Foundation of Ottoman State

PROF. DR. HALİL İNALCIK
University of Chicago / U.S.A.
Bilkent University / Turkey


One of the most important problems of Turkish and world history is to explain how a small Turkish state (beylik) that emerged in the 14th century in Western Anatolia became an empire, within a period of half a century, stretching from the Danube to the Euphrates. One should, however, distinguish between the formation of the Ottoman state (beylik) on the one hand, and the rise of the first political core and formation of the Ottoman Empire on the other, as two separate historical processes. The question of the formation of the Ottoman Empire requires the analysis of various circumstances in such a vast land, extending from Hungary to Iran. Here, we shall first examine the formation of the Ottoman state.

It is necessary here to analyze the rise of the Ottoman beylik within the context of developments in Anatolia in the second part of the 13th century and the establishment of the gazi Turkish states on Byzantine soil in Western Anatolia. Three main factors have determined this process: first we see a demographic revolution, viz., the continuous and intense migration of the Oguz tribes, that is, the Turcomans into Anatolia; second, the evolution of the Turkish-Islamic gaza (holy war) movement; and third, the rise of Denizli, Antalya, Ayasoluk and Bursa as international markets, which made Turkey a significant point at the crossroads of world trade routes. First, let us turn to the demographic factor, namely the mass migration of the Oguz tribes towards the West, into Anatolia.

The Oguz / Türkmen (Turcoman) Migrations into Anatolia

The migration of the Oguz tribes to the West occured in two phases. The first stage is, from the 1020s on, the Turcoman invasion of Azerbaijan and their raids into Anatolia under the Saljuqid leadership. The second stage begins with the victory of the Saljuqid ruler Alparslan in Malazgird in 1071, which opened the doors of Byzantine Anatolia to the Turcomans. After the suppression of Byzantine resistance, the Turcomans invaded the entire landmass of Anatolia up to the Aegean Sea. The local Greek speaking people either fled to the fortified places at the seashore or continued their lives peacefully in the cities with the newcomers. This invasion was one of the most decisive turning points in Anatolian history.


With the collapse of the Great Saljuqid Empire and the rise of the Kharezmshahs in Iran, a new wave of Turcoman migration began in the second part of the 12th century. The second major migration, however, was the emigration of the Turcomans, after the 1220s, from Central Asia and from the highly populated areas in İran and Azerbaijan, as a result of the destructive Mongol invasion. With the terrified people, this flight became a kind of mass migration, including people of all classes. The Saljuqid sultans and later on Ilkhanid (Mongol) rulers of Iran were trying to drive the Oguz tribes to the west from agricultural areas, which were considered a vital tax source for the state.


Ertugrul Masjid, Soğut

According to F. Sümer, the Turkish population in the cities and rural areas of Anatolia then became extremely dense, owing to this second mass migration from Transoxania, Khorasan and Azerbaijan. Among these emigrants were ordinary people, scholars, tradesmen and craftsmen. In the 13th century, Anatolia began to look a dominantly Turkish country. Marco Polo, who was traveling through Eastern Anatolia in 1279, calls this area *Turcomenia*. A great majority of the Turcomans preferred over time a sedentary life, founding villages in suitable areas. As the village names in the waqf deed of Nureddin Caca Bey, the governor of Eskişehir, dated 1272, testifies various Turcoman tribes had established

villages in this area even before this date. Hence, villages with the names of such Turcoman tribes as Çepni, Bayat, Eymir, Avdan and Kayı Türkmen can be found in the area.

The first wave of the westward migration of the Turcoman tribes began in 1220's with the Mongol invasion of the vast pasturelands of Azerbaijan. Thus, the Turcomans of the Meraga, Arran and Mogan areas were forced to evacuate these pasturelands. The Turcomans were concentrated mainly in the Sivas-Amasya-Bozok region, the Taurus Mountains and the mountainous areas adjacent to the Byzantine lands in Western Anatolia. These Turcomans had always been opposed to the heavy taxation of the central-bureaucratic state of the Saljuqids and Ilkhanids. The most important revolt of the Turcomans against the Saljuqids broke out in 1240 under the leadership of Baba Ilyas, the Turcoman shaykh of the Vefaiyye order, and Baba Ishak, a collaborator of Baba Ilyas. It was only three years after this event that the Mongol commander Baycu invaded Anatolia. This devastating invasion was one of the decisive events in the history of Anatolia. The descendants of Baba Ilyas, Âşık Pasha, Muhlis Pasha and their successor *Babaîs*, migrated to the frontier (Uc) and played a definitive role in the social and cultural life of the Ottoman frontier society. After the suppression of the revolt, many Babaî dervishes migrated to the west. One of these Vefaiyye-Babaî shaykhs, Ede-Bali, is depicted in the Ottoman annals as the spiritual teacher (murşid) of Osman Gazi.



Inside view of Gazi Evrenos Bey Inn, (late 14th century).
(Studies on the Ottoman Architecture of the Balkans, Machiel Kiel)

In 1235, the Anatolian Saljuqid State had to recognize the undisputed authority of the Mongols. But the Mongol rule actually began in 1243 with the invasion of Anatolia by the Mongol commander Baycu and his large Mongolian army, which included a number of Mongol and Turkish tribes. In the second part of the 13th century, the Mongol oppression continued to intensify in Central Anatolia, and it was mainly due to the Mongol oppression that the Turcomans moved and invaded western Anatolia. For example the Germiyanids, which established the most powerful front against Byzantium in the western regions, were initially in the Malatya region in the 1240s. It was only after the 1260s that they migrated towards the west and settled in the Kütahya region. It was most probably during this time that Ertogrul, Osman's father, migrated to the Eskişehir-Sakarya region with his tribe. In 1277, when the attempt to end the Mongol yoke with the help of the Egyptian Sultan Baybars failed, the Mongol control reached its peak, with the direct control of the Mongol governors and Persian bureaucrats. There is a close relationship between this state of affairs and the process of the establishment of the gazi Turcoman beyliks, and among them the Ottomans, in the western Anatolia. As the main opposition force fighting against the Mongols, the Turcomans warmly accepted the Islamic gaza (holy war) ideology and collaborated with the Mamluks.

In fact this made the Turcomans the leaders of the independence movement of Anatolian Turks against the Mongols. The political center of activity thus moved from central Anatolia to the western borders. The westward migration of the Oguz Turcomans had its ups and downs, in correlation with the tempo of the quarrel with the Mongols. Even though the military raids of the Ilkhanid khans usually succeeded in quelling the Turcoman revolts, the independence movement continued to linger every time the Mongol suppression weakened.

Al-Umarî, the Eguptian author, notes that in the beginning of the 14th century, there were 200,000 Turcoman tents in the Denizli region, 100,000 on the Kastamonu *uc* and 30,000 around Kütahya. Byzantine sources also testify to the large population of the Turcomans in the outer regions of the Saljuqid Empire in the west. The formation of the Ottoman State is closely linked to the events occuring in the 1290s and the presence of a large Turcoman population in areas stretching from Kastamonu down to the Sakarya river.


The Birth of the Frontier (UC) Beyliks

The border regions of the Saljuqid State were organized along the lines of three frontiers, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the western. Each of these regions had an emîr (bey), or vice-roy, appointed by the Saljuqid sultan. As early as the 13th century, such areas as Denizli (Tonguzlu), Karahisar (Afyon), Kütahya, Kastamonu and Amasya in these border areas had already developed into centers of classical Islamic-Turkish civilisation. The mountainous areas lying beyond these borders were ruled by the semi-nomadic warrior Turcomans, called *Etrâk-i Uc* in contemporary sources. These people remained far from the influence of centralist state policies or sophisticated city life and the cosmopolitan culture of Islamic Middle East. The religious life of these border areas was dominated by the dervishes and Central Asian Turkish traditions, derived mainly of the Yeseviyye and Babaiyye orders. The people who were called Alp and Alp-eren were warriors dedicated to Islamic holy war (gaza).

It would not be wrong to take 1261 as the beginning of the widespread Turcoman uprisings against the Mongols in Anatolia, which, in turn, led to the establishment of various Turcoman *beyliks*, among them the Ottomans'. From this period on, Anatolia was divided into two political regions. One was the part ruled by the

Persian Ilkhanid Mongol State and its puppet rulers, the Saljuqid Sultans of Konya, the other being the western frontiers dominated by the Turcomans. The semi-independent Anatolia under Turcoman control was represented by the Eşref oğulları, Hamid oğulları, Sahib Ata oğulları, Germiyan (Alişir) oğulları and Çoban oğulları (Kastamonu), all of whom were established on the western frontiers of the Saljuqid state, and by such frontier states as Menteshe, Aydın, Saruhan, Karesi and Osmanlı, all of which were established beyond the Saljuqid borders, in the Byzantine lands. The year 1261 marks the first attack against Konya by the Karaman Turcomans, who were engaged in a continuous war against Little Armenia, with the help of the Mamluk sultans, around Kilikya-Çukurova, in the middle-Taurus region. It was in the same year that the Saljuqid sultan Izzeddin Keykavus II, after having been defeated by his rival with the support of the Mongols, took refuge with his followers in the Turcoman frontier and was finally forced to flee to Byzantium. One important incident during Keykavus' refuge to the West is closely related to the Islamization history of the Balkans. Baba Sarı Saltuk was one of the *babais* who migrated to the west, and his tomb in Dobrudja became the centre of the heterodox dervishesî a moseleum was later built there by Bayezid II in 1484 during his military campaign to Akkerman. Baba Saltuk had been joined by around 40 Turcoman clans who were the supporters of Keykavus, and they were permitted by the Byzantine emperor to settle in Dobrudja. Sarı Saltuk's Turcomans lived under the protection of Nogay, the powerful *emîr* of the Golden Horde, who was a Muslim, influenced by Sarı Saltuk. According to Paul Wittek, this Turcoman group has been called Keykavus/Gagavuz because of their loyalty to sultan Keykavus. The *Saltuknâme*, the great legend of the Balkan Turks, depicts Baba Saltuk also as a gazi, or holy warrior, who had dedicated his life to the spread of Islam in the Balkans. After the Ottoman takeover of these areas at the end of the 14th century, Dobrudja became the center of frontier forces, the heterodox movements and especially the babaî-abdal dervishes in the Balkans. When Nogay died in 1299, the Turcoman group lost its protector. Some of them tried to come back to Anatolia, but a great majority of them were wiped out. Those who remained became Christian and continued to live under the name Gagavuz (Linguists have shown that the Gagavuz dialect is a branch of Anatolian Turkish).

In Anatolia the semi-nomadic Turcoman tribes, who were against the central authority and financial system of the Mongol Ilkhanid bureaucracy, were also against the puppet-sultans in Konya appointed by the Mongols. After the appointment of Sultan Mes'ud (1284-1296) by the Mongols in 1284, and the start of the Mongol attacks on the Germiyan frontier Turcomans, who were supporting their own rival candidate against Mes'ud, the Turcomans turned their attention to the western lands, namely to the Byzantine areas. Eventually, western Anatolia was conquered by the Germiyan military leaders (subaşı). As a result of this, between the years 1290 and 1310, the Aydın, Saruhan and Karesi Gazi Turcoman beyliks came to the existence. The first Turkish State in the region was the one established by the seaman emîr Menteshe in 1269, supported by the Teke Turcomans in the south.




These Turkish states, just like the Ottomans, were part of a new chain of Turkish states established through conquests in the Byzantine lands beyond the borders of the Saljuqids. Of these newly established states, the Ottomans became, according to Ibn Battuta's observation (1334), the richest and the most powerful, and began to invade the other states, the first invasion being that of the Karesi state in 1335-1345. As far as the Ottomans' cultural background is concerned, this formative period is no different from the other beyliks. In the Aegean region, other gazi states developed as sea-gazi states (*ghuzât fi'l-bahr*). It was only in the 1330s that the Ottomans had their first significant navy. It is in these years that Cantacuzenos talks about the navy of sultan Orhan. One of the watershed events of the 14th century history is the return of the Ottomans to central Anatolia in order to establish their rule there. In this period, two factors were instrumental in the Ottomans' ascent to the empire, namely their invasion of the Balkans (Rumeli) and inheriting the Byzantine heritage there.

Gaza and the Rise of Osman Gazi

The re-emergence of gaza ideology in the Islamic world, and especially in Anatolia, may be explained in reference to two major historical events: the first is the establishment of the Mongol rule in Anatolia after the defeat of the Anatolian Saljuqid state (1243), and the second is the crusader attacks on Egypt, Syria and Anatolia (the order of the Pope in 1291 for the blockade of Islamic countries, and the settlement of Latin Christians in Rhodes and Aegean islands). This situation became a matter of life and death for the Islamic world. In the meantime, the Mongol Ilkhanid dynasty was trying to invade Syria and was establishing diplomatic relations with the Pope and Byzantium. It was in this historical context that the gaza, holy war, became of the utmost importance. While the border Turcomans in Anatolia were in the front lines against the Mongols and the Byzantines, in Egypt, Salahaddin's state was replaced by the military regime of the Mamluks (1250-1517) and the Mongols were defeated in Syria (Aynıcalut, 1260) by Sultan Baybars (1260-1277), a Kipçak Turk. In 1277, Baybars, after coming to Kayseri with his army, tried to reestablish Islamic sovereignty in collaboration with the Turcomans. It is in this context of

gaza movements, which reached their peak during the period 1260-1300, that one should analyze the formation of Turkish gazi states in western Anatolia. Osman Gazi was then a chieftain (boy-beyi) or *Alp* fighting against the Byzantines in the farthest frontier under the rule of the Choban ogulları, the frontier emîr in Kastamonu. When we compare Pachymeres account with the old Ottoman narrative, the following picture becomes discernable: Whereas the Kastamonu emîrs were somewhat loose in their warfare against the Byzantines, Osman was launching a full-force gaza-war, thus becoming the real leader of gazi warriors in this frontier area.

The situation before the rise of Osman Gazi is depicted both in Pachymeres and Aksarayî as follows: Around the year 1291, Muzafferüddin Yavlak Arslan, a member of the celebrated Chobanid family, was ruling over Kastamonu under the title of *sipah-bed-i diyar-i uc*. Pachymeres attributes the rise of Osman Gazi to the time of 'Amurivs, namely the Çoban oğulları, who were emirs in the Kastamonu region. The contemporary Saljuqid historian Aksarayi clarifies most of what Pachymeres narrates, talking vaguely about "Melek Masur and Amurius". According to Aksarayî, Mes'ud, one of the sons of Keykavus II who had returned from the Crimea to Anatolia, received the Saljuqid throne from Argun Han and placed his brother Rükneddin Kılıç Arslan in the border region of Akşehir. After the death of Argun Han and the election of Keyhatu as the next Khan on July 22, 1291, the Mongols began to fight against each other and this led to a period of chaos and anarchy in Anatolia. In the border regions, the Turcomans revolted, and Kılıç Arslan came against his brother Mes'ud. Upon the arrival of Keyhatu Han with his army in November 1291, Kılıç Arslan went to the Kastamonu region and gathered the Turcomans around himself. He killed Yavlak Arsalan, the long-time supporter of Mes'ud, and defeated Mes'ud himself who had been sent by Keyhatu. (Pachymeres is wrong in taking Masur, i.e., Mes'ud, for Melik Kılıç Arslan). Later, Mes'ud, supported by the Mongol soldiers, defeated Kılıç Arslan (December 1291). Although Kılıç Arslan had fled, Ali, the son of Yavlak Arslan, finally killed him in a raid. After the events of 1291, Ali began to organize raids to the Byzantine lands in the West, captured the areas up to the Sakarya river, and even went beyond it. But, later on he developed peaceful relations with Byzantium. Then, Osman Gazi was ruling over the Söğüd area near the Sakarya valley. Pachymeres informs us that when Ali stopped his raids, Osman Gazi took up the leadership and launched an energetic gaza activity against the Byzantine lands. It was after this event that the gazis began to gather around Osman Gazi. According to Pachymeres, these fighters, upon the success of Osman, came from areas as far as Paphlagonia, that is Kastamonu. As the Byzantine historical sources shows, Osman comes upon the scene of history at this time. We shall analyze below the gaza movements of Osman and the formation of the Ottoman beylik.




At the time of Osman, the founder of the Ottoman State, all the Turkish states that had emerged in Anatolia were small patrimonial states, in which the state and the subjects were regarded to be the patrimony of the dynasty. Following this tradition, the Ottoman state was named after its founder. In fact, the first warrior group emerged with the gathering of various Alps and 'comrades' (nöker/yoldash) around the gaza leader in order to take part in the gaza and the booty. It was not necessary for the 'nöker' to have a relationship of blood with other fighters in the group. Rather, those who came from outside, called 'garib', were adventurers, ready to fight. According to the earliest story, going back to Ishak Fakı (fakih), the imam of Orhan, Osman Gazi's fighters were composed of this kind of people. As stated by Oruc, "bu Osmânîler garîbleri sevicilerdir", i.e., these Ottomans liked the alien fighters" - a tradition that continued to the end of Ottoman history. Those aliens who were loyal to the dynasty were always the close followers of the ruler. The principle uniting this warrior group was, on the one hand, "doyum" (the booty) and the gaza (the holy war), on the other. It is also true that the tribal Turcomans in the service of the gazi leaders constituted a large number of this group. The final target that Osman Gazi set for the *gâziyân* was the city of Iznik (Nicaea), once the capital of the Saljuqid sultan Süleymansah, which had been recaptured by the Crusaders in 1097. The military campaign of Mudurnu-Göynük, for which Osman collaborated with Köse Mihal and Samsa Çavuş, and the conquest of the river passage cities of Sakarya, such as Lefke, Mekece and Geyve in 1304 were nothing but preparations for the capture of Iznik, which was regarded by these border Turks as the ultimate conquest to be integrated into the lands of Islam. In the old Ottoman *menâkib* traditions, the Saljuqid Kutalmışoğlu Süleymanşah, who was responsible for the capture of Iznik in 1078, is depicted as the grandfather of Osman. In other words, the holy Islamic war was a sacred ideology that had mobilized Osman and other fighters of the border areas, providing a justification for their raids. In the beginning, such frontier leaders as Aykut Alp, Turgut Alp, Konur Alp, Hasan Alp, Akça Koca, and Samsa Çavuş, were acting independently. In the course of time, they became the 'comrades' (*valdash*) of Osman Gazi, because he was, as the contemporary historian Pachymenes put, the most vigorous and successful leader of the gaza movement in this border region. Moreover, according to the narratives, Ede-Bali, the most revered shaykh of the Babaî dervishes, supported Osman (the *Menâkibnâme* of Elvan Chelebi, a contemporary source, describes Ede-Bali as a representative of the Vefaiyye order, see below). It is certain that the dream motif in which God grants the world dominion

to the Ottoman dynasty is a later addition, as a common theme in all histories. But it is historically true that Osman and the sultans after him had close relations with the Vefaiyye shaykhs. Also, the Turkish-Mongol tradition of 'anda', i.e., ritual taking oath for comradeship, became united with the Islamic ideology of gaza, which, in turn, made Osman Gazi the most prominent leader of the gaza movement in this frontier region. Gaza played a crucial role in Osman's political career, so much so that he has always been mentioned in historical sources as Osman Gazi, a title in which his descendants took the most pride (see, below).

Initially, Osman's headquarters were at Söğüd. The second phase in the emergence of the beylik was the capture of Karacahisar, which is a fortress only seven kilometers away from Eskişehir. According to the narratives, this event elevated him from being a gazi to the status of a frontier commander *(bey)* appointed by the sultan of Konya. At the time of Osman Gazi, all of the Turcoman beys in Anatolia were local emirs appointed by the Saljuqid sultan and none of them had even dared to use the title 'sultan' for himself. This would mean a revolt against the legitimate ruler, the Saljuqid sultan and the Ilkhan in Iran.


In the border regions, we know, there were commanders appointed by the Saljuqid State under the title of "sipâh-bed" or "sipeh-sâlâr". It was under their direct rule that the local Turcoman beys carried out their gaza activity. We have already mentioned that Osman Gazi was one of these leaders, under the Choban ogulları in Kastamonu. Osman was subject to a hierarchy of the following kind: Osman was subject to the emir of Kastamonu; this emir was subject to the Saljuqid sultan, and the sultan, in turn, was subject to the Ilkhanid Khan in Iran. It was this hierarchic structure that provided justification for political authority. In the menâkib tradition it is claimed that Osman Gazi was granted the official title of 'sancak beyi' by the Saljuqid sultan after the capture of Karacahisar in 1288. This, however, may have been added to the chronicle later. In the vakfiyye of Orhan Gazi, Osman's son, dated 761/1360, Osman Gazi is mentioned as a *Bik* (*Bey*, commander). It is possible that Osman claimed to be a 'bey' even in his own life-time. In this regard, there is an interesting chapter in the old menâkib about Osman's decisions on state policies after the capture of Karacahisar (Âşıkpaşa-zâde: Bab 9). In his conversation with his brother Gündüz, Gündüz proposes to continue the booty raids. In response to this, Osman says that "our city of Karacahisar will never reach prosperity with continuous raiding activity. It is wiser to establish reconciliation with our neighbors."



Panorama of Bursa.
(Chesney, C., Survey of the Rivers Euphrates and Tigris, 1850)

Osman is shown protecting the local Christian population, peasants and the city dwellers against the attacks of the Germiyanid Turks through "istimâlet", which allowed Christian peasants to stay in their homes. "Istimâlet" means gaining the support of people through reconciliation and protection. The Ottoman historical sources have emphasized the importance of "istimâlet" for the Ottoman conquests and the rapid spread of the Ottoman rule. Âşıkpaşa-zâde (Bab 13) says that 'they captured these four fortresses (Bilecik, Yarhisar, Inegöl, Yenişehir), ruled them fairly, and all the peasants remained in their places. Thus, they became perhaps even more prosperous than at the time of the infidel rule. As people heard about the conditions, more people began to flow into those areas.' During the capture of Geyve (Bab 20), 'they gave people full guarantee for their safety'. One of the reasons for the rapid spread of the Ottoman state is without doubt, the Islamic *dhimma* law, according to which the Christians were protected and the Greek priests were granted to keep their privileges (see, about istimâlet below). The law of dhimma applies to non-Muslims who accept the political authority of the Islamic state. Accordingly, it is the responsibility of the state to protect their lives, property and freedom of religion. The Ottomans, before capturing an area by force, always offered, three times, to allow peaceful surrender and gave, in case their offer was accepted, what is called "amân-nâme" or "ahdnâme", i.e., the official guarantee of protection. In 699/1299, after the conquest of Karacahisar, the second phase of this process was realized with the capture of such places in the west of Eskişehir as Bilecik, Yarhisar, Yenisehir and Inegöl. According to the historical narratives, it was at this time that Osman had the *hutbe* (religious sermons) read in his name, thus claiming his independence for the first time. It seems that the Menâkibnâme tries to depict Osman, just like the other Turcoman beys, as an independent Islamic ruler who could have the *hutbe* read in his name. Menâkibnâme narrates how Osman had the hutbe read in his name in 699/1299 and claimed independence (Bab 14). Declaring his rule (Bab 15), he appointed a religious judge (cadi); and engaged in organizing his small beylik as a Turkish-Islamic state. In other words, the author of the Menâkibnâme (Yahşi Fakîh) and its narrator (Ishak Fakîh, the imam of Orhan) were aware of the actual emergence of the Ottoman state at this early date. Following this tradition, the historians have accepted this date to be the real and legal beginning of the Ottoman state. In fact, the formation of the state depends, first of all, on the rise of a charismatic leader whose authority is believed to have been granted by God. Naturally, it was also seen necessary to ha-

ve a land large enough and people under the command of the leader. Yazıcızâde Ali (Târih-i Âl-i Selçuk, Topkapı M5, 30a, written during the reign of Murad II) describes this situation as follows: "Pâdişâhların devleti ve hörmeti nöker ve il ve memleketledir. Eğer nöker ve il ve raiyyet olmayacak olursa pâdişâhlık mümkün değildir" (the prestige and power of the ruler lies in his companions (nökers) and his land. It is not possible to have kingship without companions, land and subjects). 'Nöker', means a companion or comrade who is tied and loyal to the leader until his death through 'anda', i.e., ritual allegiance. Their, territory refers to the country in which taxpayers live). In most cases, an important victory was interpreted as a clear sign of divine support and a definitive event, so crucial for the emergence of a leader and the formation of his dynasty.



Green Mosque, İznik

This old narrative may have been added to the story at the time of the later Ottoman rulers, who have claimed independence for their political authority from the time of Osman. It is, however, certain that the capture of the Bilecik-Yenisehir region was a turning point in Osman's career. It was right after this event, in the years 1300-1302, that Osman besieged two important centers of the Byzantine State in Bithynia, namely Iznik (Nicaea) and Bursa (Prusa).

In fact 1299, Osman, like other beys who had invaded western Anatolia from the Byzantines, was already an established bey, ruling over many cities and fortresses beyond the borders of the Saljuqid State. After this year, Osman had to fight, not against the local Byzantine "tekvurs", but directly against the forces of the Byzantine Empire. At the same time, both the Saljuqid sultans and their superiors, the Ilkhanid Khans, had already lost their control over these frontier areas. It is, therefore, incumbent upon us to analyze these particular phases in Osman's career, depicted in the old narratives, through a strict critical method, rather than rejecting them all as mere legends.


First of all, our sources picture the Karacahisar Tekvur (local Byzantine commander) as a tributary (haracguzâr) of the Saljuqid sultan. Karacahisar was a steep fortress founded on a hilltop seven kilometers outside Eskişehir. The Saljuqid sultan had left this fortress to the tekvur as his vassal. Being a part of the Daru'l-Islam, this tekvur was under the protection of the Sultan, and to attack him meant to revolt against the authority of the Sultan himself. But according to the Ottoman tradition, this Byzantine tekvur attacked Osman Gazi, i.e., the Muslims, and thus ceased to be, according to Islamic law, 'illik' (the status of being part of Islamic territory) and became 'yagilik', ennemy land. According to the story, the sultan said that 'the Karacahisar tekvur became 'yagi' with us'. It was during this time that the sultan, "upon receiving the news of new attacks by the Ilkhanid commander, Bayancar, in central Anatolia, had left the aforementioned siege to Osman, who then captured the fortress" Actually, we know from Müsâmeretü'l-Ahbâr, the chronicle of the contemporary Saljuqid historian Aksarâyî, that the Ilkhanid general Bayancar was appointed by the Ilkhan as the chief army general of the Mongol forces in Anatolia in 1299. We also know that the other Ilkhanid general, Sülemiş, who was contending for the same position, revolted against this decision in 1299. It is clear that one can hardly establish any connection between Osman's capture of Karacahisar (1288) and the Bayancar incident (1299). On the other hand, Alâeddin Keykubad III was certainly in power as the Saljuqid Sultan between 1298-1302. It is obvious that the events of 1299 were confused with Osman's capture of Karacahisar in 1288 in the Ottoman chronicles. In short, the Ottoman sources were trying to 'legitimize' Osman's attack on the Karacahisar tekvur in 1288 and as such, they confused the events of 1299, which were in fact related to the sultan Alâeddin. In 1288, the Saljuqid sultan was not Alâeddin, but Gıyâseddin Mes'ud II. Sülemish's revolt (1299) may be related to Osman's claim of independence, because it was as a result of this revolt that the outlying frontier regions became virtually independent of the Ilkhan's authority.

At this point, it can only be said that Osman in 1299 was a *de facto* independent bey, engaged in a number of important political activities. It was also during this year that he began to fight against the powerful tekvur of Bilecik, who was a vassal of the Saljuqid Sultan. In 1299, Osman directly threatened the city of Iznik from his new Yenişehir frontier center. In 1302 Osman tried, for the first time, to capture the city of Iznik, which had been the capital of the Byzantine Empire between 1204-1261, and prior to this the first capital of the Saljuqids, between 1078-1097 (The Ottoman tradition talks about a set-up wedding in order to justify Osman's attack on a Saljuqid vassal; (see, Âşık Paşa-zâde Bab 12).

It is not possible to understand the developments in western Anatolia without taking into account the events of 1288-1299. The period of 1284-1288 was a period of turmoil in Saljuqid Anatolia. In 1284, Argun Han had hung Gıyâseddin Keyhüsrev and put in his place Mes'ud as the next Saljuqid sultan. In response to this, the forces of Karaman and Eşrefoğlu captured Konya and enthroned the two sons of Keyhüsrev. In order to punish the Turcomans, Argun Han sent his son Keyhatu to Anatolia with a large army. Keyhüsrev's sons were captured and killed, after which Sultan Mes'ud and Keyhatu entered Konya. In 1288, all the Turcomans, including the Germiyanids, accepted the authority of Sultan Mes'ud. It is most probably at this time of tur-

moil in central Anatolia that Osman Gazi captured Karacahisar. With the arrival of Keyhatu, the military and economic control of the Mongols in central Anatolia became much stronger. With this event, the bureaucracy in the Saljuqid capital, Konya, was controlled entirely by the bureaucrats sent by the Iranian Ilkhanid Khan. Being under the threat of the Ilkhanids, the Germiyan state, Osman's neighbor, was not in a situation to attack Osman, and in fact acted like a buffer-state between Osman and the Mongols. In 1291-1292, we see Keyhatu Geyhatu launching a harsh action of chastisement against the frontier Turcomans. In Konya, Sultan Mes'ud was an impoverished lame duck at the hands of the Mongols. In 1298, Ilkhan replaced him with Alâeddin Keykubad III. In 1302, Mes'ud came to power one more time, and with his death in 1308 the Saljuqid rule in Anatolia came to an end. It is obvious that at this time there was no Seljukid or Mongol force to stop the increasing attacks that Osman had been conducting against the Byzantine lands. Their neighbour, the Germiyanids, were busy with the events in central Anatolia, the Saljuqid sultan was completely powerless, and the Mongol khans were in a mire of internal strife and revolts caused by the governors that they had sent to Anatolia. During 1299-1300, the Ilkhan had to send one army after another against Sülemish in Anatolia.

In 1299-1301, Osman and other Turcoman beys in the west, taking advantage of the weakening of Mongol control, launched a general attack on Byzantine cities. We know as certain, in 1302, Osman besieged Iznik. When Osman died in 1324, the Ottoman beylik, like the rest of the beyliks in western Anatolia, was already a small state ruling over a large land with its towns, army and bureaucracy of which there is documentation: the 'tevliyet nişanı' (diploma for supervision) of the Mekece *zaviy* waqf, dated March 1324, obviously written just after the death of Osman, appoints Şerefeddin Mukbil as the waqf administrator of the zaviyah. Among the witnesses mentioned are Osman's children Çoban, Melik, Hamîd, Bazarlu and Fatma Hatun. Malhatun, the daughter of Ömer bey, is also mentioned among the witnesses. The fact that this document is written in the tradition of highly developed Persian bureaucratic style proves that Osman had a number of able secretaries, i.e., a well-established bureaucracy. The later Ottoman records show that Osman had dedicated waqfs to many dervishes, *ahi*s and religious men, including Ede-Bali. The appointment of a chief eunuch as the supervisor of the Mekece waqf may be taken as proof that Osman had a palace of his own. In short, it is safe to say that the Ottoman state at the time of Osman, just like other Turkish frontier states, such as Aydın and Karaman Beyliks, was established as a full-fledged beylik fighting against the Byzantine Empire. It was as a result of these achievements that Osman's son Orhan succeeded his father apparently without opposition. The Arab traveler Ibn Battuta describes Orhan, when he visited Bursa in 1334 as follows: 'This sultan is the greatest of all the Turcoman beys as far as his power, wealth, land and army is concerned. He has around one hundred fortresses under his control, and he spends most of his time visiting these places, checking their conditions and repairing them... His father had besieged the city of Iznik for twenty years before his death. Orhan captured it after a siege of 12 years. I met him there, and he sent me a large amount of money.' This description was written only ten years after Osman's death. In short, it is certain that the Ottoman beylik was actually founded by Osman Bey and had became a sultanate by the time of Orhan.



Plan of Nülifer Hatun Zaviya

The Battle of Bapheus (Koyunhisar)

The fact that Osman's was able to become the founder of a dynasty is related to his victory over a Byzantine army in 1302. After the capture of the Bilecik-Yenişehir region in 1299, Osman Gazi set out to capture Nicaea (Iznik) and Prusa (Bursa), the two important strongholds of Byzantium in Bithynia. Before marching to the Iznik region, he took control of Marmaracık and Koyunhisar near Bursa, in order to secure his rear. In 1302, he marched to the Iznik area crossing the Avdan mountains via the Kizilhisar valley, and besieged the city. The contemporary source Pachymenes and the Ottoman anonymous Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osman, provide ample information about Osman's siege of Iznik and his victory over the imperial army under Heteriarch Muzalon who came to rescue the city. When we compare the accounts in these two independent sources, we reach the following conclusion about this momentous event that made Osman's emergence possible. According to the details provided by the anonymous Ottoman chronicle, the first place to be captured was Köprühisar, a strategic stronghold on the way to Iznik (this place today is on the Göksu river, known by the same name). First, Osman's forces crossed the valley of Yalak-Dere. They were able to expel the counter-attacks coming from the fortress, Bapheus. But it was not possible to besiege İznik from all directions, as its outlying land was marshy and the gate to the lake was the only route to İstanbul. Before pulling out, Osman, in order to capture the city, decided on a strategy of uninterrupted blockade and famine; thus establishing a *'havale'*, or watch tower on the mountain side and placing a small armed force therein, under the command of Draz Ali (today, the same place is still known as the Draz Ali village, and the Draz Ali Pınarı, the source was mentioned

by Ottoman sources). The people in Iznik sent a dispatch to the emperor, saying that without outside help they would have to surrender.

'When the Byzantine emperor', the Ottoman chronicle says, 'found out about this situation, he gathered a large naval force with a large number of soldiers and sent them to the region in order to expel the *gaza* fighters from Iznik... In response to this, the *gazi*s laid an ambush. In the mean time, the infidel soldiers came to the harbour in the Yalak-Ova plain and began to land at night. When they set their feet on the ground and began to unload their horses and war equipment, the *gazi*s launched their attack, taking refuge in God, and then began to kill the enemy soldiers... those who remained in the ships were forced to go back.'



Derwish

The scene of this battle, Yalak-Ova, east of today's Yalova, is in the plain of Hersek-Dili into which the Yalak creek (known today by the same name) flows. Even though Pachymeres provides some additional details, he is in perfect agreement with the Ottoman chronicle. According to Pachymeres, the emperor Andronikos II sent an army under the command of Heteriarch Muzalon in order to save the city of Iznik. This army of 2,000 was composed of paid forces coming from İstanbul and other local fighters. There was disagreement among these groups. The fortress of Bapheus stands right on the way to Yalak-Ova before entering the plain. (This fortress is mentioned in the Ottoman sources as Koyunhisarı, whose ruins are today called 'Çoban-kale'. Since the time of J. von Hammer-Purgstall, this fortress has been confused with the other Koyunhisarı, near Bursa). It was here that Osman's forces gained their first victory, which gave Osman the chance to march towards the sea and to counter the Byzantine army. According to Pachymeres, Osman, having found out about the preparations of the Byzantine army, asked the surrounding Turcomans for help and fought against the Byzantine army (we know of some other collaborations of this kind among the *gazi* beys). Osman's army was composed of foot-soldiers and cavalry. According to Pachymeres, the Byzantine defeat was caused by the disputes within the Byzantine army. Although the *'Alans'* had fought well, the Byzantine soldiers and their local aides were in a state of panic. Pachymeres gives 27 July 1302 as the date for the battle of Bapheus (Koyunhisar). According to the Ottoman source, the Koyunhisar battle must have taken place one year before the Dinboz battle (H. 702 the year begun 26 August 1302), i.e., in the summer of H.701 (H.701 Atarts 6 September 1301, and ends in 25 August 1302). Thus, both of our sources are in agreement here on the course and the date of the battle.

This victory over an imperial army made Osman a charismatic leader in the region. Pachymeres notes that after this victory, Osman's fame spread as far as the Paphlagonia (Kastamonu) region and that the *gaza* fighters rushed to gather under his banner. The historian Neşrî, in the fifteenth century, rightly sets this date as the date of Osman's actual independence, because this victory gained him the charisma needed for the founder of a dynasty and allowed his son to succeed him without opposition. Therefore, we can accept 27 July 1302 as the date of the formation of the Ottoman dynasty, and accordingly the Ottoman State.

As the preceding account shows, in the 1300s Osman emerged as an important military power, threatening the Byzantine sovereignty in Bithynya. Like Pacyhmeres, the Ottoman historian Yazıcızâde also writes that after 1300 Osman's fame reached the faraway corners of the Anatolia and that 'many Turkish households, one after another, began to flow' to his side. Observing these events, Pachymeres notes how the Byzantine authorities took Osman's threat seriously. In order to stop Osman, the Byzantine emperor offered the princess Maria as wife first to Gazan Han (died 1305) and then to Ölceytü Han in Iran, and attempted to provoke the Mongol army against Osman.

Now let us turn to the situation in western Anatolia at the time of the formation of the Ottoman Beylik. In the 1300s, the Byzantine Empire attached more importance to the conquests carried out by the Germiyan and his commanders, and Menteshe's son-in-law Sasa, in the western parts of Anatolia. The emperor had sent, in 1278 and 1296, two royal armies in order to expel these conquerors, but to no avail. Other paid soldiers (*Alan's* and *Catalan's*) had failed in the same way. Ephesus (Selçuk) was captured immediately after the pull out of the *Catalans* (1304). Mehmed Bey of the Aydın family captured Birgi (Pyrgion) in 1308 and made it his capital. He then expanded his rule as far as Izmir and established the most powerful *beylik* of western Anatolia. In the north Saruhan Bey captured Manisa in 1313 and made it his capitol, with which the Saruhan *beylik* was unquestionably established.


In the north, Mysia had been under the pressure of Karesi Bey since 1293. Karesi Bey captured Balıkesir (Plaeocastron) and made it his centre, settling a large population of Turcomans including Karacalar in the area. This *beylik* expanded as far as the Sea of Marmara, the Dardanelles and the bay of Edremid; to the east of this state lay Osman's land.

Timurtaş, the Mongol governor of Anatolia, who was trying to fight against the frontier beys, finally revolted against his own master, the Ilkhanid ruler, and was forced to take refuge in the land of the Mamluks in Egypt (1328). Even though Karamanids, the Hamidoğulları, the Tonguzlu (Denizli) *beyleri*, Umur Bey in Aydın, Germiyanids, Orhan (Ottomans), Gerdebolu (Gerede), Kastamonu, Eğridir and Sinop were recorded as

part of the Ilkhanid territory in the state records of revenues in 1349, under the name of *'Ucât'*; these frontier states had already become independent sultans by this time. Orhan is claimed to have struck the first Ottoman silver coin as a sign of independence in 727/1326-1327. But the date of his crowning as sultan must be in 1336, upon the death of the Ilkhanid Abû Saîd Khan.

The Frontier Society and Culture

Holy war and booty raids usually led to the formation of fighting groups around *gazi*-alp leaders, spiritually supported by the alp-erens, sufî dervishes. In most cases, such fighting companies took their names from the leaders. Thus, *gazi*s gathered around such successful leaders as Osman Gazi or Aydın Bey in the beginning. Most of these beys, were active in the frontier regions of the Saljuqid State, as modest frontier leaders. These *gazi* beys either refused to pay tributes or sent a small amount to show their loyalty to the central government. Life in the frontiers was replete with dangers and required personal initiative; beyond the borders lay the Christian frontier organization, the Byzantine *akritai* or "tekvurs" of the fortified places active, with the same spirit. Ethnically, the border society was extremely mixed. It was a place of refuge for political dissenters, heterodox people, adventurers and nomads. In contrast to the highly civilized forms or culture of the interior, with its theology, elite literature and religious law, the frontier regions had rather an eclectic folk culture based on heterodox orders, a mystical and epic literature. The worldview of the frontier had a completely chivalrous character.



"Azap"

The old Ottoman stories about the life of Osman reflect this way of life in a poignant way. We should not loose sight of the fact that these stories provide a distorted version of what actually happened. According to the history of Oruc (p. 3), the Ottomans were typical frontier *gazi*s. "They fight in the path of God. They collect the booty and spend it for God and follow God's path. They are zealous in the path of religion and never fond of the world. They are mindful of the *Sharîa* and take revenge from the polytheists..."

The continuous expansion of the Islamic domain to the west was regarded as a sign of divine decree as they told to Archbishop Gregory Palamas in 1354. They also considered themselves to be the 'sword of God' - an image held not only by the Ottomans but also by the Byzantines. In the classical stories of the Ottomans, *alp*s, *alperen*s and *ahi*s are depicted as the closest associates of Osman. Osman became a *gazi* and began his *gaza* raids after Ede-Bali, who was a vefaî sheikh, guided him and tied a *gaza* sword around his waist, which was a ritual practiced among the *ahi brotherhoods*.

In the frontier, the most impressive success story between 1330-1345 was that of Umur Bey of the Aydın family. Against Umur Bey who, as the bey of Izmir, had carried his military campaign to the sea, the Christians rulers signed a pact, on 6 September 1332, for the formation of a crusader navy of twenty ships in the Aegean Sea. In 1334, the crusaders destroyed the navy under Yakhshi, the bey of Karesi. On 28 October 1344, the crusaders, in a sudden attack, captured the fortress on the harbour of Izmir. Umur was martyred in the battle while trying to recapture the place (May 1348). Seeing the death of his brother, the new bey Hızır left the policy of *gaza* and preferred the benefits of trade. He made peace with the surrounding Christian rulers, and granted them *'aman-nâme's*, i.e., peace and trade concessions to let them do business in his country (17 August 1348). It was also declared that he would not increase the customs tariff and that the knights from Rhodes would be allowed to settle in his ports with their representatives and that they would be permitted to use the seaports freely.

An Arab source Al-Umarî, in the 1330s, describes the beys of Karesi, Saruhan, Menteshe and Aydın as gazis known for their sea battles, i.e., as *'ghuzât f'il-bahr'*. He pinpoints Umur Bey among them as a gazi bey engaged in a continuous war. Like the Rhodian knights, Christians, too, later appear to prefer the benefits of trade. Accordingly, the dominant culture in those areas became no more the way of life and institutions of the frontier *gaza*, but that of classical Islamic society. It was as a result of this change that the leadership of the *gaza*, then passed to the Ottomans, who were fighting in the forefront of the frontier.

In 1461, Fâtih Mehmed, when climbing up the Trebizond mountains on foot, said that 'all of this trouble is for God. We have the sword of Islam. Were we not to take this trouble, we would not deserve the name of *gazi*'. Beginning with Orhan, all of the Ottoman sultans used the title *'Sultan al-ghuzât wa'l-mudjahidîn'*. In this regard, it is correct to compare the Ottoman *gazi*s to the first Arab conquerors. The *gaza* became a raison d'etre for the Ottoman state. The original Islamic tradition of carrying out *gaza* on the frontier came to dominate the entire Ottoman history. This was apparent in their domestic and foreign policies. Cantacuzenos states that a *gazi* bey would be happy to include the *gazi*s of another bey in his army. Nevertheless, there was also competition and wars among them. According to the old Turkish tradition of *'ülüş'*, or apanage the chief bey used to distribute his country among his sons. The unity among these semi-independent beys was maintained by the ruler in the centre who had the title *'ulu-bey'*. Yet, there always occured civil war among the brothers. Ottomans,

faced with more apparent threats, usually had the ability to keep their unity.

As the *gazi* beys settled in the rich valleys of western Anatolia and captured such international ports as Ayasolug (Altoluogo, today's Selçuk) and Balat, their countries developed into little sultanates with an advanced trade, on the one hand, and the high forms of Islamic culture, on the other. This is corroborated by what Al-Umarî and Ibn Battuta reported in 1334. Ibn Battuta admired these cities with their beautiful bazaars, palaces and mosques. According to him, Denizli, with its seven mosques and bazaar, was one of the 'most beautiful and biggest cities in Anatolia. In the same way, Balikesir, the centre of Karesi Beylik, was 'a beautiful and crowded city with its bazaar' and finally Bursa was 'a big and important city with its beautiful bazaar and wide streets' (p. 449). In western Anatolia, Ayasolug and Balat were the two great centres of Levantine trade. Towards the middle of the 14th century, the Venetian consulates settled in these two cities, Venice attaching supreme importance to trade with the *Beyliks*. As a result of this, rich Christian merchants settled in those ports. The main centre of trade was the city the Turks had established in Ayasolug to which traders came from all over the world. The Italians traded for the natural products of Anatolia, such as cotton, rice, wheat, saffron, wax, wool, hemp, raisins, alum, and bought slaves. These bazaars had precious cotton products made in Denizli and silk clothes made in Balikesir. The silk and silk clothes produced in Iran were also sold to the western traders in Ayasolug. The western traders were interested in importing mainly fine woollens to which tin and lead should be added. We know that in order to facilitate the trade, the Turcoman rulers printed silver coins in Balat, Ayasolug and Manisa, called *'gigliati'* upon the model of Neapolitan coins with Latin inscriptions on them.

Ibn Battuta (p. 442) mentions the palace of Aydın ruler in Birgi and talks about his servants in their silk costumes. In addition, he underlines the great influence and respect enjoyed by the scholars of religious law (429, 435, 448, 450). The first viziers were elected from among these scholars, coming from great centres of culture in the hinterland. The first Ottoman viziers were scholars of law who shaped the state, like Sinanüddin Yusuf, Çandarlı Halil. In 1331, Orhan Bey opened a madrasa in Iznik and converted the monastery in Bursa into a school. The bazaar district in Bursa, with its mosque, *'imaret'* (hospice), bath-house founded by Orhan Bey has remained one of the most lively centres of the city up to our own day.

The distinguishing characteristics of this newly emerging frontier culture was the preservation of the indigenous Turkish traditions and customs blended with Islamic culture. An important fact is that Turkish came to assume a dominant role in the Turcoman beyliks as the language of the state and of written literature. We know that many Persian and Arabic works were translated into Turkish on the request of the rulers. As the translation movement continued, the literary activity reached a creative stage in the second half of the 14th century with the rise of such writers as Şeyh oğlu Mustafa and Ahmedi.


In addition to the *vaqfiyyas*, in Arabic and Persian we find also *vaqfiyyas* written in Turkish. As for the architectural works produced in this period, the most important ones are the Ulu Cami in Birgi (1312) and the Orhan Cami in Bursa (1340). In the second half of the century, the imposing structures were built: Ulu Cami in Manisa, Isa Bey Camii in Ayasolug (1375), Ahmed Gazi Medresesi in Peçin (1375) and Yeshil Cami in Iznik (1379) represent a high level of artistic achievment. In ornamentation, all of these monuments are characterized by simplicity in comparison to the Saljuqid works, but we also notice some novelties in the layouts inspired by indigenous culture.

The Babaî Dervishes in the Ottoman Frontier Land

The dervishes of the Babaî order seem to have migrated to the farthest regions of frontier, including the Ottoman lands. Although the Mongols were organizing raids of chastisement to central Anatolia and Denizli, they had to trespass the Germiyanid lands to reach the Ottomans. In the meantime, since the frontier region was seen as rich areas, because of the possible prisoners and booty to be taken in raids and western trade, many dervishes from central Anatolia, Azerbaijan and Konya came to these areas in order to collect alms and charitable contributions.

We have reliable information about Ede-Bali, who was one of such sheikhs taking refuge in the frontier. The fifteen century survey book of Hüdavendigâr, as an official document, tells us that Osman had given the Kozağacı village to Ede-Bali's (Ede Şeyh) *zawiye* in Bilecik as a *waqf*-donation. Among the donations mentioned are three infidel slaves in Söğüd. As stated in the history of Aşık Paşazade (Atsız edition, p. 96), in the *tahrir*, too, Mahmud was recorded Sheikh Ede's son.

The *Menâkibnâme* of Elvan Çelebi, written in 1300's, informs us that Şeyh Ede-Bali was one of the *khalifa*s of Baba Ilyas, engaged in converting the non-Muslims to Islam, and that he had learnt from Haci Bektaş not to be aspiring for the worldly sultanate. This last note



Alaeddin Mosque, Bursa. (Hakkı Acun Archive)

is important because the Babaîs were militant dervishes at times rising up against the sultan. The dervishes were usually divided into two groups, the conformists who were loyal to the state, accepting the sultan's *waqf*s, and the non-conformists who were against the state, such as Sheikh Bedreddin and Otman Baba. Abdal Babas believed in the *'kutbiyye'*, according to which the saint of each period, called the *'kutbu'l-aktâb'*, was in constant relationship with God, in a state of ecstasy, and having a first-hand knowledge of sultanate affairs. They would lead the people, if necessary, to disobedience. A typical example of this is Şah-Kulu, who led a terrible revolt in 1511. A completely different example was the Vefaî sheikh, Seyyid Velâyet, who had gained the great respect of Mehmed II. This Sheikh represented, in his personality, the close bond between the *Vefaiyye* order and the Ottoman dynasty. In contrast to the Abdal-Kalenderî dervishes, the *Vefaî* sheikhs were observant of the *Sharî'ah*, as stated in Elvan Çelebi's *Menâkibnâme*.



"Deli"

The dervish-historian Âşık Paşazâde, a descendant of rebellious Baba Ilyas, was a member of the *Vefaiyye* order, as well as his father-in-law Seyyid Velâyet. In his history, he allocated an exceptionally large space to Ede-Bali, underlying the close relationship between the order and the dynasty. According to his account, Ede-Bali was Osman Gazi's spiritual guide and advisor on matters relating to Islamic law. When the question of reading the religious sermon (*hutbe*) in Osman's name arose, Tursun Fakîh consulted 'Osman Gazi's father-in-law Ede-Bali'. Also, Orhan Gazi asked Ede-Bali's opinion about organizing the foot soldiers, *yayas*. Ede-Bali's relatives had a considerable influence on the Ottoman administration. In their attempt to give support to the power of the dynasty, the *Vefaî* sheikhs granted the Ottoman sultans the title of *'velâyet'* (sainthood) and gave them God's consent, as we see in the case of Murad I, who had the honorific title of Gazi Hüdavendigâr.

The later *waqf-tahrir* records on *abdals*, *babas*, scholars of law and *dedes* provide information about how Osman and Orhan donated to many of them *waqf*-lands. For instance, the *waqf* record (1455) of a *zawiye* given to Ede-Bali by Osman Bey around the Söğüd region reads as follows (see Osmanlı Arşivi, Maliye, no. 16016, p. 13): "the Kozağacı village donated by Osman Bey as a *waqf* to be enjoyed by Ede oğlu Mahmud Paşa. It is now passed on to his son Sheikh Mehmed"(for Ede-Bali's son Mahmud and his grandson Mehmed, (see Aşık Paşa-zâde, p. 96). It is worth noting that most of the Söğüd *waqf*s were given to the *fakihs*, i.e., scholars of Islamic law (Haci Eşref, Ahmed, Ömer, Ali, Murad, and Mustafa). The *waqf*-villages that Osman Bey had given to Kumral Dede (See Aşık Paşazade, 95) are recorded in the *tahrir* books and known even today by the same names. This proves the accuracy of the tradition conveyed by Aşık Paşazade.

Aşık Paşa-zâde also mentions Abdal Murad, Abdal Musa, Geyikli Baba, and Kumral Dede as being among the dervishes who took refuge in the Ottoman lands as *'alp-eren*'s, and accepted *waqf*s for their *zaviye*s from Osman and Orhan. We have an important written record about Geyikli Baba. A group of Babaî dervishes, known as *'babailer'*, settled with him in a fertile area on the foothills of Uludağ near İnegöl. This place is mentioned in a *waqf* record of the Fatih period (Osmanlı Arşivi, MM 16016, 5, 8) as 'Baba' village (known today as Baba Sultan). Like one such dervish, Otman Baba, Geyikli Baba lived in the mountains and was able to tame the deer. Similar to the shamans in many ways, he was also a traveling and ecstatic dervish. Turgut Alp who was ruling over the İnegöl region as his apanage was very close to this kind of dervishes, and had a deep respect for Geyikli Baba. Turgut Alp sent news to Orhan, who was asking about this noble dervish. Orhan then sent many dispatches inviting the sheikh, but the dervish refused, saying that dervishes wait for an auspicious time. After this, we see Orhan visiting the sheikh.

Orhan wanted to donate a large area as a *waqf* to the sheikh, but he did not accept and remained attached to the Babaî principle of absolute poverty. When Orhan insisted, he accepted to have 'that small place on the hill as the place of the dervishes'. This place, revived later by the dervishes, is known in the *waqf-tahrir* books of the Fatih era as Baba köyü or Babayîler Köyü.(a typical dervish convent); the village had a yearly income of 1,500 *akça* (25-30 gold pieces) with six families resident, having large farms and eight families with small farms. Later, fruit gardens were added to the village. During the time of Murad II, Umur Bey, a descendant of Osman's friend Aykut Alp, donated a bathhouse to the Geyikli Baba *zawiye* (with an annual income of 420 *akça*). Later, a water mill and three shops in Bursa were added to this *waqf*. In the 16th century, the 'surplus' of the *waqf* , 6,000 *akça*, was invested, with interest. The bathhouse and the mill were repaired with money from *'tithes'* incomes). One day, Geyikli Baba came to Orhan's palace in Bursa with a plane-tree, planted it in the garden and said that 'this is a sign of our gratitude. As long as this tree is here, the prayers of the dervishes will be upon you and your progeny' (reminiscent of chamanistic tree cult). The fifteenth century chronicle Aşık Paşazade says he saw this tree (since the plane-tree is considered to be sacred among the Central Asian Turks, many places in the Balkans have been named *kavak / çınar*). This story of Geyikli Baba reveals his characteristics: he was a typical

Babaî dervish, living in the mountains, eating wild plants and fruit, befriending the animals, preferring absolute poverty and refusing to accept alms from the sultan.

In the earliest *tahrir* documents, we find many records about how many *Kalenderî* Babaî dervishes reclaimed virgin lands, established their *zawiyes* on them and then had these lands approved by the sultans to be *waqf*s. Here we can give an example: Şucâ' Abdal, Sinan, Ismail, Mustafa, Ali, Kaygusuz and other dervishes appropriated a place at the foothills in Saruhan, and 'cleared it from stones, settled there, cultivated it, established a *zaviye* on it and finally got a *waqf* permit from the sultan'. Ö. L. Barkan considers this group of dervishes as 'colonizing dervishes'. The Sultans granted such *waqf*s, on the condition of service for travelers. In his campaign to Mudurnu, Osman *Gazi* asked the sheikh of the Beştaş *zaviye* about the route. Dervishes usually establish a centre, cultivate the land, lived on the income they get from the land, and provided accommodation and food for travelers for up to three days. The *ahi* brotherhoods had such *zaviyes* in the *futuvvet* tradition. The tradition of hosting travelers was a binding rule, for all *zavives* with land grants from the Sultan. The members of the *zaviyes* had a communal life, sharing everything, from cultivating the land and harvesting to spending the income. As underlined in the *Bayramiyye* order every one had to work. Providing service for travelers and the religious poor and working collectively within the *futuvvet* discipline was regarded as a charity, thus related to the religious *waqf*. In some cases, new villages and areas of residence were formed around the *zaviyes*. Many villages in Anatolia and the Balkans emerged as a result of such *zaviyes*. One of the most effective means of Turkish settlement in Anatolia and Rumeli was such grants of waqf lands by the sultan, with tax exemption.



Enthronement of Sultan Orhan, (from Hünernama)

Today in many parts of Turkey, these old dervish *zaviyes* function as centres of festivals for Ottoman cultural heritage. The Geyikli Baba (Baba Sultan) festival at the beginning of every June, for instance, attracts thousands of people as a religious and cultural event. The *tekke* of Hacı Bektaş in Kırşehir, visited by seven hundred thousand people every year, continues to be the site of such festivals.

GAZÂ AND GAZİLİK

In the 13th and 14th centuries Anatolia, a Turkish literature appeared as a means for teaching people the religion of Islam, sufism, *futuvvet* and *gaza* rules. This literature was, without doubt, a response to public need, and a means of educating groups of people. In the face of the sophisticated Persian language and culture, which was prevalent in the Saljuqid cities and especially in Konya, the main purpose of this simple Turkish literature was to educate the ordinary Turcoman people, nomads or settled in towns and villages, and the *gazis* fighting in the frontier regions. Some of these didactic works *(ilm-i hâl)* aimed to teach the frontier people the religion of Islam and daily religious practices while futuvvetnâmes were composed to explain to the *ahi*s the *futuvvet* rules and manners and books for the dervishes to teach the principles of the order. There were also works in the form of epic, explaining the rules of *gaza* and encouraging people to the holy war. The contemporary sources show beyond any doubt the existence of a social group bound by a number of similar rules and regulations in the frontier. This group was called *gâziyân* or *alplar*.

In the 13th century, the spirit of *gaza* was the main source of activities in Muslim countries which were fighting, on the one hand, the Crusaders from the West, and on the other, the Mongols. It was around this time that the spirit of *gaza* reached its zenith in the Mamluk sultanate and among the Turcomans of Anatolia. Caught up between the Crusaders and the Mongols, these two Muslim countries were taken over by military regimes. A military aristocracy of Kipçak origin captured the Mamluk sultanate in Egypt and Syria, while the *gazi* Turcoman states were on the rise in Anatolia. Toward the end of the 14th century, all of these Turcoman states became united under the umbrella of the Ottoman dynasty.

This historical process marks the beginning of the fundamental *gazi* characteristic of the Ottoman State. There is an interesting chapter on *gaza* in a catechism called *Risâletü'l-Islâm* written in one of these *gazi* states. According to Ş. Tekin, who published it, the book was written in Karesi in the first part of the 14th century, i.e., during the time of Osman or Orhan. The Karesi beys were the leaders of *gaza* preparing the way for passage to Rumeli. Tekin notes that the aforementioned work was based on an Arabic treatise by Abû'l-Leys-i Semerkandî, written at the end of the 10th century.

This kind of works describes *gaza* as a religious duty of Islam, bound by strict rules. In the Ottoman lands, until the spread of Ibrahim Halebî's work, written in 1478, the main text used for Islamic law was, first Şeyh Bedreddin's *Tashîl* and then Molla Husrev's *Durer*. Just like in the Risale, these works explain the *Shari'ah* rules for *gaza*.

A *gazi* is usually defined as a Muslim fighter seeking the blessings of the other world. Here *gaza* is presented as a religious-Islamic duty. Accordingly, the booty gained in battle was regarded as a religious award. The

Ottoman *menâkibs* underline especially the *'halal' legitimate* nature of *gaza* and of the booty. Western studies on the subject usually perceive *gaza* as a way of justifying killing and plundering, thus ignoring the real meaning and function of *gaza* for the Muslim society, and individual.

It is not the task of the historian to discuss the ethical meaning of *gaza* acts, but rather to determine the reasons and beliefs lying behind them.

Risâletü'l-Islâm enumerates nine religious conditions for becoming a *gazi*: 1. the consent of the parents, 2. to be clear of all *'emanet'* (such as being free from debts, etc), 3. to leave a certain livelihood for his family, 4. to be able to continue his livelihood during the *gaza* (thinking that they may become plunderers on the way), 5. to have the command of the Muslim ruler, i.e., the war should be approved by *'emîrü'l-mü'minîn'* as a just war for the good of the muslim society, 6. to help his companions; i.e. there should be solidarity and unity, 7. not to injure anybody on the way (the plundering and injuring of the Muslim population or *dhimmî* non-Muslims by marching soldiers was always a concern for the rulers, so much so that some issued death penalties to prevent it), 8. not to flee the battle when fighting the enemy, and to remain until the end of the war. Islam grants the status of martyr, *shehid* to those killed and *'gazi'* to those who survive. 9. not to cheat on the booty. Islamic law attaches supreme importance to the fair distribution of the booty.



Orhan Gazi

According to the principles of Islam, *gaza* is usually considered to be *'farz-i kifâye'*, i.e., a religious duty that can be carried out only by a limited number of people for the rest of the society. But in cases when the Islamic country is in great danger, the leader may declare the *gaza* to be *'farz-i 'ayn'*, i.e., to be compulsory for each and every male member of the society. Those who cannot join the battle are required to pay a fee to the state treasury. When the Crusaders invaded Rumeli and came to Varna in 1444 and when the Ottoman lands were invaded from all sides in 1686, *gaza* was declared to be obligatory for every one and a *'nefîr-i âm'*, i.e., general mobilization, was issued.

After the capture of Edirne in 1361, there was a considerable increase in the number of war prisoners, as a result of the rapid expansion realized by Hacı-İlbeyi in the Meriç valley and Gazi Evrenuz Bey of Karesi on Via Egnatia toward Salonica. The *gazis* were asked to pay *'pencik' (penc-i yek)*, i.e., one fifth of the value of each prisoner of war. Mevlana Kara Rustem of Karaman issued a warning about introducing this important source of income for the treasury. In political works, it was usually believed to be the best policy to leave every kind of booty to the soldiers. Upon the request of vizier Çandarlı, Murad I ordered to 'do whatever God's command is'. As it was approved by the *ulema*, Kara Rustem was given the authority to collect *'pencik'* in the Gelibolu passage. *'Pencik'* began to be collected, taking either one prisoner from every five prisoners, or taking one fifth of the value of each prisoner. The soldiers obviously disliked this invention of the 'two scholars'. Those who returned from Rumeli with their prisoners began to use different routes to avoid this new tax. In response to this, Gazi Evrenuz was ordered to collect the *pencik* tax on the frontier and a cadi was appointed to collect it. The idea of forming a new army composed of these *'pencik'* recruits came as a result of the increasing number of prisoners of war in the hands of the government. These prisoners, called *'oğlan'*, were sent to Bursa and its vicinity to learn Turkish and to embrace Islam. Afterwards, they were gathered in a military corps to form a standing army under the direct command of the sultan, which laid the foundation for the janissary army.

The intention of the *gazi* should be sincere and he should not forget that he is fighting for Islam and other Muslims. There should be no 'greed and hypocrisy' in battle, i.e., they should not go to war for the sake of the booty and should always remain within the borders of religion in their attitude. As we have pointed out, this last rule underlay the religious-ideological basis of *gaza*. It was, of course, not possible to determine who was sincere and who was not.

In Turkish tradition, the *gaza* fighters were supposed to obey ten moral characteristics. These qualities were compared to some qualities with animals, such as courage, perseverance, self-confidence, strength and combativeness, power, endurance, the ability to stay calm, patience, the ability to make use of opportunities, and loyalty to one's companion, all of which have been mentioned in such Turkish legends as *Dede Korkud* and *Dânişmendnâme*. These qualities encapsulate what is expected of a professional soldier in Âşık Paşa's *Garîbnâme* (1271-1332), whose main audience was the Anatolian Turcoman people and the *gazis* of the frontiers. These expectations are certainly different from those of the Islamic *'ilm-i hal'* books and reflect the common traditions around the *gazis*.

Since *gaza* was considered to be the duty of all Muslims, in some cases the sultans used to summon the entire population to war. The devout Muslims took *gaza* seriously and donated large amounts of money. In Bursa, a rich person by the name of Hoca Ibrahim hired 20 cavalry soldiers for 20,000 *akça* to contribute to the military campaign of Fatih Mehmed against the Hungarians in 1476, saying 'let me partake of the blessings of the holy war.'

Bayezid II, in his edict addressed to the people of Anatolia, asked them to join the frontier commander Bali Bey, in his campaign against Poland, promising them *timar* and other rewards. The Ottoman sultans continued to prefer the title of *'gazi'*, until the last sultan.

Alps, Nökers (Yoldaş / Companions)

It appears that Osman ruled the beylik together with other members of his family. He gave the rule of Karacahisar to his son Orhan and his brother Gündüz, and used to consult his uncle Dündar on important political decisions (Neşrî, 94). However, in a dispute with him, he killed him. In 1302, he gave one of the towers built to blockade Bursa to his cousin Aktimur. Osman sent his son Orhan to the battlefield with such experienced commanders as Akça Koca, Konur Alp and Köse Mihal, thus preparing him for his succession. Osman died before the capture of Bursa in 1324. The ageing bey, Osman appointed his son Orhan as the chief commander in the last seven years of his life.

Orhan came to power in 1324. His brother Alâeddin Bey dropped out of the contest and he and his sons lived peacefully in the village of Fodura. Upon Orhan's death in 1362, a dispute emerged between Murad and his brothers, and Murad used force to silence them. In the old Turkish tradition, it is a powerful belief that authority is granted only by God. There was no established rule for succession. Usually, either the decision was made by the family congregation, or at the end of a war, a member of the family was chosen as if he received God's consent for his *'kut'*, i.e., fortune. Neither age nor experience was a criterion for succession. The tradition of distributing the country in apanages among the sons goes back to a custom that was practised among Turks and Mongols in Eurasia. Osman and Orhan divided the conquered lands among their sons and *'alp'*s, as *'yurtluk'*, i.e. apanages and usually appointed the eldest son to the most important frontier region. This feudal structure assumed a merely symbolic meaning as the central bureaucracy became more and more powerful. Nevertheless, the same Eurasian tradition was responsible for the frequent internal strife among the crown princes, which damaged the state to a considerable extent.



Tugra of Orhan Gazi

According to the old *menâkibnâme* related by Aşık Paşazade, the *'yoldash'* and *'nöker'*s were the main companions of Osman. When Osman ruled a territory extending from Eskişehir to Bilecik and Yenişehir (1299), he gave Karacahisar to his son Orhan Bey, and Yarhisar to Hasan Alp who was a *'yoldash'* (companion) (Neşrî, I, 112). İnegöl was given to Turgut Alp whose territory was called 'Turgut-ili'. The sources mention Saltuk Alp and Konur Alp among the commanders who participated in military campaigns with Osman and received such apanages on the frontier. The descendants of these *'nöker'*s and companions came to hold important positions and formed some sort of Ottoman aristocracy. The abolition of autonomous *'yurt'* (*apanage*) came at a much later time.

Samsa Çavuş, Akça Koca and Gazi Abdurrahman and other companions with the title of *alp* acted as companions to Orhan on his campaign to Sakarya, around 1305 (Aşpz., Bab 22). Then, each of these companions was assigned to different frontier areas. 'Samsa Çavuş and his people were good companions' (Neşri, 90).

In the steppe empires of Central Asia, the *'alp*s among the Turks and *'noyan'*s (pl. *noyad*) among the Mongols were the descendants of noble families. The Mongol *'noyan's* were of aristocratic families and held the title *ba'atur* or *bagatur (bahadır* in Turkish). As we see, the *alp*s among the Ottomans also held the honorific title of *'bahadır'*. They were engaged in military campaigns on the frontier with *gazi*s under their command, living in their own apanages. In the beginning, the *alp*s were Osman's allies in his campaigns (Aşpz., Bab 10). It seems that when Osman won a series of battles between 1299-1302 and was recognized as a charismatic leader, the *alp*s became his yoldash under his command.


'Nökerlik'/'Yoldaşlık' are usually established through a ritual *'anda'* (oath of allegiance) to the leader of *gaza*. This is most probably how the *"gâziyân"* group came into being. Köse Mihal, the Greek tekvur of Harmankaya, who was captured as a prisoner of war, became Osman's *nöker* (Neşrî, 76) and served him with loyalty in the military campaigns and Osman's relations with Greek tekvurs. He finally accepted Islam.

Inegöl area, which was captured by Turgut Alp, was given to him as a *'yurt'* (*'apanage'* land). It is interesting to note that this region was then called Turgut-ili that is Turgut Alp's territory (like Aydın-ili, Konstantin-ili, and Şişman-ili used for the Bulgarian king who became a vassal to the Ottoman Bey). The pasture-lands of the *'noyan'* are known as *'yurt'* or *'nutug'* in Mongolian, which is defined as 'piece of land owned by the *noyan* who is responsible for the livelihood of a nomadic group' (Vladimirtsov). Among the Saljuqids and the Ottomans in the classical period of 15th and 16th centuries, *'yurt'* or *'yurtluk'* was defined as a piece of land given to the chieftain of a nomadic group with certain privileges. In other words, *'yurt'* is an *'apanage'* given to a *'bahadır'*, war hero. Osman distributed the conquered lands among the *gazis'* (Neşrî I, 118). In the 1320s, the Kara-Çepiş fortress was given to Konur Alp and Absu (Hypsu) to Akça-Koca as yurt. This feudal system of *'apanage'* was later applied to such frontier beys of Rumeli as Evrenuz Gazi, Mihal-oğulları or Paşa-yiğit. In contrast to

the feudal nature of the state during the reign of Osman and the frontier areas later on the centralist bureaucratic structure gained prominence in the hinterlands as the viziers of ulema background became more and more influential in the administration.

Speaking of Haci Bektaş, Aşık Paşazâde talks about four groups of *mütsafir* (guest) religious *tâ'ife* (communities): *Gâziyân, Ahiyyân, Abdâlân and Bâciyân*. The menâkib says, Haci Bektaş had chosen Hatun Ana as his daughter and his intimate friend, and the followers of Hatun Ana formed the group called *Bâciyân* (*baci* means sister, female companion). According to M. Bayram, the *Bâciyân* group was formed by Kadın Ana Fatma Hatun, the daughter of the famous sûfî Evhadüddin Kirmânî, who married Ahi Evren (Nasiruddin Mahmud), (see below). Also the women who belonged to a sheikh family and were in charge of a *zaviye*, like Tâcî Hatun who had the responsibility for a zaviye *waqf* in the province of Hüdavendigâr, were considered to be among the members of the *Bâciyân* group.

The group known as *Gâziyân*, which is mentioned in the sources in relation to Rum Abdalları and *'ahi's*, were the same people as the *'alp's* of Osman's period, characterized with certain qualities. Âşık Paşa (1271-1332), the grandson of Baba Ilyas, in his book *Garîbnâme (Ma'ârifnâme)* (completed in 1310) mentions nine qualities that the *'alp's* were supposed to have. It is interesting that Aşık Paşa uses the pre-Islamic word *'alp'* instead of *gâzi*, which was defined as 'a group of fighters who go to battle periodically together in order to preserve their existence.' The religious equivalent of this group are *'alp-eren's*, who were known for their spiritual perfection and their real goal was converting infidels.


Quiver

According to the *Garîbnâme*, nine qualities are required for those who want to take the name *'alp'*. The first condition is to have a 'firm heart', i.e., to be brave. Bravery is the 'pillar' that holds up the soldiers (i.e., the leadership of the *alp*). Secondly, the *alp* should have physical strength, and be respected by every one. Thirdly, the *alp* should be zealous for the public good.

"*Alp*lığı başarmıya gayretsüz er"

(No one without zeal can be an *alp*).

Fourthly, the *alp* should have a horse. The Ottomans regarded the *'sipahilik'*, riding horse, as a requirement of beylik. As a result of this, in their conquests they had given *'timar'* to the horse-riding Christian noblity in the Balkans, but considered foot-soldiers (like *voynuk*) to be mere subjects. In fact, the non-Muslim subjects, in general, were not allowed to ride on horses.

The most valuable gift exchanged among the beys was horse. There should be an armor covering the belly of the *alp's* horse. This armor adds a dignified look to the horse and protects it from attacks. 'The enemy knows an *alp* by looking at his horse'.

Fifthly, the *alp* himself should have an armour.

*Alp*a *alp*lık adını don kondurur

(The name of *alp* comes with the costume, i.e., armour).

For the Ottomans, the horse-riding soldiers always wore armour. In the history of Eurasia, it was the horse-riding armoured soldiers that established empires and gained the control of nomadic peoples. This continued until the 40,000 armoured army of Shah Ismail was defeated by the guns and cannons of Selim I at Chaldıran. The 'arm-to-arm battle' of the *alp*s was emphasized. This was a sign of companionship *(yoldaşlık)* among the *gazis*.

The sixth and seventh conditions pertain to the weapons of the *alp*, i.e., the bow and the sword.

Katı yay çekmek ve uzatmak ere
K'ey hünerdür kim kime Tengri vire
(To pull a firm bow and launch the arrow
Is a great talent given by God).

The 'firm bow' is a long-range bow, consolidated by bone; it played a crucial role in the Ottoman victories over Christian soldiers. It required a special talent to pull this bow. In the Ottoman army the *yaya*s and *azeb*s, foot soldiery who belonged to the reaya class were allowed to use only bow and arrow. The seventh and eighth conditions are about having 'weapons', namely the sword and lance.

Yalunuz ok yay ile *alp* olamaz
Ok ile ol *alp*lık adın alamaz
(It is not enough to have bow
Nor an arrow to become an *alp)*

The sword is the most precious property of the *alp*; it is his 'gold and pearl'.

Kılıç üzre and anunçün içilür
(This is why one takes oath on the sword)

'Anda' ('and', taking oath), as practised among the *alp*s, was a ritual for establishing blood brotherhood or war companionship among the Eurasian people. The life-long bond of loyalty between Osman Gazi and the *alp*s, must have been established through the ritual of *'and içmek'*, i.e., mixing their blood in one cup and then drinking it. The booty and conquered lands were distributed among the *alp*s loyal to the leader through *'anda'* as *'yurtluk'*, i.e., an apanage.

Thus Garîbnâme written about Osman's time gives us details about his solidery and their weapons. According to the *Garîbnâme*, the sword and arrow are not by themselves sufficient. One should have also what is called 'sügü' (süngü), i.e., a lance, which has been defined as stick or spear. A more common word for this was 'gönder'. In the classical sources, the lance/spear is usually mentioned together with the sword, showing the widespread use of them in the battlefield. A *'sügü'* was made of wood, the top of which was the *temren (demren)*, made of iron.

The *Garibnâme* informs us that the use of spear required a special talent, and this was a sign with which the *alp* was recognized by his enemies.

All of these descriptions present the *alp* as a horse-riding and armoured soldier with bow, sword and spear. As such, an *alp* had to be physically strong and morally brave. Another important point mentioned by the *Garibnâme* is that the *alp* should have a *'kafadar'*, i.e., a friend to watch his back. The following poem describes this:

Cümle âlet oldu bu kez yârı yok
Bile ardınca yürür dildârı yok
Çün kafadar olmaya pes neyleye
Dört yanını kendü nice bekleye
Bil ki *alp*lık yalnuz olmaz ey safâ
Nitekim yalnız değildi Mustafa

.....

Pes bu *alp*lık yalnız olmaz yâr gerek
Yâr içün ol baş-u-can oynar gerek
(He had all the necessary equipment except a friend
And a companion to follow him
If one does not have a comrade, he is at a loss
How can he watch all four directions by himself?
Know that one can not be an *alp* by himself
As the Prophet Mustafa was not alone

.....

Hence the *alp* cannot do without a companion

A companion for alp he is ready to sacrifice himself).

We have already mentioned how companionship takes place through a ritual ceremony, according to which the *alp*s should fight 'arm-to arm'.

In sum, Âşık Paşa describes the *alp* as follows:
Kimde varsa bu dokuz nesne tamâm
Alp adıyla anı okur hâss-u-âm
(Whoever has these nine qualities
Is called an *alp* by everyone).

Being an *'alp'* is considered to be a God-given quality. The counterpart of an alp is *alp-eren*, a religious alp.

Bildük *alp*lık dünyada niceyimiş
Dinle imdi dîn içinde neyimiş
(We came to know what *'alp*lık' is in this world
Now listen how it is in religion).

As the Prophet of Islam said, the greatest fighting *(cihâd-i ekber)* is to fight against one's carnal soul.

According to Âşık Paşa:
Dün ü gündüz çalışa nefsi ile
Tâ ki nefsi düzele aklı ile

(One should try day and night to train one's soul so that it may be perfected with the help of reason)

The religious and spiritual qualities of *alp*-erens are described as follows: the *alp* should not succumb to the love of the material world. He should avoid such negative attitudes as stinginess and corruption, which result from a lack of seriousness. An *alp* of religion should fight against these temptations so that ordinary people will bow before him, as the pillar of religion.

Hód bu *alp*lık kimde olsa şeksüzün
Ayağına süre cümle halk yüzün
Ilk velî olmak gerekdür ol kişi


.....

(Whoever has the quality of being an *alp*
Is respected by everyone,
Such a person should first be a saint).

Âşık Paşa then moves to the nine qualities of the spitual *alp*s, which are sainthood, contemplation, contentment, love for the divine (freedom from the concerns of the world), putting one's trust in God, knowledge of the *Sharî'ah*, knowledge (ilm), spiritual zeal (helping others), having the right companion (*'eshâb'*, *'arkadaş'*, dervishes).

Yâr ile açıldı bu dîn ey Dede
(O Dede, this religion began with (good) companion)

An *alp* or *alp-eren* with these nine spiritual qualities is seen as the guide of the people.


Chanfron

For Âşık Paşa, the terms *alp* and *gazi* are synonymous. The former signifies the warrior hero and leader known as *alp* and *bagatur/bahadır* among the Eurasian people, whereas the term *gazi* refers to the Islamic version of this type. As Âşık Pasha observes, *alp* represents the ideal professional warrior type in 13th century Anatolia. It is interesting to note that he uses the Turkish word *'alp'* instead of the Islamic word *'gazi'*. This account by Âşık Paşa is parallel with the rules of the *futuvvet*, brotherhood which sets the ethical and social norms for the *Ahiyyan*. In sum, one has to have these nine qualities to be entitled to the name of *alp;* the armoured, horse-riding soldier with a companion. Such an *alp* should fight 'arm-to-arm' on the battleground. The representation of *alp*s by Âşık Pasa reflects the qualities of Osman *gazi*, his companions and other beys fighting on the frontier, and is very close to the hero represented in such Anatolian epics as *Battalnâme, Dânişmendnâme* and *Dede Korkud*. In the classical Ottoman sources, Âşık Paşa, called *aziz* (saintly person), is mentioned with great respect among religious people. His majestic tomb in Kırşehir is today a place of pilgrimage. It should also be noted that he is the *'pîr'* not of the *Mevlevis* but of the *Babaîs* and the *alp-erens*.

The Turcomans, joining the *gaza* battles in the Anatolian borderlands, and thus becoming, in a way, a professional soldier, became socially differentiated from their tribal background as a result of their joining the *'gâziyân'* group. The *'garib'*s (wanderers), coming from

different regions and origins, in order to win Islamic religious quality and sacred booty, used to take oath under a leader and become his companion.

As mentioned above a life-long bond of relationship was established between the leader and the *'nöker'* through *'anda'*. The *'anda'*, taking oath, of the Central Asian Turkish-Mongol society can be compared to the *'commendatio'* or *'hommage'*, *mannschaf* of Western feudalism (See Marc Bloch, *La société féodale, la formation des liens de dependance*, Paris: A. Michel, 1968, pp. 210-217). According to Bloch (p. 210), *commendatio* was responsible for the formation of 'one of the strongest social bonds the feudal period has ever known' between the chief and his companion.

In the 13th century Mongol society, *'nöker'* was defined as the battle companion and assistant of the noble class, living in their house and always traveling with them in military campaigns. The prisoner *'nöker'* enters the service of the chief with his people, many of whom become life-long subject and comrade-in-arm of the chief through *'anda'*.

As in the steppes of Eurasia, *gaza* groups began to be formed around the *alp*s, each carrying out *gaza* in one region of the frontier. In the beginning, Osman Gazi was one of these *alp*s. What made him become distinguished above and beyond the others was the intimacy and blessings of sheikh Ede-Bali, who had come to the frontier region as a *khalifa* of the Vefaî-Babaî order. The contemporary Byzantine historian Pachymeres depicts Osman as the most aggressive *gaza* leader among the Turks attacking the Byzantine lands. The *gazis/alp*s gather under the flag of the most successful and victorious chief on gaza expeditions. According to the story (Aşpz, 105), Osman 'gave Yarhisar to Hasan Alp who was a comrade (*yoldaş*)'. The second phase of Osman's career was his gathering of all the *alp*s under his flag in military campaigns. They became, just like Köse Mihal, companions (yoldash) of this energetic leader. It is probably through such a process, similar to that of Osman's, that the core of the first military structure of other frontier beyliks came into being.

The *nöker/yoldaş* establishment, like the *alp*s, appears to have been a central institution during Osman's time. In the Sakarya expedition of 1304, the tekvurs of Lefke (today Osman-eli) and Çadırlu accepted Osman's authority and became 'Osman Gazi's special companions' (Aşpz. Bab 10; Neşri, I, 120). Osman forgave and freed the Byzantine tekvur of Harmankaya, Köse Mihal, who was captured in battle. 'Köse Mihal became a *'nöker'*, wholeheartedly, and a companion of him' (Neşrî, I, 76). Most of the servants of these *gazi*s were the infidels of Harmankaya'.

Nöker, or nökör in Mongolian (pl. nököd), was a common institution in the Eurasian feudal system. *Nöker* seems to have given rise to the *'kul'* system in the formative period of the Ottoman State. *'Bey kulları' (gulâm-i mîr)* and the *gulams*, who were the servants of the beys and sipâhî, or horse-riding soldiers, were always composed of *'nöker*s.


In sum, we can talk about a pragmatic socio-ethic or socio-religious system that shaped the entire social life of Anatolian Turks, including the frontier communities. This model was a common structure, shared by *gâziyân, ahiyyan, abdâlân* and *bâciyân*. Historians trace the origins of this model back to the tradition of brotherhoods, that we see in pre-Islamic Iran, the Central Asian Turkish world and, Syria and Egypt under Roman rule. The general features of this model had ethical qualities, such as being a gentleman, solidarity, self-sacrifice and humility on the one hand, and a tripartite hierarchical organization such as *şeyh, ahi* and *yiğit* (the master, the brother and the youngman) or *şeyh, derviş* and *tâlib* (the master, the dervish and the seeker) on the other.

The Ahis and the Fakis in the Ottoman Frontier

In the Ottoman frontier areas, the *Ahi*s and the *fakıs ('faki'* is an abbreviation of *'fakih'* meaning Islamic jurist) were the spiritual supporters of Osman *Gazi* and actively involved in the organization of social and legal affairs of the beylik.

After capturing a place or region, Osman always consulted the *ahi*s and the *fakis* as how to organize it. The *fakis*, as the scholars of religion and religious law, provided information to guide the leader. The survey books contain many records regarding the *waqf* villages and farms given by Osman and Orhan to the *ahi*s and the *fakis*. In this period, the majority of the *waqf*s were given to the *fakis*. These records show also how the Turcomans, at this early stage of the state, were settling in the villages. Naturally, there was always a need for an imam, a religious guide, to organize the people's life according to Islamic tenets. The lowest group of these *fakis* was thus the village imams. The cadis and the viziers were next in rank. Ibn Battuta talks about such village imams whom he met in his travels.

Tursun Fakîh was the most famous of all the *fakis* during Osman's time. His tomb is a place of pilgrimage today. It used to be thought that the *ahi*s had a more central role in the beginning of the Ottoman society. The *waqf* records in the *tahrir* books, however, showed that the *fakis* were in fact more central at this time. In a *waqf* book from



Mehmed Bey Mosque, Serez, (1492)

Fâtih's period (Ottoman archives, MM, 16016, 13-17), which contains the *waqf* records of the time of Osman and Orhan, the *waqf*s of Söğüd were distributed as follows:

Kadı Sofi	Imam	The sheikhs of zaviye	*Fakı*
1 (the kadi of Söğüd)	1 (İbrahim Fakı)	3 (Ede Şeyh, Süleyman Tursun)	8 (Hacı Eşref Ahmed, Ali Ali, Ömer, Murad, Yusuf, Turbegi timur)

The prominent *fakis* played important roles as the scholars of sunnî Islamic law. Ede Bali and Tursun Fakîh were among the well-known *fakis* of Osman's period. Among the *fakis* who were granted *waqf*s were Ishak Fakîh, who provided information for the early Ottoman history written by his son Yahşi Fakîh. As the *waqf* records show, there was a very close relationship established between the bey and the scholars of Islamic law, as early as Osman's time. These *ahis* and *fakis* played a crucial role in the organization of the state and the regulation of the social life. The fact that the scholars acted as advisers to the bey for the organization of the state explains the reason why the first viziers were also chosen from among them. Of the first viziers, Sinâneddin Yusuf was certainly a religious scholar. Çandarlı Kara Halil is the most famous vizier of *ulema* origin, whose descendants had, until 1453, a position in the state comparable only to that of the sultan.

Ahi Evren


The Saljuqid sultans were always in close contact with the Caliph in Baghdad, and considered themselves, in official correspondences, as sultans appointed by the Caliph. Consequently, they used such titles as *'zahir'* and *'mu'în'*, meaning the aides of the Caliph. The beginning of the *futuvvet* movement, which laid the foundations for the *ahi* lodges, is usually traced back to the Caliph Nâsir's relationship with the sultans. Ahi Evren (Evran), the founder of the *ahi* organization in Turkey, was among the group of scholars and sufis who came to Anatolia from Bagdad in the early 13th century. These scholars were under the patronage of Alâeddin Keykubad I (1221-1237), who was a friend of the people of *futuvvet*. After the poisining of Alâeddin by his son Giyaseddin Keyhüsrev II, Ahi Evren (Nâsirüddin) was put in prison. He was close to the Babaîs and the Turcomans. After he was released from prison, he settled in Kırşehir as the head of the tanners. Ahi Evren was a scholar with a number of books on philosophy and *tasawwuf*. His original name is Şeyh Nâsirüddîn Mahmud of Hoy. The famous sufi and leader of the *futuvvet* movement, Evhadü'd-dîn Kirmânî, who had a number of *khalifa*s in Anatolia, was his teacher and father-in-law.

There was an open animosity between Ahi Evren and Mevlânâ Celâleddin Rûmî, who had collaborated with the Mongols and addressed himself primarily to the elite class of the Saljuqids, who were fond of Persian culture. This animosity had to do with the murder of Shems-i Tebrizî (1247), Mevlânâ's spiritual teacher. The *ahis* loyal to Nâsirüddin were supporting sultan Izzeddîn Keykâvus II against the Mongols. Keykâvus went to Kırşehir in 1254 and was defeated by the Mongol forces in the Sultan Hanı battle, 1256. Determined to quell the revolt, Mongols massacred many people, including Nâsirüddin. It seems that he was killed (1261) during the massacre by the mevlevî Nureddin Caca Bey, who had been appointed as the *emir* of Kırşehir. In such large cities as Tokat, Sivas and Kayseri, the Mongols killed anyone coming their way including the craftsmen and the groups of tanners. After the massacre, the *ahi zaviyes* were given to the *mevlevî*s, and many *ahis* migrated to the frontier areas where the Turcomans were living.

It has been suggested that Osman Gazi's sheikh, Ede-Bali was among those who had migrated from Kırşehri (today's Kırşehir) to the frontier. In the same way, Abdal Musa, who was together with Orhan Gazi in the Bursa siege, was one of the dervishes who came to the frontier with other *ahis*.

Âşık Paşa, the author of the Turkish *Garîbnâme*, was also from Kırşehir. All of these show that the *ahis* and the *abdal/kalender* of babaî groups that we see in the Sultan-Öyügü frontier during Osman's time migrated as a result of the Mongol-Turcoman struggle that broke out in 1256 in central Anatolia.

Ahi Evren was considered to be a saint among the Anatolian Turks and his *'kerâmât'* (miraculous deeds) have been collected in a *menâkibnâme*. According to extensive research done by Mikayil Bayram, Ahi Evren was one of the first founders of the *ahi* institution in Anatolia. It is certain that the *ahis* and the *futuvvet* people played a decisive role in the formative period of the Ottoman State. Murad I who is represented as a saint in the Ottoman menâkib was girded with the belt of ahis in a ceremony. Ahi Evren, who is considered to be the spiritual father (*pîr*) of the tanners, was also seen as the patron saint of 32 different guilds. Tanning was one of the most important arts of Anatolia, because traditi-



Inside view of Sheikh Edebali Mausoleum, Seres, (Hakkı Acun Archive)

onal household items, from various instruments to animal equipment, were made from leather. When Fâtih founded his mosque-complex (*Külliye*) in İstanbul, he built a large hall of saddle shops next to it. In the cities, the tanners were the most crowded, independent and powerful labour group. Kanuni Suleyman is reported to have threatened the disloyal *'kapıkulu'* soldiers with the name of the tanners. According to Evliya Çelebi, there were around five thousand tanners in İstanbul. In the 1651 revolt of the artisans, the *"sarrachane ahileri"*, i.e., the tanner *ahi*s, were the first to raise their flag of uprising. In Kırşehir, the sheikh of the Ahi Evren *tekke* used to send *'icâzetnâme'*, license, to the chief *ahi*s throughout the entire empire in order to confirm their positions.

Ahilik and Futuvvet

Ibn Battuta, who visited Anatolia in 1334, talks about the *ahi*s who had hosted him in their *zaviye*s throughout the country. These *ahi*s, says Ibn Battuta,

'...are to be found in every region, city and village in the land of the Turcomans. There is no one in the world comparable to them in their hospitality for the foreigners, in providing food and shelter for them, in preventing the injustices of the bandits or other security guards, and even in their serious attempt to destroy them. In their tradition, *ahi* is defined as a person who accepts to lead the craftsmen, the bachelor youths and those who prefer a celibate life. This is also called *futuvvet*. Usually the *ahi* founds a *zawiyah* and decorates it with rugs, lamps and other ornaments. Those who stay with him in the *zawiyah* work during the day and then, following the afternoon prayer, bring their daily earnings together to buy food and vegetables for the *zawiyah*. If there is guest in the city, they host him and serve him whatever they had bought, until his departure. If there is no guest, then they eat together and sing religious songs and perform *sama'* (a sacred dance). The next day, they go back to their work and bring their earnings again back to the *ahi* after the afternoon prayer. The members of the *zawiyah* are called *'fityan'*, where the head, as we have said before, is called *ahi*. I have never seen such gentle and polite people in the entire world. The people of Shiraz and Isfahan may be compared to them, but they show more respect and compassion to travelers. The youth, called *'fityan'* carry a long dagger and wear a conical hat made of felt (we shall see these hats later used by the Janissaries). When they line up in the room, they take their hats off and put them in front of them. Underneath they have a beautiful skullcap made of silk" (434). They nearly come to blows over who will play host to the Arab traveler. For Ibn Battuta, the people of Anatolia are not fanatical in their religious and ethical life. In the religious festivals, the young *ahi*s walk together with the sultan's soldiers. There are both rich and poor *ahi*s. In Kayseri, many prominent people belong to the magnificent *zaviye*s of *ahi* Emir Ali where they meet every evening. "If a place is not subject to a sultan, then the *ahi*s act like the governor of that place".



Sufi Turk

Ibn Battuta mentions Denizli (Tonguzlu) among the most prosperous cities of Anatolia and talks about the famous textiles produced by the Greek female workers (425). Among other large cities, he visited Konya observing its wide streets and bazaars, where the *kadı* was an *ahi*. He also mentions Aksaray, which is famous for its carpets outside Anatolia, as 'one of the most beautiful and richest cities of Anatolia' (432).

The *ahi*s had a genealogy of masters going back to Ali and had a special costume showing their allegiance to the *futuvvet* organization of the Caliph Nâsir.


Ibn Battuta also talks about the scholars and the sufis who had migrated to the frontier areas from different parts of the Islamic world (In Milas fakîh al-Harezmî, Kastamonulu vâiz Alâeddin, in Eğridir fakîh Müslihiddin, in Antalya Şihâbeddin from Syria, in Amasya many sheikhs from the family of Ahmed Rifâî, in Birgi Muhyiddin, in Bursa fakîh Mecdeddîn al-Konevî and Abdullah al-Mısrî, in Iznik Alâeddin Sultanyükî).

Ibn Battuta heard that Mehmed Bey, the sultan of Birgi, used to go to the his mountain resort every summer because of the hot weather (439). He visited him in his typical Turcoman tent and then became his guest in his palace in the city, by which he was impressed. He saw twenty Greek servants with their silk clothes in the palace, where he was served drink in gold and silver cups (442). The Sultan's doctor was a Jew. The Sultan visited the Arab traveler with a group of scholars and asked him questions about a number of the traditions of the Prophet.

In 1354, Gregory Palamas archbishop of Salonica, then a prisoner of the Ottomans, also finds Orhan Gazi on a mountain in a cool valley. It was a tradition for the Turcoman leaders to go to summer camping-grounds and this custom continued through to the Ottoman period. Some concluded hastily that the Ottomans were still a nomadic people during Orhan's time. Osman Gazi had chosen Söğüd, Karacahisar and Yenişehir as his administrative centres and, as the *menâkibnâme* informs us, he lived for a while in Bilecik with his family. In short, Ibn Battuta describes the western Anatolian frontier states as having well-organized and prosperous cities with their Muslim population, big bazaars and socio-religious institutions under a Sultan's authority. He also points out that some areas were not completely safe, due to the activities of some bandit groups.

The details given by Ibn Battuta about Osman's beylik are interesting (449-452). We should remember that it was ten years after the death of Osman (1324) that Ibn Battuta visited the area. He says:

'Bursa, surrounded by gardens and rivers, is a large and important city with its beautiful bazaars and wide streets. (Near the thermal spring) there is a *zawiye* where the sick people are served food and shelter during their three-day stay. This *zawiyah* was built by one of the Turcoman beys. We went to the *zawiyah* of Şemseddin, one of the prominent *'feta'* (young) *ahi*s, in the city. It was the tenth of the month of *Muharrem* (the day of *aşure*). Şemseddin gave a feast and invited most of the commanders and dignitaries of the city. After the recitation of the Qur'an and a sermon given by Konyalı Mecdeddin, they began the sama' (the sacred dance). It was really a blessed night.' Ibn Battuta's description of Mecdeddin proves that he was a typical *abdal* dervish. 'This preacher Mecdeddin is a noble and righteous man. He lives solely on his own earnings and does not accept alms from anybody. He does not have a home and only enough clothes to cover his body. He sleeps in the graveyard and warns people against hell fire in his sermons in such a way that many of them repent right in front of him'.


Courtyard of Abdal Mehmet Mosque, Bursa

According to Ibn Battuta, during Mecdeddin's sermon, a dervish in spiritual retreat in a cave cried out and fainted in a state of ecstasy.

'The Sultan of Bursa *ihtiyârüddîn* Orhan Bek is the son of Sultan Osman 'cuk', which means 'little'. This sultan was the richest and most important Turkish bey with his land and soldiers.

Our traveller stayed in a *zaviyes* in the village of Kürele near, Iznik. He says: 'In Iznik, there are no more than a few servants of the sultan, the most important of whom is Orhan's wife Bayalun Hatun. She is a good and virtuous woman'. She met Ibn Battuta and sent him presents. Continuing his travels, Ibn Battuta stayed in various *zaviyes* in Geyve, Yenice, Mudurnu and Bolu. He always mentioned the *ahi*s with the name *'feta'*, whose Turkish equivalent is 'yigit', young man.

Futuvvet and the Esnaf Guilds

For centuries, the *futuvvet* and *ahi* ethics determined the national character of the Anatolian Turkish people. Hospitality, helping the needy, self-sacrifice and solidarity, working in the fields together, which is called *'emece'*, respecting the elderly, abstaining from theft, sexual abuse and backbiting (to watch one's hand, waist and tongue'), courage and heroism, all of these qualities that social anthropologists can observe today among the ordinary village people of Turkey go back to the qualities described in the *futuvvetnâme* books. At night, in the villages today the youth gather in the guesthouse and learn these qualities. These guesthouses resemble the old ahi *zaviyes*. This tradition has continued unabated up to our day (the so-called *yaran* gatherings); *Futuvvet* and *ahilik* ethics have also shaped the manners of the *esnaf*, the professionals comprising the craftsmen, workers and bazaar traders. In the *ahi zaviyes*, the youth were taught the moral requirements of the guilds, such as humility, social solidarity, self-sacrifice and obedience to the master. Since the Ottoman crafts were based on an apprentice-master-head master training system, the *futuvvet* manners functioned as the ethical basis of the socio-economic structure.

While the *futuvvetnâmes* and *ahi zaviyes* provided the ethical-social discipline of the workers, the standards of production in the cities were ensured by collaboration between the *esnaf* organizations and the state. This has led to the intervention of the political authority into the guilds. Historically the Ottoman guilds and their ethical norms were determined by the small town economy of the middle ages, in which, there was as a rule, no export to distant markets. Accordingly, the local production catered solely to the needs and demands of the town and Burrounding villages. Since the demand was limited, overproduction led to a fall in prices, which in turn caused losses for the *esnaf*. Underproduction, on the other hand, caused the prices to go up and harmed the consumer. As a result of this, production had to be proportioned to the population of the town. It was this structure that determined the basic economic system of the *esnaf* organizations in small towns and cities. In medieval towns, the number of each class of producers was adjusted to the population of cities. For instance, in Beypazarı the number of bakers allowed to work was 10, whereas in İstanbul the number was 150. When the demand increased, there appeared a number of illegal artisans in the outlying areas of the city. To prevent this, the guilds would take their complain to the government. The *esnaf* masters were chosen by the *esnaf* and then appointed by the sultan. The state usually supported the guild members who had official permission (*berat*) from the sultan.

This led to an increasingly strong relationship between the state and the *esnaf* guilds. Before the rise of the Ottomans, this function was performed by the rich and powerful *ahi* leaders. The quality of production and the discipline between the apprentice, the master and the head master were ensured through a number of rules. This gave a relative independence to the internal administration of the guilds. The Ottoman state intensified the control of production quality through market (*ihtisab*) regulations and through regular checks of the *muhtesib, a bazaar inspector*. However, the guild members were able to preserve their internal autonomy. Af-

ter the election, such officials as *'kethüdâ'*, *'yiğit-başı'*, *'nakib'* and *'şeyh'* received their diploma from the sultan and were registered in the record books kept in state offices. It was only after this process that they could exercise their authority in the guild.

Enriched by the works of Ömer Sühreverdî and sufi ethics, the *futuvvetnâme* books spread throughout Anatolia as manuals of ethics for *ahi*s, and many *ahi zaviye*s were established in the villages and cities. These *zaviye*s were supported by *waqf*s donated by the sultans and people. The *waqf* records of the times of Osman and Orhan show that many *ahi zaviye*s were established in Ottoman lands at a very early time. Since the Saljuqids had lost political control to the Mongols, the *ahi*s in the cities were responsible, not only for the socio-economic activities, but also for the maintenance of security. Ibn Battuta has observed how an *ahi* master was able to act like a sultan in the major cities. Ahi Şerefeddin, for instance, was a dominant figure in the public affairs of the city of Ankara, which had become rich from mohair production and export.

In later periods, there were disagreements between the elected and the state approved *ahi* master and the hereditary sheikhs of the *zaviye*s. This can be seen in the following incident.

In 1682 in the city of Beypazarı, the disagreement over the Ahi Evren *waqf*s between the sheikh of the *zaviye*s and the *ahi*s of the tanners was brought to the court. The descendants of *ahi* Isa who had donated to the *zaviye*s a shop, a caravanserai and a tannery, claimed the right over the administration of *waqf* revenues on the basis of the conditions of the *'vaqfnâme'*. Against this claim, the *ahi* of the guild, who was elected by the tanners and appointed by the sultan, claimed the right over this revenue on account of the *ahi* tradition. The Sultan supported the second view.

The Battle of Pelekanon (Eskihisar), 1329

The 1330s mark one of the turning points of Ottoman history. Between 1305 and 1331, the Ottomans had settled in Adapazari and east of Sapanca and were putting Bursa, Iznik and Izmit under pressure by continuous blockade, so much so that the city of Iznik faced famine. This created a sense of alarm in Byzantium. During Orhan's time (1324-1362) Ottomans conquered first Bursa (April 6, 1326) and made a last attempt to capture Iznik and Izmit, the two most important cities near İstanbul.



Bursa, 1838

There is no doubt that the Ottoman 1329 Pelekanon victory, like the conquest of İstanbul in 1453, was a turning point in the history of the Ottoman state and the Byzantine Empire. It was after this victory that the city of Iznik surrendered in 1331 and Izmit only six years later. In the mean time, many small strongholds, including Hereke, were captured and this brought the Turks to the vicinity of İstanbul from the Anatolian side.

The two armies met in the spring of 1329 in a place called Pelekanon near the port of Gebze, east of today's Eskihisar. The commander in chief of the Ottoman forces was Orhan himself, whereas the Byzantine army was under the command of Andronikos III, whose forces were composed of around 2,000 soldiers.

The emperor came to Pelekanon with the hope of protecting İznik from the Ottomans who had been besieging the city for 27 years. After the capture of Bursa, the Ottoman pressure had become more intense than ever.

The emperor came to Pelekamon through Üsküdar. His plan was to cross to the other side of the İzmit gulf and to proceed through the Yalakdere valley to İznik. Having discovered the plan, Orhan occupied the hills surrounding Eskihisar. The Byzantine army was thus not allowed to cross the sea and were defeated in Pelekanon. The emperor was injured and forced to flee. The Pelekanon victory is described in J. von Hammer, and other historians following him, as the Maltepe battle, whereas Maltepe is far from Pelekanon.

The Byzantine sources give the exact date of this battle as the end of May and the beginning of June, 1329. The first result of this victory was the surrender of Iznik, with which the Ottomans attained Osman's goal, since 1300. The capture of Bursa and Iznik made the Ottomans a serious threat to the Byzantine Empire. It is for this reason that we consider the Pelekanon victory to be a turning point in the history of the Ottomans.

In the Ottoman chronicles, this battle has not been related. The only information we have is about Abdurrahman Gazi's defeat of a Byzantine army in collaboration with Orhan Gazi. Grand Domestikos Cantacuzenos, who was present in the battle, gives a detailed description of it. Here we shall focus on this watershed event.

The battle of Pelekanon took place in two stages. In the first stage, the Byzantine Emperor took the following decision in his military court: 'We shall pull the Ottomans from the hills to the flat land and confront them there'. They decided to leave the scene if this strategy did not work. Therefore, the Ottomans had strategic superiority in first place.

Orhan continued to observe the battlefield from the hills, his plan being to encircle the Byzantian army in

the hilly terrain. For this, he lay in ambush a part of his forces in a vally. This was the classical battle tactic of the Ottomans; one also applied against the Hungarians in the battle of Mohács.


According to the details given by Cantecuzenos, on the first day of the battle, June 1 Orhan Gazi sent about 300 horsemen against the Byzantine positions in order to draw enemy towards the hills. They came near the Byzantine forces, launched their arrows and then retreated. The aim was clearly to pull the Byzantine forces out of their positions and draw them towards the hills. The same tactic was repeated several times.

In the beginning, neither did the Byzantian forces come out of their positions nor did Orhan's forces leave their positions on the hills. But on the second day of the battle, the emperor sent a group of his forces forward to destroy the attackers. Orhan immediately sent some of his soldiers, under the command of his brother Pazarlu, to the plain. In response to this, the Byzantine army also came forward and the confrontation turned into a full-fledged battle between the two armies.

During the battle the Byzantine emperor was wounded. The Byzantine soldiery began to run away in a state of panic. The emperor, despite his injuries, tried his best to prevent the panic but to no avail.

Since this region was a passage to Anatolia, over centuries the Byzantines had built a series of fortresses there. There were four major ones: Flokrinia or Flokren in Kaleburnu, Nikitiaton near Flokren, Darıca (Daritzion) and Eskihisar. The last of these has survived until today, standing right in the middle of the passage.

In a state of panic, the Byzantine soldiers tried to take refuge in these fortresses as Orhan's forces chased them. Seeing that he would not be able to stop the panic, the Byzantine emperor fled to İstanbul, carried on a carpet.



This was a great victory for the Ottomans. Cantacuzenos attempts to portray this defeat like a victory for the Byzantines. In contrast to his account, the other contemporary historian Nikeforus Gregoras, gives a completely different and more truthful narration of the battle.

After the emporor's defeat, the people of Iznik had no hope of holding on. As the Ottomans intensified the siege, the city surrendered to Orhan in March 2, 1331.

Ottomans in Europe, 1352

The passage of the Ottomans into Europe is still surrounded by the legendary tales in historical literature. In fact, we have the full details of this event in contemporary historical sources. The legend of crossing the Dardanelles in rafts must have been a reflection of various attacks carried out by the *gazis* of Karesi with their boats. On the basis of Ottoman historical records, it is certain that a Greek youth, who was captured and then embraced Islam, was one of the three sons of Asen, the Byzantine commander of Gallipoli. Having disagreements with his brothers, he took refuge in the Ottoman territories, embraced Islam and guided the Ottomans in European soils. Like the conquest of İstanbul, the settlement in Rumeli was an epoch-making event. Had it not been for the Ottoman settlement beyond the strait, the Ottomans, like the other Turcoman frontier states, would have remained as a small state in Anatolia. Thanks to the efforts of Orhan's elder son, Süleyman Paşa the ottomans cpatured a bridgehead on the European noil&.

The historical events preceeding Süleyman Paşa's conquests in Thrace can be summarized along the following lines. In fact, Aydınoğlu Umur Bey was the first *gazi* bey in paving the way for the Balkan conquests with his continuous.sea expeditions from Izmir, between the years 1329 and 1344. In these expeditions, he collaborated with Cantacuzenos, his ally who was fighting in Thrace against John V. Paleologus in İstanbul. With his light navy, umur was able to land in Thrace and to launch attacks into the Serbian and Bulgarian areas as an ally of Cantacuzenos. Each time, he returned to Izmir with his ships filled with booty.


In 1344, a powerful Crusader navy captured the Izmir fortress and destroyed Umur's ships. Umur was killed in 1348 while trying to retake this place. It is worth noting that Ibn Battuta heard about his martyrdom in Syria and shared the grief of the Islamic world. After the fall of Izmir, the Ottomans became the leaders of the *gaza* movement and the *gazi* groups began to fight under the Ottoman banner, launching attacks against Thrace through the Dardanelles. Before his death, Umur Bey had advised Cantacuzenos to make an alliance with Orhan. The Turkish aid was the most crucial military help for Cantecuzenos, both against his rivals in İstanbul and against the Serbian king Stefan Dushan, who was intent on capturing Adrianople and İstanbul. Both Umur and Orhan saw such an alliance as being essential for their activities in Rumeli. The Ottomans had already reached the Dardanelles after invading the Karesi Beylik in 1335. Such Karesi *gazi* leaders as Ece Bey, Gazi Evrenuz, Hacı Ilbeyi and Gazi Fazıl were encouraging the Ottomans to settle on the other side of the Dardanelles.

In 1346, Cantacuzenos cemented his alliance with the Ottoman ruler by giving his daughter Teodora to Orhan as wife. The following year Cantacuzenos, with Orhan's support, entered İstanbul and was proclaimed to be co-emperor with John V. It was at this time, the Byzantine empire can be said to have come under the

protection of Orhan. By using the Ottoman forces, the emperor Cantacuzenos was able to maintain the Byzantine sovereignty in Thrace against the Serbian king. In 1352, Süleyman Paşa, while marching to support the Byzantine forces, destroyed a Serbian army in Thrace. Then, he went onto Adrianople and was welcomed by Cantacuzenos as a saviour. In the Ottoman sources, this victory by Süleyman Paşa has usually been confused with the conquest of Adrianople in 1361 and the battle of Çirmen (Sırpsındığı) in 1371. Süleyman Paşa's victory in 1352 enabled him to settle in Rumeli. Before returning to Anatolia, he left a group of soldiers in a fortress called Tzympe on the European side of the Dardanelles in order to prepare the next year's military campaign. He actually made it a bridge-head for his conquest. This caused alarm in İstanbul. Cantacuzenos' proposal to buy back this place was rejected by Süleyman Paşa. On the contrary, he fortified this bridge-head with more forces that he brought in from Anatolia. The Karesi beys who had settled in Rumeli had already began their conquests in Gallipoli peninsula on the one hand, and in the Rodosto-Malkara direction on the other. The Turkish settlements caused panic in İstanbul and the Byzantines realized how their city was now being surrounded on both the Anatolian and the European sides.

In the meantime, Süleyman Paşa, after landing at Kozludere, captured Bolayır with an army of 3,000 soldiers, that he had brought from the Anatolian port of Kemer near Biga. On 1 March 1354, after an earthquake the walls of many fortresses, in and around Gallipoli, collapsed. The Ottoman forces immediately occupied these places. This earthquake has been recorded by all of the contemporary historical sources. Having interpreted the quake as a sign of God, the Ottomans became even more resolute not to leave Rumeli, and the new forces and immigrants from Karesi began to settle on the European side. People in İstanbul, forced Cantacuzenos to leave the throne, as they accused him to be responsible for Ottoman settlement in Thrace. In addition to this, the Serbian king, Stephen Dushan died and the Serbian Empire collapsed in 1355. With this, the greatest rival to the Ottomans in the Balkans left the scene.

Thanks to these extraordinary events and the resolute efforts of Süleyman Paşa and the *gazis* of Karesi, the Turkish settlement in the Balkans became an undeniable fact. The only hope that the Byzantine emperor John V had was a Crusader army from Europe. Towards the end of 1355, the emperor sent his representatives to Pope Innocent VI and begged for a Crusader army to be sent urgently, promising at the same time union with the Roman-Catholic Church. In 1357, events suddenly turned against the Ottomans.



Mausoleums of Sultan Osman and Sultan Orhan, Bursa. (1890)

Orhan's 12 year old son, Halil, was captured by the Greek pirates of Phocaea in the summer of 1357. In the meantime, Süleyman Paşa, the conqueror of Rumeli, died. These unfortunate events proved to be a turning point in the Ottoman-Byzantine relations. The ageing sultan Orhan pleaded to the Byzantine emperor for the release of his son Halil. Taking advantage of the situation, the Byzantine diplomacy forced Orhan to sign a treaty, which stipulated that Orhan would stop his attacks on the Byzantine lands, pay for all the expenses of the ships to be sent to Phocaea for his son and forgive all the debts of the Byzantine emperor. Orhan also promised not to help Cantacuzenos' son Matthew in Thrace anymore, and to support instead the emperor.

With this treaty, the Ottomans were forced to forgo their alliance with the Cantacuzenos family, which had made their expansion in Europe possible, and thus they entered a period of recession. In fact, the Ottoman expansion came to a complete halt until the release of Halil in 1359.

In 1358, the Ottoman ally Matthew Cantacuzenos was taken prisoner in Dimetoka with the help of Serbian forces. This gave a relative advantage to the Byzantine state in Thrace. The treaty that Orhan signed mentions the emperor's old debts, which may indicate that the Byzantine empire was paying tribute to the Ottomans as early as the first part of the 14th century. In fact, in 1334 the emperor had accepted to pay an annual tribute to the Ottomans for not besieging the city of İzmit (Nicomedia). We know for sure that after 1371 following the battle of Maritsa, the Byzantines were forced to pay the Ottoman sultan 15,000 hyperpera, namely 7,500 Venetian ducats. In the meantime, however, Byzantine diplomacy was intensifying its efforts to mobilize a Crusader army, as the most efficient check against the Ottomans.

According to the story, Süleyman Paşa, in order to prevent the possibility of abondoning Rumeli, ordered his body to be buried in Bolayir and to have its place kept secret. As the anonymous Tevârîh-i Âli Osman records, the *gazis*, confronted with the new situation, were in a state of despair. Yet the gazis of Karesi must have been against the idea of leaving Rumeli. After the capture of Tzympe and Gallipoli, many people from Karesi had begun to migrate to Rumeli and established villages. After the death of Suleyman, Orhan sent his other son Murad to Gallipoli, as an experienced commander together with his tutor Shahin. The Byzantine and Ottoman sources, Chalcocondyles and Düsturnâme, mention that Murad was sent to Rumeli immediately after the death of Suleyman. But Murad could not become involved in any serious activity between the years 1357 and 1359, until the release of Halil.

In 1358, in order to save Halil, the Byzantine emperor sat out to Phocaea with his three ships. Orhan's friend Ilyas, the ruler of Saruhan, marched from land and besieged the city. They, however, did not succeed. The emperor returned to İstanbul without consulting Orhan. Kalothetos, the Greek lord of Phocaea, was insistent on receiving a large ransom for Halil. As soon as Orhan threatened to abolish the treaty, the emperor asked for a meeting with him. They met in the port of Prikonisos, the emperor had to go to Phocaea one more time in the same year. This new expedition did not bring any success either. In the spring of 1359, negotiations began between Orhan, who had come to Kadiköy from land, and the emperor, who had arrived there with his ships. Willing to take full advantage of the difficult situation that Orhan was in, the Byzantine emperor forced Orhan to accept new conditions.

For ransom, Orhan paid a large sum of money and Halil was released. He was brought to İstanbul and engaged to the emperor's younger daughter. Halil then went to Izmit. The emperor was also given the promise that Halil would be the next sultan after Orhan. Apparently, the Byzantines, by using Halil, were hoping to have a new period of peace and balance with the Ottomans. According to the contemporary Byzantine historian Gregoras, Orhan accepted these conditions. The crown-prince Murad was against this agreement and was determined to continue the policy of *gaza* and expansion in Thrace together with his tutor and *gazis* of Karesi. After all, war and success against the Byzantines in Thrace would guarantee the throne to him. Gregoras confirms that the *gaza* movement stagnated in Thrace for two years, until the arrival of Halil. It should be noted here that following the Turkish-Mongol tradition, the Ottomans did not have an established rule of succession for the throne. Events were usually the main factors in determining the next ruler. As the eldest son of the family, Murad was sent to the farthest frontier area as the chief-commander of the army. This situation guaranteed him the throne *de facto*. This, however, depended on his great achievements as a conqueror in Rumeli.



Green Mosque, Bursa. (1894)

In these two years, the migration from Anatolia to Rumeli continued and the Rumeli frontier became stronger. The *waqf* record (1360) of a hospice founded by Orhan for Süleyman mentions many villages and farms in the area with Turkish names. This is also borne out by Greek sources. It was within these few years that the Ottoman Rumeli emerged as a vast area of settlement. Gregoras confirms that Süleyman was then shaping the general policy of the state. His death and the Byzantine efforts to mobilize the Crusaders from Europe against the Ottomans put everything in danger. The situation posed a serious threat to the future of the Ottoman State. While signing a treaty with Orhan, the emperor was at the same time hoping to have a Crusader army sent over against the Ottomans.

Part of the strategy was to block the straits with the help of the Crusaders and to destroy the Turks in Rumeli once and for all, by separating them from Anatolia. This was a very serious and critical situation for the Ottomans. The same plan then became the main strategy of all Crusaders in the 14th and 15th centuries.

The emperor began his efforts to mobilize the crusaders immediately after the fall of Gallipoli in 1355 by promising the Pope Innocent VI (1352-1262) the Union of the Churches. He asked for an immediate dispatch of a five ship navy to be followed by a large Crusader army. In order to ensure this, the emperor even agreed to send his son Manuel as a hostage to the Pope in Avignon. In the following year, the emperor tried to mobilize such Mediterranean states as Venice, the Genoese Republic and the Rhodian knights against the Ottomans.


All of these plans, however, failed. In 1357, Venice, a crucial force for the Crusad, started a new war against Hungary over the Dalmatia. The Senate was not aware of the critical conditions of the Byzantine capital. From İstanbul, the Venetian ambassador reported how serious the situation was, and even noted that the Greeks were considering entering under the protection of Venice. The Pope sent his representative, Nuncio Pierre Thomas to Hungary and İstanbul for preparations for the formation of a crusader army. Thomas, who was to become a crusader hero in Europe, worked day and night and went to Buda to end the conflict between Venice and Hungary. By now, the Papacy was aware of the dangers of the Ottoman advances in Europe, and sat out to launch a Crusader attack to recapture Gallipoli, which was considered to be the key passage to İstanbul. Due to Thomas' endless efforts, the first Crusader attack against the Ottomans took place in 1359.

The Conquest of Adrianople (Edirne), 1361

In order to expel the Turks from Thrace, the Byzantine emperor began a military mobilization there in 1355 while he contacted the Pope to provide a crusader army against the Ottomans. According to the plan, the Hungarians would join the Crusader forces from land and the Venetians from the sea to drive the Ottomans out of Europe.

Byzantium was a critically important for Europe, for political as well as economic reasons. First of all, Constantinople was seen as the last stronghold of resistance against Islam. Moreover, the Byzantine economy was controlled by such European countries as Venice, the Genoese Republic and France. The fall of Constan-

tinople would mean the fall of their colonies in the Levant. Thus, the Pope sent Pierre Thomas one more time to Constantinople in 1359, this time with a naval force of 20 ships. Together with the Byzantine navy, Thomas went to the Dardanelles and landed on Lapseki (Lampsakos), an important passage used by the Turks. We have two sources for this first Crusader campaign against the Ottomans. The first is by Philipe de Mezière, writing about the life of Pierre Thomas, who was later made a saint by Rome. The second source is an anonymous Ottoman history called *Tevârîh-i Âli Osman*. The relationship between the Ottoman narrative and this Crusader expedition has not been noticed up until now, whereas in fact the two sources are in perfect agreement concerning the confrontation. The Ottoman forces left their ambush and attacked the Crusaders. The result was a disaster for the landing army. This victory over the Crusaders ensured the presence of the Ottomans in Europe.


Beylerbeyi of Rumelia

In historical literature, we find several dates given for the Ottoman conquest of Adrianople (Edirne). Usually the dates 1363, 1364 and 1369 or 1371 after the battle of Çirmen, are suggested. As we shall explain below, in 1371 the Serbian forces marched against Adrianople to take the city back from the Ottomans, but were defeated. In fact, the city of Adrianople had already been captured in 1361, ten years before this battle, by the prince Murad and his tutor Lala Shahin.

The intricate point here is the misleading view that Murad captured Adrianople after he became sultan. The Byzantine chronicles, the contemporary Italian historian Villani and the Alâeddin Mosque inscription in Ankara all state that Murad was not the Ottoman sultan when Orhan died in 1362. C. Jireček and İ. Uzunçarşılı give the date 1363 for the conquest of Adrianople, thinking that it was only after this date that sultan Murad could have captured the city. Uzunçarşılı reasons that the conquest may take place in 1363 or around 1364-1365 and that this delay was due to the revolts which broke out against Murad in Anatolia. E. Zachariadou, and those who followed her, date the conquest as late as 1369. The point that misleads Jireček and others, is the belief that Murad captured the city after coming to throne; a mistake repeated by Neşrî and other Ottoman sources. The truth is that Orhan, upon the death of Süleyman Pasha in 1357, had sent his son prince Murad to Rumeli together with his tutor Lala Shahin. It was they who captured Adrianople in 1361. This means that Murad captured the city while he was still the crown-prince. We shall explain this below in more detail.

The years 1357-1359, during which prince Halil was held prisoner, were a period of recession for the Ottomans. When Süleyman Pasha died, the borderline in Thrace stretched from the Yayla mountain in Keşan-İspala front in the west to the Bakacak hill and Hora, south of Tekirdagı, on the Marmara side. Tekirdagı and Ispala were still lying outside this line. However the raids extended as far as Adrianople. The core of the Rumeli province was formed during Süleyman's time. It was most probably at this time that the term *'Paşa sancağı'*, began to be used. After the capture of Adrianople and Murad's succession to the throne, Lala Shahin became the Rumeli *Beylerbeyi* with the title of 'pasha'. But since the Christian forces had control of the Straits, the Ottoman presence in Rumeli continued to be always under threat.


As soon as Halil was released in 1359, the Ottoman forces under the command of Murad and Lala Shahin began their campaign to conquer Thrace in a systematic manner. Shortly thereafter, as confirmed by the contemporary Greek and Italian sources, the groups of raiders (*akıncılar*) were seen in front of the walls of Constantinople. The Ottoman sources also state that a large-scale attack began in 1359 and that the *gazis* captured the fortress of Çorlu, on the İstanbul route. A state of panic erupted in İstanbul, reaching as far as Italy. After capturing Çorlu, Murad and Lala Shahin began to attack the main strongholds on the Constantinople-Adrianople route. While the ultimate target was, of course, the capture of Adrianople, these strongholds were taken by the Ottomans in order to secure their rear and to stop a possible attack from Constsantinople. The Ottoman historical sources provide quite ample information about this strategy.

The Ottoman Expansion in Asia Minor

We have seen above how, within half a century, the Ottoman Bey became the leader of the *gaza*, being given the honorific title *sâhib al-ucât*, or the master of the frontier lands. In 1354 the Ottomans captured an important economic and political centre, the city of Ankara, from the Eretna State, and this marks the beginning of the Ottoman expansion into the Seljuqid area in Anatolia. In other words, this was a move from the western frontier territories into the hinterland areas of Anatolia. This new strategy brought the Ottomans into a face-to-face confrontation with Eretna, the ruler of Sivas, and his close ally, the powerful bey Karamanoğlu. Having fought against the Mongols for a long time, the Karamanid family finally settled in Konya, the former capital of the Saljuqids, as the most powerful frontier bey of the southern Turcomans. They considered themselves to be the patrons of other frontier beys and the heir to the *'saltanat-i Rum'*, i.e., Anatolia under the Seljuqid control. This claim by the Karamanids has been

stated very clearly in Yarcânî's *Şehnâme*. Being the most powerful frontier state in the Balkans, the Ottomans confronted the Karamanids with the same claim. The Ottomans had already subjugated the southern beyliks by the time of Murad I (1362-1389) through peaceful means, threats and even military force. In most cases, they gave in compansation rich *'timar'* lands to those former beys whose regions were annexed to the Ottoman territory. The Ottomans would have preferred to achieve their goal through peaceful means, because it is forbidden by Islam to fight against a Muslim, especially against another *gazi* state (Qur'an, *Nisa* chapter, verse 90). This would jeopardize the fame of the Ottomans as *gaza* leaders. Accordingly, the Ottomans tried to justify cases where they had annexed a state by force. Thus, the lands of the Hamid and Germiyan states were an area of contention between the Ottomans and the Karamanids. The Ottomans claimed to have taken these territories in a religiously legitimate way. The Karamanids never accepted the invasion of Hamid-eli, which was, like the city of Ankara, part of the former Seljuqid territories. It was mainly in these areas that the Ottoman-Karamanid struggle was focused.

The Ottomans often used *'fatwa'*, i.e., a religious verdict from ulema, to justify their attacks on the Karamanids and other Muslim states. It was seen as a religious duty to fight against those who prevented the *gazis* from *gaza* by attacking them from the rear. And not surprisingly, the Karamanids and others in Anatolia were seen as maverick states; a view repeated many times in Ottoman sources. Murad II had taken a *fatwa* from the neutral Egyptian *ulema* to legitimize, in the eyes of the Islamic world, his war against the Karamanids in 1444. The Ottomans referred especially to the Karamanid-Christian alliance, which is also confirmed by Western sources.



Çilehane, Amasya, (1413)

The second direction of the Ottoman expansion was the Persian silk route. They not only took Ankara in 1354, but also began to support the beys in the Tokat and Amasya regions against the sultan Kadi Burhaneddîn, who had replaced the Eretna State in Sivas. When in 1389 Murad I was in the Balkans fighting against the Serbs, the beys loyal to Kadi Burhaneddîn claimed that it was the best time to attack the Ottomans. This view, however, was rejected by the Kadi as a way of weakening the unity of Islam and lending support to the enemy. But when Murad died in Kosovo, Burhaneddîn took Kırşehir.

The resistance movement led by the Karamanids against Ottoman rule in Anatolia came to an end when Murad I marched and won the battle against the Karamanids in 1387. At this time, the Slavic states of Serbia, Bulgaria and Bosnia were united to fight against the Ottomans in the Balkans. In 1388, Bulgaria was invaded, and the next year Murad marched into the Kosovo plain to fight against the Serbs and Bosnians. The victory that came on 15 June 1389 ensured the Ottoman presence in the Balkans.

For political reasons, the Ottoman sultans gave supreme importance to the preservation of their title *'gazi'* in the Islamic world. They usually sent *fethnâme*'s and prisoners taken from the spoils of war to the eastern Muslim rulers. When Yıldırım Bayezid defeated the Crusader army in Niğbolu (Nicopolis) in 1396, he sent prisoner knights to Cairo, Baghdad and Tabriz. As these prisoners were paraded in the streets, it brought about an enormous display of support for the Ottomans. The fame of the Ottoman sultan as *gaza* leader was an important political instrument for him.

For a long time, Timur's entourage did not approve of attacking the *gazi* sultan. After taking Bayezid prisoner in Ankara (1402), Timur himself wanted to have a demonstration of *gaza* by taking Izmir from the Crusaders. Towards 1420, Mehmed I used the title of *gazi* in his letters in order to ward off the threats of Timur's successor, Shahruh, stating that he was about to launch an attack against the Christian enemies of Islam. In the same way, Murad II, to justify his attacks on the Karamanids, mentioned in his letter to Shahruh that the Karamanids were hampering the *gaza* by attacking the Ottomans from the rear.

After his great success in the conquest of İstanbul, Fatih, in the *'fethname'* he sent to the sultan of Egypt, left to the sultan only the responsibility of 'protecting for muslims the routes of *hajj*', pilgrimage to Mecca presenting himself as the only representative of 'equipping the people for *gaza* and *jihad*' in the Islamic world. In the same way, Selim I used the honorific title of *'hâdim al-harameyn al-sharîfeyn'* after defeating the Mamluks, and Suleyman the Magnificent the title of *'halife-i rûy-i zamîn'*, thus emphasizing that they were *gazi* sultans fighting for the cause of Islam. With the Ottomans, the concept of *gaza* became such a powerful instrument of dominance and control that other Muslim rulers elsewhere gave priority to use the same title. None of them, however, were comparable to the Ottoman rulers who were fighting for the cause of Islam in Europe, the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. Naturally, as the pressure of the Christian West on the Asian and the Islamic world intensified, the influence and power of the Ottomans increased in the Islamic world, of which the Ottomans took great advantage. As in Europe, the main reason for the rapid expansion of the Ottomans into Muslim Asia was a result of the *gaza* ideology.

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