

302. At 0200 on 15 August, Army Corps B at Egret received an order from the Field Army through the wireless, which cancelled the previous order for attack and subordinated the corps along with the Independent Division to Army Corps A. It stressed also that Major General Trikoupes had to cover communications towards Smyrna, and assume a counterattack as soon as this was feasible. Army Corps C would keep Eskishehir, covering communications towards Prusa.

The order was sent immediately with a liaison and Army Corps A received it at 0300. Major General Trikoupes did not recall his initial order for withdrawal. However, he sent a telegram to Army Corps B to be transmitted from its own wireless to the Field Army and to Army Corps C, requesting the movement of the Independent Division from Akin to Dumlupinar in order to meet the forces of Army Corps A. The telegram however was never transmitted , since Army Corps B had already left Egret before the arrival of the liaison there.

303. At 0500 on 15 August according to Army Corps A order the column of non–divisional units of the army corps and the Field Army moved from Bayram Gol to Altintash. In the meantime the 2 Cavalry Division of Turkish V Army Corps was moving to the north in two columns, one towards Egret and the other Bayram Gol and Arapli Chiftlik (Sketchmap 60). Three kilometers west of Bayram Gol the leading section of the second Turkish Cavalry column attacked the Greek column, which was surprised and suffered many casualties with the intervention of the Reserve Officers School of Afyon Karahisar and a battalion of XII Division, the Turkish Cavalry was repulsed.

At the same time the foot soldiers section of the 2 Cavalry Division launched a surprise attack against IX Division. This division had encamped together with Army Corps B Headquarters at Egret and was preparing to move the moment it was attacked. The Turkish attack was repelled following the intervention of a battalion and two batteries, ordered by the commander of IX Division.

At 0630 IX Division marched towards Olujak in three columns. Approximately at 0700, while the march proceeded in the aforementioned disposition, a strong Turkish Cavalry column appeared which also was moving to Olujak. The column in question was Turkish 2 Cavalry Division, two columns of which were amalgamated into one and was following the road along the northern foot of the ridgeline of Resil Baba. The march formation of IX Division facilitated quick deployment. Immediately the commander ordered all the units to attack and the Artillery to deploy and support the attack. At 0715 the Artillery began firing followed by Infantry fire. The Turkish Cavalry was surprised and turned to the neighboring ridgeline in panic,

under constant effective fire of the Artillery. Confusion prevailed and the Turkish Cavalry made successive efforts to escape now towards the north and then towards the south. In order to avoid the effective Artillery fire the Turks climbed and descended the steep ridgeline four times and finally succeeded in escaping towards Altintash.

The casualties of the Turkish Cavalry Division were heavy and many men killed or wounded were abandoned on the battlefield. Two Turkish officers and fourteen enlisted men were taken prisoner and 50 horses and 6 Pack Artillery guns were captured. Furthermore three Greek medical officers, 15 medical enlisted men and 5 spouses of Greek officers, who had been captured during the morning attack on the column of non–divisional units were freed. The casualties and the weakening of morale of the Turkish 2 Cavalry Division were so significant that it was never again employed during the ensuing operations except as reserve.

304. The forces of IV Division spent the night in the area of Koprulu (Sketchmap 58) Approximately at 0300, an officer of the staff of Army Corps A passing with his car through Koprulu informed the commander of IV Division that the Plasteras Detachment was located at Bal Mahmut. The division sent an officer with a group of cavalrymen to establish liaison with the detachment, only to disappear along with all the men.

At 0400 the Command of IV Division following orders by Army Corps A, issued an order for the continuation of the withdrawal from 0500 in one column through Koprulu – Chatkuyu – Bashkimse towards Kuchukkoy, where it would remain as reserve. At 0500 the excessively tried units of IV Division resumed their withdrawal following a rest period of only three hours. After a two–hour march, the advance guard of the column moving towards the crossroad to Bal Mahmut and Chatkuyu was fired upon from the direction of Takli Tepe. Shortly later the fire intensified and the column which included field formations halted its march since it could not pass through the defile at this area under these conditions. At the same time the advance guard deployed for combat. The commander of the division judged at that time that in order to have more freedom of movement the field formations had to move towards Olujak through Arapli Chiftlik. The Infantry units would deploy in order to repel the enemy attack. In the meantime the enemy Artillery also began fire against the column.

The new Turkish action caused great disorder and confusion to the troops of the division. Many of them, especially those of the non–combat troops, were detached from the column and rushed to the heights to the north of the road. This mixing and the panic of the troops steadily increased and eventually turned into flight to the north. Thus many units of IV Division did not comply with the order of its commander and rushed to Kuchukkoy on

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their own initiative. The remaining units followed their commander to the southern slopes of Resil Baba. The surprise attack on IV Division could have been avoided if the Plasteras Detachment had seized the heights south of Koprulu and if the Louphas Detachment had not retired prematurely, as mentioned below, from the heights north of Bal Mahmut.

At 1000 the commander of IV Division reached the Chatkuyu saddle, where after a while the Cavalry of IV Division, Infantry battalions of the same division and 26 Infantry Regiment of IX Division also assembled. Nothing else was known about the rest of the units of the division.

These units, amounting to five Infantry battalions under the Commander of 8 Infantry Regiment Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Ioannis Karydes had turned to the west through the road Koprulu – Ayvali and at 1600 reached east of Kuchukkoy, where they encamped to spend the night. Soon after two Pack Artillery battalions arrived at the same location along with the Engineer two–company force of IV Division. Assessing that spending the night at Kuchukkoy would be dangerous since there was no liaison with the division, Lieutenant Colonel Karydes ordered the continuation of the march towards Dumlupinar. The column departed at 2100.

The commander of IV Division sent the divisional Cavalry to find the missing sections, but they returned after a two hour search without any results. After this the commander of the division reported through his chief of staff to the commander of Army Corps A at Olujak the situation that had arisen, requesting orders. The latter ordered that the remaining units of IV Division spend the night at the location they were occupying, deploying outposts in liaison with IX Division located to their west.

305. The other divisions (XII, V, XIII) moved according to the order of Army Corps A dated 15 August without serious incident (Sketchmap 60) By the early afternoon hours XII Division had arrived and deployed outposts on the heights of Ilbulak Dag; V Division deployed on the northern slopes of Resil Baba and XIII Division on the heights east of Egret.

Around 1400 Major General Trikoupes arrived at Olujak to meet the commander of Army Corps B. Soon after this the chief of staff of IV Division arrived at the same location, and reported that the Headquarters of the division, with a force exceeding 500 men, was located on the heights southeast of Olujak and that the division had lost the rest of its units following the morning Turkish surprise attack. This report and the total lack of information for the whereabouts of I and VII Divisions forced Major General Trikoupes to spend the night at Olujak and to order the remnants of IV Division to remain during the night at the positions they already occupied under cover of the outposts of IX Division.

At 1630 the commander of IX Division arrived and reported to the two army corps commanders that an officer of his Staff had been informed in the morning from an officer of the Cavalry of I Division that I and VII Divisions were going to withdraw in the evening to Dumlupinar. At the same time he suggested that the force of the two army corps withdraw immediately with a forced march to the same location in order to reunite with the aforementioned divisions and to secure a new strong defensive area. However the commanders of the two army corps rejected this proposal and abided by their decision for their forces to spend the night at Olujak.

306. In the meantime, the forces under the direct orders of Major General Frangou the units of I Division encamped in the area of Bashkimse. At dawn on 15 August Major General Frangou regrouped his forces and deployed them in the area of Bashkimse, waiting for the arrival of the forces under Colonels Kourousopoulos and Louphas.

Without any information concerning I Division or the general tactical situation, VII Division under the command of Colonel Vasileios Kourousopoulos moved at daybreak in two columns to the north, after spending the night at Ayvali. These forces crossed the Duzagach river without incident and arrived in the area south of Bashkimse, where they made visual liaison with the units of I Division located there. The Turkish Cavalry had retired towards the west.

Concerned about the delay of VII Division to occupy the line, designated the previous day, Major General Frangou ordered the division to expedite its deployment. VII Division then ordered the occupation of the heights northeast of Karajaoren where it deployed at approximately 0945. During the deployment, the battalion assigned to occupy the heights north of Kumari failed to do so. As a result it did not establish liaison with the Louphas Detachment, a fact that was going to have grave consequences.

As the aforementioned events were unfolding, there was no liaison between Army Corps A and the other divisions. The wireless of I Division made repeated efforts to communicate with them, without success.

Until 1000, VII Division confronted only Turkish Cavalry forces, conducting minor skirmishes with them. From this time however, Turkish Infantry columns appeared from the southeast heading towards Kumari and the heights surrounding Karajaoren. These forces belonged to IV Army Corps , which had been conducting operations from Akhisar and further west. This situation alarmed Major General Frangou because he observed that VII Division already engaged with strong enemy forces, while the troops of I Division had not yet deployed the defensive area.

The Louphas Detachment, which had deployed north and south of the

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rail line close to Bal Mahmut during the previous night, did not succeed in establishing liaison either with the Plasteras Detachment to the east or VII Division to the west. The former one had failed to occupy the heights south of Koprulu and the latter the heights before the village Kumari, as mentioned above. Approximately at 0500 on 15 August the outposts of the Louphas Detachment received sparse Infantry fire and at the same time a strong Turkish Infantry column appeared, headed toward Bal Mahmut. At 0600 Turkish Cavalry troops were observed moving from the area of Ayvali to the two flanks of the detachment. Half an hour later the Plasteras Detachment crossed the line of outposts, withdrawing towards Kuchukkoy.

All these events alarmed Colonel Louphas with regard to the security of his detachment and led him to the decision to withdraw initially to the southwestern ridges of Resil Baba and at 1220 to the northwest.

In the meantime at 1030 enemy pressure against VII Division had already increased. Around 1300 the Plasteras Detachment first reached Bashkimse followed by the Louphas Detachment. Colonel Plasteras briefed Major General Frangou on the situation and reported that he would withdraw to Dumlupinar, since he considered that area better suited for conduct of defense. Major General Frangou instructed Colonel Plasteras to move towards the Hasan Dede Tepe heights and occupy them, leaving the rest of the defensive area of Dumlupinar to I and VII Divisions. Due to the development of the situation the withdrawal of these two divisions seemed feasible until the evening of that day. At 1800 the Plasteras Detachment arrived at Dumlupinar, where it encamped.

307. The commander of I Division as time passed by, relinquished any hope of establishing liaison with Army Corps A. Having no possibility whatsoever to reinforce or resupply his units, he decided at 1500 to withdraw I and II Divisions to the Dumlupinar defensive area. The appearance of fresh Turkish forces moving towards Bal Mahmut and Dumlupinar contributed significantly to his decision.

According to the orders by the commander of I Division, the withdrawal would be conducted successively from the left to the right of its disposition. The departure of the columns started as planned at 1600. Major General Frangou departed in a vehicle with the first echelon of his Headquarters in order to be at Dumlupinar on time and to regulate the defensive deployment of his forces there.

The units of I Division had withdrawn by 2400 on 15 August, without any Turkish harassment. The withdrawal of the units of VII Division was completed as late as 0500 on 16 August, due to strong Turkish pressure during their march. The arrival of the troops at the two divisions at the

Dumlupinar defensive area was covered by light screening force, deployed since the morning of 15 August by the commander of 1/38 Infantry Regiment, in order to cover its rear at Karagozeli and the Dumlupinar railway station.

The withdrawal of the forces under Major General Frangou at Dumlupinar and the insistence of Major General Trikoupes on the deployment of his own forces in the area of Olujak and Egret during the night of 15/16 August brought the complete and final break up of the Greek forces into two groups: the Frangou Group and the Trikoupes Group, which comprised:

The Frangou Group: I Division, II Division (from 18 August), IV Division (five battalions, two Pack Artillery Battalions, and one Engineer two–company force), VII Division, two battalions from XII Division, the Plasteras Detachment (three battalions, one Pack Artillery battalion), the Cavalry Division (from 18 August), one Field Artillery battalion and one Heavy Artillery battalion.

The Trikoupes Group: IV Division (the Command of the division, four battalions and the divisional Cavalry), V Division, IX Division, XII Division (minus two battalions), XIII Division (minus the Plasteras Detachment), five Field Artillery battalions, two Skoda 105mm Battalions, one Heavy Artillery battalion (plus one battery) and one howitzer battalion.

Beginning at 1600 of 15 August in the front of II Division, a Turkish force, more than a division in strength, launched sustained Artillery fire against Karagozeli and Toklu Tepe. Successive attacks followed until 20.00, which were all repulsed. From 2200 the pressure increased and the combat was conducted from close quarters.

In the meantime at 1800 Major General Frangou called Colonel (Inf) Ioannes Zeras, Commander of 1/38 Evzone Regiment on the phone from the rail station at Dumlupinar. The latter reported that strong Turkish forces, moved from Sinan Pasha against him at Karagozeli. The situation however was progressing smoothly. Judging an attack against at Karagozeli as imminent, Major General Frangou ordered the immediate withdrawal of 1/38 Evzone Regiment to the line Berdiman Tash – Toklu Tepe. (Sketchmap 61). His order was dictated by his wish to keep 1/38 Evzone Regiment, intact up to that moment, fresh and strong for the combat in the Dumlupinar area. Upon arrival, the Evzone regiment had to establish liaison to the right with II Division and to the left with I Division. The latter would occupy positions in the fortified area of Dumlupinar during the night. This order however was never executed since II Division, to which 1/38 Evzone Regiment was tactically subordinated, ordered the regiment to keep its positions, judging that the holding of the summit of Akar Dag was absolutely necessary for the support of the left flank of its disposition. The failure to implement the order of Major General Frangou was to bear grave consequences for the ensuing developments in the operations and the fortunes of the Trikoupes Group.

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
308. At 1325 on 15 August the Field Army issued the following telegraphic order to Army Corps A:

> *II Division is the axis whose maintenance and reinforcement shall allow the entire force to hold its line towards Smyrna and avoid retreat towards the north. If in any case the enemy operating against its left separated this division from the rest of the forces, and the withdrawal of the entire force towards the west were impossible, then this division would cover the line of Smyrna assuming command of all units along this line, and conducting delay action.*

This order could not be transmitted to Army Corps A, resulting in the complete lack of knowledge of the intentions of the Field Army. The Commander of Army Corps A Major General Nikolaos Trikoupes confronted the following situation during the night between 15/16 August: All liaison with I and II Divisions had been lost, while nothing was known concerning the fate of the greatest part of IV Division. Strong Turkish Cavalry forces were located on the rear of his forces. His opinion according to his report was that, if he continued his march during the night on rough terrain with insufficient and inaccessible roads without any local guides since all the villagers had left their villages, his forces would run the risk of being diverted and his columns of becoming mixed up. The use of the only pack trail in good condition presented great difficulties for the movement of Artillery, which comprised two Artillery regiments and the entire Heavy Artillery, as well as all the transport and medical vehicle companies. Consequently he decided to continue the movement of his forces in the morning of the following day, 16 August, with then objective of leading them to the location of Dumlupinar, where he hoped to meet the Frangou Group.

In the aforementioned argumentation of Major General Trikoupes, it must be stressed that the Headquarters of Army Corps A arrived at Olujak at 1400 and all the forces of the Trikoupes Group had deployed at the anticipated positions between 1000 and 1630. There would therefore be sufficient time for the continuation of the march towards Dumlupinar in daylight until the evening, provided that the pertinent decision would have been made in time.

At 2400 Major General Trikoupes issued an order for the continuation of the withdrawal effective morning of 16 August. IX Division would be the advance guard, followed by the remnants of IV Division, under its Commander Major General Demetrios Demaras. XIII Division would be the rear guard. In case of contact with the enemy, the divisions would attack fiercely in order to keep advancing towards their objectives. The Headquarters of Army Corps A would move along with IX and IV Divisions and the Headquarters of Army Corps B would follow XIII Division. The condition of the troops of the two army corps was not good, since to the lack of food was added



Sketchmap 59. The Movement by the Turkish Forces, 14–17 August 1922.

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the lack of drinking water. The little drinking water at the village of Olujak was not sufficient for a force exceeding 20,000 men and numerous pack animals.

In the night 15/16 August the situation presented by the Greek forces was the following (Sketchmaps 60, 62): From the right flank of Trikoupes Group at Ilbulak, where the outposts of XII Division were deployed, up to the left of Frangou Group where the outposts of Plasteras Detachment were deployed, there existed an uncovered gap twenty–five kilometers wide in straight line. The Trikoupes Group was isolated in the area of Resil Baba – Olujak – Egret with its flanks uncovered and the Turkish Cavalry on its rear. Furthermore it had no liaison with the rest of the large units and lacked any passable routes for its westward movement.

309. On 15 August the Turkish forces continued their advance and gained contact with some of the withdrawing Greek forces.

The forces of 61 Division and VI Army Corps of the Turkish 2 Field Army (Sketchmaps 58, 59, 60) arrived at the line Ihsaniye – Kazli Gol Hamam, without gaining contact with the withdrawing forces of Army Corps B.

II Army Corps (7 and 8 Divisions) of the 1 Turkish Field Army advanced towards Resil Baba though Koprulu. During its movement it surprised the withdrawing units of Greek IV Division and slightly harassed XII Division.

IV Army Corps (5, 11 and 12 Divisions) turned towards the northwest and advance in the general direction of Bashkimse, During the night it assembled in the area of Ayvali – Kumari – Akhisar.

I Army Corps (Turkish 3, 14, 15, 23 and 57 Divisions) moved towards Karajaoren and Chaltilar. During its movement 3 and 23 Divisions on the right clashed successively first to the north of Bal Mahmut with the Louphas Detachment of Greek VII Division and then in the area of Ayvali with the rest of the forces of the same Greek division under Colonel (Inf) Vasileios Kourousopoulos. The forces of I Army Corps spent the night in the area of Duzagach – Karajaoren.

V Cavalry Army Corps, which had infiltrated in the rear area of the Greek forces, conducted operations north of the railway line in the area of Olujak – Egret. 2 Cavalry Division of this army corps launched a surprise attack against the Greeks in the area of Egret with half its force, while the remaining force harassed severely the movement of the non–divisional units of Army Corps A close to Bayram Gol. Later however it clashed with Greek IX Division and retired towards the direction of Altintash, having suffered heavy casualties.

Thus the right flank of Turkish 1 Field Army approached the northwestward axis of withdrawal of the Trikoupes Group. At the same time the middle and the left flank threatened the area of Dumlupinar, towards which the forces of the Frangou Group were withdrawing. Turkish 2 Field Army on the other hand and Turkish V Cavalry Army Corps had already been moving along a curve from east to north, threatening the delayed forces of the Trikoupes Group with encirclement.

In the evening of 15 August, the Turkish forces had succeeded in breaking up the Greek forces and weakening their morale, while they threatened to cut off the Greek withdrawal towards Dumlupinar. The Turkish leadership then ordered 1 Field Army to move towards the west in order to seize Dumlupinar on the following day 16 August, before the Greek forces had the chance to do so. At the same time 2 Field Army would continue its pursuit towards the north, moving on the right flank of 1 Field Army and Turkish V Cavalry Army Corps would cut off the two routes of withdrawal of the Greek forces, which strove to retire to the west.

The Battle at Hamurkoy and Ilbulak
Sketchmaps 60, 62

310. In the morning of 16 August the divisions of the Trikoupes Group did not move at the designated time, due to a delay in the receipt of the order from Army Corps A. This event along with the decision of Major General Trikoupes to spend the night 15/16 August in the area of Olujak sealed the fate of the aforementioned forces. Contrary to the Greeks, the Turkish forces continued their advance during that same night in their effort to cut off the Greek withdrawal. Especially VI Army Corps moving from the north advanced from the line Kazli Gol Hamam – Ihsaniye and at dawn of 16 August reached Besh Karish Egik on the rear of the Trikoupes Group (Sketchmap 60).

IX Division commenced its movement from the village to the southwest of Olujak towards Kuchuk Aslanar at 0430, that is, with half an hour delay. Approximately at 0630 Turkish troops moved to the Koja Kaya heights and the column halted its march for one hour, so that Cavalry of IX Division could have sufficient time to seize these heights (Sketchmap 62).

When the march resumed and the head of the advance guard reached the area two kilometers west of Hamurkoy, the Cavalry of IX Division acting as the left flank guard reported that Turkish Cavalry forces were moving close to the railway line towards the north.

Shortly after this, Cavalry of IX Division was engaged in combat with the Turkish units, whose fire harassed the column of the advance guard. Following this, the march was halted and the advance guard was deployed in order to repel the Turkish forces. As time passed IX Division was forced to

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commit all the battalions of its advance guard. Since fresh strong Turkish forces attacked laterally the main column of the division, all combat units were ordered at 0900 to turn to the south in order to confront the Turkish attack.

The combat had already intensified along a front exceeding four kilometers in width, starting from the forested ridge east of Kuchuk Aslanar and ending at the west bank of the Porsuk river. The Greek forces committed to the action were four battalions, four Pack Artillery battalions, two Field Artillery battalions and one 105mm Skoda Artillery battalion.

XII Division, according to the order by Army Corps A had to await at Ilbulak Dag the movement of V Division to the north, employed as steady flank guard of this division. And to follow its march. However, at 0600 before the passage of the column of V Division the flank guards of XII Division were attacked by the Turks from the south, which increasingly intensified. In order to confront the whole situation, XII Division was forced to commit its reserve regiment to the combat as well. At the same time the leading units of V Division were noted to descend from Resil Baba.

Two hours later, under strong pressure by the Turks, XII Division requested from V Division reinforcement for mop–up operations in Ilbulak from the Turkish troops, so that the movement of the two divisions could continue. Responding to its request, V Division established a mixed detachment comprising an Infantry regiment and one Pack Artillery battery, which was assigned to the right flank of the disposition of XII Division. However, despite its reinforcement and the repeated attacks it conducted, XII Division was not able to implement the capture of Ilbulak Dag. It continued nevertheless to wage battle and provided the opportunity to the rest of the forces of V Division to retire to the west until 1200.

311. Major General Trikoupes with his Staff remained at his Headquarters at Olujak waiting the passing of XIII Division, with which he marched along. In the meantime he repeatedly telegraphed with the wireless radio of Army Corps B to the Field Army and II Division in order to be informed about the positions of I and VII Divisions, but received no answer.

Around 0800 XII Division arrived at Olujak, whose Commander, Colonel Miltiades Kaimpales delivered to Major General Trikoupes a message, dropped to his column from a Greek aircraft. This message reported that strong Turkish assemblies were noted in the area of Pashakoy and Sinan Pasha, south of Karagozeli. This intelligence combined with the fact that a strong Turkish Infantry and Cavalry column, moving towards Olujak led Major General Trikoupes to conclude that his group had already been encircled by Turkish forces.

XIII Division continued its march towards Hamurkoy, followed by the Headquarters of Army Corps A, which upon arrival at the saddle of Olujak was confronted with the following situation: IX and IV Divisions had already passed through and no information was available about them, while the saddle was strongly attacked by the Turkish Artillery from the south. The movement of wheeled pack trains continued at a slow rate through attacked locations for extended times, resulting in the impedance of the movement of the columns. Furthermore, there was great confusion and disarray that could bring panic. This situation forced Major General Trikoupes to personally intervene for the imposition of order and the expediting of the march, while he remained on the saddle in order to encourage his men.

XII Division continued to clash on Ilbulak Dag, holding the positions, but could not break through the Turkish front and move to Kuchukkoy, since the enemy forces were more numerous and very aggressive. The column of V Division continued its march to the west. At 0900 it arrived in the area between Ilbulak and the road connecting Bashkimse and Olujak, where it was attacked by the Artillery and threatened by Turkish forces moving from Eyje towards the direction of the saddle of Olujak. The regiment at the head of the column then received an order to attack towards the direction of Eyje and Bashkimse. This regiment managed to overrun the Turkish forces and to pin them down on the heights north of the aforementioned villages. At 1030 the Greek forces started to be seriously pressed and through repeated requests asked for reinforcements. Following this V Division assigned the other regiment to its left flank, on orders to cover the gap between the aforementioned regiment and XII Division.

Major General Trikoupes remained on the saddle of Olujak, when he was informed about the situation of XII and V Divisions. He then ordered XIII Division to assign 2 Infantry Regiment (minus one battalion) under Commander Colonel (Inf) Konstantinos Tsakalos, southwest of the aforementioned saddle for its reinforcement in the clashes conducted by V Division.

In the meantime Turkish pressure on XII Division, especially on its left flank was steadily increasing and around 1330 its units started to be overpowered and to withdraw, impeding the enemy. Confronted by such a situation, the commander of XII Division ordered the withdrawal of the entire division to the west, under cover of V Division.

312. IX Division continued to clash strongly against the Turkish forces attacking from the south. The distance between the lines of the opponents ranged from 400 to 600 meters. The Turkish pressure was constant and strong. No fold of the terrain could protect from the fire by the enemy Artillery and the casualties were heavy. The Greek Artillery did not have any observa-

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tion posts, from which the attacks of the Turkish Infantry could be observed. For this reason it had to restrict itself to return fire. Furthermore, there was a shortage of ammunition and the automatic weapons exhibited stoppages, due to their extensive and continuous employment.

At midday the pack trains of IV and IX Divisions, of Army Corps A and B, assembled in a very limited area behind the battle lines and were attacked by the Turkish Artillery, which was deployed on the heights north of Kuchuk Aslanar. The attack became increasingly more effective, inflicting heavy casualties, destruction, confusion and panic among the tightly assembled formations, but also to the Armenian and Greek civilians who followed the march.

Approximately at 1430, 26 Infantry Regiment of IX Division arrived at the battle scene. One battalion of the regiment, following orders of the Commander of IV Division Major General Demetrios Demaras, seized the forested area close to the road towards Dumlupinar in order to cover the right flank and rear from the north and northwest. On its right the Cavalry of Division VII fought on foot. At the same time numerous strong Turkish forces attacked with exceptional intensity against the left flank of the Greek disposition, south of Hamurkoy, which started to be strongly pressed.

Moving along with the rest of XIII Division, Major General Trikoupes received information for the first time at 1200 that IX Division had been engaged in combat on the heights north of Kuchukkoy. Shortly after, at 1230 he received a written report from XII Division concerning the harsh struggle it had been conducting and about the critical situation it had come into. Immediately Major General Trikoupes ordered V Division to reinforce the battle of XII Division, allowing the latter to withdraw as reserve in the valley of the Porsuk river.

XII Division which had been engaged at 0600 was receiving increasing pressure, while V Division was conducting forceful clashes with its main forces on the right flank of XII Division and with one of its regiments on the left of the same division. 2 Infantry Regiment of XIII Division was conducting struggle on the right of V Division and as far as the Porsuk River. The struggle was progressing smoothly on the front of IX and IV Divisions despite the strong Turkish pressure under protection of the Artillery, which was at the same line and was in the same danger as the Infantry. At 1400 the Greek disposition south of Olujak became unbroken from Chatkuyu to the Porsuk River. On the contrary the left flank on the front of IX and IV Divisions was exposed to the gap on the west of the aforementioned river.

In the meantime the communication with Dumlupinar had been completely cut off and no information was available concerning the Frangou Group. The morale of the combatants started to be challenged and the lack of Infantry ammunition became increasingly more apparent.

At 1430 XII Division reported that its front started to be weakened and that all its reserves had been committed, requesting at the same time urgent reinforcement. Major General Trikoupes did not respond to the desperate call for help, judging that the report of XII Division had been issued prior to his orders for its withdrawal in the valley of the Porsuk River.

At 1600 arrived a Staff officer of VII Division, who delivered to Major General Trikoupes a report by Major General Demaras, by virtue of which he requested reinforcement of the struggle of IX and IV Divisions with the entire XIII Division, since all the reserves had been committed. Following this Major General Trikoupes decided to withdraw towards Dumlupinar and issued an order at 1600, through which he stated:

> *XII and V Divisions to move towards the west at dusk and to cross the Porsuk river and to move towards Kuchuk Aslanar.*
>
> *XIII Division to hold its position in order to withdraw the aforementioned divisions and then to move to Buyuk Aslanar.*
>
> *IX and IV Divisions to hold their positions in order to cover the aforementioned movements and then to withdraw to the heights north of the railway station at Dumlupinar.*

313. On the same day, 16 August, Turkish IV Army Corps (Turkish 5, 11 and 12 Divisions) reinforced with Turkish 3 Division from Turkish I Army Corps conducted operations for the capture of the line formed by Bashkimse – Selvisaray – Chiftlik – Hamurkoy and the repelling of the Greek forces towards the north. Turkish 5 Division attacked against the southern ridges of Ilbulak Turkish 11 Division against Hamurkoy, Turkish 3 Division against the heights north of the railway station at Kuchukkoy and Turkish 12 Division remained as reserve south of Bashkimse.

The struggle progressed strongly throughout the entire front. Turkish 11 Division clashing with Greek IX Division had exhausted all its reserves, while Turkish 5 Division clashing forcefully against Greek V Division suffered heavy casualties. Approximately at 1200 after receiving repeated Greek counterattacks, it was weakened and withdrew to the south. Before this situation the commander of Turkish Army IV Corps requested reinforcement of Turkish 1 Cavalry Division located in the area of Kumari and Ayvali. This division engaged in combat at 1315, fighting on foot on the right flank of Turkish 5 Division. At the same it was reinforced with one regiment of Turkish 7 Division of Turkish II Army Corps, assembled south of the railway station at Kuchukkoy. At 1355 the commander of Turkish IV Army Corps committed Turkish 12 Division to the battle between Turkish 5 and 11 Divisions, along the axis of the attack against Hamurkoy.

At 1630 the situation along the entire front of the Trikoupes Group

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started to deteriorate dangerously. The following forces were attacking the group: from the southeast between Ilbulak Dag and the heights north of Selvisaray – Chiftlik Turkish IV Army Corps (Turkish 3, 5, 11 and 12 Divisions). From the southwest Turkish 23 Division of Turkish I Army Corps, which conducted operations along the road connecting Dumlupinar and Altintash. Turkish VI Army Corps of the 2 Field Army moved in forced marches towards Salkoy and threatened the area of the Greek disposition from the northeast. From the north and on the rear of the Greek disposition Turkish Cavalry army corps had been conducting operations, whose Turkish 14 Cavalry Division had seized the heights south and southwest of Salkoy and attacked the rear of IX Division, Turkish 1 Division fought on foot on the ridges of Ilbulak and Turkish 2 Division followed as reserve.

The rest of the divisions of Turkish I Army Corps (Turkish 14, 15 and 57 Divisions) as well as the Turkish 6 Independent Division subordinated to the army corps conducted operations against the position of Dumlupinar occupied by the Frangou Group. Turkish 14 Division conducted operations north of Belche Dag, Turkish 57 Division in cooperation with the left flank of Turkish 6 Division against Toklu Tepe and Turkish 15 Division followed as reserve.

Turkish II Army Corps remained as reserve in the area of Duzagach, Karajaoren and Bakirjik, participating in the battle only with one regiment of Turkish 7 Division.

314. In the zone of responsibility of IX Division, the Turkish pressure became specially serious at 1630, and at 1700 the Turks launched a fierce attack against the entire front with the support of Turkish Artillery. Shortly thereafter, Turkish Cavalry troops arrived at the wooded hills around Kuchuk Aslanar and attacked the right flank of the division. At the same time units of Turkish 3 Infantry Division were conducting attacks against the rear of the division from the south. Approximately at 1730 the Turks seized the wooded hill west of Selvisaray – Chiftlik. After a while, most of the commanders of the battalions could not carry on with the struggle. The entire battle front of the division started to be overpowered and to retire in confusion.

At this critical moment the action of the Artillery of IX Division must be stressed. The Artillery batteries of Pack Artillery Battalions IXa and IXb deployed between 100 and 400 meters behind the battlefront were not impelled into retirement by the withdrawing Infantry troops, but held their positions and attacked with direct laying against the attacking forces. Their fires checked the Turks back and allowed the Infantry troops to hold their positions with difficulty approximately 600 meters north of their initial positions.

In order to confront the situation Major General Demaras assigned one battalion of 26 Infantry Regiment, the last unit of his reserves. In a desperate counterattack, the battalion led personally by its Commander Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Demetrios Kalliangakes managed to temporarily check the attacking forces and to hold the weakened Greek disposition. However the fatal wounds suffered by Lieutenant Colonel Kalliangakes and the Chief of the Artillery of IV Division Lieutenant Colonel Athanasios Pournaras, who voluntarily participated in the counterattack, challenged the morale of the men of the battalion. A new strong Turkish attack swept the entire IX Division, driving it back in complete confusion and disarray.

Confronted by such a dangerous situation, Field Artillery Battalions IIa and IIb were deployed close to the Headquarters of IX Division, with five Artillery batteries in line, uncovered and unprotected by the Infantry and commenced firing against the attacking forces with direct laying. The effective fire overpowered the Turkish troops, who retired approximately 1000 meters to the south. At the same time the commander of IX Division made the effort to regroup the Infantry troops of the division. At the same time the Commander of Army Corps B major General Kimon Digenes sent an officer to report to Major General Trikoupes the adverse development in the battle and to request the supply of ammunition and reinforcements.

315. Around 1800 Major General Trikoupes arrived at his Headquarters at Hamurkoy, where a Staff officer of Army Corps B delivered a note by Major General Digenes and reported to him orally that the entire battle front of IX Division had been overpowered and encircled by the Turks. Major General Trikoupes was surprised by the adverse turn in the events and sent one of his Staff officers to verify the situation. Upon his return, the staff member verified the facts, as well as the absolute urgency of sending reinforcements and ammunition to IX Division in order to prevent the complete collapse of its resistance. Major General Trikoupes then ordered one battalion of XIII Division, which had arrived at Hamurkoy at 1700 to be deployed on the heights on the left flank of IX Division and another one to establish itself at Koja Kaya in liaison with the first one. The same staff member departed immediately to meet with Major General Digenes.

Arriving at the command post of Army Corps B, he met Major Generals Digenes and Demaras, who presented to him what had happened. They also reported to him that they had no available reserve force and their judgment was that they had been encircled by the Turks.

All the formations of the Greek forces had assembled at Hamurkoy and especially to its west. Due to the limited area the forces had mixed in such a degree that most of them had lost their leaders, lacking any sense of tactical integrity, resulting in the prevalence of total disarray and confusion. At night, the constant fire by the Turkish Artillery and the arrival at the aforementioned area of XII and V Divisions resulted in complete mixing and dis-

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persion of the troops, resulting in total lack of discipline of the leaders over the troops. After having retired with great difficulty, XII Division arrived at Hamurkoy at 2000. The withdrawal of V Division, on the other hand, had been conducted in a state of confusion and disarray under enemy pressure, resulting in the isolation and capture of certain troops. After having regrouped to the southwest, close to the saddle of Olujak, V Division moved to Hamurkoy and then assembled in the area southwest of Hamurkoy at 2300.

At dusk on 16 August, following harsh fighting that lasted the whole day, the Trikoupes Group was in an extremely critical situation. The encirclement of its forces had become final. Turkish I, II and IV Army Corps of the 1 Turkish Field Army encircled the Greek forces from the east, south and southwest, while Turkish VI Army Corps of the 2 Turkish Field Army advanced and threatened them from the north. Finally the forces of Turkish V Cavalry Army Corps conducting operation from the south had cut off almost completely its withdrawal to the west. There were severe shortages in ammunition and food was at a minimum and the morale of the men was at a very low level.

Major General Trikoupes rejected the proposal for a conference of the commanders of the major units and decided that his forces should withdraw towards Salkoy, judging that the road to this village was not strongly seized by the Turks. Furthermore he believed that it was possible for him descend towards Dumlupinar and to unite with the Frangou Group.

Based on the above, he issued orally the following order early in the evening:

> *The divisions shall depart in the evening towards Salkoy. In case of contact with the enemy, they shall attack in order to break up his forces. The order of the march shall be the following: XII Division, column of formations of Division V, Division XIII and finally IX Division with units of IV Division. IX Division under the command of General Demaras shall withdraw last from the battle front, following the retirement of the rest of the divisions.*

Furthermore, Major General Trikoupes ordered that the heavy guns be abandoned, since their transport was impossible, after rendering them unserviceable by removing their breeches. He stressed the necessity of transportation of the wireless radio of Army Corps B, which was the sole means of communication with Smyrna and Ushak. Its transportation was unfeasible and had to be abandoned, following its destruction.

The departure of the Trikoupes Group, however, started as late as 2300. XI Division commenced first, followed by the column of the formations (non–combat units). Following a four kilometer march, the advance guard clashed with weak enemy resistance, which was however sufficient to halt the movement for one full hour and to worsen the confusion and the mixing of

units. Failing to overpower enemy resistance, XII Division turned to the north and continued its march to Salkoy.

The movement of the rest of the divisions was not implemented according to the plans. V Division did not follow the route of the main column but moved further south. It was detached from the Trikoupes Group and was never reunited with it ever again. IX Division, on the other hand, could not assemble and regroup its troops, which had been seriously challenged. Taking advantage of the darkness, they turned towards Salkoy. Only the outpost units remained with their commander of the division and one Artillery battery. Following this, XIII Division was forced to take security measures for the withdrawing column on its own initiative, by being assigned the rear guard at the tail of the column. Around 0200 on 17 August, after subordinating the outpost troops of IX Division and deploying a weak rear guard, XIII Division moved towards Salkoy.

The mixing of the troops ad the complete disruption of the tactical integrity resulted in the slowing down of the march. The men were exhausted after repeated clashes, hunger and sleeplessness. Nevertheless, there still remained many elements in fighting condition among them, that were going to make one last heroic act of resistance on the battlefield of Ali Veran against a much stronger opponent the following day, on 16 August.

The Frangou Group in the area of Dumlupinar

316. During the night 15/16 August, the units of the Frangou Group encamped in a state of relative disarray in the area between the rail station of Dumlupinar and the villages of Oturak Chiftlik and Buyukoturak (Sketchmaps 61, 62). The Plasteras Detachment had established itself at Hasan Dede Tepe with its front to the east, according to the plans issued the previous day by its commander and Major General Frangou.

1/38 Evzone Regiment reinforced with the detachment of Major (Inf) Georgios Lelos (one battalion from 34 Infantry Regiment and one Artillery battery) was located in the sector of Karagozeli, assigning one of its battalions to the area between Berdiman Tash and Toklu Tepe, one battalion on the trapezoidal hills of Akar Dag and the Lelos Detachment to the heights north of Elvan Pasha and east of Oturak Chiftlik. The third battalion of 1/38 Evzone Regiment remained as reserve at Karagozeli. This regiment had been ordered the previous day by Major General Frangou to withdraw to the line formed by Berdiman Tash and Toklu Tepe, abandoning the area of Tazler. The order was never implemented, following the intervention of the commander of II Division, who did not authorize the abandoning of the summit of Akar Dag, judging that the occupation of the summit was necessary for the security of the disposition of the division. The failure to implement this order was going to bear disastrous consequences.

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Based on the assumption that 1/38 Evzone Regiment had implemented his orders, at 0545 Major General Frangou issued a bulletin about the establishment of his group at Dumlupinar. By virtue of his order, he divided the front in two sectors, the North Sector and the South Sector. In the North Sector, from the areas west of Dumlupinar to the road connecting Oturak Chiftlik and Buyukoturak he assigned the forces of VII Division, while in the south Sector from the southern boundary of the North Sector to Toklu Tepe, where 1/38 Evzone Regiment was located, he assigned the forces of I Division. The mission assigned to the troops was the defense of this line at all costs.

Anticipating an adverse development of the events which could possibly influence the operations of the entire I Division, Major General Frangou decided to reinforce the right flank, so that he could, in case of emergency, conduct his struggle from Summit 1535 towards Hayir Oluk and further west towards Chorum Dag. After this he ordered 4 Infantry Regiment of I Division to seize the mountains of Hayir Oluk.

The troops of the Frangou Group deployed on the new line at 1200 on 16 August. The disposition was dense and exhibited effective depth. A force including 25 Infantry battalions, one Cavalry battalion, 14 Pack and Field batteries and six Heavy Artillery guns covered a front twenty kilometers in width, along with a reserve force of seven battalions and two Artillery batteries of IV and XII Divisions. Six battalions and four Artillery batteries of the aforementioned forces were deployed at Toklu Tepe on a front extending approximately five kilometers.,

At 0300 on 16 August the Turkish forces, assembled in the valley of Dokuzlar from as early as the evening of the previous day, attacked the Evzone company at Tazler and forced it to retire to Elvan Pasha. The rest of the battalion to which the company belonged and which occupied the trapezoidal hill of Akar Dag was forced to withdraw to Karagozeli. At 1000 Turkish troops forcefully attacked from the east against the Greek forces at Karagozeli which were repulsed following hard struggle. In the meantime two Turkish columns arrived, with total manpower of about 8,000 men, moving from Chalishlar towards the north.

While this was the tactical situation at the front of the Frangou Group, the commander of VII Division called at 1200 on the telephone the director of C3 of I Division and called his attention to the movement of the two aforementioned columns, handing the receiver to Colonel Plasteras. He reported that he observed clashes at Hasan Dede Tepe east of Kuchukkoy between the columns conducting operations from the north and others which were withdrawing to the south. His judgment was that the attacking forces were forces of Army Corps B and the withdrawing forces the Turkish forces. Judging that this presented a unique opportunity, he suggested that the

Frangou Group attack towards the east, to assault laterally the withdrawing Turkish forces and to reunite with the Trikoupes Group.

They agreed to submit a proposal to Major General Frangou for attack of the Plasteras Detachment from Hasan Dede Tepe towards the villages of Kuchukkoy and Bashkimse. The rest of the forces of the Frangou Group would attack on the axis through the villages Oturak Chiftlik, Akcha (Ak) Hisar and Bashkimse. Major General Frangou, to whom the aforementioned telephone communication was reported and with whom the attack plan was agreed on, accepted completely the immediate implementation of this plan. At the same time, he ordered the establishment a detachment comprising two regiments and one Artillery battalion of VII Division, which was assigned along with the Plasteras Detachment the implementation of the attack.

During the time required for the typing of the aforementioned order, the commander of VII Division called once again the Director of C3 of I Division to whom he announced that the Turkish forces opposite his forces were descending deployed on the heights east of Oturak Chiftlik and shortly after they would make contact with the Greek defensive area. At the same time he requested that the Turkish intentions be verified, prior to the launching of the attack.

Major General Frangou to whom all the above were reported, ordered initially the immediate and timely launching of the attack. Shortly after, he requested the draft of the typewritten order and replaced the last phrase "Implementation conditional to clarification of the situation"

The postponement of the launching of the attack was only the first step; it was finally cancelled after the capture of Toklu Tepe by the Turks. The cancellation finalized the break–up of the Greek forces and condemned the Trikoupes Group to certain capture.

317. As the aforementioned events were unfolding, all telephone communication of the command post of the Frangou Group with the Karagozeli sector was cut off. At approximately 1400 a Turkish Infantry column was seen from the observation post of Major General Frangou moving from Toklu Tepe towards Summit 1535 and another Turkish Cavalry column moving from Hayir Oluk to the west. Taking into consideration the failure of telephone communication, Major General Frangou started to be concerned about the fate of Karagozeli. Officers of the staff of I Division were immediately assigned the identification of the situation. They returned shortly after and reported that 1/38 Evzone Regiment was located at Buyukoturak in complete disarray and 4 Infantry Regiment was withdrawing arrayed towards the same village.

At 1200 the Evzone company established at Toklu Tepe at the sight of the approaching Turkish forces, fled in disorder, after the initial fire by the

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Turkish Artillery. The other troops of the battalion, located in Berdiman Tash and north of Toklu Tepe, observed the retirement of the company without any reactions. Instead of conducting immediate counterattack, the other two battalions of 1/38 Evzone Regiment abandoned their positions and fled in disorder towards Pashajik. The Lelos Detachment observed this movement. At 1230 all the troops arrived at the rail station at Buyukoturak, where they regrouped.

Instead of conducting operations to restore the front by means of a counterattack, or at least, to hold the naturally dominating occupied fortified positions, 4 Infantry Regiment, established on the eastern slopes of Hayir Oluk, returned *en masse* withdrawing towards Pashajik. The retirement was conducted in order towards the rail station of Buyukoturak, following the Evzone regiment.

Seeing that the Turkish columns moving through Hayir Oluk towards Chorum Dag and from Karagozeli to the west, Major General Frangou judged that there was no chance of conducting an attack and that there was no hope of ever restoring the situation. Two of his regiments were already far away from the battlefront and with very low morale. For this reason he judged that the withdrawal of his right flank of his disposition was necessary, so that his forces would not be cut off from the forces of II Division and to cover the road of transportation from Oturak to Islamkoy. The withdrawal was decided to be implemented with an axis of rotation around Hasan Dede Tepe, where the Plasteras Detachment was established, so that there could be some hope of making liaison with the Trikoupes Group.

Following this at 1600 he issued an order of withdrawal of his forces, by virtue of which he determined that VII Division would withdraw on the line formed by the mountains south of Halijilar to the ravine of Hasan Dede Tepe and I Division on the line formed by the heights west of Chorum Dag up to the railway line. The Plasteras Detachment would remain at Hasan Dede Tepe.

318. At the same time, 1600, the Frangou Group received orders from the Field Army, stating that he had to make all efforts to cover the Smyrna line and, if possible, to conduct a lateral operation, attacking the Turkish forces assembled in the area of Elvan Pasha and Kuchuk Jorja (Sketchmap 60).

Later at about 1800 a new order from the Field Army arrived by virtue of which I Division was ordered to maintain its right flank in continuous liaison with the left flank of II Division. It furthermore ordered the conducting of an attack with the right flank of I Division to repel a possible enemy effort to infiltrate the position between them. The Frangou Group had to maintain its positions along with II Division on the line formed by Hasan Dede Tepe and the heights south of Chorum (Sketchmap 61) until receipt of orders from

Army Corps A to make liaison with it. The front had to be directed towards the east crossing the railway line in order to cover it.

Major General Frangou ordered only the implementation of the withdrawal order. By approximately sundown of 16 August the evacuation of all the troops of the Frangou Group from the valley of Buyukoturak had been completed, who managed to depart through the sole road, under cover of the fighting troops of VII Division. During the night Major General Frangou established the command post at Islamkoy.

319. During the whole course of 16 August the Field Army continued to make efforts to conduct the struggle from Smyrna, concerned about the fate of the Trikoupes Group and the failure of any liaison with it. All orders stressed the urgent significance of covering the railway transportation to Smyrna, suggesting the maintenance of a front perpendicular to these forces.

During the night 16/17 August the situation of the forces of Army Corps A and B was the following (Sketchmaps 61, 62):

The Trikoupes Group following its struggle throughout the day at Hamurkoy was retiring in a state of confusion and disarray towards the village of Salkoy.

The Frangou Group following the fall of Toklu Tepe was withdrawing from the location of Dumlupinar towards the line of Chorum Dag. II Division followed this movement in order to seize the line of Banaz Chay.

On the other hand, realizing the adverse situation of the Greek forces of the South Front, the Turkish Command decided to conduct an attack with 1 and 2 Turkish Field Army and Turkish V Cavalry Army Corps. The objective of the Turkish Command was to pin down the Trikoupes Group, its encirclement by both flanks and the blocking of its escape route from the rear through the valley of Murat Chay (Kizil Tash).

During the night 16/17 August the Turkish forces encamped as follows:

– Turkish VI Army Corps of the 2 Turkish Field Army (Turkish 16, 17 and 61 Divisions) in the area of Altintash and Yenije, threatening the Trikoupes Group from the northeast.

– Turkish V Cavalry Army Corps (Turkish 1, 2 and 14 Cavalry Divisions) moved during the night towards Sarayjik in order to cut off the Greek retirement towards Dumlupinar.

– Turkish I Army Corps of the 1 Turkish Field Army (Turkish 6, 14, 15, 23 and 57 Divisions) spent the night opposite the Frangou Group.

– Turkish IV Army Corps of the 1 Turkish Field Army (Turkish 3, 5, 11 and 12 Divisions) maintained Turkish 11 Division on the heights between Kuchukkoy and Hamurkoy, the strongly challenged Turkish

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12 Division with many casualties between Kuchukkoy and Selvisaray and Turkish 3 Division on the heights north of the line formed by Selvisaray – Chiftlik and Kuchuk Aslanar. The Headquarters of the army corps along with the reserve Turkish 5 Division spent the night at the railway station at Kuchukkoy.

– Turkish II Army Corps of the 2 Turkish Field Army (Turkish 4, 7 and 8 Divisions) served as reserve in the area of Duzagach and Karajaoren.


The Battle at Ali Veran

320. Shortly before dawn on 17 August, the advance guard of the Trikoupes Group arrived at Salkoy from Hamurkoy, where the chief of staff of Army Corps B ordered one battalion of XII Division to seize the heights northwest of Kuchuk Aslanar (Sketchmaps 62, 63) from which the Turkish troops fired against Salkoy. The battalion did not implement this order and returned without attaining the objective, following an exchange of Infantry fire with the enemy.

In the meantime, the troops of the Trikoupes Group started to arrive at the area of Salkoy in complete confusion and disorder. The nighttime march on a single road, the darkness and the harsh struggle during the previous day had contributed to the mixing of the troops and the lowering of their morale. The troops were in such a condition that they could not be deployed without prior rest and regrouping. The only exception to the overall situation was 14 Regiment of XII Division, 26 Regiment of IX Division and XIII Division, which served as the rear guard of the column and had not yet arrived at Salkoy. The integrity and the discipline of the numerous Artillery troops were also remarkable. Despite the harsh struggle of the previous day and the nighttime march under extremely adverse conditions, there was no loss of equipment or pack animals.

Major Generals Trikoupes and Digenes with their Headquarters arrived at Salkoy at approximately 0600 immediately after the arrival of the advance guard. Although the distance between Hamurkoy and Salkoy did not exceed eight kilometers, it took the troops six hours to cover it.

At about 0700, the Turkish Artillery started to fire from the south against the troops assembled southeast of Salkoy, thus enhancing the confusion and disorder. The Turkish attack indicated that the heights south of Kuchuk Aslanar were occupied by the Turks. Major General Digenes then ordered the commander of the advance guard of XII Division to seize these heights and to push off the Turkish forces. At the same time, Major General Trikoupes ordered some of his field batteries to support the operation to be conducted by the advance guard of XII Division. With the objective of reuniting his forces with the Frangou Group and of obeying to the letter the orders



Sketchmap 63. The Battle of Ali Veran, 17 August 1922.

issued by the Field Army for the cover of Smyrna at all costs, Major General Trikoupes firmly intended to advance to Dumlupinar.

A little later, the commanders of IV, IX and XII Divisions met with Major General Trikoupes to receive orders. The commanders of V and XIII Divisions were not present, since nothing was known concerning the whereabouts of the first, and the latter, comprising the rear guard, had not yet arrived at Salkoy. The first order issued by Major General Trikoupes concerned the regrouping of the units and the report on the available battalions from each division.

The commander of XII Division and some of the staff officers of Army Corps A proposed the continuation of the march towards Banaz along the road Salkoy – Ali Veran. This proposal was rejected by Major General Trikoupes, who insisted that first he wished to clear the tactical situation at Dumlupinar.

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
For this reason, Major General Trikoupes issued at 0730 an order for the continuation of the march towards Dumlupinar. In accordance to this order, IX and XII Divisions would seize the heights south and north of the village of Buyuk Aslanar respectively, in order to secure the advance to Dumlupinar. Meanwhile sections of Army Corps A and B continued to arrive at Salkoy. From the three remaining regiments of the missing V Division arrived about 1,700 men who were organized into two battalions. At 0800 XIII Division arrived and was ordered to occupy the heights 1,000 meters to the northwest of Kuchuk Aslanar in order to cover the movement of the other units from Salkoy to the west. From 0900 the observation post of Major General Trikoupes noticed strong Turkish columns advancing on Salkoy from the east and southeast. The appearance of these strong forces did not alter at all the decision of Major General Trikoupes to continue his movement towards Dumlupinar. For this reason, he issued at 0930 supplementary orders to IX and XII Divisions to seize the heights south and north respectively of the village of Buyuk Aslanar, in an effort to cover the withdrawal of the group towards Dumlupinar. IV Division would assemble at the rear of IX Division and XII Division at the rear of XIII Division.

At about 1100, the reports of the divisions concerning their strength were submitted to the staff of Army Corps A. According to these reports, the total combat arrayed strength was 7,000 infantrymen, 180 cavalrymen and 116 Artillery pieces. XIII Division was the most combat ready unit of all. Furthermore, a great number of men from various units, with no tactical integrity and very low morale had gathered in the area around Salkoy. Their number ranged between 10,000 and 15,000, most of them with no armament or equipment. None of the radios of the army corps or the divisions were operating. All food supplies had been depleted and the available ammunition was limited.

Many of the stranded men had gathered in the wooded ravines west of Salkoy, in a state of complete confusion and disorder, which were made worse by the Turkish Heavy Artillery fire from the south. Most groups, as well as some of the organized sections troops started to slip out through the ravines towards the village of Ali Veran in order to protect themselves from the enemy fire. Major Generals Trikoupes and Digenes who were following the movement of the Greek divisions towards the positions assigned to them, did not notice this situation.

A little later, more Turkish columns appeared from the north moving, from Altintash to Ali Veran, besides the columns advancing from Hamurkoy and Kuchukkoy. The Turkish intention to encircle the Greek forces became evident at that point.

321. Shortly before 1600, Major General Trikoupes suddenly changed his



Sketchmap 64. The Capture of the Trikoupes Group.

mind. Realizing the strength of the Turkish forces, he assessed that his total battle worthy Infantry, amounting to the strength of about one division, did not suffice for the effective confrontation of the enemy. He then decided the immediate continuation of the retirement towards Banaz (Sketchmap 64), through the only road likely to be open, namely, the road Salkoy – Ali Veran. He finally agreed with the proposal made to him, but valuable time had been lost, during which the Turkish columns had advanced and approached his group.

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The retirement route followed inaccessible summits and deep lines, crossed by dry river beds, which meant that it was not trafficable by wheeled equipment. Despite this it was decided that all vehicles, even motor trucks, were to move. The order for the continuation of the march was issued at 1130. XII Division was assigned as advance guard, along with all Engineer units, whose mission was to pave the road for the passing of wheeled vehicles.

The exit of the deep line at Salkoy through which passed the road to Ali Veran was crowded and the column of the advance guard of XII Division moved with difficulty. As the advance guard point was approaching the village of Ali Veran, suddenly Turkish Cavalry came out of the woods north of the village, deployed for combat. The advance guard point was deployed then to face this new threat.

Major General Trikoupes immediately realized the hazard, since the aforementioned Turkish forces threatened to cut off the one and only route open for retreat. Hoping that these forces were weak, he ordered XII Division to repel them, so that the march could be continued.

XII Division deployed one of its regiments, which was immediately engaged in fierce combat with the mounted Turkish troops. The Greek forces initially repelled these troops to the north. However, fresh Turkish troops continuously reinforced the combat, the intensity of which increased as time passed. It was becoming apparent that the Trikoupes Group could not avoid engagement with the enemy coming from the north and the south. The column had to halt its march and to accept the battle, which was going to prove fateful for it.

322. At 2300 during the night of 16/17 August, V Division which succeeded only after great difficulty in disengaging, assembled in the area two kilometers south of Hamurkoy. Due to the darkness combined with the densely wooded area and the enemy pressure, most of its troops had mixed in their retirement. During the battle of 16 August, V Division was exceptionally tried, fighting fiercely against superior Turkish forces. The withdrawing forces were already exhausted from the combat and the morale of the men was very low.

After arriving at the area four to five kilometers north of Kuchukkoy, V Division met various sections from other divisions or non–divisional units of the army corps, that were marching in a state of complete disorder and confusion. These sections mixed with those of the division during the night, and as a result the cohesion of the units became loose and all sense of discipline was lost. Under these circumstances, the advance guard point of the column lost its orientation and deserted from the route followed by the Trikoupes Group.

Shortly before dawn, the main column of the division clashed with the advanced enemy positions east of Kuchuk Aslanar, from where it received Infantry fire. This forced the division to turn to the northwest in order to bypass the enemy. The change of the route and the confusion resulting from the nighttime clashes brought about the complete break–up of the units and their disorderly routing in various directions.

At first light Turkish forces deployed on the heights south of Aslanar villages began to fire against the head of the moving sections. The Command of the division succeeded with difficulty in assembling and regrouping sufficient forces from its own personnel or that of other units and deployed them on the northern heights of Kapsa mountain which dominate the entrance to the Murat Chay defile. Capture of these heights by the Turks would mean that the last remaining route of escape would be cut off. At noon on 17 August, the entrance of the defile was secure and thousands of infantrymen and cavalrymen, belonging to various divisions and non–divisional units, completely mixed, were moving towards it. The Command of V Division regrouped these men and set them to march towards the west, with the objective of turning later to the south and arriving at Banaz, where it would seek to establish liaison with the Frangou Group. Thanks to the efforts of the cadre, a march column of the division was formed and set to march at 1500.

As the advance guard point was approaching Banaz, they received information that it had been seized by the Turks. Instead of turning south, the commander of the division decided that the column would continue its march to the west on the road Balchova – Gumushkoy Han, in order to arrive at Ushak, where there was still hope to establish liaison with the Frangou Group. The march towards Ushak commenced after sundown and continued throughout the night, following the aforementioned route.

In the morning on 18 August, the column moved through the saddle of Balchova, reached the exit of the defile, entered the valley of Gumushkoy. The commander of the division then ordered all his units to encamp for rest and regrouping. Troops had assembled in this area from all divisions and non–divisional units, with a strength of approximately 30,000 men.

It should be noted that the aforementioned events were not known to the Commands of Army Corps A and B at Ali Veran. V Division, on the other hand, made no effort to establish liaison with the aforementioned Commands throughout the day of 17 August.

323. The Turks today regard the Battle at Ali Veran as "the decisive battle by the Commander in Chief" since it was led personally by Mustafa Kemal, who had established his observation post on the heights of Zafer Tepe, south of Salkoy.

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The attack against the Greek forces in the area of Salkoy and Ali Veran (Sketchmap 63) was conducted by IV and VI Army Corps and by V Cavalry Army Corps. IV Army Corps of 1 Field Army attacked from the southeast and the south with four divisions. Specifically, 11 Division attacked south of Salkoy, 5 Division attacked northwest of Selvisaray, 3 Division to the immediate left of 5 Division towards Buyuk Ada Tepe and 23 Division attached to IV Army Corps at 1000, against both sides of Askoy. However, this attack was later assigned to 23 Division, since 3 Division could not implement its mission, due to the great number of casualties suffered during the battle of Hamurkoy. Thus 23 Division finally attacked immediate to the left of 5 Division and 3 Division attacked left of 23 Division on both sides of Askoy.

VI Army Corps and V Cavalry Army Corps attacked from the north. VI Army Corps began its attack with 16 Division north of Salkoy. It later engaged 61 Division at the west of 16 Division in the area between Salkoy and Ali Veran. It kept 17 Division as reserve. Turkish V Cavalry Army Corps attacked with 14 Division northeast of Kechililer. The other two divisions of the army corps (1 and 2 Divisions) served as reserves and did not participate in the operations. However, the entire Turkish Heavy Artillery participated in the attack.

As a result, the weak forces of Major General Trikoupes were attacked by six Infantry and one Cavalry division. Furthermore, the whole area occupied by them was attacked by effective and concentrated fire of the Turkish Artillery.

Forced to fight, Major General Trikoupes gave verbal orders to the divisions to defend until dusk. At that time, they would make an effort to retire through Ali Veran towards Banaz. XIII Division was ordered to deploy on the right of XII Division, which already had been fighting towards the north and to confront the Turkish forces attacking form the east. Troops from IX Division and IV were ordered to be deployed on the right of XIII Division, with their front towards the south in order to confront the Turkish forces attacking from this direction. Some of the troops of V Division extended the left flank of XIII Division, while others served as reserve at the Headquarters of the two army corps. By virtue of the aforementioned orders, the disposition of the Greek forces had the shape of a horseshoe, with the open side to the west, that is, towards the valley of Ali Veran.

Approximately 20,000 men were crowded in the deep line, forming the interior of the battlefield. These men belonged to the auxiliary formations of both the army corps and the divisions, and merely sought an opportunity to escape to the west. These non–combatants forming a totally mixed and completely disorderly crowd in a very limited space, caused great confusion and adversely affected the fighting men.

The Greek pack batteries were distributed among the divisions to support the fighting infantrymen and were deployed under relative cover. On the contrary, the Field Artillery and the Skoda batteries were deployed on a cultivated and treeless deep line under almost no cover. Their position among numerous vehicles and the multitude of non–combatant personnel was not optimal for effective fire. For this reason, their effect was insignificant. Some of the batteries remained on their transport positions because, due to the crowding and the lack of proper space they could not deploy.

At about 1600, the fire of the Turkish Artillery became more effective and covered the entire interior of the deep line, where no position could provide even minimal cover. The effects of the Turkish shells were indeed horrific. Motor and other vehicles were burning, while the casualties of the crowded non–combatant personnel were extremely heavy.

All Field and Skoda batteries, fourteen in all, were forced to silence under the sustained fire. Many of the guns and some of the caissons were blown, wreaking havoc all around them. The crews of the guns suffered many casualties and, after abandoning their guns, escaped to the surrounding wooded areas. The horses were galloping about in all directions, seeking in vain to cover themselves. Only three batteries of Field Artillery Regiment A, which supported XIII Division deployed on the heights of Kuchuk Ada Tepe, continued their fire throughout the night, owing to their relative cover.

The Turkish Infantry, on the other hand, did not participate actively until 1500, satisfied with keeping close contact and exchange of fire with the defending Greek troops, with the exception of the units of VI Army Corps, which attacked fiercely the left flank of XIII Division.

324. At about 1600, two strong Turkish columns were observed moving to Salkoy from the direction of Altintash. This was 17 Division of VI Army Corps. The other two divisions of this army corps were already attacking, 16 Division against the left flank of XIII Division and Turkish 61 Division against the weakened forces of XII and V Divisions. Major General Trikoupes ordered the divisions to try to maintain their positions until dark in order to be able to withdraw. He also suggested that they save ammunition. A little later, in order to glean a reserve force, he ordered the assembly of all men belonging to the Engineer units and the non–combat formations in order to continue the fighting until the evening.

In the meantime, the Turkish pressure against the right of the Greek disposition intensified. The northern flank of the Greek disposition continued to fight strongly and steadily to maintain its positions, despite repeated Turkish attacks. At 1700 Second Lieutenant Karamanos from the Plasteras Detachment leading a small mounted group arrived at the battlefield to deliver to Major General Trikoupes a note from the commander of the detachment,

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according to which the Frangou Group occupied the location of Dumlupinar and the Plasteras Detachment the mountainous location of Hasan Dede Tepe. The first piece of information, however, was not accurate. The Frangou Group had abandoned the area of Dumlupinar the previous day (17 August), while the Plasteras Detachment continued to hold Hasan Dede Tepe.

Furthermore, Second Lieutenant Karamanos reported that there was a pack trail leading from the battlefield to the position of the Plasteras Detachment, adding that he offered to lead the troops of the Trikoupes Group during the night. Lieutenant Trikoupes however rejected the proposal.

According to his report, the reasons for rejecting this proposal was that his units with no food or ammunition were in need of resupply before conducting any operation and that the Artillery vehicles could not move on the aforementioned pack trail. Furthermore, it was very likely that the Turks could have captured earlier the zone through which this pack trail ran. He therefore decided to lead his force towards Banaz, provided that the battle developed favorably until dusk, that is, behind the positions occupied by the Frangou Group. He would be able there to join the latter group, under conditions of better supply. For this reason, at 1800 he ordered the divisions to retire towards Banaz as soon as it became dark with the following order of march: XII Division, formations, IX Division, XIII Division.

From 1600, the situation developed to be extremely critical. Fierce, heroic and desperate fighting was conducted by XIII Division against the Turkish forces attacking from the east, These forces were constantly being reinforced, extending their front further to the west. Repeated Turkish efforts for the capture of the Buyuk and Kuchuk Ada Tepe heights were repulsed with local counterattacks. The Turkish Artillery intensified its effective fire, crushing everything and turning the interior of the battlefield into a virtual massacre. The Headquarters of Army Corps A and B remained uncovered in this inferno.

Turkish pressure had already started to mount also against the weak fighting forces of XII and V Divisions, west of Salkoy, that started to bend. Despite their heavy losses, the Turkish forces repeated their attacks stubbornly and with ever increasing force, as the situation of the Greek forces was steadily deteriorating. A short while after 1900, the battle line of XII Division was broken under strong enemy pressure and the left flank fled towards the direction of the village of Kechililer. The right flank withdrew to the heights south of the Urkmes creek, trying to hold positions there with great difficulty. Most officers were out of action, while the best of them were killed, including the Commander of 2 Infantry Regiment Colonel (Inf) Konstantinos Tsakalos and the Commander of 26 Regiment Major (Inf) Demetrios Papagiannides.

Shortly before dusk, the dense fire of the attacking forces checked an effort of counterattack conducted by a section of XII Division, led by Lieu-

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tenant Colonel (Inf) Ioannes Kotoulas. These forces suffered heavy losses and were overrun and retreated in complete disorder. Their disorderly retreat drew the men and the horses of the Field Artillery batteries into flight. The mule drivers of the transport companies of the units and the non–combat formations followed suit, cast aside the packs from the mules, mounted the animals and followed the same direction. This human mass evacuated the interior of the location in a very short time, as a result of the rapidly unfolding events before the astounded and surprised Major Generals Trikoupes and Digenes. All sought to escape the zone that was under sustained Turkish Artillery fire.

Despite these adverse developments, the battle line of XII Division was not affected by this flight in the least. Its brave men along with some of the troops of IX Division continued to make a desperate defense until nightfall. Some troops of XII Division under Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Ioannes Kotoulas continued to conduct a heroic resistance along with these forces in the small valley of Ali Veran.

325. The Battle at Ali Veran was the culmination of the Turkish offensive that had started five days earlier, resulting in the break–up of the Greek forces. During this battle, the Trikoupes Group was finally crushed and after the Battle at Ali Veran virtually ceased to exist. Isolated and away from its communications, without the support of the Frangou Group, the men of the group were hungry, sleepless and continuously fighting, encircled twice and finally succumbed under the weight of circumstances. The crushing of the Trikoupes Group and the reduction to a great extent of the combat effectiveness and the strength of the Frangou Group resulted in the necessity of the evacuation of Asia Minor by the Hellenic Army.

From the beginning of the Battle at Ali Veran, the Trikoupes Group had deployed almost all of its forces, which amounted to sixteen Infantry battalions, with reduced strength. Only ten of the Pack batteries and three of the Field batteries, out of a total of twenty–eight, participated actively in the battle. The rest of the batteries could not launch any fire since they were quickly destroyed by the enemy Artillery because they were totally uncovered.

The total strength of the Turkish forces was sixty battalions and sixteen companies, supported by twenty–three Artillery batteries of varying caliber, whose sustained and well adjusted fire covered completely the limited area of assembly of the Greek forces. Despite their great superiority in numbers and high level of morale combined with the repeated successes and the personal presence of the Commander in Chief Mustafa Kemal Pasha, these Turkish forces were not able to subdue the Greek resistance for the whole day of 17 August. The Turks, however, launched fierce and repeated attacks, with selfsacrifice and exceptional momentum. The Turks attacked with their usual tactics i.e. in dense lines, reaching repeatedly times up to the Greek positions,

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only to be repulsed to their line of departure by the defending forces, by means of counterattacks and close combat with bayonets.

The Greek forces fighting at Ali Veran honored their arms until the very end. The heroes, however, of these harsh struggle have remained unknown, due to the disastrous outcome.

326. At night, the Turkish Artillery ceased its fire on the battlefield, fearing that it might strike against its own men due to the dense darkness. The westward retreat of the Trikoupes Group began at 2030 on 17 August. The village of Kechililer served as a beacon, since it was set on fire and, so, easily discernible in the darkness (Sketchmap 63).

The troops of the Trikoupes Group were moving mixed and in such disarray that each divisional Headquarters was only followed by very few troops of their respective division, and a multitude of unorganized men belonging to other formations. All the wheeled equipment, including the guns and their caissons and 250 medical and transport vehicles were abandoned on the battlefield. Due to the lack of any transport means, all the wounded who could not walk were also abandoned.

All men, from the commanders of both Army Corps A and B down to the last enlisted man were completely exhausted from sleeplessness, hunger, anguish and apprehension about their fate. There were deeply felt emotions of bitterness and disappointment for the futility of all their sacrifices. Due to the aforementioned conditions, their march was difficult and tedious. Having reached the ultimate limit of endurance, many men lost all their strength, collapsed on the ground and were overwhelmed by a death–like sleep.

XII Division departed last, around 2230, after having repulsed Turkish attacks during the first hours after dusk. This division was the only large unit retaining cohesion, even though they had confronted the main Turkish effort throughout the day of 17 August and had conducted an almost superhuman struggle in order to check it.

For some reason the road to Kechililer remained open and the escape of the troops though this road went on during the whole night, without any attempt by the enemy to cut it off. The enemy just launched flanking automatic weapons fire, inflicting light casualties on the withdrawing troops.

Due to the darkness and the overall conditions of the march, the Trikoupes Group was divided in three columns, marching separately, following separate routes. The first column comprised 1,500 infantrymen and 600 cavalrymen under the commanders of IV and XII Divisions Major General Demaras and Colonel Kallidopoulos respectively. The second column comprised of XIII Division under the Commanders of Army Corps A and B Major Generals Trikoupes and Digenes respectively. The last column comprised IX Division under the command of Colonel Gardikas.

The Capture of the Trikoupes Group

327. The Murat Dag mountain is located northwest of Afyon Karahisar. It is inaccessible and indeed in many places unapproachable with deep ravines and covered by dense woods. The main massif in its northern section is split by two very deep lines, extending from the Balchova saddle, which is the main saddle on Murat Dag, located five kilometers on a straight line from its highest peak. At that time, the main and shortest cross route ran through these deep lines, which connected the area of Ali Veran with the area of Han located on the macadam road Kutahya Ushak. To the south of this cross road, there was only the carriage road leading out of the village of Dumlupinar through the towns of Buyukoturak and Banaz, to Ushak. The aforementioned roads were connected to each other by means of some impassable pack trails

V Division, which did not participate in the battle on 17 August departed at the head of the columns that withdrew from the area of Ali Veran to the west, following the main cross road. It managed to move in time, so as to escape from the Turkish encirclement, while by seizing and holding the saddle of Balchova made it possible for the Gardikas Column to escape capture as well.

The column under Division Commanders Demaras and Kallidopoulos (Sketchmap 64) continued its march throughout the night 17/18 August. During the march Major General Demaras disappeared. According to some unreliable information he fell from his horse and was killed in the woods on Murat Dag. The column continued its march under the Command of Colonel Kallidopoulos and after the first light its leader directed it to the southwest with the objective to meet with the Plasteras Detachment at Hasan Dede Tepe.

The march continued until 1400, when a disagreement concerning the best route to be followed arose between the commander of XII Division and the Chief of Staff of IV Division Major (Inf) Georgios Tsolakoglou who led the remnants of this division. The column then was split, with troops of XII Division and certain men from V Division under the command of Colonel Kallidopoulos continuing on their southwestward march. On the contrary, leading the officers and the enlisted men of IV Division, Major Tsolakoglou followed the route of V Division.

After a two–day march, the Tsolakoglou Column arrived at Ushak in the morning on 19 August. The evening of the same day it was reunited with the Frangou Group and was subordinated to it.

In the meantime the Kallidopoulos Column continued its march throughout the day of 18 August and at evening it met Major General Demaras, who rejoined it. Unable to overcome fatigue Major General Demaras had collapsed into sleep the previous night, hence the rumors about his death. Under the command of the Division Commanders Demaras and

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Kallidopoulos the column continued its march throughout the night 17/18 August on the northeast slope of Murat Dag. The commanders were under the impression that they had been marching towards Ushak. They had actually lost their direction in the dense forest of Murat Dag, turned back and were marching again towards the northeast.

At 1600 of 19 August, the column was surprised by Infantry fire while it was on the northeast approaches to Murat Dag. The column halted and shortly thereafter its leaders realized that they had already been encircled by Turkish Cavalry, accompanied by an Infantry battalion. Following a conference of the two commanders, with the rest of the senior officers, they came to the conclusion that any further effort for resistance or escape was completely futile, since the men were exhausted and lacked ammunition.

A little later a Turkish Cavalry company approached the Greek sections and after negotiations the column surrendered to the Turks at about 2000 on 19 August. Eighty four officers and approximately 1600 enlisted men were taken prisoner and set to march to the southeast, under the escort of Turkish Cavalry.

328. Followed by a number of Christian refugees, the Trikoupes Column moved towards the west during the night 17/18 August on the road running through Kechililer. During the march, the column was forced to halt its movement many times upon orders of Major General Trikoupes, in search of local guides, but with no effect, since the inhabitants of the area had evacuated their villages.

In the morning on 18 August, the column arrived at a small and narrow valley, where the road forked off to the south and to the west. According to information from some officers, who had served earlier in the sector of Banaz, the southbound road would lead them to that city, a little less than five kilometers away from their present position. Seeking to verify that Banaz had not been captured by the Turks, Major General Trikoupes ordered XIII Division to send an Infantry battalion to reconnoiter the area. The battalion set to march at 1200, while the column stayed put.

As time passed with no information from the battalion yet received, an officer was assigned with the mission to track the battalion. He returned at 1400 with a note from the Director of C3 of Army Corps A, who had been watching the battalion. According to this note, no road could be found leading to Banaz due to the densely wooded terrain, adding that no further information was available as to whether Banaz had been seized by the Turks or not.

Judging that he could easily reach Banaz, Major General Trikoupes ordered the resumption of the march to the direction that had been followed by the aforementioned battalion. The column continued its march through

wooded and impassable terrain and halted at night for rest. At the same time some officers were assigned with the mission to find the battalion. These officers succeeded eventually in finding the battalion after a search of many hours shortly before daybreak on 19 August. Realizing that there was no possibility to move towards Banaz which would have been seized by the Turks anyway, the Major General decided to move towards the west, along the valley of Murat Chay. From there, depending on the available information at the time, he would set to march towards Ushak or else he would continue on westwards, in case Ushak had been captured.

The column began its movement at 0500 on 19 August. After having descended the northern ridges of Murat Dag, the column entered the deep valley of Murat Chay. Around midday the advance guard was attacked by a small group of Turkish cavalrymen, who occupied the heights north of the valley. The advance guard repelled easily the Turkish Cavalry, capturing a Turkish deserter and a local Turkish villager. Following interrogation, it was established that Ushak was still under Greek control.

Assessing that the overall condition of his men and the lack of ammunition did not afford him the option to conduct any further operations, Major General Trikoupes decided to alter his route and turn south, taking also into account the configuration of the terrain, being not optimal for the deployment of troops for combat. Implementing the above order, the column turned south and resumed its march. Realizing the need of his men for rest, Major General Trikoupes at 2000 ordered the halt of the march to spend the night on the spot.

At 0700 of the following day, 20 August, the column once again set to march to the south, but amidst great disorder, due to the assembly of many men belonging to various non–combat units under no command whatsoever. The march was indeed extremely slow, with the men more dragging themselves than marching, since they could hardly stand on their feet, due to complete exhaustion and hunger. There were only ten to fifteen cartridges per weapon left, whereas the Artillery had a sufficient number of shells. The overall condition made it impossible for the remnants of the Trikoupes Group to assume any military action.

Under these conditions, the column moved to the saddle between Elma Dagi and Kizil Dag, northeast of Ushak. As they were marching, a local villager informed them that Ushak had already been seized by the Turks, as early as noon on the previous day, that is, 19 August. As soon as the advance guard reached the village of Karajashehir, Major General Trikoupes ordered the column to halt its march and to seek cover in the heights immediately south and southwest of the village. His intention was to remain there until dusk, and then to move towards Kapaklar, bypassing Ushak from the south.

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While the column was taking security measures for encampment strong Turkish formations appeared, moving towards Ushak. Presumably informed by the local villagers in Karajashehir, three of these formations, each of divisional strength, turned north, moving against the positions of the Trikoupes Column. At the same time, these positions received Infantry fire.

Major General Trikoupes at that time ordered the commander of XIII Division to deploy his forces and to make a stand "to the last man". This order however was half–heartedly received by all men present. Their physical exhaustion and the futility of any further resistance operations contributed to their rejection of the request to make this ultimate sacrifice.

Confronted by this situation, Major General Trikoupes was forced to send a herald in order to come to terms for surrender. The capture of the Trikoupes Column was completed at 1700 on 20 August. Along with the Commanders of Army Corps A and B Major Generals Trikoupes and Digenes and the Commander of XIII Division Colonel Kaimpales, 190 officers and 4400 enlisted men with six Pack Artillery guns surrendered as well.

329. Initially the Gardikas Column was in reality a part of the Trikoupes Group, following the same route a few kilometers behind. However, the repeated halts of the march ordered by Major General Trikoupes during the night 17/18 August, as well as in the morning and the afternoon on 18 August resulted in the complete separation of the two columns.

Comprising the remnants of IX, XII and IV Divisions, the Gardikas Column arrived at the saddle of Balchova at 0900 on 18 August. The passing of this saddle was hard and dangerous, since it was effectively fired upon by Turkish Cavalry troops, who occupied the heights to the northeast. During the crossing the column sustained heavy casualties in killed and wounded men, until the time when a battalion from IX Division deployed and through appropriate action pushed away the Turks.

Around 1200, the column arrived at the area five kilometers west of the village of Balchova, where it encamped for three hours, so that the exhausted men could rest. The troops regrouped and reorganized during encampment. At 1430 on 18 August, the column resumed its march. At 0100 on 19 August, the column arrived at the bridge crossing the Gediz River, north of the town of Han. The Gardikas column had already escaped the Turkish encirclement.

This was the only force of all the Greek troops that had fought at Ali Veran that was spared from capture. Its strength was 5,000 officers and enlisted men. However they were in such a condition that they could not be assigned any further military mission.

Retrograde operations of the Frangou Group to Philadelphia

330. The forces of the Frangou Group arrived at a new area, defined by the general line Hasan Dede Tepe – Chorum Dag, in the afternoon hours on 16 August (Sketchmap 61). This position was not as optimal for defense as that at Dumlupinar. Its flanks did however have support on very strong points: Its left on the steep southeastern ridges at Hasan Dede Tepe and its right on the centers of resistance at Yenije and Ahatkoy, which had been occupied by one Infantry regiment of II Division. The forces of the Frangou Group deployed from north to south, in the following order: Plasteras Detachment, VII Division, I Division, II Division.

At 0600 on 17 August, an order of the Field Army arrived, by virtue of which the group was instructed to hold the line Hasan Dede Tepe – Yenije, in order to give ample time to the forces of Army Corps A and B, already moving to the west to join it.

The forces of Turkish I Army Corps attacked the Frangou Group on 17 August. Specifically, 15 Division attacked towards Halijilar and the 14, 57 and 6 Divisions attacked against the ridgeline of Chorum Dag.

At approximately 0930, 1/38 Evzone Regiment of I Division, which had not yet executed the order to occupy during the night the key position of the Chorum Dag ridgeline, moved towards the aforementioned position. However in the meantime, the Turkish forces had already deployed on Chorum Dag and surprised the Evzone regiment firing against it. The regiment turned back and retired in disorder. The capture of Chorum Dag by the Turks made the position of the Frangou Group problematic and dangerous in the new area.

Confronted by this situation, Major General Frangou ordered the four battalions of IV Division reinforced with a two company force from 1/38 Evzone Regiment and one regiment of VII Division to attack and to seize Chorum Dag. The Greek attack began at 1400, during which the battalions of IV Division in particular excelled. Following fierce and stubborn fighting, the Turkish forces were pushed off the summit of Chorum Dag, which came under Greek control. Whereas the struggle on the front of I and IV Divisions developed favorably, the struggle on the front of VII Division took an adverse turn.

Until 1400, there was absolute calm in the sector of responsibility of VII Division. At that time, however, strong Turkish forces of about two divisions moved against its positions and at 1700 attacked the entire front of the division. Despite the strong and repeated Turkish attacks, the combat was developing rather favorably until 1900, and the Greek troops held their positions. Half an hour later the Turks scored some local success and this fact shook the whole Greek disposition.

At 2130, an order by the Field Army arrived, according to which the

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forces of I, II, IV, VII, XII and XIII Divisions would be subordinated to Major General Frangou. The Frangou Group had to maintain the positions it held in order to receive the Greek forces which were isolated in the east.

At 2300, VII Division reported that it had been continuously attacked by strong Turkish forces and as a result it was in critical situation. Immediately after a new fierce Turkish attack overran the section of VII Division that retired in disorder. The commander of VII Division was then forced to order the withdrawal of his forces three kilometers further back. Confronted by this situation, at 2400 Major General Frangou ordered VII Division to withdraw on a new line established from the heights northeast of Halmanlar (Haltibag) to the ridgeline on Chorum Dag, that covered the valley of Banaz Chay.

331. At dawn on 18 August, all units of the Frangou Group were retiring. VII Division withdrew and seized the line, designated by a relevant order. Its withdrawal, however, shook the troops of I Division deployed at Chorum Dag, which started to withdraw successively since 0700. By 0830, all positions occupied by the Greeks had been abandoned and they were in turn seized by the Turks. The valleys of Banaz and Islamkoy had been crowded with withdrawing Greek troops. Most of them had lost all tactical integrity, while all efforts by their officers and by Major General Frangou himself for regrouping had failed.

The situation at this point become critical. Following the fall of Chorum Dag, all hope for liaison with the Trikoupes Group had been lost. Furthermore, liaison with the Plasteras Detachment was broken. Confronted by this serious situation, Major General Frangou at 0900 ordered the withdrawal of his troops to the old fortified area Kizil Dag – Elma Dagi – Kapaklar – Banaz – Chay river. All forces of the Frangou Group withdrew through the valley of Banaz and Islamkoy, while all technical works and the railway line were destroyed with explosives.

At 1240, the Frangou group received an order by the Field Army, fixing its withdrawal up to the line Kizil Dag – Elma Dagi – Kapaklar – Banaz – Chay River in order to cover Ushak and the railway line, with the center of gravity of the disposition east of Ushak. The Field Army thus agreed absolutely with the orders by Major General Frangou, whose objective was to conduct one last effort for resistance on the old fortified line.

In accordance to the order of Major General Frangou, the units would be deployed on the new line as follows:

– VII Division: to the north from the saddle of Elma Dagi (not inclusive) Kizil Dag to the highway Ushak – Gediz (inclusive).

– I Division: at the center from the railway line (not inclusive) to the saddle of Elma Dagi (inclusive).

– II Division: to the south from the railway line (inclusive) to Banaz Chay.

– IV and XII Division were held as reserves.

The divisions retreated following separate routes. They arrived at the location of the new area at 1800 and deployed there during the night. The sole exception was VI Division, which did not receive the order by the group on time, resulting in its moving alone in the morning on 19 August. II Division disengaged during daytime in close contact with the enemy, and as a result it was tried hard.

Despite all these efforts, the complete regrouping of the units was not possible. The flow of escaping troops increased to such a degree that the strength of the units was drastically reduced. In general, the withdrawal was such a mess that Major General Frangou was forced to send at 2200 the following telegraphic report to the Field Army:

> *The harsh fighting of the last days have had such an adverse effect on the morale of the men, that they have the appearance of a mass of people escaping in disorderly fashion and disobeying their superiors. The result is the reduction of the combat effectiveness of the enlisted men to a significant degree. As the situation is presently, any contact with the enemy must be avoided, since in such a case the total dissolution would be unavoidable.*

Late at night Major General Frangou was informed that V Division and the remnants of Army Corps B, under the command of Colonel Gardikas had arrived at Han, northwest of Ushak, in bad condition.

The same day, 18 August, the Frangou Group received an order form the Field Army which stressed that:

> *The enemy must be held and crushed quickly, most quickly, for the honor of the Motherland and the name of the Hellenes. Also by failing to repulse the enemy, by being down–hearted and constantly retreating, [the men] upon returning to their country and their villages, crowned not with laurels but an indelible stigma and stain, they will contaminate not only themselves but also their posterity.*

Soon after a new order by the Field Army remarked, "All superiors have the right to execute on the spot any deserter disobeying his order to fall back into his ranks." Despite these orders, no drastic measure was taken by the Commands of the large units for the restoration of the discipline so radically shaken. No cadres or enlisted men were given capital punishment in order to set an example, resulting in the total breakdown of discipline and the fleeing of the greatest part of the troops. This leniency during the retreat of the Greek forces much contributed to the adverse outcome of the operations.

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In the meantime at 0100 on 18 August, the Plasteras Detachment arrived at the heights three kilometers north of Halijilar, after a continuous and arduous march, as it had been withdrawing since the evening of the previous day. At daybreak Colonel Plasteras decided to continue his march to Banaz. The movement began at 0700 and the detachment followed the pack trail through the heights of Murat Dag. Around noon, as it was entering a ravine before the village of Sobran (Samura), a Turkish regiment supported by Artillery launched a surprise attack against the detachment. The situation became difficult, since the advance guard had already entered the ravine and could not be effectively deployed to repel the Turkish attack. This fact caused much confusion and disorder to the men of the Evzone regiment, who fled to the north suffering many casualties. Its regrouping was achieved five kilometers away from the ravine. The Pack Artillery battalion accompanying the detachment, left alone without any protection, fought with its own means and lost three of its guns.

After regrouping, the detachment changed the direction of its march and following a trail from the western approaches of Murat Dag succeeded in arriving at 2430 two kilometers west of the village of Demirjiler on the southern foot of Elma Dagi following a forced and tedious march through impassable and wooded terrain. The men were totally exhausted. Among them there were eighty–five wounded, three of whom were officers.

332. In the morning on 18 August, the forces of the Frangou Group deployed on the fortified line of Kapaklar. At approximately 1045, 4 Infantry Regiment of I Division fled in disorder, under no enemy pressure and only at the mere sight of one Turkish column, moving towards its positions. At 1100, the Plasteras Detachment, whose men were in the stage of final exhaustion arrived in this area. For this reason, when ordered by Major General Frangou to recapture the positions abandoned by 4 Infantry Regiment, Colonel Plasteras responded that the condition of his men did not allow the implementation of any kind of military operation. He offered, however, to assume the command of 4 Regiment in order to make it recapture its previous positions. His proposal was approved by Major General Frangou, who also allocated to him two more battalions of VII Division. Colonel Plasteras, in command of these forces, attacked and, overrunning the Turkish forces, recaptured the abandoned positions.

At about 1230, five battalions, which comprised the left flank of II Division under Commander Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Ioannes Pitsikas fled in disorder, abandoning their positions, only at the sight of strong Turkish forces. Major General Frangou ordered II Division to recapture the aforementioned positions, since the group was in danger of being enveloped from

the south. Upon perceiving, however, that II Division made no effort, despite his orders, while the Turks commenced to conduct a threatening encirclement movement, he ordered the withdrawal of the unit of I Division on the heights north of Ushak and assigned the Cavalry of I Division to the right flank.

At the same time, Major General Frangou reported to the Field Army that he was being pressed by the enemy, adding that he had concentrated his effort on the maintenance of his positions around Kapaklar in order to provide time to the troops of Army Corps A and B to escape towards Ushak. A little later he received orders of the Field Army, by virtue of which at his own discretion and depending on the situation he was to remain on the fortified line of Kapaklar or to withdraw to the line Sarayjik – Takmak – Elehen (Sketchmap 65).

Following the aforementioned order, at 1500 Major General Frangou ordered the general withdrawal of his forces on the new line by means of a forced and continuous march. The withdrawal of the Frangou Group commenced at 1600. From VII Division, the detachment under Colonel Louphas (23 Regiment plus a battalion from 37 Regiment and Pack Artillery Battalion VII) moved from the village of Sorkan at 1800 (Sketchmap 61), where it was totally isolated, without seeking liaison with its division.

In the evening of the same day, 19 August, V Division and the remnants of Army Corps B under the command of Colonel Gardikas reunited with the Frangou Group.

The premature retreat of II Division was the cause for the evacuation of the entire Greek defensive area around Ushak. This withdrawal led to the capture of abundant military equipment in the city of Ushak by the Turks and the capture of the Trikoupes Group on Murat Dag. If the defense of the Frangou Group at Kapaklar had lasted a little longer, the Trikoupes Group could have reunited with it, avoiding capture.

333. Since the evening of 18 August, the Turkish command had realized that the bulk of the Hellenic Army had been completely annihilated and thus ordered (Sketchmaps 65, 66):

– V Cavalry Army Corps: to advance towards the general direction of Salihli in order to seize the stragglers of the Hellenic Army; to impede the retirement of the Creek forces to Ushak as well as the conduct of defensive operations by them on a new area; and, finally to prevent the destruction of the railway line.

– 1 Field Army: to advance with one part of its forces along the railway line of Philadelphia and the rest along the road to Philadelphia; following the capture of the city to move towards Salihli, and from there to continue the pursuit with its main force towards Magnesia

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and Menemen and with the rest of its force towards Nymphaeum and Smyrna.

– 2 Field Army: advancing north of Murat Dag, to move along and astride Gediz River.

During the night 19/20 August and during most of the day of 20 August, the forces under the command of Major General Frangou continued their withdrawal towards the area of Sarayjik – Takmak – Elehen. VII Division minus the Louphas Detachment, V Division, the Gardikas Column, as well as the Plasteras Detachment reached in that order the village of Takmak, where they encamped (Sketchmap 65).

Relaying orders by the Field Army, Major General Frangou ordered the first serious effort for regrouping the Greek units. According to this order, all the divisions of Army Corps A (I, II, IV and VII Divisions) and the divisions of Army Corps B (V, IX, XII and XIII Divisions) would comprise the Southern Battle Group under the command of Major General Frangou. The command of Army Corps A and B was assigned to the Commander of II Division Colonel Gonatas and to the Commander of V Division Colonel Rokas respectively, who would retain the Command of their own divisions.

During the night on 19 August, the Louphas Detachment had received the order by VII Division to move towards Takmak. Its commander, however, was of the view that Turkish V Cavalry Army Corps would make the effort to move towards Philadelphia, through the village of Kula and the pass of Kapaka Dag, in order to cut off the retirement of the Southern Battle Group. For this reason, he decided on his own initiative not to execute the order of the division, but to move to the pass of Kapaka Dag, between Kula and Philadelphia, in order to cover the carriage road.

At 1900 on 21 August, the column arrived at the area 500 meters west of the village of Kula, where it encamped, following a long and extremely arduous march. At 0300 on 22 August, it continued its march from there and at 0600 arrived and deployed defensively on the saddle of Kapaka Dag.

In the meantime, deprived of the forces of the Louphas Detachment, VII Division failed to occupy the sector assigned to it. It only occupied the heights north of Takmak and Kemer Dag. The Plasteras Detachment on the initiative of its commander remained with the above division as reserve. The rest of the organized divisions were deployed to the south of VII Division as follows: IV Division from the right flank of VII Division at Kemer Dag to the road Ine – Elehen, II Division from this road up to Elishler and I Division in the area of the villages of Chakal and Damlar as a general reserve. The remnants of the Army Corps B assembled at the railway station of Gunekoy. These troops were in such a bad condition that they could not be assigned any kind of combat mission.

334. The General Headquarters of the Field Army at Smyrna received information from air reconnaissance that on 19 August the Turkish Cavalry was assembled in the area of Han. Concerned about the possibility of the capture of the Kula defile by the Turks, which would obstruct the retirement of the Southern Battle Group, Headquarters issued an order on 21 August, by virtue of which: Army Corps A and B were ordered to avoid any contact with the enemy and to withdraw, so that their rear guards could be located in the night on 21 August at least seventeen kilometers east of Philadelphia and on 22 August at least ten kilometers to its west.

In the evening on 21 August, a force of at least 3000 men was ordered to block the Kula defile with Artillery until the passage of the columns. On 22 August, another force of comparable strength was ordered to cover the Bolu Salihli defile.

Relaying the aforementioned order by the Field Army at 1800 on 21 August, the Southern Battle Group ordered the withdrawal of its forces to the line Yorukkoy – left bank of the Hermus river (Alashehir) up to the area northwest of Paklajik.

The regiment that occupied the heights north of Kemer Dag and Takmak, and was deployed as the left flank of VII Division, engaged since 1030 of 21 August with Turkish Infantry forces, that were supported by Artillery, and attacked towards Takmak. At 1245, this regiment reported that a strong Turkish column was moving towards Derekoy and expressed concern that the enemy would start to bypass the area of the division.

Following these developments, the commander of VII Division ordered the reserve Plasteras Detachment to seize the heights north of Cheshmekoy in order to cover the left flank of the division from the north. Once at this position, the detachment observed strong Turkish forces moving to the west, with the obvious objective to cut off the retirement of the division towards Kula. At around 1400, when they had approached unnoticed the positions of the detachment, the Turkish forces were hit by dense Infantry and Artillery fire, were surprised, turned back and retired in disorder, suffering heavy casualties. Until the evening the Turks did not dare to make any other effort towards this direction.

At 1600, a Turkish column, one division strong, appeared north of Derekoy, moving towards Kula. Shortly thereafter the Turkish column launched a fierce attack against the regiment on the left flank of VII Division. The regiment, with very reduced strength, fought hard to maintain its positions. At approximately 1800, however, under strong pressure on its front, it was surprised by an attack against its left flank as well, and was forced to retire west of Kirankoy. The Turkish Cavalry charged in order to encircle the regiment, but was checked by the Cavalry of VII Division. The Greek casualties during this harsh struggle were significant.

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Due to the development of the situation, at 1900 on 21 August, VII Division withdrew its left flank to Beshkaya Dag, while its right flank remained on Kemer Dag in order to secure the defiles towards Philadelphia. Starting at 1700 and throughout the night 21/22 August, the Southern Battle Group withdrew to the new line Yorukkoy – bank of the Hermus river area – northwest of Paklajik. The divisions of Army Corps A had deployed in this area by midday on 22 August. The divisions of Army Corps B with the exception of the Plasteras Detachment, which had followed VII Division, had assembled in the area of the railway station at Derekoy by 2430 on 22 August.

On the same day, 22 August, the forces of the Turkish Army were located:

– V Cavalry Army Corps had 1 Division at Kula, 2 Division moving towards Philadelphia and 14 Division to Mene.

– 1 Field Army was moving to the west, following the railway line Ushak – Philadelphia.

– 2 Field Army followed Turkish V Cavalry Army Corps.

In the meantime the General Headquarters of the Hellenic Field Army at Smyrna was informed that the Turkish Command ordered V Cavalry Army Corps to capture Salihli by 23 August, in order to cut off the retreat of the Greek forces. Following this, it ordered at 2145 on 21 August: The Cavalry Division to move urgently to the area of Andala in order to block the exit of the defile with the same name; Major General Frangou to move by rail towards Andala, an organized force of at least 3000 men with Artillery. This force under unified command with the Cavalry Division would try to push the Turkish Cavalry back to the north.

For the implementation of this order, the Southern Battle Group ordered in the morning on 22 August XIII Division (the Plasteras Detachment), reinforced with the 3 Field Army Engineers Battalion and 400 men of the Railway Security Regiment to entruck at 1430 in order to move to Salihli. Once there, they had to seek liaison with the Cavalry Division, to which they would be tactically attached.

At the railway station of Philadelphia there was indescribable confusion. A great part of the local Greek population had already crowded the place along with a significant number of the wounded enlisted men of the Hellenic Army, who were trying to escape by rail to Smyrna. Troops from XIII Division restored order and four trains managed to depart with the entire aforementioned force. Then two more trains, the first one at 1900 and the second one at 2030, departed to Salihli with the troops of XIII Division.

335. As early as the morning on 22 August, the Louphas Detachment had deployed on the defiles over Kapaka Dag (southwest of Kula), with three battalion on the frontline, supported by Artillery. The fourth battalion remained as reserve. At approximately 0900, an airplane delivered a drop message, containing the information that strong Turkish Cavalry forces were moving from the area of Kula towards Philadelphia.

This was 2 Cavalry Division, advancing to capture Philadelphia. A little later, its advance troops clashed with the forces of the detachment and shortly dismounted and fought as Infantry, in an effort to overpower the resistance of the defenders. The battle intensified and the enemy Artillery participated actively in it. The attacking Turkish forces had been continuously reinforced, but did not make any progress.

The combat went on until noon, at which time the commander of the Turkish division decided to bypass the area from the northwest and to descend on the plain of Philadelphia, taking into account that he could not overpower the Greek resistance and the significant casualties he had suffered. The Turkish sections disengaged, mounted their horses and moved to the northwest. Colonel Louphas perceived the Turkish action and deployed his reserve battalion on the heights west of the carriage road. Turkish 2 Cavalry Division arrived at Mendechora at dusk, captured it and spent the night there. In the meantime, the Louphas Detachment communicated by means of optical telegraphy with VII Division, from which he received an order to withdraw during the night to the village of Paklajik to meet Headquarters there. The detachment abandoned its positions at 2400 and at 0200 of 23 August reached Paklajik. It did not however meet the Headquarters of VII Division and continued its march to Philadelphia where it arrived at 0400.

On 22 August, the Field Army ordered successively: II Division to move within the day to Odemish and Torbali (Sketchmap 3), and to subordinate the forces of the Military Command of Odemish. All personnel and the pack animals of all non–combatant formations (services, medical centers and military installations) established in Smyrna, to prepare for embarkation on the same day. At 1430 it informed Major General Frangou that following an attempt by the Turks to encircle the valley of Philadelphia from the north, the Field Army had the intention to withdraw the Southern Battle Group to the area of Magnesia and Kasaba.

The Battle of Salihli
Sketchmap 65

336. The city of Salihli (Sketchmap 65), in the area of which the battle of the same name was to be conducted, is located in the valley of the Hermus river and to the south of its confluence with the tributary Gediz Chay, on the foot of the northern ridges of the Boz Dag, on the railway line Smyrna Philadelphia, approximately forty kilometers away from Philadelphia.

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XIII Division arrived there during the night on 22 August, and encamped at the railway station of Salihli. The division took no security measures whatsoever, assuming that these measures had been taken by the Cavalry Division. Nor did it make any effort to establish liaison with this division, according to the orders by the Southern Battle Group. Meanwhile the Cavalry Division in Philadelphia received the order of the Field Army at 0830 on 22 August. The Cavalry Division decided to move to Salihli, assessing that it could not arrive at Andala within the same day, due to the fatigue of its horses. It just limited itself to dispatch a platoon to reconnoiter the area Mendechora and Andala.

The division moved towards Salihli at 1030. Its march was very slow, due to the indescribable crowding on that road, resulting in its arrival at Derekoy as late as 1430, where it encamped to water its horses. From Derekoy, the division sent the commander of the Mounted Artillery Battalion in order to be briefed on the security measures taken by the Military Command there. Furthermore, to conduct Colonel Plasteras, to whom he would report that the Cavalry Division encamped east of Salihli.

Continuing its march from Derekoy, the Cavalry Division arrived at the area two and a half kilometers east of Salihli at 2200 where it encamped to spend the night. By midnight both the commander of the platoon sent to wards Mendechora – Andala and the commander of the Cavalry battalion had returned to the division. The first reported that no Turkish Cavalry was noted anywhere, while the latter reported that the Military Command of Salihli occupied the bridge over the Hermus River with just a force of Gendarmes and one machine gun and that XIII Division would deploy outposts north of the railway station of Salihli.

The Cavalry Division taking into account this vague information considered that it was absolutely secure and ordered the unsaddling of the horses and the rest of the men, without taking even minimum security measures. In contrast to the aforementioned order, only the Cavalry battalion not only never unharnessed the horses from its guns, but also ordered the gunners to stay on high alert close to them, thus ready to take action at any moment.

Furthermore, the Cavalry Division ordered reconnaissance to be made in the area towards Kula and Demirji at 0400 of 23 August in order to verify the movements of the Turkish Cavalry. Consequently during the night 22/23 August, XIII Division and the Cavalry Division were resting heedless of any danger, each one assuming that the other had taken security measures. However, no such measures had been taken.

At noon of the same day, 22 August, the Field Army sent the following information to Major General Frangou:

Air reconnaissance reported at 0830 today 3,000 cavalrymen halted three kilometers south of Injikler on the road Demirli – Kula, 800 cavalrymen riding trotting towards Kula on the road Injikler – Kula, 1,000 cavalrymen halted at Kula and 500–600 cavalrymen south of Kula on the march."

The aforementioned information was not made known by the Field Army to the Cavalry Division. This omission proved extremely serious, since the Turkish Cavalry was assembling at Kula, that is northeast of Salihli. On the contrary, the Cavalry Division had been ordered to seize the exit of the Andala defile, forty–five kilometers west of Kula, exposing thus its rear to a possible action of the enemy from the direction of Mendechora.

In the meantime, Turkish V Cavalry Army Corps continued on its march during the night 22/23 August, seeking to cut off the retreat of the Southern Battle Group. From the divisions of this army corps, 2 Division was moving to Derekoy, 1 Division moved to Kula and shortly before dawn entered Salihli unopposed, since there were no Greek forces in the city at the time and 14 Division reached Salihli around noon, following 1 Division.

337. In the early morning hours on 23 August, approximately 300 men from the Field Army Telegraphic Service arrived by road at the railway station of Salihli, and started to gather the telegraphic equipment existing at the station in order to send it to Smyrna. At the same time, Colonel Plasteras ordered two battalions of the 5/42 Evzone Regiment, which had spent the previous night in the vicinity of the station to move to the northern outskirts of Salihli, while the third battalion and the 3 Field Army Engineers Battalion was to remain at the station. During the time required to implement the aforementioned movement, the liaison of the Cavalry Division arrived and reported that the division was assembled east of Salihli. Colonel Plasteras was surprised and concerned to hear this and rushed to meet the commander of the Cavalry Division.

The Cavalry Division was preparing its departure, expecting at the same time the return of the sections sent to reconnoiter. However, these sections had delayed their departure and when they set off, the Turkish Cavalry had already entered Salihli. As a result as soon as the reconnaissance sections moved away from the camp, they clashed with a Turkish Cavalry company marching towards the railway station. They dismounted immediately, deployed in battle positions and started fighting as Infantry.

At approximately the same time, the railway station was attacked by Turkish cavalrymen fighting dismounted, who were also supported by Artillery. The Turks were only 200 meters away from the station, when First Lieutenant Spyridon Vlachos, the Commander of the 4 Company of the 3 Battalion of Engineers, moved rapidly with a few men from his company and occupied the Turkish cemetery on the heights west of the station. Organizing

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thus a strong center of resistance. On the other hand, the officers, leading the reconnaissance sections of the Cavalry Division, succeeded in assembling about fifty men from the units withdrawing in disorder, due to the surprise they had just been dealt, in order to reinforce their defenses.

At the same time and while Colonel Plasteras had met the commander of the Cavalry Division, the encampment of the Cavalry Division came under surprise attack by Turkish Artillery fire. For some time confusion prevailed, because the cavalrymen were harnessing their horses. At 0830, Turkish 1 Cavalry Division launched an attack from both sides of the city in order to capture the rail station. At the same time, the two Evzone battalions made efforts to enter the city, clashing in fierce street fighting, while the men of the Engineer Corps and the Telegraph Operators at the rail station resisted resolutely.

The commander of the Cavalry Division and Colonel Plasteras decided to face the Turkish surprise attack as follows: 1 Cavalry Regiment reached hastily the heights to the immediate south of Salihli, 3 Cavalry Regiment was forwarded east of Salihli to repel the enemy forces towards the north and 2 Cavalry Regiment remained to the east of the city in reserve.

The forces of Colonel Plasteras assumed the task of mopping up Salihli from the Turkish cavalrymen who had infiltrated it. They pushed them towards Hermus River.

During the battle the Commander of 1 Cavalry Regiment Lieutenant Colonel (Cav) Nikolaos Vasos and the Commander of 43 Regiment of V Division Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Demetrios Nikolodemos[1] were both wounded. Around noon the city of Salihli was mopped up from all the Turkish cavalrymen, who were pushed towards the Hermus River.

The Turks left two officers and 120 cavalrymen killed on the battlefield. One officer and twenty–five cavalrymen were taken prisoner, while fifty horses and two machine guns were captured. The casualties of XIII Division were one officer and twelve enlisted men killed and four officers and thirty–two enlisted men wounded. There are no figures for the Cavalry Division, but its casualties were not significant.

338. Around 1300, Turkish 14 Cavalry Division arrived at Salihli and immediately launched a new fierce attack against the Greek forces, but was repelled successfully. The effective fire of the Artillery of the Cavalry Division greatly contributed to this outcome.

During the Turkish attack, the Commander of the Southern Battle Group Major General Frangou arrived at the command post of the division,

1. He led 2 and 3 Regiments of XIII Division that took part in the Battle of Salihli.

and followed the progress of the battle. During his stay there he informed the commander of the Cavalry Division that by the evening his forces would move to Ahmetli, with the exception of II Division which had been ordered to move to Odemish. Departing at 1330, Major General Frangou ordered the Cavalry Division to assign 2 Cavalry Regiment to Army Corps A, in order to be employed by the Louphas Detachment as flank guard to cover the Greek forces from the north. This flank guard would cross the Hermus River and march along its course towards Bin Tepe.

The Turks did not conduct any other operation against Salihli after 1400 and began to withdraw towards the northwest, under the fire of the Artillery of the Cavalry Division. In the meantime, the forces of the Southern Battle Group fled towards the west. At approximately 1830, when the major part of these forces had fled, the Cavalry Division moved towards Ahmetli, where it arrived at 2200. XIII Division remained as rear guard and spent the night at Salihli, under constant harassment of the enemy.

Battles at Derekoy and Bin Tepe
Sketchmaps 65, 66

339. During the battle at Salihli, the Louphas Detachment was engaged in fighting in the village of Derekoy with the Turkish 2 Cavalry Division. The Louphas Detachment had departed from Philadelphia at 0600 on 23 August marching towards Salihli as the rear guard of the Southern Battle Group. 7 Infantry Regiment of II Division the strength of which was significantly reduced was following on its tail. At around 0900, as it was approaching the village of Derekoy, the detachment was fiercely attacked by Turkish 2 Cavalry Division. The four battalions of the detachment immediately occupied positions along the railway line, stubbornly resisting the Turkish cavalrymen, who had in the meantime dismounted and been fighting as foot soldiers. The combat became fierce when 7 Infantry Regiment joined it. The intervention by the regiment turned the tide. At 1100 the Turkish Cavalry was forced to abandon any further effort and to retreat to the northwest, having suffered significant casualties.

The Louphas Detachment continued its march and at 1400 was reunited with the rest of the forces of VII Division, three kilometers west of Derekoy. In the meantime, the Southern Battle Group continued its westward march. During the night 23/24 August Army Corps B encamped with V Division at Ahmetli, XII Division encamped at the railway station at Sardich and IX Division at Kasaba (Sketchmap 66).

At approximately 1100 of 23 August, Colonel Gonatas, the Commander of both Army Corps A and II Division received an order from the Southern Battle Group to turn over the Command of Army Corps A to the Commander of I Division Colonel (Inf) Demetrios Messenes. Leading II Division,

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he would then move through a route of Boz Dag towards Odemish with mission to mop up the valley of the Cayster River from all Turkish cavalrymen there. From now on he would be subordinated to the direct orders of the Field Army. Colonel Gonatas objecting to the advisability of the above action, decided to keep the command of Army Corps A. Furthermore, he decided to leave II Division in the column of the Southern Battle Group, continuing with it the march towards Philadelphia (Sketchmap 65). After opening the road leading to Salihli, Army Corps A continued its march and in the morning hours on 24 August deployed on the line heights of Sardich – Hermus River.

340. In the evening of 23 August, the Field Army ordered Major General Frangou to assemble Army Corps A at Kasaba and Army Corps B at Magnesia. Following this, at midnight of the same day, the Southern Battle Group ordered its units to continue their march and the following day to deploy defensively around Kasaba. Implementing the aforementioned order, Army Corps A and B assembled around Kasaba at 1900 on 25 August. The Louphas Detachment reached Bin Tepe through Salihli at 1100 on 24 August, where it deployed defensively in order to cover the withdrawal of the column of the Southern Battle Group.

Following the Battle of Salihli, Turkish V Cavalry Army Corps was not in a good condition, since its ammunition had almost been depleted and its men had reached their limit in physical endurance. Around 1300 on 24 August, Turkish 1 and 14 Cavalry Divisions moving north of Gediz Chay reached Bin Tepe, where they clashed with the forces of the Louphas Detachment. The advance guards of the Turkish divisions were deployed and attacked the area. Four successive fierce Turkish attacks followed, but were all repulsed after stubborn fighting. The Turkish 2 Cavalry Division also participated in the last attack, arriving there from Salihli.

Realizing the immense superiority of the enemy and its efforts to encircle it from the left, the commander of the detachment decided to conduct a retrograde maneuver. Thus at 1700, the detachment withdrew to new positions five kilometers behind the initial ones, where it deployed itself in contact with the Turks. After having provided all the required time to the Southern Battle Group for escape towards the west, at 0400 on 25 August, the Louphas Detachment retired from Bin Tepe to Kasaba at 1150 of the same day. The divisions of Turkish V Cavalry Army Corps moved on 25 August west and north of Gediz Chay with direction towards Magnesia.

In the meantime during the night 24/25 August, as the Southern Battle Group and Army Corps A occupied the old fortified line of Sardich, with Army Corps B and the Cavalry Division in the area of Kasaba, Turkish 1 Field Army was marching between Philadelphia and Salihli and 2 Field Army, which had already turned to the south, had been encamped between Bolu and

Andala. At around midnight the Turkish Command ordered 1 Field Army to advance to the line formed by Andala, Axarium and Soma and 2 Field Army with its main force to move hastily south of Lake Marmara and to seize Ahmetli with its advance guards. Turkish V Cavalry Army Corps had to move hastily through Menemen towards Smyrna (Sketchmaps 65, 66). The continuous and arduous marches on 22, 23 and 24 August had exhausted the men of the Southern Battle Group, most of whom collapsed on the ground refusing to continue their march, despite the urging of their superiors and the danger of capture. The morale of the troops had sunk to a very low level and there were very few units that could be assigned a military mission.

Relief of the Greek Commander in Chief

341. Observing that the Army could not defend the line of Dumlupinar nor the line of Sardich and verifying that a significant number of officers of the Field Army staff had become resentful of the commander in chief, on 22 August 1922 the Greek government at Athens decided to relieve him of his duties. Major General Trikoupes was designated as his successor and Major General Victor Dousmanes to become Chief of the Army General Staff. The following day, 23 August, the government was informed of the capture of Major General Trikoupes and assigned the duties of Commander of the Field Army to Lieutenant General Georgios Polymenakos. In the evening of the same day the Minister of the Army Theotokes and Generals Polymenakos and Dousmanes departed for Smyrna aboard a destroyer. They arrived there the morning of 24 August and a council was immediately held in the offices of the Field Army, in which besides the aforementioned, participated Lieutenant General Chatzanestes and High Commissioner Stergiades. Lieutenant General Chatzanestes briefed the participants on the military situation and was informed about the decision of the Greek government to relieve him of his duties. In the evening of the same day Lieutenant General Chatzanestes departed for Piraeus, to be followed two days later, on 26 August, by the minister of the army and Lieutenant General Dousmanes.

On 24 August the new commander of the Field Army ordered (Sketchmap 66) Major General Frangou to repel with his forces any enemy effort to advance to Smyrna, through the valley of Nymphaeum, through the Magnesia Smyrna defiles and the neighboring routes; the Cavalry Division to cover the Menemen defile and the routes through Yamanlar Dagi; the Higher General Military Command of Smyrna with the forces of the Military Commands of Odemish and Buldan, under unified command, to cover Smyrna from attacks by irregulars and Cavalry from the south and southwest.

A little later a new order was issued according to which II Division was to continue its movement towards Torbali and to cover Smyrna and the Erythrea Peninsula from the south and southeast, occupying for this task the

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general line Selenousia Lake – Alaman Dagi – Torbali – south ridges of the Drakon Mountain. The forces of the Military Command of Odemish under Colonel (Inf) Demetrios Zengines were attached to the division. At the same time, further orders regulated the embarkation and the departure from Smyrna of the remaining services and the non–combatant formation.

With the aforementioned orders, the new commander in chief took security measures, with the objective of providing ample time for the evacuation of Smyrna. These orders however were unrealistic, given the developments of the situation. II Division was not moving in accordance to the orders through the valley of the Cayster river, but on the initiative of its commander together with the rest of the divisions of Army Corps A and was at that time in the area of Kasaba. Furthermore, the morale of the men of all units was so low, that they could not be assigned any serious military mission.

Regardless of the aforementioned orders by the Field Army, on 25 August the Southern Battle Group issued an order for withdrawal of its forces from Kasaba towards the passages of Nymphaeum and Sapanja, as ordered by the Field Army. According to the aforementioned order, the divisions of Army Corps A and B moved during the night on 25 August towards new positions, where they arrived in the morning of the following day. During their withdrawal, 23 Regiment of VII Division repulsed an effort by the Turkish Cavalry (1 and 2 Cavalry Divisions) to cut off the route of withdrawal of the column to the village of Bornova. The combat took place on the saddle seven kilometers northeast of this village, through which the road connecting Magnesia and Bornova runs. The saddle had been occupied by 23 Regiment and under its cover the passage of the column to the west was made possible. The regiment held its positions through the night and moved towards Smyrna in the morning of the next day, 27 August.

The Greek Cavalry Division arrived at Menemen at 0600 on 26 August and at noon of the same day departed hastily towards Mersinli, following urgent orders by the Field Army. The premature withdrawal of the Greek Cavalry Division left the road towards Smyrna open to Turkish 14 Cavalry Division, which hastened to seize the defile of Menemen in the evening on 26 August.

The Destruction of Smyrna

342. The dramatic events, that had been unfolding on the front since 13 August were not known in their true extent to the population of Smyrna. Even the High Commissioner was not sufficiently informed by the General Headquarters. In the morning on 19 August, the packaging of files started in both the General Headquarters and the High Commissioner's office, which heightened the alarm among the population. Following instructions of the Government, the High Commissioner ordered the civil servants and the Gendarmerie to begin preparations for departure. At the same time the populations of all Christian creeds, overcome by panic, rushed to the shore, and crowded the railway stations of both the Kasaba and Aydin lines. All those who could not get a seat aboard the departing trains, went to Smyrna on foot.

The citizens of Great Britain, France and Italy sought the advice of their consuls on how to deal with the situation. The consuls of Great Britain and France advised their citizens to leave the city. On the contrary, the Italian Consulate suggested that its citizens not go, since they were in no danger. Those Greeks with foresight were departing for the islands in the Aegean Sea or even to Piraeus. In the beginning of the last third of August, Smyrna was a city in which thousands of people were desperately seeking a place aboard a ship to be spared the Turkish rage.

In the evening on 23 August, some transport ships put to the harbor of Smyrna, transporting A Division as reinforcements from Thrace. Seeing the poor condition of the soldiers coming from the battlefront, the enlisted men of A Division started to become resentful and demanded that they return to Thrace, most of them refusing to disembark in the city. By 25 August the departure of the inhabitants of Smyrna had taken the form of a true exodus, while the ships carried passengers three times their capacity. The quay of Smyrna was overcrowded with people and baggage. On the same day all patients in the military hospitals embarked on the ships and left for Piraeus.

Commander in Chief Polymenakos along with his staff carried the Headquarters of the Field Army on the Greek ships, anchored in the harbor. All employees departed aboard two steamships, followed in the morning of 26 August, by senior employees of the Greek administration. At midday of that day the city was abandoned to its fate, since the Gendarmes had assembled on the quay waiting to embark. The consulates of the Great Powers were guarded by naval detachments from the warships of their respective countries.

Just before sundown on 26 August, the transport ships with all the Greek civilian and military authorities, as well as the Gendarmerie, started to sail away. Their departure was soon followed by the Greek fleet. Smyrna with no civilian authorities, was left to the discretion of the advancing Turkish forces. In the evening hours on 26 August, the remaining troops of the Southern Battle Group were moving on the road connecting Nymphaeum, Smyrna and Vryoula, directed towards the coast of Erythrea and the port of Cheshme.

343. In the morning on 27 August, Smyrna was in a desperate state. Many of the residents and some military personnel who did not succeed in boarding a ship the previous day were on the quay, seeking in vain for some ship to embark. At around 1100, the information that the Turkish Army was coming spread like wildfire.

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Shortly thereafter a force of about four hundred irregular cavalrymen was seen to advance through the quay. This force coming from Salihli, moved faster than the Turkish Army. After midday a strong section of Turkish V Cavalry Army Corps entered the city, and its commander immediately declared martial law and established a military commission. A strong section of Turkish Infantry entered Smyrna in the evening hours from the road to Nymphaeum, and was directed to the army barracks.

On 28 August large sections of Infantry and Artillery of 1 Field Army entered the city together with its Commander, Nureddin Pasha, who ordered his forces to advance to Vryoula in order to monitor the movement of the withdrawing Greek troops. His objective was not to attack them, since he was aware that the Erythrea Peninsula from which the departure of the Greek forces would take place was effectively protected by sea and by land. He merely wanted to monitor and verify the embarkation of the Greek forces.

In the early afternoon hours of 30 August, the first breakout of fire was noted in the Armenian Club in the Armenian quarter. Within less than an hour more breakouts were observed in the same area, while shortly the greatest part of the city was being consumed by the fire, with the aid of the gusting winds. The fire raged on for four days, that is, until 3 September out of control, charring the greatest part of the city. What took five centuries to be created was reduced to ashes and the wealth of so many generations was turned into ruins.

The Departure of the Southern Battle Group from Asia Minor

344. Confronted with unavoidable necessity, the Command of the Field Army ordered the evacuation of Asia Minor at 1000 on 26 August, with the authorization of the Greek government. According to this order (Sketchmap 66):

The Field Army would have to evacuate Asia Minor as soon as possible, aboard steamships.

All embarkation would be conducted form Smyrna (the quay of Punta) by midnight 26 August and would be resumed after that from the Erythrea Peninsula (the quay of Cheshme)

The Higher General Military Command of Smyrna would deploy on that day a flank guard on the heights around Kozagach, in order to secure the departure of the columns from Smyrna.

The forces of the Military Command of Odemish under Colonel Zengines would retreat towards Erythrea through the southern slopes of Kizil Dag in order to defend the neck of the Peninsula.

Continuing their retrograde movement from the morning of 27 August, the last troops of the forces under Major General Frangou would

have to pass Smyrna by midday on the same day, following the northern slopes of Kizil Dag.

Arriving at Mersinli in the morning on 27 August, the Cavalry Division would be the rear guard of the forces of the Field Army retreating towards Erythrea, assigned with the mission of delaying the enemy advance towards this direction.

All forces retreating towards Erythrea, once there, would be subordinated to the Commander of the Higher Military Command Major General Andreas Plates, who was ordered to assume the command of the entire force and to conduct the defense and the embarkation.

Major General Frangou would assign his most combat–worthy forces to the defense of the isthmus of Lestren Dag. The Fleet would cooperate in the defense of the necks of the peninsula and the protection of the embarkation of the remaining troops.

When the Southern Battle Group received the above order at 1100 on 26 August, it estimated that in order to be able to pass by Smyrna by noon of 27 August covering a distance of about forty kilometers, the section deployed as outposts on the eastern foothills of Sipylos mountain, had to begin their movement during the night 26/27 August. If the movement had started in the morning on 27 August during daytime, that is, there would have been danger of getting the Southern Battle Group engaged by the Turkish Cavalry, with very grave consequences. Furthermore, given that the Cavalry Division would cover the right (northern) flank of the group, its Command decided to secure only the left (southern) flank of the column.

Based on these estimates, the Southern Battle Group issued an order at noon of 26 August, according to which Army Corps A moved to Narli Dere, where it assembled by 1800 of 27 August. Army Corps B assembled and encamped at Agios Georgios between 1000 and 1200. Following the departure of the forces of the Southern Battle Group, the Greek Cavalry Division deployed the heights of Balchova and sent sections to reconnoiter the area towards Smyrna. The reconnaissance sections returned at noon, reporting that at 1000 the Turkish Cavalry had entered the city.

The Headquarters of the Field Army, the Higher General Military Command and the Garrison Station of Smyrna had evacuated Smyrna by midnight on 26 August and were aboard the ships. Although planned to be conducted on 27 August, their departure was so hasty that it was not made known to all military authorities in Smyrna. This resulted in some services being left behind to be captured by the Turkish troops. The same fate was in store for some Greek soldiers dispersed throughout the city, who went around in the streets or who were just sleeping totally exhausted on the pavements and in other places around the city.

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345. On 28 August the Southern Battle Group continued its withdrawal. Army Corps B assembled in the village of Gul Bahche at 0830 and Army Corps A at Vryoula at 0900. The Cavalry Division moved from Balchova at 1800 on 27 August and after a nighttime march arrived at the area four kilometers east of the Skala seaport of Vryoula at 0700 on 28 August.

The entire defense of the Erythrea Peninsula was assigned by the Field Army to Major General Andreas Plates, who was in command of A Division, with orders to cover the embarkation of the Army from Cheshme. The defense would be conducted on two successive areas initially, at Lestren Dag on the neck of the Peninsula and then on the neck of Alachati, which protects the bay of Cheshme.

At 0800 on 29 August, the withdrawal of the Southern Battle Group to the west was resumed. Army Corps B led the way followed by Army Corps A, under cover of XIII Division. During the night 29/30 August, Army Corps B encamped in the area of the village of Alachati. Army Corps A arrived and deployed in the area of Lestren Dag at midday on 29 August. A Division had already deployed in the same area. One squadron from the Greek Fleet, operating north of the bay Gul Bahche was also assigned with the defense of the Erythrea Peninsula, providing fire from the battleship *Kilkis*, the cruiser *Helle* and the destroyer *Nike* and south of the bay of Sigajik with the fire from the destroyer *Sphendone* and the light cruiser *Naxos*. Behind the first defensive line, occupied by I, II, VII and A Divisions, XIII Division remained as reserve. Leaving 3 Cavalry Regiment at the Skala of Vryoula, the Cavalry Division moved towards Cheshme at 0700 on 30 August.

Army Corps B moved from the area of Alachati at dawn on 3 August and at noon following the order by the Southern Battle Group deployed on the line Linja – gulf of Agrielia. Then at 0200 on 31 August, the army corps received orders to march at once towards Cheshme, so that beginning at sunrise it could embark in order to be transported to Chios.

346. In accordance to orders of the Southern Battle Group, effective midnight on 31 August, XIII Division was designated Plasteras Detachment and moved towards Alachati. When it arrived at the defile west of Zeytineli at 0730 on 1 September, the detachment was deployed and occupied positions on the surrounding heights. Besides, Army Corps A with the troops of A Division withdrew from the first defensive area, undetected by the Turks. Army Corps B had already reached Cheshme, where the embarkation of the Greek forces for their transport to the island in the Aegean Sea began.

Army Corps A arrived at the second area of resistance at Alachati at 1000 on 1 September. II and VII Divisions deployed defensively there in order to cover the port of embarkation, while the remaining force of Army Corps A continued its march towards Cheshme.

In the meantime, the forces of the Military Command of Odemish under Colonel Zengines had come from Aydin to the Erythrea Peninsula through Torbali and Jumaovasi from 25 August. On 27 August they arrived at Jumaovasi, where they were informed that Smyrna had been captured by the Turkish Army. Despite all this, Colonel Zengines ordered the continuation of the march towards Smyrna, instead of marching to the west in order to save his troops.

Thus at 0730 on 28 August, the column resumed its movement. During the movement Turkish irregulars and small sections of Cavalry launched minor attacks which were repulsed easily. When the head of the column arrived at the heights south of Paradeisos it was hit by Infantry fire and forced to stop. The advance guard deployed and returned fire while the entire column crowded the highway and the men of combat troops mixed up with pack transportation. The exchange of fire went on for about an hour without positive results. The Turkish Artillery deployed on the Pagus fort and Voutza heights joined the attack. Greek confusion and disorder prevailed among the Greek sections and any tactical integrity ceased to exist.

The situation gradually worsened, as the Turks were being continuously reinforced, while the Greek troops started to flee. Left with only twenty–three officers and about 1,000 enlisted men, Colonel Zengines realized that coming to terms with the Turks was inevitable. Following negotiation, this force surrendered to the Turks. Only two groups succeeded in escaping from the entire force of the column. The first group comprising twenty–five officers and 800 enlisted men under Major (Inf) Elias Vamvakopoulos made a forced march to the west and managed to embark on the light cruiser *Naxos* in the bay of Demirjiali. The other group comprising seven officers and 70 enlisted men arrived at the Skala of Vryoula, where they embarked on the battleship *Kilkis* on 29 August

347. The embarkation of the Southern Battle Group for their transportation to the islands in the Aegean Sea was conducted from the port of Cheshme. Army Corps B (IX, V and XII Divisions) embarked first during the day of 31 August. VI Division followed XII Division, to be followed by the pack transportation of non–combatant formations of Army Corps A, which was completed in the morning on 1 September. I Division arrived at Cheshme of 1 September and embarked in the early afternoon hours of the same day.

In the meantime, II and VII Divisions of Army Corps A occupied the next line of resistance: east of Linja, heights two kilometers west of Alachati east of Agrielia. The Plasteras Detachment held the defile west of Zeytineli on 1 September, covering the embarkation of the troops. The Cavalry Division arrived at Alachati on 30 August and embarked at Cheshme between the evening of the same day and the evening hours of the following day. 3 Caval-

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ry Regiment, attached to the Southern Battle Group on 29 August for the cover of the line of Lestren Dag, clashed in the afternoon on 30 August close to Vryoula with a force of about 300 Turkish cavalrymen, who captured this city. Accomplishing its mission, the regiment embarked at Cheshme on 1 September.

In the evening of the aforementioned day he Field Army issued an order which regulated the embarkation of the units of Army Corps A. II Division would organize a joint detachment of 1,200 men of 1 Infantry Regiment with two Pack batteries under the Commander of 1 Regiment Lieutenant Colonel Odysseas Maroules, assigned with the mission of covering the embarkation. The detachment would remain in the area of resistance until midnight of 2 September. In order to execute this order, the Maroules Detachment occupied the entire defensive area west of Alachati and under its cover the embarkation of the units of Army Corps A started hastily.

348. In the meantime, after leaving Turkish 2 Cavalry Division in Smyrna, V Cavalry Army Crops pursued the Hellenic Army towards the direction of Vryoula and Cheshme, followed by Turkish 57 Cavalry Division. The broken terrain was not favorable for the deployment of the Cavalry. At noon of 30 August the 1 Cavalry Division captured Vryoula.

On the same as well as on the following day the aforementioned Turkish forces made repeated efforts to attack the outposts of I and VII Divisions, deployed on the area of Lestren Dag. They were nevertheless repulsed easily, abandoning killed and wounded men on the battlefield. Another action against the Plasteras Detachment in the Zeytineli defile on 1 September failed and the Turks hastily retreated.

Following the withdrawal of the units of Army Corps A, at noon of 2 September, a strong Turkish Infantry and Cavalry force appeared in the front of the Maroules Detachment. The batteries of the detachment began to fire against this force. At the same time the battleship *Kilkis* notified with the optical telegraph fire with its 205mm and 305mm gun towers as well as with 178mm guns. The fire of the battleship continued until the early evening hours, when the Pack batteries of the detachment had withdrawn. At the same time the battleship *Kilkis* and the destroyer *Nike* as well the armed merchant ship *Aktion* anchored in the harbor of Punta and commenced barrage fire. The lights of the warships were concealed and at times the searchlights were employed in order to detect possible movements of the enemy. No movement however was detected. The fire continued until 0100 on 3 September.

At 2100 on the same day, 2 September, the entire force of the Maroules Detachment abandoned the defensive area and withdrew in two columns towards Cheshme under cover of small rear guards. Following the embarkation of the last unit of the detachment, conducted in the early morning hours on 3 September, the Commander of the Detachment Lieutenant Colonel Maroules ordered the bugler of 1 Infantry Regiment to sound the call to quarters from the quay of Cheshme. The troops of the Southern Battle Group had already left the precious and blood–soaked land of Asia Minor.

As soon as the aforementioned bugle call was sounded, the entire war and merchant marine fleet set sail from the harbor, with direction towards the islands of Chios and Mytilene. The Commander of the Field Army Lieutenant General Polymenakos with his General Headquarters departed along with the last remaining units. The town of Cheshme was seized by the Turkish forces in the morning on 3 September.

The approximate strength of the Greek forces that were transported to Chios and Mytilene was the following according to division:

– IV Division: 200 Officers, 3,300 enlisted men, 450 pack animals.

– V Division: 204 Officers, 3,000 enlisted men, 1,212 pack animals.

– VII Division: 240 Officers, 6,500 enlisted men, 2,800 pack animals, eleven Artillery pieces.

– XII Division: 155 Officers, 2,200 enlisted men, 1,100 pack animals, eight Artillery pieces.

There are no reliable figures for the remaining divisions, that is, I, II, IX, XIII and the Cavalry Division. Their strength was certainly very reduced in both personnel and equipment.

The Hellenic Army abandoned on the land of Asia Minor almost its entire Heavy and Field Artillery, a significant part of its Pack Artillery and large quantities of equipment and supplies.

At the same time, a great part of the Greek population of Asia Minor managed to be ferried along with the Hellenic Army to the islands in the Aegean Sea. The greatest part of this population remained at the discretion of the Turks on the land of Asia Minor. These people lost everything they had. Their houses were burned, their property looted and many lost their lives in the most hideous and barbaric way imaginable.

347 clergymen out of a total of 459 in the province of Smyrna were murdered. Metropolitan of Smyrna Chrysostomos, Metropolitan of Moschonesia Ambrosios, Metropolitan of Cydoniae Gregorios and Metropolitan of Iconium Zelon were horribly tortured to death.

All men of ages between eighteen and forty–five were taken captives on the pretext that they had taken up arms against their own country as inductees in an enemy army. These men were then taken to the country's interior and very few managed to survive. Most of these men were either summarily put to death or ended their own lives or died of torture and the hardship they were made to suffer.

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The women, children and the aged who escaped horrible death were ordered on 3 September to leave Asia Minor within fifteen days. It is estimated that more than 250,000 Greek refugees left aboard ships from the ports of Smyrna, Cheshme and Ayvali. Similar was the fate of the Armenians of Asia Minor, who were victims of an organized plan of ethnic cleansing by the Turks.

The same situation prevailed in the ports of the Propontis Sea (Artaki, Cyzicus, Mudanya, Keos), where thousands of refugees from northwestern Asia Minor arrived to escape violent death at the hand of ravaging Turks. The refugees from these areas have been estimated at 60,000 and approximately 41,000 of those who met a hideous death.

The Greeks of the Pontus were also persecuted without any prior notification and allowed to carry only the barest of their personal belongings. Out of a total of 400,000 Pontus refugees to Greece, only half of them had been ferried by February 1923 under the most miserable and dramatic conditions.

Finally, it must be stressed at this point, that, while all these events were developing, the official governments of the European Powers and the United States of America did little to aid the Greeks of Asia Minor during those tragic days of disaster.

CHAPTER 11

Withdrawal of Army Corps C Towards Artaki Peninsula

The Disposition of Opposing Forces
Sketchmaps 55, 67

349. In the beginning of August 1922, Army Corps C continued to occupy the northern sector of the front of the Field Army in Asia Minor, which started at Propontis, on the bay of Kios, went through Askoy lake and the regions of Kopruhisar, Bilejik, Boz Dag, Seyitgazi and ended in Akin. Its total width was about 300 kilometers (Sketchmap 67).

Army Corps C, under Major General Petros Soumilas, with its Headquarters in Eskishehir, comprised the following units: III Division minus 1/39 Evzone Battalion, and III Pack Artillery Battalion dispatched in Thrace; X Division minus 28 Infantry Regiment, also in Thrace; XI and Independent Divisions; 47 and 57 Infantry Regiments (non–divisional); Engineers Detachment of the Field Army; Field Army Regiment C (9 batteries); III Pack Artillery Battalion Skoda 105, (2 batteries); Artillery Battalion (Howitzer 155 and I, 3 batteries); two independent Field Batteries; two and a half Pack batteries, Heavy Artillery Battery 4 (120mm); Field A/A Platoon (75mm) and 2/I Cavalry Battalion (two companies); Moreover, Airplane Squadron C with Seyitgazi as its base, had 12 reconnaissance aircraft which could also be used as bombers, and a small group of two fighter planes of minor combat value. The Military Commands of Dorylaeum (Eskishehir) and Prusa were also under Army Corps C. Its total force amounted to thirty–eight Infantry battalions, thirty–one batteries (six of them heavy), two Cavalry companies and nine companies of Engineers. To these numbers must be added four more divisional Cavalries and the two two–company forces of pioneers of the divisions.

From the forces above:

XI Division (Major General Nikolaos Kladas) occupied the thirty–five kilometer wide sector from Askoy lake up to Bilejik (not included). Since the end of July 1922 it had been subordinated to the Kios subsector with a width of twenty–five kilometer. This subsector extended from the Kios Gulf up to Askoy Lake and since that time it had been subordinated to the Prusa Military Command.

III Division (Colonel Georgios Gortzas) occupied the fifty–five kilometer wide sector from Boz Dag to Porsuk River. The thirty–five kilometer wide area between the above mentioned divisions, which extended from Bilejik to Boz Dag, was occupied by 16 Infantry Regiment of XI Division directly subordinated to Army Corps C.

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X Division (Colonel (Inf) Demetrios Papanikolaou) occupied a fifty kilometer wide sector to the right of III Division to Malyabashi Tepe.

Independent Division (Colonel (Inf) Demetrios Theotokes) occupied the thirty kilometer wide sector to the right of X Division up to Akin (inclusive).

The army corps kept 12 Infantry Regiment (minus battalion) of III Division and Independent Infantry Regiment (except for a battalion that had been employed for the safety of the railway line) as general reserve. Of the thirty–eight battalions the army corps employed in all, twenty were deployed in the first line, eight as subsector reserves, two as sector reserves, one for the safety of the railway lines and seven as general reserve. Of the general reserve battalions, three were deployed in the second defensive line and one at the railway station of Karakoy.

The first area occupied by the army corps had been studied and its defense had been organized well in advance. The organization was in depth and was almost continuous, except for the massif of Boz Dag which was a natural fortress. Barbed wire had been placed in front of the trenches and the camouflage had almost been completed. Shelters, which could endure even prolonged shelling, had been constructed in most of the defensive positions. Command and Artillery observation posts had also been constructed in selected points so as to ensure good, in depth observation. Transportation and communication means had progressively been organized. Similarly, a second area had been organized in the high plateau of Eskishehir – Seyitgazi, south and southeast of Eskishehir, in dominating positions, providing excellent observation to the south, and interdicting any potential Turkish action from this direction. The second position extended to X Division sector and the right flank of III Division.

Between the two areas, which were about ten to fifteen kilometers apart, intermediate defensive lines had also been identified that would be used in case of a withdrawal under pressure of the enemy. The old area east of Prusa, which had been organized after the operations of March 1921 was considered a second area in the sector of XI Division.

350. The enemy forces opposite Army Corps C were as follows:

Facing XI Division and the subsector Bilejik was XII Army Corps (Group Kojaeli) comprising the 18 Infantry Division two independent Infantry battalions and a Cavalry force. Its total strength was 7,345 armed combatants, 4,630 unarmed combatants, 3,850 non–combatants, and 810 horsemen with twenty machine guns and eighteen guns.

Facing III Division and part of the front of X Division was the Porsuk Detachment (61 Infantry Regiment plus one battery.)

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Facing the Independent Division was 41 Division of III Army Corps. The Corps other two divisions (1 and 61) were further east. The line the advanced Turkish sections occupied comprised the first defensive. With the cover of these sections the Turkish army was preparing an attack. Two other successive organized lines, the first west of Sivrihisar – east of Aziziye and the second even further to east, enhanced the defensive ability. The Turkish troops of the first line were not keeping close contact at all points, but keeping their back to the rear, were observing the Greek movements with advanced small reconnaissance patrols. They kept close contact only with the sections of III Division.

The command of the Turkish army, having decided to launch an attack to breach the Greek deployment at the front Akar Chay – Akar Dag, reduced its forces opposite Army Corps C to the necessary minimum. It also ordered Kojaeli Group (18 Division) to conduct demonstration operations against Greek XI Division during the attack. The Porsuk Detachment and 41 Division would advance and launch an attack, the first against III and X Divisions and the second against the Independent Division. Finally, it ordered the Cavalry Division located about thirty–five kilometers southeast of Seyitgazi to move towards of Doger to cut off the railroad line Afyon Karahisar – Eskishehir.

Generally during the first days of August no remarkable action was noticed in Army Corps C's zone of responsibility, except for various feints intended to cover the assemblies and preparations of the Turkish attack. The surprise attack against the bridgehead of Ortanja (Sketchmap 55) of 6 August, forced Army Corps C to enhance security measures. From that day on, the action on both sides intensified.

The Initial Activities of Army Corps C

Sketchmaps 52, 56, 67, 68, 69

351. Army Corps C was informed of the launching of the Turkish attack against the Southern Group, from the morning situation report of Army Corps A of the 13 August (Sketchmap 67). Immediately, the army corps took all necessary measures to repel a likely Turkish attack. From the morning hours before its zone, engagements and movements of significant forces, Artillery bombardments and small scale attacks took place, with the obvious objective to pin down the forces of the corps and to hinder their movement towards the south. After that, certain movements in the interior of the divisions were ordered and the importance of vigilance was stressed.

In the afternoon hours, Army Corps C was ordered by the Field Army: "To hastily prepare a strong force, of at least one division, ready to attack towards Bordi and Karaja Dag, neutralizing with the rest of the forces any activity of the enemy north of Seyitgazi." This mission was assigned by the

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corps to the Independent Division, which, after leaving all its Heavy and Field Artillery to X Division, would keep one Pack Artillery battalion and would be at notice to move as soon as it was ordered.

From Army Corps A's evening situation report of 13 August, the Command of Army Corps C was informed that, with a successful strong counterattack, the enemy was driven out of Tilki Kiri Bel, and that the forces at Sinan Pasha were holding their ground (Sketchmap 56). At the same time, the wireless of III Division overheard by a report of Army Corps A to the Field Army that the Turks' intentions at the south front were clarified and that they operated with thirteen divisions intending to break the front of I Division. Army Corps C recommended that the Field Army should not carry out the attack provided by the plan by Army Corps C and B against Bordi and Karaja Dag (Sketchmap 52), but that their reserves should be at the disposal of Army Corps A.

On the morning of 14 August, the Field Army ordered Army Corps C to assemble by nightfall the Independent Division in the region of Akin and to assign it to Army Corps B. The assembly was accomplished by 2200 on the same day, except for 53 Infantry Regiment which completed its assembly by the morning hours of the next day.

In the afternoon hours, the army corps received an order by the Field Army which determined:

> *Army Corps A to recapture its positions, Army Corps B to counterattack towards Buyuk – Chobanlar and Army Corps C, covering Eskishehir, with a joint detachment of at least four battalions to move rapidly, with forced marches, towards the area of Bordi, covering the left of Army Corps B. To transport hastily by rail munitions and food from Eskishehir, partly towards the railway station of Doger, and partly towards Prusa subsequently.*

Army Corps C ordered X Divisions and the Independent Division to assemble as soon as possible, the former in the region of Akin, and the latter ten kilometers south of Seyitgazi, with the objective to move towards the south under the commander of the corps.

But a new Field Army order, which arrived at the corps at 2245, assigned Army Corps B and the Independent Division to Major General Trikoupes, who was ordered to counterattack as soon as possible. Army Corps C, minus the Independent Division, was ordered to secure Eskishehir, and to cover the line of communications towards Prusa.

By the evening of 15 August, due to the departure of the Independent Division, certain changes were made in the sectors of the divisions. Thus, the sector of III Division extended further to the south and the sector of X Division up to Akin while its Headquarters moved to Seyitgazi.

At 1000 of 16 August, the Independent Division, with a total force of 244 officers, 7,400 enlisted men, 2,845 pack animals, forty–eight machine guns, and fourteen guns began its movement from the area of Akin to Chukurlar (Sketchmap 68) and from there to Dumlupinar to the Command of Army Corps B. 52 Infantry Regiment, following the order of Army Corps C was subordinated to X Division, and remained in the subsector of Akin to cover its right flank.


352. After the adverse development of the situation in the southern sector of the front, and the withdrawal of Army Corps B towards the west, Army Corps C's situation became very critical. This forced the Field Army to order the assembly of the forces of Simav, Ushak, and Kutahya, and the subordination of the latter to Army Corps C. In its order the Field Army drew the army corps' attention regarding the holding of Eskishehir. It also stressed the dire need to secure the communications to Prusa, and the railway line Eskishehir – Kutahya so that it could be used to resupply the south forces of the Field Army. In another order, which was forwarded to Army Corps C in the early afternoon hours of 14 August, the units were directed to rid themselves of unnecessary equipment which had to be transported from Kutahya and Eskishehir through Karakoy to Prusa. Thus, from the morning of 15 August began the hasty evacuation of equipment by rail to Prusa.

Finally, with another order, the Field Army determined the forces of the Military Command of Kutahya to move through Gediz to Ushak. After the total evacuation of the equipment and the destruction of the railway line, the final task of the corps would be to cover Prusa in the old fortified line east of the city.

Concerning this last task the commander of Army Corps C fixed the following to the divisional commanders: the withdrawal would be conducted gradually within three days following the complete evacuation of Eskishehir and the total destruction of the railway line and factories of this city; the successive lines to be occupied. Furthermore he issued instructions regarding the conduct of the movement, the security and discipline measures to be taken during the marches, the need for identification of the lines to be occupied, the timely advancement of the pack transportation columns and their protection by Infantry sections and finally the avoidance of accelerating the pace of the marches and of the tension during their conduct, factors that could affect adversely the morale of the men.

The situation which the army corps faced on 17 August was as follows: in the south sector of the Field Army a stubborn and dubious battle was raging at Dumlupinar. The regular Cavalry Division, which was heading to the north with a horse–drawn battery, shelled the railway station of Alayunt (Sketchmaps 68, 69) and went on through Kutahya to Inonu to cut off the

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Sketchmap 68. The Disposition of Forces in the Kutahya Military District, 17 August 1922.

communications of the army corps. This development called for the acceleration of the transportation of the equipment to Prusa and the cover of the routes that led from the region of Kutahya to the south flank and the communications of the army corps. The evacuation of the Greeks, the Armenians, the Circassians, and the anti–Kemalist Turks was going on at increased pace. Regarding the cover of the routes at 0200 of 18 August, the army corps ordered the joint detachment of Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Nikolaos Lephas (52 Regiment, minus the pack Xb Artillery Battalion) to cover the defile southwest of Eskishehir, through which passes the railway line to Kutahya. The joint detachment of Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Konstantinos Vlachogiannes (one battalion of each of 6 and 30 Infantry Regiments) would be deployed further west. Finally, the Engineer detachment would be transported by railway

from Karakoy to Inonu and from there by road to Dutlucha Tepe to cover the route from Kutahya to Inonu. All the Heavy Artillery was subordinated to the army corps and ordered to move towards Eskishehir. The equipment of Bridging Company C was transported to Prusa and the destruction of the railway line was ordered. The corps, estimating that the total evacuation would be completed before 19 August, decided that the withdrawal should be conducted on the night of 18/19 August.

Operations from 14 until 18 August, 1922

353. During the time the transportation of material was being accomplished and measures were being taken for the cover of the flanks of the army corps, the screening elements faced continuous and intense activities from the Turkish forces opposite them. Thus, during the period from 14–18 August, repeated Turkish attacks with the support of the Artillery were launched but repulsed. The attackers sustained many casualties.

The Military Command of Kutahya, under Colonel (Inf) Perikles Spyropoulos, subordinated to Army Corps B, comprised 32 Infantry Regiment (four battalions,) Bridging Company 3 in Alayunt and other sections. The regiment was assigned the security of the section of the railway line Dumlupinar – Afyon Karahisar – Sabunju Pinar, about 200 kilometers in total length. Its strength was sixty officers (only fifteen regular) and about 3,000 enlisted men. It consisted of men of various origins, especially from Asia Minor, of lesser combat effectiveness, a lax feeling of discipline due to the dispersion, and low morale since their enlisted men were mainly fugitives from the Battle of Sakarya, draft dodgers and previously hospitalized, many of whom were still recuperating.

From 15 August, the Military Command of Kutahya came under Army Corps C. Its commander, after the evacuation of the equipment, ordered on his own initiative all the troops of the guard of Kutahya, who had remained in the area, to assemble in the city. At 0330 of 17 August, after exchange of views with Army Corps C and having forwarded the Christian population (about 10,000 people) to Prusa instead of to Ushak, moved through Gediz to Ushak. The column that moved on the highway Kutahya – Ushak, 1,420 men in all, despite the security measures, on entering the gorge of the Kumari River (about ten kilometers in length) was attacked by a force of about 200 Turks who occupied the south edge of the gorge. A section of the column comprising an Infantry company and fifty cavalrymen launched an unsuccessful attack against the Turks. The commander of the column ordered the abandonment of all equipment except armament and ammunition and the assembly of all men around him at the head of the column. During the movement, the men fled towards different directions, while fire from the Turkish Artillery added to the confusion and panic. The rough, broken ground contributed to a

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total loss of contact with the commander of the column, who, with sixty mounted and thirty infantrymen, moved to the outlet of the gorge from a route parallel to the carriage road.

In this confusion, the commander of the independent two–company force of the Military Command of Prusa, Major Soterios Sakellariou, who was following the column, assumed the command of the approximately 900 remaining men. This force moved through Hajikoy and Han and reached Ushak on 19 August, where it was organized in two companies subordinated to IX Division. A smaller group surrendered to the Turks and another consisting of seven officers and 250 enlisted men joined the Independent Division the next day.

The commander of the column, with his section and a car, continued moving and through Gediz and Han reached Ushak. There, he attached his men to the Garrison Headquarters and on 19 August, departed to Smyrna by rail.

The Withdrawal of the Independent Division
Sketchmaps 7, 16, 65, 68

354. At 1000 of 16 August, the Independent Division started moving from Akin to Chukurlar, with the objective to reach Dumlupinar (Sketchmap 68) and be assigned to Army Corps B. The march, because of the slow–moving pack transportation of the Howitzer battalion, was difficult and the division only succeeded in assembling at Akoluk in the first morning hours of the next day. The division had not succeeded in contacting another unit and was totally ignorant of the overall military situation. Continuing its movement, it arrived at 0930 at the railway station of Chukurlar, and found it deserted. There, it was informed that a Turkish division reinforced with Cavalry and Artillery seized Doger in the morning and was heading toward Kutahya. After this, the commander of the division decided to move to the railway station of Alayunt through a route running further north and closer to Army Corps C to avoid captivity.

In the beginning of its movement, at about 1400, it received the following order of the Field Army:

> *Today, a wavering battle is being waged in the area of Dumlupinar. Independent Division should advance through Gediz to Ushak, but for contrary order of Army Corps A, in which case to comply with this, always making sure to seek contact through wireless with the army corps and Field Army.*

At 2100 the division reached the railway station of Alayunt without having once again succeeded in gaining contact with another unit. The railway line and the telephone lines with Eskishehir had been destroyed by the

Greek forces, while all Greeks and the Turkish–speaking of Greek descent had departed. In Alayunt the information was confirmed that Kutahya had been captured the previous day by two Turkish Infantry regiments, which afterwards moved to the north, and that the area between Afyon Karahisar – Dumlupinar – Kutahya had also been seized. The Command of the division then decided to continue the movement towards the north to join Army Corps C. For this decision, the following factors were taken into consideration: the combat being waged in Dumlupinar; the great distance to Ushak; the possibility of not establishing liaison; the risk of attack during the movement through the defiles; the difficulty of its movement due to the disproportionate volume of the convoys and its formation; and finally, the fact that it was in enemy territory. Its effort to submit these considerations to Army Corps C or the Field Army for approval did not succeed. The Command was extricated from its difficult situation by an order of the Field Army which arrived at 0300 of 18 August through Army Corps C and determined: "If by 18–8–22 you do not link up with Army Corps A and B, move through Gediz to Ushak." From the remaining text of the order, though this was incomprehensible because of many omissions, indications were given that in the area of Dumlupinar were V and VII Divisions as well as forces of IV, XII, and XIII Divisions.

355. At 0630 of 18 August, the division continued its march from Alayunt to Ushak, following the carriage road through the defile of the Kumari River. The cover of the movement was undertaken by an advance guard which moved forward to the northwest exit of the defile after the deployment of standing flank guards in the surrounding heights.

During its movement, the advance guard found itself before a hideous sight, which confirmed the extent of the loss of the sections of the Military Command of Kutahya in the battle with the Turks the previous day. On the ground, many killed lay scattered, and next to them, a large number of wounded in a deplorable condition, while every kind of equipment had been abandoned over a large area. With the help of the division, the dead were buried, and the wounded were evacuated to field hospitals. Thirty oxcarts full of ammunition were recovered and a small number of prisoners led by Turkish escort, were freed.

At about 1030, the left flank guard, under the strong pressure of the advanced sections of a Turkish column coming from Afyon Karahisar, was overrun with many casualties despite its stubborn resistance. The attacking Turkish Infantry sections rushed to cross the river from the few available. Simultaneously, the division received Infantry and Artillery fire, which caused confusion.

The commander of the division then ordered the bulk of his forces to hasten their movement towards the exit of the defile. He also forwarded two

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battalions of 53 Infantry Regiment with a Pack Artillery and two machine gun platoons north of the road, with the order to fire at the Turkish advance, towards the south bank of the river.

Under the cover of 53 Regiment that was supported by the fire of the Skoda battalion, at 1400 the sections which were not engaged continued their march towards the exit of the defile. There the advance guard had been forwarded already. The commander of the latter on his own initiative had covering sections on either side of the defile and deployed liaisons with the moving column. At the same time troops of the Turkish Cavalry division coming from Kutalik attempted to attack the right flank of the division but were neutralized by the standing flank guard.

From 1700 the movement of the covering sections of 53 Infantry Regiment began following a mule rack. The Turks tried to take advantage of the opportunity and launch a fierce attack on them. The combat went on until the last evening hours, at which point contact was broken, and the fighting was over. The losses of the Independent Division were relatively serious, and amounted to five killed and three wounded officers, thirteen killed and fifty–four wounded enlisted men, and fifty–five missing, all from 53 regiment.

During the night, seven officers and 250 enlisted men of 32 Infantry Regiment, who had been wandering after their units had sustained surprise attack the previous day, presented themselves to the division. They eventually were incorporated into the military police detachment of the division, since their inclusion into the combat sections was considered disadvantageous because of their low morale. The march of the division continued from 0200 of 19 August. At about 1030 of the next day, 20 August, a weighted envelope which was thrown from an airplane gave the division the following directives from the Army:

> *Southern Group of Divisions, under pressure by the enemy, retreats towards Philadelphia, not pressured by the enemy. Because withdrawal of Southern Group was conducted faster than expected, the Independent Division must determine a route to its advantage, marching if necessary towards the north. Army Corps C, through aerial reconnaissance, should observe the movement providing information.*

Simultaneously, the pilot, in a handwritten note, informed the division that on the same day, the last sections of the Southern Group were west of Ushak, and that the city of Ushak and the massif of Kizil Dag (Sketchmap 65) further north had been occupied by the Turks. This information led the commander of the division to the conclusion that the movement either to the Northern or Southern Group was impossible since both Kutahya and Ushak were occupied by the Turks. The only available route was that through Simav – Demirji towards Salihli, (Sketchmap 16) which was the one he decided to follow. The decision was made in a conference between the commander of the

division with the commanders of the regiments and was then announced to the men. The gravity of the situation was particularly stressed and it was pointed out that the obstacles would be surmounted only by discipline and cohesion. This made an excellent impression and inspired them with respect and confidence in their leaders.

356. The division, moving to the new direction, arrived at Simav at noon of 22 August, without interrupting its pace despite a three hour attack by a Turkish Cavalry which it confronted with Infantry and Artillery fire. The town gave a warm reception to the division, while after deliberation with the local authorities the units were provided with bread, food, and fodder. With a portable telephone, adjusted to a secret Turkish circuit which connected the town with Demirji and was used by Turkish intelligence, the division was informed that the defile through which it would pass during its move to Salihli was occupied by a band of 500 irregular Turks with Pehlivan as their chief. It was also known that the Turks occupied the pass of Emet mountain (thirty–five kilometers northwest of Simav). This fact made the movement to the north impossible. Following this information, the division abandoned the idea of moving to Salihli and decided to move through Shidirji to Axarium, their objective always being to link with the Southern Group and support its left.

At 1500 of 22 August, the division continued its movement to the west through the Simav Pass, about fifty kilometers long. At 1830 of 25 August, it arrived at Shidirji and at 1900 of the next day in Derbent, about twenty–five kilometers northeast of Kirkagach (Sketchmap 67). The march was very arduous and difficult because of the poor condition of the road. During this time, it successfully repelled with fire four assaults of enemy Cavalry and Infantry sections as well as a significant force of irregulars. According to information collected in Derbent the inhabited areas on the division's axis of movement Kirkagach – Axarium – Soma – Balikesir had been evacuated and that the Turkish irregulars conducted raids against the Greek population, killing every soldier who was captured.

The division continued its movement to Kirkagach – Kinik – Pergamum – Dikili from 0200 of 27 August. When it approached Kirkagach at about 1200, Greek and Turkish representatives presented themselves to the division carrying white flags and on behalf of the local Turkish military commander, asked for the surrender of arms and also that the division not approach the city. At the same time, they gave exaggerated information concerning the number of the Turkish forces there. Their proposals were not only rejected, but they were also ordered to return to the town and gather the necessary quantity of bread, food and fodder, otherwise the town would be bombarded. The representatives complied with the terms of the division.

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About 2,500 Christians of Kirkagach followed the column of the division, which resulted in many problems during the march. At about 1500 of 28 August, the division encamped in Kinik. During the night, a committee of Greek, Armenian and Turkish inhabitants of Pergamum arrived in Kinik and presented themselves before the division commander asking him not to pass through the town. In return, they would see to the resupplying of the division in bread, food and fodder. The agreement was implemented and on 29 August the division sent an Infantry and Artillery detachment into Dikili to restore order because of the large number of refugees gathered there. At the same time, the Commander of 53 Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Nikolaos Tsipouras departed to Mytilene with the mission to contact the ministry, report the arrival of the division in Dikili and ask for means for its further transportation. The division arrived in Dikili on 30 August where the required steamships for its transportation to Mytilene were made available to them. On 31 August, the embarkation started. First embarked the refugees, then certain selected animals and, finally, the sections of the division. The embarkation went on under headlights and was completed at midnight. Disembarkation on Mytilene was completed in the morning of 1 September. From there, the division was transported to Thessalonica, where it regrouped and was transported to eastern Thrace.

The withdrawal of the Independent Division was exemplary. From 16 August, when it started its movement, it covered in a period of seventeen days, more than 600 kilometers in mountainous and inaccessible areas over poor roads, without food, without information and without any contact with the other units. Except for the battle of the Kutahya pass, it did not engage in any other remarkable battles. During all its difficult march, however, through enemy territory, it received continuous attacks, harassment and surprise attacks by Turkish troops and irregulars. Despite all this, it succeeded, until the end, in keeping high morale, cohesion, discipline and order. It took the wounded and sick and a significant part of its equipment. Its behavior towards the Turkish inhabitants was laudable, despite the obvious hostility and the atrocities against the inhabitants of Greek origin which definitely could create rage. It took the column of Greek refugees with it and succeeded, before the embarkation of any troops, in embarking about 6,000 Greek and Armenian refugees as well as all the Christian inhabitants of Dikili.

Battles of the Army Corps
During the Retrograde Movement to Prusa (19–23 August)
Sketchmaps 67, 69, 70, 71, 72

357. After its decision to begin retreat on the night of 18/19 August, Army Corps C issued an order for the withdrawal of only the right, i.e. the subsector of Akin up to the subsector of Akpinar (not included) while the other forces

would remain in their positions. In the afternoon of 18 August, the army corps received an order from the Field Army, informing that the situation of Army Corps A and B made it necessary for Army Corps C to withdraw towards Prusa. The Military Command of Prusa and the bases of Mudanya were immediately ordered to forward hastily to Rhaedestus all equipment which was not absolutely necessary.

Afterwards, the army corps received information that significant Turkish forces appeared in Inhisar (about thirty–five kilometers north of Eskishehir, Sketchmap 67) and that the Turkish Cavalry Division was heading northwards in order to cut off communications with Prusa. Following this Army Corps C issued a new supplementary order fixing that the withdrawal would be conducted in greater depth towards Eskishehir so that total disengagement could be achieved. It also fixed that only strong reserves would be kept in order to face any contingency. Furthermore it took additional measures to cover communications from Kutahya to Prusa.

The withdrawal began from 2000 of 18 August and was conducted in order. The next day, 19 August, the army corps deployed on the line of heights It Burun – Muttalip – Hasanbey, heights Karaja and Chaklan – Ak Chay (Sketchmap 69). The army corps Headquarters moved to the airport of Eskishehir.

Though the Turks had many indications of an impending withdrawal of the Greek forces, they did not follow. Only a column of about 1,000 men appeared before the sector of X Division (south of Eskishehir). It was dispersed with accurate Artillery fire. In the morning of the same day, about 300 irregulars attacked an anti–Kemalist force and occupied Inhisar.

By the evening of 19 August, during which the army corps troops withdrew to the first line that had to be occupied, the railway transportation from Eskishehir to Karakoy of all the equipment which could not be transported by road, as well as all the population of refugees, had been completed. In total, about 1,000 railway vehicles had been used for this task. At the same time 300 trucks had started transporting equipment from Karakoy to the railway station of Prusa (Sketchmap 67).

The limited space of the railway station of Karakoy, the daily increasing accumulation of every kind of equipment and refugees, and the delay in loading caused great difficulties during evacuation. With the proper organization and the measures which were taken, an increase in the efficiency of the transportation towards Prusa, up to 400 tons per day throughput was made possible. Considering the fact that 2,000 tons a day were being transported there by railway, it was estimated that the total evacuation of the equipment of Karakoy would take a long time. In face of this situation Army Corps C sought to increase the transportation efficiency fixing priorities and loading

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of equipment according to its value; also by reinforcing the transportation means with the requisition of great number of oxcarts and the employment of forty ambulances. Thus the daily throughput increased to 500 tons.

From 0330 of 20 August, the withdrawal of the army corps units to the new predetermined line went on. From 0800, the Headquarters of the army corps moved to the railway station of Inonu, while in the early afternoon the divisions completed their deployment on the line Avgin – Chukur Hisar – Kale Tepe – Yoruk Yayla.

The heavy Artillery, protected by a company of Engineers, was ordered to continue its movement up to Aksu (Sketchmap 71). Its mission was to prepare fire to cover Inegol and Menteshe Valleys and to protect with an anti–aircraft gun crew the village of Aksu and the Artillery ammunition stored there.

While the army corps was deployed on the second line, its left wing was repeatedly attacked during the day of 20 August by a strong Turkish force of about 1,000 men supported by two pack and four field Artillery pieces. All attacks were repulsed following combat that lasted until 0400 of the next day.

358. On 21 August, Army Corps C continued its withdrawal and deployed on the line Akchapinar – Kovalicha – Erikli Yayla with its Headquarters at Bozuyuk.

At noon, X Division, moving to occupy its designated positions from Chay Dere up to Erikli Yayla, clashed with Turkish forces who occupied the heights between Kandilli and Inonu. After a clash, the division occupied the heights northwest and west of Kovalicha, where, however, it was attacked by strong enemy forces. The combat went on in the afternoon until 1800, at which point the sections of the division in the northeast heights of Kovalicha were heavily bombarded and withdrew in disorder. The Turks succeeded in taking the eastern part of the heights of Kovalicha, but the stubborn resistance of 27 Infantry Regiment, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Miltiades Mellios, that occupied the heights west of Kovalicha, did not permit the Turks to exploit their success. The casualties of the division were sixteen killed, eighty wounded, and forty–five missing.

Army Corps C aimed to continue its further withdrawal from 22 August. Therefore, it ordered III Division to deploy before the entrance Karakoy defile an Infantry and a Field Artillery battalion. It also ordered the units to limit their loads so that the greatest possible number of oxcarts could be gathered for the evacuation of the absolutely necessary equipment from Karakoy. Thus, the transportation of this equipment to Prusa was accomplished. Furthermore, when it was informed that Turkish troops were heading from the north towards Karakoy, it organized a joint detachment with the mission to cover the railway station of Karakoy from the north. The detachment comprised

two Infantry battalions, and an Artillery platoon and was under the commander of 16 Infantry Regiment Colonel (Inf) Georgios Zeras.

On 22 August, the army corps occupied the line from the north of Akchapinar up to the heights north of the villages Ovajik and Muratlar, having III Division on the eastern side of the Karakoy defile and X Division on its western side. The Headquarters deployed at the railway station of Karakoy.

The Zeras Detachment, deployed on the heights north and northeast of Karakoy and in liaison with the left of III Division, was attacked in the early morning hours by a Turkish force of 1,500 infantrymen with the support of Artillery. At about 1200, the detachment launched a fierce counterattack, overran the enemy, and pursued it to a depth of more than two kilometers, towards Sogut.


Meanwhile, XI Division, reinforced with 47 and 55 Infantry Regiments (the latter was transported to Rhaedestus and disembarked to Kios) continued to remain in its initially occupied positions (Sketchmap 70). From the early hours of 22 August, 47 Infantry Regiment, which occupied the section between the eastern banks of Askania Lake and Kios Bay, was attacked by surprise by two Turkish Artillery battalions. The Turkish attack succeeded in breaking and penetrating the Greek line, threatening the communications of Army Corps C. As soon as the army corps was informed of the above, it ordered Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Elias Polites, Commander of reserve 55 Infantry Regiment in Kios, to counterattack immediately and regain the positions that had been abandoned. The counterattack, supported by the fire of the anchored Greek destroyers *Panther* and *Leon* in Kios bay, started at 0345 of 23 August and until 1430 succeeded in restoring the Greek line. The successful outcome of the battle secured the army corps' communications and contributed to boosting the men's morale.

The army corps, assessing the exceptional importance of the Kios sector for its communications and its withdrawal lines, decided to reinforce it with the Zeras Detachment. At 0400 of 23 August this detachment, which was comprised of three Infantry battalions, a Pack Artillery platoon and a 105mm Skoda Artillery platoon, moved with 100 trucks from Nazifpasha to Kios (Sketchmap 67) where it arrived before midnight. The Skoda platoon, the pack animals of the detachment, and III/C Field Artillery Battalion which was assigned to it, moved by road.

The Command of Army Corps C, wishing to deploy it as soon as possible in the old fortified line east of Prusa, decided, regardless of the Turkish operations at the railway station of Karakoy and in Kios, to continue the withdrawal during the night of 22/23 August. XI Division would follow.

After this, at 2000 of 22 August, the units of the army corps arrived at their next positions. XI Division occupied the line the south banks of Askoy

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Sketchmap 70. Battles in Subsectors of Kios, 22–28 August 1922.

Lake – Pabujak – Yenishehir – Sumpaskoy (Sketchmap 71). X Division, having on its left 1/16 Battalion of XI Division, occupied the line Arap Dere – Elmalikebir – Bakmaja. Finally, III Division, comprising the rear guard of the army corps, reached west of Nazifpasha. During 23 August, no Turkish activities took place.

359. On 24 August, Army Corps C, continuing its withdrawal, deployed on the old fortified line east of Prusa. XI Division occupied the line Islam Selous – Tepekoy – Fethiye – Seymen (exclusive), III Division the line Tibos – Mustafa – the northern foot of Olympus Mountain, and X Division assembled at Pekmez Han (two kilometers west of Aksu.) The army corps Headquarters deployed in Kestel.

On 23 August, Army Corps C received an order from the Field Army, according to which it should start embarking at the ports of Kios and Mudanya so that it could be assigned elsewhere. The army corps had to secure the ports of Panormos, and of the peninsula of Cyzicus, so that it could use them to leave Asia Minor in case of strong Turkish pressure. After this order, the army corps took hasty measures for the evacuation of all equipment gathered in Aksu to Mudanya, and for its transportation from there to Rhaedestus. To this harbor transportation of equipment had been directed for a number of days.

The initial plan for the army corps was to embark at the ports of Kios and Mudanya after the total evacuation of Prusa and the base of Mudanya. With this in mind, it issued the pertinent orders for future withdrawal and security measures that should be taken. Furthermore, it ordered the reduction of the number of pack transportation of the units to the minimum possible through the transportation of only munitions and food so as to render the units more mobile.

On 25 August, while the above actions were being implemented, the army corps received a new order from the Field Army which determined its embarkation from Mudanya and Kios and its transportation to Rhaedestus without further orders. In the same order, it was fixed that in case of strong enemy pressure and the inability to disembark at those ports, the army corps should make its way either to Panormos, or to the peninsula of Cyzicus for embarkation. The choice between the ports of Mudanya and Kios or Panormos and Artaki was left to the discretion of the army corps (Sketchmaps 71, 72). Between these, the first two were near the assembly area of the army corps and embarkation could start immediately. However the port of Kios was disadvantageous because it did not have an appropriate dock. Besides, the port of Mudanya could only be used if weather conditions were favorable. Its maximum throughput capacity under the most favorable conditions reached 350 tons a day, while the total equipment to be loaded amounted to about 60,000

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tons. Furthermore, in order that army corps, to cover its embarkation, should be deployed in a big front line, totally unsuitable, which meant that it would be doubtful if it could maintain its position in case of a Turkish attack.

On the other hand, the disadvantage of the ports of Panormos and Artaki was their distance of about ninety kilometers from the assembly area of the army corps and there was the risk of an attack against its left flank. However, they had the advantage that the port of Panormos had significant facilities permitting the docking of any ship. In case of enemy pressure, the army corps also had the possibility of securing, with few troops, the neck of the peninsula of Cyzicus and withdrawing for embarkation to the ports of Artaki and Gonia, with the support of the warships. This last reason persuaded the army corps Command to opt for the ports of Panormos and Artaki.


For the implementation of this decision, an order was issued at 1800 of 26 August for withdrawal in the direction of Panormos – Artaki, cancelling the former order which fixed Mudanya and Kios as embarkation ports. The army corps, after having estimated the required time, determined that loading of the equipment should have been completed by the evening of 29 August.

360. In the old fortified line east of Prusa, Army Corps C remained from 24–27 August. During this time, it was repeatedly attacked by the Turks, who were repelled after fierce combat.

On 25 August, the Turks launch a fierce attack against the left flank of 45 Infantry Regiment of XI Division. The regiment fought stubbornly until 27 August and succeeded in repelling all Turkish attacks. Their casualties amounted to one officer and forty enlisted men wounded. The enemy left thirty–two killed in action on the battlefield.

On 26 August, III Division was repeatedly attacked by Turkish troops, who were estimated at one regiment with twelve Artillery pieces. The attacks were directed at the sector of the division's front between the villages Tibos and Mustafa and were repeated seven times during the night. The division employed at the point of the Turkish attack the entire 2/39 Evzone Regiment, which fought resolutely and repelled all attacks.

The army corps, after the persistent Turkish attack, decided to launch a counterattack on 27 August to decisively rid the enemy pressure. With the first light, however, the enemy broke off the contact and withdrew about two kilometers easternmost to a territory suitable for defense. After this, the army corps ordered the cancellation of the counterattack. During their withdrawal, the Turks abandoned many killed and wounded. The casualties of 2/39 Evzone Regiment were eight enlisted men killed, and one officer and twenty–four enlisted men wounded.



Sketchmap 72. The Withdrawal of Army Corps C, 10 August– 5 September 1922.

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On 27 August, the units of Army Corps C moved to their next positions. From midnight on the same day, the forces of the Kios sector (47 and 55 Infantry Regiments and the Zeras Detachment) were engaged in hard and bloody combat which lasted until the night of the following day. Only then did these units succeed in disengaging and withdrawing towards the west. XI Division occupied the line east of Sechkoy – southeast of Avdanjik (Sketchmap 71) and, X Division, the line directly east of Prusa from the swamp of Nilufer until the southwest approach of Olympus Mountain. III Division assembled west of Prusa, as reserve of the army corps.

The interior wings of X and XI Divisions did not succeed in joining in Kalasan according to the Field Army's order, but were at a distance of about eleven kilometers in a straight line and did not communicate with each other. Through this big gap a Turkish Cavalry division passed unseen heading to Mudanya, while, some time later, Infantry forces followed it.

361. The Greek forces in Kios had to be deployed in the line heights of north Kios – Derbent – Karsak (Sketchmap 70). From dusk, all sections were ordered to move during the night of 27/28 August, except for 55 Infantry Regiment, which should remain in the occupied position to cover the withdrawal. The withdrawal of 47 Infantry Regiment and the Field Artillery started at about midnight. The Turks, however, took notice of the withdrawal because of the din which was created during the departure of the Artillery, and at 0100 of 28 August, launched an attack. Soon, the battle spread over the entire front.

At 0800, the Turks launched a fierce attack with about 4,000 infantrymen supported by Artillery. The battalion of 55 Regiment, which was in the rear right of the disposition, after close combat with hand grenades, bent, and at about 1030 was forced to withdraw, dragging along the other battalions. The commander of the regiment succeeded in assembling part of the retreating troops and, with the support of the pack battery, repelled the further advance of the Turks.

At noon, the situation in Kios became very critical for both the Zeras Detachment and the thousands of inhabitants who crowded the shore for embarkation. The steamships were far out in the sea, the troops of 55 Infantry Regiment were withdrawing with heavy casualties and the battalion of 16 Infantry Regiment that was deployed in defense on the north heights of Keli Mountain had been surrounded and was in danger of being captured. Before this situation, Colonel Zeras ordered the only battalion that had remained at his disposal to immediately occupy the ridge north of Kios until the evacuation of the city of its inhabitants, and the total departure of the retreating troops towards Derbent.

At about 1400, when the battalion was three kilometers away from

the ridge it had to occupy, the last Greek units in defense there were overrun and withdrew in disorder. The battalion then made a dashing attack and succeeded in recapturing the ridge after an hour.

From 1500, and throughout the afternoon, the Turks launched repeated fierce attacks which were, however, repelled after hard fighting and heavy casualties on their part. As soon as night fell, the detachment forces withdrew on the southern outskirts of Kios, from where they moved westward. The town of Kios had almost been evacuated. The casualties of the Greek forces amounted to three officers and fourteen enlisted men killed, and three officers and sixty–three enlisted men wounded.

362. The morning of 28 August a staff officer of Army Corps C took notice of the gap between XI and X Divisions (Sketchmap 71). At 1030, Army Corps C ordered X Division to keep a battalion with Artillery behind its left wing in order to block the valley and to establish liaison with XI Division as soon as possible in order to close the gap behind them. In compliance X Division ordered 30 Infantry Regiment to move the battalion, deployed to the left of the regiments disposition, further to the north. However liaison with XI Division was not established. Afterwards, in order to survey the wooded area between Prusa and Kalasan, X Division assigned Cavalry of X Division, as well as Cavalry of III Division, which, on its request, had been assigned to it by the army corps.

At about 1600, in the sector of XI Division, a strong column of Turkish Cavalry was observed moving northwest in line with Demirtash, where the division Headquarters was. Earlier, a small section of Turkish Cavalry, which was easily repelled, had attacked the division Headquarters. The combination, however, of these facts, created a serious concern for the division. Fearing it had been isolated, it moved the Headquarters further west and ordered the units to dispose of superfluous equipment and be prepared to move. The division did not report these events to the army corps, estimating that the required time for the assembly and disassembly of its wireless could delay a quick departure in case of emergency.

Besides, at about 1300, at this sector of X Division, a column of Turkish Cavalry comprising six Cavalry companies from Kestel was observed moving towards the northwest. The division ordered a battalion of 27 Infantry Regiment to hurry and confront it, but the battalion did not carry out the order. When the army corps was informed of this, it was not worried because it believed XI Division, which according to its order should have occupied Kalasan, would easily repel the enemy Cavalry. However, it repeated to X Division, which had provided the information, the order to clear the wooded area in the gap between the two divisions, and to establish liaison with XI Division.

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At about 1930, the Turkish Cavalry column, which, as was later ascertained was the Cavalry Division, passed Prusa near the village Tepejik. Then, X Division ordered 30 Infantry Regiment to dispatch a battalion twenty–five kilometers northwest of Prusa. The wooded area and the darkness of night did not allow the battalion to observe the movements of the enemy Cavalry. X Division did not pass on this information to the army corps despite its great importance. As a result the Turkish Cavalry column headed towards the north and after two days contributed to the cut–off and the capture of XI Division.

In the evening hours, the army corps was informed of the appearance of Turkish Cavalry west of Armutlu, but even then was not duly concerned so as to take some measure, neither did it consider it was possible to amend its decisions for withdrawal. It conveyed this information to X Division with a staff officer, who furthermore repeated to the division Command that it should take immediate and active care to clear the wooded area north of Prusa and to try to establish contact with the left of XI Division. Despite all this, the Command of X Division did nothing, considering that the battalion assigned for this task was enough. Besides, it was dark already and it was very difficult to seek liaison with XI Division.

Withdrawal to Artaki and Embarkation of Army Corps C
Sketchmaps 71, 72

363. At noon of 28 August, a committee of three officers (a British, a French and an Italian) reported to the commander of Army Corps C, and stated that it was assigned to see to the security of Prusa and the mosques, which were in the town, and for this reason two French companies were in Mudanya on Allied ships. The Commander of the army corps replied that under no circumstances would debarkation of French troops on Mudanya be allowed, since Greek forces were there and that the inhabitants of Prusa and its mosques were not in danger, because the Hellenic Army had undertaken their security. The committee went about the town and found out indeed that total order prevailed everywhere. After this, it acknowledged there was no need to occupy Prusa with French forces.

The army corps was informed by a member of the committee that the Turkish Army had occupied Smyrna since the previous day, that the city was on fire and that the troops of Army Corps A and B had dispersed in bad condition. Thus, for the first time Army Corps C was being informed of the condition of the other two army corps and ordered this information to be kept strictly confidential so as to avoid the shaking of the morale of its troops.

Army Corps C aiming to continue its withdrawal, issued orders for its preparation, especially as regards the large formations, the Heavy Artillery

and the pack transportation of the units. The army corps fixed as a new defensive line the following: Maneuvers (in the sea of Marmara) Filadar Dag – the heights of Ahmetkoy – Derekoy – Agioi Theodoroi – Bashkoy – Akchalar (Sketchmap 71).

The army corps included Mudanya in its disposition, by creating a salient in it, because there had gathered there abundant equipment and a significant number of refugees, whose transportation to Rhaedestus was possible only if the army corps covered the port of Mudanya. Besides, it assessed that the Zeras Detachment could not cover within a night, in one stage only, the long distance between the heights north of Kios and those surrounding Chepni. From 2000 of 28 August, the army corps Headquarters moved two kilometers east of Konstantinato.

The Zeras Detachment, at 1930 of the same day, broke off its contact with the enemy and withdrew to the line south and southeast of the village Paladario. The column comprising 47 and 55 Infantry Regiments, during its march was hit by the Turkish Artillery. Panic ensued and the troops dispersed. A section of 47 Regiment in a state of disintegration fled via the coastal road to Mudanya. There a part of it embarked for Rhaedestus and another followed the column of what had remained of the detachment. The remnants of 55 Regiment, with its commander, arrived at Paladario at 1100 of 29 August and deployed on the positions the detachment had already occupied.

XI Division did not arrive in the area of Ahmetkoy until 1100 of 29 August. This area comprised the east flank of XI Division, while its right had to extend up to Derekoy. III Division occupied the line left bank of the Nilufer River – the heights of Agioi Theodoroi – the southeastern heights of Bashkoy – Akchalar – Artynia Lake. X Division moved to the area of the village Orhaniye, where it encamped.

364. In the early hours of 29 August, the army corps found out that liaison between X and XI Divisions had not yet been established. It then ordered III Division to search for XI Division with the Cavalries of III and X Divisions. XI Division had to be reminded it ought to extend its front towards the west and join III Division, which already occupied the heights south of the Nilufer River. Furthermore, the army corps sent two officers of its staff with an escort of fifteen cavalrymen to Chepni, which had been fixed as the Headquarters of XI Division. During its move, this team clashed repeatedly with armed Turkish peasants, while, on arriving at Chepni, did not encounter XI Division, nor could it gather information about it. The same thing happened with the two divisional Cavalries even though they moved in great depth to the northeast and, many times, had to confront the attack of armed peasants.

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The army corps, however, striving to join XI Division at all costs and through it the Zeras Detachment, used the only means that had remained at its disposal, the Cavalry and the wireless. After many attempts, it succeeded finally at about 1700 in getting in touch with XI Division through the wireless, and was informed of its position. An order was passed on to the division regarding its movement and that of the Zeras Detachment on the night of 29/30 August. Until dusk, no other contact was made because of the interference of the wireless of the French warships.

At about 1200 of 29 August, when the Zeras Detachment had completed its deployment on Filadar Dag, a Turkish column of almost division size was observed advancing to Paladario following two directions and, after a while, another column of the same size was observed advancing towards Ahmetkoy. At 1530, these forces were deployed and gained contact with the position of XI Division and the Zeras Detachment. The Turks, involving all their forces, started at 1730 a general attack all along the front, which was repelled. Repeated Turkish attacks followed, with increasing intensity, but all of them ran into sturdy resistance of the Greek defenders.

At about 1900, when firing had ceased in all the line, XI Division ordered the Zeras Detachment to withdraw from 1930 to the line monastery of Pelekete – the Nilufer River (exclusive). The withdrawal was conducted with great difficulty and sluggishness and the detachment gathered before the town of Mudanya at 0400 of 30 August. II/16 Battalion and the Independent Guard Battalion of the detachment remained in the occupied area until 0230 of 30 August, when, on the initiative of the commander of the Independent Battalion, withdrew to Mudanya. However, as soon as their withdrawal started, they received effective enemy fire from very close. The two battalions, continuing their movement through the northwest mountainous passes of Filadar Dag, arrived at Mudanya at 0600 on the same day. On arriving there, they did not succeed in joining the detachment so they continued their movement by following mountainous routes south of Triglia.

365. At 0900 of 29 August, the town of Mudanya had been totally evacuated by the Greek troops, and the debarkation of French troops followed so that order could be kept. The line which the army corps had fixed to be occupied on the night of 29/30 August was the monastery of Pelekete – the northern heights of Mejidiye – Badera – Orhaniye – Artynia Lake (Sketchmap 72) From 1900 of 29 August, the army corps Headquarters was transferred to Uluabat. The Zeras Detachment, on arriving at Mudanya the morning of 30 August, was informed that French troops had occupied the city the previous day and had already undertaken the maintenance of order. Colonel Zeras, still unaware of the fate of the two battalions (II/16 and Independent,) and having

been left with a small part of III/16 Battalion (its remaining troops had surrendered to the French) was asked to surrender by the French acting on behalf of Kemal. Then, the Greek colonel proudly answered: "Let he himself come and capture us. I, with my detachment, will depart, and without being resupplied, for which reason I am mainly going through Mudanya." Thus, at about 0500, at the head of a column the size of a company, he moved towards the west. After a while, the column was followed by 55 Regiment, II/16 and Independent Battalions, and later by a section of 17 Infantry Regiment, which was detached from XI Division. At 0900 of 31 August, the detachment arrived through the bridges Chesneyir and Enjiler, at Mihalichchik having previously been resupplied in Uluabat.

X Division reached the line Rogus – Badera – Artynia Lake. III Division passed the line of X Division, arrived at Uluabat at noon of 30 August and by night had deployed on the line Makrikoy – Karaagach – Keles – Aksakal – eastern bank of Kush Lake.

In the early hours of 30 August, the army corps had no reliable information about XI Division and the Zeras Detachment. Concerned about their fate, it ordered X Division, to try to establish liaison with a joint detachment and to convey the order of movement the following day. Reconnaissance of Infantry troops and the Cavalry of X Division that were made from 1000 to 1400 brought no result. In the meantime, according to some information, XI Division and the Zeras Detachment had been fighting from 1900 of the previous day and their withdrawal towards the bridge Rogus had been cut off by Turkish troops. After this, at 1550, the army corps formed a joint detachment from two Infantry battalions and one Pack Artillery battalion with the Commander of 30 Regiment Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Ioannes Pikoulakes in charge, which was ordered to move northeast, to free the above troops from the enemy pressure and enable their withdrawal. During its movement, the detachment was informed that XI Division was surrounded by Turks and was captured, and then discontinued its movement and awaited a new order. This information was later confirmed by troops of the Zeras Detachment, which the divisional Cavalry met. Then, the Pikoulakes Detachment was ordered to recapture and keep the Rogus bridge until further order. In answer, its commander reported that the bridge had been destroyed immediately after receiving the information of XI Division being captured.

The Zeras Detachment had escaped from another road to Uluabat and there were no other troops to pass through the road. The army corps, nevertheless, doubting the information that XI Division had been captured, ordered X Division to forward its divisional Cavalry in order to clarify the situation, by surveying the Rogus bridge and the ford west of it.

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366. At 1030 of 30 August, Army Corps C received an order from the Ministry of the Army informing it that the North Group disembarked on mainland Greece and the Aegean islands.[1] At the same time, it was ordered to hasten its embarkation at the ports of Propontis for its transportation to Rhaedestus, where Army Corps D would arrange its stay. The army corps should have taken as many pack animals and equipment as possible without dangerously delaying its embarkation.

At 1800 on the same day, the army corps Headquarters was transferred to Mihalichchik. There was no distinct information concerning the fate of XI Division and the Zeras Detachment. X Division remained on the night of 30/31 August in the positions it occupied, awaiting XI Division and the Zeras Detachment to pass through the Rogus bridge. In the early morning hours of 31 August, after the arrival of the Zeras Detachment in Uluabat, and fresh information according to which XI Division had withdrawn towards another direction, X Division withdrew north of Uluabat without any Turkish harassment. III Division continued to remain in the positions it had occupied on the night of 29/30 August.

The military command of Panormos gathered its forces west of the Kush Lake and occupied the line west banks of Kush – Artaki Bay, with the objective to cover Panormos from this direction. At 1000 of 31 August, the army corps was informed by units of XI Division, who, under Major (Inf) Konstantinos Mauromates, had escaped from the Mudanya region, that the rest of their division had been captured the previous day. Other information which the army corps received in the early afternoon hours of the same day notified it that Mudanya had been captured by the Turks, who had advanced their troops to the west and that large numbers were noted towards Susurluk and Kremaste, south of the section of III Division. army corps Headquarters deployed in Panormos.

On 1 September, Army Corps C continued its withdrawal. After having encamped for a while in a delaying position, it finally deployed in the following positions: X Division in the line Bayram Tepe – Akchapinar – Deblekoy. To its west, the forces of the Panormos Military Command up to the east of Saliderkoy. III Division passed between Korukoy and Deblekoy and by night arrived at the area of Chiftlik – Gokmen, near the railway line Panormos – Balikesir. The General Command of Panormos Base under Major General Ioannes Striphtos, was ordered to depart immediately to Rhaedestus to take charge of the command, reorganization, and restoration of the cohesion

1. Editor's Note: This cable was inaccurate since the Southern Group began boarding in Cheshme on 31 August and completed on 3 September. Its transport to Chios and Mytilene took place in stages.

of the formations of Army Corps C that disembarked there, and, furthermore, to maintain order and discipline. The Commands, staff and officers of the Military Commands of Dorylaeum, Prusa, and Mudanya, as well all the Gendarme force were put at his disposal.

On 31 August and 1 September, the non–divisional units of the army corps, the survivors of the formations and the pack transportations of XI Division, as well as the echelon of the army corps Headquarters with the wireless, embarked on the ports of Panormos.

On 2 September, and until the morning of 3 September, medical formations and personnel, the Engineering two–company forces, the divisional Cavalries, the Cavalry Battalion, the Zeras Detachment, the Panormos Headquarters Military Command, Xa Pack Artillery Battalion, and the Headquarters company of the army corps, embarked.

The remaining units would embark afterwards from both the ports of Panormos and Artaki. Because of a big jam of pack animals and vehicles at the embarkation ports, the army corps limited the number of pack animals which would be transported from every unit and formation. The heavy trucks could not be transported, and thus their destruction was ordered. Communication between the army corps and the Field Army was achieved by the wireless of the Fleet.

367. In the morning hours of 2 September, there was information that a Turkish column of about two division size was noticed two days previously, heading from Mudanya to Mihalichchik (Sketchmap 72). At 0800 of the same day, a column of three Cavalry companies and one Infantry battalion was observed moving on the way to Mihalichchik – Panormos. After about an hour this column reached the line III Division occupied; and soon a Turkish Artillery platoon started firing against it.

The army corps ordered the continuation of the withdrawal. X Division, starting its movement at 1400, arrived at the line Bayram Tepe – Kayajik. The Zeras Detachment and the Panormos Military Command Headquarters detachment were relieved in time by III Division and assembled south of Panormos. The Cavalry Battalion, the Cavalry of X Division and Xb Pack Artillery Battalion assembled in Panormos for embarkation. III Division moved towards the line heights of Chiftlik – heights of Korukoy with IIIa Pack Artillery Battalion, and a field battery. From the morning of 3 September, feverish movements of Turkish troops of various sizes were observed before the front of the army corps. Around 1030 about 200 Turkish cavalrymen were observed, before the front of X Division, coming from Kara Dag and heading against the left of the division. After an hour, an Infantry company and a Cavalry company, with four machine guns and the support of a Field Artillery platoon, attacked 27 Infantry Regiment at Bayram Tepe.

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At that point, stubborn combat began. The battalion of 27 Infantry Regiment, which occupied the left wing of the area, was forced to abandon the peak of Bayram Tepe at 1315 and to withdraw to other positions about 800 meters further west. After an hour, under the strong pressure of the enemy, the battalion was forced to abandon these positions. From then on, the Turkish attack spread to the entire front of 27 Infantry Regiment, with the support of a Field and a Pack Artillery. The Turks also launched similar attacks against the subsection of 30 Regiment with the support of Artillery. The Turkish Artillery also bombarded the port of Panormos, but inflicted only small damage to the docks where embarkation was taking place.

During the attack, III and X Divisions were ordered to concentrate their fire against the attacking Turkish forces at Bayram Tepe. 27 Regiment was ordered to counterattack to recapture its area. At the same time support by the Fleet gunfire was requested. At 1400, the destroyers *Velos* and *Aetos* launched accurate fire against the Turks. The counterattack of 27 Regiment, with the support of the entire Artillery of X Division and part of III Division, as of well as the destroyers, stopped any further Turkish advance. Later, the Turks launched other fierce attacks as well. During such an attack the commander of 27 Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Miltiades Mellios, was wounded. At 1615, the Turks stopped their advance because of the Artillery fire and the flanking counterattacks of 27 Infantry Regiment. Then this regiment succeeded in disengaging. The casualties of 27 Regiment amounted to four officers and twenty–nine enlisted men killed, one officer and six enlisted men wounded, and 119 enlisted men missing.

368. At 0730 of 3 September, III Division was ordered to consider the possibility of deploying on Delikli Bayir (northwest of Chiftlik) on which the army corps would withdraw in case of enemy pressure. However, from reconnaissance made by a staff officer of the army corps at 0900 it was discovered that III Division did not occupy the heights of Korukoy, as it had been ordered, but those of Delikli Bayir. The importance of the heights of Korukoy was obvious. Their occupation by III Division provided the defensive area with the necessary depth and the defense could have been long and successful. On the other hand if the Turks succeeded in capturing them, they could launch Artillery fire against Artaki Bay. In such a case the situation would become critical and the embarkation of Army Corps C problematic For these reasons, the army corps had ordered the capture of the heights of Korukoy, but III Division did not comply with its order.

As a consequence, the army corps ordered III Division to immediately recapture the heights of Korukoy it had abandoned. Nevertheless, the division did not execute the order reporting that if didn't consider their capture necessary. At the same time, it asked the army corps not to insist on its decision. The army corps, however, did not give any reply, because it was too late and because of the intervening order to withdraw during the night to new positions.

On the night of 3/4 September, the army corps withdrew as follows: its Headquarters moved to Artaki, where III Division's Headquarters had also deployed. X Division's Headquarters deployed in Delikli, taking charge of the sector. Of their units, 6 Regiment of III Division and 27 Regiment of X Division arrived respectively in Artaki and Panormos, while 12 Regiment of III Division and 30 Regiment of X Division occupied the line from Artaki Bay up to the Panormos Bay to cover the embarkation.

At 0500 of 4 September, X Division received an order from the army corps according to which it could, provided it considered it expedient, withdraw north of the Cyzicus Isthmus, deploying one to three battalions with four pack batteries on the ridge that dominates the neck, and, on the routes leading from the south to the Isthmus. In this area, which directly covers the port, the last defense should be conducted. In carrying out this order, X Division deployed a battalion of 27 Infantry Regiment with a field battery in the positions north of the canal to cover the withdrawal. On 3 September, and until the morning hours of the next day, many units and formations of III and X Divisions, as well as certain non–divisional units of Army Corps C, embarked at the ports of Artaki and Panormos.

369. At 0600 of 4 September, a Turkish Infantry and Cavalry column, of about 2,000 men, was observed descending the heights west of Panormos towards the section of 30 Infantry Regiment. An accurate Artillery fire, however, blocked its further advance. At 0845, another Turkish column of about 1,000 infantrymen and two pack batteries appeared south of Panormos, heading towards the positions of the Greek sections that were there, and started firing against them. At about 1100, the Turkish forces opposite 30 Infantry Regiment were reinforced with a Skoda battery and resumed their advance. Shortly, a Turkish battalion attacked the left of 30 Regiment. A fierce battle ensued. The Turks were constantly reinforced, and, as time passed by, their attacks became more and more fierce. The superiority of the Skoda battery was noticeable compared to the Greek Artillery. The warships in the bay took part in the battle with no result because they could not launch unobserved fire.

Towards noon, the Turks were considerably reinforced and renewed stubbornly their effort against the left of 30 Regiment with the obvious objective to seize the Artaki Isthmus, to block X Division's withdrawal and harass its embarkation. The left of 30 Regiment was reinforced in the meantime with a two–company force and a platoon of the reserve battalion of the regiment and succeeded in keeping its positions, despite the very strong Turkish pres-

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sure and the intense shelling of the enemy Artillery. Gradually, the fight expanded to the rest of the front with fierce clashes on both sides. Finally, the Turkish attacks, despite their support with strong Artillery fire, proved fruitless. A Turkish attack against the left of 12 Regiment had the same fate.

At about 1400, the new commander of the Field Army, Lieutenant General Georgios Polymenakos, arrived in Artaki with his staff by steamship. At 1600, he returned to his steamship and visited the 30 Regiment at its most crucial time of the battle.


The Turkish attacks went on tenaciously and fiercely until dusk, with no result. All of them were repelled by the 30 Infantry Regiment. The morale of the soldiers in this last battle in the territory of Asia Minor was excellent in every way. At certain points, the Greek soldiers fighting man to man with the enemy, repelled and pursued them. The casualties of the 30 Regiment amounted to three officers and fifteen enlisted men killed and three officers and seventy enlisted men wounded. The casualties of the enemy were not verified, but were certainly much higher.

The withdrawal and embarkation of the last troops of Army Corps C was ordered for the night of 4/5 September. The Fleet assumed the mission to survey the Cyzicus Isthmus, and to launch effective, concentrated interdiction fire there with the guns of the warships, in case the Turks might seek to follow the retreat of X Division. The survey of the isthmus would continue in the morning of next day, 5 September, until the complete evacuation of the Artaki port. X Division was ordered to leave one of its officers at the neck of the isthmus with orders to inform by telephone the army corps that every unit of the division had left.

370. At 2200 of 4 September, a big fire broke out at the shore of Artaki port, that destroyed the most important of the six docks. No one could approach it, while, at the same time, the ammunition boxes that were near were in danger. Besides, the tugboat captains, in panic, pushed away their boats from the port, interrupting the embarkation for three hours.

After this, the embarkation of the remaining troops of the army corps at the port of Artaki became problematic. Thus, 30 Infantry Regiment and a Pack Artillery battalion were ordered to head for embarkation on the bay of Gonia (six kilometers northwest of Artaki) where a dock had been built for cases of emergency.

Shortly after midnight, officers of the Navy brought back the tugboats to the docks, and from 0100 of 5 September a hasty embarkation started again, which went on throughout the night until noon of 5 September without any Turkish pressure. Thus, Army Corps C about 6000 strong, except for XI Division, was transported to Rhaedestus. It also succeeded in saving most of its equipment.



Sketchmap 73. The Movement of XI Division Towards Mudanya.

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Between 13 of August and 5 September, the casualties of Army Corps C, except for those of XI Division, amounted to twelve officers and eighty–four enlisted men killed, forty–five officers and 446 enlisted men wounded, and 119 enlisted men missing.

Withdrawal of XI Division at Ahmetkoy
Sketchmap 73

371. On 28 August, XI Division had deployed on the line Sechkoy – Avdanjik, having its Headquarters at Demirtash. The section of order of Army Corps C, regarding the withdrawal of the division on the night of 28/29 August, was as follows:

> *XI Division (also reinforced by Field Artillery of the Kios subsector) will occupy the line from the Nilufer River (exclusive) – the heights of Derekoy – the heights north of bridges Yeni Charsan, up to Ahmetkoy (inclusive). Division to start off at 2030 via the shortest routes north of the Nilufer River, with its Headquarters in Chepni.*

The Zeras Detachment would be deployed on the left of the division, and III Division (Sketchmap 73) on its right.

The Commander of XI Division, Major General Nikolaos Kladas, considered the distance the division had to cover and the extent of the line to be occupied as excessive. For this reason he sent Captain (Inf) Charalampos Stamatelos, his S3 to Headquarters in Prusa, to convey the thoughts of the commander of the division and to try to amend the order. The proposal, however, was rejected. While returning to the division, Captain Stamatelos was captured and killed by the Turks, who took hold of the orders he carried. Consequently, the division had to carry out the order it had received.

The division's withdrawal towards Demirtash was conducted in two columns by the same route, with significant delay, and was completed at 0500 of 29 August. In the meantime, from 2200 of 28 August, the column of the Field Artillery and the division's field formations, consisting of vehicles and large numbers of refugees coming from Kios, started to arrive in Demirtash. These formations had crowded the space around Demirtash, significantly decreasing the mobility of the division. This event obliged Major General Kladas to order the disposal of unnecessary equipment and the abandonment of the vehicles that carried it. Furthermore, he authorized the commander of the ox–drawn battery to abandon the Artillery in the event that it was impossible to follow the column.

At 1030 of 28 August, the division had sent two officers accompanied by a small group of Cavalry to reconnoiter the route to Ahmetkoy. The reconnaissance group during its movement met with a column of Turkish Cavalry, sustained casualties, and at 1530 returned to the division without having accomplished its mission. The division, already cut off by the remaining army

corps, had no information of the enemy and was obliged to move at night in an unknown territory on which no reconnaissance had been made.

At about 0200 of 29 August, the commander of the division decided to continue its movement from Demirtash in two directions: on the left, the column of 45 Infantry Regiment, with the field formations, would move via a field route with Derekoy as destination. On the right, the column of 17 Infantry Regiment would move through a mountainous route with Ahmetkoy as its destination. The troops' morale was not good, and great disorder and anxiety prevailed among the men.

At about 0300 of 29 August, the movement of the two columns from Demirtash began. Together with the left column of 45 Infantry Regiment, the division's Headquarters moved as well. From the first moment of its departure, the column moved with difficulty because of the interference of the Field Artillery, the wheeled formations, and the refugees who followed the column. Besides, the route passed through impassable terrain, traversed by successive ridges. All this resulted in the extreme delay of the march and the creation of total disorder.

Under these conditions, the head of the advance guard arrived at the village of Maskara at 0700 where it encamped, awaiting the assembly of the remaining sections of the column. During its march, the advance guard deviated from the route and headed northwest instead of west.

At 1000, the commander of the division climbed a hill near the village Maskara where he assembled all the commanders of the regiments and ordered them to deploy outposts with front to the south. The positions which would be occupied would be organized in the sectors, of Ahmetkoy on the left with 17 Infantry Regiment in liaison with the Zeras Detachment, and of Derekoy on the right with 45 Infantry Regiment (minus battalion.) The division's Headquarters, with one battalion of 45 Regiment and the formations, would advance to Chepni. The chief of the divisional Artillery would be responsible for the deployment of the Artillery.

According to this order 17 Infantry Regiment occupied the heights of Ahmetkoy in liaison with the Zeras Detachment. 45 Regiment, however, instead of moving towards the west to occupy the sector of Derekoy, kept on moving towards the northwest. The commander of the division noticed this deviation of 45 Regiment at 1030, and then he hurried personally to meet the Commander of 45 Regiment, Colonel (Inf) Konstantinos Kakousaios, and ordered him to follow the assigned course. But it was already 1130 and the head of the column was about two kilometers southeast of Mesepole, while its bulk was about five kilometers northwest of Ahmetkoy.

The Field Artillery, the wheeled formations, and the field hospital vehicles full of wounded followed, inevitably, the mistaken course of the column of 45 Regiment. As a consequence, its further advance from Maskara was

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extremely difficult and slow due to the steep inclines of the route they followed. Thus, movement of Infantry, Artillery, and wheeled formations was possible only by 1430.

372. At about 1015, 45 Infantry Regiment perceived a Turkish Cavalry column on the highway Prusa – Mudanya comprising 1,000–1,200 cavalrymen and two Artillery pieces. At that time it was at a distance of about two kilometers from the advance guard of the column. Simultaneously, Turkish troops concealed in the neighboring forest fired against the Headquarters and the Field Artillery from close range. Immediately, the two battalions of 45 Regiment were deployed and clashed with the Turkish cavalrymen, who dismounted and fought as Infantry.

The commander of the division, who was watching the events, ordered the third battalion of 45 Regiment, under his orders, to deploy in order to secure the Artillery and the field formations columns. Before this new situation, Major General Kladas considered that his mission to occupy the line Ahmetkoy – Derekoy, of a width of about fifteen kilometers, was impossible and hazardous to accomplish because of the presence of the Turkish Cavalry and the time needed towards that end. The fatigue and the low morale of his men, as well as the impossibility up to that time of the Field Artillery to move, contributed significantly to his assessment. Furthermore, concerned about the cohesion of his troops, he decided to suspend the movement to Derekoy and stay near Ahmetkoy. Thus he would be able to combine further action in compliance with any order that the army corps might issue regarding the division's movement the night 29/30 August. After this, he also ordered the withdrawal of 17 and 45 Regiments around Ahmetkoy where they deployed in horseshoe formation with the front to the south and the opening to the sea.

From 1400, Infantry and Artillery fire was launched against the front of XI Division. The fire went on until dusk. Turkish 18 Infantry Division was operating against 17 Regiment, which was deployed in the east, while the Cavalry Division launched attacks against 45 Regiment on the west. The Zeras Detachment, which was deployed northeast of Filadar, was strongly pressed and forced to withdraw to Mudanya.

At about 1600, in the valley of Prusa, appeared a strong Turkish column comprising Infantry and Artillery, which moved southwest of Ahmetkoy. Most of its advance troops, even though hit hard by the division's Artillery fire, succeeded until night in approaching the left bank of the Nilufer River. This column belonged to the Turkish 1 Infantry Division, which, as the Cavalry Division, came from Sivrihisar. With the dissolution of the Southern Greek Group, the Turkish divisions moved northwest to cooperate with the Turkish 18 Infantry Division to harness the embarkation of Army Corps C at Mudanya.

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Movement of XI Division to Mudanya
Sketchmaps 71, 73

373. At 1700 of 29 August, XI Division received Army Corp C's order by wireless, according to which on the night of 29/30 August it had to move to Agia Kyriake (four kilometers south of the bridge of Rogus, Sketchmap 71), where it would remain as reserve of the army corps. The division was assigned to send a copy of the order to the Zeras Detachment. The division, during its communication with the wireless, reported that it was in Ahmetkoy and could not move until night because Turkish forces were pressing it from all directions. The army corps, however, did not receive the whole text of the radio telegram, but only part of it, which referred that the division was in Ahmetkoy. Army Corp C's wireless tried to reconnect with XI Division but this was not possible because of the interferences of the wireless of the French ships.

At 1800, the commander of the division ordered the troops to move to Agia Kyriake during the night following the route Neochori – Mudanya – Triglia. What mostly contributed to the choice of this route was the appearance of strong Turkish Infantry forces on the right of the division in the first evening hours that threatened to cut off the route Prusa – Mudanya. This actually happened the next day.

The division did not complete the reconnaissance of the route on account of nightfall. From a hasty reconnaissance, however, it became evident that in order for the Field Artillery to reach the predetermined starting point of the route to follow, it would have had to ascend a steep slope and that would have resulted in significant delay of the departure of the advance guard. With a new order, it was determined that the advance guard would start its movement at 2400 instead of 1900. At the same time, a note was also sent to the Zeras Detachment to delay its departure so that it would be able to cover the left of the division. The detachment, however, had already started moving, and at 0400 of the next day, 30 August, arrived in Neochori.

The movement of the Field Artillery and the field formations started only after dusk because of the bombardment of the position from the enemy Artillery throughout the afternoon, and in order for the enemy not to notice the direction of the withdrawal of the division. Their movement, nevertheless, presented so many difficulties that despite the help of the Infantry it was completed after midnight and only the field guns and the caissons could be taken. The other vehicles, the trucks and the ox–driven battery, were abandoned. The wounded were transported on the caissons. This, in conjunction with the delayed withdrawal of 45 Infantry Regiment responsible for the formation of the advance guard, resulted in its departure only at 0230 of 30 August. Moreover, shortly after the departure, there were new difficulties and delays, because the two battalions of 45 Regiment followed the wrong route

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through a narrow pack which they were forced to pass in single file. The rest of the column, shortly afterwards, followed an adjoining road which made for easy movement.

374. The division's march went on in one column on the road Yanikli – Neochori (Sketchmap 73). Movement and halt alternated frequently. This slowness was due to the difficulty of the movement of the Field Artillery. Had it been abandoned from the night before, the division might have been able to arrive in Mudanya six to seven hours earlier and might have met a different fate. The commander of the division, however, would under no circumstances accept the abandonment of the Field Artillery.

From midnight on, the risk of the division being disintegrated was also added to these unfavorable conditions of movement since the men started abandoning their ranks and hurried on their own to Mudanya. All efforts made by the officers, and particularly by the division's chief of staff to stop them were in vain. Any of those who returned to their ranks tried again in a while to escape, disobeying the orders of their officers, who had no control over them.

As soon as the column approached Neochori, it was fired upon by Infantry from the heights west of the village and from a distance of about 1,200 meters. The Turkish force there, after a brief engagement, was repelled and fired upon by Artillery.

At 0700, when the column of the division was near Mudanya, its commander was informed that there was a French detachment in the town and sent one of his staff officers to meet its commander. The French officer informed him that the town had been occupied by the Turkish Cavalry the previous day, which, however, withdrew as soon as it noticed the approach of the division. He also stated he was willing to return the Greek soldiers who had surrendered and been disarmed the previous day, with their weapons, and that he would not obstruct the division's passage through Mudanya. He made it known, however, that the carriage road had been blocked near the railway station and that passage through it was impossible. Indeed, through reconnaissance it was verified that the road had been cut off for a length of about one kilometer by various destroyed vehicles and trucks and other bulky equipment. A more diligent reconnaissance, which the commander of the Field Artillery battalion made shortly afterwards, identified an adjoining, bypassing road which enabled the movement of the wheeled equipment.

An officer of the division, who later met with the French commander to find out which means the division could use to force its way through Mudanya, received his written answer that:

> *The Greek division can use all necessary means, according to its estimation for forcing its way through the village of Mudanya including its Artillery. In this case, however, I consider myself obliged to state that I will embark the battalion under my command on the vessels, abandoning to their fate 1,500 refugees who have escaped to the railway station and most of them are Greeks."*

The Battle of Mudanya
Sketchmap 74


375. As soon as the advance guard approached the entrance of the town it was fired upon from the southeastern heights of the town (Sketchmap 74). Immediately, 6/45 Company was ordered to deploy together with a machine gun platoon on Height "A," as a standing flank guard for the safety of the moving column. In the meantime, activity was noticed by Turkish troops against the remaining forces of the advance guard also, with the objective to obstruct the division's passing. These Turkish troops comprised the advanced forces of the 1 Infantry Division, which had been observed on the road Prusa – Mudanya the previous afternoon, and had occupied the heights south of Mudanya in the early hours of 30 August. The commander of the division suspended further movement, and ordered 45 Infantry Regiment immediately to seize the heights south of Mudanya to cover the column. The order pointed out, however, that the regiment should avoid any serious engagement in order to be prepared to continue its march.

By 1100, 45 Regiment had completed its deployment on a line 1,500–2,500 meters from Mudanya. The commander of the division remained about one kilometer southeast of the town. The Field Artillery assembled in the olive grove southeast of Mudanya. The field formations continued their march towards Mudanya, while 17 Regiment was in a deep line southwest of Neochori with its head near the village.

From 0830 until 0930, 6/45v Company had been strongly pressed by Turkish troops of about battalion strength. With repeated counterattacks, however, and the support of the Artillery fire, it succeeded in keeping its positions. Its casualties amounted to twenty killed, one of them an officer. The left flank of II/45 Battalion was also attacked by Infantry and machine gun fire, launched by armed peasants and a small Cavalry force from the town itself.

At about 1000, west of the carriage road Prusa – Mudanya, two Turkish columns were observed of battalion strength each, moving towards the northwest to cut off the division. Simultaneously, two more small columns were descending the heights south of Mudanya to the town. After half an hour, at the encampment area of the division, there was some panic, which was about to spread. This was avoided with the timely intervention of the commander of 45 Regiment. The pressure of the Turkish troops against both flanks of the regiment reached its greatest force at about 1100. Until that time, the Field Artillery had been inert. It was deployed on the side of the

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Sketchmap 74.
The Battle of Mudanya– The Capture of XI Division, 30 August 1922.

highway with orders to support the withdrawal and then destroy the guns on the spot.

376. In the meantime, from 0830, 17 Infantry Regiment, which was XI Division column's rearguard, had suspended its movement because of the slowness of the troops marching in front, and remained in the deep gorge southeast of Neochori with its first troops near the village. This delay had adverse consequences for the regiment since it allowed the Turkish forces to approach it and attack simultaneously from three different directions.

From the east, the Turkish 18 Infantry Division (of about 2,000 men and four cannons) attacked in two directions, and, from the southeast, a Turkish battalion (1,000 men and two cannons.) The Turkish attack was also supported by four guns of the Turkish I Division, which had been deployed on either side of the carriage road Prusa – Mudanya.

17 Regiment deployed two of its battalions near the road and in the heights to its east, and, with the support of a Pack Artillery platoon, put up a

stubborn resistance. The Commander of 17 Regiment, Colonel (Inf) Demetrios Kammenos, continued moving towards Mudanya, when he was informed by the regiment's intelligence officer that the surprise attack had affected the morale of the men and that some had started to flee. Then he ordered the withdrawal of the engaged battalions and assigned their assembly east of the railway station of Mudanya, under the supervision of the intelligence officer.

At about 1100, the commander of 17 Regiment went to the division Headquarters and reported to its commander that the situation of his regiment had become critical, since the attacking forces were superior and it had suffered heavy casualties. He also added that the retreat of the regiment to Mudanya would not be possible before about two hours. The commander of the division ordered him to take charge of the combat of the rear guard, to hasten the movement of the regiment, to regroup its forces, and block the eastern entrance to the town of Mudanya, extending the deployment of 45 Regiment up to the sea to prevent the envelopment of its left flank.

At the same time, the Turkish pressure against III/17 Battalion on the west side of the road had become asphyxiating. With great intensity, the Turkish Artillery successfully hit the battalion, as well as the Pack Artillery platoon which supported it. The platoon suffered many casualties in men and pack animals, while its commander was seriously wounded. The Greek Field Artillery could not intervene because of a lack of spotting.

Despite this, the defenders fought with vigor. However, when the two companies of the hard–pressed III/17 Battalion, and one company of III/45 Battalion, that had been assigned the mission of rear guard were overrun and retreated in disorder, suddenly the whole battle line was seized by panic and fled to Mudanya. The personnel of the troop transportation and the formations of the division did the same, as well as certain troops of II/17 Battalion, which still continued its march. Only I/17 Battalion remained fighting on the eastern side of the road, repelling the repeated Turkish attacks. It could not, however, stop the advance of the Turkish column along the shore, hastening towards the plain of Neochori to cut off the withdrawal of the regiment.

I/17 Battalion suffered extremely heavy casualties, especially in officers, but its heroic resistance allowed the remaining troops to withdraw. In a while, however, its position became very critical because of the advance of Turkish troops beyond Neochori, threatening to cut it off. Its commander then ordered his men to abandon the guns and launch an assault, with the intention of escaping to Mudanya. Most of the battalion fled to Mudanya, while a small sector was cut off. The battalion could not regroup any more and most of its men were captured in Mudanya after a desperate combat with hand grenades and bayonets.

Under these circumstances, the remnants of 17 Regiment assembled in Mudanya near the shore. With the intervention of the Cavalry of the divi-

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sion, the panic subsided and the troops of 17 Regiment extended the deployment of 45 Regiment with front to the east. The commander of II/17 Battalion assembled about 200 officers and enlisted men and escaped to the west of Mudanya, following the Zeras Detachment.

The Turkish forces of the 18 Infantry Division that overran 17 Regiment advanced to the left flank of XI Division opposite the line that the remnants of 17 Infantry Regiment had occupied. At the same time, a regiment of the Turkish 1 Infantry Division encircled both flanks of the Greek division. In a while, the Turkish ring closed around it and the enlisted men, as well as some officers, whose morale had been shaken, refused to keep fighting, escaping toward the French detachment in the hope that they would succeed in embarking on the French ships.

At about 1230, there was a new panic, which brought upon the final disintegration of the remaining troops, who abandoned their positions and guns and fled in disorder to the town of Mudanya. Only some troops of 45 Regiment, and the Pack Artillery which supported it, remained in their positions under the commander of the regiment.

The Surrender of XI Division

377. Until 1100 of 30 August, the commander of XI Division believed that escape was possible. By the time, however, he was informed of the critical condition of 17 Infantry Regiment, he started considering what action to take. There were two possibilities: either to abandon the regiment and escape with the remaining forces of the division or to await its assembly before undertaking any other action. At no time did he consider abandoning 17 Regiment. Thus, from noon, he transferred his Headquarters to a dominating hill west of Mudanya and awaited the development of the situation.

At about 1300, and while more and more men of the division continuously fled, Turkish forces were observed conducting a broad maneuver to encircle both flanks of the division. It was not possible to hinder this Turkish maneuver due to the condition of the units. Their men, having lost any desire to continue the combat, were fleeing in every direction. Consequently, the encirclement of the division looked inevitable.

The commander of the division then decided to try to break through the Turkish ring followed by the commanders of the two regiments, the chief of the Artillery and a number of enlisted men. In a while, however, he realized the extent of the disintegration of the units, and considered that under these circumstances any further bloodshed was in vain.

At 1330, when he was finally convinced that the division could not escape capture, he believed it was necessary that, while negotiating with the Turks, to ask for the intervention of the French commander in Mudanya.

After this, he personally visited the French commander and succeeded in getting his promise to intervene so that the capture would be completed without further bloodshed. At the same time, he sent the chief of the Artillery to the commander of the Turkish III Army Corps to negotiate the surrender of the division by protocol. This proposal, however, was rejected by the Turkish commander, by whom the division commander was informed of the disintegration of the Greek Southern Group and of the capture of Major Generals Trikoupes and Digenes, with a great part of Army Corps A and B.

In a while, a Turkish Cavalry captain presented himself to the French commander's Headquarters and started assembling and counting the Greek officers and enlisted men. In the meantime, the forces of the center of 45 Regiment, unaware of the capitulation, kept on defending their positions. After an hour, the Commander of the regiment, Colonel Konstantinos Kakousaios, noticed that from all directions, he was encircled by the Turks, who broke through his lines and speared the defenders. At the same time, he was informed of the surrender of the division, at which point he assembled the officers and enlisted men who were there and surrendered to the Turks.

The force of XI Division that surrendered to the Turks totaled about 4,500 men and thirty–six guns of various calibers.

378. On 3 September, the last Greek troops abandoned the peninsula of Erythraea, the furthermost point of the landmass of Asia Minor in that area. Two days later, on 5 September, on the peninsula of Artaki, the Greek troops operating in the north part of western Asia Minor abandoned the last bit of its land.

The ambitious and risky campaign of the Hellenic Army in Asia Minor came to an end. During the forty months (May 1919–September 1922) the campaign lasted, much blood was shed and many victories crowned Greek arms. Unfortunately, it was fated that the famous Hellenic Field Army of Asia Minor must in the end take the road of return, defeated and destroyed.

In the wake of the retreating Hellenic Army followed the Greek Asia Minor populations. Those who did not perish at the hands of the enemy lost everything else. They were forced to abandon their homes, the graves of their ancestors, their beloved land in Asia Minor, the cradle of Hellenism. As refugees they settled in the Helladic mainland and the Aegean Islands. Even though Greece bled from the numerous wounds, she received her children with maternal affection.

The vision of Hellenism, the "Great Idea" (*Megale Idea*) of the Greek Nation to liberate the Greeks and unite them with the motherland was not fulfilled. It was extinguished with the passage of time and the evolution of events. It was buried in the battlefields of Asia Minor, together with those heroic dead of the Hellenic Field Army.

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CHAPTER 12

The Revolution of 1922, the Army of Hebrus, and the Treaty of Lausanne

The Asia Minor Army Forces that Withdrew to Chios and Mytilene
Sketchmaps 3, 8

379. The embarkation of the Southern Group of the Asia Minor Field Army, the remnants of Army Corps A and B, took place at the port of Cheshme. These forces were transported from 31 August until 3 September 1922, to the islands of the Archipelagos, and deployed as follows:

In Chios: Army Corps A's I, VII, and XIII Divisions. Army Corp B's Headquarters (Colonel (Inf) Ioannes Dedes) with the formations and the non–divisional units and IV, V, IX and XII Divisions.

In Mytilene, the Headquarters of the Southern Group (Major General Athanasios Frangou) and Army Corps A's Headquarters (Colonel (Inf) Stylianos Gonatas) with II Division. The Independent Division (Colonel (Inf) Demetrios Theotokes) was also transported from Dikili (Sketchmap 3).

Transportation to these islands of all units that had survived was completed by 3 September. The Independent Division preceded and disembarked on Mytilene on the first hours of 1 September and immediately committed itself to the task of restoring order. The disorderly and disobedient enlisted men were disarmed and the inhabitants gradually regained their courage and went back to their work. The transportation of the division by sea to Thessalonica and the hasty reorganization of its units began on September 4. From 21 until 26 September, it was transported by railway from Thessalonica to Luleburgaz (Arkadoupolis) (Sketchmap 8). On 2 October, 52 Infantry Regiment, which had been assigned to III Division, returned to the division.

After receiving the order to evacuate eastern Thrace, the division, with continuous marches from 7 until 13 October, assembled in Pherres (Ferejik) under Commander Colonel (Inf) Dionysios Staurianopoulos. In Pherres, he received the few remaining officers and enlisted men of XII Division and the Independent Division was redesignated XII Division.

The Protopapadakes government had also ordered, besides Army Corps C, which was transported to Thrace from Asia Minor, to transport there the units that had disembarked on Chios and Mytilene, after the restoration of order on the islands. On 24 August, the Protopapadakes government resigned and on the 28 of the same month a new government took over with Nikolaos Triantaphyllakos as prime minister. The additional concern of the new government was the rapid reorganization of the Army.

The situation in Chios was deplorable from every point of view. The

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town had been inundated by many thousands of stragglers, mostly unarmed, who wandered in the streets or slept in squares or sidewalks. As soon as the first organized unit (25 Infantry Regiment of IX Division under Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Antonios Antonopoulos and a force of 300 men) disembarked on Chios, it was immediately ordered by the commander of the Military Command to impose order on the town, which it succeeded in doing by using severe measures.

The sight of the arriving refugees on Chios and Mytilene was tragic. All the dock was packed with people who lamented the catastrophe and were frantically searching for their missing relatives in the crowds whenever a new ship arrived at the port. The refugees were mainly women, children under 15 years old, and old men, since the remaining men were held hostage by the Turks . Any of them who survived were used as workers for the reconstruction of the Turkish cities and villages that had been destroyed during the war.

Actions to Regroup the Army
Sketchmap 8

380. The last section of Army Corps C, about 60,000 men, with the bulk of their equipment, disembarked at Rhaedestus. At first, the units of Army Corps C remained around the town for rest and reconstitution. After two days, they moved to their final positions in eastern Thrace (Sketchmap 8).

III Division (without 12 Infantry Regiment) occupied the section of Chatalja, and began to fortify it. The Headquarters was established in Tyroloi (Chorlu). X Division occupied the sector of Saranta Ekklesies, with its base in the town of Saranta Ekklesies. A joint detachment from 12 Infantry Regiment with a field battery deployed at the isthmus of the peninsula of Kallipolis, north of Balayir, and began organizing defensively. The peninsula of Kallipolis was occupied by the French. The Independent Division arrived a little later and assembled at the railway station of Luleburgaz. Army Corps C's Headquarters, the non–divisional units and 57 Infantry Regiment (directly under the Army Corps C) deployed in Luleburgaz.

The first substantial measures for the restoration of order were taken after the Triantaphyllakos government assumed power, and after Lieutenant General Victor Dousmanes took command of the Army Staff. The discharge of the reservists of the class of 1918, and earlier, was ordered first. It was decided that the men from the classes of 1919, 1920, 1921, and 1922 who were kept in arms to receive gradually a leave of 10 days, as soon as the units, to which they were to be assigned, reached their destination.

Then, when order was restored in Chios, the arms and munitions of those discharged were handed in, and the congestion in the town was relieved. Simultaneously, the equipment of Army Corps B's divisions gathered from the discharged reservists was stored in depots in the town. During the

first week of September, it became possible for the 60,000 reservists to return to their homes.

The same task was completed in Mytilene but on a smaller scale, because the forces which disembarked there were much smaller than those of Chios.

After the evacuation of the Hellenic Army from Asia Minor, the Turks remained free to assemble and be ferried to the European shore, occupying Constantinople and the Straits with few forces, which the Allies held. With the sudden withdrawal of the Hellenic Army from Asia Minor, Greece was in great danger since Kemal's Army was powerful and had many means to ferry forces to the European shore and attack the Greek forces in Thrace, which had not yet been regrouped, nor had regained their morale. After this, the government decided to notify the troops of the gravity of the nation's situation, in the hope that everyone would contribute to the rapid reconstitution of the armed forces. In order to achieve this aim, on 4 September, the prime minister and Minister of the Army Triantaphyllakos issued a relevant order to all units.

On 6 September, with his order, he regulated the issues for the reconstitution of the Field Army of Thrace and dissolved the Army of Asia Minor. The Field Army of Thrace went under the orders of Lieutenant General Polymenakos. With another order, he regulated the temporary regrouping of the military units which had assembled on the islands of the Archipelagos. His orders, however, were not carried out because of the revolution of the Army and the Fleet with Colonels Plasteras and Gonatas at the head on the night of 10/11 September 1922.

The Revolution of 1922 and the Events that Followed

381. The conspiratorial movement of the officers in Asia Minor, under the leadership of the capable, courageous, and popular Colonel (Inf) Nikolaos Plasteras, had begun in early 1922. They were moving actively to win over supporters and to overthrow the government when the time was ripe. In the meantime, the press supporting him in Athens and Constantinople had also started to highlight and praise his military action, mainly during the last period of the operations, when he especially distinguished himself, and, with his detachment, covered the withdrawal of the main bulk of the Greek forces at the southern front.

After the unfavorable turn of events for the Hellenic Army following the great Turkish attack of August 1922, and while the remnants of the Southern Group of the Greek Field Army withdrew towards Erythraea, the rebellious movement started to intensify and became more active during the departure of the Greek troops for Chios and Mytilene. On 2 September, at

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Cheshme, Colonel Plasteras embarked on the battleship *Tenos* in charge of the remnants of XIII Division. The Army Commander, Lieutenant General Polymenakos, having information of an imminent coup, ordered Colonel Plasteras to go to Samos, but instead he headed with his troops to Chios. From the first moment of his arrival rebellion started brewing. The rebels directed their efforts to winning over the Fleet. In the bay of Chios were anchored the battleships *Kilkis* and *Lemnos,* a number of destroyers, and other armed merchantmen, on which began the initiation of their captains and officers, most of whom had acceded to the movement. At the same time, the organization of the revolution was progressing in the Army too. Until 7 September, most of the officers of the units in Chios and Mytilene had acceded to the insurgent movement.

On 9 September, a three–member revolutionary committee was formed in Chios by Colonel Nikolaos Plasteras, Colonel Panagiotes Gardikas, and Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Miltiades Koimeses, which considered that the Commander of II Division, Colonel Stylianos Gonatas, should be put in charge of the revolution because he was a capable officer, and his person inspired confidence in most of his officers. He accepted the leadership under the condition that the revolution would ask for:

The resignation of King Constantine in favor of the heir to the throne.

Immediate dissolution of the National Assembly.

The formation of a neutral (transcending political parties) government, which would inspire confidence in the entente, *and would proceed to hold unbiased elections, so that the people could decide on the regime.*

Under these circumstances, the revolution broke out in the early hours of 11 September and prevailed immediately and almost without bloodshed. On 12 September, the revolutionaries embarked on the steamships which, accompanied by warships, set sail for Piraeus, while, in the morning of 13 September, an airplane dropped the following declaration of the leader of the revolution over Athens:

The Army and Fleet, in Mytilene and Chios, spontaneously assigned me their leadership, so as to set forth on their behalf the following claims, in total confidence that the rest of the Army and Fleet are in agreement and especially all the Greek people, except an insignificant minority, not differing in opinion from noble motives for the salvation of our country we demand the following:

Abdication of the king for the sake of the nation in favor of his heir.

Immediate dissolution of the National Assembly.

The formation of a neutral government that will inspire confidence in the Allies for quicker and unbiased holding of elections of the National Assembly and the management of foreign affairs, whereupon the people finally decide for their fate.

Immediate reinforcement of the front of Thrace.

May pure patriotism prevail amongst us for averting killing one another and for the national restitution to rapidly begin its work, through which total catastrophe, to which we are heading, will be suspended and the salvation of the country will be accomplished.

On the night of 13 September, the ships of the revolutionaries sailed into the port of Laurio. At the same time, they delivered an ultimatum to the government to accept the conditions of the declaration of Colonel Gonatas with a deadline by 2200 of the same day. The ultimatum of the revolutionaries was received the moment the Cabinet was in session, to decide on the government's stance against the rebellious movement. After a long session, resignation of the government was decided.

On the next day, 14 September, King Constantine, not wanting to be the cause of a civil war, handed in his resignation in favor of the successor, George, and addressed a relevant proclamation to the Greek people on the same day. Immediately after the resignation of King Constantine, King George II was sworn in. Constantine, with the queen and the other members of his family, departed from Oropos at midnight of 16 September, heading to Palermo of Sicily. After these developments, the revolutionaries' ships sailed off from Laurio to Phaliro. Disembarkation started the next day and, with their leaders in charge, the revolutionary troops marched through the central roads of Athens and headed to their barracks.

On the same day, the revolutionary government, with a telegram to Eleutherios Venizelos, expressed its total confidence in him and assigned him as the government's representative abroad to handle national issues.

The Execution of the Six

382. On 15 September 1922, despite the assurances of the leader of the revolution, Demetrios Gounares, Petros Protopapadakes, Nikolaos Stratos, Nikolaos Theotokes, Georgios Baltatzes, the former Commander in Chief Georgios Chatzanestes, and Rear Admiral Michael Goudas, and Major General Xenophon Strategos, were arrested and imprisoned.

The next day, 16 September, the new government was sworn in, with Soterios Krokidas as prime minister. Shortly thereafter, the leaders of the revolution were called to the British Embassy, where the ambassadors of Great Britain and France stressed to them that indictment of arrested politicians to the Revolutionary Court Martial would have an unfavorable impression on the Allies and the other European countries. The revolutionaries replied that the guilty would be punished "in due time" by the appropriate courts.

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On 4 October, and while the revolutionaries had decided that the new National Assembly should decide how these politicians and militarists would be tried, having also issued a relevant revolutionary decree suddenly and under the pressure of its hardcore elements, in charge of whom was Major General Theodoros Pangalos, issued a declaration to the people stating that punishment of the enemies of the country was imperative. The defendants were brought before the Examining Committee, with Major General Pangalos as President, which indicted them with a charge of treason to a Military Commission on 24 October. The trial started on 31 October, with Major General Alexandros Othonaios as President of the Court Martial. It was forbidden the defendants, after a categoric denial of the British ambassador, to refer to diplomatic documents of great importance for the explanation of their policy.

The Krokidas government, predicting the conviction of the defendants, resigned, and on 14 November a new government was formed with Colonel Stylianos Gonatas as prime minister. Colonel Nikolaos Plasteras remained leader of the revolution.

After two weeks, the court martial issued its verdict on 14 November, according to which the politicians Demetrios Gounares, Petros Protopapadakes, Nikolaos Stratos, Georgios Baltatzes, Nikolaos Theotokes and former Commander in Chief Georgios Chatzanestes were unanimously sentenced to death, while Rear Admiral Michael Goudas and Major General Xenophon Strategos were sentenced to life imprisonment. The sentence was carried out at 1130 of the same day, five hours after the verdict was issued.

The impression that was created in the public opinion abroad of the execution of the six was most unfavorable. Great Britain, France, and Italy severed diplomatic relations with Greece and the press of the United States of America attacked Greece severely.

On 31 March 1931, Eleutherios Venizelos, who was the main political opponent of the politicians who were condemned and executed, stated in Parliament:

> *I am able to assure you that none of us believes that those executed by a firing squad were traitors of the country by conviction, or that they were aware of leading the country to the catastrophe of Asia Minor. I certainly add that all of us firmly believe that those executed would be pleased if their policy had lead Greece to a national triumph. Under normal circumstances, of course, one could not even think that their error could be punishable by the terrible penalty of death. If, however, one considers the fall of 1922 and the tragic sight of myriads of refugees and the remnants of the Army of Asia Minor, one will comprehend that the power of circumstances and the pressure deriving from them was stronger than the first thoughts of the revolutionaries to try those responsible for the plight. I must say, of course, that of those who were executed according to the decision of the court martial, the one mostly wronged is the late Protopapadakes."*

After the Trial of the Six, followed the trial of Prince Andreas, former Commander of Army Corps B, accused of insubordination, a crime that was committed on 26 August 1921 during the operations east of Sangarius after an intervention by Great Britain. The verdict of the court martial was deportation for life. The Prince departed with his family abroad.

At 1000 of 29 December 1922, King Constantine died prematurely at the age of 55 from an acute brain hemorrhage in Palermo, Italy.[1] After the execution of the Six, no other penalty was imposed for the catastrophe of Asia Minor and on 8 January 1923, the leader of the revolution issued a decree of general amnesty.

The Mudanya Armistice

Sketchmap 75

383. On 10 September 1922, the Allies sent a note to the government of Ankara, which was also communicated to Athens. With this note they suggested their mediation for pacification and in particular asked for deliberations regarding the line that the withdrawing Greek troops could occupy before the conference for peace began. On 18 September, with a new collective proceeding of the Allies, it was defined that the withdrawal of the Greek troops would go as far as the line of Hebrus. Simultaneously, the Allies asked for the immediate withdrawal of the Turkish Army from the neutral zone and suggested the convocation of a preliminary conference in Mudanya to define the military details of the agreement.

On this overture, Kemal answered positively and directly only to the Prime Minister of France, Poincarré, thus expressing openly his special affinity and trust for the French. At the Mudanya negotiations, he assigned as representative the Commander of the Western Turkish Front, General Ismet Pasha (Inonu). Meanwhile, Athens had almost been totally ignored. The revolutionary government, except for a warning that was forwarded by the High Commissioner in Constantinople, had received no other official note from the Allies regarding the conference of Mudanya. Only at the last moment the ambassador of Great Britain informed the government. After this, the Greek government decided to send a mission to Mudanya. Major General Alexandros Mazarakes was put in charge. The cabinet instructed him that "the objective of the conference in Mudanya was the definition of the line to which the Greek troops could possibly withdraw, before the beginning of the conference of

1. G.I. Skabardones, N.D. Schizas, "The Illness and Death of King Constantine (1915–1922)," *Deltos* 18 (Dec. 1999): p. 32.

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peace." To carry out this directive, the orders of the Greek government to the delegation were not to accept evacuation of eastern Thrace. It could only accept amendments of the already occupied line.

In order to face this situation, the revolutionary regime asked the help of Eleutherios Venizelos, its diplomatic representative abroad. In the first telegram Venizelos addressed to the regime, he announced that he accepted his delegation and that he would depart for London at midnight. At the same time, he asked for information about the armed forces Greece could deploy in Thrace, the available equipment, the morale of the troops, and the public's mood.

On 18 September, the first information was forwarded to Venizelos. According to this the Army in Thrace comprised five divisions with a total force of 45,000 men. Within fifteen days, the Infantry divisions would be increased to six and one Cavalry division would be forwarded. Later on, the force could be increased to 80,000 men and, after the training of the class of 1923 (in November), 30,000 more men would be added. The Field and Pack Artillery was enough for six divisions. There was need for Infantry ammunitions and Pack Artillery shells. There was also lack of clothing, blankets and tents. The men's morale had started to lift.

The conference of Mudanya had been set for 20 September 1922. Great Britain was represented by the English General Harrington, France by General Sarpi, Italy by General Mobelli and Turkey by General Ismet Pasha. The Greek delegation comprised Major General Alexandros Mazarakes, Colonels Nikolaos Plasteras and Ptolemaios Sarregiannes and Secretary of Foreign Affairs Gouras Oikonomou. The Greek delegation arrived in Mudanya on 21 September 1922.

384. The Allied generals, after meeting alone on 20 September, called the Turkish delegates the next day and took decisions in absentia of the Greeks, who had not reached Mudanya.

On the morning of 22 September, the Greeks were called to attend on the English battleship *Iron Duke*. The Turkish delegates did not attend this meeting, whereas the Allies announced to the Greeks the agreements they had reached with the Turkish delegates. Simultaneously, they handed in for study a copy of the agreements that they had reached with the Turks, and in which they mentioned the withdrawal of the Hellenic Army to the line of Hebrus, with the objective to discuss the best means of evacuating eastern Thrace. The Greek delegation refused to talk about the details of this issue since the evacuation of eastern Thrace before peace was concluded predetermined its fate and this was a political issue. Its mission, however, was restricted to discussing only the terms of a truce.

In the afternoon meeting the same day, the members of the Greek delegation were called upon and it was announced to them that a serious political issue had arisen, and for this reason the generals would go over to Constantinople for deliberation with the commissioners of their governments. They would return to Mudanya the next day. Simultaneously, the Greek delegation was handed for study a plan of agreement to evacuate eastern Thrace, which had been drawn up without its cooperation. The Greek delegation stated once again that it could not discuss this issue. The major stipulations of this plan, announced by Major General Mazarakes to the government, were the following:

> Hostilities would cease when the agreement went into effect.
>
> Hebrus, until the Bulgarian borders, was defined as the line behind which the Hellenic Army from eastern Thrace would withdraw. Adrianoupolis and the region of Karaagach (Sketchmap 75) were included in the zone of evacuation.
>
> The evacuation would be completed within thirteen days at the most and the Turkish authorities would be accompanied by police to keep order. Battalions of the Allied forces would also secure order.

On 23 September, the Allied generals returned from Constantinople, while the Greek delegation, which was called to the conference, stated it did not receive newer orders from Athens to change stance. Two days later, however, the delegation received directives from the Greek government to accept and sign the agreement with certain reservations. Shortly, it received a telegram from Venizelos as well, from Paris, according to which the Greek delegation could accept the evacuation of eastern Thrace but only until the line of the Turkish–Bulgarian borders of 1915[2] which was about two kilometers east of Hebrus. The territory to the west of this line was Bulgarian and had been defined by the Neuilly Treaty (27 November 1919.) Consequently, it was irrespective of the Sevres Treaty.[3] After this, at the meeting of 26 September, the Greek delegation submitted a written statement and also gave a verbal account that it would accept to sign the agreement of evacuating eastern Thrace until the Turkish–Bulgarian line of 1915. In this same statement, it asked for the deadline for the evacuation to be extended a month and for the population of eastern Thrace to be protected effectively.

On 27 September, a plan of the protocol agreement was delivered to the Turkish delegation by the Allied generals, without taking into consideration the Greek proposals. The Turkish delegation was called and signed this protocol. At midnight, the Greek delegation was also called to do the same. It, however, had previously reported to the Greek government that its proposals had not been taken into consideration. Not having received an answer until

2. Treaty of Ples, Bulgaria (6 September 1915).
3. See above, Chapter 2 (pp 65ff.)

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the moment it was invited to sign the protocol, it refused to sign it and lodged a written protest. On 28 September, the meeting ended and the truce was signed only by the Allies and the Turks.

The Greek cabinet, in which the leaders of the revolution also participated, called Major General Mazarakes and gave an account of the facts. It was then decided to accept all that had been unilaterally agreed upon and the commissioner in Constantinople was ordered to sign the truce protocol.

Evacuation of Eastern Thrace

385. On 30 September 1922, the minister of the army hastened to announce to the Field Army of Thrace, which was under the command of Lieutenant General Konstantinos Nider, the signature of the truce of Mudanya by Greece. According to the agreement of Mudanya, the army of Kemal had no right to violate the neutral zone, to pass the Straits and be ferried to Thrace until peace was signed. The occupation of eastern Thrace would be done by the Allied troops and then the establishment of political Turkish authorities and 8,000 Turkish police for order to be kept would begin.

Nevertheless, despite the relevant term of the treaty of Mudanya, it was considered certain that the Turks would violate the truce and would assemble forces (regular and irregular) in eastern Thrace. Thus, the Field Army of Thrace was ordered while withdrawing its forces west of Hebrus, to assume a proper deployment and active regrouping of its units, so that it would be in the position either to start a new struggle in eastern Thrace or confront raids by large bands from the Bulgarian territory until the final peace was signed eventually.

Based on these directives, the Field Army ordered the evacuation of eastern Thrace and the withdrawal of its forces west of Hebrus. Then, after the deliberation of the Field Army of Thrace with a Higher Allied Military Command about the way the Allied troops would deploy in the evacuated area, the occupation of eastern Thrace was carried out by three English, three French and one Italian battalion. In each one of these there would be a committee with its commander acting as chairman. In the Field Army's Headquarters during the evacuation there would be a bilateral Allied committee for the solution of possible problems that could arise.

On 1 October 1922, with another order of the Field Army of Thrace, the deadlines of the gradual evacuation of eastern Thrace by the Greek troops were defined. The evacuation would start on 3 October 1922, would take place separately in each region and would be completed by 15 October. At the last moment, the Field Army was compelled to extend the evacuation for three days so that time could be given to refugees to evacuate eastern Thrace.

The evacuation of eastern Thrace by the Hellenic Army was completed in total order and discipline. The English Commander in Chief, General Harrington, sent a warm letter of thanks to Lieutenant General Nider about the total success of the arduous and painful operation.

The evacuation of Kallipolis took place later and was completed by 11 November 1922 under very hard circumstances. The Greek inhabitants of eastern Thrace fled. After having inhabited this area from time immemorial, they were forced to abandon the land of their fathers, to which they were attached by unbroken historical and ethnic bonds, and to follow the masses of refugees.

Strength and Mission of the Field Army of Hebrus
Sketchmap 75

386. The Hellenic Army, after its total withdrawal from eastern Thrace, deployed west of Hebrus as follows (Sketchmap 75):

General Headquarters (Lieutenant General Konstantinos Nider in Alexandroupolis).

Army Corps D (Major General Georgios Leonardopoulos) in Didymoteicho, having VII Division (Major General Konstantinos Manetas) in Didymoteicho, VI Division (Major General Zapheires Papathanasiou) in Souphli and the Division of Adrianoupolis (Colonel (Inf) Georgios Ziras) southwest of Karaagach. In December of 1922, this division merged with XI Division.

Army Corps C (Major General Chrestos Chatzemichales) in Komotene, having XII Division (Colonel (Inf) Dionysios Staurianopoulos) in Serres. X Division (Major General Euthymios Tsimikales) in Komotene and III Division (Colonel (Inf) Vlasios Tsirogiannes) in Xanthe.

Army Corps B remained in its positions in Macedonia for reconstitution.

The leadership of the Hellenic Army made continuous efforts to raise the morale of the troops, to organize and equip the army with sufficient quantities of military equipment of good quality so that this army could become an asset supporting the Greek claims for the negotiations that would start with the Allies and the Turks in Lausanne.

In the middle of December 1922, the commander of the Field Army of Thrace fell ill and was replaced by Major General Theodoros Pangalos, who was up to that time the minister of the army. Major General Pangalos carried on the work of his predecessor and, by imposing strict and decisive administrative measures, reinforced discipline in the Hellenic Army. Nevertheless, the Army, despite being well organized and equipped, did not yet have the necessary morale for new warfare. The memory of the blows it suffered in the Asia Minor campaign was still vivid.

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On 11 June 1923, when the peace conference was at its most critical point, the strength of the Field Army of Hebrus amounted to 4,446 officers and 111,775 enlisted men. This force was satisfactorily equipped with all types of weapons and framed by a cadre chosen from among the most competent. At the same time, after Major General Pangalos had taken charge of the Field Army, the organization and reconstitution of Army Corps B continued.

Army Corps B (Major General Alexandros Othonaios) based in Thessalonica comprised: IV Division (Colonel (Inf) Konstantinos Petsas) based in Thessalonica, the Division of Crete (Colonel (Inf) Georgios Kondyles) based in Serres, and XIV Division (Colonel (Inf) Antonios Panagiotopoulos) based in Thessalonica.

In early January 1923, the Field Army Headquarters relocated from Alexandroupolis to Thessalonica. At the same time, the commander in chief had issued orders which foresaw that if negotiations broke down, to denounce the truce and, simultaneously, surprisingly pass Hebrus with the three divisions of Army Corps D, XII Division of Army Corps C and the Cavalry Division through the bridges of Adrianoupolis and the bridges (road and railway) Kuleli and Luleburgaz (northeast of Didymoteicho). Army Corps B, comprising two divisions, transported by sea and escorted by the Fleet, would sail across the straits and would land forces between Herakleia and Agios Stephanos (ten kilometers southeast of Constantinople). In the event that the Allies would not allow them to pass the straits, the landing would take place in the Xeros Bay and an operation to rapidly occupy Chatalja would follow.

The Forces of the Turkish Army

387. The victory of the Turks in Asia Minor boosted their morale and increased the forces of their army with the arrival of draft dodgers and volunteers. They were also reinforced with equipment with the help of the Soviet Union and with purchases by the western powers. During that time, the Turkish Army consisted of twenty–six Infantry divisions, six regimental depots of Infantry divisions and six Cavalry divisions. This force was divided into four field armies, of which 1 and 2 Field Armies comprised the elite of the Turkish Army.

These two field armies comprised the western front with Ismet Pasha as commander. They had a total of twenty–two Infantry divisions deployed from Smyrna to Bosporus.

1 Field Army consisted of three army corps (III, IV, and the Kojaeli Group) and one Cavalry division, and it was deployed in the Bosporus area and the region Nicomedia – Prusa.

2 Field Army consisted of two army corps (II and VI) and encamped between Dardanelia and the railway line Smyrna – Panormos.

Independent elements in the region of Smyrna comprised the 1 and 5 Cavalry Army Corps with a total of four divisions. The strength of these two field armies amounted to at least 100,000 combatants. Every day in eastern Thrace, since the signing of the Mudanya treaty, transportation of army troops and equipment from the ports and the bays of Propontis and the Black Sea were conducted. Every kind of equipment and Artillery was also being transported by rail. The men were transported, either by organized units on the pretext that they comprised part of the force (8000 men) of the Turkish police that was allowed by the Mudanya treaty, or dressed as civilians. Thus, the total amount (including the police) of the Turkish Army in eastern Thrace, except for the region of Constantinople, amounted to 35,000 men (30,000 of whom were combatants), and about 100 guns. These forces were organized into five Infantry divisions (three complete and two under organization.) It was also estimated that the Turkish Army had more than fifty aircraft at its disposal in the region of Constantinople.

Peace Negotiations in Lausanne

388. On 8 November 1922, negotiations for a peace treaty began in Lausanne with the participation of representatives from Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia, Greece, Turkey, Rumania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Belgium, Portugal, Japan and the United States.

Despite the compliance that the Allies and Greece showed, the Turkish claims from the beginning went beyond all expected limits, and it seemed impossible for them to be satisfied. At the beginning of the conference, the representative of Turkey, Ismet Pasha, asked for the borders of Greece and Turkey to be finally regulated along the Hebrus River and for a referendum to be conducted in western Thrace. For this last issue there were long talks and finally the Turkish claim was rejected. Ismet Pasha counter proposed that Karaagach should also be ceded to Turkey, and supported the Bulgarian claim for an outlet to the Aegean. These petitions were rejected by the British representative, Lord Curzon.

On 12 November, Ismet Pasha asked for the islands of Imbros, Tenedos, Samothrace, Lemnos, Mytilene, Chios, Samos, and Ikaria, because of the Greek imperialistic aspirations in Asia Minor, to become neutral and, even become autonomous. The Greek delegation vehemently opposed the proposal, and only accepted the demilitarization of the islands near the Dardenelles.

Afterwards, the problems of exchanging the prisoners of war and the populations were put forward. The first was quickly solved but the second became the object of intense and long drawn out discussions. After negotiations that lasted a month, the exchange of populations was agreed upon, except for those of Constantinople and western Thrace. Ismet Pasha had also posed as a condition the removal of the Ecumenical Patriarchate from Con-

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stantinople, but after the vehement objection of Great Britain, he withdrew it. The Turkish delegation also demanded that the capitulations, an old institution in effect for foreign nationalities in Turkey since 1835, be abolished. In the end, it was agreed upon to do so.

On 17 January 1923, the Greek and Turkish delegates signed a treaty about the exchange of the prisoners of war. The next day, the conference was declared closed and 4 February was set for the committee to meet and sign the peace treaties. The final plan, as this had been drawn up by the Great Powers, included the following:

> The Bulgaro–Turkish border line in Hebrus was defined as the Greek–Turkish border, while Karaagach remained Greek. Zones that could not be equipped would be defined from both sides of Hebrus. Turkey could not keep a force larger than 20,000 men in its European section.
>
> Greek sovereignty was validated over the islands of the Aegean, except for the islands Imbros and Tenedos, which would remain with Turkey with guarantees of autonomy.
>
> The war reparations of Turkey and Greece were believed to have been settled on both sides.
>
> A committee, which included a Greek delegate, was formed for the straits.
>
> The Greek citizens in Turkey would enjoy the same privileges as the Allied citizens. These concessions would be the same for the Turkish citizens in the Allied countries and Greece.
>
> The issue of Mosul was brought before the League of Nations to be adjudicated.
>
> Cyprus and the Dodecanese remained under the control of England and Italy respectively.

In the beginning of the meeting of 4 September, before this plan was read, Ismet Pasha made new claims, especially that Greece should pay Turkey additional war reparations of many more millions of pounds, in gold. These statements created confusion and rage, and Lord Curzon departed the same day. The meeting was dissolved despite the efforts made by the delegates of the United States and Italy.

At this critical time the Greek government in face of the arrogant demands of Turkey considered the use of force of arms in order to recapture eastern Thrace. The progress of the organization and preparation of the armed forces permitted optimistic estimates in case of new conflict.

389. After the abrupt interruption of negotiations in Lausanne, the Turkish National Assembly of Ankara held a session "behind closed doors" and

rejected the treaty plan of 7 March 1923. Simultaneously, it assigned the Turkish government to try with diplomatic overtures to bring about its amendment, on the basis of the National Council. With the new proposals, it asked: the Greek–Turkish border to be defined as the main flow of the Hebrus River instead of its left bank. Control over the island of Kastellorizo. Amendment of the financial terms and reduction to the minimum the jurisdiction of foreigners over public debt. For Greece to pay reparations for the damages in Asia Minor. To regulate within a short deadline the issue of Mosul. To evacuate Constantinople from the Allies and the territories they occupied after signing the peace contract. Total application of the Turkish law to Turkish citizens of foreign nationality, with complete mutuality in similar cases in Allied countries.

This new intransigence of the Turks took the Allies by great surprise and the Allied press, commenting on these proposals, characterized them as provocative and unacceptable. Negotiations began in Lausanne on 23 April 1923 and the first contacts with the Turks proved that communication with them would be difficult because of their intransigence. Long talks were held and endless conversations took place without any final decision being taken.

The exasperation of the Hellenic Army and of Greek public opinion from the continuous provocations of the Turks was immense and the only solution that could be seen was to recommence operations. The Allies realized the intentions of the revolutionaries and on 16 May 1923 addressed a verbal overture to Greece in which they stressed that "The Powers would see a possible operation of Greece in eastern Thrace with great disfavor and would not allow it to reap the fruits of a potential success."

The government, because of the prolongation of the negotiations, and of Venizelos' show of compliance, was forced, under the pressure of public opinion, to arrange a meeting in order to receive final decisions and to define its further stance. On 7 May 1923, the prime minister, elements of the government and the leader of the revolution convened and reached the decision that the Greek delegation in Lausanne should denounce the truce of Mudanya within fifteen days at most, because of its violation by the Turks. Venizelos, after being informed of this, answered that he agreed, but since there was no support from the Great Powers and since they had complied with the Turkish claims, Greece would be considered intransigent and, in case of a war operation, their position would be doubtful.

Eleutherios Venizelos, calculating the dangers of such a policy, and being pressed by the Allies to offer some exchange instead of the required reparations, suggested that Greece concede Turkey, in order to achieve peace, the triangle among the rivers Hebrus and Arda, and the town of Karaagach. The British asked him to submit his proposal to the conference in order to have more validity. At the same time, with a telegram to the government, he

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recommended acceptance of the proposal believing that this sacrifice was necessary for the furtherance of Greek benefits.

The government, in agreement with the regime, accepted Venizelos' proposal so that in case of an act of war, Greece would secure at least Allied neutrality, if not their acquiescence. The issue of the area of Karaagach immediately after the armistice of Mudanya became the object of painstaking negotiations in the defining of the borderline behind which the Greek troops had to withdraw.

On 25 March, the two main opponents of the diplomatic struggle in which they were engaged suddenly decided to meet in order to personally solve the differences of the countries they represented. In a two–hour discussion, which took place in a cordial atmosphere, Venizelos and Ismet Pasha presented their arguments without any progress. This discussion was repeated in the same conciliatory tone, but even then the Turkish delegate showed no signs of relenting. In Venizelos' categorical statement that Greece could not undertake to pay the reparations, Ismet Pasha asked for commercial ships of the same value to be given to Turkey. This proposal was rejected and it was stressed that the concession of the area of Karaagach was a real sacrifice from Greece in favor of peace.

390. After the meeting of Venizelos and Ismet, a week passed without any answer from the Turkish delegation. Then, Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexandros Alexandres, who was in Lausanne, suggested that the government denounce the truce. The government accepted his proposals and sent a cable: "The denunciation of the truce to be done as soon as possible because any prolongation is for the benefit of the enemy." At the same time, the president of the Greek government sent a cable to Commander in Chief Pangalos for the Army to be ready to depart on the morning of 7 May. He then went to the palace and informed the King of the decision taken. After this, on 24 May, the Greek delegation in Lausanne asked for the convocation of the plenary session of the conference for 26 May to discuss the decision that should be taken about the Greek–Turkish differences.

The Allies, in order to prevent a possible failure at the last moment, decided that the meeting, from which the result was expected with such anxiety, not to have the usual public appearance, but for the necessary members to convene in a secret conference. Thus, the delegates of the Allies, of Greece, and Turkey were invited for 0330 of Saturday, 26 May to the offices of the British mission.

On 23 May, that decisive moment for peace, Venizelos sent a cable from Lausanne to the president: "All my wishes and my attempts tend to the success for peace, because the repetition of warfare under the present circumstances would be completely similar to that heroic medicine which is given in hopeless situations, which may save, but may also bring the patient's

demise." At the same time, Venizelos, in indication of a last yield to the Allies, promised them that if Saturday's meeting would not end in agreement, he would not leave Lausanne, but would remain until Monday, 28 May, in order to exhaust all attempts and hopes for peace. The president of the government notified the leaders of the Army and Fleet of the postponement to 28 May.

The Signing of the Lausanne Treaty

391. The Turks realized from the negotiations that had preceded that the Greeks were unrelenting over the issue of war reparations and that they would find no support, neither from the Great Powers nor the Balkan countries. Moreover, they saw that their Army's morale had started to waver.

Nevertheless, until the last moment, the Turkish delegation wanted to give the impression that it would be unyielding in demands for reparations and that if Greece did not accept its views, would walk out of the conference. Finally, at 0330 of Saturday, 26 May, the secret pre–conference, on which the negotiations fate depended, took place in the house of the British delegate. The Turks, according to their set policy, seemed unrelenting in the beginning, afterwards more relenting, and, finally, Ismet Pasha stated that Turkey gave up on the issue of reparations in exchange for Karaagach and its suburbs as well as the return of the ships that had been confiscated in 1918.

It was then Venizelos' turn to speak, who declared that he accepted the Turkish proposals, at which point the session was dismissed.

This agreement suddenly relieved the conference's atmosphere of the agony and uncertainty and stabilized optimistic predictions for peace. Greece acknowledged that it had to make up for the damages its Army inflicted on Asia Minor. Turkey, however, gave up on this claim in exchange for the region of Karaagach. The same night, Venizelos announced to the government and the leaders of the Army and the Fleet the agreement that had been achieved.

Prime Minister Stylianos Gonatas and the leader of the revolution Nikolaos Plasteras sent a cable to Venizelos to express national gratitude for the results that were achieved. There was, however, information that Commander in Chief Major General Theodoros Pangalos, accompanied by a small group of officers, aspired to take charge of the leadership of the revolution and he made overtures to the commanders of the army corps and individual units for signs of support to overthrow the authorities and take charge. His movement, however, found no response in the Army and, furthermore, was made known to the revolutionaries, which forced him to resign. Then, Lieutenant General Perikles Mauromichales Pierrakos, until then minister of the army, assumed his command. Prime Minister Stylianos Gonatas took charge of the Ministry of the Army.

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392. At 0330 of 24 July 1923, in the big room of the University of Lausanne, an official ceremony of the signing of the peace treaty took place. Eighteen different agreements, declarations, and protocols were signed. Briefly, the issues that were arranged with these documents and directly involved Greece were the following:

> The new boundary line of Greece and Turkey in Thrace went through the middle of the river Hebrus, but left the triangle of Karaagach to Turkey. Greek sovereignty over the islands of the Aegean (Lemnos, Samothrace, Mytilene, Chios and Ikaria) was acknowledged, with some military limitations only, and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos were returned to Turkey with special care for the protection of their Greek inhabitants.
>
> The Dodecanese, including Kastellorizo, were conceded to Italy, while Cyprus was acknowledged under British control. By a special contract, free navigation, on any occasion, was established in the straits. The capitulations were abolished and mutual protection as well as religious freedom of the minorities was established. The Greek–Turkish boundaries were demilitarized to a depth of thirty kilometers and no force larger than 5,000 men could be kept in the Turkish zone, and 2,500 men each in the Greek and Bulgarian zone.

APPENDICES

Tables and Casualty Information

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TABLE 1

Comprehensive List of Casualties Sustained by the Field Army of Asia Minor According to Operational Period

Significant Operational Period	Total Casualties						
	Officers			Enlisted Men			
	Killed	Wounded	MIA	Killed	Wounded	MIA	Total
2 May 1919– 31 May 1920	15	29	–	200	553	3	800
Operations in the Philadelphia– Prusa Areas. June 1920	11	28	–	79	306	–	424
Operations toward Ushak and Demirci Simav, July–August 1920	3	7	–	60	209	8	287
Operations east and north of Prusa, Gediz, Han, October 1920	3	7	–	43	125	–	178
Operations toward Eskishehir and Banaz, December 1920	4	8	–	46	157	–	215
Operations toward Eskishehir and Afyon Karahisar, March 1921	60	195	7	927	3,508	497	5,194
Operations toward Afyon Karahisar– Kutahya– Dorylaeum June–July 1921	64	190	–	1,128	4,897	252	6,531
Operations in the Sangarius– Ankara– Afyon Karahisar August–September 1922	234	750	3	3,392	18,594	640	23,613
Operations of August 1922*	30	83	2	308	1,698	293	2,414
Total	424	1,297	12	6,183	30,047	1,693	39,656

*These figures are incomplete for this period on account of the situation that resulted during the period of the withdrawal and evacuation.

TABLE 2

Casualties of the Campaign in Asia Minor 1919–1922 Listed According to Chronological Period

Operational Period	Officers				Enlisted Men				
	Killed	Died*	MIA	Wounded	Killed	Died*	MIA	Wounded	Total
1919–1920	66	42	–	150	1,140	2,146	–	2,133	5,677
1921	346	39	15	1,116	6,110	1,101	530	29,451	38,708
1922	400	60	450	430	11,300	1,500	17,100	15,600	46,840
Total	812	141	465	1,696	18,550	4,747	17,630	47,184	91,225

*Category of deaths not attributed directly to fighting or e hostilities, i.e. from wounds, disease and related causes.

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Casualty Grand Totals

Casualty Category	Officers	Enlisted Men	Total
Killed	812	1 8,550	9,362
Died*	141	4,747	4,888
MIA	465	17,630	18,095
Wounded	1,696	47,184	48,880
Total	3,114	88,111	91,225

*Category of deaths not attributed directly to fighting or e hostilities, i.e. from wounds, disease and related causes.

APPENDIX A

Commands of the Major Units of the Army of Asia Minor 1919-1922

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FIELD ARMY OF ASIA MINOR

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Lieutenant General Leonidas Paraskevopoulos	8.6.20–9.11.20
Lieutenant General Anastasios Papoulas	9.11.20–22.5.22
Lieutenant General Georgios Chatzanestes	23.5.22–26.8.22
Lieutenant General Georgios Polymenakos	26.8.22–5.9.22

CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Colonel (Inf) Theodoros Pangalos	8.6.20–9.11.20
Colonel (Arty) Konstantinos Palles Major General as of 6 October 1921	9.11.20–27.5.22
Major General Georgios Valettas	27.5.22–5.9.22

ALTERNATE CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Colonel (Eng) Ptolemaios Sarregiannes	8.6.20–27.5.22
Colonel (Inf) Michael Passares	27.5.22–5.9.22

OCCUPATION FIELD ARMY OF ASIA MINOR

(22 December 1919–15 February 1920)

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Lieutenant General Konstantinos Meliotes Komnenos

CHIEF OF STAFF:

Colonel (Eng) Ptolemaios Sarregiannes

ARMY CORPS A

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Major General Konstantinos Nider Lieutenant General as of June 1920	3.6.19–27.2.21
Lieutenant General Alexandros Kontoules Lieutenant General as of 6 October 1921	27.2.21–2.6.22
Major General Nikolaos Trikoupes	2.6.22–20.8.22

CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Colonel (Inf) Alexandros Othonaios	3.6.19–23.7.19
Colonel (Arty) Loukas Sakellaropoulos	23.7.19–19.11.20
Colonel (Inf) Stylianos Gonatas	19.11.20–24.6.22
Colonel (Arty) Alexandros Merentites	24.6.22–20.8.22

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ARMY CORPS B

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Major General Perikles Pierrakos Mauromichales	3.8.20–30.1.21
Major General Konstantinos Petmezas	30.1.21–19.3.21
Major General Georgios Polymenakos	19.3.21–14.5.21
Major General Aristoteles Vlachopoulos	14.5.21–23.7.21
Lieutenant General Andreas Vasilopais	23.7.21–18.9.21
Major General Nikolaos Trikoupes	18.9.21–2.6.22
Major General Kimon Digenes	2.6.22–20.8.22

CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Georgios Phessopoulos	3.8.20–2.3.21
Colonel (Arty) Demetrios Demaras	2.3.21–14.5.21
Colonel (Inf) Leonidas Sagias	14.5.21–23.7.21
Colonel (Inf) Alexandros Gavalias	23.7.21–28.8.21
Colonel (Cav) Panagiotes Nikolaides	28.8.21–19.9.21
Colonel (Inf) Konstantinos Petsas	19.9.21–24.6.22
Colonel (Inf) Ioannes Vasilakopoulos	24.6.22–20.8.22

ARMY CORPS OF SMYRNA

(Renamed Army Corps C on 24 December 1920)

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Lieutenant General Demetrios Ioannou	27.11.19–November 1920
Major General Konstantinos Petmezas	November 1920–24.12.20

CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Colonel (Cav) Nikolaos Spyropoulos	27.11.19–30.9.20
Colonel (Inf) Petros Klados	1.10.20–November 1920
Colonel (Cav) Panagiotes Nikolaides	November 1920–24.12.20

ARMY CORPS C

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Major General Konstantinos Petmezas	24.12.20–29.1.21
Major General Aristoteles Vlachopoulos	29.1.21–10.5.21
Major General Georgios Polymenakos Lieutenant General as of 6 October 1921	10.5.21–23.5.22
Major General Petros Soumilas	23.5.22–5.9.22

CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Colonel (Cav) Panagiotes Nikolaides	24.12.20–20.1.21
Colonel (Cav) Nikolaos Spyropoulos	20.1.21–5.9.22

I DIVISION

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Colonel (Arty) Nikolaos Zapheirou	2.5.19–8.6.20
Colonel (Eng) Zapheirios Papathanasiou	8.6.20–216.12.20
Colonel (Inf) Petros Soumilas	16.12.20–10.5.21
Colonel (Inf) Athanasios Frangou Major General as of 6 October 1921	10.5.21–20.8.22
Colonel (Inf) Demetrios Messenes	20.8.22–1.9.22

II DIVISION

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Major General Nikolaos Vlachopoulos	3.7.19–8.6.20
Colonel (Inf) Panagiotes Gargalides	8.6.20–24.7.20
Major General Nikolaos Vlachopoulos	24.7.20–2.2.21
Colonel (Eng) Georgios Valettas Major General as of 6 October 1921	2.2. 21–27.5.22
Colonel (Inf) Stylianos Gonatas	24.6.22–2.9.22

III DIVISION

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Major General Nikolaos Trikoupes	1.6.20–15.7.21
Colonel (Inf) Georgios Nikolaides	15.7.21–1.11.21
Colonel (Inf) Georgios Gortzas	1.11.21–4.9.22

IV DIVISION

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Major General S. Iatrides	27.3.21–8.4.21
Major General Konstantinos Petmezas	8.4.21–20.4.21
Colonel (Eng) Major General as of 6 October 1921	15.5.21–19.8.22

CYDONIAE DIVISION

(Incorporated into the Crete Division 20 December 1920)

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Colonel (Inf) Alexandros Othonaios	5.2.20–25.7.20
Colonel (Inf) Panagiotes Gargalides Major General as of 27 July 1920	25.7.20–24.8.20
Colonel (Inf) Nikolaos Soumpasakos	24.8.20–20.12.20

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CRETE DIVISION

(Renamed V Division on 1 January 1921)

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Major General Euthymios Tsimikales	2.5.19–8.6.20

V DIVISION

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Major General Euthymios Tsimikales	1.1.21–19.3.21
Major General Konstantinos Petmezas	20.3.21–1.4.21
Major General Panagiotes Gargalides	1.4.21–30.5.21
Colonel (Inf) Ioannes Trilivas	30.5.21–24.6.22
Colonel (Inf) Konstantinos Petsas	24.6.22–1.8.22
Colonel (Inf) Nikolaos Rokas	1.8.22–31.8.22

ARCHIPELAGO DIVISION

(Renamed VII Division on 24 December 1920)

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Colonel (Inf) Charalampos Tseroules Major General as of 27 July 1920	18.6.19–10.11.20
Colonel (Arty) Polychronos Karakalos	10.11.20–24.12.20

VII DIVISION

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Colonel (Arty) Polychronos Karakalos	24.12.20–10.2.21
Colonel (Inf) Andreas Plates Major General as of 6 October 1921	10.2.21–5.7.22
Colonel (Inf) Vasileios Kourousopoulos	5.7.22–31.8.22

IX DIVISION

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Major General Demetrios Gidas	1.4.21–1.6.21
Major General Georgios Leonardopoulos	1.6.21–15.6.21
Colonel (Inf) Vlasios Tsirogiannes	15.6.21–26.7.21
Colonel (Cav) Andreas Kallinskes	26.7.21–18.9.21
Colonel (Inf) Vlasios Tsirogiannes	18.9.21–17.12.21
Colonel (Inf) Ioannes Dedes	17.12.21–July 1922
Colonel (Inf) Panagiotes Gardikas	July 1922–31.8.22

SMYRNA DIVISION

(Renamed X Division on 24 December 1920)

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Colonel (Arty)Alexandros Mazarakes–Ainian Major General as of 27 July 1920	17.6.19–11.11.20
Colonel (Inf) Konstantinos Boukouvalas	11.11.20–24.12.20

X DIVISION

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Colonel (Inf) Konstantinos Boukouvalas	24.12.20–January 1921
Major General Georgios Leovardopoulos	January 1921–10.5.21
Colonel (Inf) Petros Soumilas Major General as of 6 October 1921	10.5.21–23.5.22
Colonel (Inf) Elias Fasitsas	23.5.22–20.7.22
Colonel (Inf) Demetrios Papanikolaou	20.7.22–5.9.22

MAGNESIA DIVISION

(Renamed XI Division on 1 January 1920)

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Colonel (Inf) Antonios Papanikolaou	8.7.20–24.8.20
Major General Panagiotes Gargalides	24.8.20–1.1.21

XI DIVISION

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Major General Panagiotes Gargalides	1.1.21–February 21
Colonel (Arty) Eustratios Katsikogiannes	February 1921–May 1921
Colonel (Arty) Nikolaos Kladas Major General as of 6 October 1921	May 1921–30.8.22

XII DIVISION

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Prince Andreas (Major General)	20.5.21–23.7.21

XIII DIVISION

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Major General Iakovos Negropontes	14.6.19–8.6.20
Colonel (Inf) Konstantinos Manetas Major General as of 27 July 1920	8.6.20–27.2.21

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Colonel (Arty) Kimon Digenes Major General as of 6 October 1921	27.2.21–2.6.22
Colonel (Inf) Miltiades Kaimpales	2.6.22–20.8.22

INDEPENDENT DIVISION

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Major General Georgios Leovardopoulos	15.7.21–23.9.21
Colonel (Inf) Demetrios Theotokes	23.9.21–1.9.22

CAVALRY BRIGADE

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Colonel (Cav) Panagiotes Nikolaides	13.6.20–30.9.20
Colonel (Cav) Nikolaos Spyropoulos	30.9.20–20.1.21
Colonel (Cav) Demetrios Rikakes	20.1.21–13.4.21
Colonel (Cav) Panagiotes Nikolaides	13.4.21–28.8.21
Colonel (Cav) Nikolaos Varthes	28.8.21–3.11.21

CAVALRY DIVISION

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Colonel (Cav) Panagiotes Nikolaides	3.11.21–16.11.21
Major General Andreas Kallinskes	16.11.21–1.9.22

APPENDIX B

Commands of the Major Units of the Army of Thrace 1920-1922

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NATIONAL DEFENSE ARMY CORPS

(As of 3 June 1920 renamed Field Army fo Thrace)

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Major General Emmanouel Zamvrakakes	Until 2 June 1920

CHIEF OF STAFF:

Colonel (Inf) Ioannes Kalogeras	Until 2 June 1920

FIELD ARMY OF THRACE

(Renamed Army Corps D on 1 June 1922)

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Lieutenant General Emmanouel Zamvrakakes	3.6.20–December 1920
Lieutenant General Andreas Mompheratos	January 1921–April 1922
Lieutenant General Georgios Chatzanestes	8.5.22–18.5.22
Major General Konstantinos Demetrakopoulos	19.5.22–31.5.22

CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Colonel (Inf) Ioannes Kalogeras	3.6.20–December 1920
Colonel (Inf)Michael Passares	December 1920–31.5.22

ARMY CORPS D

(Was reorganized as Field Army of Thrace in September 1922, following the regrouping of the remnants of the Field Army of Asia Minor)

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Major General Konstantinos Demetrakopoulos	1.6.22–16.6.22
Major General Aristoteles Vlachopoulos	17.6.22–5.9.22

CHIEF OF STAFF:

Colonel (Arty) Stylianos Panourgias	1.6.22–5.9.22

FIELD ARMY OF THRACE

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Lieutenant General Georgios Polymenakos	6.9.22–20.9.22
Lieutenant General Konstantinos Nider	21.9. 22–December 1922

CHIEF OF STAFF:

Major General Alexandros Mazarakes	September 1922–December 1922

ALTERNATE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Colonel (Eng) Ptolemaios Sarregiannes	September 1922–December 1922

VI DIVISION

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

Major General Epameinondas Zymvrakakes

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Major General Konstantinos Demetrakopoulos

IX DIVISION

COMMANDING OFFICERS:
Major General Georgios Leonardopoulos

CHIEF OF STAFF:
Major (Inf) Aristeides Chasapides

X DIVISION (SMYRNA)

COMMANDING OFFICERS:
Colonel (Arty) Alexandros Mazarakes
Major General Euthymios Tsimikales 31.10.22

XII DIVISION (XANTHE)

COMMANDING OFFICERS:
Major General Konstantinos Mazarakes
Colonel (Inf) Dionysios Staurianopoulos 31.10.22

XIV DIVISION

COMMANDING OFFICERS:
Colonel (Inf) Vasileios Kourousopoulos 1.3.20
Colonel (Inf) Ioannes Mauroudes 1.8.20
Major General Epameinondas Kourtes 1.9.20

ADRIANOPLE DIVISION

COMMANDING OFFICERS:
Major General S. Koureveles

A DIVISION

COMMANDING OFFICERS:
Major General Konstantinos Skarlatos

B DIVISION

COMMANDING OFFICERS:
Colonel (Inf) Chrestos Papanikolaou
Colonel (Inf) Georgios Zeras 7.9.22

CAVALRY BRIGADE

COMMANDING OFFICERS:
Colonel (Cav) Panagiotes Nikolaides

SOURCES FOR THE PRESENT VOLUME

(All Army History Directorate Publications)

Chapter 1 *The Greek Army in Smyrna.* Athens, 1957.

Chapter 2 *Operations of Philadelphia, Prusa, Ushak.* Athens, 1958

Chapter 3, 4 *Reconnaisance in Force December 1920–March 1921.* Athens, 1963

Chapter 5 *Operations June–July 1921. Athens.* Athens, 1965

Chapter 6–7 *Operations Towards Ankara.* Parts 1–2. Athens, 1965.

Chapter 8 *The Events preceding the Turkish Attack.* Athens, 1960.

Chapter 9–10 *The End of the Campaign. Part 1 (Struggles Related to the Withdrawal of Army Corps A and B).* Athens, 1962

Chapter 11 *The End of the Campaign. Part 2 (The Retreat of Army Corps C).* Athens, 1962

Chapter 12 *Operations in Thrace 1919–1923.* Athens, 1969

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
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
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


1. Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos, 1919.

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
2. Greek military sections in Odessa for the campaign in southern Russia.



3. Prime Minister Venizelos signing the Treaty of Sevres.




4. Commander in Chief L. Paraskevopoulos with his staff, during the Asia Minor Campaign.




5. Prince Andreas and the Commander in Chief amidst the Corps Commanders of the Field Army of Asia Minor. Left to right: Bairas, Koutoulas, Papoulas, the Prince, Mompheratos, Polymenakos.

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6. Sitting left to right: A. Bairas, A. Mompheratos. Standing left to right: A. Kontoules, A. Papoulas, Prince Andreas, G. Polymenakos.



7. A: D. Gounares; B: Commander in Chief A. Papoulas; C: Lt. General V. Dousmanes; D: Minister of the Army Theotokes; E: Lt. General Kontoules; F: Colonel (Inf) P. Kallidopoulos, interim Commander of II Division; G: Major General X. Strategos.



8. Prince Andreas.



9. A national celebration by Greek youths in Asia Minor.


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10. Greek officers studying archaeological remains, imprints of Greek civilization in Asia Minor.



11. Blessing rites at the front.




12. A DeHaviland 4 aircraft ready for action.



13. One of the heroic assaults in the Hermus River Valley. (Archive of General Paraskevopoulos).

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14. Inspection of a section under the Command of Commander in Chief Papoulas.



15. A transport column marches toward the town of Afyon Karahisar, 1920–1922. In the background are the forts of Afyon.




16. Pack animal transport crossing the Beylik Kopru, during the operations towards Ankara.



17. The staff of II Division crossing the desert on the way to the Sangarius river.

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18. I Division in Evrek. Movement of Evzone Section.



19. Construction of a makeshift bridge over the Sangarius river. From a military postcard (AHD Archive).



20. Artillery in action.

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21. An outdoor medical operation on a wounded soldier.



22. III Division in Asia Minor. mountain Artillery on march, 9 August 1921.




23. XIII Division, 13 August 1921. The burial of the heroes, who fell in battle on 12 August.



24. The crossing of the Porsuk river, 2 September 1921. Return of Greek forces from operations towards Sangarius – Ankara.


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25. An encampment after a battle. (Archive of General Paraskevopoulos).




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


27. From the life of the Evzones. (Archive of General Paraskevopoulos).

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28. King Constantine decorating battle flags during a ceremony after the Battle of Dorylaeum (Eskishehir).



29. By the grave of a hero. The inscription on the cross reads: "Here Lies Captain Georgios Gregorakes."




30. Commander in Chief Chatzanestes inspecting an Army Section.



31. Artillery of V Division ascending an incline.


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
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33. The leaders of the 1922 revolt, Colonels Plasteras and Gonatas, entering Athens on horseback.



34. The leaders of the 1922 revolt, N. Plasteras and S. Gonatas, amidst other dignitaries.



35. E. Venizelos and D. Kaklamanos with the other members of the Greek delegation to the Lausanne Conference.

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