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MILITARY AND FISCAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1600-1700*

H. İNALCIK

Introduction

With the beginning of the last decade of the sixteenth century, certain profound changes started to take place in the Ottoman Empire — changes that eventually were to affect the whole political structure and the social conditions of the country. These changes were so sweeping and sometimes so violently disruptive that, struck by them, many contemporaries, native and foreign, predicted the imminent fall of the empire. This, in turn, prompted members of the Ottoman élite, particularly the bureaucrats, to ponder the causes and true nature of these revolutionary alterations and to offer to those in power their formulas for the desired recovery.[1] In their diagnosis of the ills they found that the Muslim *re'āyā*, the tax-paying subjects of the sultan, had invaded "the military institution", which, as an instrument of the sultan's power, had until then been reserved strictly for his *kul*s, slaves trained to this end. The change was considered a threat to the Empire by these well-meaning bureaucrats who, following the age-old notions of Persian statecraft, thoroughly believed that the well-being of the state and society depended first of all on the strict separation of the different

* For the transliteration of the Arabic, Persian, and Turkish words, the transliteration system used in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*[2] is followed in this article.

[1] No comprehensive study has yet been made of the Ottoman "pamphlets" or "advice books" dealing with the causes of the Ottoman decline during the period between 1590-1640. For listings of them *see* Mehmed Tahir, *Aḫlāḳ Kitāblarımız*, Istanbul, 1325 H., and *Siyāsete Mute'allik Aṯār-i Islāmiyye*, Istanbul, 1330 H.; F. Babinger, *Die Geschichtsschreiber der Osmanen und Ihre Werke*, Leipzig, 1927; A.S. Levend, "Siyâset-nâmeler", *Türk Dili Araştırmaları Yıllığı, Belleten* 1962, pp. 184-194, and "Ümmet çağında Ahlâk Kitaplarımız", *TDAY, Belleten* 1963, pp. 89-115; K. Röhrborn, *Untersuchungen zur osmanischen Verwaltungsgeschichte*, Berlin–New York, 1973, pp. 6, and 163. Since most of these "pamphlets" ('Ālī, Hasan al-Kāfī, 'Ayn-i 'Alī, *Ḳawānīn-i Yeniçeriyān, Kitāb-i Mustaṭāb*, Koči Beg, 'Azīz Efendi, *Hirz al-Mulūk*) are closely related to each other — their theoretical background is common and they are mostly recapitulations of what was said before — a comparative analysis is necessary in each case for a proper assessment of the authenticity of the ideas and observations in them. Selānikī, and especially 'Ālī (*Naṣiḥat al-Salāṭīn*) seem to have largely served as sources for the others.

estates and on keeping the masses in their proper place — an ancient ideal of Near-Eastern statecraft which, indeed, was approximated by the Ottoman Empire in its classical period.[2] Their concern was that as *re'āyā* replaced the *ḳul*s, on the one hand the sultan's authority could no longer be implemented, and on the other hand lands might be left uncultivated and consequently, taxes unpaid. They further maintained that the reasons for this change were to be sought primarily in the fact that under Süleyman I, and particularly under his successors, the sultan's authority in general had weakened, and that bribery and corruption had become so widespread that it became impossible to keep the constitutional laws of the Empire in force and to guard them from alterations.

These concerned bureaucrats, who as functionaries of the government were in a position to make first-hand observations on events and developments affecting central authority, were, in general, accurate in their findings. But their conclusions about the causes and their predictions about the effects of these developments were often misleading. The reason is that they interpreted their findings within the framework of the traditional notions of Oriental statecraft; their primary concern was the preserving and reviving of old regulations and institutions, to which they attributed the past greatness and prosperity of the Empire. Historians of our time have not much questioned their way of thinking and, in most cases, have been content with simply reproducing their arguments.

Actually a struggle of the Anatolian Muslim *re'āyā* to share in the privileges enjoyed by the sultan's *ḳul*s, this tremendous movement, which shattered the social and political foundations of the Empire, has only recently been re-interpreted on the basis of the evidence supplied by the Ottoman archives. In his works on banditry and administrative problems in Western Anatolia, M.Ç. Uluçay published,[3] for the first time, interesting archival evidence on various aspects of

[2] *See* H. İnalcık, "*Kutadğu Bilig*' de Türk ve İran Siyaset Nazariye ve Gelenekleri" in *Reşid Rahmeti Arat İçin*, Ankara, 1966, pp. 259-271.

[3] *XVII. Asırda Saruhan'da Eşkıyalık ve Halk Hareketleri*, Istanbul, 1944, and *18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda Saruhan'da Eşkıyalık ve Halk Hareketleri*, Istanbul, 1944, and *XVII. Yüzyılda Manisa'da Ziraat, Ticaret ve Esnaf Teşkilâti*, Istanbul, 1942, and *Sürgünler*, Ankara, 1951. In the 1930s and 1940s, a number of books and journals containing original material on local history were published under the auspices of the *Halkevleri* in various cities in Anatolia (*see* H. Taner, *Halkevleri Bibliyografyası*, Ankara, 1950).

this struggle. Following him, Mustafa Akdağ, in his various works,[4] concentrated on the economic and social background of the movement, emphasizing its revolutionary character. With the extensive use of archival material Akdağ showed that the *djelālī* rebels or *sekbān*s originated from among the *levend*s, the landless vagrant peasants of Anatolia whose number had, as a result of a general economic crisis in the Ottoman Empire, greatly increased in the second half of the sixteenth century. While Akdağ suggests a general economic breakdown — a drop in crop production, scarcity of precious metals, an unfavorable balance of trade, excessive exploitation by the state and its agents of the populace in the provinces — as an explanation of the disorder and unrest, and of the *levend*ization of the peasants, others place the emphasis rather on population pressure, imbalance between population growth and production output.

The theory that in the sixteenth century population pressure was responsible for some major structural changes in the Ottoman Empire, as was the case in other Mediterranean countries, was first proposed by F. Braudel.[5] But it was M. Cook[6] who, with the use of Ottoman sources, first attempted a systematic investigation of the question. Working "to establish and contrast indices for the size of the population and the extent of arable land" over a period of some hundred and twenty-five years (*ca.* 1450-1575) in three different areas comprising 700 villages in Anatolia, he finds that "population growth was more rapid than the extension of cultivation".[7] Still, he takes care not to overestimate the role population pressure played in the erosion of social order by adding: "The precipitating role of population pressure

[4] "Tımar Rejiminin Bozuluşu", *DTCFD* 3 iv, Ankara, 1945, pp. 419-431, and "Celâlî İsyanlarının Başlaması, *idem*, 4 i, 1945, pp. 23-50, and "Yeniçeri Ocak Nizamının Bozuluşu", *idem*, 5 iii, 1947, pp. 291-309, and "Celâlî Fetreti", *idem* 15 i, 1958, pp. 53-107, and "Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Kuruluş ve İnkişafı Devrinde Türkiye'nin İktisâdî Vaziyeti", *Belleten* 13, Ankara, 1949, pp. 497-571, and 14, 1950, pp. 319-418, and *Türkiye'nin İktisâdî ve İçtimâî Tarihi*, i, Ankara, 1959, ii, Ankara, 1971, and *Celâlî İsyanları*, Ankara, 1963, and *Büyük Celâlî Karışıklıklarının Başlaması*, Erzurum, 1963, and "Türkiye Tarihinde İçtimâî Buhranlar serisinden : Medreseli İsyanları", *IFM* ii, Istanbul, 1949, and "Celâlî İsyanlarından Büyük Kaçgunluk", *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* 2 ii-iii, 1964, pp. 1-49.

[5] *La Méditerranée et le monde méditérranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*, Paris, 1949, pp. 447-470 (ed.[2], i, Paris, 1966, pp. 535-542), (trans.: *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, by S. Reynolds, i, New York, 1972, pp. 591-606.).

[6] *Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia, 1450-1600*, London, 1972.

[7] *Idem*, pp. 10 and 43.

in the explanation of the breakdown of social order is by no means implausible. But population pressure is not the only possible precipitant." Though he raises the question of what made these peasant paupers turn into *djelālī* rebels[8] who, organized in bands and even in armies, for more than a decade challenged the sultan's authority in Anatolia, he discusses the question only briefly without relating it to the crucial development of that time: the use by the state of mercenary units composed of *levend*s equipped with firearms.

The most significant change brought about by the new trend of hiring *levend*s equipped with firearms for military purposes was the rapidly growing number of companies of mercenaries of *re'āyā* origin. Once in existence, these formations, when not in government service, could undertake actions at their own discretion as independent military units or armed bands. One of the reasons for the new trend was that modern warfare came to rely heavily on the use of handguns.[9] Furthermore, since the use of the new weapon brought no additional prestige to the members of the traditional military group,[10] it is easily understood why it was adopted mainly by the lowest stratum in the society, the vagrant peasants in rural areas. The landless peasants in Central Anatolia, as well as in Bosnia and Albania, who, as will be seen later on in this article, had easy access to handguns, welcomed the change as an opportunity for a new livelihood. Also, the government, under the increasing strain of budgetary deficits incurred by the heavy expenses of the Austrian war, but at the same time in desperate need of infantry armed with handguns, found that the use of this group could provide an inexpensive and effective solution to its fiscal and military

[8] Cook, *Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia, 1450-1600*, pp. 39-44.

[9] *See* H. Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte*, iv, Berlin, 1920; W.Y. Carman, *A History of Fire-Arms*, London, 1955; M. Roberts, *The Military Revolution, 1500-1660*, Belfast, 1956; D. Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom*, London, 1956 (for a review of it, *see*, *Belleten* 21, 1957, pp. 501-512); Ch. Oman, *A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century*, London, 1937, pp. 211-218. The author of the *De Turcica Militia* (p. 768) says: "The Turk surely will be beaten, because his infantry, except the few battalions of Janissaries, is worthless and cannot stand against the properly marshalled regiments of pikemen and arquebusiers". Toward the close of the sixteenth century Thomas Sherly says: "The mannor of the fightes that the Turkes vse are Straundge... the horse men haue for weapons a lance de gaye, a bowe, a semiterre... of the foote... the Janissarys doe vse a certeyne peyce that is as long as a muskette..." (*Discourse*, ed. D. Ross. p. 7; *see* also the papers by *V. Parry* and H. İnalcık in *The Proceedings of the Conference on War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, London, 1975).

[10] *See*, *Belleten* 21, pp. 501-512.

problems. Thus, though the theory of population pressure and economic breakdown has its definite merits, the more direct and effective factor drawing peasants away from agriculture in this period seems to be the government's increasing demand for mercenary military men. It is interesting to note that the author of *Kitāb-i Mustaṭāb*, as well as Koči Beg and other contemporary observers, speak of great numbers of peasants abandoning their lands because of their desire to become soldiers; and these observers ascribe the economic downfall of the country to this exodus from the land.[11] Specifically, the state's demand for more and more mercenaries caused, first of all, peasants living under the most disadvantegeous conditions, namely the *mudjerredān* — bachelors living with their parents and siblings on small village plots — to leave home and land. It can be argued that the drop in

[11] "Now most of the *re'āyā* left their homeland moving on to settle either in Iran, or in the Crimean Khanate, or in the frontier lands of Rumili, or in big cities like Istanbul, Edirne, Bursa as porters, while some of them became *celālī*, and others workers on the big estates of the grandees." (*See*, *Kitâb-i Müstetâb*, ed. Y. Yücel, Ankara, 1974, p. 34). The author of this "advice book" places emphasis on the fact (p. 54) that "Turks, Kurds, Gipsies, and many from among the *re'āyā*" now found ways to intrude into the military class which up to then was strictly reserved — under the fundamental laws of the Ottoman State — to *ḳul*s (*see* text pp. 7-8, 15, and 66; *cf.*, *Koči Beg*, ed. A.K. Aksüt, Istanbul, 1939; *see* also "Ghulām" in *EI²*, ii, pp. 1085-1091). The *Kitāb-i Mustaṭāb* was written under Osman II (1618-1622) to tell of serious deterioration in governmental institutions and to submit to the Sultan advice on how order and prosperity could be restored to the country. According to the book, the main problems under Murad III were: the intrusion of the *re'āyā* into the military organizations, the insubordination of the *ḳul*s, the depredations of the *djelālī*s, anarchy in the provinces, and deficit in the state budget resulting from unwarranted increases in the number of the *ḳul*s (*see* esp. p. 16). But apparently in particular the loss of a number of provinces to Shāh 'Abbās and the *djelālī* disorders in Anatolia were the things that most worried the author's contemporaries and prompted him to make this bold and candid address to the Sultan. According to him, the main causes for the unhappy situation were the neglect and violation of the old good regulations of the state, the Sultan's failure to place only honest and able men in high positions, and the corruptness of the high officials. As in all such "advice books", the author's approach to and analysis of the questions is based entirely on the traditional concept of government in the Middle East (*see* İnalcık, "*Kutadgu Bilig'de*", note 2). Oppression of the *re'āyā*, resulting from the government's failure to maintain *'adāle*, and the consequent decrease in state revenues and the weakening of the military are the main themes in the book. The author was apparently of *dewshirme* origin (*see* p. 55) and was connected with the finance department (*cf.*, pp. 34-35). His particular mention of the *ḳapı-aghası* (p. 44) brings the author of the *Ḳawānin-i Yeniçeriyān* to the reader's mind. Yücel's edition of the text is not completely satisfactory. *Kitāb-i Mustaṭāb* was closely adhered to and, in parts, reproduced by Koči Beg. On the situation under Murad III, special attention should be given to the reports of Sinān Pasha (*see* S. Faroqhi, *Die Vorlagen (telhise) des Grosswesirs Sinān paša an Sultan Murad III*, Dissertation, Philos. Fakultät, University of Hamburg, 1967).

production and the eventual breakdown of social order in Anatolia was the direct result of peasants' leaving the land rather than of progressive economic deterioration or population pressure which seems to us rather difficult to prove.

Thus, the growing need for soldiery with firearms in the Central-European battlefields and the resulting increase in financial burdens seem to have been initial factors in bringing about a new era in Ottoman history. Another immediate factor was the collapse of the Ottoman monetary system, caused by the invasion of cheap silver from the West — a collapse that resulted in inflation and devaluation, making the traditional fiscal system obsolete and impoverishing the members of the élite military class. The military and fiscal needs of the state prompted a radical change in the relation of government and subjects, and eventually brought about a state-wide decentralization policy. On the following pages the reasons and results of these changes will be dealt with in detail.

A. Transformation of the Military Organization

1. Ḳapıḳulus

During the long period of war in 1593-1606, reports (*telḫīṣ*)[12] sent by the Ottoman commanders from the battlefront to the government indicated that the Ottoman forces, and especially the *sipāhī* cavalry armed with the conventional weapons of bow and arrow, lance, sword, and shield, proved ineffectual against the Austrian musketeers. In their reports, the commanders urged that paid soldiers, equipped with firearms, be recruited and sent immediately to the battlefront.[13] Impelled by the urgency, the Ottoman government first rapidly increased

[12] C. Orhonlu, *Telhîsler, 1597-1607*, Istanbul, 1970, pp. 52, 56, 59, and 71-72.

[13] In a report to the Sultan (*see* Orhonlu, *Telhîsler*, pp. 51-52) the Grand Vizier says the following about the situation on the Hungarian front: "If by the month of March (1602) five to ten thousand *tüfenkdjis*, men equipped with muskets, do not arrive there, the situation will become critical... But to have ten thousand *tüfenkdjis* enrolled poses great difficulties". In another report to the Sultan (*idem*, pp. 71-72) the Grand Vizier says: "The enemy troops consist mostly of infantry armed with muskets, while the Muslim soldiers are mostly of the cavalry. Also, among our infantry there are very few men skilled in the use of the muskets which causes us great difficulties both in field battles and in siege." In 1605, the Grand Vizier requested a special order from the Sultan commanding Mehmed Beg, the governor of Menteshe, "to come to the Hungarian campaign with a large group of *tüfenk-endāz sekbāns* (*sekbāns* equipped with muskets)" (*idem*, p. 98).

the number of Janissaries, the standing infantry corps: from 13,000 in the 1550s, they grew to 38,000 in the 1600s.[14] Next, the government recruited peasants equipped with firearms as mercenaries from among the *re'āyā* and sent them to the Austrian front.[15]

The expansion of the Janissary corps had two major consequences. First, the *ḳapıḳulus* came to dominate the Ottoman capital and the central government. In the period between 1617 and 1656, state affairs were decided primarily by a coalition consisting of the household of the sultan, which was the source of all legitimate political authority and which, as a result of the seclusion and minority of the sultans, was now dominated by the mothers of sultans and by Palace officials; of the higher *'ulemā* who, with the *Shaykh al-Islām* at their head, were the source of religious sanction; and of the high officers of the Janissary corps, such as the *agha* of the Janissaries, the *sekbān bashı*, and the *ḳul kakhyası*, who represented the actual physical might. In 1622, when the secret efforts of a reform group, gathering around the nineteen-year-old Sultan Osman II, failed to bear fruit, the Janissaries carried out a coup d'état, killing the young Sultan and his supporters. A period

[14] For these figures *see* 'Ayn-i 'Alī, *Risāle-i waḍīfa-khōrān...*, Istanbul, 1280 H., pp. 88, and 117. The number of the *ḳapıḳulu* soldiery (Janissary, *sipāh*, *djebedji*, artillerymen, artillery carriers) at different dates can be estimated as follows:

1451-1481	10 - 12 thousand
1481-1520	12 - 16 thousand
1520-1590	16 - 30 thousand
1590-1630	30 - 70 thousand
1630-1670	60 - 50 thousand
In 1704	70 thousand

In the *Kitâb-i Mustetâb* (ed. Yücel, pp. 14, 27, and 63-64) we find the following figures:

	Under Süleyman I	Under Osman II
Janissaries	12 thousand	35 - 40 thousand
Sipâh	7 - 8 thousand	19 - 20 thousand

But of the 40,000 Janissaries under Osman II only 10,000 participated in the campaigns (*idem*, pp. 27-28).

[15] From 1600 onward, the Ottoman government drew its best mercenary troops from Bosnia and Albania, a practice that had a strong impact on the social conditions in those two countries. Christian *pandurs* (*pandor*) and Eflâks armed with muskets, with the *knezes* and *primükürs* as their commanders, were employed in large numbers in the 1605 campaign (*see* Orhonlu, *Telhisler*, p. 52). There seems to be a direct relationship between their soldiering and the subsequent spread of banditry in the Balkans in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. (On banditry in the Balkans *see* D. Šopova, *Makedonija vo XVI i XVII vek.*, Skopje, 1955; also *Turski dokumenti za aidutstvoto i aramistvoto vo Makedonija*, i-ii, ed. A. Matkovski, Skopje, 1961; B. Cvetkova, "Haidutstvoto v bălgarskite zemi prez XV-XVIII v.", *Istoričeski pregled* 24, 1968)

of Janissary supremacy followed the coup d'état (1622-1656), during which time Anatolia became the center of opposition to the capital. The struggle between the Janissaries in the capital and their opponents in Anatolia resulted in the weakening of the authority of the central government in the provinces.

Even before gaining supremacy in the Ottoman capital, the Janissaries held a dominant position in most Anatolian cities and towns. At the beginning, the Janissaries, acting as guardians of the sultan's authority, were sent only to important centers where they were stationed in garrisons within the walls of the citadels. But, during the period of civil strife among the Ottoman princes which had taken place under Süleyman the Magnificent, and especially during the *djelālī* rebellions in 1596-1607, Janissary garrisons were installed in almost every town and city of Anatolia,[16] mainly for security reasons. By this time, the *sipāhī* cavalry in Anatolia ceased to be an effective force against the rebellious *levend-sekbān* bands who, equipped with firearms, continued to ransack the countryside. Hence, under the command of *serdār*s in the cities and *ḍābiṭ*s in the towns, Janissaries were used in the actions taken against these bandits. These Janissaries, who often remained in particular cities or towns over lengthy periods of time, eventually became urbanized and, through their participation

[16] *See* Ş. Turan, *Kanûnî'nin Oğlu Şehzâde Bâyezid Vak'ası*, Ankara, 1961, pp. 175-179, and Akdağ, "Yeniçeri Ocak". In a firman dated 1589 (*see* Ö. Ergenç, *1580-1596 Yılları Arasında Ankara ve Konya*, Dissertation, DTCF, University of Ankara, Department of History, 1973, Chapter III, note 87) we read: "As soon as the *yayabashı*s and Janissaries took seat in the aforesaid *sandjak* (of Ankara) the *ḳāḍī*s began to have recourse to them on matters that actually were the responsibility of the *mīr-liwā* (governor), and consequently the condition of the people in that province started to deteriorate. Yet the *yayabashı*s and Janissaries had been sent there with the main purpose of guarding the province against those seeding unrest." On the basis of the *ḳāḍī* records Ergenç finds that toward the end of the century, as brigandage started to increase in their respective areas, cities and towns in central Anatolia began to urge the government to send Janissaries there as guardians (*yasaḳdjı*). After their arrival, bandits often tried to disguise themselves in Janissary uniforms. Once the *yasaḳdjı*s were settled in, their commander was often appointed *subashı* of the town or city where he resided. In the middle of the seventeenth century Evliyā Čelebī mentions, in each city or town he visited, among the chief public officials a Janissary officer acting as *ḍābiṭ*, *serdār* or *čawush* of the locality, the *čawush* found only in important cities such as Ankara or Konya (*see*, *Seyâhatnâme*, ii, Istanbul, 1314 H., p. 428, and iii, Istanbul, 1315 H., p. 21). Koči Beg, on the same issue, says: "Now that the *ḳapıḳulu* invaded every corner of the Empire and gained authority over the villages as well as the towns, the governors and *ḳāḍī*s cannot perform their public functions any more, and tax-collectors cannot collect taxes. Now there is almost no city or town where *yasaḳdjı* Janissaries would not be found" (pp. 43, 51, and 88).

in the local social-economic life, began to form an integral part of urban society.[17] Though the chiefs of the corps, the *aghas* in Istanbul, tried very hard to maintain control over them, these Janissaries tended to act more and more as autonomous local groups; and, in some instances they even resisted — successfully — new appointments made by the *agha*.[18]

But Janissaries were not the only *ḳapıḳulu*s to settle in Ottoman cities and towns during the same period of time. Other *ḳapıḳulu*s, such as members of the cavalry divisions, *čawushes*, and *ḳapıdjıbashı*s also were present in all important centers. The *ketkhudā-yeri* (local commander of the *ḳapıḳulu sipāhī*s), for instance, outranked the *serdār* of the Janissaries, but they both could act in the capacity of *emīn*s (government agents) and *mültezim*s (tax-farmers), and be instrumental in the collection of taxes.[19] In the cities, posts of importance, such as the post of the *subashı* (police superintendent), *'ases bashı* (head of night watchmen), and *muhtasrb* (market inspector), were frequently held by *ḳapıḳulu*s.

In the seventeenth century, emerging as a dominant group in the Ottoman cities and towns, the *ḳapıḳulu*s soon extended their control over agricultural lands as well as over provincial trade. Not only did they enjoy a leading position in urban social-economic life, they also became a determining factor in urban politics, and, with the weakening of the authority of the central government, their role as representatives of local autonomy in the provinces became increasingly prominent.[20]

[17] *See* H. İnalcık, "Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration", *Colloquium on the Muslim World in the Eighteenth Century*, University of Pennsylvania, 1971 (under press), and "Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire", *Journal of Economic History* 29 i, 1969, pp. 124-135.

[18] Already in the seventeenth century, incidents like this had taken place (*see* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, doc. no. 142, 194, 211, and 219).

[19] The *ketkhudā-yeri*s were especially powerful since they had monopolized the collecting of *djizya* and related taxes (*see* "Djizya", *EI*², ii, pp. 562-566; *see* also Akdağ, "Türkiye'nin İktisadî Vaziyeti", pp. 557-561), and their rebellion in 1600 seems to have been directly connected with that matter (*see* İnalcık, "Capital Formation", pp. 123-124). In *Na'imā* (v, p. 164) *ketkhudā-yeri*s in the provinces are described as "powerful men, with large possessions and retinue capable of destroying a whole province". Evliyā Čelebī (ii, pp. 396, and 408) compares them to pashas and *beg*s in the provinces. Also, as *woywoda*s (local agents acting as collectors of *khāṣṣ* revenues belonging to the Treasury or to pashas), *ketkhudā-yeri*s or *sipāhī*s of the Porte played a major role in the political and social life of the provinces.

[20] *See* İnalcık, "Centralization and Decentralization".

2. Sekbān *and* Sarıdja[21] *and Rebellion in the Provinces*

In order to meet the challenge of the new military technology it encountered on the battlefields of Central Europe, the Ottoman state resorted to a second measure: the organizing in Anatolia of companies of mercenaries known as *sarıdja* and *sekbān*. This was by no means a novelty to the Ottomans, for the Ottoman state, ever since its foundation, had recruited paid soldiers as auxiliary forces at times of need and had met their expenses by extraordinary taxes (*'awāriḍ-i dīwāniyye*) levied on the *re'āyā*.[22] What distinguished the sixteenth-century practice from the earlier ones was that this time the recruitment was, in Anatolia, from among the vagrant *levends* armed with muskets, and that the new recruits were grouped into special companies called *sekbān bölükleri*.[23] The new practice provided a new

[21] *Sekbān* and *sarıdja*, as designations, are usually mentioned together. The plebeian *sekbāns* seem to have had some resemblance in organization and appearance to the *sekbāns* of the Janissary corps, while the *sarıdjas* were simple *levends* (*cf.*, *Na'īmā*, v, p. 280). The *sekbāns* were used both as foot-soldiers and as cavalrymen. As foot-soldiers, the *sekbāns* proved to be rather inefficient during the Austrian war of 1683-1699 (*see* Fındıklılı Mehmed Agha, *Silāhdār Tārīhi*, ed. A. Refik, Istanbul, 1928, ii, p. 249). *Sarıdjas*, sometimes, are linked to Sarudja Pasha, a frontier lord under Murad II (*See* H. İnalcık, *Arvanid Sancağı Defteri*, Ankara, 1954, p. XVI).

[22] On recruitment of soldiers from among the *re'āyā* under the names of *'azeb*, *sekbān*, or *djerekhōr*, *see* in P. Wittek's "Zu einigen frühosmanischen Urkunden" (*WZKM*, vols. 56-57, and 59-60) the diplomas granted by early Ottoman sultans; *see* also T. Gökbilgin, *Edirne ve Paşa Livası*, Istanbul, 1952, pp. 183, 213, and 380; for a regulation on the enrollment of *'azebs*, *see* the so-called *Süleymān Kānūnnāmesi*, supplement to the *TOEM*, Istanbul, 1330 H., pp. 59-61. A copy of the document, dated 1501, was published in N. Beldiceanu's *Code de lois coutumières de Mehmed II*, Wiesbaden, 1967. (On it *see* H. İnalcık, "Süleyman the Lawgiver and the Ottoman Law", *AO* 1, 1969, p. 137). In the sixteenth century, the recruiting from among the *re'āyā* had brought about some important changes. While before the *re'āyā* used to return home to resume their regular way of living after a campaign, they now stayed on as professional soldiers — a trend that seems to have gained momentum especially during the civil wars between members of the dynasty. At that time the common recruits usually were referred to as *yevmlü*, that is, 'the ones with daily pay', and they can be considered the forerunners of the *sekbāns* (*see* Akdağ, *Celâlîler*, pp. 78, and 114). A firman of Süleyman I (*see*, *Selānikī*, p. 75) speaks of "recruitment from among the *čift-bozans* (peasants who abandoned their land) of *yevmlü* capable of mounting a horse and using firearms".

[23] According to seventeenth-century regulations (*see* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, doc. no. 15, and 243; M. Cezar, *Levendler*, Istanbul, 1965, pp. 351-356) enrollment and organization of the *sekbān bölüks* were carried out as follows: Janissary officers, *čawushes*, were sent from Istanbul to each *ḳāḍilıḳ* (county) with a decree of the sultan authorizing the enrolling of *re'āyā* (toward the end of the century members of the *a'yān* replaced the *čawushes* in this job). The newly enrolled men were provided with an advance payment, *bakhshish*, amounting to 12 *grush* in 1698, to enable them to prepare for the expedition (*see* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, doc. no. 243; *cf.*, Cezar, pp. 355-356). A given sum representing the salary, *'ulūfe*, also was paid out in advance. This was reckoned by multiplying the daily fee by the number of the days in service which could extend over two, three, four, or six months. In addition, the men received some *ta'yīnāt* or *dhakhīre-bahā*, a cash equivalent of their own food ration and the fodder for their animals. The *'ulūfe* amounted to two and a half *grush* per month, and the *ta'yīnāt* to one-eighth of a *grush*. (For the *grush*-to-gold-coin ratio *see* note 27 below.) The *sekbāns* were organized after the model of the Janissary in *bölüks* (squadrons) under *bölük-bashıs*, usually consisting of fifty men (*yoldash*) each. Groups of these *bölüks* were headed by *bash-bölükbashıs*. All the *sekbān bölüks* in Anatolia were put under a *serčeshme* who, like the *bölükbashıs*, was appointed by the central government. The *bölükbashıs*, as a rule, were chosen from among the *ḳapıḳulu*. The symbol of the *bölük* was its *bayraḳ*; and the *bayraḳ-dār* (standard-bearer) was the second highest officer in the *bölük*. The revoking of the standard, symbol of authority given in the name of the sultan, meant the dissolution of that *bölük* (*see* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, doc. no. 465). *Sekbānlıḳ* played a major role in the Ottoman rural social and administrative setup. *Sekbān* esprit de corps made *bölüks* join forces at moments of common danger and unite under the command of one single leader, as it happened, for instance, in the case of Karayazıdjı. In the critical period after 1688, *sekbāns* often claimed to be essentially "belonging to the Janissary *sekbān* organization at the Porte even if employed in the services of some local authority in one of the provinces" (*see* Akdağ, *Celâlîler*, pp. 190-250). Many claimed that the deterioration of the original organization was caused by the infiltration of "outlaws of Kurdish and Türkmen origin" into their ranks (*see* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, doc. no. 243). What the *sekbāns* demanded, when pressing for the reform measures, was the guarantee that "no one would be cut off from his pay, and that no standard would be furled, no *bölük* abolished at the end of a campaign". Though later on the government aimed at eliminating *sekbānlıḳ* as an organization, it had no such intention against the *sekbāns* as individual soldiers (*see* Cezar, *Levendler*, pp. 344-372).

means of livelihood first of all for young landless peasants in the countryside who, attracted by the profession of soldiering, started to leave their villages in increasing numbers. Generally known as *levends*,[24] they became a rich reservoir of manpower both for military service and for banditry.

Though the manufacturing of firearms was a state monopoly, the number of artisans manufacturing firearms privately multiplied rapidly toward the end of the sixteenth century. This sudden growth in production was an obvious result of the increasing demand for firearms by the villagers; and even the strictest orders by the government

[24] One of the reasons why *sekbānlıḳ* was so attractive to young peasants was that it offered exemption from taxes, and especially from the *'awāriḍ*, which had become particularly burdensome to the peasant population (*see* note 77 below). Already in the early times of the Ottoman State, vagrant, jobless peasant boys destined to turn to brigandage were a familiar type in Anatolian society (*see* Cezar, *Levendler*, pp. 3-17; for the ease with which *levends* were recruited for the army *see*, *Na'īmā*, v, p. 280; on the word *levend*, *see* also H. and R. Kahane-A. Tietze, *The Lingua Franca in the Levant*, Urbana, 1958, p. 276).

forbidding the use of firearms by the *re'āyā*, and periodic government raids to enforce this rule by confiscating all firearms from the *re'āyā*, could not bring it to a halt.[25] The increase in production brought about a quick decrease in prices: an ordinary musket could soon be purchased for three to five gold ducats — that is, for a half or even a third of the price of a horse.[26] (A situation most advantageous to the *levend*s whose livelihood directly depended on the use of firearms.[27])

No wonder that the Ottoman writers of the early seventeenth century had cited the arming of the *re'āyā* as one of the most ominous developments of their time. The peasantry's leaving the villages in order to sign up with companies of paid soldiers (*sekbān bölükleri*) or with armed bands roaming the countryside and ransacking towns and villages is, in fact, one of the crucial events in Anatolian history.[28]

[25] Convinced that the appearance of the *djelālī* bands in Anatolia was directly connected with the spreading of uncontrolled use of *tüfenk*s (muskets), the government periodically ordered general inspection and collection of firearms (*see* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, doc. no. 171). The fact that, in 1559, during the rebellion of prince Bayezid, a strict ban on firearms had to be put into effect would indicate that their illegitimate use was, indeed, already widespread. An imperial *fermān* announced that manufacturers supplying gunpowder to the outlaws would be severely punished (*see*, *Mühimme Defteri*, no. 27, p. 173, *Başvekâlet* Archives, Istanbul; *see* also R.C. Jennings, "Firearms, Bandits and Gun-control" (= "Firearms"), immediately following this article.

[26] On their efficiency, especially at the Hungarian front in 1600-1602, *see*, *Na'īmā*, i, pp. 251, 257, and 330-333. But Koči Beg (p. 38) criticizes the use of *sekbān*s, saying that they can easily turn into elements of disorder.

[27] In 1636, an ordinary musket cost 10 *gruṣh*, a horse 36 *gruṣh* (*see* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, p. 217; *see* also Jennings, "Firearms"). At the official rate, one *gruṣh* was equal to two-thirds of a gold piece (*see* H. Sahillioğlu, "XVII. Asrın Ilk Yarısında Istanbul'da Tedavüldeki Sikkelerin Raici", *Belgeler* I ii, 1964, pp. 228-233). Uncontrolled availability of cheap handguns also had revolutionary effects — with far-reaching military, social, and political consequences — in the East-European countries (*see* İnalcık's paper in *The proceedings of the Conference on War, Technology ...*).

[28] *Djelālī* depredations, affecting mostly Anatolia, were especially disastrous in rural areas. Using archival documentation, Akdağ, in his *Celâliler*, tries to prove that the movement started as early as the beginning of the sixteenth century as plundering by landless, rebellious, vagrant peasants. He also maintains that it gained momentum around the middle of the century, during the upheavals caused by the rebellions of the princes under Süleyman I, continued, in the form of depredations by the *sūkhte* (students in *medreses*), during the period between 1560 and 1587, and entered its most critical phase during 1596-1610, as *sekbān-djelālī* disorders. The real background of the movement, according to Akdağ (pp. 145, and 147), was "the economic breakdown" and the resulting "growing number of *levend*s (vagrant peasants) in the rural areas". The unrest first showed itself in the form of conflicts between the *ehl-i 'urf* (state officials and military of *kapı-kulu* origin) and the *levend-sekbān*s. The worsening economic conditions, including the scarcity of liquid money, devaluation, drop in agricultural production, and climbing prices, caused an unprecedented *levend*ization and *sekbān*-ization of the Anatolian peasantry. The organization of the *levend*s into *sekbān bölük*s,

The state was powerless against these vagrant armed bands, because the *tīmār*-holding *sipāhī*s, who were responsible for security and order in the provinces, proved to be completely ineffectual against their muskets. By lending their services to whoever offered to pay them, these *levend-sekbān*s, and especially the *bölük*s they formed in Anatolia, became a most important factor in the decentralization process of the Empire: they were the principal source on which the rebellious pashas and *a'yān* could and did build their military strength in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

In previous times, when the *tīmār* system was still in effect, it was virtually impossible for a provincial governor to rebel against the central government. The retinue (*ḳapı*) of a governor then consisted mostly of his own slaves (*ḳul*s). Unlike the *sekbān*s of later times who, under the command of their *bölükbaṣhı* (a condottiere type of military chief), acted as independent soldiery companies, the slaves had no independence whatsover: they were completely dependent on the governor, whose intercession with the central government they needed in their quest of a *tīmār*, since the central government was the authority responsible for the assignment of all *tīmār*s and the promotion of all *tīmār*-holders. In addition to the *ḳul*s, the governor also had under his command *tīmār*-holding *sipāhī*s both for military campaigns and for the maintenance of civil order. These *sipāhī*s, however, all were anxious to return

according to Akdağ (pp. 121-125, and 146), started in central Anatolia around 1580, and ended with the *djelālī* depredations between 1596 and 1610. He suggests that this particular period can really be divided into two distinct periods: one from 1596-1603, when the *sekbān* companies independently plundered villages, and the other from 1604-1610, when *sekbān* companies, united into larger forces, attacked cities. Some of Akdağ's sweeping generalizations for a whole period or region should be tested, as M. Cook did in his *Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia, 1450-1600*. According to W.J. Griswold (*Political Unrest and Rebellion in Anatolia, 1605-1609*, University of California, Los Angeles, Ph.D., 1966, History, Modern), the *djelālī*s were "wandering raiders ... trained into skillful divisions" by subordinate officers of *ḳapı-ḳulu* origin, and the theory that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was a direct result of the *djelālī* rebellions is at best exaggerated. "Though evidences of deterioration in the Ottoman system existed", Griswold says, "they represented neither chaos nor a fatal crumbling of the structure of the empire". Focusing on the activities of Djanbulād-oghlu 'Alī Pasha, Griswold suggests that, unlike other *djelālī* leaders, Djanbulād-oghlu had the definite objective of "establishing a sovereign state in northern Syria". (On the *djelālī* depredations in the Kayseri region *see* Chapter I of R.C. Jennings' *The Judicial Registers (Şer'î Mahkeme Sicilleri) of Kayseri (1590-1630) as a Source of Ottoman History*, UCLA, Ph.D., 1972, History.) The critical period of the *djelālī* rebellions ended with Murād Pasha's purge in 1609 and Nasūḥ Pasha's reconciliation with the rebels in the following year. Though they were simultaneous with the *djelālī* rebellions in rural areas, no study has been made yet of the *ḳapıḳulu* uprisings in the capital.

to their villages, the source of their revenue, as soon as they had fulfilled their duties under the governor.[29]

Now, the governors in the provinces[30] started to fill up the ranks in their retinues with more and more *sekbān* companies, especially at times of war and campaigns. The government made it a policy to encourage the governors' efforts in this direction, despite the fact that the governors made it a practice to impose on the *re'āyā* extraordinary levies (*ṣalghun*) to meet the expenses of their *sekbān* companies. After returning from a campaign, the governors were often compelled to dismiss a large number of these companies; and similar measures had to be taken by governors reassigned to posts that did not require the maintenance of military.[31] On the other hand, the *sekbān*s, under the leadership of their *bölükbashı*, could easily and frequently did leave the retinue of a governor when no longer satisfied with the pay.

The *sekbān* companies, in their setup, can best be compared to the military groups that appeared in Europe towards the end of the Middle Ages, or to tribal organizations. The *sekbān* companies were led by *bölükbashı*s, each of whom, as organiser of his company, negotiated the conditions of its services and pay. In other words, the *bölükbashı* was responsible for the survival of the company. Once their employment in the service of the government or in the retinue of a governor was terminated, the *sekbān*s, acting under the leadership of their *bölükbashı* as autonomous bodies, usually roamed about in Anatolia. There they imposed their own taxes on the population, exacting tributes of money, food supplies, and animals in amounts proportionate to the size of the town or village concerned. When confronted with local resistance, they did not hesitate to use force against the population. In little more than a decade (1596-1607), these companies of brigand-soldiers, known in the history of Anatolia as the *djelālī*s, brought ruin and devastation to all of Anatolia. Peasants left their lands in large numbers to seek refuge in fortified cities, while the wealthier segment of the population fled to Istanbul, to Rumelia, to Syria, and even to the Crimea.

[29] On the *tīmār* system *see* in *İA* "Timar" by Ö.L. Barkan; *see* also H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire, the Classical Age, 1300-1600*, London-New York, 1973, pp. 104-118.

[30] In the 1689 reform project of the *sekbān*s governors were to employ in their retinue *sekbān* forces in proportion to their means (*mansıblarının tahammülüne göre*) (*see* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, doc. no. 243, p. 456).

[31] *See* Uluçay, *18 ve 19. yüzyıllarda*, pp. 72-80.

This period of anarchy and distress, known as the Great Flight (*Büyük Kačghun*), was not the only incident of its kind in Anatolian history.[32] In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, perhaps on a smaller scale but repeatedly, *sekbān* companies used in and unemployed after military campaigns caused similar disturbances. Confronted with the ineffectiveness of the central government against the *sekbān*s, the population of Anatolia turned to its local leaders for aid and assistance, seeking and obtaining arms to defend itself against these brigand-soldiers, a development that was to become one of the principal factors in the emergence of the *a'yān* in the provinces.

Sekbān companies, in general, consisted of 50-100 men. But frequently enough, and especially in face of a common threat, several of these companies would unite under an energetic leader and would march even against big cities.[33] These groupings were mostly of short duration.

There were times when the *sekbān*s were looked upon as a possible source of force to counterbalance the power of the rebellious Janissaries, and attempts were made to employ them for the attainment of political objectives. It appears that in 1622, for instance, a group of reformers planned to have Osman II lead an army of *sekbān*s in Anatolia to reduce the domination of the Janissaries in the capital.

3. *The* Sekbān–*Janissary Rivalry*

There were, indeed, irreconcilable differences and rivalry between the Janissaries and the *sekbān*s, and not without good reason. First of all, as already mentioned, there were times when Janissaries were used to suppress the *sarıdja*s and the *sekbān*s. Next, though during campaigns they performed duties and functions equalling those of the Janissaries, the *sekbān*s were not given the privileges which the Janissaries enjoyed. This, essentially, was because the *sekbān*s originated from the *re'āyā* class, while the Janissaries were *kul*s, the sultan's men. Beginning with the middle of the sixteenth century, the *sekbān*s had shown a growing tendency to strive by all means for the title and, with it, for the privileges of the Janissaries.[34] The Ottoman writers of *kapıkulu*

[32] *See* Akdağ, *Celâlîler*, pp. 250-257.

[33] The most famous among them are Karayazıdjı Abdulhalīm, his brother Deli Hasan, and Kalendar-oghlu Mehmed over the period 1596-1609, and Abaza Mehmed Pasha (1623-1628), Djennet-oghlu (1625), Ilyās Pasha (1632), Gürcü Abdünnebī (1649), Varvar Ali Pasha (1648), and Yeğen Osman Pasha (1688).

[34] In 1559, the main objective of the *yevmlü* was to be included in the *kapıkulu*

origin, Koči Beg among them, were right when identifying as the crucial problem of this period the *re'āyā*'s attempt to infiltrate the Janissary corps and, through it, the entire *ḳapıḳulu* organization, including the Palace.[35]

In 1622, following the murder of Osman II by the Janissaries, Abaza Mehmed Pasha, a governor in Anatolia, gathered a large number of *sekbān*s around him and, proclaiming the belligerent action of the *sekbān*s to be a fight to avenge the Sultan's murder, gave their agression the needed legitimate aspect and a political character. For years (1623-1628), Abaza dominated a large part of Anatolia, holding it against the Janissaries who had control over the government in the capital. He did so mainly by conducting a thorough hunt for Janissaries in Anatolia and having them massacred wherever they were found.

The revolt of Abaza Mehmed Pasha can be considered a turning point in the history of Anatolia. It marked the beginning of a period one might call the era of rebellious governors, an era that continued until the suppression of their coalition under Abaza Hasan Pasha, by Köprülü Mehmed in 1658.[36]

As to the *sekbān* companies, they continued in existence throughout the whole seventeenth century. Time and again, gathering around an energetic leader, they succeeded in bringing together sizable armies of their own. But these coalitions were usually of short duration, and broke up into independent companies again as soon as the strong leaders disappeared. The state, on the other hand, though it was badly in need of these companies and increased their number in times of war, was faced almost constantly with the serious peacetime problem of unassigned *sekbān* companies roaming the country and causing undue hardship to the population. As we have seen, the problem arose from the circumstance that, though they maintained their organizational form throughout, the *sekbān* companies received no pay while unassigned in peacetime and, to secure their livelihood, felt compelled to turn to exactions, plunder, and brigandage in armed bands. Of even greater

divisions of the Porte (*see* Turan, *Kanûnî'nin Oğlu*, p. 175). The self-declared Janissaries — fakes — were called *saplama yeniçeri*. According to Koči Beg, they numbered 300,000. It was with the greatest fervor that the *yasakdji* Janissaries in the provinces tried to seek them out and to eliminate them.

[35] *See* notes 1 and 11 above.

[36] Hüseyin Pasha, who joined Karayazıdjı in 1599, can be considered the first of this type of rebellious pashas. But it was only after Abaza Mehmed Pasha's uprising in 1623 that rebellious pashas appeared as heads of *sekbān* forces in the provinces.

concern to the state was the fact that during campaigns *sekbān* companies that had been paid in advance would often remain in Anatolia and engage in banditry there.

It should be added here that, unlike the *a'yān* of subsequent times, the *bölükbashı* and his *sekbān* company had no local status base. If anything, their interests were essentially opposed to those of the local population, and their actions mostly confined to undertakings bordering on banditry. Nevertheless, some of them were still able to rise to prominence and to fill the post of a bey, a pasha, and even of the grand-vizier, as was the case with Kara Ibrahim Pasha.[37]

4. Sekbān *Domination of the Empire*

The *levend-sekbān*s reached the height of their prominence during the years 1687-1689, when the Ottoman state suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Holy League and the Janissaries turned to rebellion. It was at this time that Yeğen Osman, who — contrary to all accounts by court historians depicting him as a mere bandit chief — had assumed the leadership of Anatolian *sekbān*s, and emerged as a man of primary importance in the political life of the Empire.[38] At the time of Mehmed IV's deposition (November 8, 1687) and in the following period of confusion, he was considered the only force strong enough to counterbalance the Janissary rebels. In the autumn of 1687, when the rebellious Janissaries, returning defeated from the Hungarian front, were determined to march on Istanbul and to depose the Sultan, Mehmed IV first made Yeğen Osman *sandjak beyi*, then, giving him the title of *serčeshme*, appointed him the commander of all Anatolian *sekbān*s. And when Yeğen, at the head of 4,000 *sekbān*s, came to Istanbul, the Sultan bestowed special favors on him, and had him march on to Rumelia. He even sent word after Yeğen that he would give him his daughter, Hadidje Sultan, in marriage. Yeğen Osman Pasha took his stand at Edirne, hoping to halt the march of the rebels there. Unable to stop them and not wanting to cooperate with them, he stayed put in Rumelia.

[37] *See*, *Silāhdār Tārihi*, ii, p. 295.

[38] The principal source on Yeğen Osman Pasha is *Silāhdār* (ii, pp. 271, 354-376, and 402-415); *see* also *Rāshid's Tā'rikh*, (i, p. 506). *Silāhdār* made good use of the reports (*telkhīs*) to the Sultan. Yeğen Osman, a *djelālī* active in the region between Sivas and Bolu, the classic homeland of the *djelālī*s, had under his command about 4,000 *sekbān*s. During the critical years of the Austrian war he successfully challenged the Sultan's forces sent against him. When invited to join the imperial army, he promised to round up all the *sekbān*s in Anatolia if he was made *sandjak beyi* and given the title of *serčeshme*.

Süleyman II, who succeded Mehmed IV, saw in Yeğen Osman and his *sekbāns* the only group powerful enough to stand up against the Janissaries, who had deposed Mehmed IV. As a first step, the new Sultan appointed Yeğen Osman Pasha governor general (*beylerbeyi*) of Rumelia (November 25, 1687), then made him the commander in chief of the forces on the Hungarian front. Osman then increased the number of his *sekbāns* to 10,000 men and, for their upkeep, imposed special taxes on the *re'āyā* population. At the same time, he saw to it that members of his family as well as his fellow *bölükbashıs* were appointed to governorships and other high positions. Posing as the savior of the state (*ṣāḥib-i khurūdj*) against the coalition formed by the *ḳapıḳulu*, who dominated Istanbul, he planned to march on Istanbul to take over as grand vizier.

Realizing the intentions of Osman Pasha, Grand Vizier Ismail Pasha decided to eliminate him. To this end, the Grand Vizier secured both a decree by the Sultan and a *fatwā*, declaring the abolition of *sekbān* organizations altogether and ordering the death punishment for all *sekbāns* trying to resist. Stating: "From now on, in the provinces and in the *sanḍjaḳs*, persons carrying the titles *mütesellim* and *woywoda*, and other state officials (*ehl-i khidhmet*) are forbidden to have in their employ, or to maintain in their retinue *sarıḍjas* and *sekbāns*",[39] the decree is a clear proof of the predominant position the *sekbāns* actually held within the Empire. Traveling between Anatolia and Rumelia was put under strong control and, in Rumelia, a *nefīr-i 'ām* — a call to arms — was issued against Yeğen Osman and his followers ordering: "Under the command of governors, *mütesellims*, *woywodas*, *subashıs*, *ketkhudā-yeris*, *serdārs* of the Janissaries, village *ḍābiṭs* and village *ketkhudās*, village and town population shall be armed and made to search, as if in pursuit of a prey, the mountains and the valleys, and shall kill the *sekbāns* wherever they find them".

In Anatolia, the population had taken to arms on its own initiative, forcing the *post factum* issuance of *nefīr-i 'ām* there.[40] Everywhere, towns and cities were surrounded with stockades and were reinforced with militia equipped with firearms. The Palace in Istanbul was thrown into confusion by this sudden insurgence of the people, while the *sekbāns*, though bewildered and without supplies, began to unite to fight for their survival. Finally, a Palace group that advocated the necessity

[39] *See*, *Silāhdār*, ii, pp. 355-356.

[40] Pursuit of *sarıḍjas* and *sekbāns* in Anatolia with the cooperation of Hüseyin Pasha and his *il-eris* (*see* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, doc. no. 225).

of supporting the *sekbāns* against the Janissaries managed to convince the Sultan to dismiss the Grand Vizier. The call to arms was then immediately revoked and new orders disbanding local militia forces were dispatched everywhere.

Yeğen Osman Pasha emerged from this crisis even more powerful than he had been. The fact that, after Rumelia, now many *sanḍjaḳs* in Anatolia were given to his fellow *bölükbashıs*, as well as the new appointments of men of *re'āyā* origin as *sanḍjaḳ beyi* and *beylerbeyi*, and the changes made among the commanders of the Janissary corps were clear indicators of the profound changes that had taken place in the attitude of the Palace. Soon all Anatolia was in the hands of the *sekbāns*; they dominated the countryside by controlling the roads and passes. And now it was the turn of the *sekbāns* to track down the *ḳapıḳulus* and to massacre them wherever they were found. Also, fearing revenge, peasants and small-town inhabitants once again sought refuge in nearby cities and, once there, they often tried to reinforce the place by digging trenches around it.

When Yeğen Osman Pasha suddenly announced his decision to march on Istanbul in order to seize full power by eliminating all those who were involved in the call to arms against him, the news created a state of panic in the capital. At the same time, news had reached Istanbul that the Austrians had taken Belgrade and were now preparing for a general occupation of the Balkans. Anatolian cities, in their petitions as well as in the *fatwās* sent to Istanbul, made it known that they would refuse to cooperate with the government in fighting against the enemy, unless a new *nefīr-i 'ām* was declared against the *sekbāns*. Finally, in December 1688, an imperial council was convened, and the abolition of all *sarıḍja* and *sekbān* organizations, and the use of *nefīr-i 'ām* soldiers against those who disobeyed decreed. First, however, a *fatwā* to that effect had to be obtained from the *Shaykh al-Islām*. Next, Selim Giray, the Crimean khan, whose influence at the capital was very great at that time, was invited to Istanbul so that his support might be enlisted. Only thus could the *sekbāns* be prevented from seizing power in Istanbul.

In Sofia, in a street fight, the people joining forces with the *ḳuls* were able to defeat Osman Pasha's attempt to take over the city. Thereupon, *nefīr-i 'ām* soldiers armed with muskets and "*re'āyā* from all around with scythes in their hands" began to march against the *sekbāns*, while other *nefīr-i 'ām* soldiers took the road passes under their

control. Finally, the *sekbāns* around Yeğen Osman were dispersed, and Osman Pasha himself caught and executed.

The situation developed somewhat differently in Anatolia, where *sekbāns*, about four thousand of them, gathered around Djiridj-oghlu and, staging a successful resistance, annihilated the forces of Hüseyin Pasha, the inspector general sent by the central government. Eventually here too the main resistance of the *sekbāns* was broken with the assistance of *nefīr-i 'ām* soldiers and of some tribal forces.[41] Nevertheless, in 1695, new orders had to be issued calling for the merciless annihilation of the *sarıdjas* and *sekbāns* still continuing their resistance in Anatolia. In 1698, the *sekbāns*, who by then were fighting for their existence, decided to reorganize and reorient themselves, since their only chance for survival was to become a military organization in the service of the state. A number of prominent *bölükbashıs* then came together and demanded the intercession of the Janissary corps, to which *sekbāns* traced the origin of their organization, in arranging for an agreement with the central government. Containing specific stipulations,[42] the agreement called for the reinstatment of the office of the *serčeshme* in the retinue of the grand vizier. This office was to represent all *sekbāns*, and was to take on responsibility for all their actions. Second, the appointments of *sekbān bölükbashıs* in the retinues of governors could be made only by the order of the sultan, upon the petition of the *serčeshme*. Third, the *serčeshme* and the *bölükbashıs* in a governor's retinue were to assume the full responsibility "in agreement and in unison" for the punishment of *sekbāns* engaging in banditry. In return, the *sekbāns* were to be given full guarantee to receive salaries and rations consisting of 12 piastres in bonus (*bakhshīsh*), six months' pay in advance, and 0.24 piastres per day for food and horse fodder; and no cuts should be made in these, be it during or after campaigns. The last stipulation of the agreement called for the employment by the governors of as many *sekbāns* as their offices could carry, and forbade their dismissal after their return from a campaign, a frequent cause for *sekbāns* to turn to brigandage. Interestingly enough, this agreement strongly resembles the much younger *sened-i ittifāk* concluded between the *a'yān* and the government in 1808:[43] both agreements contain specific stipulations

[41] *See*, *Silāhdār*, ii, p. 451; *see* also Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, doc. no. 225, 229, and 237.

[42] *See* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, doc. no. 243, pp. 464-467, and *18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda*, doc. no. 8.

[43] *See* H. İnalcık, "Traditional Society: Turkey", in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, eds. R. Ward and D. Rustow, Princeton, 1964, pp. 52-53, and "Sened-i İttifak ve Gülhane Hattı", *Belleten* 28 cix-cxii, 1964, pp. 604-611.

and involve, as participants, the government and some independently organized group. Unfortunately, the agreement which was to introduce discipline among the *sekbāns* by placing them under governmental control, and which was to provide them with a regular income for their livelihood failed to achieve its aim, neither side having had the necessary means to live up to its stipulations.[44]

During the lull following the war against Austria, many of the *sekbān* companies were left without pay and returned anew to banditry for their livelihood. As a result, in 1718 the office of the *serčeshme* in the capital was once again abolished, and all *sekbān* companies in the provinces disbanded. Also, it was proclaimed that *sekbāns* resisting this decision would be sought out and mercilessly killed by the *nefīr-i 'ām* soldiers.[45] The main purpose of the order was to eradicate *sekbānlık* as an institution.

New organizations were formed to replace the *sekbāns*, but the recruits, once again, were drawn from among the *re'āyā levends*. Instead of *sekbān* they were now called under the different names of *deli*, *gönüllü*, *tüfenkdji*, *fāris*, *levend*, and *'azeb*. Like the *sekbāns*, they were mostly musketeers. But the basic problem still remained: while one part of the *levends* was enrolled by the state or employed in the retinue of a governor or an *a'yān*, the other part, the *kapısız* (unemployed) *levends*, continued to roam Anatolia. Thus, the *levend/sekbān* phenomenon, as a manifestation of ever-present social conditions and a result of military needs, persisted throughout the eighteenth century, fluctuating with peace and wartime opportunities and demands. The Austrian (1736-1739) and the Iranian (1722-1746) campaigns and, later on, the Ottoman–Russian war of 1768-1774 caused a great increase in the number of *levend* companies.[46] But, in 1774, upon the conclusion of the Russian war, the *levends*, like the *sekbān* companies before them, were ordered abolished; and once again *nefīr-i 'ām* soldiers were used to ensure compliance with the order.[47]

[44] For *levend-sekbān* depredations after 1695 *see* Uluçay, *18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda*, doc. no. 11, and 12.

[45] *See* Uluçay, *18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda*, doc. no. 18, dated March 1719.

[46] For the *miri-levendāt* organization *see* Cezar, *Levendler*, pp. 343-372; *see* also Uluçay, *18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda* (p. 73 note 3) on the enrollment of 1,000 *miri-levendāt*, under twenty *bayraks*, in Rumili.

[47] *See* Cezar, *Levendler*, pp. 297-310; *see* Uluçay, *18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda*, pp. 212, and 218-224.

5. *General Call to Arms (*nefīr-i 'ām*) and* il-eri *Organization*

As we have seen, the *nefīr-i 'ām* played a rather important role in the security of the provinces. But, at the same time, by enabling the creation of local militia units under the leadership of the local *a'yān*, it also was greatly instrumental in the decentralization process at work in the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century. For a better understanding of what was happening, we must take a look at how security was maintained in the provinces during the classical period of the Empire, and how this process was disrupted eventually.

Until the mid-sixteenth century, under the centralistic sultanate system, the task of maintaining security in the Empire was regarded as part of the sultan's absolute jurisdiction. The disrupters of public security could be prosecuted only by those who represented the central authority in the provinces, that is, in ascending hierarchical order, by the *sipāhī*, the *subashı*, the *sandjak beyi*, and the *beylerbeyi*; and punishment could be inflicted only upon the legal decision of the local *ḳāḍī* or his agent (*nā'ib*). The imposition of corporal punishment was strictly the right of the custodians of public trust in the provinces, that is, of the *sandjak beyi*s, the *beylerbeyi*s, and of the viziers.[48] Originally it was the right of the *tīmār*-holding *sipāhī*s and *subashı*s to collect the fines set by the *ḳāḍī* for misdemeanors committed within the boundaries of their *tīmār*s. Later on, this right was transferred to the *sandjak beyi*s as part of the revenues of their *khāṣṣ*es.[49] In pursuit of personal gain, the *sandjak beyi*s, acting both as prosecutors and as enforcers of the law, made frequent tours in their provinces with their retinues. This system of serving justice became a constant source of often serious abuses and injustices against the *re'āyā*. In larger areas, because of the extent of their territory, the beys and pashas often entrusted the collection of fines, dues, and fees to their deputies, the *woywoda*s and the *subashı*s. In many instances they simply farmed out their revenues to their subordinate officials in return for a certain amount of money paid in bulk for these privileges.

In the period of decline most oppressive actions against the *re'āyā* took two forms. In one, deputies acting in the name of governors often

[48] H. İnalcık, "Adâletnâmeler", *Belgeler* 2 iii-ixl, 1967, pp. 79-84; *see* also U. Heyd, *Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law*, ed. V.L. Ménage, Oxford, 1973, and my review of it in *BSOAS* 37 iii, 1974.

[49] İnalcık, "Adâletnâmeler", p. 81.

attempted to collect fines and fees not due to them. In the other, unemployed *levend*s, or *sarıdja*s and *sekbān*s, made it their habit to collect from the *re'āyā* illegal levies in money and kind for their livelihood. This practice could become greatly aggravated in wartime, when the pashas and beys, with all their forces, were away fighting in distant lands. But even *sekbān*s and *levend*s in the retinue of those responsible for the security of the people often resorted to such illegal actions, especially when they had not been paid.

Under these circumstances the central government was compelled, time and again, to issue a *nefīr-i 'ām*, calling to arms the *re'āyā* population by the order of the sultan to assist the forces of the state.[50] At the turn of the century, when Anatolia was plagued with *djelālī* activities (1596-1609), these popular forces were called upon not only against the *sekbān*s engaged in banditry, but also against all *ḳapıḳulu*s, *woywoda*s, and *subashı*s who, traveling in Anatolia by large parties of armed men, oppressed the *re'āyā* population. By a radical resolution of the central government, *ḳapıḳulu*s and other local government agents abusing the authority entrusted to them were declared lawbreakers rebelling against the sultan's authority.[51] For a better understanding of the reasons behind this radical resolution of the central government, a more detailed study of the situation is needed.

By this time it had become a common practice with the military administrators and the military in general to use extortion of the *re'āyā* as a means of increasing their revenues. Apparently they were impelled to do so by the fact that, while their revenues dwindled as a result of both

[50] *Nefīr-i 'ām* was ordered, at times of extreme urgency, against internal or external enemies. In 1908, a foreign observer (E. de Hurmuzaki, *Documente privitoare la istoria Românilor*, Supplement i, Bucharest, 1889, p. 263) describes the call to arms, the mobilization of the peasants, as follows: "Le grand vizir organisa des bandes irregulières de paysans turcs et bulgares... organisés à peu près commes les guerillas espagnolles". For the ordering of a *nefīr-i 'ām* a *fatwā* of the *Shaykh al-Islām* was needed (*see, e.g.*, Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, p. 290). There is ample evidence that, in Seljukid and early Ottoman periods, able men from among the *re'āyā* population were organized against the disruptive elements in the cities and in rural areas. In the sources, their city commanders are called *il-bashı*, *yigit-bashı*, or *igdish-bashı* (*see* Akdağ, *Türkiye İktisadî ve İçtimâî Tarihi*, i, Ankara, 1959, pp. 13-17; ii, Ankara, 1971, p. 75 note 1). Under Süleyman I and after, *il-eri*s were often employed against *levend-sükhtes*; and, beginning with 1574, the *il-eri* was a well-established institution in Anatolia (*see* Akdağ, *Celâliler*, pp. 61, 95, and 103-107). Sometimes, especially in fighting against *levend* outlaws, tribal forces were preferred to the *il-eri*s (*idem*, p. 459).

[51] *See* İnalcık, "Adâletnâmeler", p. 122.

the inflation and the devaluation of the *akče*,[52] the cost of maintaining their retinues constantly increased, especially during the campaigns. They practiced this extortion within the framework of the existing laws and long-established customs, such as touring the countryside in the pursuit of criminals, or receiving gifts from the *re'āyā*, both in cash and in kind, a standing obligation in Ottoman society.[53] Most onerous of all were the *ṣalghuns* or *ṣalmas* (requisition of money and provisions) imposed on the local population by the governors and their deputies in order to provide for the large number of *sekbāns* they had to keep in their service against the *levend-djelālī* bands.[54] By the end of the sixteenth century the situation in the provinces had become so critical that, in 1595, in a rescript addressed to the governors and all subjects, the sultan sternly warned that *sandjak beyis* or their deputies committing such unlawful acts would face the death penalty, and that their entire holdings would be given to those who had been victimized by their action.[55]

[52] In 1588, Selānikī (MS, DTCF, Ankara), a contemporary historian and office-holder in the Ottoman finance department, recorded it as follows: "Now one gold piece went up in value from sixty to one hundred and twenty *akče*, and consequently all prices were doubled at the markets by the traders. Food prices and clothing items had become twice as expensive as they were before. The ones getting a salary of ten ducats now suddenly found themselves in the position of the ones getting only five ducats earlier". About the same time, Muṣṭafā 'Ālī, another office-holder in the finance department, wrote: "Now that the shopkeepers feel free to set their own prices, the once officially set prices increase daily, so that the grocers, as a group, are getting rich while the military class and the élite are being impoverished by the day" (*Naṣīḥat al-Salāṭīn*, Fātih Library, Istanbul, no. 3522, 5a). Measured by the price of silver, the general price index went up 16 percent in 1585. Ö.L. Barkan, in his "The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century" (*IJMES* 6 i, January 1975, pp. 3-28), tries to explain the sharp rise in prices primarily as a result of the devaluation carried out by the state. But one cannot and should not overlook the events preceding the devaluation: the influx of silver from the West, the increase in foreign exchange, and the money shortage on the market, a phenomenon that evidenced itself as early as 1575 in the bigger Ottoman cities.

[53] *Mütesellims*, *woywodas*, and *subashis*, acting as deputies of governors, were usually the ones in the forefront of these plunders. They were motivated by the desire to carve out for themselves a fat share of the money before they sent it on to their masters, who in most cases were far away on battle fronts (*see* İnalcık, "Adâletnâmeler", pp. 70-75).

[54] Also, in earlier times, it was not uncommon for governors to demand such levies from the *re'āyā* to meet military expenditures. They claimed these levies to be a variety of the *'awāriḍ-i diwāniyye*, taxes to which the government took recourse in case of similar need. But because of the abuses committed through them, the sultans made the imposition of such taxes by pashas subject to the sultan's personal approval. The imposing of taxes on the *re'āyā* independently of the central government was regarded as a serious transgression of the sultan's authority and an act detrimental to the state since such illicit taxes often prompted the *re'āyā* to abandon their lands, thus causing major losses in state revenues and other disruptions in the order of the state.

[55] *See* for text pp. 104-108, and for analysis of it pp. 69-79 in İnalcık's "Adâletnâmeler".

It is clear from the contents of the petitions forwarded to the government through the offices of the local *ḳāḍīs* that both the *a'yān* — the influential citizens — and the common people were much more concerned over the abuses committed by the regular members of the military-administrative class than over those committed by the *sekbān-djelālī* bandits. And not without reason. Even the inspector-pashas, who were appointed by the central government to chase rebels and bandits, could not resist the temptation to impose their own levies on the *re'āyā* population.[56] In 1687, a new decree was issued abolishing the inspector-pasha status. According to the decree, some inspector-pashas had gathered as many as two thousand *levends*, and used them to pillage towns and villages.[57] Sometimes it was governors who, compelled to maintain their *sekbāns*, imposed illegal levies on the *re'āyā* population just as the *djelālīs* did, and consequently were declared rebels by the sultan.[58] In Anatolia the central government was compelled time after time to sanction organized popular resistance to its own agents when, in disregard of law and authority, they created chaos and anarchy; but it seems that such sanctions were often issued after rather than before the people's mobilization in self-defense. As to the purpose and implementation of a *nefīr-i 'ām*, the following description is given in a juridical rescript (*'adāletnāme*) sent to the *ḳāḍī* of Erivan in 1596:[59] "An able and strong leader called *yigit bashi* is to be appointed for each village, and the villagers are to give him their oath of loyalty. It shall not be considered a crime to kill those who come to a village with titles such as sultan's *sipāhi*, Janissary, armorer (*djebedji*), artilleryman, door keeper (*ḳapidji*), *beylerbeyi*, *sandjak beyi*, or *subashi* and, traveling under military insignia, impose illegal taxes on the *re'āyā* population, attack the families of Muslims, or commit any other kind of injustice (against the people)."

The militia known as *il-eris*,[60] according to decrees sent to Anatolia

[56] *See* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, doc. no. 13, 37, 104, 116, 143, 145, 146, 156, 159, 172, 215, and 219.

[57] Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, doc. no. 215.

[58] Famous examples were Yusuf Pasha in 1607 (*see* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, pp. 20-27, doc. no. 16, 27, 30, 31, and 32; *see* also *Na'imā*, ii, pp. 65-71), Ilyas Pasha in 1627 (*see* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, pp. 37-49, doc. no. 67, and 99), and Genç Mehmed Pasha in 1696 (*see* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, pp. 108, and 448, doc. no. 232, and 238).

[59] *See* İnalcık, "Adâletnâmeler", pp. 104-108.

[60] For *il-eris see* note 50 above. In 1578, an imperial order permitted the governor of Anatolia to organize *il-eri* forces under *yigit bashis* in the villages (*see*, *Başvekâlet* Archives, Istanbul, *Mühimme*, no. 35, p. 101).

between 1598 and 1605, was organized in the following manner : Upon the arrival of the sultan's decree to this effect, the local *ḳāḍī*, whose task it was to organize the militia, convened the local notables (*a'yān*)[61] in the presence of the *mubāshir*, the envoy of the *beylerbeyi*. They then elected from among themselves a *serdār* (chief), also called *il-bashı* or *il-ketkhudası*. According to the decrees, the man thus elected had to be someone "from the local *a'yān* (a person) competent, well-known, honest, and wealthy, and (whose) words were listened to by the people", a description fitting almost verbatim the definition of an *a'yān* given in eighteenth-century documents. Once a *serdār* was elected, it was his duty to select from every village a *yigit bashı* who, in turn, would gather under his command *yigits* or *il-eris*, young villagers able to use fire-arms.[62] Then, at times of need, the *yigit bashıs* and their men were mobilized by the *serdār* under the oath to act, in unison with the local population, against the outlaws. The names of those who took the oath were recorded in a register (*defter*) kept by the *ḳāḍī*. If a band of brigands, ten or more, was seen in action, it was enough to set the machinery into motion. First a call would be sent out ordering the group to appear at the court of the *ḳāḍī*. If they refused to comply, *il-eris*, under the command of the *serdār*, were ordered to take action against them. According to a contemporary source,[63] the *nefīr-i 'ām* was a practice dreaded not only by the outlaws but also by government officials, who, guilty or not, often felt threatened while it lasted. Increasingly concerned over the situation, the government finally appointed a general commander of its own, called *bashbugh*, to head the *nefīr-i 'ām* forces.[64]

[61] The term *a'yān* referred to the leading elite in the cities and towns. Since in this period *ḳapıḳulu* officers and agents of governors already formed part of the *a'yān*, they also could be elected *serdār*s.

[62] *Il-eri*s were expected to be "fully skilled in using muskets (*mükemmel tüfenk-endāz*)" (*see* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, p. 185).

[63] *See*, *Silāhdār*, ii, pp. 402, and 414.

[64] In 1625, Hüseyin Pasha, governor general of Anatolia, was appointed *bash-bugh* with the order to lead *wilāyet-erleri* and *ahālī-i memleket* (*il-eri*s) against the brigand Djennet-oghlu, who in turn called on the population to unite under his leadership in the fight against the tyranny of the sultan's officials (*see* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, doc. no. 46, 47, 225, and 228). In 1688, Süleyman Agha, *silāḥshor* of the Sultan, was given the title of Rakka *beylerbeyi* and made *bash-bugh* of the *nefīr-i 'ām* forces in Anatolia (*see* Rāshid, *Tā'rikh*, ii, p. 37). The title *bash-bugh*, or *bash ve bugh*, was a general term for commander, leader. (For the various uses of the word *see* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, pp. 234, 309, and 464).

As can be seen, the *ḳāḍī*s, and especially the *a'yān* in the provinces, played a considerable role in the institutionalizing of the *il-eri* organization. Not only did the *a'yān* exert great pressure on the government with their petitions (*maḥḍar*s) demanding the declaration of a *nefīr-i 'ām* sent to Istanbul by way of their *ḳāḍī*s, but they also actively participated in the formation of their local *il-eri* organizations.[65] They were usually notables formerly belonging to the military class : ex-*ḳapıḳulu*s, *aghas*, or *za'ims* who had taken on the leadership of their local *il-eri* troops and made use of their services. Most of these notables had a vital interest in keeping the villages undisturbed, not only because of fear for their estates surrounding the villages, but also because of fear of losing their income as *mültezim*s (tax-farmers), and often usurers. Other *a'yān*, whose riches came from trade, needed protection for their caravans and more safety on the trade routes in general. Yet, the natural interdependence of city and rural areas had its share in the events. On the one hand, since provisions for the city and raw materials for crafts were supplied by the nearby villages, it is easily understood why the city *a'yān*, allied with the *ḳāḍī* and the urban military elements, fought so hard against anybody or anything trying to disrupt the security of the surrounding rural area. On the other hand, the peasants, whatever type of settlement their villages might have been, were strongly dependent on the urban economy, which provided a market for their produce and supplied them with manufactured goods as well as with agricultural credit, seeds, and animal stock from the *a'yān* farms.[66] In addition, the peasants looked at the city as a place where they could seek refuge at times of danger.

In principle then, the *nefīr-i 'ām* soldiers originally were to co-operate with the government forces in their fight against the brigands, but their cooperation could be on a much larger scale. As early as the 1683-1699 war, we see the emergence, in Anatolia, of local leaders coming from the urban military class or from the city notables who, representing central authority, could and often did assume the command of these forces under the official title of *serdār*, *mütesellim*, or *ḳapıcıbashı* (*serbewwābīn-i dergāh-i 'ālī*).[67]

One of the results of the social reverberations caused by the *nefīr-i 'ām*s was the emergence of the *gharīb-yigit*s, young vagrants, who, after

[65] *See* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, doc. no. 220, and 222.

[66] *See* İnalcık, "Capital Formation", pp. 124-135.

[67] *See* İnalcık, "Centralization and Decentralization".

leaving their *il-eri* organizations, went to seek their careers as *sekbāns* or *levends*, thus providing a good reservoir of trained fighting men for the government and its agents. But frequently enough *nefīr-i 'ām* soldiers, staying in a group under the leadership of their *serdār*, would resort to straight brigandage as a means of livelihood.[68] It was thus only natural that in most of the cases the central government was anxious to disperse the *nefīr-i 'ām* soldiers as soon as the return of an orderly situation would permit it, and that frequent raids were conducted by the government to search for firearms in *re'āyā* possession. Though only a temporary measure, in each case the *nefīr-i 'ām* was an open manifestation of the underlying social malady that plagued the Empire. By the eighteenth century this malady was alleviated by the circumstance that when the great *a'yān* needed to replenish their military forces, they turned more and more to the by-then institutionalized *levend-sekbān* organization. This situation benefited both the government and the people, since it opened the way to economic and social rehabilitation for many needy peasants.[69] In later stages of this trend, the government did not cease to encourage the *sandjak beyis* to employ, instead of the *sarıdjas* and the *sekbāns*, young peasants able to use muskets, but not "*sekbān*ized" — that is, still unaffected by the *sekbān bölük* organization. The idea was that unspoiled, ingenuous young people would respond better to discipline than organized *sekbāns*. It is interesting to see that, in the nineteenth century, the manpower of the regular armies of Selim III and Mahmud II had been drawn mostly from the same source, the large human reservoir of the peasantry.[70]

As to the *il-eri* organization, though its name had given way to the designation *bashı-bozuk 'askeri* (irregular soldiers), the organization itself lived on under the leadership of the *a'yān*, whose task it remained to organize the peasant youths in case of need.[71] Not infrequently, *aghas* of Janissary origin — especially the *serden-gečti agha* in command of the *il-eris*, or some urban *kapıkulus* leading forces in the struggle against brigands — would usurp power from the local *a'yān*, establish

[68] In 1593, a certain Mehmed Čawush, *bash-bugh* of the *il-eris*, was declared an outlaw (*see*, *Başvekâlet* Archives, Istanbul, *Mühimme*, no. 71, p. 31). Akdağ in his *Celâliler* (p. 106) suggests that after 1584 a new generation of *djelâli* leaders emerged from among the *il-eris*.

[69] *See* İnalcık "Centralization and Decentralization".

[70] For this information I am indebted to Dr. Avigdor Levy, University of Tel-Aviv.

[71] On the troops of irregulars led by local notables against the insurgent Bulgarian peasants in the Vidin area of northern Bulgaria in 1850 *see* H. İnalcık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, Ankara, 1943, pp. 69-94.

their own supremacy in the area, and thus become de facto members of the *a'yān* class. Similarly, *ketkhudās* and *aghas* employed by *mütesellims* in the pursuit of brigands, with the aid of the local forces under their command, could gain enough power to eventually emerge as *mütesellims* or members of the *a'yān* class. Lacking the benefit of locally based power, these self-made notables sought to secure support by collaborating with and protecting the outlaws roaming the area; and the outlaws' activities became a constant source of anxiety for and complaints from the rural population in particular.

In the provinces, the maintenance of public order — that is, the performing of gendarmerie functions — was basically the responsibility of high-ranking government officials, such as viziers, *beylerbeyis* and *sandjak beyis*, or their deputies, the *mütesellims*, *subashis*, and *woywodas*. The eventual establishing of continuous security forces under the command of the local *a'yān* brought about changes with far-reaching consequences, mainly in Anatolia. There, in the first half of the eighteenth century, and especially during the wars with Iran (1722-1746), the central government made it the task of the *a'yān* to maintain public order in the provinces and to perform certain administrative functions otherwise left unattended during military campaigns. In addition, the governors chose their deputies from the ranks of the local notables. This was a major factor leading to the emergence of numerous *a'yān* dynasties in the provinces because, even after leaving their posts, the *mütesellims* and *woywodas* would keep their retinue the *sarıdjas*, *sekbāns*, or *levends* they had to maintain while in office.[72]

B. Transformation in the Fiscal System and its Consequences

In the classical period, when the *tīmār*-holding *sipāhīs* formed the backbone of the Ottoman army, a major part — 30 to 40 percent — of the military expenses was met by way of *tīmār* assignments, that is, through the collection of state taxes by the *sipāhīs* from *tīmārs* assigned to them in the provinces. At that time, the principal expense of the central treasury consisted of the payment of *kapıkulu* salaries. In the era immediately following the classical period one witnesses a considerable accumulation of military expenses befalling the central treasury. The reason for this change was partly the growing number of *kapıkulu*, which had all but tripled by that time, and partly the growing

[72] *See* İnalcık, "Centralization and Decentralization".

number of *sarıdja* and *sekbān* troops, which increased with each military campaign. Thus, by this time, the main concern of the government was how to secure additional revenues, paid to and collected by the central treasury regularly and in cash, so as to be able to make large payments without delay.[73] In other words, the government was faced with the major task of reorganizing state finances to meet the challenging needs of changing times.

Another important factor leading up to the changing of the prevailing tax-system based on feudal dues and tithes to a general cash-tax applicable to all subjects of the Empire was the impact that the influx of silver from Europe and the subsequent price revolution,[74] starting with the 1580s, had on the Ottoman economy. The devaluation of the *akče*

[73] In 1527, approximately one-fifth of the revenues of the central treasury was spent on salaries for the soldiery at the Porte (7,886 Janissaries, 5,088 cavalrymen and, in addition, *djebedjis*, artillerymen, and cannon carriers). Approximately one-seventh of the treasury revenues went for the salaries of navy personnel and fortress garrisons (24,875 men, not including those in Syria and Egypt). All in all, out of a 277-million yearly central budget 100 million *akče*s were spent on military costs (*see* Ö.L. Barkan, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Bütçelerine dair Notlar", *İFM* 15, p. 282). The total of the budget, including the revenues assigned to the *timār* and *khāṣṣ* holders in the provinces, amounted to 477 million at that time (*idem*, p. 277). In 1609, for the standing army (Janissaries, *djebedjis*, cavalry, artillerymen, and cannon carriers, 70,000 in number) a sum of 257 million *akče*s was allocated. Since, in 1611, one gold piece was equal to 120 *akče*s, the total sum paid out in salaries to the military had, in terms of gold, more than doubled by that time. The following is a list of the revenues of the central treasury at different dates:

Year	Central Treasury (in *akče*)	(in gold ducats)	Total Revenues (in *akče*)
1475 (I. de Promontorio de Campis)	———	1.8	———
1504 (A. Gritti)	———	5	———
1524 (Zeno)	———	4.5	———
1528 (Ottoman account books)	277 million	5	537 million (including *awḳāf* and *amlāk*)
1562 (Donini)	258 million	4.3	———
1591 (Kātib Čelebi)	293 million	2	———
1648 (Kātib Čelebi)	362 million	3	———
1660 (*İFM* 17, pp. 193-347)	600 million	——	2,400 million
1670	612 million	——	———

Obviously the government's efforts to secure additional revenues for the central treasury did not result in substantial increase in terms of *akče*s before 1660, nor could they prevent the sharp drop in terms of gold. On the traditional Ottoman taxation *see* "Darība" in *EI*², ii, pp. 146-148.

[74] On inflation and devaluation *see* note 52 above.

to half of its original value resulted in a proportionate decrease in state revenues. The *tīmār*- and *khāṣṣ*-holders also suffered serious losses because their revenues, as a rule, were established in fixed sums. It seems that the central government, though anxious to counteract the pressing inflation, did not want to resort to an increase in the traditional taxes, fearing that such a measure might lead to a large-scale socio-political upheaval. Furthermore, such a tax increase, which would have been greatly detrimental to the *re'āyā*, would have benefited the holders of the *tīmār*s and the *khāṣṣ*es, but not the State Treasury.[75] Whatever the underlying reasons, the government, instead of effecting changes in the classical tax system representing, as a whole, an integral part of the *tīmār* system, chose to resort to *'awārid* levies, extraordinary taxes imposed, as a rule, at times of emergency and collected directly by the State Treasury.

Thus, as a first step in fighting increasing state deficits, the *'awārid-i dīwāniyye* and *tekālif*, two existing extraordinary cash-and-kind levies, were converted into regular sources of state revenues. As a second measure, new taxes called *imdādiyye* were introduced. Thirdly, the revenues of the *tīmār* and *khāṣṣ* lands as *muḳāṭa'a*s were recovered for the State Treasury to be farmed out directly to *mültezim*s (tax-farmers). Finally, more general use was made of the *maḳṭū'* system, by which taxes were determined in lump sums, and their distribution and collection entrusted to local communities. These emergency measures, which required profound changes in the administrative setup of the Empire, opened the way to decentralization and to the emergence of the *a'yān* as the new leading class in the provinces.

1. *New Taxes*

1a. *The* 'awārid-i dīwāniyye

Ever since the Middle Ages, the rulers of empires, whether in the East or in the West, had resorted to temporary emergency levies to meet

[75] When the sheep-tax doubled in 1596, the government tried unsuccessfully to maintain the previous rate in the *tīmār*s: one *akče* per two sheep (Akdağ, "Türkiye'nin İktisâdî Vaziyeti", *Belleten* 13, 1951, p. 551). On the financial difficulties of the Ottoman Empire during this period Selānikī's contemporary history and 'Ālī's *Nasihat al-Salāṭīn* (both unpublished) are particularly interesting. In the *Başvekâlet* Archives, the documents in the *Mâliye Ahkâm Defterleri*, in the *Kepeçi Tasnîfi*, and in the *Mâliyeden Müdevver Defterler* are of basic importance on the financial policies of the Empire.

unforeseen state budgetary needs. These impositions were in the form of demands for services, as well as of taxes to be paid in kind or in cash, and they were exacted from either one part or the whole of the population of the country. The Ottomans were no exception. They also imposed emergency levies on their subjects,[76] particularly in wartime, to meet the increased costs of maintenance of their army and fleet. First among the demands for services and the emergency levies most commonly imposed by the Ottoman government was a levy of provisions, known as *nüzül*. Second was the obligation known as *sürsat* which required that the *re'āyā* bring and sell their goods at specific locations. Third was the measure known as *kürekdji*, used to levy oarsmen for the fleet from among the *re'āyā*. And finally, there was the *'awārid akčesi*, an emergency tax levied in cash. Most of the time a specified sum of money, called *bedel*, was accepted or often even requested in lieu of services or payments in kind. Excepting the members of the military class, of the *'ulemā*, and of those in possession of a *berāt* (a diploma from the sultan), all adult males, urban or rural, Muslim or non-Muslim, were subject to *'awārid* levies. It was the task of the *kādīs* to draw up a list of those liable for taxation and to register them in units consisting of three, five, or fifteen families (*'awārid khānes*).[77]

[76] For such extra taxes in the early Ottoman state *see* Wittek's "Zu einigen frühosmanischen Urkunden"; for those in the fifteenth century *see* the collection of documents published in Gökbilgin's *Edirne ve Paşa Livası*.

[77] On *nüzül* and *'awārid-i dīwāniyye* in general *see* "Avâriz" in *İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (ii, pp. 13-19) by Ö.L. Barkan; *see* also Akdağ, "Türkiye'nin İktisâdî Vaziyeti", pp. 545-564, and *Celâliler*, pp. 30-35; A. Sućeska, "Die Entwicklung der Besteuerung durch die Avariz-i divaniye und die tekalif-i örfiye im osmanischen Reich während des 17 und 18 Jahrh.", *Südost-Forschungen* 27, 1968, pp. 89-130; L. Güçer, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Hububat Meselesi ve Hububattan Alınan Vergiler*, Istanbul, (1964, pp. 67-134; Uluçay, *18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda*, doc. no. 3, and 37. A vast collection of material on the subject, present in the archives, is still unexploited (*e.g.*, *Mâliyeden Müdevver* no. 6572, 539, 43, 5403, 4418, and 118 from the seventeenth century). The *'awārid* taxes eventually developed into regular taxes. At the beginning they were levies imposed in kind, in services, or as cash contributions, on a temporary basis. With the growing need of the government, they were collected with increasing regularity and gradually converted into *bedels*, regular taxes collected in cash. While they were in effect, the *nüzül* and *sürsat*, the *kürekdji*, and the *'awārid-akčesi* were the three most important levies among all the *'awārid* taxes. The first was levied to cover expenditures for provisions for the army during wartime; the second to provide the navy with oarsmen; the third, a levy in cash, to pay for various services. The second one became particularly heavy during the costly naval expeditions of the sixteenth century (*see* C. Imber, "The Costs of Naval Warfare, The Accounts of Hayreddin Barbarossa's Herceg Novi Campaign in 1539", *AO* 4, 1972, pp. 203-216). In 1566, it cost

While in appearance the government was upholding the old system of taxation, in reality the *'awārid-i dīwāniyye*, the emergency levies, were more and more modified into annual cash-taxes imposed on the entire population so as to meet the rapidly growing state budgetary needs. It was presumably during the period of the wars in 1593-1606 that the government turned the *'awārid* into a regularly levied tax in cash. The amount of the *'awārid* was not fixed, but was left open for changes according to government needs.[78] This meant that each time the tax was levied, the sum required by the government had to be established first. Then an assessment had to be made of all *'awārid khānes* to determine the sum to be paid by each individual unit.

The final amount of *'awārid* taxes to be paid by the inhabitants of an area was often the result of hard bargaining between the central government and the local population. Claiming that the amount demanded was beyond their means, the people simply refused to pay and threatened to abandon their lands unless the government withdrew its demands. Thereupon, well aware of the fact that the emergency levies constituted onerous impositions on the subjects, the central government, as a conciliatory gesture, usually agreed to somewhat reduced taxes. In the majority of the cases the population, in

1,200 *akčes* (twenty ducats) to hire an oarsman for a campaign season, which meant an actual imposition of eighty-seven *akčes* per taxable household (*Başvekâlet* Archives, *Mühimme*, no. 6, p. 519). By the end of the century it rose to 2,500 *akče* (Akdağ, "Türkiye'nin İktisâdî Vaziyeti", p. 555). In the seventeenth century, the *tüfenkdji bedeli*, a new tax in cash, was introduced to cover costs of increased musketeer enrolling (*Başvekâlet* Archives, *Mâliyeden Müdevver*, no. 9824). In 1613, an eight-*akče bedel* was added to the *djizya*, head-tax collected from non-Muslim tax-payers (*Mâliyeden Müdevver*, no. 9824, p. 35). During the campaign against Iran in 1606, the cash equivalent of *nüzül* amounted to 1,000 *akčes* per *'awārid* unit; this met with the tax-payers' resistance (Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, doc. no. 21). In 1660, the amount of this tax was established at 200 *akčes* (*see*, *İFM* 17, p. 330). As a rule, *'awārid* taxes, increased during wartime, were to be abolished by the government as soon as peace was restored. Nonetheless they often continued, but usually under different names. When, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the *'awārid* taxes were consolidated in one regular tax, the amount levied was 2,000 *akče* per 'awārid unit consisting of nine households. In the eighteenth century, the principal taxes paid by the population were the *bedel-i nüzül*, the *'awārid*, the *imdād-i seferiyye*, and the *imdād-i hadariyye*.

[78] In the first half of the seventeenth century the total number of *'awārid* units (one unit could consist of from three to fifteen families) in the Empire (Anatolia and Rumili?) was established as 120,000, of which 20,000 were declared *čürük* (useless). The revenue obtained from the rest was reckoned as 30,000,000 *akčes*. In 1660, the *'awārid* units numbered 176,825 in Anatolia and Rumili, and the total of the *'awārid* taxes collected (that is, the *bedel-i nüzül*, the *bedel-i kürekdji*, and the *bedel-i sürsat*) amounted to 81,785,380 *akčes* (see, *İFM* 17, pp. 330-331).

its effort to resist the government's demands, was supported by the local *a'yān* and *eshrāf*, eager to act as representatives of the local population. The local notables would apply pressure on the local *ḳāḍī* and, through his mediation and testimony, would see to it that the people's demands were heard by the central government.[79] In reality, however, the notables were pursuing their own interest since, on the one hand, a major part of the *'awāriḍ* levies was borne by them and, on the other, their own prosperity depended on the well-being of the local *re'āyā*. After the *'awāriḍ* and the *tekālīf* had become *vergis*, principal taxes, the frequently recurring bargaining sessions placed the *a'yān* in an increasingly important position as mediators between the government and the people. Furthermore, by advancing, in times of crisis, the *'awāriḍ* from their own wealth and having the *re'āyā* reimburse them afterwards, or by extending cash loans to the *re'āyā* toward the payment of the tax, the *a'yān* and *eshrāf* had soon maneuvered themselves into a situation where both central government and local population were increasingly dependent on their financial assistance.[80] For the *re'āyā* the *'awāriḍ* had become one of the most onerous of all taxes.[81] Many of them fled their land to escape this imposition.[82] And each time, the government would not only issue decrees ordering the fugitives' immediate return, but also demand of the ones who stayed behind full payment of the fugitives' share in taxes. *'Awāriḍ* thus became more and more of a central issue for both the rural and urban population with the result that, to assist the poor in the fulfillment of their tax obligations, cash *waḳfs* (endowments) and *'awāriḍ* chests were set up everywhere by the local *a'yān*. In brief, the new system of taxation, spearheaded by the *'awāriḍ* taxes, caused serious social reverberations, the most important among them being the fact that the *a'yān* and *eshrāf* reached a prominence hitherto unknown to them.

A long-standing tradition, one of the main responsibilities of the *ḳāḍīs* was to enter all *'awāriḍ khānes* in a register and to inform the government about them. And it was the *ḳāḍī* who, in case of

[79] *See* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, doc. no. 21; *see* also Akdağ, *Celâlîler*, doc. no. 33.

[80] *See* İnalcık, "Centralization and Decentralization".

[81] *See* Uluçay, *18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda*, pp. 38-52; Akdağ estimates ("Türkiye'nin İktisâdî Vaziyeti", p. 556) that in the seventeenth century the average rate of the *'awāriḍ* collected per unit was 2,000 *aḳče*, which became considerably higher in wartime (*see* also note 77 above).

[82] For examples *see* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, doc. no. 21, 192, and 194.

emergency, had to prepare a register of distribution (*tawzī defteri*) assigning the amount each village and town district had to contribute toward the sum demanded by the government. On the basis of this *defter*, the taxes were collected then by the *mubāshir*, the tax officer sent from the imperial capital.[83] These tasks enabled — and often prompted — *ḳāḍīs* to demand bribes from the inhabitants to refrain from exaggerating the number of *'awāriḍ khānes*, and thus from levying taxes in excess. This misuse of office by the *ḳāḍīs* had strong repercussions among the local notables, prompting them to file complaint after complaint with the central government.[84] In an effort to remedy this situation, the central government, during the war of 1683-1699, ordered the *a'yān-i wilāyet* to assist the *ḳāḍīs* not only in the levying of the *'awāriḍ*, but also in other tasks,[85] such as the collection of *nüzül*, the levy of provisions for the sustenance of the army. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this levy was still being imposed on the *re'āyā*, although by then the *'awāriḍ* had long been established as a principal tax in cash. It should be noted here that, in the eighteenth century, the revenue from the *'awāriḍ* tax was usually placed at the disposal of the *a'yān* of the different provinces for the recruiting and hiring of *levend* troops.[86]

1b. Tekālīf-i 'urfiyye *and* tekālīf-i shāḳḳa

In the period beginning with the turn of the seventeenth century, as a result of the depreciation of the *aḳče*, the beys and pashas were in serious financial difficulties. Their situation was aggravated by the fact that they felt compelled to maintain in their retinues large numbers of *sarıdja* and *sekbān* troops for fear of jeopardizing their positions if unable to provide the government with the necessary number of troops in case of emergency.[87] Thus, bent on maintaining their *sekbān* troops even in times of peace, but lacking the necessary finances for doing so, the governors were anxious to transfer their

[83] *See* Uluçay, *18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda*, pp. 38-52.

[84] *Idem*, doc. no. 116.

[85] For examples of this practice in the sixteenth century *see* Akdağ, *Türkiye'nin İktisâdî ve İçtimâî Tarihi*, ii, p. 221. For the following centuries *see* Uluçay, *18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda*, p. 48, and doc. no. 35-37.

[86] *See* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, doc. no. 15.

[87] Derwīsh Pasha, governor of Baghdad, was reported to have in his retinue ten thousand *levends* and *iç-oghlans* (*Na'imā*, vi, p. 24). On the pashas' need for sources of large income *see* Orhonlu, *Telhisler*, doc. no. 18.

expenses to the *re'āyā*. One way for them to do so was to travel in the countryside accompanied by a large number of *sekbān*s and, under the pretext of making investigation tours, exact from the *re'āyā* provisions for their troops.[88] Another way was to resort to the old custom of imposing on the inhabitants levies called *tekālīf-i 'urfiyye*, which the pashas interpreted as a term referring both to service fees (*'ā'idāt*) and to levies collected by them as representatives of the sultan's executive authority (*ehl-i 'urf*) based on custom (*'urf u 'ādet*). Used in a more general sense, the term included even the *'awārid* taxes, which means that it encompassed all extraordinary levies imposed on the *re'āyā* by the state or its agents.

Generally, pashas could impose their own taxes on the population, but only at times of emergency and with the sultan's special permission. Exactions made by the governors contrary to and against the stipulations of the sultan's orders were called *tekālīf-i shāḳḳa* (unlawful impositions) so as to emphasize their burdensome and irregular character. Nonetheless, the state was glad to employ a pasha, or even a *serden-geçti* (commander), who recruited large numbers of *sekbān* troops — be it through unlawful impositions — in times of need, and especially during campaigns, and to give him a high military post, even if previously he would have been considered a *djelālī*, a rebel. In other words, the Ottoman state tradition, which enabled the pashas to levy their own taxes, lived on as a custom revitalized by the conditions of the period. We find many incidents of this kind, for instance, during the time of the rebellious pashas (1623-1658), and the war of 1683-1699. Still, the most practical way for the governors to exact levies and provide for their troops was to lead inspection tours in order to collect fines in the rural areas. The levies they exacted under this seemingly legitimate pretext can be classified in two categories: i) the *khidhmet aḳčesi* (service fee), and ii) the *pīshkesh* (gifts and entertainment expenses).

i) The *khidhmet aḳčesi*, or fee taken from the *re'āyā* for provisions and other expenses by government officials while performing public

[88] *See* İnalcık "Adâletnâmeler", pp. 69-72. Evliyā Čelebī (ii, p. 82) quotes two figures as the income of governors and *ḳāḍī*s, the first one being collected "with right" and the second "with oppression". The latter usually exceeded the former by one third (*cf.* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, doc. no. 104, 146, and 188). As early as 1482, pashas were prohibited from extorting excess levies from the *re'āyā* while touring rural areas (*see*, *Süleyman Kānūnnāmesi*, ed. M. Ārif, p. 68). Still, Evliyā tells us (ii, pp. 406, and 408) that the peasants left their homes and ran away at the news that the pasha and his soldiery were coming.

services, was one of the most important and most commonly used *tekālīf-i 'urfiyye*. The amount and the conditions of collecting it were usually defined by law, and exactions in excess of the specified amount were strictly forbidden. Cash sums could be charged in lieu of services and provisions which the officials traditionally demanded from the *re'āyā*. In the period of our interest, *khidhmet aḳčesi* was more commonly known as *mubāshiriyye* (agent's fee) and *ḳapı khardjı* (expenses for the retinue). But, as was so often the case in the Ottoman administration, many antiquated taxes and customs, though forbidden by the law, were revived and put into use again by local and visiting government agents alike. Thus, for instance, *mubāshir*s appointed by the central government or by a governor to perform certain specific functions, usually for the collection of taxes, often were not content to collect only their legal *mubāshiriyye*[89] from the *re'āyā*, but insisted on demanding from the population provisions in kind, or their equivalent in cash. Later on it was ordered that all *mubāshiriyye* be entered in the local expense registers (*tawzī' defteri*).[90]

Similarly, the pashas and the beys, as well as their *mütesellim*s (agents), the *woywoda*s and *subashı*s, made it a practice to demand various fees (*'ā'idāt*) comparable to the *khidhmet aḳčesi*, such as: a) *dewir aḳčesi* or *dewriyye* exacted in cash during provincial inspection tours; b) *dhakhīre-bahā*, levy of provisions in kind or its cash equivalent; c) *na'l-bahā*, the shoeing of horses and the fodder for animals, or their cash equivalent. Though there were many other impositions involving provisions for men and animals, such as *ṭavuḳ-bahā* (chicken levy), *yemeklik* (food provision), *yemlik* (fodder provision), *ḳurbān aḳčesi* (sheep money), and *at-bahā* (horse levy), the levies a, b, and c were the most common and the most deeply rooted of them all. Customs crystallized in state orders made it obligatory for the *re'āyā* to provide for the officials, their retinues and their animals housing and sustenance for a period of three days. Government officials, on the other hand, had strict warning not to abuse these orders by traveling with overly large retinues, or by staying in one village over a longer period of time, or by placing other undue demands on the population.

ii) *Pīshkesh*, the offering of gifts and provisions or their equivalent in cash as a token of hospitality and deference, was a deeply rooted

[89] *Mubāshiriyye* was taken at the rate of six to ten percent of the tax collected (Akdağ, *Celâliler*, p. 28).

[90] For details *see* İnalcık, "Centralization and Decentralization".

custom in Ottoman society. It was designed to define the social obligations of those of a lower social standing towards those of a higher status.[91] As might be expected, governors and other government officials often abused these established customs and, converting them into undue exactions, made them a source of unlawful revenue and profits. Major impositions related to *pīshkesh* were: a) welcoming fee known under the names of *selāmiyye* or *selāmlık*, *teshrīfiyye*, *ḳudūmiyye*,[92] *ikrāmiyye*, *ṭoprak-baṣṭı*, etc.; b) *mefrūshāt-bahā*, which called the accommodation of the pasha in a mansion and of his retinue in local homes, or for the cash equivalent of this service; c) *ḳaftān-* and *čizme-bahā*, a levy providing the pasha and his principal commanders (*aghas*) with articles of fine clothing and shoes, or the equivalent in cash; d) *ḳonaḳ* and *göček akčesi*,[93] levies to meet the expenses of accommodation on the way to other locations. These were occasional levies collected only at the time of the pasha's visit; but when the pasha took up residence in his province, he was entitled to regularly collect revenues called *dewriyye* and *dhakhīre-bahā* either as *'ā'idāt* or as levies.

The imposition of such levies was by no means limited to the governors. *Mubāshirs* and *taḥṣildārs* (tax-collectors), though to a lesser extent than the pashas, were entitled to exact contributions such as *mubāshiriyye* and *taḥṣildāriyye*. In addition, *taḥṣīldārs* responsible for the collection of revenues from *waḳfs* and *tīmārs* were given the right to impose levies, such as *ḳoldju akčesi* (gendarme money), *yazıdjı akčesi* (scribe money), *ṣarrāfiyye* (changer's dues), *akče bashı* (cash dues). Even the *sekbān bölükbashıs* were entitled to collect contributions from the population known in general as *ḳonakdjı akčesi* and *čawush akčesi*. The *ḳāḍīs*, on their part, made it a habit to collect, at the conclusion of each case or transaction, fees beyond those prescribed by law, such as the *khuddāmiyye*, the *čuḳadāriyye*, and the *ketkhudāiyye*.[94]

[91] Evliyā Čelebī recorded candidly and in detail (ii, pp. 334, and 346, and iii, p. 85) what he received as *pishkesh*, or *ḳudūmiyye*, or *ḳademiyye* from the *a'yān* of the localities he visited as the agent of the pasha whom he served. On the *pīshkesh* given to the powerful İbshīr Pasha of Aleppo *see*, *Na'imā*, v, pp. 197-198.

[92] For *resm-i ḳudūm* in 1571 *see* Ö.L. Barkan, *Kanunlar*, *I*, Istanbul, 1943, p. 215, article 12.

[93] For a detailed description of a pasha's accommodation while visiting a city *see* Evliyā, ii, p. 427; *see* also Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, doc. no. 122, and *18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda*, pp. 29, 33, and 102.

[94] *See* İnalcık, "Adâletnâmeler", pp. 75-79; *see* also Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, pp. 134-139; on the fees *see* Uluçay, *18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda*, pp. 34, 51, 140, 165, 197-198, 200, 225, 250, 255, and 258.

Moreover, *ḳāḍīs* and their *nā'ibs* (deputies; surrogate judges), like other government officials, imposed levies of provisions on the inhabitants when touring the countryside. And when an inspector-governor visited a city with a large retinue of troops, the cost of food supplies and fodder imposed on the local population could range between the rather large sums of 5,000 and 10,000 *grush*. Not infrequently the pasha would send one of his men to the city before his own arrival, demanding the preparation of the three-day supplies in advance.[95]

It must be noted here that the sum a city had to spend on the governor's visit was levied on the people by their own *a'yān* and *eshrāf*. For this purpose first a register of local expenses (*wilāyet khardjı*) was prepared, then the sum established was apportioned on the basis of the *'awārid* units involved. Examples of such registers can be found from the second half of the seventeenth century onward.[96] The city population would often try to forestall impending and dreaded visits of inspector-governors by collecting and sending to them in advance the required gifts. In 1685, the opening lines of the register of the gifts given to Ömer Pasha, inspector-governor of Anatolia, read as follows: "When Ömer Pasha set out to go to Manisa, in accordance with the agreement of all *a'yān* and *eshrāf* there, four piastres were collected from each *'awārid* unit to meet the expenses of the gifts which were prepared in advance so as to forestall his coming to the city".[97] We also know that by the order of the sultan, in response to complaints from the local population, one of the inspector-governors was forced to pay back excess sums he had extorted from the *re'āyā* through unlawful methods.[98] Thus it is evident that the inhabitants of urban centers, under the leadership of the local *a'yān* and *eshrāf*, tried to resist extortion attempts made by governors, and that the central government encouraged them in this direction. Some of the urban centers, in order to strengthen their position, acquired *mu'āf-nāmes*, diplomas (*berāts*) of exemption from the sultan, which freed them from all *tekālīf-i shāḳḳa*; and cities in possession of such documents are known to have denied to pashas wanting to settle in their communities the permission to do so.[99]

[95] *See* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, doc. no. 214, 215, and 238, and p. 457 note 852.

[96] *See* note 122 below.

[97] *See* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, doc. no. 213.

[98] *See* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, doc. no. 238.

[99] On Manisa *see* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, pp. 7-11, and doc. no. 2, and *18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda*, p. 41. In 1655, the notables of Manisa sent a delegation to Istanbul

But a *mu'āf-nāme* was not a charter and could not provide for rights of a permanent nature because, like the other imperial *berāt*s, it was subject to renewal at the accession of each new sultan. Thus, to compare the Ottoman cities holding *mu'āf-nāme*s with the autonomous urban centers in medieval Europe would be to overestimate their status. Yet these temporary and limited exceptions granted to urban centers — clear manifestations of the government's overall policy in this period — undoubtedly played an important role in the gradual development of some small-scale autonomy in the handling of local affairs. At the same time, these exemptions greatly contributed to the strengthening of *a'yān* prominence in the provinces. From the mid-seventeenth century on, the *a'yān*, striving to strengthen their influence in local affairs, had taken on more and more responsibilities not only as intermediaries between the pashas and the central government on the one hand and the population on the other, but also in more practical matters, such as the preparation of registers of the town-expenses and the apportioning of same among the inhabitants, or the assessing and collecting of *tekālīf* levies. Indeed, in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, at the height of their influence, the principal function of the *a'yān* in the *ḳaḍā*s (counties) still was determining and compiling local expenses and apportioning them among the people. Every special government imposition enhanced their influence, since it had become their task to compile such impositions in the *tawzī' defteri*s and to levy them by assessment.[100] The most important among these levies was the *imdād-i seferiyye*.

1c. Imdād-i seferiyye *and* imdād-i ḥaḍariyye

During the early years of the seventeenth century, whenever faced with monetary difficulties created by war, the central government

to request a new *fermān* exempting the city from the obligation to accommodate government officials and governors (*see* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, doc. no. 147). Manisa also had exemption from several other taxes (*see* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, doc. no. 130). There are many examples of Anatolian cities refusing to accommodate pashas and their retinues (*see* Evliyā, ii, pp. 350-450; *see* also *Na'īmā*, vi, pp. 24-25). In 1602, for instance, the inhabitants of Konya drove Sefer Pasha and his *sekbān*s out of the city by force (*Na'īmā*, ii, p. 316). Drawing on the accounts of French travelers whom the *a'yān* administration impressed as an "espèce de république oligarchique", M. Hadjijahić, in his "Die privilegierten Städte zur Zeit des osmanischen Feudalismus" (*Südost-Forschungen* 20, 1961, pp. 30-58), points with strong emphasis to the autonomous position of certain cities and towns in Rumili.

[100] *See* İnalcık, "Centralization and Decentralization".

borrowed large sums from the wealthy, who then collected levies from the *re'āyā* in the way of reimbursement. These levies (eventually called *imdādiyye* or *imdād-i seferiyye*, which literally means 'urgent war contributions') resembled the *taille royale* in medieval Western Europe. In fact, the word *imdād* ('help in great need') was used purposefully to emphasize the extraordinary and most urgent nature of the situation. Toward the end of the year 1686 (Muharrem 1098 A.H.), following the disastrous defeat on the Hungarian front, the central government decided that "a certain amount of money was to be borrowed from the *a'yān* and the *eshrāf* in all towns and cities on Ottoman soil". Accordingly, 1500 *kīse* (1 *kīse* = 500 *grush*, the equivalent of 330 gold pieces) was to be collected from Istanbul, 200 *kīse* from Bursa, 350 *kīse* from Cairo, 150 *kīse* from Baghdad, 150 *kīse* from Basra, and from the other cities and towns according to their means. At the same time, the governors were requested to make personal *imdādiyye* contributions, and the ladies of the Palace were asked to offer half of their revenues.[101] In Istanbul, when the *'ulemā* and the public leaders were called upon to contribute to the *imdādiyye*, the *'ulemā* protested against the levy very strongly and was exempted from having to share in it.[102] Government agents then sought out the wealthy in Istanbul, and exacted contributions from them proportionate to their wealth.

İmdādiyye seems to have been a loan demanded, at the beginning, only from the wealthy subjects of the Empire. In February 1688, the *ḳapıḳulu* junta then in power in Istanbul decided to levy a *dīn u devlete imdād* (emergency help for state and faith) — an extraordinary tax (*ṣalghun*) totaling 10,000 *kīse* — to be collected throughout the Empire, in order to raise the sums necessary to cover the expenses incurred by the extraordinary military measures taken to halt the advancing enemy forces. It has to be noted here that in order to implement this decision the junta first had to obtain a *fatwā* from the *Shaykh al-Islām*. After the elimination from power of the junta, the collection of this *imdād* was abandoned. But, in 1698, in connection with the same war, the government, needing large sums to recruit additional *levend* soldiers and to meet the increasing expenses of the fleet, decided to collect as *imdādiyye* 42 *kīse* from all high officials, 132 *kīse* from the savings of the imperial *ewḳāf* (religious endowments),

[101] *See* Rāshid, *Tā'rikh*, i, p. 496; *see* also *Silāhdār*, ii, pp. 324, and 375.

[102] *See*, *Silāhdār*, ii, pp. 262-263.

and 110 *kīse* from the notables of Egypt. In other words, the government, reluctant to burden the *re'āyā* with additional taxes, tried to meet the excessive campaign expenses from the inner treasury of the Palace combined with contributions exacted from the wealthy.[103] In this period of the war, apparently no *imdād-i seferiyye*, no additional *'awārid* tax was imposed on the *re'āyā*; but some time between the years 1700 and 1717 such an *imdād* must have been levied in the form of a general tax. This becomes evident from a reform edict dated 1717[104] which not only shows the changes effected in the *imdādiyye* but also sheds light on the real nature of this tax.

In 1717, when the Ottoman armies met with disastrous defeats at the hands of the Habsburgs, a great council, composed of the members of the government and of men renowned for their experience, was convened at the imperial capital to enact reforms in the methods applied in the collection of the *imdād-i seferiyye*. Initially, these levies were designed to meet the expenses of the provincial *sekbān-levend* troops, which were under the command of the governors. For instance, for the year 1717 the sum of 330 *kīse* was allotted to the governor of Anatolia as *imdād-i seferiyye*, half of which was to be spent to hire and equip 1,064 *levend* cavalrymen for the imperial army, and the other half for the pasha's own retinue (*kapı*). The main purpose of the intended reforms was to abolish the unlawful levies brought about by the *imdād-i seferiyyes*. The principal grievances of the *re'āyā* related to the extra dues collected under such names as *bayraḳ akčesi*, *ḳonaḳ akčesi*, *ḳurbān-bahā*, and especially to the impositions levied to cover maintenance expenses of the *sekbān-levends* in the retinue of the governor or his agent while touring rural areas to collect the *imdād-i seferiyye*. In provinces other than Rumelia, Anatolia, Karaman, and Sivas, *imdād-i seferiyye* already was collected locally, and delivered in lump sums to the governors or their agents; the aim of the reforms was to extend lump-sum *imdādiyye* collection even to these four provinces. This meant the granting of a certain amount of autonomy to the *ḳaḍās* of these provinces, since the *ḳāḍīs* together with the local *a'yān* and *eshrāf*, now assumed the responsibility of administering this tax. Here again, the government's concern was the same as in the case of local security: to protect the *re'āyā* against the abuses of government agents. This, in turn, led to growing local

[103] *See*, *Rāshid*, i, p. 498.
[104] *See* text in Uluçay, *18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda*, pp. 112-115.

autonomy where provincial administration was concerned.[105] Finally, the central government found it necessary to obtain a *fatwā* from the *Shaykh al-İslām* sanctioning capital punishment against transgressors of the sultan's orders on the matter, an indication of the ineffectiveness of the government orders by themselves.

The reform decree also defined the procedure by which the levying and collecting of the *imdād-i seferiyye* was to be handled locally. Upon receiving the order, the *ḳāḍī* in the capital city of the province was to invite to his courthouse all the "*a'yān* and *ish-erleri*",[106] that is the notables and functionaries of that province, to determine the sum to be paid by each *sandjaḳ* of the territory, in proportion to the *sandjaḳ*'s size and resources. This council of the *a'yān* was ordered to act under the supervision of the local *ḳāḍī*, and of the *mubāshir* sent by the central government. After their return from the provincial capital, the notables of each *sandjaḳ* were to call a meeting at the courthouse of their capital, bringing together all the elders (*ikhtiyarlar*) of the *ḳaḍās* to discuss and determine the portion that each *ḳaḍā* was to pay. The lump sum thus determined for a *ḳaḍā* was to be portioned out among the households, the *'awārid khānes* of that *ḳaḍā*, in accordance with a register drawn up under the supervision of the *ḳāḍī* for this purpose. So, in the final analysis, it was the *ḳaḍās* which, as the smallest administrative units, were made responsible for the collection of the *imdādiyye* taxes. It was absolutely forbidden to take more from the inhabitants than the sum decided upon by the council of the *a'yān*. All complaints about abuses in the matter had to be taken directly to the central government. Finally, considered as a fundamental regulation, the reform decree was to be announced publicly and, after having been entered in full in the *ḳāḍī*'s register, the original copy was to be placed for safeguarding in the *bedesten* of the capital city of the province.

İmdād-i seferiyye can be considered one of the major factors paving the way toward an era of *a'yān* predominance in administration. Not only did practices related to this tax strengthen the position of the notables toward the pashas, but they also provided ample grounds for more effective participation in provincial administrative matters. Thus, for instance, in order to protect the local inhabitants as well as

[105] *See*, İnalcık "Centralization and Decentralization".
[106] The term *ish-eri* was, in general, applied to those who performed any kind of public service. The term *mubāshir* was sometimes used as a synonym for *ish-eri*.

themselves from undue burdens resulting from this already onerous levy, the *a'yān*, resorting to passive resistance, sometimes delayed in the performance of their duties as *imdādiyye* registrars, assessors, and collectors.[107] Then again, when impatient pashas took it upon themselves to collect *imdādiyye* taxes directly, they were not only in conflict with the orders of the central government, but also in open collision with the local *a'yān*.[108] As pointed out above, this tax was especially designed for the recruitment of *levend-sekbān* troops which, originally, was the task of the governors. When then the government deemed it more advantageous to place the *a'yān* in charge of *sekbān* troop recruiting, the new measure greatly enhanced *a'yān* prominence in provincial administration. Also, by making loans to the *re'āyā* toward the payment of the *imdādiyye*, the *a'yān* further augmented their prestige both in the eyes of the government and of the people. As early as the 1730s, members of the *a'yān*, in an effort to gain control over their province, acting on their own, prepared registers and collected *imdād-i seferiyye* and *imdād-i ḥaḍariyye* taxes without waiting for government orders to do so.[109]

In the period under discussion, as a result of the new finance policy adopted by the central government, the revenues of the governors were subject to considerable fluctuation. Since *imdād-i seferiyye* was a tax imposed only for the duration of military campaigns, governors were cut off from this source of revenue in peacetime, and were forced to dismiss most of the *sekbān-levend* companies in their services. Turning to banditry for their livelihood, these unemployed *sekbān bölük*s, as we have seen earlier, caused serious problems to population and state, because the governors, with only a small number of *sekbān* soldiers at their disposal, were unable to maintain order, and to protect life and property in their provinces against their acts of brigandage. To overcome these peacetime difficulties, the government had no other way but to introduce a new tax called *imdād-i ḥaḍariyye*, emergency peacetime contributions (1713).[110] This tax, to be delivered to the

[107] *See* Uluçay, *18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda*, doc. no. 16, and 39; for an example of *imdād-i seferiyye*, *see* doc. no. 14.

[108] Uluçay, *18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda*, doc. no. 15.

[109] Y. Özkaya, in his "XVIII. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Anadolu'da Âyanlık İddiaları" (*DTCFD* 34, 1966, pp. 195-231) and *Âyan Rejiminin Kuruluşu*, Ankara, 1970 (Dissertation, DTCF, History), shows how dependent governors had become on the *a'yān*, whose responsibility it had become to collect *imdādiyye* taxes. On the weakening position of the governors *see* also *Na'imā*, vi, p. 141, and Cevdet, *Tā'rikh*, vi, pp. 49-51.

[110] *See* Uluçay, *18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda*, doc. no. 21.

government in three installments, was to be collected, like the *imdād-i seferiyye*, from each *ḳaḍā* through the services of the *ḳāḍī* and the local *a'yān*. One might safely assume that the *imdād-i ḥaḍariyye* was a fixed tax-replacement of the earlier mentioned *tekālīf-i shāḳḳa* — which the governors had collected, in case of need, to meet their increasing expenses — since from then on collection of the latter was strictly forbidden.[111] The sum to be collected as *imdād-i ḥaḍariyye* was established by the government, and *mubāshir*s were sent from the capital to the provinces to supervise its collection. Whatever the changes, the *imdādiyye* taxes resulted in further increasing the local influence of the *a'yān* and strengthening their position in relation to the pashas.

2. *Methods of Tax Collection*

2a. İltizām – muḳāṭa'a *system*

In the Ottoman Empire, as in all classical Near-Eastern empires, *iltizām* had formed the backbone of the administrative-financial structure of the state. From the 1580s onward, the changes that occurred in the financial and the provincial administrative systems in general resulted in the rapidly spreading application of the *iltizām* (tax-farming) system,[112] and, with it, the growing influence of a new *mültezim* (tax-farmer) – *a'yān* class, which started to play an increasingly prominent role in provincial administration. Our primary intent here is to show the extent of this system and the forms it had taken during the period beginning with the end of the sixteenth century.

Generally speaking, farming out by *iltizām* meant selling, by auction, a source of revenue for a specific period of time, usually for three years, to a private person. The *mültezim* — also known as *'āmil* or *'ameldār* — who bid for and entered into such a contract, was under obligation to make payments on an established sum according to stipulated terms. The terms usually called for a cash down-payment

[111] *See* Uluçay, *18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda*, doc. no. 21, and 23.

[112] On the *iltizām* system in the Islamic Califate *see* C.H. Becker, *Islamstudien*, i, Leipzig, 1924, and in the Ottoman Empire H. İnalcık, "Notes on N. Beldiceanu's Translation of the Kanunname...", *Der Islam* 43 i-ii, March 1967, pp. 139-157; *see* also B. Cvetkova, "The Ottoman System of *İltizam* in Bulgaria in the Period of the XVI-XVIII Centuries", *Izv. na Ins. za bālgarska istorija* 11 ii, 1960, pp. 195-223. Vast material can be found on the *iltizām* system in the Ottoman archives. For example, no. 9824 of the *Mâliyeden Müdevver Defterler*, under the *suver-i ahkâm*, contains *fermāns* from the years 1612-1617 dealing with *iltizām* affairs in the lower Danubian region.

followed by monthly, quarterly, or semi-annual installments. In compliance with the terms, the *mültezim* not only had to put up all properties in his holding as securities, but also had to show additional reliable sureties. Thus, no matter how rich the individual *mültezim*, the security stipulations created great interdependence among the *a'yān*, leading to the emergence of a closely-knit group of very wealthy people with growing influence on local and state affairs.

Though *iltizām* was essentially a sales transaction, it was made subject to further conditions because the resulting revenue belonged to the state. Consequently, the state, to assert proprietorship of these revenues and display concern for the protection of the *re'āyā*, reserved for itself the right to interfere at any stage of the collection of an *iltizām*. Furthermore, if it was found that a *muḳāṭa'a*, a revenue unit, was farmed out far below its effective worth, the state had the right to annul the *iltizām* contract without any indemnification of the contractor. Also, a government agent called *emīn* was assigned to each *mültezim* with the task of checking the accounts. On the other hand, provincial administrators were required to assist the *mültezim*s in the collection of revenues and to provide them with troops in case of necessity. This last stipulation brought the *mültezim*s in closer contact with provincial administration and administrators. It also explains why members of the *a'yān*, when acting in their capacity as *mültezim*, were considered quasi representatives of the state.

A characteristic of the *iltizām* system with far-reaching consequences was the fact that the *mültezim* in possession of certain state revenues could divide his *muḳāṭa'a* into smaller units and sell them to secondary *mültezim*s. Such divisions were almost unavoidable in cases of extensive *muḳāṭa'a*s covering overly large territories. The result was a chain of interdependent *mültezim*s along the vertical line, extending from the imperial capital down to small provincial *ḳaḍā*s. But, not only did this practice lead to the formation of a hierarchy within the *a'yān – mültezim* class, it also provided the dignitaries, the *ḳapıḳulu*, and the governors, who enjoyed *ḫāṣṣ* revenues, or crown revenues contracted by *iltizām*, with the opportunity to sell these resources to local *mültezim*s. As early as the mid-sixteenth century, Süleyman the Lawgiver prohibited that governors partition and sell *ḫāṣṣ* revenues assigned to them to their *woywoda*s.[113] Nonetheless, in the seventeenth

[113] *See* İnalcık "Adâletnâmeler", doc. no. V, pp. 110-116.

century, this practice was widespread and contributed significantly to the increased participation in local administrative matters of the *a'yān* who, under the title of *mütesellim*, *woywoda*, or *subaşı*, often acted as tax-farmers or agents of the pashas.

One of the changes of major consequence that had taken place in the *iltizām* system was the extension of the strict time limit earlier applied to *muḳāṭa'a* holdings. At the beginning, *muḳāṭa'a*s were farmed out, as a rule, for a period not more than three years. In time, however, this practice changed, and tax-farmers were granted in increasing numbers lifetime tenures to their *muḳāṭa'a*s; and finally even their heirs were given preferential rights in the bidding for them. Especially when the farmed out revenues were tithes or dues on land, this new practice, known as *mālikāne*, virtually gave the *mültezim*s quasi-proprietory rights over extended territories, villages included. Thus, the *mālikāne* system made a major contribution to the rise of a new landlord class with the rights, as free holders, over large tracts of state lands (*mīrī*),[114] and it is in this practice that one has to look for the origins of the *čiftlik* system,[115] and the rise of the village *ağa*s (landlords) and the renowned eighteenth-century dynasties with large *muḳāṭa'a* estates in their holding. It should also be pointed out here that the *mālikāne* system was a development by no means unique to the Ottoman state. It can be witnessed in all Near-Eastern empires at the root of changes bringing decentralization and subsequent fragmentation in their wake. In the Ottoman Empire a widespread application

[114] *See* H. İnalcık "L'empire Ottoman", *Rapports, First Intern. Congress of South-East European Studies*, Sofia, 1966, p. 100; on *mālikāne*, *see* M. Genç, "Osmanlı Mâliyesinde Mâlikâne Sistemi", *Tebliğler, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi Semineri, Hacettepe Üniversitesi*, Ankara, 1973; *see* also A. Sućeska, "Mālikana", *Prilozi za orientalnu filologiju* 8-9, 1958-1959, pp. 111-142; *see* also Uluçay, *18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda*, pp. 7-11.

[115] On the *čiftlik* system *see* İnalcık, "Capital Formation", pp. 124-132, and "*Čiftlik*", *EI*², ii, p. 32; *see* also A. Sućeska, "O nastanka čifluka našim zemljama", *Godišnjak drustva istoričara Bosne i Hercegovine* 16, 1965, pp. 37-57; Ch. Ganev, "L'apparition des rapports capitalistes dans l'économie rural de la Bulgarie", *Etudes Historiques*, Sofia, 1960, pp. 207-220; Ö. L. Barkan, "Balkan Memleketlerinin Zirai Reform Tecrübeleri", *İFM* 3 iv, 1944; R. Busch-Zantner, *Agrarverfassung, Gesellschaft und Siedlung in Südosteuropa*, Leipzig, 1968; T. Stoianovich, "Land Tenure and Related Sectors of the Balkan Economy", *Journal of Economic History* 13, 1953, pp. 398-411. Among the Ottoman sources especially the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century *Tapu Defterleri* of the Morea, Thessaly (Tırhala, Yenişehir), and Salonica regions contain valuable information on the subject. Interesting information also can be gained from one of the registers in the *Topkapı Palace* Archives (no. D. 6685) listing the *čiftlik*s held by Tepedelenli 'Alī Pasha at the time of his death.

of this system can be seen during the period of decline, when the central government could no longer control its sources of revenue.

In the Ottoman Empire and in all Near-Eastern empires, the reasons for the wide-spread application of the *iltizām* system are mainly the technical, economic, and bureaucratic difficulties the governments of these states had to come to grips with in controlling and collecting the state revenues. Especially in the case of taxes paid in kind, their collection in distant provinces, their storage, and their conversion to cash for the State Treasury had often turned out to be a task of insurmountable difficulties for the central government. And, as we have already seen, the State Treasury was frequently in need of a ready cash supply for the upkeep of the military, especially in time of war. The easiest and surest way to overcome these difficulties for the government was the large-scale application of the *iltizām* system in which cash payments were made by the *mültezim*s in regular intervals into the State Treasury. Consequently, from the end of the sixteenth century on we find the central government, under the growing pressure of the state's needs, rapidly expanding the use of the *iltizām* system and showing increased willingness to make concessions to the tax-farmers.

Generally speaking, among the revenues farmed out by the state, beside the custom duties and revenues from mines and state monopolies, were certain urban dues considered *khawāṣṣ-i humāyūn*, that is, non-*tīmār*-like revenues under the direct control of the State Treasury (*khizāne-i 'āmire*). It was the task of special bureaus, under the supervision of the chief *defterdār* (secretary of finances), to classify these revenues into individual units or *muḳāṭa'a*s, and to farm them out to *mültezim*s. The *defterdār*s sent out by the State Treasury to the provinces were to be assisted in their work by the local *ḳāḍī*s.

The major changes that had taken place beginning with the 1580s were brought about mainly by the decay of the *tīmār* system. The result of this decay was that the *tīmār*s and *khāṣṣ*es, held earlier by beys and pashas, and other officials,[116] came, at a swiftly growing rate, under the direct control of the State Treasury. Once under government control, most of the *tīmār* and *khāṣṣ* revenues were farmed out by *iltizām*; that is, the state, instead of assigning the revenues of *sandjaḳ*s to pashas or beys as *khāṣṣ*, farmed them out as *muḳāṭa'a*s to *mültezim*s or to governors who acted as *mültezim*s.

[116] *See* İnalcık, "Adâletnâmeler", p. 111.

İltizām was used not only in the administering of *khāṣṣ* revenues belonging to the treasury, but often also in the case of *khāṣṣ*es, *ze'āmet*s, and large *tīmār*s assigned to pashas, beys, or other officials. The main circumstance that prompted the holders of large *tīmār*s and *khāṣṣ*es to resort to *iltizām* was that this was the only practical method for the collection of occasional dues, such as fines and *bādihawā*, where extensive territories were involved. Also, many of the *tīmār*-, *ze'āmet*-, or *khāṣṣ* holders, especially the women of the Harem, Palace officials, scribes, *čawush*es, as well as pashas and beys on campaigns or stationed at frontier fortresses, were mostly away from their assigned fiefs. In order to collect their due revenues, these fiefholders either appointed agents, called *subashı* or *woywoda* or *mütesellim*, transferring to them some of their own administrative authority, or they farmed out their revenues altogether by *iltizām*, in which case the *subashı*s, *woywoda*s, and *mütesellim*s acquired the position of a *mültezim*. Thus, from the end of the sixteenth century onward, with the growing increase in the number of absentee fief-holders, the *iltizām* system spread rapidly in the provinces.

The spreading of the *iltizām* system brought with itself a strong *mültezim* class that controlled and intercepted most of the state revenues. Moreover, it is only natural that the *mültezim*s, who in the period under discussion controlled most of the state revenues, had become increasingly involved with responsibilities in the provincial administration. It was from this group of *mültezim*s with large *muḳāṭa'a* or *khāṣṣ* revenues under its control that many of the *a'yān* and local dynasties of the eighteenth century arose.

Compelled by circumstances, the *mültezim*s eventually closed ranks in a social entity with well-defined characteristics. This entity consisted of people who, having accumulated large supplies of cash,[117] lived in urban centers. In most cases they were either money-changers (*ṣarrāf*) or big merchants engaged in interregional trade and credit operations. *Mültezim*s living in big cities such as Bursa or Istanbul were often the holders of *iltizām* rights over large, extended territories which they divided into smaller *muḳāṭa'a*s, farming out their revenues to local *mültezim*s.

[117] Already in 1573 we read in a *fermān*: "Since the *muḳāṭa'āt* belonging to the imperial *khawāṣṣ*, when being farmed out, were not given to the proper persons, experienced and well-to-do, with large amounts of cash in hand, each contracted term is ending with big deficits" (*see*, *Başvekâlet* Archives, *Mühimme*, no. 23, p. 204, doc. no. 431).

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries tax-farming was an uncommon practice with the military élite, and the sultan's *ḳul*s were content to perform duties such as those of the *taḥṣīldār* (tax collector), *emīn* (commissioner or agent), and *nāẓir* (inspector). From the end of the sixteenth century onward, however, members of the military class began to show increasing interest in acquiring control of *iltizām*s, especially in smaller provincial centers. This development started, on the one hand, with the growing flow of *ḳapıḳulu*s to provincial cities and towns, where they settled and eventually integrated with the wealthy and influential urban *a'yān*. On the other hand, it was related to the new practice of the central government in farming out by *iltizām* governmental posts to members of the military class, such as *ḳapıḳulu*s and governors. The government justified this new practice by taking the stand that what was sold was not the post itself but the revenues derived from it. The purchaser of the *iltizām* agreed to pay to the state its due share of the revenues, and was given the right, in return for his services, to retain for himself all revenues in excess of the state's due share. As evidenced by the registers of the period, *ḳapıḳulu*s acquired their *muḳāṭa'a*s by pledging their salaries toward the fulfillment of the *iltizām* contract. The *ḳapıḳulu*s' involvement with *iltizām* often came from their administering *khāṣṣ*es, *muḳāṭa'a*s, *arpalıḳ*s (pensions given to dignitaries), and *pashmaḳlıḳ*s (pensions granted to sultanas) as *müteselli*ms or *woywoda*s. For the most part, they acquired these posts by *iltizām*, offering to pay to the state, or to the individual holder if that be the case, the highest bid for these revenues. From the seventeenth century onward, *mültezim*s acting as *müteselli*ms or *woywoda*s were elected in increasing numbers from among the local *a'yān*; and many of the famous *a'yān* families owed their wealth and power to the fact that they had been able to maintain their *iltizām* rights over long periods of time.

The acquisition of an *iltizām* in any of the provinces usually meant a spectacular rise for its holder, literally from rags to riches and prominence. The rise usually began when an ambitious member of the military class acquired the unassuming post of a *muḥtaṣıb* or a *woywoda* by *iltizām*, and enriched himself often in illicit ways. Then, with surety provided by some of the more wealthy citizens in town, he would enter into more significant *iltizām* contracts, acquiring great wealth and prominence in a relatively short period of time. Many of the great *a'yān* families in the Anatolian cities and towns rose to prominence

in this manner.[118] But the old-established great families of the urban *a'yān* had mostly originated from merchant, money-changer, or *'ulemā* families. The farspread application of the *iltizām* system in finance-administration, coupled with the subsequent rise of a new *mültezim* class in the provinces, has to be considered one of the most important developments in Ottoman history after 1580.

2b. Maḳṭū' *system*

The large-scale application of the *maḳṭū'* system by the central government was aimed at eliminating the services of the *mültezim*s and replacing them by the services of the tax-paying community itself. It was one of the major changes in the direction of decentralization that heralded the new era. In its general sense *maḳṭū'* meant the lump-sum amount a community, small or large, had to pay in collective taxes to the state, and was usually arrived at by direct agreement between the taxpayers and the central government. But the word *maḳṭū'* also referred to the practice of compiling the various taxes due from the individuals, and collecting them for the state in a lump sum. In the *maḳṭū'* system, areas or communities were assigned collective responsibility for the handling of the revenues to be paid to the state, and they entrusted their own representatives with the collection and the forwarding of the taxes to the State Treasury. This practice was, in fact, tantamount to communal *iltizām*.[119] The central government, on its part, expected to derive two major benefits from the *maḳṭū'* system: 1) by protecting the *re'āyā* from the abuses of tax-collecting *mültezim*s, *taḥṣīldār*s, pashas and beys, and their agents, the government hoped to be able to prevent considerable losses in state-revenue sources, and 2) it hoped to secure definite amounts of revenue from given areas or communities. In many instances the people appealed to the sultan for the application of the *maḳṭū'* system in their province so that they might escape the abuses of the governors and other tax-collectors.[120]

[118] *See* İnalcık, "Centralization and Decentralization".

[119] For the early application of the *maḳṭū'* system *see* Barkan, *Kanunlar*, *I*, p. 480 (*İndeks*: *Maḳṭū'*). The system was applied in particular in the case of the *djizya* (*see* Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda*, doc. no. 3, p. 172). The collection and delivery of the *maḳṭū'* was sometimes entrusted as *mālikāne* to pashas or other influential people, and in that case it was not much different from an *iltizām* (*see* Uluçay, *18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda*, pp. 7-15, and especially doc. no. 23, 39, 40, 51, 81, and 83.).

[120] *See* Uluçay, *18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda*, doc. no. 23.

Generally, the local population tried hard to obtain this privilege by bidding a sum higher than the amount assessed as *muḳāṭa'a* revenue, or higher than the *mültezim's* bid; and the members of the community acted as each other's surety.

The *maḳṭū'* system was most of all applied to *muḳāṭa'as* that belonged to the State Treasury. In the seventeenth century many imperial decrees were issued, granting permission to numbers of Christian communities in Anatolia and Rumelia to pay their *'awāriḍ akčesi* and *djizya* taxes as *maḳṭū'*, that is, in lump sums, straight to the State Treasury. By introducing a more general application of the *maḳṭū'* system — that is, by expanding the use of the system over the whole Empire — the central government was able to regain control over most of the revenues originating in the provinces. This was possible because the *maḳṭū'* system consolidated the numerous various taxes and levies in one lump sum, the *māl-i maḳṭū'*; and, in growing numbers, provinces and towns now paid their taxes in terms of the *māl-i maḳṭū'*. One of the greatest merits of the *maḳṭū'* system was that not only did it alleviate the burden that the various levies imposed by governors and their agents placed especially on the *re'āyā* population, but it also eliminated many of the onerous abuses committed by these officials in the pursuit of undue revenues and personal benefits.

Māl-i maḳṭū', in general, was a tax in cash, collected, as were the *'awāriḍ* levies before, on the basis of the established *'awāriḍ* units. Each *ḳaḍā* constituted a major unit, and it was made the task of the local *a'yān* to apportion the levied amount among the major and minor units. The immediate collection of the *maḳṭū'* was made the duty of the *imāms* and the *ketkhudās* of the villages and the city dixtricts. Thus, large-scale application of the *maḳṭū'* system was bound to bring about some major social and administrative changes. In the first place, it greatly enhanced the influence and prominence of the *a'yān*, especially in local administrative matters. But even more importantly, by promoting internal community structuring, it necessarily prepared the way for a certain amount of local autonomy[121] throughout the Empire.

[121] In Rumelia, as a result of these concessions, the *kodja-bashis*, *čorbadjis*, *knezes*, and members of the clergy became an increasingly influential part of the *a'yān*, emerging later on in the nineteenth century as the leaders of the nationalist uprisings. Obviously the *maḳṭū'* system opened the way to a certain degree of home rule within some communities in the provinces. In view of the important part it played in the rise of the *a'yān*, the *maḳṭū'* system has to be accepted as a major factor in the decentralization of the Ottoman administration. At first, *maḳṭū'* was applied only in the case of communities with defined boundaries, such as islands and in-cities. Ever since the foundation of their empire, the Ottomans made it their policy to grant exemptions from *'awāriḍ* levies to certain city fortresses, islands, and tribal communities, and often exempted them from taxes altogether in return for a lump-sum payment. This policy was applied particularly when the government wanted to gain the loyalty of certain regions or communities with special status, or to compensate for services rendered to the state. Some of the Balkan cities described by Novaković (S. Novaković, *Tursko carstvo pred Srpski ustanak 1780-1804*, Belgrade, 1906) as having a privileged status under the Ottoman rule were places where the *maḳṭū'* system was in force. The sultans could and frequently did exempt cities from certain levies by providing them with speical *mu'āf-nāmes*, patents of exemption. In such cases the remaining taxes were often converted into *maḳṭū'*. For the *maḳṭū'* system in Greece *see* N.J. Pantazapoulos, "Community Laws and Customs on Western Macedonia under Ottoman Rule", *Balkan Studies* 2 i, 1961, pp. 1-22; *see* also note 99 above.

3. Tawzī' Defteris

As we have seen, in the period of our particular interest it was the local *a'yān* and *eshrāf* who played the principal role in the administration of major taxes. Assessing the *'awāriḍ* units and levying taxes — not only the *māl-i maḳṭū'*, but also the *'awāriḍ-i diwāniyye* and the *wilāyet khardjı* (local expenses) for each *ḳaḍā* — were among the functions of a special council consisting of members of the local *a'yān* presided over by the local *ḳāḍī*. Having local influence and a first-hand knowledge of local conditions, the *a'yān* were considered by the government as being in the best position to apportion and collect taxes in a *ḳaḍā*. Consequently, the government was keenly intent on soliciting the cooperation of the local notables for the effective implementation of its new tax system. The claim that certain public responsibilities held by the *a'yān* were by usurpation rather than by government authorization must be considered a gross generalization. In the new taxation structure two institutions, the *tawzī' defteris* (registers of apportioning) and the councils of the *a'yān* and *eshrāf*, were of vital importance, because they provided the mechanism for local administration and, as already mentioned, they paved the way toward the emergence of some internal autonomy, a certain grade of independence in the handling of local affairs within the community itself.

A separate *tawzī' defteri* was to be prepared and used for each different purpose: the *'awāriḍ* levies, the *imdād-i seferiyye*, the *imdād-i ḥaḍariyye*, the *māl-i maḳṭū'*, and the *wilāyet khardjı*. But the various *tawzī' defteris* differed only in their content; in their arrangement they were the same. The amount of the *'awāriḍ* or *imdādiyye* to be collected from a *ḳaḍā* was established by councils convening in the capitals of the provinces and the *sandjaks*. The official responsible for the collection

of the sum established by the council would then send a *mubāshir* to each *ḳaḍā* with a memorandum indicating the sum apportioned to that *ḳaḍā*. The memorandum was directed to the local *ḳāḍī*, whose responsibility it was to convene a council of the village elders. The council had to assist the *mubāshir* and the *ḳāḍī* in their task of apportioning the amount requested by the state among the people in accord with their means. The preface of each *tawzī' defteri* emphasized that the distribution was made "with the full consent of the *a'yān* and *eshrāf*"[122] involved. To make a just distribution of the required amount possible, the council had to review the conditions of the *'awāriḍ* units in each village and city district and redetermine the number of taxable *'awāriḍ* units. This process was called *ta'dīl we teswiyye* (adjustment and equalizing) and, for a correct readjustment, all demographic and economic changes had to be taken into account. Only after the adjustment was completed was the requested sum apportioned among the units. And since the adjustment and equalizing had taken place after the sum requested by the government was established, any decrease in the number of registered units inevitably meant a proportionate increase in the tax burdens of the remaining units; and so did any increase in the number of tax exemptions. The increased tax burdens often provoked bitter complaints from the people. After the *tawzī' defteri*s were completed, and the *'awāriḍ* units determined and registered village by village, district by district, the *ḳāḍī*s ratified the *defter*s and handed them over to the *mubāshir*s, who then collected the taxes on the basis of these defters.[123]

However, a closer examination of the *tawzī' defteri*s reveals that the population was always charged more than the amount of the principal taxes, because the sum requested by the state in each case was inflated by the addition of various dues. For instance, all *tawzī' defteri*s included court fees and separate fees for court employees: *nā'ib*s, *ketkhudā*s, *kātib*s, *muḥḍir*s, and *khademe*s. These additions, made by the *ḳāḍī*, amounted to three to four per cent of the total tax. But, while in the *'awāriḍ*, the *maḳṭū'*, and the *tawzī'* registers the additions were limited to those made by the *ḳāḍī*, the *imdād-i seferiyye* registers usually included additions such as *dhakhīre-bahā* and *khidhmet akčesi*, impositions which sometimes amounted to twice the sum of the principal tax.

[122] *See* Uluçay, *18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda*, doc. no. 4, 5, 15, 23, 34-36, 80, 81, and especially 93, pp. 214-215.

[123] *See* Uluçay, *18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda*, doc. no. 5, 6, 16, 21, 37, 80-84, 118, and especially no. 81; *see* also orders on *Tawzī' Defteri*s in the *Başvekâlet* Archives (Cevdet, Belediye no. 1).

Compiled yearly, the *maṣraf-i wilāyet* (local expense) registers, also called *wilāyet khardjı* or *sālyāne* registers, greatly differed in their content from all other *tawzī' defteri*s in being strictly devoted to the immediate expenses of the communities themselves; thus, they had the character of provincial budgets. The levies registered in these *defter*s were mostly of the *tekālīf-i shāḳḳa* kind which, upon careful examination, can be divided into the following four categories: 1) *dhakhīre-bahā* to cover expenses of provision and entertainment of governors, *mubāshir*s, and other officials; 2) *dhakhīre-bahā* to cover travel expenses and daily pay for the *mütesellim* while he was touring the province on a public assignment, and to cover the interest on the amount lent by the *mütesellim* for public matters; 3) levy to cover fees paid to the *ḳāḍī*, to court officials and servants; 4) levy to cover various expenses connected with public celebrations in town, the most particular among them being *barut parası*, money used to purchase gunpowder.

The fact that they were now being recorded in *tawzī'* registers and collected annually modified many of the former *tekālīf-i shāḳḳa* (irregular impositions) into what one might consider regular local taxes. The new status of these levies meant new procedings in their treatment. Previously, members of the *a'yān* would advance the required sums and collect them afterwards from the people. In the new structure a local council, presided over by the *ḳāḍī*, first had to confirm the registered expenses as genuine expenses for public affairs. Only then could the *mütesellim*, representing governmental authority as the agent of the governor and responsible for the collection of taxes, undertake action. The *mütesellim*s, on their part, also made lump-sum advance payments, especially where *sandjaḳ* affairs were entailed, only this time the advanced sums were entered in the *maṣraf-i wilāyet* register with due interest added to them — and so were the bribes *mütesellim*s paid to the governors in the first place for their assignments. Though most of these practices were explained away as payments for public services rendered by the *mütesellim*, the people regarded them as unlawful and unjust impositions, and the sultans, in their *'adāletnāme*s,[124] forbade their collection as *tekālīf-i shāḳḳa*. Thus, the *tawzī' defteri*s, which first came into use in the early eighteenth century, were to become a major political issue in the growing tension between the central government, the *a'yān*, and the *re'āyā*.

[124] The 1671 list of expenses for a *mubāshir* cannot be considered a *Tawzī' Defteri*. Expense lists like the 1671 can be found even from earlier periods.

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