Second Paper

ISLAMIC CALIPHATE, TURKEY and MUSLIMS in INDIA

The function started with the recitation from the Holy Qur'an. Prof. Hamdard recited the following *āyāt* from *sūrah al-Nūr:*

لَقَدْ أَنْزَلْنَآ آيٰتٍ مُّبَيِّنٰتٍ ۚ وَاللّٰهُ يَهْدِيْ مَنْ يَّشَآءُ إِلٰى صِرَاطٍ
مُّسْتَقِيْمٍ ۝ وَيَقُوْلُوْنَ اٰمَنَّا بِاللّٰهِ وَبِالرَّسُوْلِ وَأَطَعْنَا ثُمَّ يَتَوَلّٰى فَرِيْقٌ
مِّنْهُمْ مِّنْ بَعْدِ ذٰلِكَ ۚ وَمَآ أُولٰٓئِكَ بِالْمُؤْمِنِيْنَ ۝ وَإِذَا دُعُوْٓا إِلَى
اللّٰهِ وَرَسُوْلِهٖ لِيَحْكُمَ بَيْنَهُمْ إِذَا فَرِيْقٌ مِّنْهُمْ مُّعْرِضُوْنَ ۝ وَإِنْ
يَّكُنْ لَّهُمُ الْحَقُّ يَأْتُوْٓا إِلَيْهِ مُذْعِنِيْنَ ۝

"Verily We have sent down revelations and explained them. Allah guides whom He will unto a straight path.

"And they say: We believe in Allah and the *Rasūl*, and we obey; then after that a faction of them turn away. Such are not believers.

"And when they appeal unto Allah and His *Rasūl* to judge between them, Lo! a faction of them are averse;

"But if right had been with them they would have come unto him (the *Rasūl*) willingly" (24:46-49)."

In the first lecture I have tried to point out that institutions in an Islamic state can be examined in two ways: first, commenting on the basis of the ideology: the Qur'an and *sunnah;* and second, following historical evolution and interpreting the new formations in the light of changing conditions in time and space.

The institution of the Caliphate[1] based on the divine guarantee is considered a predestined, immutable institution. Even then it appears to have gone under change due to historical circumstances.

Even then it is believed to be potentially ever present. From this viewpoint Islamic Caliphate is eternal as the religion itself. As for the historical interpretation of the Caliphate, it is considered as an institution which had its own course of evolution and had a different structure in each period of time.

For Islamic state the basic problem was always to determine how *imāmah*, religious leadership, was to be combined with *amārah* political-military power. The twin notions of *Dīn wa Dawlah, sharī'ah wa siyāsah* were expressions of the same dichotomy.

As far as their combination or coexistence was concerned, the elective Caliphate of the early *Khulafā'* was essentially different from the successive caliphal dynasties of the Umayyads and the Abbasids.

The first four Caliphs followed the *sunnah* of the Prophet in conductng the affairs of the community as understood by the *dīn*. The Umayyads of Damascus, not legislating at all, continued the same policy. However, under the Abbasids the subsequent dynasties gave primacy in practice to the temporal authority or *dawlah*. Under the Buwayhids and, particularly, under the Saljukids there occurred a fundamental development. In 1055 when the Seljukid Sultān Toghrul came to Baghdad the Caliphate had to turn over temporal

authority, *Salṭanat al-ʿāẓam* to him over the old territories of the Caliphate. But, in the theory the Abbasid Caliphate was still considered the only legitimate authority over the Islamic *ummah*. The claim was that *Amīr al-Muminīn* had simply delegated his *temporal* power to the Sulṭān.

In 1258, the fundamental, actually fateful, change came about when Baghdad was captured by the Mongols, thanks to the machinations of Ibn al-'Alqamī.

Large Muslim populations in Central Asia, Iran, Iraq and Anatolia fell under the domination of heathen Mongols. Under the circumstances the principle of the rule of the *Sharī'ah* gained primacy in the interpretation of the Caliphate. In other words, the actual enforcement of the *Sharī'ah* determined the Islamic character of the community no matter what the religion of the ruler was. And the Sulṭān who efficiently maintained the application of the *Sharī'ah* in his territory deserved to bear the title of Caliph. It was the historical conditions that dictated this state of affairs and a group of *'ulemā*, stressing the paramount significance of the *Sharī'ah* for the Islamic community, reached a new consensus on the caliphal institution. The most important change was that now the Caliphate lost its universal character over the *ummah*. Each Sulṭān considered himself directly chosen by God to rule over a particular Muslim community. Thus, Sulṭāns did not hesitate to assume the unusually pretentious title of *Khalīfat-ullāh/Ẓillullāh*.

Obviously, historical conditions, the prevalence of political power in the newly rising Sultanates as well as the spread of mysticism made this new interpretation possible. A Muslim ruler in possession of real power capable of protecting a Muslim land and applying the *Sharī'ah* was duly recognized as *Khalīfah*. Along with this development came the idea of the foremost Sulṭān in the Islamic world.

It can be said that now the unity of the *ummah* was symbolized by the pilgrimage: the power which was capable of keeping safe the pilgrimage routes and protect *Ḥaramayn Al-Sharīfayn* was to be considered as the supreme authority in the Islamic world. How the primacy claim led to a confrontation betweeen the Mamluks and the Timurids and later on between the Mamluks and the Ottomans is well known story[2]. On the other hand the spiritual leadership of the Islamic world was totally eclipsed. True, the Abbasid Caliph under the protection of the Mamluk Sultans in Cairo continued to send the *manshūr* and other symbols of legitimation *('alāmāt-i mulūkīyya)* to the Sulṭāns all over the Islamic world including those in India and Turkey. But now, the real foundation of primacy in the Islamic world was considered the *actual political power* which would enable the claimant to be the custodian of the most sacred common object of the Islamic world, namely *al-Ḥaramayn al-Sharīfayn*.

Now let me explain how the Ottoman Sulṭāns regenerated and assumed universal Caliphate[3].

> According to a tradition which apparently originated in the 18th century, the Abbasid Caliph al-Mutawakkil officially transferred to Sulṭān Selīm and to his heirs all rights to the Caliphate, at a ceremony held in the mosque of Aya Sofya in Istanbul. In fact, however, there is no contemporary record of Selim receiving or claiming to receive the caliphate from al-Mutawakkil. But, in fact, Selim claimed to the Universal Caliphate on other grounds. §

§ Whether Al-Mutawakkil formally transferred the *Khilāfat* to Selim should be besides the point. When the Abbasids of Baghdad and Cairo, the Ismā'īlī 'Ubaydiyūn of Egypt, the Umayyads of Spain (from Al-Nāṣir onwards) and the Mughals of India (Akbar to Ālamgir I) expropriated to themselves this office they neither received nor claimed to receive the Caliphate from anybody. The case of Selim appears to be better than theirs. The presence of Al-Mutawakkil in Istanbul is the political consent and the possession of the relics of the Rasul (A.S.T.) is the spiritual apology, if any visible proof was required, particularly in his case. Editor.

During their ascendancy, the Ottomans looked at the Caliphate in a different light. The claim which they made for themselves was that, as foremost among the sovereigns of Islam, they were its protectors. For this reason they claimed to succeed the Prophet and the earlier Caliphs as 'the best of *ġāzīs* and of fighters in the Holy War' *(afḍal al-ġuzāt wa'l-mujāhidīn).* This is the interpretation they made already under Bayezid II (1481-1512) father of Selīm I. In 1516 in Aleppo, Sulṭān Selīm I assumed the title, formerly held by the Mamlūk sulṭāns, of 'Servitor of the Two Holy Sanctuaries' *(Khādim al Ḥaramayn al-Sharīfayn);* he kept the Caliph al-Mutawakkil at his court, and he had the Prophet's relics sent to Istanbul. In so doing he claimed, as the Mamlūk Sulṭāns had done before him, to be the most powerful sovereign in the Muslim world and the protector of Islam. In the preambles to their legal edicts *(Qānūn-nāme)* Sulṭān Selīm and his successors emphasized this title.

The protection of Makkah, Madīnah and the Pilgrimage routes conferred a title to pre-eminence on Selīm in the world of Islam. Announcing his victory in Egypt to the Shirvan-Shah, Sulṭān Selīm claimed that the Mamlūks had been incapable of protecting the pilgrim routes in the Hijāz against depredations, and that God and entrusted him with the task of bringing order to the lands of Islam and of sending the *maḥmil*, a palanquin symbolizing political authority. On these grounds Selim claimed the obedience of all the rulers of Islam. He added in his letter that the whole of the Hijāz including Makkah and Madīnah was now subject to him, and warned that he would shortly appear in Persia and conquer it. He demanded that Shirvan-Shah should accept his 'Exalted Caliphate' *(Khilāfat-i 'Ulyā)* and have his name mentioned in the *khuṭbah*. Later, in the letter which Suleyman the Magnificent sent on his accession to the Sharīf of Makkah, he announced that God had brought him to the throne of the Sultanate and the position of the Caliphate. In his reply the Sharīf of Makkah confirmed that Suleyman had by the will of God come to occupy 'the seat of the Sublime Sultanate and the dignity of

the Great Caliphate' *(sarīr al-Sulṭāna al-'Uẓmā wa masnad al-Khilāfa al-Kubrā)* adding 'by conquering the countries of the Franks and of their likes, you are senior to us and to all the Sultans of Islam'. These letters are noteworthy for the Sulṭān's claim to the Great Caliphate. In the preface to the *Qānūn-nāme* of Buda, drawn up by Abu's-Su'ūd Efendī, Sulṭān Suleyman is described as "Inheritor of the Great Caliphate... Possessor of the Exalted Imamate, Protector of the Sancturary of the Two Respected Holy Places' *(Wāriṯh al-Khilāfa al-Kubrā . . . Ḥā'iz al-Imāma al-'Uẓmā, Ḥāmī Ḥimā al-Ḥaramaynal-Muḥtaramayn).* When the Muslim rulers of India and of Central Asia asked for Suleyman's help against the Portuguese and the Russians, the Sulṭān claimed in his reply that God had granted him the dignity of 'Caliph of the Face of the Earth' and that it was his duty to keep the pilgrim roads open.

This conception of the caliphate was no doubt partly different from that formulated under the Abbasids, since for one thing the Ottoman Sulṭān did not come from the tribe of Quraysh. In the reign of Suleyman the Magnificent the question whether it was licit for the Ottoman sultans to use the titles of *imām* and of Caliph, in the absence of any lineal descent from Quraysh, was in fact posed. According to Lutfi Pāshā, Suleyman, as the effective ruler of all the Muslim lands from the Habsburg frontier to the Yaman, "is the *imām* of the Age in fulfilment of the relevant stipulation relating to the maintenance of the Faith and guardianship of the homeland of al-Islam... He is the *Imām* of the Age without dubiety and he is truly the defender of the Shar'. Obedience was due to him as *Imām*". 'The Great Caliphate' and 'Exalted Imamate', as represented by the Ottomans, was a new concept born of historical circumstances. Ottoman Sultans considered their *de facto* position as the most powerful rulers and protectors of Islam, to be the result of God's will. This conception was in fact only an extension of the idea of the Caliphate which prevailed in the Muslim world in the fourteenth century, an extension required by fresh historical developments. Thus, every Muslim ruler who possessed *de facto* sovereignty and

assumed the task of implementing the *sharī'ah* could call himself Caliph. The innovation which the Ottomans introduced into this conception was to revive the idea of an exalted Caliphate applicable to the whole world of Islam §. In other words, as they considered it their task to defend the world of Islam against Christian attacks and to protect Makkah, Madīnah and the Pilgrimage routes, all of which were matters of common Muslim concern, they wished to exercise a predominant influence throughout Islam. In this way the new conception of the Caliphate served a policy seeking to establish Ottoman influence and mastery over the world of Islam. The idea was obviously derived from the *ghāzī* tradition. What happened was that after Selīm I the Ottoman state developed the old tradition of a *ghāzī* border-state, and revived the old Islamic caliphate in a new form. The new conception of the Caliphate was based on the fulfilment of the tasks of *ghazwāt* and of the defence and protection of Islam. As Lutfī Pāshā made it clear, it rested on the power actually exercised by the Ottoman state. In the succeeding age of decadence, the Ottomans changed their standpoint by turning to the theoretical conception of the Caliphate developed under the Abbasids and enshrined in *fiqh* formularies, in which they hoped to find a source of strength.

In his capacity as Caliph, representing *Sunnī* Islam, the Ottoman Sultan considered the population ruled by the Safavids as heretics who had to be forced into subjection. Around 1556-1707 the view was accepted that two *imāms* coexisted, the Ottoman Sultans and the Indian Moghal emperors, whose separate existence was made possible by the ocean which divided their respective dominions. Towards the end of the eighteenth century Tīpū Sulṭān's attempt to use the Ottoman Caliphate for his political aims is illustrative of the concept of

§ Under the Umayyads of Damascus the universal *Khilāfah* remained in force in the three continents. Even after its fragmentation the name of the Abbasid *Khulafā'* alone was announced from all the pulpits of the Muslim dominions till such time the 'Ubaidiyun (the Anti-Caliphs) in 975 A.C. (al-'Azīz) assumed sovereignty in Egypt. Editor.

the universal Caliphate at that time[4] From the fifteenth to the nineteenth century close relations were maintained, through the *ṣūfīs*, pilgrims and merchants between India and Ottoman territories. As Seydī 'Alī Re'īs noted in 1555 Indian Muslims had a real veneration for the Ottoman *Khalīfah*[5]. Now all this formed the background to the Khilāfat movement and Ottoman pan-Islamism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

It was not a coincidence that the Khilāfat movement in India coincided, in its successive phases, with the Ottoman -Turkish struggle for survival against Christian powers in the nineteenth century. In his book, *Britain, India and the Turkish Empire*, Rām Shukla[6], depending almost exclusively on the British sources, developed the theme that in the beginning it was English diplomacy that was responsible for the rise of the Khilāfat movement §, and the idea of the Universal Caliphate of the Ottoman Sultans in the second half of the nineteenth century. Using the Ottoman Caliphate, he said, Britain aimed to obtain two objectives. First, it was hoped to create a common front against Russian expansion from Central Asia to the eastern Mediterranean, and second to win over the Indian Muslim loyalty.

The British tried to exploit the plan first during the 1857 uprising and "obtained a proclamation from the Ottoman Sultan calling on Indian Muslims to remain loyal to British rule[7]". However, during Turco-Russian war in 1854-1856, Rām Shukla observes[8], "Indian Muslims were utterly indifferent". It was only during Russo-Turkish war in 1877-1878 that sympathy for the Ottoman Turkey took the character of an active movement. An address is then sent to Queen Victoria asking her support of the Caliph, and meet-

§ Despite the Armistice (Nov. 11, 1918) Istanbul was in occupation of the Allies and the Caliph Sulṭān was their prisoner in his own palace. Muslim feelings ran high. It was precisely at this juncture that an All Parties Muslim Conference was held at Lucknow on January 26, 1919 which decided *inter alia* to constitute the Khilafat Committee. Editor.

ings were organized in various places in India, and money was collected to aid the Caliph[9]. "The pro-Turkish movement among the Indian Muslims", a British memorandum said, "rapidly spread and there was no place in India, however small, where meetings were not held in moral and financial support of Turkey. All Muslims irrespective of sects and creeds joined the movement[10]". The Ottoman Caliph had declared *Jihād*. A letter from Turkey asserted that it was incumbent on all Muslims to help the Caliph[11]. The movement gained momentum among Indian-Muslims[12], and now the British were worried that the Caliph's call of a *Jihād* might lead to anti-British demonstrations. The situation showed that the idea of Caliphate had a great political potential. Thereupon Disraeli delcared that in fact England was the greatest Muslim power in the world and the Ottoman Caliph was receiving her support[13]. England would pursue the same policy later on by trying to take under her protection the last Ottoman Sulṭān Caliph Vahideddin and, when this failed, by encouraging Sharif Husayn to take the title. The British manouevers would be the main reason why Mustafa Kemal regarded the Khilafat movement itself with distrust in a later period. However, the assumption that in the nineteenth century the pan-Islamic movement was an invention of the Brtish diplomacy is evidently an unjustified view. It ignores the long history of the Ottoman caliphate and relations between the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph and the south Asian Muslims. After the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 Indian Muslims went to action again to support the Ottoman caliph and Turkey during the Greco-Turkish war of 1897 and the Balkan War of 1912. In the meantime under ʿAbdulḥamīd II the universal Khilāfat policy and pan-Islamism had become the cornerstone of the Ottoman foreign policy[14]. In Western literature the scope of this reorientation in Ottoman policy is often minimized or misinterpreted Basically, Ottoman ideology grew out of internal conditions. During the second half of the nineteenth century there existed parallel and interconnected movements of Islamic revival in various parts of the Islamic world, in Egypt, North Africa, Turkey and India[15]. Recent studies confirm that these movements were

not independent and isolated from each other; but Muslims and Muslim leaders from all parts of the Islamic world were in contact through pilgrimage and trade, and religious and political ideas spread in a relatively short time, thanks to the improved means of communication. The impact of journalism should be particularly emphasized in the period.

Then, in Turkey and among the North Indian Muslims two parallel movements were in progress. In Turkey westernized intelligentsia, composed mostly of military and civil bureaucrats, advocated the idea that modernization through westernization was the only way for Islamic societies to regenerate and progress as well as to shun European tutelage and domination[16]. But the *ʿUlamā* believed that the answer to these problems was a regeneration of Islam based on the true foundations of the religion. I believe this cleavage was actually a recurrence in a new form of the eternal rivalry between bureaucrats, *kuttāb*, and *ʿUlamā* in Islamic history. While in power during the period 1839-1877 the Ottoman bureaucrats introduced radical westernizing reforms *Tanẓīmāt*, not only in the technical areas but also in law and administration. They were whole-heartedly supported by the British government in their liberal policies which were responsible in opening up the Ottoman market for the rapidly growing English industrial capitalism[17]. As to the Indian Muslims, keeping always in mind the dissimilarities due to the different conditions and circumstances between the two cases, the Ottoman *Tanẓīmāt* movement can be compared to the Aligarh School in India. On the other hand, the reform activities of the Ottoman *ʿUlamā* such as the codification of the *Majalla* and reforms in the training of the Qāḍis and in the *sharīʿah* law courts[18] corresponded to the reforming activities of the Deoband School and similar educational reform movements among Indian Muslims. I am also tempted to explain the alienation from Britain of the Muslim scholars of the Aligarh school as a consequence of the anti-Ottoman

policy of the British following the occupation of Cyprus and Egypt in 1878 and 1882 respectively §.

This is also the period in which Britain played with the idea of creating an Arab, as opposed to a Turkish Caliphate. At any rate, after 1878 both Turks and Indian Muslims became independent of the British in their Caliphate policy and their cooperation was actually directed against the British imperialism §.

The theory is maintained that the Khilāfat movement in India was more an internal development aiming at the Islamic consciousness and solidarity than a religious movement. It was explicitly so in the period1919-1924 as quite convincingly explained in Gail Minault's new book[19]. He suggests that in 1857 the final eliminaton of the Mughal emperor who had embodied the symbols of the Islamic unity and solidarity for Indian Muslims created a vacuum. The use of pan-Islamic symbols, now born by the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph served to forge a pan-Indian Muslim political unity out of Muslim masses divided by regional, linguistic, class and sectarian differences. In the period 1919-1922, for the westernized bureaucrats, nationalists and Turkish people at large, as well as for the Indian Muslims the deliverance of the seat of the Caliphate from captivity was the rallying point. Caliphate had become a symbol of the struggle for the Anatolian peasants and the Indian Muslims to fight and achieve independence against "the infidel" power, England. Both movements were fundamentally national in character, and there was a complete agreement and solidarity between the Turkish and Indian Muslim movements at the beginning. In India, by the decision of non-cooperation and issuing the *fatwā* of 1921 July, forbidding In-

§ Madrassah was established in 1875 while the College in 1877.

§ Here the author is himself refuting the presumptions of Shukla.

dian Muslims to serve or enlist themselves in the British army the Khilāfat leaders had provided not only a moral encouragement to the Kemalist struggle against England but also a decisive support to the Turkish nationalist cause. Because of the strong feeling against mobilization at home, the British government's only chance to put pressure on Mustafa Kemal was to raise recruits in India. The Khilāfat movement eliminated this possibility for England. This was a great help to the Turks. When at the climax of the Khilāfat movement the *'Ulamā'* declared that Islam and living under a non-Muslim rule were incompatible, an exodus of Indian Muslims started towards neighboring Muslim countries. This can be seen at the same time as a national uprising though it was expressed in religious terms. A special term, *proto-nationalism*, has been invented for this type of religio-national movements which owing to particular reasons could not express itself fully and explicitly under properly nationalist symbol[20]. The theory of the so-called 'proto-nationalism' and political symbolism, however ingenious in interpretation of an emerging nationalism may be, still ignores one essential point for the Indian Muslim awakening, that is Islam, the very content of the movement. Without considering it one cannot understand the future development among Indian Muslims. The very fact that the statehood achieved thirty years later was to have an Islamic character supports our contention. Whereas in Turkey, the movement developed into a secular nation-state because of the particular historical background as well as the strong leadership of Kemal and a westernized group of bureaucrats.

Ziya Gökalp, sociologist and the spiritual father of Turkish nationalism, attempted to interpret mutual relationship of religion and nationalism[21]. Sociologically, he said, national consciousness is a higher stage in social evolution and basic social reality is nationality while the *ummah*, the religious community embracing many nations, brings an additional identity to the individual. Turkey reached to the stage of national consciousness during the war of independence. The Caliph as the head of the religious community, he continued, has to be exclusively a religious authority and spiritual guide.

His claim to have a political authority in a nation-state can only lead to conflicts detrimental to both nation and religion. As Islam and *ummah*, he argued, are also social and religious realities, a Caliph as the head and symbol of them is necessary for the unity of Islam. In his earlier writing[22] Gökalp had warmly advocated "the re-opening of the gate of *ijtihād*" for modernizing the Islamic community as far as wordly affairs were concerned.

In 1922, for the Kemalists the most urgent problem subsequent to victory over the Greek army was to make the Allied Powers recognize the objectives of the Independence War in a formal treaty[23]. This in turn raised the fundamental question of the country's regime: who was going to represent the Turkish state in the coming peace conference? The claim of the Sulṭān's government to this effect triggered off the *"great inḳilāb"* or revolution. Mustafa Kemal reacted by declaring that absolute sovereignty of the Turkish state is embodied in the Grand National Assembly (GNA). Only three days after the Sulṭān's claim, Kemal proposed to the GNA the separation of the Caliphate from the Sultanate and the abolition of the latter (November 1, 1922). A fortnight later the Sulṭān Vahideddin fled aboard an English warship, still with the claim of being the Caliph of the Muslims of the world. A new Caliph, Abdulmejid Efendi, was elected by the GNA. Then, the question came up whether the new Caliph was to be considered as the head of the state and would enjoy political power in the Turkish state. The question was asked by many deputies including the *ḫōjas*, i-e., men of religion and the most influential nationalist leaders and companions of Kemal, Rauf, and Refet. At the GNA, Kemal stressed that the Turkish nation now replaced the state of 'Uthman § in sovereignty and took its destiny in its own hands. "National sultanate and sovereignty", he said, "is embodied only in the GNA composed of the representatives of the nation. As to the question of the future of the Caliphate, history gives example

§ Sulṭān 'Uthmān Ghāzī (1299-1326) the founder of the dynasty. Ed.

of the Caliphate continuing side by side with the Sultanate. Now that Sultanate is gone the Caliphate will stay as the spiritual and religious center of the whole Muslim world. The Sultanate now is replaced by the powerful body of the delegates of the nation and from now on it will be able to take care of the nation's affairs towards a *modern* prosperous socity". In these words Kemal declared the fundamental revolutionary change in the regime of the country and summarized its future policy. Against the primacy of the GNA *Ḫōja* Sükrü, a traditionalist *'ālim* claimed that according to Islamic principles the Caliph should be the head of the Islamic state or the head of the GNA, and that his ratification was necessary to make the acts of the GNA valid laws for the community or nation. However, some other *Khoja* supported the nationalist interpretation, and *inḳilābcḫis* joined them in using, as an argument, Islamic law and history. One of them *Ḫōja* Rasih, emphasizing the important place of social action in Islam, asserted that exercise of political power is to be entrusted as a trust *(emānet)* to the most capable person or body for the good and salvation of the Islamic community. The most important thing is to defend and maintain, he said, the independence of the Muslims. Islam, he said, is incompatible with bondage. Islam is based on the absolute equality of the Muslims. He also asserted that brotherhood and equality are the foundations of the Islamic community. Islam commands management of their affairs in *sḫūrā*, that is in consultation. Citing verses from the Qur'an in his article he asserted that government by a body elected by Muslims is the only valid form of government based on Islamic foundations. Many *Ḫōja* using exclusively Islamic arguments, supported *Ḫōja* Rasih's view. Later, Mustafa Kemal was going to use all the Islamic arguments to defend absolute sovereignty of the nation as represented at the GNA against those who advocated sovereign rights of the Caliph in the Islamic state. Rasih Efendi's emphasis on independence of the Muslims was particularly important in support of Mustafa Kemal's authority, and Islamic leaders in India would whole-heartedly espouse these Islamic arguments of the nationalists. When Kemal found a potential opposition in the GNA, including some of

the army generals, on the issue of the powers of the Caliph, Kemal decided to create a political party and to gather the nation around himself as *halāskār ghāzī*, the saviour of the fatherland. In a speech in İzmir he rejected the idea that the Caliph should be considered as the head of the state, or a dignitary with any political responsibility. He argued that since the greater part of the Muslim world was at the moment under foreign domination, the GNA took the Caliphate under its protection until the time when other Muslim countries became independent and gave a definitive form to the Caliphate. In the meantime, he said, the new Caliph Abdulmejid will be wise enough to realize his real position and cautious enough not to cause a crisis by an inappropriate action or behaviour. All along the campaign he addressed himself to two different groups separately, the *khalq*, common people, artisans, peasants, landowners and farmers on the one hand and, on the other, *gençler* or *münevverān*, that is students and the intelligentsia. In the meetings in every city he visited, the *Khōjas*, clerics, came forward as the spokesmen of the *khalq*, people, a function established in the traditional Ottoman society. Questions posed by both groups centered around the position of the Caliph and Islam within the new state. Since Kemal's opponents claimed that the Caliphate could not be separated from the state and the new Caliph had to assume real responsibly in the state, the future of the Caliphate had become the most fundamental and emotional issue across the country.

In his answers to *khōjas*, Kemal used the religious arguments forwarded by the Islamic modernists saying that Islam originally depended on consultative government, and the community's sovereignty was an essential principle in early Islam. But on the other hand Kemal must have been aware that the use of Islam for the *inḳilāb* was contradictory. The *khōjas* were using it confidently against the *inḳilāb* before a religious mass ready to listen. On this platform no real agreement was possible, for the fundamentalist *khōjas* were talking about the Islamic *ummah*, or community ruled by the Religiour Law and its administrator the Caliph, while the *inḳilābchīs*

were considering the people as a nation whose government was based on the national will. In his speeches Kemal carefully distinguished the modernist *khōjas* by calling them "the enlightened *'ulamā* while he accused the conservatives of following the example of those *'ulamā* who served despotic Caliphs for their own personal interests. Kemal talked about conservative *khōjas* as a class with vested interests in defence of the traditional order. Many of them actually made up part of the powerful body of notables in the provinces. He denounced them as enemies of the nation fomenting against the *inḳilāb* which had restored the nation's sovereign rights.

Kemal emerged as a radical revolutionary when he was speaking to the youth and *münevvers*, an elite with secular and professional education, during the campaign. In Konya, a city known traditionally as being unsympathetic to the Ottoman dynasty, in an emotional speech Kemal declared that "if they (the supporters of the Caliphate) make a wrong move he shall consider it not only an opposition against his personal beliefs and goals but a conspiracy and a deadly danger against the life and existence of his nation. When this happens the only thing that he and his comrades sharing his ideals can do is to pass to action and fight until their total oblivion/extinction". This was a declaration of war against those who hoped to create a movement against the *inḳilāb*. Confrontation was inevitable.

With a personality combining the idealist and statesman, Kemal was at the same time a strategist, and a pragmatic politician. He asserted in his speeches to the youth that the *inḳilābchis* definitely are going to win the struggle. The assurance came from the fact that he had full control over the armed forces.

When he was back in Ankara from the tour he had the GNA pass a law to the effect that anyone acting contrary to the GNA's decision on the abolition of the Sultanate and the legality of the acts of the GNA shall be sued under the law for treason against the country.

This political campaign of Kemal in early 1923 has a crucial significance not only for his major *inḳilāb* with the radical changes in the political order of the country, but also for publicly expressing the changes Kemal and his *inḳilābcḥī* companions were planning for the future. First and above all he made it perfectly clear that the GNA representing national sovereignty was the only source of political power in Turkey and no political responsibility was going to be accorded to a member of the Ottoman dynasty under whatever name or office. He declared the Ottoman state dead and replaced by a new Turkish state. This declaration would logically lead to the promulgation of the republic and the abolition of the Caliphate.

Representing all the traditional forces in the country, the Caliphate had the potential to become the center of reaction to the *inḳilāb* and to the modernizing reforms of the future.

The incidents leading to the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 are well known.

A rather practical matter, the question of *who* actually was the head of the state, came to the fore when the Allied Powers at Lausanne made it an issue. Conservatives turned their eyes naturally to the Caliph. Subsequently, Abdulmejīd's behavior and the attention he was getting in the country and abroad led the *inḳilābcḥīs* to make a revolutionary move which was to be achieved through the GNA. Seven months after Kemal's tour in Anatolia, and three months after the signing of the peace treaty, the Republic was promulgated by the GNA and Kemal was elected as its first president. Ismet became prime minister. This new *inḳilāb* further estranged the Rauf group from Kemal, and when the rumours of the Caliph's resignation spread, the opposition beseeched him

not to do it because this, as Lutfi Fikri, chairman of the Istanbul bar, put it, "would thrust the world into a calamity" §.

A letter supporting the Caliph written by the Indian Muslim leaders to Ismet Pasha was published in an Istanbul newspaper before it reached the addressee. This as was well as Rauf's visit to the Caliph in Istanbul, made Kemal and Ismet decide to make the final move and abolish the Caliphate through the GNA.

What was accomplished by the abolition of the Caliphate and the immediate measures of secularization was a radical change. As Count Ostrorog, a judicial consultant to the Ottoman government and a close observer of the changes in Turkey in 1924, pointed out, this was "one of the most considerable events that has happened in the history of the East since the fourteenth century".

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§ If by the word 'world' Lutfi Fikri meant 'the World of Islam'-which he certainly meant–, for visualizing and foreseeing the untold, unprecedented, ruinous and nihilistic *'calamities'* which the Muslim World was to undergo after 1924, this *munevver* Turkish son of Islam must be acclaimed as a reliable 'prophet' (one who makes prophecies):

Six Turkish Muslim Republics under *lā dīnī* communism, *Bait al-Maqdis* under Zionism, fight between Shi'i 'Amal Militia and *sunnī* Palestinians, Iran-Iraq war, fight between Muslims in *maghrib al-aqṣā'* over Western Sahara, intermittent belligerency between the two Yamens, dangerous rivalry between radical and conservative members of the Arab League and the daily massacre of the Eritrean *kalimah* reciters are not sufficient examples of *our calamity* ! Do we not require in 1987 a powerful neutral *Khilāfah* with effective military backing for the entire Muslim world? Editor.

FOOTNOTES

1. Orientalists' principal contributions to the subject include V.V. Bartold, "Caliph and Sultan", *Mir Islama*, 1-2 (1912); Sir T.V. Arnold, *The Caliphate*, Oxford 1924, reprint with a concluding chapter on "The Abolition of the Caliphate", London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1965; an important contribution is Emile Tyan, *Institutions du Droit Public Musulman: II. Sultanat et Califat*, Paris: Recueil Sirey 1965; Pakistani scholars' studies include Siddiqui, *"Caliphate* and *Kingship* in *Medieval Persia"*, *Islamic Culture*, vol. X; and Kemāl A. Fārūkī, *The Evolution of Islamic Constitutional Theory and Practice*, Karachi; National Publishing House 1971; on the abolitian of the Caliphate also see H. Inalcik, "The Caliphate and Ataturk's *Inḳilāb" Belleten* vol. 46 (Ankara 1982), 353-365.
2. See Bartold, *op. cit.*
3. The following is a summary of my, "The Ottomans and the Caliphate", *The Cambridge History of Islam*, I, Cambridge: CUP, 1970, 320-323.
4. On Tipu Sultan Ottoman documents are published by Y.H. Bayur, "Lettres echangees entre Tipu Sultan du Maysor et les sultans ottomans Abdulhamid I et Selim III", *Belleten* vol. XII (Ankara 1948), 617-654.
5. Seydi 'Ali Re'is, *Mīrāt al-Mamālik*, ed. K. Asim, Istanbul 1313 H., 33, 37, 39, 51-52.
6. New Delhi: People's Publishing House 1973, 121-135.
7. Gail Minault, *The Khilāfat Movement, Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India*, New York: Columbia Univ. Press 1982, 6.
8. *Op. cit.*, 111.
9. *Op. cit.*, 95-96.

10. *Op. cit.*, 105.
11. *Op. cit.*, 102.
12. *Op. cit.*, 101-105.
13. *Op. cit.*, 110.
14. *Op. cit.* 154-212.
15. Aziz Ahmad, "Seyyid Ahmad Khan, Jamal al-Din-Afghani and Muslim India", *Studia Islamica*, XIII (1960), 55-78; Nikki R. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī"*, Berkeley: University of California Press. 1968; I. H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent*, The Hague: Mouton 1962; A. Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967.
16. Ihsan Sungu, "Tanzimat ve Yeni Osmanlilar", *Tanẓīmāt*, I, Istanbul Maarif Matbaas, 1940, 777-857; Serif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, Princeton: PUP 1962.
17. F.B. Bailey, *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement*, Cambridge, Mass., 1942.
18. See "Maḥkama" (Inalcik and Findley), EI^2; Cevdet, *Tezakir*, ed., C. Baysun, Ankara 1953-1967.
19. See note 7.
20. N. Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism", Paper presented at the annual meeting of the *American Historical Association*, New York, 1966; Minault, *op. cit.*, 208-212.

21. See Ziya Gökalp, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959, 184-252; Orhan Turkdogan, *Milli kultur, Modernlesme ve Islam*, Istanbul: Ucdal, 1983.

22. Gökalp, *op. cit.* 103, 196, 209, 217, 220.

23. This section dealing with the abolition of the Caliphate is taken from my, "The Caliphate and Ataturk's *Inḳilāb*", *Belleten*, vol. 46 (Ankara 1982), 353-365.

Dr. I.H. Qureshi Memorial Lectures

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University of Karachi