Comments on "Sultanism": Max Weber's Typification of the Ottoman Polity

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In his analysis of the patrimonial state, Max Weber often refers to the special character of the Ottoman state *as an extreme case of patrimonialism*.[1] In general, he says, the patrimonial state makes administrative and military organization "a purely personal instrument of the master to broaden his arbitrary power."[2] Patrimonial authority, "where it indeed operates primarily on the basis of discretion will be called sultanism, which is distinct from every form of rational authority.[3] "It is also totally different *from estate-type domination* (*ständische Herrschaft*)" such as existed in the medieval west.[4] Patrimonialism, and in the extreme case sultanism, tends to arise whenever traditional domination develops an administration and a military force that are purely personal instruments of the master. "Appropriation by the master personally is a phenomenon of patrimonialism."[5] Then the pre-eminency "turns into personal right." Patrimonial power is something of personal possession. "Where domination is primarily traditional . . . . It will be called *patrimonial authority*; where it indeed operates primarily on the basis of discretion, it will be called sultanism."[6]

"The classic location of sultanism," Weber underlines, "is the Near East."[7] Sultanism is characterized by complete reliance on *military force and arbitrary power*, or *despotism*. There occurs a complete "differentiation between military and civil subjects," and increasing professionalization of the army. The Janissary and Mamluk armies,

consisting of slaves, were typical examples of such professional armies. They were made part and parcel of the ruler's household and served him with absolute loyalty. Their later transformation is explained by Weber in terms of their having become a "traditional status group" enjoying relative independence from the sultan's patrimonial control. Let us add that in their new function they sided with other traditional groups, such as the ulema and religious orders. The Janissary corps identified itself with Bektashism, one of the independent religious-traditional groups in the empire. It is to be noted that the abolition of the corps and Bektashism occurred at the same time, when Mahmud II embarked upon the restoration of his central patrimonial power in the period from 1812 to 1826.

As one of the most fundamental principles of patrimonial power, the Ottoman ruler in all situations jealously reserved for himself the judicial authority, which was administered personally in the central imperial council or, by delegation, qadis whom he appointed.[8] In the sultan's law codes it is repeatedly stated that no subject (*ra'ıyyet*), in particular peasants, shall incur any obligation, taxes, services, or fines without a decision rendered in due process of law by his qadi. In striking contrast to the feudal lord's judicial right in the West, no local authority, even in the age of *a'yāns* in the eighteenth century, was allowed to exercise judical power—a characteristic of the Ottoman centralist and absolutist regime.

What made the Ottoman imperial system a "sultanism" in Weber's sense may also be the Ottoman sultan's arrogating political as well as spiritual power in his person. "Domination," Weber stresses, may be based on either physical force or "psychic coercion by distributing or denying religious benefits."[9] The former type, represented by a military monarchy, is the "typical natural form of domination." The latter type, called by Weber "hierocratic organization," is represented by the church. But the Ottoman sultan's simultaneous monopoly of political and spiritual powers produced a perfect type of absolute patrimonial rulership. In fact, his dual titulature, sultan-caliph and padishah-khan, signifying the divine and temporal origins of his power, was an expression of his two capacities; however, there was never any real unity between the two.[10] In the classical period, when the patrimonial state (with its dual monopoly) seemed paramount, the ulema were actually prevented from exercising power, and the padishah enacted *'urfī* (state) laws independently from the *sharī'a* (Islamic religious law).[11] Yet, when the sultan's power began to decline at the turn of the seventeenth century, the ulema, in alliance with other traditional forces, assumed an increasingly dominant place in state affairs. It can be said that this dichotomy actually constituted the underlying conflict in all Islamic states. It was particularly true in the sultanates founded by Turkish dynasties, which were jealous of their absolute patrimonial domination. Still following Weber's course of interpretation, we

can suggest that the Ottoman sultans, particularly in the period of "decline," by emphasizing their spiritual domination as caliphs and integrating the ulema into their bureaucratic apparatus, were attempting to compensate for their loss of power.

That state power was indeed regarded as the collective property of the ruler's household is quite apparent in early Ottoman history. In line with a Central Asiatic tradition that survived with the Ottomans, the realm was divided among the sons of the reigning ruler.[12] Despite the disastrous civil wars that tradition begot, it remained strong until the time when the notion of state power came to be conceived as an impersonal authority, absolute and indivisible, embodied in the ruler to serve "Islam and (the Islamic) state" (*Dīn u Dawla*). This development coincided with the transformation of the bureaucracy into a relatively autonomous group and the ulema's assertion of its paramount position within the polity. These groups, supported by public opinion, actually became responsible for the establishment of a new protocol for succession to the throne based on the principle of seniority. Thus, new traditions emerged and became prevalent in the Ottoman polity and modified the "Sultanism" of the Ottoman ruler as the political and social structure evolved (see "Sultanism, Status Groups" p. 3–11).

Finally, recognizing no legal limits or traditional checks, sultanism can be interpreted as "the pure form of patriarchal domination," or patrimonialism.[13] Realized in its near perfect form in Ottoman sultanism, as the logic of the system required, Ottoman absolutism was taken as the typical form of absolutism by the theoreticians of the sixteenth century. Obviously Weber, living in an age of liberal idealism, could not see the Ottoman regime with the eyes of a Jean Bodin.[14]

SULTANISM, STATUS GROUPS, AND ESTATE-TYPE PATRIMONIALISM

Through regulatory power, Weber affirms,[15] patrimonial domination, whether of the head of the family, a feudal lord, or a patrimonial ruler, is a decisive determinant of social and economic relationships.[16] "Social positions may be established by an autocratic ruler which, in relation to other free strata, are privileged through freedom from taxation and special land rights."[17] The patrimonial state may also appropriate direct control over the economy through "managerial powers."

Weber defines status order as follows:

> The way in which social honor is distributed in a community between typical groups participating in this distribution we call the status order.[18] The market and its processes knows no personal distinctions: "functional" interests dominate

> it. It knows nothing of honor. The status order means precisely the reverse: stratification in terms of honor and styles of life peculiar to status groups as such.

In status order status groups are stratified according to the principles of their *consumption* of goods as represented by special styles of life.[19] In a patrimonial system it is not the legal order but the ruler's favor that conditions honor,[20] and social honor sometimes becomes the basis of domination within a group, as seen with the notables.[21] Honor as social estimation depends on the ruler's distribution of power. Stratification by status is based on honorific and material monopolies. But status honor need not be linked with economic conditions. *Status order is the opposite to class order.* Whereas class is determined exclusively by economic interests conditioned by the commodity of labor markets, status groups are created by power or domination. While property and lack of property are the basic categories of market conditions, property is not always recognized as a status qualification in status order.[22]

It is possible, however, that status groups can evolve into a closed caste,[23] and that status can be bound to a class group. But both status and estate-type societies can be viewed in essence as politically stratified. The ruler's will in creating status groups is seen specifically in establishing social positions for a military group which, "in relation to other 'free' strata, are privileged through freedom from taxation and special land rights (*Bodenrecht*). In return, the incumbents are obliged to undergo military training and to be at the lord's arbitrary or limited disposal for military or administrative purposes."[24] As will be seen, "the military" is the main or exclusive status group in the Middle Eastern patrimonial state.

Although sometimes in current literature no distinction is made between estates and status groups, in Weber these two are clearly distinct concepts. "Feudalism is estate-type patrimonialism,"[25] or estate-type domination involving hereditary fiefs and established siegneurial powers that put limitations on the lord's discretion. In estate-type domination, an individual or an organized group appropriates positions and also the economic advantages associated with them. The contractual allegiance of the feudatory relations, the established rights limiting the lord's discretion, makes an essential difference in estate-type patrimonialism. There the estate is under the guarantee of a bilateral contract involving the appropriated rights, whereas in pure patrimonialism the ruler's arbitrariness and discretion is the norm.[26]

> In the case of pure patrimonialism, there is complete separation of the functionary from the means of carrying out his function. But exactly the opposite is true of the estate-type of patrimonialism. The person exercising governing powers has personal control of the means of administration.[27]

The difference between the two is best seen in comparing the western fief

with the Ottoman *tīmār* and the western landed military aristocracy with the sultan's *kuls*, which included the tīmār-holding *sipāhīs*. A status group can evolve into an estate-type under certain conditions. Also, estate-type patrimonialism may prove to be an evolution toward a bureaucratic state or an obstacle to it.[28]

In the Ottoman Empire, status groups were organized and legitimized exclusively through the sultan's favor. Such favor was rendered in an elaborate ritual that included the grant of a magnificently decorated imperial *berāt* (diploma). No exercise of power, no rank, and no title deed was legitimate without the possesson of a berāt, which, with the ruler's seal, showed his favor. The sultan's taking back the berāt, or his death, annulled all kinds of authority and disposition in the society. The ritual was often coupled with the grant of royal symbols, a standard, a robe of honor (*khil'at*) prepared in the ruler's palace by imperial tailors, and a richly harnessed horse; the grantee recognized the favor by a present (*pīshkesh*) symbolizing his loyalty.[29] The carrying of the sultan's emblems as the external marks of authority and rank had an awe-inspiring, almost sacred, character, overshadowing all other social and economic distinctions. The status of social groups, immunities, and privileges existed only through the regulations or *fermāns* accorded directly by the ruler.[30]

Theoretically, the whole social organization was based on estates, groups created or formalized by an act from the patrimonial ruler. Such status groups were stratified in the social pyramid so often described in the mirror-for-princes literature of the Middle East. What Weber meant by *sultanism* was originally derived not from Islamic precepts but from the caliphal state organization, which owed its basic philosophy and structure to the Byzantine and Sassanian heritage. This Iranian state tradition was transmitted to the Ottomans through native Iranian bureaucrats and the literary activity of the Iranian converts who translated Sassanian advice literature into Arabic.[31]

According to the letter of Tansar,[32] a royal advice letter from Sassanian times,

> men are divided into four estates . . . and at their head is the king. The first estate is that of the clergy . . . the second estate is that of the military, . . . the third estate is that of the scribes . . . the fourth estate is known as that of the artisans, and comprises tillers of land and herders of cattle and merchants and others who earn their living by trade. . . . Assuredly there shall be no passing from one to another unless in the character of one of us outstanding capacity is found. . . . The King of kings . . . kept each man in his own station and forbade any to meddle with a calling other than that for which it had pleased God . . . to create him. He laid commands moreover on the heads of the four estates. . . . All were concerned with their means of livelihood and their own affairs, and did not constrain kings to this by evil devices and acts of rebellion. . . . The commands

> given by the King of kings for occupying people with their own tasks and restraining them from those of others are for the stability of the world and the order of the affairs of men. . . . He has set a chief over each [estate] and after him a trusty inspector to investigate their revenues.[33] The King of kings has issued a decree to exalt and ennoble their (noble families) rank. . . . By it he has established a visible and general distinction between men of noble birth and common people with regard to horses and clothes, houses and gardens, women and servants. . . .[34]

In the advice-to-king literature, the clergy (the ulema in the Islamic system) is sometimes placed after that of the men of the sword, who represented the sultan's authority. But in any case the ruler is the head and source of legitimacy for all ranks and status groups. From the foundation of the Arab empire under the Umayyads, and particularly under the Abbasids, this Iranian estate system appears to have determined the whole social structure of the Islamic state.

The use of the titles *shāhānshāh*, king of kings, and *pādishāh*, great king, originally the titles of the Sassanian emperors, was banned in Islam until the tenth century, when they were assumed by the newly rising non-Arab rulers in order to assert their image of omnipotent rulers within caliphal universalism.[35] The favorite title of the Ottoman sultans was *pādishāh-i 'ālempenāh*, "the universal ruler in whom the whole world finds protection."[36] While designating the ruler's supreme power for the purpose of protection, the title emphasized in particular the Iranian notion of omnipotent ruler.

A complete description of the ranks and hierarchy of the ruling elite is to be found in the formulary manuals designed for the education of the state bureaucrats.[37] The elite (*mu'tabarān*), says al-Khōyī,[38] consists of two groups (*ṭā'ifa*); the first includes the ruler and high dignitaries and the second the leading ulema (*a'yān-i Dīn*). Among the members of each group there is a hierarchical subdivision (*ṭabaḳa*) for which specific titles and styles of address must be used. The members of the central government are ranked over provincial dignitaries. The second *ṭā'ifa* consists of two layers (*ṭabaḳa*): the first of which includes qadis, *muftīs*, and *mudarris*es, legal experts, teachers, and others; and the second, physicians, astronomers, and men of letters. In the introductory part to his compilation of state papers, the Ottoman chancery chief Ferīdūn gives the same ranking system, placing men of the sword and men of the pen above the ulema.[39] During public gatherings, the rank and seat of dignitaries was predetermined by the marshal of ceremonies (*teshrīfātjı*), and occasionally serious disputes arose over ranking, particularly among religious officials.

Whereas the Iranian notion of omnipotent ruler and estate society prevailed in the Islamic state, a parallel theory, apparently of Greek origin, emphasizing division of labor and social solidarity, could be found in the Islamic literature on ethics. According to the anthropomorphic interpretation of society found in this literature,[40] there are four groups (*ṭā'ifa*), like the

four elements in the human body: first, men of the pen (*ahl-i ḳalem*); second, men of the sword (*ahl-i shimshīr*); third, traders and artisans (*tüjjār and arbāb-i ḥiraf wa ṣanāyi'*); and fourth, the agriculturalists (*ṭā'ifa-i zirā'at*). Separation and equilibrium between these groups is seen as essential for the health and good functioning of the body politic. If traders or agriculturalists become soldiers or soldiers become traders or artisans, society begins to fail and deteriorate.[41] Whereas the Iranian tradition maintained that the whole society was organized by, and geared to, the ruler's demands, the anthropomorphic theory emphasized solidarity. Expounded in detail in al-Fārābī's *Ideal State*,[42] the anthropomorphic theory was popularized in Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī's *Ethics*.[43]

As formulated by Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī or by Dawānī,[44] the prevailing theory of society and "social classes" regarded society purely as a political entity, focusing mainly on the ruling elite, which was composed of *ṭā'ifa*s, "communities," or status groups.[45] In this system the productive classes were considered necessary merely for the support of the state, and the state, in essence, consisted of the ruler and those who represented royal authority. We have purposely avoided the discussion of the place or claims of the sharī'a (Islamic law) and the ulema in order to focus on the definition of sultanism as a Weberian type of patrimonial state.

In any event, in the Islamic state extra economic criteria are taken as the basis for material life and for stratifying men in society. The economy is a communal economy.[46] Society is conceived essentially as a political and moral entity and the social classes as *ṭā'ifa*s, status groups. In this society the social relations are based, in Weber's terms, on patriarchal domination, dependency, rank, and loyalty. It is the ruler's duty, "for the good order of the world" (*nizām-i 'ālem*) or for the good of "Islam and [the Islamic] state" (*Dīn u Dawla*), to ensure that this order is preserved and each man is kept in his own *ṭā'ifa*. The same Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī reportedly[47] advised the Mongol khan Hulagu that, since the wandering *Ḳalandarī* dervishes could not be placed in any of these *ṭā'ifa*s, they should be eliminated.

The Ottoman patrimonial system, particularly in its classical age (1300–1600), can be viewed as resting on an emphatically regulated polity. The *ḳul ṭā'ifesi*, the palace and the army, constituting the ever-expanding household of the ruler, can be traced back to the initial warband of *nökers* or *yoldash*, comrades, who assembled around Osman Ghāzī, the founder of the Ottoman state.[48] Weber's theory of charismatic leadership and patron-client solidarity furnishes an illuminating concept for the emergence of the typical Turco-Mongol state.[49] In the Eurasian steppe, every conqueror started his career with a warband of *nöker*s, usually personally bound to him by *anda*, an oath of loyalty unto death. The core group maintained itself through solidarity of interest in booty and conquest. Recruited from among the allies or captured enemies, *nöker*s or *yoldash*, to whom the early Ottoman traditions make

frequent reference, formed the original household of Osman Ghāzī, and their descendants monopolized for more than a century all the key positions in the Osmanlı state—Osmanlı signifying those who were affiliated with the person of Osman and represented the leader's power or the "Ottoman" state, which meant the same thing. As organizers of the conquests and of the central bureaucracy, the ulema maintained a parallel position of control within the power group. Later on, when the state became increasingly dependent on their bureaucratic skills, the ulema families, in particular the Çandarlıs, assumed both military and bureaucratic control and became supreme at the center of government, whereas several old families of *nöker* origin maintained their original status in the distant frontier zones in the Balkans. The radical change came under Mehmed II the Conqueror, who dismissed the Çandarlıs from power and made the slaves from his seraglio, with no hereditary rights, the only group entrusted with authority. The change signified the replacement of the personal *nöker*s by an impersonal body of servants whose ranks were determined by a set of rules (*ḳānūn*) and whose loyalty to the ruler was the exclusive criterion for being entrusted with authority. The ruler's household was reorganized to maintain the ruler's omnipotence in a state now transformed into an empire in which the direct personal control of the ruler was no longer possible. Or in Weber's terms, personal household patriarchalism simply evolved into a centralist and formalized patrimonialism—a change only in degree in the dependency relationship of the household.

Mehmed the Conqueror, the ultimate founder of the Ottoman centralist empire, emphatically upheld the Iranian tradition, as reflected in his law code[50] and government as well as in the "palace" culture, including its architecture and literature. It was not a coincidence that his favorite son, Jem, bore the name of a legendary king of ancient Iran. Mehmed's law code governing state organization reserved to the highest dignitaries the privilege of eating at his table and is symbolic of the change; as Weber indicates "Originally the patrimonial officials are typically maintained at the ruler's table and from his supplies, as is every other household member. . . ."[51] Patrimonial officials, especially their highest ranks, retained for a long time the right to be fed at the lord's table when they were present at court. . . ." "In a relatively larger apparatus," Weber adds, "a further evolution was the maintenance . . . by the granting of benefices or fiefs to patrimonial officials."[52] Whereas in the orient patrimonial officialdom, Weber asserts, never transcended its basically household character, in the West it evolved into a bureaucratic officialdom whose jurisdictions derived from impersonal interests.[53]

The traditional status order did not remain mere theory; state papers and regulations show that it was applied by a bureaucracy that was imbued with it and considered it the foundation of the state and society. The candid narrator of Ottoman life and society, Evliyā Çelebi,[54] describes urban populations in the second half of the seventeenth century in terms of traditional

status ranking. Groups representing the ruler's authority always came first. These were followed by the men of religion, who were stratified among themselves as descendants of the Prophet and ulema, including muftis and qadis. Last were the civil notables of the town. Separated from these groups, which together comprised the elite *(a'yān ve eshrāf)*, ordinary subjects *(re'āyā)* were also differentiated according to their status as members of mercantile or artisan associations.

We have seen that the only status groups created by the Ottoman ruler consisted of the "military" groups, which constituted part of his household, primarily the palace—the troops of his "Porte" (*kapı-kulları*), the *tīmār*-holding cavalry in the provinces, and the bureaucratic apparatus that managed the sources of revenues in his land.[55] As for the rest of society, consisting of the *re'āyā*, the tax-paying productive groups, the ruler's role was limited to reorganizing or formalizing under state regulations, to serve his patrimonial system, the social classes of the preconquest period.[56] In the sultan's orders or state papers, the *re'āyā*, or any group of *re'āyā*, were addressed only indirectly through state officials in the provinces, primarily through qadis, who at the same time represented the local community. The conquered productive masses, the Ottoman *re'āyā*, were systematically excluded from the "military household" (*kuls*). Instead, they were, in Weber's terminology, "extra-patrimonial subjects" or "political subjects" whose function was to supply the ruler's needs.[57] Forced into compulsory associations to serve the ruler's demands, they were subordinated to the political machine that he had created. In Weber's analysis of the patrimonial state, the ruler's use of "non-privileged masses and especially the rural masses" in military service is emphasized.[58] These were elevated to a privileged position relative to the majority of ordinary subjects, but were never given *'askerī* (elite) status. This group of subjects, well known in the Ottoman case under the status designation of "exempt" (*mu'āf ve müsellem*) *re'āyā*,[59] was integrated into the "military" class only under exceptional conditions. Although these *re'āyā* soldiers lost their privileged status in the second half of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman state continued to use *re'āyā* as mercenaries. They, too, however, were denied the full privileges of the sultan's "military" *kuls*. Fierce struggles between the *kuls* and the mercenaries (*sekbān* and *sarıdja* companies)—called *jelālīs* when they turned rebellious—fill the annals of seventeenth-century Ottoman historians.[60] In the eighteenth century, as professional soldiers costing less than regular *kuls*, they came to form the main body of the sultan's army and of the "private" armies of provincial notables. The poorest rural elements thus obtained employment in the imperial army without ever acquiring the privileges of the household *kuls*. In the Balkans such local organizations of Christian soldiery, created by the Porte, became in the nineteenth century the nucleus for troops supporting the cause of nationalistic rebellious minorities like the Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians, and Albanians.

In Weber's scheme such changes can be interpreted as clues to the weakening of central patrimonial control.[61] In fact, the Janissaries and other divisions at the Porte were transformed into semi-autonomous traditional status groups possessing their own special regulations with consolidated privileges. Increasingly conscious of their own corporate interests, they became an important force in the struggle for power. As for the mercenaries, they, too, being organized into permanent companies in the provinces, challenged the sultan's centralist authority. The seventeenth century witnessed a violent struggle, with temporary compromises, between these "autonomous" groups.[62] The Köprülü revival of centralist patrimonial-bureaucratic power in the second half of the century collapsed under the disastrous impact of the long war in the period between 1683 and 1699.

An important feature of the Ottoman patrimonial system, often confused in the literature, has to do with the fundamental difference in the ruler's attitude toward his *ḳuls* and toward the *re'āyā*. If confiscation of property or capital punishment was carried out against the *re'āyā* without due process of law in the religious court, the act was regarded as religiously wrong and a flagrant injustice (*ẓulm*), injurious to the reputation of the ruler. In the classical mirror-for-princes literature, the ruler was admonished to avoid such acts and to prevent them in his subordinates. The ruler's discretionary punishment (*siyāset*) was legitimate in principle only against his *ḳuls*.[63]

As Weber notes, the ruler's exercise of power in the interest of maintaining a balance of power between rival status groups was a fundamental principle of the Ottoman political system.[64] The Sultan's *ḳuls* versus the *re'āyā*, ulema versus *ḳuls* and bureaucrats, Janissaries versus *sipāhī*s, or salaried army versus timariot army, low rank qadis against high ulema—all were status groups traditionally in conflict. The ruler was conscious of the necessity of employing his regulative power to keep them in equilibrium, since this guaranteed his "domination" of the polity. However, there were times in Ottoman history when this equilibrium was lost. Threatened by his *ḳuls* in the capital, Süleyman I is reported to have said that he might use against the *ḳuls* the large group of unskilled workers from the tanneries that was available in the capital city. The sultans of the troubled seventeenth century organized peasants into military companies to fight against rebellious mercenaries in the countryside.

A final note on patrimonial status order and socio-economic structure. We know that through innumerable regulations, monopolies, immunities, and market inspections, characteristics for which the Byzantine and Ottoman empires are known, the patrimonial power shaped the economy exclusively for the ruler's demands and thereby influenced to a great extent the formation of social classes.[65] However, specific developments in demographic and socio-economic conditions—for example, the emergence of the metropolis of Istanbul—brought about situations with which the regulatory power and wisdom

of the patrimonial state was not capable of coping. So there existed a constant conflict between the imperial regulations and the realities of the market or of rural developments occurring under the pressure of changing demographic and economic conditions.

Extensive bureaucratic documentation witnesses this constant struggle between the state and the market. For example, in the guild system, which was always vigorously supported by the state, the state had sometimes to yield to the pressure of increased demand for goods; this yielding caused the neglect of certain strict provisions of the antiquated regulations. The state agreed to the formation of new guilds and tolerated the activities of extra guild artisans. Perhaps more spectacular escapes from patrimonial control are found in the agrarian sector under changing economic and demographic conditions. Weber discusses these phenomena while dealing with the dissolution processes of patrimonial empires.[66] Economic and social forces would be fully released to bypass the regulations and shape the social classes when the centralist power was weakened and lost control of market forces. In fact, the conflict was always present in patrimonial states, and thus it can be argued that in reality a ruler could never succeed in creating a pure patrimonialism and a perfect status society.

"SULTANISM," TRADITION, AND TRADITIONAL GROUPS

It can be argued that the concept of "tradition" in Weber's sociology approaches what Émile Durkheim and the structuralists in general mean by collective representations, institutions, and structures. Tradition in Weber's sense is both the origin and validating principle of patrimonial domination. "What is customary and has always been so" had a sacred character and demanded obedience to the particular person who represented it. The "ruler's powers are legitimate insofar as they are traditional."[67] Upon succession to the throne, the Ottoman sultan, after mentioning all his royal ancestors, asserted that he became ruler "by inheritance and by being entitled to it *(bi'l-irs wa'l-istiḥkāḳ)*." In Weber, tradition and custom are dealt with as closely related concepts. In fact, custom, "a collective way of acting" (*Massenhandeln*), a uniform activity, which is a matter of custom and persists by unreflective imitation,[68] appears to be a factor modifying the patrimonial ruler's discretionary power. Mere habituation, Weber points out, is the first factor that stereotypes the patrimonial relationship. From there the sanctifying power of tradition evolves: "the master is restrained from introducing innovations."[69] He is also restrained from using his discretionary power by the possibility that his economic interests would be hurt by innovations[70] (the Ottoman policy of preserving the preconquest practices in taxation may be remembered here). The sultan's agents are ordered to follow in their decisions,

first, sultanic law and the sultan's written orders; and then, if there is no clear reference to the matter in either of these, to do "what had long been practiced." Thus, a stable order diminishes the area of the master's discretion in favor of traditional prescription. The master may formalize this traditional order by regulations. In fact, most of the Ottoman sultanic laws were formalized versions of indigenous customs, *'urf u 'ādāt*. But the enactment, Weber believes,[71] never committed the ruler legally:

> Sometimes it appears that sultanism is completely unrestrained by tradition, but this is never in fact the case. The nontraditional element is not, however, rationalized in impersonal terms, but consists only in an extreme development of the ruler's discretion.

Law in the Ottoman Empire was theoretically, if we use Weber's terminology, "the ruler's personal will" or "ultimately nothing but purely subjective rights and privileges of individuals deriving from the ruler's grant of favor."[72] However, the *kānūn* codes of the founding sultans, Mehmed the Conqueror and Süleyman the Lawgiver, which were actually formulated by the bureaucrats themselves, were claimed to be unalterable fundamental rules, or "restrictive traditions" in Weber's terms.

As for the traditional groups, we have discussed above how the Janissary corps was transformed from a purely patrimonial army in the personal service of the sultan into a traditional group through a typification process similar to what took place in western patrimonial states.[73] But from the beginning this process was most visible with the ulema.[74] As far as the Ottoman imperial system is concerned, the Islamic tradition was in fact the most effective check on the limitless arbitrary power of the sultan. As the custodians of Islamic tradition, the ulema, though stratified and often in conflict within its own ranks, played a major role throughout Ottoman history as a traditional and legitimate center of resistance. Other groups often took sanctuary with the ulema to protect their traditionally established rights against the discretionary power of the sultan.

When it comes to productive groups, a different concern and motivation on the part of the ruler can be discerned. The preconquest "classes" made up traditional groups, differing from the ruler's personal retainers "by virtue of the right of mobility . . . by owing traditional and therefore fixed services and taxes and by freely disposing of property and land. The disposition of property and land are arranged under customs or customary laws."[75] The obligations of this class are bound by tradition. This description of traditional or "political subjects" perfectly fits that of Ottoman *re'āyā*.

In addition to the restrictive power of tradition, Weber stresses that it was the ruler's concern to maintain the subjects' compliance and economic capacity to support him.[76] That concern limited the arbitrary acts and "personal

sanctions" of the ruler and his officials.[77] Patrimonialism has an inherent tendency to regulate economic activity in terms of utilitarian welfare or absolute values. This tendency stems from the character of the claim to legitimacy and interest in the contentment of the subjects.[78]

It is a commonplace that the Ottoman ruler regulated the economy in general as part of his patrimonial goals, but in some sectors, such as rice cultivation and mining, his bureaucracy directly managed the production process itself because of the immediate need for the products.[79] The ruler's regulatory power manifested itself most strikingly in the agrarian economy. We shall see that in the conquered lands the Ottoman government restored and systemically controlled a specific agrarian system based on peasant family farm units, or the *çift-khāne* system.

As an incisive agrarian historian, Weber was able to see that patrimonial empires had a systematic policy of protecting and maintaining small peasant farms from exploitations. "The prince," he says,[80]

> had primarily a fiscal and military interest in the "mediatized" subjects: an interest in maintaining their number, that is, the number of small holdings suffficient to support one peasant family; in preventing their exploitation by the local patrimonial authorities beyond a point at which their capacity to satisfy his own demands would suffer; in retaining the power to tax them and call them up for military service directly without any mediation.

Weber clearly defined the basic economic principle underlying the regime of peasant family farms.[81]

> The appropriation of the means of production and personal control, however formal, of the process of work constitutes one of the strongest incentives to unlimited willingness to work. This is the fundamental basis of the extraordinary importance of small units in agriculture, whether in the form of small-scale proprietorship or small tenants who hope to rise to the status of owner. . . . It is very important in all parts of Asia and also in Europe in the Middle Ages. . . . The existence of the small peasant in a sense depends directly on the absence of capital accounting and on retaining the units of household and enterprise.

In Weber's time, protection of the small farmer and the small-scale farm in agriculture had become a hotly debated political issue, and the economic advantages of both were frequently stressed.

As for the traditional groups in towns and cities, guilds with well-established traditions constituted the backbone of urban society. The patrimonial

system, according to Weber,[82] evolved into sultanism when the ruler was able to turn his "extra-patrimonial subjects" (tax-paying producers) and "collective responsibility associations" (guilds and village communities) into patrimonial groups completely dependent upon the ruler. Under different conditions, such associations in the west had evolved more into self-governing municipal associations. In the Ottoman case, the key question is to what extent the Ottoman ruler really controlled the guilds. Although Gabriel Baer held that, under the Ottomans, guilds came under the direct control of the state, documentary evidence does not confirm this.[83] A trend toward dependency can be detected, but in general the guilds preserved their autonomy. His control was confined to formally legitimizing guild officers after their election by the members of the guild from among their fellow guildsmen. As a rule, it was the local qadi who performed the validation. The real character of the Ottoman guild system and its position vis-à-vis the state has only recently begun to come to light through the examination of qadi court records.[84]

We believe that it is necessary to revise the view made popular by Orientalists influenced by Weber that the Islamic city in general was unorganized, unstructured, and completely dependent upon the state. Every Ottoman guild possessed its own warden (*ketkhudā*), and all guilds in a city formed a group under the town *ketkhudā*. It is true that all guilds achieved and maintained a formal and legitimate existence through the ruler's grant of a diploma. The guilds were also validated spiritually through the system of professional ethics and brotherhood called *akhī*-ism and through their affiliation with one or another religious order. The ruler's efforts to incorporate the *akhī*s and the religious orders into the system of status groups through grants of *waḳf* and donations were not always successful. The *malāmatī* and widespread *ḳalander-abdāl* orders in the Ottoman Empire constantly fought against such attempts. Sometimes, in alliance with discontented segmentary social groups, such as nomads, their resistance took the form of mass insurrections, such as those of Shaykh Badr al-Dīn (Bedreddin) in 1416, Shāh-Ḳūlū in 1511, and Ḳalender-oghlu in 1527.

In brief, although the Ottoman state was known as one of the most accomplished status societies in Islamic history, it still appears to have fallen short of achieving pure patrimonialism in this respect. Incidentially, the institution of *ketkhudā* had a broad significance in the Ottoman social setting. In fact, the *ketkhudā* or *kahyā* (from Persian *kadkhudā*, household steward) was a basic element in the establishment of a "solidarity group" in general. In Ottoman society virtually every group, from the guilds to the Janissary corps, was organized around the *ketkhudā*-ship. Elected by his peers, a *ketkhudā* was supposed to represent the interests of the group before the outside world, particularly the state. Although the *ketkhudā* acquired his legitimacy and

authority vis-à-vis the group only upon receipt of a diploma or certificate from the ruler's local agent, the qadi, the procedure was no more than a formality. The real decision always rested with the group and a *ketkhudā* was removed from office usually upon the demand of the group. Through the *ketkhudā*-ship a variety of social groups possessed a considerable degree of autonomy with respect to their internal affairs.

"SULTANISM" AND THE OTTOMAN BUREAUCRACY

Patrimonial domination, according to Weber, "establishes itself through an administrative apparatus."[85] Either by virtue of a constellation of interests or by virtue of authority, domination expresses itself and functions through law and administration."[86] The creation of an administrative apparatus marks development from patriarchal to patrimonial domination (*Herrschaft*).[87]

Under a patrimonial ruler, the army and the bureaucrats are selected and organized as in a patrimonial household, to respond exclusively to the ruler's demands. Government offices are organized and maintained along purely personal lines. In the choice of officials, loyalty to the ruler supersedes all other concerns. Officials are therefore selected from among the ruler's personal attendants, and professional training and specialization are not always considered necessary prerequisites.[88] Promotions depend not on objective rules but on the ruler's favor and arbitrary choice. The ruler makes his officials' economic compensation completely subject to his discretion with no provision for hereditary service. Officials never constitute a corporate group or a monopolistic legally autonomous sodality.[89] In brief, the basic features of patrimonial bureaucracy stem from its personal patrimonial character. According to Weber,[90] the household characteristics of the patrimonial state were maintained "in a grotesque degree . . . at the Turkish court" up to the nineteenth century.

In its developed form in the sixteenth century, however, the Ottoman bureaucratic apparatus displayed a number of features that do not permit us to subscribe completely to Weber's description. Under Süleyman the Lawgiver (1520–66) the Ottoman bureaucracy cannot be viewed purely as part of the ruler's household, nor were its offices based purely upon personal relations and absolute subordination to the ruler. Empirical research suggests that the Ottoman bureaucracy evolved from a pure "patrimonial" structure to an increasingly self-conscious and autonomous organization that functioned in a relatively "rational" system of fixed rules and training. Weber himself observes that, in the course of financial rationalization, the patrimonial state moves imperceptibly toward a rational bureaucratic administration.[91] Although their autonomy was not consolidated with hereditary rights as in the West, Ottoman bureaucrats could scarcely be immune to group solidarity as

they acquired specialized training through long years in guild-like bureaus.[92] The rationale and legitimation of their activities were based not so much on the ruler's pleasure and tradition as on their expertise and, ultimately, on the interests of the Islamic "religion and state" (*Dīn u Dawlat*). They became critical of the arbitrary acts of the later sultans who behaved, in their judgment, contrary to the established Ottoman state tradition instituted by Mehmed the Conqueror and Süleyman I.[93] Despite the patrimonial rule which made all the legal dispositions of a dead sultan null and void, the bureaucracy was concerned about maintaining established tradition. As the custodians of institutions, which they believed formed the underpinning of "Religion and State," they came into conflict with palace favorites and other powerful traditional groups such as the ulema.

Traditional group solidarity and autonomy were particularly apparent in the finance department, which had always recruited specialized experts. No sultan, not even Selim I, the most autocratic of the Ottoman sultans, could dispense with their services. As inherited from the old Middle Eastern bureaucratic tradition, state revenues and expenditures were under the strict control of the finance department, which operated according to extremely complex bureaucratic and bookkeeping techniques.[94] Every state undertaking was entrusted to a finance agent (*emīn*) who delivered a report on completion of the job to the head of the finance department. Though formally dependent on the grand vizier, the absolute deputy of the sultan, the head of the finance department was acutally independent in his decisions; conflicts between these two often called for the personal intervention of the sultan himself. Arbitrary demands on public funds by the sultan's favorites met with bitter criticism from authors with financial experience.[95] The transformation of military prebends (*tīmār*s) into sinecures, for example, was denounced as ruinous to "the Religion and the State." In the classical period, bureaucrats were recruited not from among the ulema but from a professional group of experts who tried to maintain their monopoly through nepotism and clientship. Even bureaucrats who owed their origin to the ruler's household or the ulema adopted the professional ethics and rules of the career group.

In the classical period, the central bureaucracy consistently worked to eliminate or restrict arbitrary exactions and practices through regulations and the rulers' edicts or rescripts of justice (*'adāletnāme*),[96] which were actually formulated and issued by the bureaucrats themselves. They constantly endeavored to define and keep close control over the acts and jurisdictions of provincial agents. Inspectors (*mufettish*) with extraordinary powers were sent to the provinces wherever there was a need. The declared motive was always to promote the interests of "the Religion and the State" and to protect "the poor, powerless *re'āyā*" against injustices. When they believed the interests of "the Religion and the State" were at stake, the same bureaucrats tried hard

to convince the sultan to take radical measures regardless of the resistance, and became responsible for genuine reforms. It is not by chance that nearly all of the great Ottoman reformer-statesmen emerged from among the bureaucrats (*küttāb*). It was through their actions that such innovations as Western technology in methods of warfare, the printing press, and even Western legal and administrative institutions found their way into the Ottoman Empire in the later centuries. However, it must be admitted that since all political actions had to have the sultan's approval in order to be valid, the success of the bureaucrats depended on their power position. Once in office, they themselves insisted on the absolute and indivisible character of the sultan's power, using it then to introduce necessary reforms that aimed ultimately at consolidating the bureaucracy's own centralized control.

Having identified themselves with the state and its interests, the bureaucrats tried to consolidate the basis of their power and legitimacy. No wonder that during the sweeping reforms known under the name of *Tanẓimāt* (1839–76) the bureaucrats were denounced as despots by the newly emerging westernized intelligentsia. But in the end, military and civil bureaucrats, in alliance with the intelligentsia, would seek to base legitimacy on the national will through new bureaucratic instruments and notions borrowed from the West. Throughout this long history it was largely the development of a de facto autonomous bureaucracy that appears to have been responsible for the change in the patrimonial Middle Eastern state. In some of the more traditional Islamic countries, it was not the bureaucrats but other traditionally autonomous groups, such as the ulema who were mainly responsible for the change. Briefly speaking, in the Islamic patrimonial empire it was these two groups, the civil and military bureaucrats and the *ulema*, evolving into increasingly autonomous groups that finally replaced the sultans' patrimonial state.

ORIENTAL FEUDALISM: PREBENDALISM

In general, Weber believes, the manner by which military service was remunerated determined the type of feudalism.[97] Allowances in kind from the ruler's storehouse, the mark of a primitive state in the remuneration of officials, depended on the specific economic conditions in the original patrimonial state.[98] In fact, in the Ottoman Empire the allowances in kind (*ta'yīnāt*), which favored groups directly attached to the sultan's household, persisted for a long time. From the benefice system, which was the next stage in remuneration, "fee benefices" *(sportelpfründe)* first developed. In this system the ruler assigned the collection of certain fees to the direct remuneration of the official. This system, too, was widely used in the Ottoman system from the earliest times; for example, the service charge of the sultan's agent (*ghulāmiyye*) in the collection of the poll tax, or the qadi's receiving fees for judicial court

services. Finally, Weber observes, "the remuneration could take the form of a landed benefice or service land (*Amts- oder Dienstland*) for the incumbent's own use."[99] The prebend is a particular form of nonhereditary benefice patrimonially granted by the ruler to his retainers. "When an administrative staff is supported in this form, we shall speak of prebendalism. In such a situation there may be a system of promotion on a basis of seniority."[100] Weber categorized the Ottoman *sipāhī (tīmār)* system as a typical example of prebendalism:

> The income sources of the Turkish sipahis, of the Japanese samurai, and various similar types of oriental retainers are benefices, not fiefs. In some cases, they have been derived from the rents of certain lands; in others, from the tax income of certain districts. In the latter case, they have generally been combined with the appropriation of governmental powers in the same district.[101]

Weber finds one of the most developed forms of prebendalism in the arbitrary patrimonial power enjoyed by the ruler and benefice-holder in the Ottoman Empire. Because of the patrimonial nature of the benefice, powers and economic rights generally included "privately appropriated economic advantages." In Ottoman documents these are called *tekālīf-i shaḳḳa*, exactions. Under sultanism arbitrariness "in determining fees, newly imposed obligations and monopolies" is claimed as a right. Bribery and corruption are logical consequences of the system. In all of this, Weber has in mind the Ottoman Empire. But "typification" also took other directions, as in Western Europe, where "estate type hereditary division of powers" developed. There,

> patrimonial rights are checked under the obligation of the ruler to compromise with the ruling elite. Benefices are called fief if they are appropriated as hereditary and granted by contract. Thus, legal and restrictive characters distinguish western fief feudalism (*Lehen Feudalismus*) from Asiatic types.[102]

The central bureaucracy systematically attempted to prevent the spread of hereditary benefices (*mālikāne* and *mülk tīmār*s) and to maintain a kind of check and balance system in the provincial administration; these efforts were all designed to preserve the ruler's absolute control and monopoly over the "benefices." In the Ottoman Empire, it is true, the appropriation of benefices, which occurred to some extent in all periods but particularly in the period when the classical system began to disintegrate, never developed into a western-style hereditary aristocracy. For Weber, while prebendalism such as that of the Ottoman Empire developed into an extreme type of patrimonialism, its evolution in Western Europe led to the rise of a rational bureaucracy.

One can easily recognize in Weber's theory the well-known hypothesis of a contrary evolution of the western and the Asiatic empires. In this too

schematic reductionism, the specific characteristics of the Ottoman system are overlooked, or rather obscured in favor of a popularized theory of the despotic Asiatic empire. Perhaps one can also detect the impact of the intense anti-Ottoman propaganda during the nineteenth century.

At the same time, Weber asserts that there were certain fundamental features common to the eastern and western benefice systems. First, prebendalism, like western feudalism, is the outcome of certain socio-economic conditions. "It originates in the reversion from monetary financing to financing in kind."[103] The patrimonial retainer receives his support either in the form of allowances from the lord's magazine or treasury or "by rights of land use in return for services."[104] It is important to stress that while an ordinary cash salary *('ulūfe)* concerns the ruler's treasury and thus makes the soldiery directly dependent, the prebend affords the recipient greater independence through indirect, albeit limited and reversible, control over land and peasants. As a further development, the appropriation of land and peasant labor by a group of hereditary landowners means, in Weber's terms, "an extreme marginal case of patrimonialism," which is shaped purely by patrimonial loyalty.[105] The last case in the Ottoman Empire can perhaps be seen in the *a'yān* regime. But this came about rather as an outgrowth of the tax farming system and decentralization, and the hereditary principle was never complete.

Following the observation made by western thinkers since Machiavelli, Weber underlines the lack of a "homogeneous manorial aristocracy" in Islamic countries due to the absence of a common interest in safeguarding "the ownership of serfs."[106] Instead, he says, there was constant competition among benefice holders for peasant labor. In the *çift-khāne* system, both land and labor came under the strict control of the state in order to maintain a definite agrarian organization whose aim was to eliminate consolidated, hereditary estates. Even during the eighteenth century the *a'yān* control over land and labor was precarious, because any legitimation of such control depended on the sultan's favor, as manifested by a diploma and an official title. The attempt in 1808 to give a kind of constitutional foundation to the *a'yān*'s actual control failed totally in the face of the sultan's patrimonial power and of resistance by traditional forces.[107]

In the West, as well as in the Ottoman state, the candidate for remuneration had first to prove his qualifications for providing the service assigned. In the Ottoman case the immediate superior (usually the *alay-beyi*) had to testify to the candidate's fitness, which was the crucial factor in acquiring a *tīmār*. The recommendation process, at the same time, established a kind of clientship between the candidate and his superior. This patrimonial relationship can be seen at every level of the Ottoman ruling elite. In the classical period a new sultan coming from his provincial seat to the capital felt obliged to promote his retainers to imperial posts. Thus, every succession brought

with it a power struggle and political crisis of greater or lesser intensity depending upon the prevailing issues and circumstances. It was against law and tradition to deprive a *sipāhī* of his *tīmār* without cause. Although *tīmār*-holders could not transfer their actual *tīmār*s to their sons through inheritance, the latter nevertheless had the right under the law to obtain other *tīmār*s whose size, albeit smaller, was determined by the size of their father's *tīmār*s. Also, in the *tīmār* system, under the bureaucracy's supervision, there was a tendency to isolate the service obligations from personal household loyalties, and thus to reduce the ruler's discretionary control over *tīmār* holders.

NOTES

1. Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, trans. G. Roth and C. Wittich (Berkeley: UCP, 1978), 1:231–232; 2:1031.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Cf. N. Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. T. G. Bergin (Arlington Heights, 1986 reprint of 1947), pp. 10–11.
5. In Weber's sociology, the concept of *patrimonialism* is often used synonymously with *power*, or *authority* as "one of the most important elements of communal action" (Weber *Economy and Society*: I, 322–324, 336).
6. Ibid., I:232.
7. Ibid., I:231–232; 2:1017.
8. ibid., I:237.
9. Ibid., I:54.
10. See note 11.
11. H. Inalcik, "State, Sovereignty and Law During the Reign of Süleyman I," to be published in the Proceedings of the Conferences on Süleyman the Magnificent (Chicago and Princeton, June 1987).
12. H. Inalcik, "Osmanlılar'da Saltanat Verâset Usûlü ve Türk Hakimiyet Telakkisiyle Ilgisi," *Siyasal Bigiler Fk. Dergisi*, XIV (1959):575–610.
13. Weber, *Economy and Society*, 2:1009.
14. L. Valensi, *Venise et la Sublime Porte, la naissance du despote* (Paris, Hachette 1987), pp. 78–86.
15. Weber, *Economy and Society*, 1:131–132; 2:1006–1015.
16. Ibid., 2:1071.
17. Ibid., 2:927.
18. Ibid., 2:936.
19. Ibid., 2:937.
20. Ibid., 2:1068.
21. Ibid., 2:1009.
22. Ibid., 2:927, 933.
23. Ibid., 2:932–33.
24. Ibid., 2:1070–71.

25. Ibid., 1:232; 2:1036.

26. Ibid., 2:1032.

27. Ibid., 1:234.

28. Ibid., 2:1035, 1037.

29. The tradition of offering presents as a token of allegiance at the New Year (*Nourūz*) ceremonies at the Ottoman court goes back to ancient Iran; the Achaemenian reliefs depicting the ceremony on the staircase of the outer palace at Persepolis illustrates such a ceremony, see "Maṭbakh" (H. Inalcik) *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2d ed. (*EI²* hereafter), p. 810.

30. A striking example is Meḥmed II's law-code on state organization: *Ḳānūnnāme-i Āl-i 'Osmān*, ed. M. Ârif, *Tārīkh-i 'Osmānī Enjumeni Mejmū'asi*, Supplement (Istanbul 1330/1914).

31. See A. von Kremer, *Kulturgeschichte des Orients unter den Chalifen* (Vienna, 1875 and 1877); see also the articles *'adab*, *Ibn Ḳutayba*, *Ibn al-Muḳaffa'* and *Djāhiz* in *EI²*.

32. *The Letter of Tansar*, trans. M. Boyce (Rome, 1968), pp. 1–3.

33. ibid., p. 33.

34. ibid., p. 36; R. Frye, *The Heritage of Persia* (Cleveland and New York, 1963), pp. 51–52, raises the question to what extent this ideal "organised division of society" is the continuation of an Aryan or Mesopotamian heritage.

35. W. Madelung, "The Assumption of the Title Shāhānshāh by the Buyids and The Reign of the Daylam," *Middle Eastern Studies*, pp. 28, 84–108, 169–83.

36. "Pâdişâh" (H. Inalcik), *Islâm Ansiklopedisi*, IX:491–95; B. Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago and London, 1988), pp. 13–70.

37. Hasan al-Khoyī, *Gunyet'ul-Kātib ve Munyet'i-Ṭālib*, ed. A. Erzi (Ankara, 1963); the work was written in 690/1291, the MS published was copied in 879/1474.

38. Ibid., p. 3.

39. A. Ferīdūn, *Munsha'āt al-Salāṭīn* (Istanbul, 1274/1857), pp. 2–13.

40. Kınalı-zāde 'Alā al-Dīn 'Alī, *Akhlāḳ-i 'Alā'ī* (Bulak, 1248/1832), written in 1564, II:5; III:7; Hajjī Khalīfe, *Destūr al-'Amel li-Iṣlāḥ al-Khalel* (Istanbul 1280/1863), 119–140. C. Fleischer, "Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism, and 'Ibn Khaldunism in sixteenth Century Ottoman Letters," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* (1983), pp. 198–220.

41. Kınalı-zāde, p. 7–8.

42. *Al Fārābī's Abhandlung der Musterstaat*, ed. F. Dieterici (Leiden, 1964), pp. 55, 187.

43. *The Nasirean Ethics*, trans. G. Wickens (London, 1964), p. 193.

44. Kınalı-zāde, II, pp. 105–12.

45. The term commonly used for groups thus distinguished is *ṭā'ifa*, meaning community. The term is also used for a nation, a religious group, or a professional group such as a guild. The term *ṭabaḳa*, emphasizing more explicitly the hierarchiacal order, is also used for status groups (see R. Mottahedeh, *Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society* (Princeton, 1980), p. 104–7; Kınalı-zāde, 2:7–9. As noted before, the term *ṭabaḳa* is sometimes used only for a sub-group in a *ṭā'ifa* (Al-khoyī, *Gunyet*, pp. 14–16). Summarizing Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī and Djalāl al-Dīn Dawānī, Kınalı-zāde points out that along with trade, craftsmanship, and agriculture, political power (*amāra*)

is a legitimate means of acquiring wealth. This attitude in Islamic culture is found more strikingly expressed in the concept of *ghanīma*, i.e., booty gained in "legitimate" war and the most welcome and legitimate type of property. Yet Muslim thinkers have argued that goods acquired through torture and injustice are not morally acceptable, although in practice they are necessary to maintain public order (Kınalı-zāde, 2:9). Kınalı-zāde argues that moral satisfaction should not be forgotten while endeavoring for excellence and success in a profession.

46. Weber, *Economy and Society*, II: 1014.

47. Ibn al-Fuwāṭī, *Al-Ḥawādith al-Jāmi'a*, ed. M. Jawād (Baghdad, 1951), p. 343, cited by A. Yaşar Ocak, "XIV–XVI, Yüsyıllarda Kalenderi Dervişleri ve Osmanlı Yönetimi" (paper submitted to the Colloquium on "Saints and Sainthood in Islam," Berkeley, April 1987).

48. See H. Inalcik, "The Question of the Emergence of the Ottoman State," *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 2/2 (1981–1982), pp. 72–79; id., "The Khan and Tribal Aristocracy: The Crimean Khanate under Sahib Giray I," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 3–4 (1979–80): 445–66.

49. Weber, *Economy and Society*, 1:241–54, 2:1070–93.

50. "Ḳānūnnāme-i Āl-i 'Oşmān," edited by M. 'Ârif, *TOEM*, Supplement (Istanbul, 1330/1914), p. 27.

51. Weber, *Economy and Society*, 2:1031.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. *Seyāḥatnāme* (Istanbul, 1314—1898), 2:90–91, 213.

55. See H. Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300–1600* (London, 1973), pp. 76–118.

56. Weber, *Economy and Society*, 2:1013: "Originally, patrimonial administration was adapted to the satisfaction of purely personal, primarily private household needs of the master."

57. Ibid., 2:1020–1021, distinguishes them clearly from status groups.

58. Ibid., 2:1015, 1018.

59. H. Inalcik, "Osmanlılarda Raiyyet Rüsûmu," *Belleten*, 23, 195, 575–616.

60. H. Inalcik, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600–1700," *Archivum Ottomanicum*, 6 (1980):283–337.

61. Weber, *Economy and Society*, 1:255–71; 2:1038–44, 1051–64, 1092–94.

62. H. Inalcik, "Military and Fiscal Transformation," mentioned in note 60.

63. U. Heyd, *Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law*, ed. V. L. Menage (Oxford, 1973), pp. 259–71.

64. Weber, *Economy and Society*, 1:161.

65. Ibid., 1:238–41.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid., 1:336.

68. Ibid., 1:319.

69. Ibid., 2:1011.

70. Ibid., 2:1012.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid., 1:232.

73. Ibid., 2:1036–42; however, he, 2:1028, finds a fundamental difference between the west and the east in "the typification and monopolistic appropriation of the powers of office."

74. Ibid., 2:1028.

75. Ibid., 2:1020–22.

76. Ibid., 2:1030.

77. Ibid., 2:227.

78. Ibid., 2:243.

79. "Managerial" role of the total state is analyzed in detail in K. A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power* (New Haven, 1957). Ottoman bureaucracy's managerial capacity is best revealed in a special sector of agriculture: see H. Inalcik, "Rice Cultivation and the çeltükci-Re'âyâ System in the Ottoman Empire," *Turcia* 14 (1982): 69–141.

80. Weber, *Economy and Society*, 1058.

81. Ibid., 1:131. On family farm and the marginalist school, see A. V. Chayanov, *The Theory of Peasant Economy*, eds. D. Thorner, Basile Kerblay, and R. E. F. Smith, with a foreword by Teodor Shanin (Madison, 1986). On the problems of labor intensity and labor absorption in developing Asian countries, see A. Booth and R. M. Sundrum, *Labor Absorption in Agriculture* (London, 1985); for structures and problems of Turkish agriculture, see Korkut Boratav, *Tarımsal Yapılar ve Kapitalizm* (Ankara, 1980); Burhan Oğuz, *Türkiye Halkının Kültür Kökenleri*, II–2; *Tarım Hayvancılık-Meteoroloji* (Istanbul, 1988); H. Inalcik, "State, Land, and Peasant," in H. Inalcik, et al., *The Ottoman Empire: Economy and Society. 1300–1900* (forthcoming).

82. Weber, *Economy and Society*, 1:231–41; 2:1009–45.

83. G. Baer, *Egyptian Guilds in Modern Times* (Jerusalem, 1964); see my review in *Archivum Ottomanicum*, 1(1969),p. 319; and H. Inalcik, "The Appointment Procedure of a Guild Warden (Ketkhudā)," WZKM, 76 (1986), *Festschrift Andreas Tietze*: 135–142; C. Cahen, "Y a-t il eu des Corporations professionnelles dans le monde musulman classique," *The Islamic City*, ed. A. H. Hourani and S. H. Stern (Philadelphia), pp. 51–63.

84. For a useful bibliography on the subject, see S. Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia* (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 125–70; H. Inalcik, "Bursa," *Belleten*, 24 (1960):45–102.

85. *Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society*, trans. E. Shils and M. Rheinstein, ed. M. Rheinstein (New York: Clarion, 1954), p. 330.

86. Weber, *Economy and Society*, I:334–36.

87. Ibid., 1:220–25; 2:1025.

88. See "Ghulām," (H. Inalcik), *EI²*, 2:1085–91.

89. Weber, *Economy and Society*, 2:1031.

90. Ibid., 2:1025.

91. Ibid., 2:1014.

92. See H. Inalcik, "Reîs-ul-Küttâb," *IA*, 9:671–83.

93. In one of the most important of such memorials, dated 1620, *Kitāb-i Müstetab*, ed. Y. Yücel, *Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilâtına Dair Kaynaklar* (Ankara, 1988), Text: 4, 9, 18, 29, 44, the neglect of the state regulations and the subsequent deterioration in state affairs are traced back to Murad III's reign (1595–1603).

94. I. M. D'Ohsson, *Tableau Général d'Empire Ottoman*, 7 vols. (Paris, 1783–1824); I. H. Uzuncarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilâtı* (Ankara: TTK, 1948); J. Shinder, "Ottoman Bureaucracy in the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century: The Central and Naval Administration," Ph.D. diss., Princeton, 1971; C. H. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Muṣṭafā ʿĀlī (1541–1600)* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); L. Darling, "The Ottoman Finance Department and the Assessment and Collection of the Cizye and Avariz Taxes, 1560–1660," Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1989.

95. Most of the memorialists and historians belonged to the group of bureaucrats, in particular to the finance department.

96. H. Inalcik, "Adâletnâmeler," *Belgeler*, II (1965): 49–145.

97. Weber, *Economy and Society*, 2:1032.

98 Ibid., 2:1031.

99. Ibid., 2:1032.

100. Ibid., 1:235.

101. Ibid., 1:236.

102. Ibid., 1:239.

103. Ibid., 1:260, 2:1071.

104. Ibid., 1:235.

105. Ibid., 2:1069–70.

106. Ibid., 2:1067.

107. H. Inalcik, "Sened-i Ittifak ve Gülhâne Hatt-i Humâyunu," *Belleten*, 28 (1964): 603–22.