Power Relationships between Russia, the Crimea and the Ottoman Empire as Reflected in Titulature

As a system of semiotic symbols designed to declare his place and power in the world, titulature is of paramount significance for a ruler. It defines and asserts in a determined order his power relationship with men and space in his own environment, in the world, and in the cosmos.

In his recent study on the titulature of the Muscovite ruler, Marc Szeftel[1] presented its evolution as follows: 1) *Velikii Kniaz'* of Vladimir, or Grand Prince of Vladimir; 2) *Velikii Kniaz' vseia Rusi,* or Grand Prince of all Rus' (1328); 3) *Bozhieiu milostiiu* or *Dei Gratia* (1449); 4) *Velikii Gosudar'* or *Gospodar* (1448, in inter-princely relations, 1489 in international relations); 5) *Samoderzhets,* or autocrator (1492 by the Church, 1591 in international relations); 6) *Tsar',* mid-fifteenth century by the Church, Ivan IV's coronation as *Tsar'* on January 16, 1547; 7) *Tsar' Kazanskii* and *Tsar' Astrakhanskii* (1553, 1554). In 1591 the tsar's envoys to the king of Poland referred to their ruler in the following manner: *Velikii Gosudar' nash Tsar' i Velikii Kniaz' Feodor Ivanovich vseia Rusi Samoderzhets.*

In view of the Orthodox Church's authority, guidance, and ceremonial function in introducing and sanctioning such titles, the general tendency has been to assume a Byzantine origin for most of these titles.[2]

In dealing with royal titulature it is important to determine which title was designed for which audience: whether it was mainly intended for domestic consumption or for international relations, or whether, as in the case of Russia, for the Eastern or Western world. Also it is important in historical analysis to know the particular purpose, historical context and circumstances behind the assumption of a particular title. For Russia the most important and immediate historical reality in power relations was the issue of Tatar suzerainty, not only in the Golden Horde era (1234-1502) but also in the following period.

The suzerainty of the Golden Horde, until its destruction by the Crimean khan in 1502, and then the claim in turn by the latter of restoring and continuing the Golden Horde's heritage, loomed large over Russia during the sixteenth century and influenced the titulature of the Muscovite rulers as far as their international status was concerned. The Tatar reaction was a weighty reality as late as 1571 when Devlet Giray khan of the Crimea invaded Russia and burned down Moscow's outskirts. Actually there were two parallel developments in the process of Russian liberation: first its *de facto* accomplishment by the buildup of her military power and by her successful resistance to Khan, and second, the recognition by the khan of the changing power relations. What was particularly important was not just to assume a title. Such an act required extremely careful preparation via diplomacy. Otherwise it could have had disastrous consequences for the very existence of the Muscovite state. The state would be in danger not only because the Tatars would themselves invade, but also because of the khan's close relations with the powerful western rivals of Muscovy, i.e., Lithuania and Poland (there was an alliance between Lithuania and Ahmed Khan of the Golden Horde and later between Casimir IV and the Crimean khan in 1480, 1511, 1516, and 1520).

THE EVOLUTION OF MUSCOVITE TITULATURE DURING THE TATAR DOMINATION

There is a scholarly consensus that Ivan I's title, *Grand Prince,* assumed a new meaning when in 1328 a *yarlıġ* (Imperial diploma) of Uzbeg, khan of the Golden Horde (1311-41), empowered him to act as an intermediary between the khanate and the Russian princes in collecting the tribute due and in settling all other similar matters.[3] This guaranteed the primacy of the Muscovite prince among the other Russian princedoms and prepared him for his unifying and liberating role in the future struggle. Already Ivan I (1328-40) styled himself "Grand Prince of all Rus" and the title was continously used until 1655. (Compare this with the Tatar title *Barça Moġol Pādişāhı,* the supreme ruler of all the Mongol people).[4]

By the assumption of the title *Dei Gratia,* which was first used in the treaty with King Casimir IV in 1449, it is suggested[5] that the Grand Prince of Muscovy must have claimed, among other things, to have received his sovereign power directly from God. This was clearly a notion in conflict with the khan's suzerainty. Actually, by his alliance with Casimir in 1449 the Grand Prince was defying his powerful suzerain Sid (Sayyid) Ahmed Khan (c. 1433-c. 1465).[6] It is also suggested[7] that the use of the title *gosudar'* occurred at a time when Muscovy achieved its so-called "independence" from the Golden Horde in 1480.

The Title *Tsar'/ Khan*

As far as the Tatars were concerned, failure to pay the yearly tribute constituted the most serious violation of vassalage relations, and it was usually punished by military action. That was the reason behind the confrontation between the Muscovite Grand Prince and Ahmed, khan of the Golden Horde, on the Oka river in 1480. However, the encounter did not result in a battle, as the khan left the battlefield upon a promise by Ivan III to pay the tribute. But what is interesting is that upon his return to Moscow the Grand Prince was greeted as a victor and liberator. Historiography has considered the date as the beginning of the independence of Russia.[8] But it is difficult to understand why the Muscovite monarch did not take the title of *Tsar',* equalling that of khan, until 1547. In fact, the most important event for the Grand Prince in the year 1480 was the alliance with Mengli Giray, the Crimean khan. This was because Mengli Giray was a Genghiskhanid claiming the Great Khanate and, as a *protégé* and a vassal of the Ottoman sultan, he was destined to give the decisive blow to the Golden Horde. The question is why during this period were Ivan III (1462-1505) and his successor Vasilii (1505-33), despite the internal chaos in the Golden Horde following Ahmed Khan's death in 1481, unable to claim the title of *Tsar'* which, it should be remembered, was always used by the Muscovite chancery as corresponding to the title *khan.*[9]

The strict Tatar notion of legitimate sovereignty required that the *khan* should be of the lineage of Djodji, the eldest son of Genghis Khan, who was assigned by his father the westernmost lands of the Empire. It remained an unchallenged rule among the Turco-Mongol peoples in Eurasia that only someone from his lineage could claim the khanate. Thus, even such powerful figures as Nogay, Mamay or Edigü would not dare to assume the title *khan.*[10] Three conditions together determined who could assume the title: 1) Genghiskhanid descent, as mentioned above; 2) factual allegiance of the *Ulus,* or the powerful

tribes under the four *Karaçu begs;*[11] 3) actual possession of the *Uluġ-Yurt,* also known as *Takht* or *Saray,* the capital region of the Empire.[12] This systems attributed to Genghis Khan and called "Yasa" or *"Töre-i Djengiz-Khānī,"* had almost a sacred significance among the military tribes as far as the khan's sovereignty was concerned. It was uncompromisingly advocated by the chiefs of the tribal aristocracy to the end of the Crimean Khanate. For example, in the seventeenth century, Murad Giray Khan (1678-83) was a staunch exponent of the *"Töre-i Djengiz-Khānī."*[13]

Also, since Mamay's defeat at Kulikovo in 1380, a test and condition for keeping the title of Great Khanship was to be able to re-impose Tatar suzerainty and tribute upon Russia. The *Uluġ-Yurt* or *Takht* was the territory on the middle Itil (Volga) river where Batu Khan (1237-56), the founder of the Golden Horde Khanate had established his capital city, *Saray.*[14] In order to become a legitimate Uluġ Khan it was imperative for the claimant to the throne to have the actual possession of this "sacred" Imperial center along with the allegiance of the four *Karaçu* tribes which provided the main military power of the khan.

The Girays of the Crimea were of Genghiskhanid descent and counted among their predecessors Toktamış Khan (1377-95),[15] who had restored the unity of the Golden Horde and re-imposed Tatar suzerainty over Russia in 1382.[16] However, Mengli Giray, khan of the Crimea, still had to fulfill the two remaining conditions to be recognized as Great Khan by the Tatar world: namely, to rally the Imperial tribes under his control and to capture the *Uluġ-Yurt.*[17] His policy for establishing his control over the *Ulus* was not completely successful. His efforts to forcibly settle the Tatar tribes in the Crimea actually alienated these tribes, including the Nogays. Besides, he could not leave the Crimea, which had become a center of power and wealth, while Saray was devastated (especially after Timur, or Tamerlane, invaded in 1395 and during the internecine war thereafter).[18]

In 1502 Mengli Giray defeated Sheykh Aḥmed's troops and captured and completely destroyed Saray. Now feeling himself the successor to the Golden Horde, he notified Ivan III of his victory so that Ivan would henceforth pay the tribute to him. Thereupon the Grand Prince of Muscovy took the role of supporter of the defeated khan and helped him to settle the Nogay tribes in the region of Astrakhan. On the other hand, the sons of Uluġ Mohammed, khan of the Golden Horde and later founder of the Khanate of Kazan', had

already come under the protection of Muscovy. Uluġ Mohammed's son Ḳāsim, in dispute in 1445 with his brother Mahmudek over the khanship of Kazan', took refuge in Moscow. Under the protection of the Grand Prince in 1453 he founded the Khanate of Ḳāsim in Gorodets. This khanate became the rallying point of many exiled Tatar partisans who thereby served the Grand Prince's plan to maintain his protectorate over Kazan'. That the Grand Prince was not only an ally but was also the actual protector of khans of Genghiskhanid descent greatly enhanced his prestige among the Tatars and became one of the most important factors leading to his assumption of the title *Khan/Tsar'* later on.[19]

In the years 1502-54, the Khanates of Kazan' and Astrakhan, as well as the Nogay tribes in the old Saray region, became the focus of the struggle between the Crimean khans and the Muscovite princes for the heritage of the Golden Horde Empire. Or, to put it differently, in the face of a revival of the Golden Horde power under the Crimean khans, Muscovy was forced, for the sake of its own future, to establish control in the middle and lower Volga regions and thus to claim the Uluġ Khanate.

The struggle reached its most dramatic and decisive phase under Mohammed Giray I (1514-23) and Sahib Giray I (1532-51). Mohammed Giray had championed an anti-Muscovite policy since 1507 when he was a *ḳalġay* or crown prince. When he succeeded Mengli he continued the devastating raids against the Muscovite territories and renewed the alliance in 1516 with Lithuania-Poland, which was then at war against Muscovy. Through his envoys he asked the Muscovite prince to stop interfering in the affairs of Kazan', pay the ancient tribute for the city of Odoev,[20] and relinquish his recent conquests in Lithuania. Then the Crimean khan, following his brother Sahib Giray's accession to the throne of Kazan', came with his army before Moscow in 1521. However, he did not attack the city, since Tatar cavalry was not effective in the face of the Russian artillery. Upon the promise of a yearly tribute he returned home. From this time onward the Crimean khans claimed a yearly tribute called *uluġ khazīne* from Muscovy. The Russians interpreted it as a "gift", although it actually was a ransom to spare Russian territories from Tatar raids. The khan always considered the regular payment of the *uluġ khazīne* a primary precondition of peace between the two countries.[21] However interpreted, Mohammed Giray apparently considered it as a continuation of the tribute paid to the *uluġ* khans of the

Golden Horde. The claim was implied in the title he used when the treaty of alliance was renewed with the king of Poland, the Grand Prince of Lithuania, in 1520. There he styled himself *"Ulu-Ordanuñ Ulu Khanı Deşt-i Kipçak barça Moġol Pādişāhı"* ("The Great Khan of the Great Horde and the Emperor of the Kipcak steppes with all Moġol people"). Here the title *Uluġ-Orda* refers to the principal tribes as well as the central region on the lower Volga. *Deşt-i Kipcak* signified the steppe area of eastern Europe from the Dniestr river to Astrakhan, inhabited by Turco-Mongol tribes. Mohammed Giray's Empire collapsed when he was killed by the Nogays in 1523 in the plain of Astrakhan.[22]

During the period 1500-25 Istanbul became the scene of Crimean and Russian diplomatic efforts to secure the sultan's favor. While the Grand Prince tried to cultivate Ottoman frienship on the grounds of Muscovy's pressure on Lithuania-Poland and the benefits of an expanding trade (in fur in particular), the Crimeans stressed such sensitive issues for the Ottoman sultan as the shame of the invasion of Muslim lands by the infidel Muscovites. He even accused the Muscovites of demolishing mosques and building churches in Kazan' and of giving aid to the Kızılbash of Iran. Muscovite envoys sent to Istanbul in 1521 were instructed to deny in particular the Crimean assertion about the demolition of the mosques and to prove that the khans of Kazan' were installed for many generations by the "sovereign Muscovite ruler, by God's grace sovereign of all Rus'."[23]

In support of his claim to sovereignty over Tatar lands, the Muscovite ruler argued that Ivan III had *granted* various khans (called *tsar'* in the Muscovite sources) possessions of land in his state in return for their service.[24] Fierce internal struggle, for power in the decline period of the Golden Horde and in the history of the successor khanates forced many ousted khans or khanzādes (sons of khans) to take refuge in the neighboring countries, including the Ottoman Empire, Lithuania and Muscovy. Each of these states took advantage of the situation to establish its own influence or protection over Tatar lands.[25] Muscovite princes particularly encouraged Tatar princes to settle in Muscovite territory, often with their retinues of begs and tribes. The Muscovite prince thus became the protector and suzerain of Tatar "tsars" or "tsareviches." The "suzerainty" over the Kazan' khans (all descendants of Genghis Khan) seems to have played a crucial role in Ivan IV's assumption of the title *tsar'* or *khan*. The implications of this notion of sovereignty and the title *tsar'* can be summarized as follows.

First, the Grand Prince interpreted his support of Genghiskhanid pretenders to the throne of Kazan' (the first instance in 1487) as the basis of the Muscovite "protectorate" over Kazan', and as giving him the legal prerogative to invest the khan of Kazan'.[26] Yet in official correspondence the Grand Prince always addressed the khan of Kazan' as "brother," that is to say, an equal. Jaroslav Pelenski[27] suggests that the Grand Prince first managed to establish his *de facto* and *de jure* protectorate over the Kazan' Khanate in the period 1516-19, by taking advantage of the voluntary submission of the Kazan' khans. In fact, as was stated in the official *Letopisets nachala tsarstva,*[28] in the final analysis, it was the Kazan' "aristocracy" that decided in favor of a Muscovite protectorate over Kazan'. The text reads:

> Leading Prince Bulat, and all the *oġlan,* and princes, and the whole Kazan' people took an oath of *allegiance* and gave a sworn charter to the great sovereign Ivan Vasil'evich [to the effect] that they would always be [united] with the Grand Prince; and they would not invite another tsar' without the consent of the Grand Prince . . .

The real issue for the Grand Prince was to legitimize his claim to the Muscovite "protectorate" over the Kazan' Tatars through the consent of the council of the Tatar aristocracy *(ḳuriltai)* against the Crimean "claim" over the Kazan' *yurt* and *ulus*.[29] In the Mongol state tradition, legally, it was the *ḳuriltai* that decided who was going to assume khanship.[30] The fact that the *ḳuriltai* of Kazan' recognized the Muscovite sovereign's prerogative to invest the khan is of paramount importance in understanding why the Grand Prince subsequently claimed *khanship* or the title *tsar'*.

Ivan IV tried to justify the campaign against Kazan' in 1549 with the argument that the *Kazan' people* had broken their original fealty and shifted their allegiance to the Crimean Girays.[31] However, anticipating the argument that the Kazan' *kuriltai* was free to elect any Genghiskhanid to the throne, Muscovy was prepared to counter with the theory of ancient territorial rights as a *votchina,* or patrimony of the Muscovite ruler. This was first applied to the case of Kazan' in the 1520's.[32]

The following formulation of the patrimony claim was put forth to justify the Muscovite campaign against Sahib Giray, the khan of

Kazan', who was, in Muscovite logic, a usurper:[33] "The Kazan' land *(zemlia)* had belonged to our sovereigns from antiquity . . ." The right of investiture was based upon this claim. The claim was insisted upon even more following the critical year 1546, when a new Crimean khanzāde Safa Giray was put on the throne of Kazan'. In the same year, the right of investiture was used to claim patrimony before the Ottoman sultan's envoy. The Ottoman envoy, Iskender, challenged this contention using the same reasoning and declared:[34] "Tsar Sahib Giray sent [his embassy] to entreat our sovereign [with a plea] last spring, and he submitted to our sovereign; and this *yurt* [belonged] to our sovereign and the Grand Prince should not send his army against Kazan'."

Jaroslav Pelenski quite rightly pointed out[35] that Russian diplomacy was deliberately confusing the Turco-Mongol notion of *yurt* with the Russian notion of *votchina* or patrimony. The truth of the matter was that the Muscovite ruler's notion of the Kazan' *yurt* came as a reaction against Mohammed Giray I's claim over the Kazan' *yurt* as part of the *Uluġ Yurt* of the Golden Horde, and his patrimonial right as a Genghiskhanid. Ivan IV, writing to the Nogay Lord Yūsuf in January 1552, referred to Kazan' as "his *yurt* from antiquity."[36] The *yurt* theory was evidently designed mainly for the Tatars, and the Nogays in particular.[37] In addition, following the Golden Horde tradition, in 1550 Ivan IV stressed that Kazan' was also a land that paid tribute to the Muscovite monarch.[38]

When Ivan IV conquered Kazan' in 1552 and put an end to the existence of the khanate, a new theory was developed that God had granted him the Kazan' *yurt* and his conquest liberated it from "rebels" and "usurpers." The conquest was reported to the Nogays in these words: "Sovereign, Tsar and Grand Prince hath taken his patrimony, the Great Tsardom of Kazan'."[39] It is interesting to note that "legal" claims of Muscovy over the Khanate of Kazan' were put forth gradually according to particular historical situations and purposes. It was after this conquest that Ivan IV added the title "Tsar' of Kazan'" to his titulature. Before long Muscovy also annexed the "Tsardom of Astrakhan," which constituted the historical *Uluġ Yurt* of the Golden Horde, and secured the allegiance of the powerful Nogay tribes in the region.[40]

THE DECISIVE FACTOR: THE OTTOMANS

It can safely be assumed that Ottoman power, then at its peak (it was capable of threatening the Habsburg Empire in Europe), influenced the course of events during the decisive period in East European history between 1502 and 1554.

Once established in the Crimea (1475) and Akkerman (1484), the Ottomans, in order to protect their new acquisitions, pursued a policy of supporting the weaker parties against the more powerful parties in the region. First, under Mengli Giray, their faithful vassal since 1475, they supported the alliance of the Crimean Khanate and Muscovy against Lithuania-Poland and an aggressive Golden Horde. The Ottoman sultan actively protected the Crimean khan against Ahmed Khan in 1476 when he threatened to invade the Crimea.[41] It was Ottoman protection that made it possible for Mengli Giray to counter-attack and give the ultimate blow to the Golden Horde in 1502. But when the Ottomans witnessed Mohammed Giray's independent and ambitious policy aimed at a revived Golden Horde Empire under his own control and were faced with his claims on Ottoman Caffa, Ottoman-Crimean relations became tense.

In foreign policy Crimean and Ottoman objectives also differed. While the sultan now wanted Crimean cooperation against Lithuania-Poland, which had come in conflict with the Ottomans over Moldavia, the Crimean Khanate found Lithuania-Poland to be an indispensable ally against Muscovy. Relations between Selim I (1512-20) and Mohammed Giray were marked by mistrust. Muscovy was quick to take advantage of the change in the Ottoman attitude towards the khan. Muscovite envoys frequently appeared in Istanbul and always found a favorable reception.[42]

Upon the murder of Mohammed Giray (1523), a time of troubles shook the Crimea until Sahib Giray's arrival from Istanbul in 1532 as Crimean khan. Sahib Giray I (1532-51), who had previously been khan of Kazan' (1521-25), was an irreconcilable enemy of Moscow and his assignment to the khanate meant that he had finally been able to convince the Porte of the Muscovite danger in the north. However, his khanate witnessed the repetition of the same story as in Mohammed Giray's reign.[43] This energetic khan tried to increase his soldiery equipped with firearms and to reorganize the khanate according to the centralized system of the Ottomans. In 1546 he eventually established his control over the Khanates of Astrakhan and Kazan', where now his

brother Safa Giray Khan (1546-49) replaced Moscow's *protégé* Şāh ʿAlī Khan (1518-21, 1546). The date 1546 is crucial to the understanding of subsequent developments. Realizing that this was the decisive moment to act, Ivan IV mobilized all his forces against Safa Giray at Kazan'. Ivan also chose this moment to assume the title *Tsar'* (16 January 1546), which corresponded to *Uluġ Khan,* the title of the Golden Horde ruler. His military campaign was a failure. The tsar continued the struggle, however, under conditions which he considered strongly favorable to himself. For since 1546 the Ottoman government had begun to turn against Sahib Giray Khan, who was on way toward reviving the Empire of the Golden Horde in the north. He was further suspected of claiming the Crimean coastal area, which was under direct Ottoman rule. According to Remmāl Khodja, an eyewitness chronicler of the time:[44]

> The sultan's vizirs were saying: The Khan does not show the slightest respect to the envoys sent from the Porte. If he unites his forces with the Nogays (of Astrakhan), no one can match him and resist.

With this, rumors spread about Sahib Giray's plans to take Caffa from the Ottomans.

Upon Safa Giray Khan's death (1549) Ivan IV, in collaboration with the pro-Muscovite faction of the Kazanian aristocracy, installed Şāh ʿAlī on the throne of Kazan' on August 16, 1551. The rest of the story of how in 1552 the tsar annexed the Khanate of Kazan' and styled himself *Kazanskii Tsar'* is well known. But an essential point for understanding the tsar's final success should be made here.

The Ottoman government had a plan to replace Sahib Giray in the Crimean Khanate with a more submissive Giray without causing an internal struggle, and then to save Kazan' by supporting a military expedition against Moscow under the new khan. The Porte hoped to secure the collaboration of the Tatars of Kazan' and Astrakhan and the Nogays. In 1551, Devlet Giray, a cousin of Sahib Giray, was ostensibly appointed Khan of Kazan' by the sultan, but actually came to Akkerman to wait the opportune moment to take the Crimean throne. The attempt to put Kazan' under Ottoman suzerainty and protection was an interesting new development. But Sahib Giray proposed to eliminate Devlet Giray, planning then to make his own sons khans of Kazan' and Astrakhan. The ensuing struggle caused the failure of the Ottoman plan.

From Sahib Giray's khanate on, the Ottoman Sultan Süleyman I (1520-66), conscious of his duty as Caliph to protect Islamic lands against Christian assaults, opposed the Muscovite plan to take over the heritage of the Golden Horde in the Itil (Volga) valley.[45] Following Ivan IV's conquests a joint Crimean-Ottoman campaign to recover Astrakhan, with a grandiose plan to dig a canal between the Don and Volga for the fleet and to expel all Muscovite forces from the region,[46] finally materialized in 1569. But again the question whether the sultan or the khan would benefit from the success of the plan caused mistrust between the Crimeans and Ottomans. Even after the failure of the expedition both sides refused to recognize the Russian occupation and continued to hope to emancipate Kazan' and Astrakhan.[47] A special provision in the treaty of alliance with Casimir, king of Poland, dated 1654, reads:[48]

> When we make war against Muscovy and conquer with God's help Edjderhan (Astrakhan), Kazan', Terek, and Tura, you agree that all these and other Muslim lands as well as all peoples of Tatar origin and Nogays shall belong to us.

Concerned about the renewal of an Ottoman-Crimean attack, the tsar henceforth took pains to appease the sultan even if it was necessary to make false promises.[49]

CHANGES IN THE MUTUAL POSITION OF THE RUSSIAN, OTTOMAN AND CRIMEAN STATES BY 1681

In his detailed study of Crimean-Russian relations based on the Muscovite archives, Novosel'skii[50] regards the year 1647 as a turning point in the assertion of Russian power vis-à-vis not only the Crimean Khanate but also the Ottoman Empire. By the mid-seventeenth century, the Russian Empire was ready to emerge as the principal power in eastern Europe. In 1647 Russia terminated her long rivalry with Poland and agreed to form a common front against the Tatars and the Ottoman Empire. Now the Russians, through the Don Cossacks directly threatened the Ottoman Empire in the Black Sea and the Crimea; and by establishing a new defense line on the frontier, Muscovy effectively contained the Crimean raids. One of the main

reasons for the shift in the balance of power on this front was that the Ottoman Empire was compelled to go on the defensive in the northern Black Sea as a result of its disastrous war in the Mediterranean with Venice beginning in 1645. In order to avoid provoking a new Cossack attack against Azak and the Black Sea ports in general, the Porte pressured the Crimean khan to control his Tatars and desist from raiding Russian territories. The devastating Cossack raids, which were most serious from the turn of the seventeenth century, culminating in their capture and defense at Azak (1637-42), made the Porte increasingly concerned about the danger from the north.[51] Muscovy had now found in the Cossacks an effective counter-force to the Tatars and Nogays to offset the pressure exerted by the khanate, as well as by the Ottomans, who played a key role by protecting and at times encouraging the Tatars. Although Moscow continued to reinforce the Don Cossacks, it was still careful not to provoke an armed reaction from the Ottomans and tried to prevent the Cossacks from attacking the sultan's dominions.

In his letter to the tsar dated September 1642,[52] *Kalġay* Feth Giray denounced the tsar's duplicity, saying that:

> Although you declare that you took the Don Cossacks out of Azak and did not send them powder, bullets, or provisions, or aid of any kind [. . .] on our return from Azak, your Cossacks pursued us and burned down and plundered a large village of ours on the sea shore. [. . .] It is not proper to appear as friends and then allow these brigands to perpetrate such acts.

In 1646, the sultan, alarmed by the success of the Cossack raids in the Crimea, tried to make a show of force and insisted on the Russian evacuation of Cherkask, threatening otherwise to attack with combined Ottoman and Crimean forces. According to Russian reports from Istanbul,[53] the Porte was then very concerned about the news of the Polish-Russian alliance against the Crimea and Azak, which was believed to be in serious danger of a renewed Cossack attack.

Muscovite control over the Zaporozhian Cossacks was first established in 1654 with the agreement of Pereiaslav. This new development was crucial from a strategic standpoint, since Russian control over both the Don and Dnieper Cossacks made the Russian threat against the Crimea and the Black Sea area all the more immediate. The

Cossacks were suited not only geographically but also in their military organization and tactics to fight successfully against the Tatars along the entire southern front from Budjak to Azak. Since heavy regular soldiery was in constant need of supplies from the hinterland, the steppe zone had always constituted a major barrier to the Russian armies. A clear reflection of the change in the tsar's power and attitude is to be found in the following lines of a letter written by Sefer Ġāzi Aġa,[54] vizir of Mehmed Giray IV, to the Muscovite government in 1660:

> We have warned you so many times that you should not interfere with Poland and the Dnieper Cossacks. [. . .] you the Tsar' *(Pādişāh)* grew conceited upon the capture of a few fortresses from Poland and the Dnieper Cossacks and, in your letters, you called yourself 'Emperor of the West and the East' *(Maġrib ve Maşrik Pādişāhı)*. Let us leave alone the East, but in the West too, like you there is a Christian *Pādişāh* who crowned seven kings.[55] Can you deny that there is a *Çasar?* [. . .] On the other hand, many countries in Europe are under the authority of the Ottoman *Pādişāh*. God does not like boastful men. If you are conceited by relying on your guns and cannons, we ourselves rely on God who created this world from nought. [. . .] If you do not give back to Poland the fortresses which you captured, we are determined to fall upon you and the Dnieper Cossacks.

The following period brought new developments, making Russia an even greater challenge to Ottoman interests. The Ottoman Empire, engulfed by the Venetian War (1645-69), could not actively intervene in the decisive developments then taking place in the Ukraine. Though for a period in 1648-53 the khanate had succeeded in making an alliance with the Zaporozhian Cossacks and securing Ottoman protection over them, the attempt failed completely in the end without the active support of the Porte.[56] It was under the energetic Köprülü vizir family that the Ottomans ended the Venetian War and regenerated the Empire's power, tackling the northern question and launching a joint Ottoman-Crimean offensive against Russia in the Ukraine (1678-81). Murad Giray Khan I (1678-83) and the entire Crimean tribal aristocracy enthusiastically participated in this popular war.[57]

TITULATURE 1641–1681

To see the changing power relationship between the Muscovite ruler, the khan and the Ottoman sultan, it is revealing to examine Russian diplomatic initiatives in the Crimea and Istanbul to introduce more and more exalted titles for the tsar insofar as he felt his power had grown upon the capture of Azak by the Don Cossacks (1637-42), the union with the Dnieper Cossacks (1654) and the ending of the long war against Poland (1667).

A general honorific title used for all Christian rulers was *Ḳidvatu* (or *'Umdatu* or *iftikhāru') l-Umerā' i' l-Milleti' l-Mesīhiyye'* (the Leader or Pride of the *Emīrs* of Christendom).[58] The German emperor, the French king, the Russian tsar, and the Wallachian prince were all seen as *emīr par excellence,* a title which in Islamic usage denoted military commanders or governors under the Caliph as well as secondary rulers. In Ottoman usage, *emīr* was a synonym for *beg* and was used for governors' military chiefs including *subaşı* or *za'īm* (subaltern commander of the timariot *sipāhī* in a subdivision of a *sancaḳ*).

Beyler-beyi or Ottoman governor-generals were addressed in official correspondence with the title *"Emīru' l-Umerā' i' l-kirām" (Emīr* of the illustrious *Emīrs),* and the *emīr* or *beg* under him with *"Mefkharu'* (or *Iftikhāru') l-Umerā' i' l-kirām,"* and *Subaşı* with *"Ḳidvatu* (or *Iftikhāru') z-Zuᶜamā."* It is clear that the main part of the *inscriptio (elḳāb)* used for Christian rulers is the same as that of Ottoman military commanders. Even the core of the honorific title used for the German emperor, *"Iftikhāru' l-Umerā' i' l-ᶜiẓām,"*[59] is the same as the title of a *sancaḳ begi.*

Actually we have to distinguish the two parts in the *inscriptio,* the original Ottoman *Iftikhāru*-section, and the actual legal or official title of the ruler such as *Knez (Kniaz'), Kıral,* or *Çar* (Tsar), etc. In fact, the original Christian titles of *Ḳral (Ḳıral), Çar, Çasar, Imperator* (or *Imperador), Hersek, Voivoda, Knez, Doj* are all used in the Ottoman documents. The Ottoman chancery had to determine which Ottoman title corresponded to a particular Christian title. The examination of the letters *(nāme)* sent to foreign countries show that *Pādişāh* was used for emperor, tsar, as well as king, such as the French king,[60] and *beg (bey)* for any king, prince, or voivode. The evolution of the titulature used for the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire is particularly interesting for it followed closely the changes which occurred in the actual power relationships between the Ottoman and Habsburg states.[61]

According to the Soviet historian A. A. Novosel'skii, the Ottomans agreed to use the title *Tsar' (Sar* or *Çar* in Turkish) for the Muscovite ruler for the first time in 1643, after the evacuation of Azak in 1642.[62] However, in a letter to Ivan IV, Selim II (1566-74) used the title *"Moskov Ḳralı Sar."* Obviously, *Sar* (Tsar) did not mean Caesar or emperor at that time.[63]

The general honorific title *(khiṭāb* or *elḳāb)* employed by the Ottoman chancery for the Crimean khan was: *"Djenāb-i Emāret-ma'āb Eyālet-niṣāb Devlet-iktisāb Zu' l-ḳadr al-atamm v' al-fakhr al-aṣamm al-mukhtaṣṣ bi-mezīdi 'ināyet' il-Malik il-Mannān Ḳırım Khanı* [the name] *dāmat maᶜālīhu."*[64] Occasionally, under special circumstances, a more elaborate *elḳāb* was used. The *elḳāb* used for Mehmed Giray[65] contains the rarely used phrase *Salṭanat-Iyāb* ("sultanate-returning). Sometimes *Devlet-ma'āb* was also used. Compound titles with *salṭanat* or *devlet* put the Crimean khan definitely above Ottoman begs.

The *elḳāb* of the Crimean khans was the same as that of minor or vassal Muslim dynasties, the phrase *emāret-ma'āb* apparently referring to the hereditary nature of the *emāret.*[66] At any rate, the title which the Crimean khan employed for himself in the letters addressed to the tsar,[67] which actually continued the tradition of the Great Khan of the Golden Horde, had no connection with the Ottoman *elḳāb* for the Crimean khan, and Moscow must have been well aware of this.

Pādişāh

The title *Pādişāh,* the paramount title of the Ottoman sultan, meaning supreme ruler in pre-Islamic Iran,[68] was used by Mohammed Giray I (as *"Moġol Pādişāhı")* for himself in 1520,[69] and by Ġazī Giray II in the form of *"Deşt-i Ḳıpcaḳnıñ Uluġ Pādişāhı"* in 1592. In the same letter addressed to the Polish king he also styled himself *"Deşt-i Ḳıpcaḳ Khanı."* In their letters to the Christian rulers the Crimean khans always used the prestigious title *Uluġ Pādişāh* which was evidently synonymous with the title *Uluġ Khan.*[70]

The Crimean khans used the title *Uluġ Pādişāh* for the Muscovite ruler apparently from the same time they used the title *Uluġ Khan.* The earliest document with the title *Uluġ Pādişāh* for the Muscovite rulers in the collection published by V. Veliaminov-Zernov and H. Feyzkhanoğlu is dated 1624.[71] Its first use must go back to a much earlier time.

It is to be noted that in the above-mentioned letter of Ġāzī Giray Khan the Ottoman sultan is styled as *Pādişāh Khundkār.* By using the

title *Pādişāh* for himself the khan intended to support his high ranking position, if not suzerainty, as a Genghiskhanid prince before the tsar rather than to attempt to emulate the Ottoman *Pādişāh.*[72] In his letters to the tsar, the khan sometimes included in the *inscriptio* the title *Āl-i Djengiz Pādişāhı Hān-i aᶜẓam* (Great Khan, Pādişāh of the Genghiskhanid lineage) while the Ottoman *Pādişāh* was referred to as *Āl-i 'Oṣmān Pādişāhı* (*Pādişāh* of the Ottoman lineage).[73]

In his letters to the tsar, the titles used by the khan for the Ottoman sultan also varied according to the circumstances. When the khan wanted to intimidate the tsar with the power of the Ottomans, he would use the most exalted titles, with emphasis on the sultan's title of Caliph or head of all Muslims on earth: *"Mekka ve Medīna milan Uluġ bolġan bu dünyā khalīfesi Āl-i 'Oṣmān Pādişāhı,"* or *"Uluġ yüz bin çok çok memleketleriniñ erkli 'aẓamatlu Pādişāhı,"* or *" Khān-i aᶜẓam khaḳān al-Mu'ẓẓam Hazretleri."*[74]

The title *Pādişāh* was enhanced in significance by the addition of the words *uluġ* (great), *aᶜẓam* (greatest), or *'ālempenāh.* While the khan and the tsar were addressed with the title *Uluġ Pādişāh,* the title *Pādişāh-i 'ālempenāh* was exclusively used for the Ottoman sultan. The title *Pādişāh* stemmed from pre-Islamic Iranian tradition but the titles *Sulṭān* and *Khalīfe* were linked to the Islamic polity and were never used for Christian rulers.

Also the title *Khundkār (Khunkār)* or *Khudāvand-i aᶜẓam,* meaning Great Lord or Emperor, was exclusively reserved for the Ottoman sultan and was never used for the khan or the tsar. The title is found in a letter addressed to the Ottoman sultan *(Khundkār)* Mehmed the Conqueror, dated October of 1478, among the earliest Crimean documents sent to the Ottomans.[75] In the Ottoman state it was used for the first time by Murad I (1362-89) who was known as *Ġāzī Khudāvendigār,* and remained a common title of the Ottoman sultans along with *Pādişāh.* With the possession and protection of Mecca and Medina the Ottoman sultan won his most important title, *Khādim al-Ḥaramayn al-Şarīfayn,* confirming his leadership in the Islamic world. In his letters to the tsar the khan mentioned this as an excuse for the khan's submission to the Ottoman sultan. At other times the khan emphasized his royal lineage as descending from Genghis Khan, who was considered the only universal Emperor in the Mongol world.

In their letters to Christian rulers, the Crimean khans did not hesitate to use even the title Caliph for themselves in order to legitimize their claims over the Muslim Tatar people.[76] In 1654, in the

treaty of alliance with John II Casimir, king of Poland, Mehmed Giray Khan started his letter by saying that God put on him "the robe of honor of Khilāfet" and, thus, all Muslim Tatar lands and peoples belonged to him.[77]

The Girays' claim of equal status with the Ottomans in lineage must have been universally known. Thus, in 1688, when the Janissaries in Istanbul planned for a moment to eliminate the Ottoman dynasty, their eyes turned to the Crimean Giray dynasty as the only family worthy of taking the place of the Ottomans on the Imperial throne.[78] However, the Ottoman sultans referred to the Crimean khans as their loyal "servants" *(khiḍmet-kār)* or "slaves" *(ḳul),* and this was accepted by the latter, as is evidenced in the letters to the Ottoman sultans by every member of the Giray dynasty since Mengli Giray, including those bearing the title *Khan.*[79]

The khan claimed to be superior to the Grand Vizir, and the meeting of the khan with the Grand Vizir during a campaign often caused difficulties in protocol.

In 1681 the Grand Vizir Kara Mustafa referred to Murad Giray (after the usual titles) as *"Fermānrevā-i memālik-i Ilhānī Mesned-ārāy-i erīke-i Djengīzkhānī 'izzetlü ve rif ᶜatlu ve saᶜ ādetlü karındaşımız Murad Giray Khan."* The interesting word used by the Grand Vizir for the khan is *"karındaşımız"* (our brother). The animosity between the haughty Grand Vizir and Murad Giray Khan (1678-83) who was so proud of his Genghiskhanid lineage may have originated from this time.[80] The antagozism between them became one of the reasons for the Ottoman defeat at the siege of Vienna in 1683.

From the time of Mengli Giray Khan, the Ottoman sultans had recognized the Crimean khan as the only intermediary in their relations with Russia.[81] This was intended to give the khan the assurance that Russia would not be allowed to compete politically with the Crimea in Istanbul. This was related to the fact that the Crimean khan, following the traditions established under the Great Khans of the Golden Horde, regarded the ruler of Muscovy as a "tribute-paying vassal." Therefore, the khan expected the Ottoman sultan to respect the khan's right to deal with his "vassal." In 1662 the khan's vizir reminded the tsar that the Ottoman *Pādişāh* was the suzerain ruler over the tsar as well as the khan.[82] On the other hand, under the terms of Islamic law, a formal payment was interpreted as submission to the *kharādj,* making the paying country a tributary of the Islamic state. Whenever a delay in payment of the tribute oc-

curred, the Crimean khan interpreted it as a "rebellion" and threatened war and continuous raids into Russian territory. The yearly payment of the *uluġ khazīne* was declared the most important condition for keeping peace with Russia.[83]

By the seventeenth century, Muscovy was transformed into a powerful Empire in eastern Europe and the "tribute" was now interpreted as a gift by Moscow. In 1643, when one of the Tatar envoys to Moscow referred to it as a *kharādj*, the tsar reacted strongly and the khan, expressing his apology to the tsar, wrote that he had dismissed and punished the man.[84] This signified a fundamental change in the mutual position of the two parties. However, payment of the annual "gift" was still viewed as an obligation.[85] We shall see that Russia obtained full exemption from *uluġ khazīne* only in 1700 by the Treaty of Istanbul.

Maşrik ve Maġrib Pādişāhı

In a letter to Alexis I Mikhailovich (1645-76), Mehmed Giray IV (1641-44, 1654-66) complained:

> For some years now, abandoning the way your father and grand-father used to follow and attempting to exalt yourself, you were using in your letters the title *"Pādişāh* of the east, west and north.' While he is a great *Pādişāh* in possession of Mecca and Medina between east and west even the Ottoman *Pādişāh* is not using such titles for himself.[86]

The titles used by Tsar Alexis I Mikhailovich for himself and for the Crimean khan in a letter dated 1646 were:[87]

> *Tengri tabārek ve taᶜ ālānın rahmeti ve 'ināyeti birlen Uluġ Pādişāh Khan ve hem Uluġ Bey Aleksay Mikhaylavic djümle Urusnuñ penāhı ve köp memleketleriñ de bolsa Pādişāhı ve Hükümdārından Uluġ-Ordanıñ Uluġ Khanı ḳarındaşımız Islām Giray Khan . . .*

1. *Tengri tabārek ve ta' ālānıñ raḥmeti ve 'ināyeti birlen* must have corresponded to *Bozhieiu milostiiu;*
2. *Uluġ Pādişāh Khan ve hem Uluġ Bey* corresponded obviously to *Velikii Gosudar' nash Tsar' i Velikii Kniaz';*

3. *Djümle Urusnun penāhı* corresponded to *vseia Rusi Samoderzhets;*
4. *Köp memleketleriñ de bolsa Pādişāhı* corresponded to *Tsar of many countries.*

The tsar addressed the khan rather briefly using the title *Uluġ Khan.* This along with the title *Uluġ-Orda* was only a relic of the past. His address to the khan as *"Ḳarındaşımız"* (our brother) is interesting in its emphasis on equal status.

In the treaty concluded in the same year Islam Giray III (1644-54) used the following *intitulatio* for himself:[88]

> *Tengri tabārek ve taᶜ ālanıñ raḥmeti ve 'ināyeti birlen Uluġ-Orda ve Uluġ-Yurtnıñ ve Deşt-i Ḳıpçaḳnıñ ve Takht-i Ḳırımnıñ ve Tat bilä Tavġaçnıñ ve Taġ-ara Çerkesniñ Uluġ Pādişāhı bolġan 'Ālī-Ḥaḍret maᶜ ālī-zīnet khurşīd-ṭal'at 'uṭārid-fiṭnet Men Islām Giray Khān . . . sözümüz oldur kim . . .*

In this treaty the titles used for the tsar are the same as above.

Along with the enumeration of the countries under his rule, the titles of Islam Giray consisted of *"Uluġ-Orda ve Uluġ-Yurtnıñ . . . Uluġ Pādişāhı Khan." Uluġ-Orda ve Uluġ-Yurt* was a reference to the Crimean khan's claim to the heritage of the Golden Horde, whereas *Uluġ Pādişāh* was an imitation of the Ottoman titulature.[89] The first part of the *inscriptio (Tengri . . . birlen)* also must have come from the Ottoman practice which corresponded to the western *Dei Gratia.*[90]

Neither the khan nor the tsar used the title *"Maġrib ve Maşrik Pādişāhı"* in the above mentioned letters, since the Crimeans objected to it, as was seen above in the letters of Mehmed Giray Khan and Sefer Ġāzī Aġa.

But in 1671 'Ādil Giray Khan used for Alexis I the title *"Maşrik ve Maġrib ve Şimāl ṭaraflarında bolġan Khristiyannıñ ata ve babadın olagelmiş Uluġ Pādişāhı"* ("Great Pādişāh from father and forefathers of the Christian peoples in the regions lying in the east, west and north . . ").[91] Thus, within a decade or so after Mehmed Giray IV's objection to the tsar's claim to the title "Emperor of the East and West" it was accepted in a modified form.

ᶜĀlem-penāh, Djümle Urusnuñ Penāhı

As early as 1643 the tsar's ambassadors insisted that the word *'Ālem-penāh,* meaning "the refuge of the world" or "ecumenical,"

should be added to the tsar's title of *Khān-i a'ẓam* (the *Uluġ* khan) by the Crimean khan.[92] They also objected to the Crimean khans' addressing the tsar with the following phrase, which was used for addressing subalterns: *"iᶜ lām-i yarlıġ-i şerīf-i khānī budur ki"* (literally, "what is notified in the imperial noble *yarlıġ* is that").[93]

Ḳalġay Feth Giray replied, in his letter to the tsar, that he had abandoned this formula of command, but he added that despite the insistence of the ambassadors, it was not possible to use the title of *'Ālem-penāh* for the tsar. The tsar's intentions were obvious: he wanted the Crimean khan to recognize him as being equal to the Ottoman Emperor, the suzerain of the khan, which was unacceptable to the Crimeans. The title *'Ālem-penāh* was one of the most exalted titles used by the Ottoman sultan, indicating his claim to world Empire. An intimate associate of the khan by the name of Meḥmed-Şāh Bey wrote to the tsar that it was contrary to Islam to use this title for a Christian ruler.[94]

Nūr al-Dīn (Nuradin) Ġāzī Giray used the title *'Ālem-penāh* in his letter to the tsar written at the same time.[95] Later, in a letter dated March of 1671, the title *Penāh* was used by the Crimeans in a restricted way as follows: *"Djümle Urusnıñ penāhı"* ("The Refuge of all Rus")[96] and later, *"Uluġ ve Küçük ve Aḳ Urusnuñ penāhı"* (refuge or protector of the Great, Little, and White Russians).[97] But the *"iᶜ lām-i yarlıġ. . . "* formula reappeared in the same document.

THE PEACE TREATY OF 1681

The treaty of 1681 bears a special importance as the last diplomatic document before the peace treaty of 1700 which would alter the whole pattern of Ottoman, Crimean and Russian relations. The negotiations leading to its conclusion are particularly illustrative of the nature of these relations in the preceding period.

As described in detail in the introduction to the treaty of 1681,[98] the "authorized ambassadors" *(mu'teber elçiler)* of the tsar first came to the Crimean capital and negotiated the provisions of an agreement with khan Murad Giray. In the sultan's words, "Murad Giray was the agent and intermediary of the sultan in this matter" *("Bu khuṣūṣa devlet-i 'aliyyem ṭarafından vekīl")*. Upon the conclusion of the agreement on the conditions of the peace treaty, a document *(temessük)*, delivered by the ambassadors was sent to the Grand Vizir at the Porte,

who in turn presented it for approval to the sultan. Finally, the sultan issued a document concerning the agreement in which he declared that he gave his approval "out of his compassion for the creatures of God who suffered in the war." Thereupon, the tsar sent his ambassadors (*büyük elçi* in the Ottoman documents) to Istanbul to present his letter to the sultan, requesting through the vizirs that he issue an *'ahdnāme* in accordance with the *temessük*. Acknowledging their request, the sultan ordered that an *'ahdnāme* be composed and delivered after enumerating the provisions which were concluded in the Crimea, together with a few additional clauses requested by the ambassadors. The *'ahdnāme* concludes with the formal oath *('ahd)* of the sultan and these words: "let the conditions of this peace treaty as well as this *oath and amnesty ('ahd ve amān)* be firmly established so that all the subject people of that country [Russia] will remain in tranquility and be prosperous."

In this procedure the following points should be noted:

1. The Russian ambassadors negotiated and concluded *(munᶜaḳid)* the provisions first with the khan in the Crimea. But the document was not yet an *'ahdnāme* or treaty. It was a simple *temessük* or certifying document.

2. After the khan concluded the negotiations, the sultan's government finalized the conditions with the tsar's ambassadors in Istanbul and agreed to include some additional clauses.

3. The whole procedure conveys the impression that the sultan was not involved directly in the negotiations for peace, but merely accepted the khan's and the Grand Vizir's requests for an agreement and approved it "for the sake of God's creatures."

4. Neither the procedure involved nor the final agreement implies a bilateral agreement concluded after direct negotiations, but rather a unilateral vow on the part of the sultan. It is called *'ahdnāme* or a document confirmed unilaterally by the sultan's oath or, in accordance with the Islamic law, "a grant of amnesty" *(amān)* confirmed by "a solemn oath" *('ahd)*. Islamic law requires that agreements made with unbelievers be made on this basis.[99] The Crimean khan also called the agreements made with Muscovy and other Christian nations *'ahdnāme* and he followed the same rules. The *'ahdnāme* mentions specifically that the tsar's men sent for negotiation and conclusion of the agreement were to be *mu'teber büyük elçi*. The ambassadors were to bear the exalted titles and be of the same stature as the *beg* (military commander) class in the Ottoman Empire. An ambassador's rank was

always a matter of concern at the khan's as well as at the sultan's court.[100]

In the *'ahdnāme* concluded in 1681 between the Crimean khan and the tsar, Murad Giray I (1678-83) and Fedor III Alekseevich (1676-82), the following titulature was used:

> *Tengri tabārek ve taᶜ ālanıñ rahmi ve 'ināyeti milan Uluġ-Orda Uluġ-Yurtnıñ ve Takht-i Kırımnıñ ve Deşt-i Ḳıpçaḳnıñ ve Sansız Köp Tatarnıñ ve Saġışsız Noġaynıñ Öñ Ḳolnıñ ve Sol Ḳolnıñ ve Sanı Yoḳ Tumannıñ ve Tat Milan Tavġaçnıñ ve Taġ-ara Çergaçniñ Pādişāhı ve Khan-i 'ālī-şānı bolġan devletlü ve 'izzetlü ve Kudretlü ve şedjāᶜ atlu ve firṣatlu Men Murad Giray Khan abbadallāhu taᶜ ālā davlatahu ilā yavm il-mīzān Ḥaḍretlerimizden, djümle Uluġ ve Küçük ve Aḳ Urusnuñ Pādişāhı Çarı Maşriḳ ve Maġrib ortasında bolġan Köp Khiristiyān ṭā'ifesiniñ penāhı Ḥükümdarı ḳarındaşımız Uluġ Beg Fodor Aleksiyeviç Ḥaḍretlerine . . .*

Here the title "*Penāh* (the Refuge or Protector) of many Christian peoples living between East and West" instead of "*Penāh* of all Rus'" recognizes the tsar's sovereignty over a larger area, although it limits it between the East and the West. The Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman government were careful to avoid a title which would declare the tsar sovereign over the Christians in Polish territory. But with this treaty Moscow's rule over the Ukrainian land on the left bank of the Dnieper river was officially recognized. Of course, Christian peoples in "the East" were always under the sovereignty and protection of the Ottoman sultan.

Farmān-farmā

In the final version of the treaty of 1681 between the Ottoman sultan and the Russian tsar the following title was used for the tsar:

> *Iftikhāru' l'Umerā' il-'iẓām il-ᶜĪsaviyya Mukhtāru' l-Kuberā il-fikhāmfi' l-Millet-il Mesīhiyye muṣliḥu meṣāliḥ-i djemāhīr iṭ-ṭā'ifet in-Naṣrāniyye Sāḥibu adhyāl' il-haşmet ve' l-vaḳār Sāḥibu dalā'il il-madjd ve' l-iftikhār Moscov vilāyetiniñ Çarı ve ana tābiᶜ olan Rus memleketleriniñ* Farmān-farmā *ve Ḥükumdarı Sudurus Aleksiyeviç khutimat 'avāḳibuhu bi' l-khayr . . .*

The first part, *Iftikhāru . . . ve' l-iftikhār* is the ancient Ottoman honorific title used for every Christian ruler. In the following part the title *Farmān-farmā* is a novelty.[101] This title, which was unfamiliar in the Ottoman titulature, literally means "the one who gives order," or an absolute monarch; it must correspond to the Russian title *Samoderzhets,* or Autocrat.

Originally, the title *Autocrator,* the Greek translation of *Imperator,*[102] was one of the most important components of the Roman and Byzantine Imperial titulature. Marc Szeftel,[103] who examined it through Russian documents, notes that its use was introduced first in 1492 by the Church for Ivan III. It implied a claim to the Byzantine heritage to which the Russian Orthodox Church was zealously attached. Meaning "a sovereign monarch holding his power directly from God, and not delegation of any other ruler," the use of the title in international relations evidently aimed at complete independence as against the Genghiskhanid claims of suzerainty.

The tsar used it officially in foreign correspondence only after 1591. Marc Szeftel[104] finds that its constant and universal use came about in 1654 when the left bank of the Ukraine was united with Moscow.

TURNING POINT: THE TREATY OF ISTANBUL, 1700

The whole pattern of relations between Russia, the Ottoman Empire and the Crimea underwent a crucial change in the period 1684-1700.[105] In order to prevent Moscow from joining the Holy League in Europe, the Ottoman government and the khan sent embassies and made concessions to Russia. In a letter expressing to his "brothers" Ivan Alekseevich and Petr Alekseevich his friendship in wartime, Selim Giray I renewed the peace treaty of 1681 and promised to punish severely those Tatars who would act against its provisions. Titles used for the tsars were more complete than ever before.[106] But on the other side, under pressure from Austria, Poland finally yielded to Moscow's demands. The treaty of Andrussovo of 1667 was ratified, thereby formally leaving to Russia the left-bank Ukraine and Smolensk. This was a tremendous diplomatic success for Russia. Paradoxically, Poland was to become the first country to suffer a loss from the Russian entry into the anti-Ottoman alliance.

In 1686 the tsar decided to join the Holy League, thus forming a broad front with other European powers against the Crimea and the Ottoman Empire. Cooperation between the latter two therefore became a matter of survival. Under Selim Giray I, who fully realized the gravity of the situation, the Crimean army not only assumed the main responsibility for the Polish and Russian fronts, but also played a significant role in Hungary and the Balkans.

The first Russian attempt to invade the Crimea in 1687 was a complete failure, due mainly to the logistic difficulties of providing for a large army in the southern steppe. In 1689 the Crimeans were able to halt a strong Russian army consisting of 162,000 men and 350 cannons behind the fortifications of Orkapı at the isthmus of Perekop. This time also, the Russian army suffered from a shortage of provisions and had to retreat. It took Moscow a long time to solve its logistical problem.

Peter the Great laid siege to Azak (Azov) in 1695 and again in 1696. He captured the fortress in his second campaign, causing a panic in the Crimea and Istanbul. Later, in 1700, the Russian ambassador went directly from Azov to Istanbul for the peace talks on a Russian ship without stopping in the Crimea.

The most important consequence of the war of 1686-99 was that Russia became a major European power while the Ottoman Empire, the Crimean Khanate and Poland suffered from the drastic change in the balance of power in favor of their age-old enemy. Russia was now the dominant power in eastern Europe. The Crimea itself and the Ottoman Black Sea possessions fell under the threat of a Russian invasion. With this change in power relations, the sovereignty symbols and diplomatic formalities referring to the old Muscovite dependence on the Tatars were done away with.

Concluded in Istanbul in August 1700, the peace treaty between the Ottoman Empire and Russia[107] terminated the century-old pattern of the relationship between Russia and the Crimean Khanate, and marked a new era in Ottoman and Crimean relations with Moscow. The Crimean khan was now eliminated as a mediator in the Ottoman-Russian relations, while full equality between the sultan and the tsar was recognized. Prior to the treaty, the Crimean khan claimed to have a status equal to or even superior to the tsar, and he was successful in playing the role of an intermediary between Russia and the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph.

According to the new treaty, the sultan vowed that the Ottoman commanders at the frontiers as well as the Crimean khan and his subjects, "being in submission to the Ottoman Porte," would keep peace and not attack the Russian territories, fortresses, or towns, and would not capture men or cattle. Article 8 states that:

> Since the Russian Empire is a sovereign, independent state, the tsar and his successors are no longer under obligation to continue to pay the tribute *(vergi)* which was paid to the Crimean khan and to the Crimeans until today. Neither the Crimean khan nor his subjects, the Crimeans and Tatars, were to recommence their hostile acts under the pretext of a demand for tribute or any other excuse, but they were to respect the peace.

Articles 14 and 15 guaranteed the Russian ambassadors and representatives *(Büyük elçi* and *kapu-ketkhüdā),* as ambassadors of other friendly countries were guaranteed, free and safe passage over land to Istanbul. "Also, the parties should not neglect to use in all official letters and documents the suitable titles for the rulers" (article 14).

The *inscriptio* used for the tsar in the Ottoman-Russian treaty of 1700 embodies the final version of the titulature used by the Ottoman chancery for the Russian ruler. It reads:

> *Iftikhāru Umerā'-il-'iẓām il-ᶜĪsaviyya Mukhtāru Kuberā' il-fikhām il-Mesīhiyya muṣliḥu maṣāliḥ-i djamāhīr iṭ-Ṭā'ifat in-Naṣrāniyye Saḥibu adhyāl' il-haşmet v' el-vaḳār Saḥibu dalā' il al-madjd v' el-iᶜtibār Moskov vilāyetleriniñ Çarı ve djümle Rūsuñ ve ana tābi' nice yerleriñ Fermān-fermā ve Ḥükümdārı Petrus Aleksiyovicius.*

In this formula there is no novelty in the tsar's titles. However, tsar Petr I (1682-1725) insisted on a special provision (article 14) making the use of it obligatory for the Crimean and Ottoman Empire. Now the initiative to act belonged to Moscow.

APPENDIX

Notes on Tribute Paid to the Tatars

The tribute which the Tatar states received from neighboring countries amounted to a substantial portion of the overall revenue of the Tatar ruling elite. The Crimeans received tribute from Muscovy, Poland, Moldavia and the Circassian begs which altogether reached an amount in value of perhaps as much as 100,000 gold pieces a year. Tribute was taken in cash, furs, fine woollen cloth, or, in the case of the Circassians, in slaves.

For the tribute under the khans of the Golden Horde see B. Spuler, *op. cit.:* 332-42; B. Grekov and A. Iakoubovski, *op. cit.:* 210-20; M. Roublev, "The Mongol tribute according to the wills and agreements of the Russian princes," in M. Cherniavsky, ed., *The Structure of Russian History* (New York: Random House, 1970): 29-64; G. Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953): 214-32. From the end of the thirteenth century the total sum of the taxes was collected and delivered to the khan by the Russian princes. It was called *vykhod* which in Russian meant "[the tribute] going out [of the country]." Vernadsky suggested that it was connected with *kharādj,* the Islamic poll tax imposed upon non-Muslims. Likewise the tribute paid by the Russian ruler to the Crimean khan is interpreted as corresponding to the Islamic *djizya* or *kharādj* (see M. Riḍā, *Al sabᶜ al-sayyār:* 166). However, the following sentence is interesting in explaining the "going out" (*çıḳış,* in Turkish) of a tribute and its "reaching" or "arrival" *(tigmek* or in modern Turkish *değmek): "birgil hazinege bakar illerniñ çıḳışlarıñ çıḳarıp bargan ilçilerge birgil hazinege tigürsünler."* (In the *yarlıġ* of Toktamış Khan, dated 1393, A. N. Kurat, ed., *op. cit.:* 148). Thus, *tiyiş* may indeed be a derivative of *tig-* (see A. Samoilovich, *"Tījīš . . . ," Izvestiia Rossiiskoi Akademii nauk,* ser. 6 (1917): 1277-78; V. D. Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo* . . . (Spb: 1887) I: 427-32). But this may also be a Turkish folk etymology of the Mongol word *dau' usi* or *togos* which is used in connection with the presents to be sent yearly to the Great Khan (see *Secret History of the Mongols,* Turkish trans. A. Temir (Ankara, 1948): 195). Claiming to be the rightful heirs of the Golden Horde, the Crimean khans attempted to restore and continue the Mongol tribute on Russia, while the Muscovite rulers regarded the Crimean khans as their peers. The Crimeans claimed that Mohammed Giray imposed a "tribute" upon Moscow in 1521 and that Devlet

Giray Khan renewed it in 1571 when he besieged Moscow. The Crimeans interpreted the payment as corresponding to the Islamic *djizya,* thereby signifying the establishment of their suzerainty over Muscovy (Halim Giray, *Gülbün-i Khānān* (Istanbul, 1871): 21 and M. Riḍā, *op. cit.:* 99, 166).

A real tribute was paid to the Crimeans by certain Russian cities such as Odoev. When such cities came under the rule of the Muscovite monarch, the Crimeans claimed the continuation of its payment by him (see above n. 20).

The Ottomans used the words *armaġan, yādigār, hedāyā, vergi, kesim* and in particular the word *pīşkeş* for deliveries which had features of a tribute (periodic payments under a formal treaty) but which did not entail actual submission and dependence for the "tributary" state (for these words see agreements made with the Habsburgs: Ferīdūn, *op. cit.,* II: 327, 337, and the Crimean documents: *MIKK);* in the early agreements with the Habsburgs it was made clear that a sum of 30,000 gold pieces was "to be paid for the Hungarian lands which were left in the hands of Habsburgs." This was called *kesim* or *vergi* (see A. Schaendlinger, *op. cit.:* n. 23). Peace was mainly conditional on the payment of the sum, which was "guaranteed by agreement" *("maᶜ hūd olan")* (see, *ibid.:* no. 32). *Kesim* was an Ottoman financial term meaning a lump sum to be paid for a tax assessment; *vergi* already in the sixteenth century meant tax (cf. G. Bayerle, *art.cit.:* 53). In later times more neutral words such as *armaġan* or *pīşkeş* were used. *Armaġan* simply meant gift, but *pīşkeş* had a more specific meaning: a *pīşkeş* was a present which a subordinate person customarily gave to the sultan at the time of receiving a grant or privilege (the Patriarch of the Orthodox Church paid a certain sum to the sultan's treasury at the time of his installation; this payment was also called *pīşkeş;* for *pīşkeş* see H. Inalcik, "Ottoman archival materials on Millets," *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire,* B. Lewis, B. Braude, eds. (New York-London, 1982) I: 448-49).

The Ottomans also called the annual payments made under formal agreements to the Crimean khan by Poland *pīşkeş* or *vergi* (Ferīdūn, *op. cit.,* II: 419-22, 436). The following note made by the Ottoman chronicler Abdülḳādir (*Tārīkh-i Āl-i 'Oşmān,* MS, Vienna, Staatsbibliothek, O. 1053, 456b) is interesting for seeing how the Ottomans interpreted the *pīşkeş:* "The Muscovite ruler used to express his submission *(bendegī)* by sending to the Sultan's Porte embassies with presents and *pīşkeş.*" Actually the Crimeans and

Ottomans regarded the Muscovite ruler as a subordinate of the Ottoman *Pādişāh* (supra note 72). Failure to pay it was considered by the Crimeans a "rebellion" or *casus belli,* as interpreted in Islamic Law. On the other hand, the Christian ruler regarded the payment as a ransom to prevent the invasions and raids by the Crimeans (see V. E. Syroečkovskii, *art.cit.:* 45). Avoiding admitting that it was a tribute, the Muscovite government preferred to call it a "present" (*pominki* in Russian, and *bölek* or *yarlıḳaş* in Turkish) see *MIKK:* n. 117). The Crimean khans always referred to it as *"uluġ khazīne,"* literally "Great Treasure." In fact, as Muscovite power grew and Crimean raiding became more difficult the Crimeans themselves began to accept the Muscovite interpretation, until the "tribute" was totally abolished by the treaty of 1700.

In Crimean Turkish a variety of terms was used for the tribute or gifts which were sent to the Crimean khan and his family, and to his officials and begs. Of these terms the principal ones were *uluġ khazīne, noḳrat akçası, ḳoltḳa, tiyiş,* and *bölek.*

The *uluġ khazīne* to be paid to the person of the khan, and even the *tiyiş,* were actually mandatory payments. In 1635 the khan wrote: "If you want to remain in friendship with me, *Uluġ Pādişāh,* to the end of our lives you shall send all the *tiyiş* described in the *defter* in total" (see *MIKK;* n. 31).

In 1592 Ġāzī Giray Khan informed the king of Poland that "he did not accept Moscow's offer of a *bölek khazīne* and a yearly payment of three million *noḳrat akçası* so that the Khan [would] give up an attack against Moscow" (*MIKK;* n. 5; *noḳrat* was a Russian silver coin in Tatar usage). This document suggests that already by that date the Crimean khan accepted the interpretation of the *khazīne* as *bölek,* that is, as a "gift." However, the khan made it clear that if the *uluġ khazīne* did not arrive in time or in full, a state of hostility existed between the two countries. The shift in essence from being a tribute to being a gift reflected a change in the actual power relations of the parties. Nonetheless, the Crimean tendency to increase *bölek* and *tiyiş* under the threat of raiding, and Moscow's resistance, often caused tension. In 1678 the tsar, while sending the missing items, said, "[I am] sending to [my] brother gifts *(bölek)* and grants *(yarlıḳaş).*" But he added at the same time that the *uluġ khazīne* was going to be sent each year regularly (*MIKK:* n. 117). In the seventeenth century, the question of the date and place of delivery and the quality of furs often led to an exchange of diplomatic notes. The khan generally accepted changes

introduced by Russia on such matters. In 1647 a special agreement was made (*MIKK:* n. 112) concerning the *uluġ khazīne* and *tiyiş* and its conditions of delivery. The khan agreed not to introduce innovations thenceforth. Upon the arrival of the *khazīne,* as befitting an important state occasion, it was displayed and examined in the council hall in the presence of begs and dignitaries.

As for the term *vergi,* in the treaty with Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich, Djanbek Giray Khan (1610-23) put a provision that stated: "The Tsar shall send as a *vergi* to the khan, aġas, and begs, 10,000 *som* of silver, many *bölek* and *ḳoltḳa* as in the time of Ġāzī Giray Khan" (*MIKK:* n. 304). The word *vergi* (also used in 1640, *MIKK:* n. 53) literally meant "anything given," such as a present or a tax. Over time it mainly assumed the meaning of tax in Turkish. The words *yarlıġamış* (granted) or *soyurġal* (grant) used together with *tiyiş* (*MIKK:* nos. 85, 106), however, leave no doubt as to the gift nature of *tiyiş.*

From a reading of the Crimean-Muscovite correspondence it becomes obvious that the *uluġ khazīne* and *noḳrat akçası* were the original core of the tribute which did not give rise to disputes from either side. On the other hand, *ḳoltḳa, bölek,* and *tiyiş* varied with the circumstances and number of recipients. It was these latter categories which often gave rise to disputes.

A regular *defter* listed the *uluġ khazīne* and *noḳrat akçası* for the khan, *kalgay* and *nuradin, ḳoltḳa* for the khan's households, *tiyiş* for the dignitaries at the palaces and government.

Ḳoltḳa consisted of presents for the khan's immediate household (*ḳoluş-kolḳa,* or gifts, in Khādjdjī Giray's *yarlıġ* dated 1453: A. N. Kurat, *op. cit.:* 66, line 38; for the Turkish word *ḳoltḳa,* or *ḳolḳa,* gift, see G. Clauson, *An etymological dictionary of pre-thirteenth-century Turkish* (Oxford, 1972): 616. *Bölek* was in fact an extraordinary gift requested by the khan (e.g., Bahadır Giray Khan's request of 300 *mithkal* of pearls and a string of pearls in 1637, *MIKK:* n. 35). Also it was a custom to send presents to congratulate a victory or a newly enthroned khan under the name of *mubārek-bād* (*MIKK:* n. 252).

According to the Crimean documents (see *MIKK:* nos. 29, 31, 34, 114, 117, 121), the *Uluġ Khazīne* (Great-, or Imperial treasure) included furs, fine woollen cloths and 4,000 *som* of silver. Whereas the *ḳalgay* and *nuradin,* sharing sovereign rights with a khan, received a *khazīne* which included 500 and 200 *som* of silver respectively, the dignitaries and begs were given only *tiyiş,* presents (sometimes the khan's vizir received 100 *som* of silver: see *MIKK:* n. 105). M. Roublev

(*art.cit.*: 31-35) calculated that the amount of Russian *vykhod* was five to seven thousand rubles during the fifteenth century and went down only by one thousand after 1481. However, the Muscovite "tribute" consisting of a long list of *khazīne, ḳoltḳa, bölek,* and *tiyiş* must have actually amounted to a substantial sum. It was estimated at 25,064 rubles (A. A. Novosel'skii, *op. cit.*: 316) in the mid-seventeenth century. In 1594 Ġāzī Giray Khan asked for 30,000 rubles as a condition for restoring peace with Moscow (*ibid.*: chapter I, n. 118). The king of Poland paid to the Crimean khan a yearly *khazīne* (*MIKK*: n. 53, dated 1640) of 15,000 gold pieces in cash and goods valued at 15,000 gold pieces. But in 1668 the khazīne amounted all together to 22,000 gold pieces (Ferīdūn, *op. cit.*, II: 422).

NOTES

This article follows the transliteration system used by the Encyclopaedia of Islam *with the exception of these letters: gh = ġ, sh = ş, w = v.*

1. M. Szeftel, "The title of the Muscovite monarch up to the end of the seventeenth century," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies,* XIII, 1-2 (1979): 59-81.

2. M. Szeftel finds a Byzantine origin or influence on the titles *Dei Gratia* (p. 62 and the literature), *Gosudar'* (pp. 62-65), *Samoderzhets* (pp. 66, 69), and *Tsar'* (p. 70); however, he points out that despite the fact that although the Orthodox Church of Muscovy initiated such titles for the Muscovite ruler, the latter avoided using them for a long time in international relations. Speaking about the title *Samoderzhets* he observes (p. 69): "Thus whatever was the original inspiration which led to the assumption by the Muscovite monarch of the title *samoderzhets,* and it undoubtedly followed the Byzantine model, the reality of his power was different from that of the Emperor in Byzantium." M. F. Vladimirskii-Budanov, *Obzor istorii russkogo prava* (Kiev-Spb, 1900): 162-63, as summarized by Szeftel (p. 62), laid emphasis on contemporary historical realities; for the assumption of the title *Gosudar'* Szeftel himself (p. 70) admits the importance of historical developments in *the east.* According to D. Obolenski, "Russia's Byzantine heritage," in Michael Cherniavsky, ed., *The Structure of Russian History* (New York: Random House, 1970): 3-28, the question of origins should be examined (p. 4) "within a wider framework" and we should not forget that "Russia's connections with the European and Asiatic worlds that surrounded and affected her during different periods of her history should also form part of the picture." While he points out (p. 6) that "the doctrine of the divinely ordained and universal Monarchy, which gave religious sanction to the theory of Moscow the Third Rome and political significance to Ivan the Terrible's Imperial coronation in 1547, can be traced back in direct line of ascent to the Byzantine theory of the Christian Empire," his conquests of Kazan' and Astrakhan "signified the Tsar's assumption of the political heritage of the Tatar Khan." The last point is more fully elaborated in M. Cherniavsky's article, "Khan or basileus: An aspect of Russian medieval political theory," *ibid.*: 65-79; there the Tatar origin of the Muscovite regalia is stressed.

3. Bertold Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde, Die Mongolen in Russland,* 2. erweiterte Auflage (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrasowitz, 1965): 90-91; also see A. Poppe, "On the title of Grand Prince in the *tale of Ihor's campaign,*" *Harvard Ukrainian Studies,* III-IV, *Eucharisterion: Essays presented to Omeljan Pritsak* (1979-80): 684-89.

4. Used by Mohammed Giray I in the treaty concluded with Casimir in 1520, published by V. V. Veliaminov-Zernov (and Hüseyn Feyzhanoğlu), *Materialy dlia istorii Krymskogo khanstva izvlechennykh iz Moskovskogo Glavnogo Arkhiva Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del—Ḳırım yurtuna ve ol ṭaraflarġa dāir Bolġan Yarlıġlar ve Khatlar* (hereafter *MIKK)* (Spb: Academy of Sciences, 1864), no. 1.

5. M. Szeftel, *art.cit.*: 61-62.

6. B. Spuler, *op. cit.*: 167-70.

7. M. Szeftel, *art.cit.*: 64.

8. B. Spuler, *op. cit.*: 183-86; the minting of coins with the Tatar khan's name was discontinued in 1480 when it was replaced by the name of the Muscovite ruler (Ivan III): see M. Cherniavsky, *op. cit.*: 70-71; however, in 1504 there was still talk at the Russian capital of tribute to be paid to the khanates: see M. Roublev, "The Mongol tribute . . . ," in M. Cherniavsky, *op. cit.*: 51.

9. *Ibid.*: 67.

10. B. Spuler, *op. cit.*, Index; as a native source reflecting the Tatar mentality and tradition 'Abd al-Ġaffār Kırīmī, *'Umdat al-Tawārīkh,* ed. N. Asim, *Supplement* to *Tārih-i Osmanī Mecmuası* (Istanbul, 1343/1924) is of particular importance for seeing that the struggle between

powerful tribes for dominance had to be organized around numerous Djodjid princes even during the decline period of the Golden Horde. Another example of how Eurasian peoples clung to the Genghiskhanid tradition of khanship is the great conqueror Timur. He bore only the title *Küregen* (or *Gurgān*) which referred to Genghiskhanid blood on the maternal side. In the Eurasian tradition Genghis Khan descended from *Altan Oruġ*, or the Imperial house of heavenly origin, see Z. V. Togan, *Ibn Faḍlān's Reisebericht* (Leipzig, 1939), Excursus 94 and 100a; P. B. Golden, "Khazaria and Judaism," *Archivum Eurasie Medii Aevi,* III (1983): 127-29 (his analysis of Tängri-Khan); *id.*, "Imperial ideology and the sources of political unity among the pre-Çingisid nomads of western Euroasia," *ibid.*, II (1981): 37-76; for the sacred character of the Genghiskhanids' right to supreme power see P. J. Vladimirtsov, *Obshchestvennyi stroi Mongolov,* Turk. trans. Abdülkadir Inan (Ankara, 1944): 210-12 (Russian original: 145-47).

11. On the *Karaçu,* see H. Inalcık, "The Khan and the Tribal Aristocracy," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies,* III-IV: 448-49, n. 8, 11. The four *Karaçu* begs in the Crimea actually continued the ancient Eurasian tradition which was transmitted by the Mongol Empire; for the four *Karaçu* begs in the Golden Horde see ᶜAbd al-Ġaffār, *op. cit.*: 193. It was the beg of the most powerful tribe of the *Karaçu* who actually determined who was going to be the khan. The power of a Mamay or Edigü in the Golden Horde Empire has its explanation in this institution. In the Crimean Khanate the chief *Karaçu beg* (belonging to the Şirin clan) was in the same position, see H. Inalcık, *art.cit.*: 445-52. Mengli Giray Khan, by his marriage to Nūr-Sulṭān, widow of Ibrāhīm, khan of Kazan', had evidently planned to strengthen his influence over the tribes in the *Uluġ-Orda* on the Volga river, which included the powerful Nogay tribes. Moscow's diplomacy would achieve a great success by securing the collaboration of these tribes before and after the conquest of the *Uluġ-Yurt* of the Golden Horde; also see B. F. Manz, "The Clans of the Crimean Khanate," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies,* II, 3 (1978): 282-309.

12. The khan's *yurt,* encompassing summer and winter pasturelands, was usually situated on the lower and upper parts of a river (see Gy. Györffy, "Système des résidences d'hiver et d'été chez les nomades et les chefs hongrois au Xᵉ siècle," *Archivum Eurasie Medii Aevi,* I (1975): 45-55) or on a sacred mountain (*Altın-Tağ* or Golden Mountain was considered a sacred locus). There, the *Altın-Orda* or Golden-Tent of the khan was pitched (see Z. V. Togan, *op. cit.*, Excursus 61b). In other words, the *Uluġ-Yurt* was the locus where the khan's sacred sovereign power rested. In the early years of the Mongol Empire it was the Kerülen river region where Genghis Khan used to hold his *orda,* i.e., headquarters. There, *kuriltai* were to be convened (see P. J. Vladimirtsov, *op. cit.*, Index).

13. In 1678, while he was on the Crimean throne, Murad Giray I even declared that too much conformism to the religious law led to the violation of the "Djinggis Töre," and caused a deterioration of the original structure of the khanate. Among the various measures he took in restoring the Turco-Mongol traditions was to abolish the Islamic office of the *ḳāḍī-ᶜasker* and to replace it with that of the "Töre-başı" prior to setting out for Hungary in 1683. Thus, he favored the Crimean tribal aristocracy against the *ulema,* who were more dependent on Istanbul than on the khan. The attitude of the *mirzas* towards the Ottomans was distinct from that of the *ulema* and the mercantile class. In close cooperation with them, Murad Giray favored an independent policy towards the Ottomans. He was very proud of his Genghiskhanid descent. Seyyid Meḥmed Riḍā, *Al-Sabᶜ al-sayyār fī akhbār al-mulūk al-Tatar,* ed. A. K. Kazembeg (Kazan, 1832): 186-89.

14. On the two Saray in the lower Itil region see B. Grekov, A. Iakoubovski, *La Horde d'or* (Paris: Payot, 1939): 135-47; A. Iakoubovskii (Yakubovskiy), *Altın Ordu ve çöküşü,* trans. H. Eren into Turkish from the third expanded edition (Ankara, 1976), chapter VII; A. Iakubovskii, *Feodalizm na Vostoke: stolitsa Zolotoi Ordy-Saray Berke* (Leningrad, 1932).

15. H. Mehmed Senā'ī, *Historia Chana Islam Gereja III,* ed. Z. Abrahamowicz (Warsaw, 1971): 58; in 1520 Mohammed Giray wrote to the king of Poland: "Great Toḳtamış Khan and my grand father Great Khādjdjī Giray Khan," *MIKK:* no. 1.

16. B. Spuler, *op. cit.*: 128.

17. M. Riḍā, *op. cit.*: 87; B. Spuler, *op. cit.*: 203; V. E. Syroečkovskii, "Muhammed-Girai i ego vassaly," *Učenye zapiski Moskovskogo gosudartsvennogo universiteta,* 61 (1940): 33-35. Since the descendants of Orda, brother of Batu, with the support of Tamerlane and the powerful tribes under Edigü Beg, expelled Toḳtamış, a descendant of Tukay Timur, younger brother of Batu, from *Uluġ* Khanate in the lower Itil region in 1397 the sons of Toḳtamış and the Girays of the Crimea fought to regain the *Uluġ* Khanate. 'Abd al-Ġaffār *(op. cit.)* is the principal source for this struggle. It is interesting to note that the last Uluġ Khan of the Golden Horde, Şaykh Aḥmed,

tried to secure the Ottoman sultan's favor. His envoys were in Istanbul in September 1503: see *"Defter-i müsevvedāt-i in'ām . . . ,"* ed. Ö. L. Barkan, *Belgeler,* IX (1979): 318.

18. See M. Riḍā, *op. cit.:* 80-86.

19. For Moscow's policy of attracting Crimean dissident princes and the intriguing by Muscovite agents in Bagçesaray and Istanbul in order to create pro-Moscow factions, see V. E. Syroečkovskii, *art.cit.:* 49-53; in 1648 Islām Giray Khan protested the tsar's sending letters directly to the Crimean begs: *MIKK:* no. 114.

20. The *kniaz'* of Odoev used to pay 1,000 gold pieces for *yasaḳ* and 1,000 gold pieces for *daraga (daruġa).* Since the *kniaz'* became a dependent of the Grand Prince of Moscow, Mengli Giray asked the latter to pay it instead. Moscow accepted, but objected to its collection directly by the members of the Tatar beg family, who had this revenue as their own appanage. Several Russian towns like Odoev were paying tribute to the Crimeans; when they came under Moscow's sovereignty the Grand Prince tried to abolish or change the nature of the payments: see V. E. Syroečkovskii, *art. cit.:* 46-47.

21. See Appendix (pp. 394-98) on tribute.

22. For the role of the division and rivalry among the Crimean tribal aristocracy see V. E. Syroečkovskii, *art.cit.:* 49-61; for Mohammed Giray's ambition see J. Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan* (The Hague: Mouton, 1974): 35.

23. *Ibid.:* 70; in order to discredit Moscow in Istanbul the Crimeans always used the same religious arguments, and the Ottoman sultans seemed impressed by them, see H. Inalcik, "The origin of the Ottoman-Russian rivalry and the Don-Volga canal (1569)," *Annales de l'Université d'Ankara,* I (1947): 47-110; a letter of Mohammed Giray I to the sultan against Moscow is published by A. Bennigsen *et al, Le khanat de Crimée . . . ,"* 110-14.

24. J. Pelenski, *op. cit.:* 79.

25. For the Ottoman case see H. Inalcik, "Kırım Hanlığının Osmanlı tâbiliğine girmesi ve ahidnâme meselesi," *Belleten,* VIII (1944): 185-229; for Kazan', J. Pelenski, *op. cit.:* 23-61.

26. For the development of this theory, see 67-75; Pelenski (p. 67) speaks of "the shrewd use of titles and legal phrases in Muscovite diplomacy."

27. *Ibid.:* 67.

28. Translation, *ibid.:* 72.

29. *Ibid.:* 55, 72.

30. On the importance and composition of the *Kuriltai (Xuriltai)* after Genghis Khan's death, see P. J. Vladimirtsov, *op. cit.:* 79-80 (Turkish trans.: 121-23); on the Crimean state council, see V. E. Syroečkovskii, *art.cit.:* 39-42.

31. J. Pelenski, *op. cit.:* 72, 74, n. 22.

32. *Ibid.:* 76-87.

33. In a statement to the Polish king in 1524, transl., *ibid.:* 79.

34. Translation, *ibid.:* 80-81.

35. *Ibid.*

36. *Ibid.:* 84-85.

37. *Ibid.:* 87. J. Pelenski observes "the equation of the Russian notion with Turkic notion of *yurt.*"

38. *Ibid.:* 82-83.

39. *Ibid.:* 86.

40. See A. Bennigsen, Ch. Lemercier-Quelquejay, "La Grande Horde Nogay," *Turcica,* VIII, 2 (1976): 203-36.

41. See H. Inalcik, "Kırım Hanlığının . . . ,": 199-223.

42. A history of Ottoman-Russian relations is written by N. A. Smirnov, *Rossiia i Turciia v XVI-XVII vv.,* two vols. (Moscow, 1946); A. N. Kurat, *Türkiye ve Idil boyu* (Ankara, 1966); a short account with a bibliography of Turkish and Russian works by Alan W. Fisher, *Crimean Tatars* (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1978); for discord between Mohammed Giray Khan and Selim I, see M. Riḍā, *op. cit.:* 88-90; Solaḳ-zāde, *Tārīkh* (Istanbul, 1298/1882): 428-29; report of the Russian ambassador Golokhvastov from Istanbul analyzed in V. E. Syroečkovskii, *art.cit.:* 57; B. Spuler, "Die Europäische Diplomatie in Konstantinopel bis zum Frieden von Belgrad 1739," *Jahrbücher für Kultur und Geschichte der Slaven,* N. F. XI (1935): 53-115.

43. H. Inalcik, "The Khan . . . ,": 445-66.

44. *Ibid.:* 464.

45. H. Inalcik, "The origin . . . ,"; 67-72.

46. *Ibid.:* 72-85; A. N. Kurat, *op. cit.;* A. Bennigsen *et als, op. cit.:* 134-38.

47. It is important to note that Muscovite rulers did not consider seriously taking part in the crusade plans of the popes against the Ottomans not only because of the negative Polish attitude on this issue (see Pierling, *Papes et tsars* (Paris, 1890)), but also, perhaps more importantly, because of their isolated position in the East before the then too powerful Ottoman Empire; however, Muscovy attempted to establish an alliance with Safavid Iran from the middle of the sixteenth

century on, see H. Inalcik, "The origin . . . ,": 94; A. Bennigsen, M. Berindei, "Astrakhan et la politique des steppes nord-pontiques," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies,* III-IV, part I: 71-91.

48. *MIKK:* no. 165.

49. H. Inalcik, "The origin . . . ,": 91-100.

50. A. A. Novosel'skii, *Bor'ba Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Tatarami v pervoi polovine XVII veka* (Moscow: Academy of Sciences, 1948): 363-67.

51. *Ibid.,* chapter VI; Na'īmā, *Ravḍat al'Ḥusayn . . . ,* (Istanbul, 1281/1865) I: 5-6; IV: 5-7, 15-17, 32-86; for the government papers see Başvekâlet Archives, *Mühimme defteri,* nos. 87, 88, 89; A. A. Novosel'skii, *op. cit.:* 375-76, 383-84; *MIKK:* nos. 3, 8, 16, 20, 21, 24, 44, 63, 68, 71, 112, 118, 159, 161, 178, 181, 194, 267.

52. *MIKK:* no. 63.

53. A. A. Novosel'skii, *op. cit.:* 386-87.

54. *MIKK:* no. 362.

55. He refers to the Holy Roman Emperor and the seven elector princes; for the Habsburgs and the Ottoman *Pādişāh*'s recognition of the title *Emperor* see *infra.*

56. For the Cossack attacks during the last decades of the sixteenth century see A. Bennigsen, M. Berindei, *art.cit.:* 87, n. 36; for their depredations on the Ottoman coasts Evliyā Çelebi, *Seyāḥatnāme,* VII (Istanbul, 1928) is important; Alan Fisher, "The Ottoman Crimea . . . ," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies,* III-IV, part 1: 215-26; A. A. Novosel'skii, *op. cit.,* chapter VI (the Don Cossacks): H. M. Senā'ī, *Islām Giray Khan tārīkhi (Historia Islam Gereja III),* ed. Z. Abrahamowicz (Warsaw, 1971); Z. Wójcik, "The early period of Pavlo Teterja's hetmancy in the right-bank Ukraine (1661-1663)," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies,* III-IV: 958-72; "Islam Giray III," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*^{2}, IV: 178; O. Pritsak, "Das erste türkisch-ukrainische Bündnis (1648)," *Oriens,* VI, 2 (1953): 266-98; it was provided in the treaty of Zuravno in 1676 that "the country of Ukraine in its former boundaries shall be returned to the Cossack nation which is dependent on our [Ottoman] Empire and from now on no intervention shall be made by Poland" (the Turkish text in Ferīdūn, *Munsha'āt al-salaṭīn* (Istanbul, 1265/1845): 422; also see V. Ostapchuk, "The publication of documents on the Crimean Khanate . . . ," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies,* IV, 4(1982): 514-22.

57. Fındıklılı Meḥmed Aġa, *Silāḥdār tārīkhi,* ed. A. Refik (Istanbul, 1928) 1: 676-723.

58. Mehmed the Conqueror's code of law on the state organization contains titles *(elḳāb)* for dignitaries (*Supplement to TOEM* (Istanbul, 1330/1914): 30-32); titles, including those used for foreign rulers, are listed in Ferīdūn, *Munsha'āt al-salaṭīn* (Istanbul, 1274/1858) I: 2-13; for a bibliography of the published copies of letters from Ottoman sultans to foreign rulers see J. Reychman, A. Zajaczkowski, *Handbook of Ottoman-Turkish diplomatics* (The Hague-Paris: Mouton, 1968): 13-103; V. Stojanow, *Die Entstehung und Entwicklung der osmanisch-türkischen Paläographie und Diplomatik* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 1983): 198-312; Josef Matuz, *Das Kanzleiwesen Sultan Süleymans des Prächtigen* (Wiesbaden, 1974).

59. For examples see Anton C. Schaendlinger, *Die Schreiben Süleymāns des Prächtigen an Karl V., Ferdinand, und Maximilian II aus dem Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv zu Wien* (Vienna, 1983), in particular facsimile, nos. 2-5, 10-18; also L. Fekete, *Einführung in die osmanisch-türkische Diplomatik der türkischen Botmässigkeit in Ungarn* (Budapest, 1926): nos. 2, 5, 6, 13.

60. Already in 1541 "Franca Pādişāhı . . . Karlo Kral" (*ibid.,* no. 2); *Medjmū'a-i mu'āhedāt* (Istanbul, 1294/1887) I: 5; "Vilāyet-i Franca Pādişāhı" (dated 1673); for the titles used for Venetian doge see T. Gökbilgin, "Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Türkçe Belgeler . . . ," *Belgeler,* V-VIII (1968-71): 17, 33, 38, 54, 56, 61; French king was always considered as "a king who had superiority and precedence over all the other kings of Christendom" (Letter of the French ambassador Nointel in a collection of letters, Ms, Bibliothèque Nationale, Supplément turc, no. 383, 64a). Tsar was considered a *kral* even when the title *Çar* was used (see Fınkıklı Mehmed Aga, *op. cit.,* I: 752).

61. In 1534 *"Vilāyet-i Nemçe Kralı"* for Ferdinand I, and *"Ispanya vilāyetinin Kralı"* for Charles V (A. Schaendlinger, *op. cit.,* nos. 1, 6); but in 1559 *"Hristiyan Krallarının ve Dukalarının ve Beglerinin Imperadoru olan iftiḫāru [. . .] Ferendoş Kral"* (*ibid.,* no. 23); a fuller rendering of the official titles of Ferdinand I in 1562 (*ibid.,* no. 25); in 1545, *"Romanların ve ana tābi' olanların Kralı olan Ferendoş"* (Ferīdūn, *op. cit.,* II: 339); for the first time in 1563 *"Nemçe ve ana tābi' vilāyetlerün Imperadoru Ferendoş"* : A. Schaendlinger, *op. cit.,* no. 28 (Ferdinand was elected Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire in 1556); but in 1564 *"Nemçe ve Alaman Kralı Imparador Maximilyanus"* (*ibid.,* no. 31), and then in 1565 corrected to *"Alaman vilāyetinün Imperadoru ve Çeh ve Isloven ve Hirvat ve sā'ir nidje vilāyetlerün Kralı* (*ibid.,* no. 32), or simply *"Beç Imperadoru"* (*ibid.,* no. 33). It

appears that the title *Pādişāh* as equivalent of *Imperator* was never used for him. The title *Pādişāh* was used for the king of France, see note 60. In the peace treaty of 1606 between the sultan and Emperor, article 2 reads: "That both of them, in writing and speech, should address each other as emperors, and not as kings" (now see G. Bayerle, "The compromise at Zsitvatorok," *Archivum ottomanicum,* VI (1980: 18); in other words equality in status was thus recognized by the Ottoman *Pādişāh* and at the same time equivalence of the titles *Pādişāh* and *Imperator*. Subsequently, the general use of the title *Nemçe* (Germany) *Imperatoru* became established (see Ferīdūn, *op. cit.,* II: 317-20); still in the letters to the Emperor emphasis was put on the fact that Ottoman *Pādişāh* possessed Konstantiniyye which "was the seat of the Kaysers" (*ibid.*: 32). Mehmed the Conqueror and his successors claimed to be the only heirs to the Roman Emperor, see "Mehmed II," in *Islâm Ansiklopedisi,* VII: 513; for a list of the letters and decrees of Süleyman the Great see J. Matuz, *Herrscherurkunden des Osmanen sultans Süleyman des Prächtigen* (Freiburg: Klaus Schwarz, 1971).

62. *Op. cit.*: 312; in fact tsar autocrat, cf. *ibid.,* 325-26, see n. 100.

63. H. Inalcik, "The origin . . . ," *art.cit.*: 102, doc. 2.

64. Ferīdūn, *op. cit.,* II (first edition, Istanbul, 1265/1845): 12-56; reference to the Genghiskhanid descent of the Crimean khan is made (*"zubda-i Djengizkhānī" : ibid.,* II, 45), but as the Crimean khan was an appointee of the Ottoman *pādişāh* he was given an imperial *berāt* (diploma) for his appointment (for example see *ibid.*: 42) in which his salary *(sāliyāne)* was also specified. His subordination to the sultan was referred to by such words as *dikme* or *tikme* (appointee, installed), or *banda* or *kul* (slave or servant), or at best *Āsitāne-i saʿādetimizin khayr-khāhı* (or *mukhlişi)* (well-wisher, or friend of our Porte). It is interesting that the Ottoman chancery kept the word *tikme* which was first used by Mengli Giray Khan in 1475, see H. Inalcik, "Kırım Hanlığının . . . ," 208; the sultan wrote to the tsar about the khan: "Murad Giray Khan who is a faithful and humble slave and servant of our state (Ferīdūn, *op. cit.,* II: 310, dated 1682). Mehmed II stipulated in his Law-Book *(Supplement* to *TOEM)* that the title *ukhūvet-ma'āb* (brother) shall be used for the sultans who have their own name mentioned on coin and *khuṭba* while only *emāret-mā'āb* (emirate-returning) for those who are hereditary emirs without *sikke* and *khuṭba;* the Crimean khan had his own *sikke* and *khuṭba* but still his title was *emāret-mā'āb.*

65. Ferīdūn, *op. cit.,* I: 6.

66. *Ibid.*: 4-7.

67. For the letters and treaties bearing the khan's titulature the principal source, *MIKK* mentioned above n. 4. Original Crimean *intitulatio* and *salutatio* formula (see Khādjdjī Giray's yarlığ dated 1453 in Kurat, *Yarlık ve bitikler* (Istanbul, 1949): 6) was expanded and modified as a result of the additions from Ottoman titulature. The Crimean titulature was basically retained with the titles *Uluġ-Orda ve Uluġ-Yurtnıñ ve Takht-i Kırımnıñ ve Deşt-i Ḳıpçaknıñ Uluġ Khanı* throughout Crimean Khanate. While countries were enumerated in the first part of the formula, tribes and peoples were mentioned in the second part *("Sañsız djümle Tatarnıñ ve Saġışsız Köp Noġaynıñ ve Taġ-ara Çerkesniñ ve Tat bile Tavġacnıñ").* Sometimes old Turkish-Mongol *"Öñ-kolnıñ Sol-kolnıñ"* formula, signifying the right-hand and left-hand tribes, was also employed (see *MIKK,* no. 3, dated 1591 and no. 17, dated 1630). The most important borrowing from Ottoman Turkish was *Pādişāh,* often in the form of Uluġ Pādişāh. In the Crimean usage it was obviously identified with Uluġ Khan or Emperor; for the Crimean use of *Khalīfe* (Caliph) see *infra.* Typical Ottoman-Islamic titles of *Sulṭān* and *Ġāzī* were also assumed (see A. Battal, "Sahib Giray Han yarlığı," *Türkiyat Mecmuası,* I (1926): 75-101). Ottoman titles of etiquette such as the Ottoman Turkish *devletlü, şevketlü, ʿadāletlü, mahābetlü, sahāvetlü, şedjā ʿatlu,* all referring to royal qualities (for example see *MIKK,* no. 104) were also introduced to the Crimean titulature; the titles of the Crimean khans in the letters addressed to the kings of Denmark during the period 1654-82 provide original materials, see n. 70.

68. For the title see "Pâdişâh" (H. Inalcik), in *Islâm Ansiklopedisi,* IX: 491-95; also see n. 60, 67 above; obviously, over time, the title eroded in its significance. For the Ottoman sultan a more exalted title, *Pādişāh-i ʿalempenâh,* i.e., P. refuge of the world or Ecumenical Emperor came to be used; in 1477, Ahmed Khan addressed Mehmed the Conqueror (see *Belleten,* II: 247), *Khudāvendigār-i Aᶜẓam.*

69. See the document in *MIKK:* no. 1.

70. Letters of the Crimean khans to the Russian and Polish rulers are to be found in *MIKK;* to Polish kings in Z. Abrahamowicz, "Dokumenty tatarskie i tureckie w zbiorach polskich," *Przeglad orientalistyczny,* 10 (1954): 141-48; an analysis of the diplomatic characteristics of the Crimean letters to the Transylvanian princes in Mary Ivanics, "Formal and linguistic pecularities of seventeenth-century Crimean Tatar letters addressed to princes of Transylvania,"

Acta orientalia (Hungary), XXIX, 2 (1975): 213-24; for the letters sent to the kings of Denmark, J. Matuz, *Krimtatarische Urkunden im Reichsarchiv zu Kopenhagen* (Freiburg: K. Schwarz, 1976); also see n. 67.

71. *MIKK:* no. 8; but already in 1592 Ġāzī Giray Khan addressed the Polish king as *"Uluġ Khristiyan Pādişāhı"* ("Great Christian Pādişāh"): *MIKK:* no. 5.

72. The Ottoman *Pādişāh "sizin dakhi efendiñüz uluġ Pādişāhımdır"* ("the Ottoman *'Pādişāh* is my great *Pādişāh* who is at the same time your *Pādişāh"*): see *MIKK:* no. 196: letter from Sefer Ġāzī Aġa to Uluġ Beg Alexis Mikhailovich dated *Djumāda* I, 1073/ Dec. 1662.

73. *MIKK:* no. 71, dated 1643.

74. *MIKK:* nos. 16, 240.

75. A. Bennigsen *et als, op. cit.,* doc. E 6691/9: 67-68.

76. See *MIKK:* no. 20, dated 1624, and no. 165, dated 1654.

77. *MIKK:* no. 165: *"Khil ʿat-i khilāfeti dūş-i hümāyūnuma giyirüp."* Following the breakdown of the Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad Muslim jurists ruled that every Muslim sultan had the right, as supporter of the Islamic Law, to bear the title *Khalīfa* (see T. W. Arnold, *The caliphate* (London, 1924): 107-20).

78. Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Silāhdār Tarihi* (Istanbul, 1928) II: 340.

79. See Ferīdūn, *op. cit.,* II: 310: *"Devlet-i 'aliyyemiziñ 'abd-i ṣadāḳatkārı ve bende-i kemīne khidmetkārı"*; Mengli Giray's letters to the sultan in A. Bennigsen, *op. cit.:* 69, 76, 92.

80. *MIKK:* no. 253; Fındıklılı Mehmed Aġa, *op. cit.,* II: 27.

81. In his letter to the tsar dated 1631 Djanbek Giray Khan (*MIKK:* no. 18) warned that contrary to the ancient rule the tsar had sent his *Uluġ Elçi* directly to the Ottoman capital without first obtaining the khan's agreement. He observed that violation of the custom occurred for the first time in 1023/1614 (*MIKK:* no. 21). The custom required that Muscovite *Uluġ Elçi* first come to the Crimea and then leave for Istanbul in the company of the khan's envoy. For ordinary matters a *tilmaç* ("interpreter") had to come to the khan's capital; the khan then made a report to the sultan and sent the *tilmac* accompanied by an envoy of his. In his letter dated 1632 (*MIKK:* no. 24) he made it clear that this ancient rule was one of the conditions for peaceful relations between the two countries.

82. See *MIKK:* no. 72.

83. See *MIKK:* no. 17, dated 1630; on tribute see Appendix.

84. *MIKK:* no. 84.

85. See Appendix.

86. *MIKK:* no. 361; in an earlier period the titles for the Muscovite ruler were simpler; in 1624 the titles in Mehmed Giray III's letter to Mikhail I were as follows: *Uluġ Urusnıñ ve Purusnıñ ve Köp Khristiyannıñ Pādişāhı karındaşımız Uluġ Pādişāh Khan hem Uluġ Beg Mikhayla Federayovich djümle Urusnıñ Pādişāhı ve Köp yerlerniñ de bolsa Pādişāhı ve Hükümdārı"* (*MIKK:* no. 8). In his letter to the Emperor dated 1562 Süleyman styles himself the conqueror of the lands from China to the end of Maghreb, see A. Schaendlinger, *op. cit.:* no. 25; Mehmed III's titles included *"Ḳhākān al-Maşriḳayn ve' l-Maġribayn"*: see Ferīdūn, *op. cit.,* I: 2.

87. *MIKK:* no. 119.

88. *MIKK:* no. 104.

89. For comparison see the Crimean letters sent to the kings of Denmark published by J. Matuz, *Krimtatarische.* In their general features and arrangement these letters display a complete similarity to those found in the letters sent to the tsar. The khan's titles are the same as in the letters sent to Moscow. For the ruler of Denmark the title *Kral* (or *Kıral*) was used. However, as in the case of the tsar, the khan addressed the king as "our brother." Ottoman and Tatar traditions are blended in the *tuġra.* Turco-Mongol *Sözümüz* is combined with an imitation of Ottoman *tuġra.* However, the Crimean *tuġra* has only one open curve instead of two closed curves of the Ottoman *tuġra.* Some of the Crimean *tuġra* (*ibid.,* facsimile nos. 3, 6, 8, 10) were arranged in the form of a pyramid similar to the *pençe* of Ottoman governors. But the Crimean *tuġra* is placed at the top of the document like the Ottoman *tuġra* (*ibid.:* 62). For a Russian imitation see Z. Abrahamowicz, "La tughra ottomane de l'empereur de Russie," *Turcica,* VIII, 1: 231-45.

90. According to L. Fekete (p. xxxii) the Ottomans introduced it under western influence; the Ottoman formula reads: *"Allāhıñ 'ināyetiyle."* Already in a *yarlıġ* of Mehmed the Conqueror dated 1473 (R. Arat, "Fatih Sultan Mehmed'in yarlığı," *"Türkiyat Mecmuası,* VI (1936-39): 298) we read: *"Allāhu taʿālā 'ināyetidin Sultan Moḥammed sözüm."*

91. *MIKK:* nos. 224, 375.

92. *MIKK:* no. 84.

93. *MIKK:* no. 63; we find it also in the following formulae: *"iʿlām ve inhā'-i Khānī budur ki"* (*MIKK:* no. 361), or *"ṭavḳīʿ-i refīʿ-i Khānī*

oldur ki" (*MIKK:* no. 90); sometimes the phrase *"buyurdum ki"* ("I ordered that") is added (*MIKK:* no. 63); these formulae are evidently an imitation of the Ottoman formula for orders used in Imperial decrees (*"ṭavḳī'-i refī-i hümāyūn vāṣıl oludjak ma'lūm ola ki"*). *Yarlıġ* means *order* in the Golden Horde and Crimean chanceries (see A. Mostaert, F. W. Cleaves, *Les lettres de 1289 et 1305 des Ilkhans Aryun et Öljeitu à Philippe le Bel* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962): 91; A. Hasan, "Birinci Mengili Giray Han yarlığı, *Türkiyat Mecmuası,* IV: 106; also the Crimean khans in their letters to the Muscovite rulers used the old Turco-Mongol *intitulatio: "Khan ibn . . . khan Sözümüz";* for *Sözüm* or *Sözümüz* (in the earlier Mongol documents *Üge manu*), see A. Mostaert, F. W. Cleaves, *op. cit.:* 22-58. It is to be found in the Crimean letters addressed to the Muscovite rulers until the end of the seventeenth century: *MIKK:* nos. 245, 252 and others; also see L. Fekete, "Arbeiten . . . und die Frage der Formel 'sözümüz," *Acta orientalia,* 1957: 18 ff.; an illustrative example of Moscow's oversensitiveness occurred in 1630 when Moscow formally protested the fact that the tsar's name had not been written in the khan's letter in complete and in gold (see *MIKK:* no. 17); on the other hand the khan complained that the Muscovite ambassador, contrary to the custome, refused to take off his *kalpak* and bow in his presence (see *MIKK:* no. 121, d. 1649); on *yarlıġ* also see G. Doerfer, *Elemente,* III: 153-58.

94. *MIKK:* nos. 84, 86.

95. *MIKK:* no. 64, perhaps because of his inferior status.

96. *MIKK:* no. 104, dated 1646; no. 119.

97. *MIKK:* no. 284, dated 1685; also the title *"djümle Khristiyannıñ Pādişāhı"* ("tsar of all Christians") came to be used (see *MIKK:* nos. 245, 251 dated 1679); the last title was to be exploited by the tsars against the Ottomans later on. Besides, the tsar, paying not attention to the Crimean protest, began to use the title *'ālem-penāh* in his letters to the khan: see *MIKK:* no. 316: *"Djümle Urusnuñ Pādişāhı 'ālem-penāh,"* undated, published along the letters of the middle of the seventeenth century.

98. The text of the treaty is published in Ferīdūn, *op. cit.,* II: 307-10.

99. Majid Khadduri, *War and peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955): 141-223; "Imtiyāzāt," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam,* second ed.: 1179-82; for the khan and *amān,* see *Historia Chana:* 52.

100. Diplomatic agents were ranked *Elçi* and *Büyük* (or *Uluġ*) *Elçi* (the latter was also called *Elçi Başı*) while an envoy was called *Çapḳun* or *Uluġ Çapḳun* and a courier *Ulaḳ.* The Crimean khan's embassy to Moscow included a *Baş Elçi* or *Elçi Başı* and a retinue of twenty men including *Çapḳun.* in 1680 the khan agreed to send only three diplomats with a retinue of twelve men (see *MIKK:* no. 284). For important business such as negotiating a treaty a *Büyük Elçi* was to be sent with costly presents; already in 1647 Islam Giray Khan had agreed to send only twelve men with the *Elçi* representing the khan, *kalġa* and *nuradin (nureddīn),* and not to permit any other Crimean authority to send envoys separately. When a *çapḳun* was to be dispatched, only three servants were to accompany him (*MIKK:* no. 112); for *Elçi* and *Çapḳun,* also see Josef Matuz, *Krimtatarische . . . , op. cit.:* 53-58. The *Uluġ Khazīne* was to be sent by the tsar each year with a *"Saym Uluġ Elçi Başı"* (*MIKK:* no. 20, dated 1632).

101. *Farmān-rānī* or *Farmān-ravā* or *Farmān-farmā* are used but always in a compound. In 1643 the Crimeans refused the use of this title for the tsar (A. A. Novosel'skii, *op. cit.:* 325-26).

102. L. Bréhier, "L'origine des titres impériaux à Byzance," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift,* XV (1906): 161.

103. M. Szeftel, *art.cit.:* 65-69.

104. *Ibid.:* 67.

105. This period is studied in detail in H. Inalcik, *The Crimean Khanate during the Great Retreat, 1683-1699,* Habilitation thesis (Ankara: Dil ve Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi, 1952, unpublished); letters of the Ottoman sultans to the Crimean khans in the period 1687-1701 are to be found in *Nāme-i Hümāyūn Defteri,* no. 5, Başvekâlet Archives, Istanbul.

106. *MIKK:* no. 284, dated 1685. The tsar's titles were rendered as follows: *"Djümle Uluġ ve Küçük, Aḳ Urusnuñ ve Maġrib ve Maşriḳ ve Şimāl ṭaraftnda Bolġan Khristiyannıñ ve Köp yerleriniñ Pādişāhları ve Hükümdārları Bolġan Ḳardaşlarımız Uluġ Khanlar ve hem Uluġ Begler Iban Aleksayevic ve Petre Aleksayevic."*

107. The text in *Medjmū'a-i mū'āhedāt* (Istanbul, 1298/1880) III: 210ff., and Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, *Nusretnāme,* ed. I. Parmaksızoğlu, II, 1 (Istanbul, 1964).