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THE EMERGENCE OF BIG FARMS, *ÇİFTLİK*S: STATE, LANDLORDS AND TENANTS

The legal framework for landholding of agricultural lands in the Ottoman Empire was provided by the *Sharî'a*, Islamic Law, and the *'urfî ḳânûn*'s, state laws issued by the Sultan. While the Islamic Law protected free-hold rights of the individual on land in general, the *ḳânûn* system was concerned with the maintenance of state control on agricultural lands. The history of landholding in the Ottoman Empire, or in Islamic countries in general, can be summarized as a constant struggle between the state and the individual for control of agricultural lands, which constituted the principal source of wealth for capital formation or state finances. The state's concern to maintain its control of agricultural lands was primarily determined by the state's absolute dependance on agrarian production for its finances and the maintenance of its *sipâhî*, mounted forces. The state was also concerned with the *çift-ḫâne* system as the basis of the traditional system in agrarian production peculiar to the Middle East.

The *Çift-Ḫâne* System: Small Family Farm Units

The law guaranteed a tenant, normally a married man, and his heirs of male descendence the right to enjoy, permanently and freely, possession and use of *mîrî* or state-owned land when this land was duly acquired and used under the specified conditions[1]. Permanent tenancy under a

[1] For a comprehensive description of land tenure in the Ottoman *mîrî* regime see Ö. L. Barkan, «Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Çiftçi Sınıflarının Hukuki Statüsü», *Ülkü*, Ankara, IX-XI, 1937-1938; *Idem*, «Toprak Hukuku Tarihinde Tanzimat ve 1247 (1858) Arazi Kanunnâmesi», *Tanzimat*, Istanbul 1940, pp. 321-421; «Çiftlik», (Inalcık), *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed. (hereafter EI²), II, pp. 32-3.

perpetual lease amounted to an actual possession of land by the farmer-*re'âyâ*. In addition, the state saw to it through its agents on the land, *sipâhî*s and cadis, that third persons did not alter the original status of the land[2]. The land and labor of the farmer-*re'âyâ* were scrupulously protected by the state against third parties who might attempt to convert these lands into privately owned farms and reduce the peasants to laborers, sharecroppers, or serfs on these lands.

The *çift-ḫâne* system consisted of organization of agricultural production on the basis of peasant households, *ḫâne*s, each of which was given a *çift* or *çiftlik*, i.e., a plot of land of sufficient size to sustain one peasant household and pay the «rent» to the landholder (the state). The size of the *çiftlik* varied with the fertility of the soil from 60 *dönüm* to 150[3]. This was the basic agricultural unit. If a *çiftlik* was found to be divided among several possessors, it was, as a rule, restored to its original form. Also, if the head of the household in possession of a *çiftlik* died leaving several sons, they were to possess it collectively. The size of household varied according to the region.

The *çift-ḫâne* system was an integral part of the *tîmâr* system, the basic military institution in the classical period. In the *tîmâr* system[4] control of agricultural production, and thence of the land, is shared actually by the state, the farmer, and the *sipâhî*, mounted soldier of the imperial army living in the villages. The *sipâhî* was assigned a *tîmâr* which consisted of collecting the fixed amount of state revenue from the peasants in a defined area of land as his salary. The assignment of *tîmâr* gave him some rights of control over the land; he implemented the state regulations on

[2] Usually a formal contract between peasant and *sipâhî* acting in the name of the state was concluded, for an example see, *Belgeler*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, vol. X, no. 14 (1980-81), pp. 52-3, document no. 157.

[3] A *çiftlik* is defined in the *Ḳânûnnâme*s as follows:

(Arable Land in *dönüm*s; 1 *dönüm* equals 920 sq. meters)

	Fertile	*Medium*	*Poor*	*Source*
Aydın (1528)	60	80	130	Barkan, *Kanunlar*, I, Istanbul, 1943, 8-13
Erzurum (1540)	80	100	130	*Ibid.*, pp. 66-16
Musul (Murad III)	80	100	150	*Ibid.*, p. 308
Sirem (Murad III)	70-80	100-110, 80-90	120-130	*Ibid.*, p. 308-7
Morea (1711)	80	100-120	150	*Ibid.*, p. 326-2

[4] On the *tîmâr* system in general, see my, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600*, London, New York 1973, pp. 104-118; Ö. L. Barkan, «Timar», *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, Cüz 123-24, pp. 286-333.

the transference and use of land by the peasants[5]. Since the *tîmar*s were indivisible and unalterable units as recorded in the survey books, the *çift-ḫâne* units too were held indivisible and unalterable in order to protect the fixed *tîmâr* income. The *tîmâr* system and the rigid state controlled system of the *çift-ḫâne* was undoubtedly one of the main reasons why the organization of agricultural production in the Ottoman Empire remained static and resistant to changes entailing other forms of landholding and production.

This system was prevalent in Anatolia and the Balkans and was closely monitored by the state. It was considered an ideal system best suited to the socio-political conditions of what we may call the Middle East Empire tradition[6]. It was scrupulously maintained by a traditional bureaucracy as the basis of a unique imperial system of the state and society. However, despite the efforts of the central bureaucracy to safeguard state control on state-owned lands, such lands came partly under control of private individuals, especially during the period of decline and decentralization beginning at the end of the sixteenth century[7]. The principal form of alteration of the *mîrî* lands came about as a result of the Sultan's granting certain rights of control to the individuals on such lands. While such rights were rarely granted during the period when centralization and the *tîmâr* system prevailed, they became widespread through administrative abuses during the sixteenth century. Influential figures from the palace or those close to palace circles obtained state lands in the form of apanges, or property grants, and subsequently turned them into *awḳâf*, or trusts for pious endowments. The change in the legal status of the land and labor on it did not in most cases involve a change in

[5] The Ottoman *ḳânûnnâme*s put at the beginning of each survey book is designed to regulate and secure the smooth functioning of the tax and land tenure system within the framework of the *tîmâr*; for *ḳânûnnâme*s, see EI², IV, pp. 562-66.

[6] No study exists examining Islamic *iḳṭâ'*, Byzantine *pronoïa*, and Ottoman *tîmâr* as part of one traditional system in the Middle Eastern history; the tradition can be traced back to the ancient Persian Empire in which the basic features of the system appear to have their definite form and continue through the successive empires in the region.

[7] The Ottoman writers on the causes of the decline at the end of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries focus on the widespread practice of granting the *miri* lands as private property; see 'Ayn-i 'Ali, *Ḳavânîn-i Âl-i 'Oṣmân*, Istanbul, 1289/1872; *Kitâb-i Müstetâb*, ed. Y. Yücel, Ankara 1974; K. Röhrborn, *Untersuchungen zur osmanischen Verwaltungsgeschichte*, Berlin and New York, 1973, pp. 29-34; the author gives a partial list of sources on the Ottoman decline, pp. 163-64; R. Murphey, «The Veliyyuddin Telhis: Notes on the Sources and Interrelations Between Koçi Bey and Contemporary Writers of Advice to Kings», *Belleten*, XLIII, July 1979, pp. 547-72.

the organization of production. The *çift-ḫâne* system continued and the relationship between the farmer-*re'âyâ* and private individuals or *awḳâf* was the same as under the *tîmâr* system. As before, the newcomers were simply collectors of the «rent» in the form of dues, and as a rule, did not attempt to reorganize the labor and production on these lands. In brief, plantation-like farms rarely emerged on the *waḳf* or *mulk* lands from *mîrî* origin. It should be added that the state reverted, though not so extensively and energetically as in previous centuries, some of these lands to their original *mîrî* status.

Big Farms on the *Mawât* Lands

In the Ottoman Empire, plantation-like farms, that is, large agricultural lands organized as a production unit under a single ownership and management and usually producing for market came into being mostly on *mawât*, i.e., waste or abandoned lands outside the areas under the *çift-ḫâne* system. Prior to the eighteenth century, such big farms were usually developed by members of the ruling class on *mawât* lands, and labor on them was mostly supplied by slaves or sharecroppers[8].

Reclamation, *şenlendirme* or *iḥyâ'*, was accomplished under special provisions of the Islamic Law, and encouraged by the state. The first prerequisite to it was the introduction of some substantial improvements in the waste land, such as the construction of water canals and preparation for cultivation. The second requirement was the *İmâm*'s (Sultan's) permission through a special document which recognized proprietary rights on the reclaimed land. The *Sharî'a* provided *mulk*, freehold status for the land reclaimed by the individuals, including non-Muslim subjects, and the *İmâm* (Sultan) readily authorized reclamation and ratified *mulk* character of duly reclaimed land. The state encouraged such reclamation projects for obvious reasons: for extension of arable land, most of which eventually became converted into a pious endowment for a charitable purpose or public use. The formal procedure for issuing a *temlikname*, document of ownership, was that the promoter of the project submitted to the Porte his project, defining the land and specific reclamation method and objective, and asked the Sultan's permission. In the early period of Ottoman history we find examples of entrepreneurs first restoring the land and later obtaining the Sultan's

[8] See my «Rice Cultivation and the *Çeltükci-Re'âyâ* System in the Ottoman Empire», *Turcica*, XIV, 1982, pp. 69-141, and «Mā'», EI², (forthcoming).

temliknâme. The Finance Department issued an imperial firman with the permission. The final *temliknâme* was a diploma granting freehold ownership and specified boundaries of the land. Usually a *sınırnâme* or a detailed document describing the land in detail after an on-the-spot inspection was drawn up[9]. At the same time the new status of the land was recorded in the *mufaṣṣal defter*, imperial land survey book which served as a basis and reference in all future decisions to be made by the central government. In the Sultan's *temlîknâme*, it is noted that the land in question was originally of the *mawât* category, and that when reclaimed, it would be cultivated by the *re'âyâ* only if they agreed to work as paid hands and not as forced laborers. Also, their share of the produce was to be surrendered to them according to a proportion predetermined in the document. Since the state did not allow the change of status of the *mîrî* lands, most of the typical big farms owed their origin to the reclaimed lands.

Reclamation usually meant investment of considerable amounts of capital and thus «entrepreneurs» were almost always members of the higher echelons of the ruling elite, including the military and clerical. Cases of merchants or urban guild masters owning such lands were rarely found in the survey books before the eighteenth century. In the period when the central bureaucracy was powerful, it was a deliberate policy on the part of the state to favor the ruling elite while social and economic developments with decentralization would bring about considerable changes in the composition of the class of the «entrepreneurs» in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries[10].

Even in the early period, labor was sometimes supplied by *re'âyâ* agreeing to extra work outside *tîmâr* lands or by runaway peasants or free *re'âyâ* unregistered in the imperial survey books. Sharecropping was a common mode of labor of *re'âyâ* origin. However, it became necessary for the «entrepreneurs» to look for labor on reclaimed lands outside the *re'âyâ* since the state strictly adhered to the *çift-ḫâne* system to protect its regular source of income. On farms of *mawât* origin, use of servile labor

[9] For an example of *sınırnâme*, see H. İnalcık, *Fâtih Devri Üzerinde Tetkikler ve Vesikalar*, Ankara, 1954, pp. 219-223.

[10] See H. İnalcık, «Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700», *Archivum Ottomanicum*, VI, Leuven: Peeters, 1980, pp. 283-337; H. Inalcık, «Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration», *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History*, ed. T. Naff and R. Owen, London and Amsterdam, 1977, pp. 27-52.

was a general practice from the earliest times, though under various conditions this kind of labor did not prove to be as effective as sharecroppers[11].

In summary, through the *mulk* lands from *mawât*, Islamic Law provided a legal framework to bring about large farms owned by individuals, and the Ottoman state, as a rule, encouraged the application of this legal device to expand the area of such lands.

A typical example of a project of this type in the mid-sixteenth century is a project for rice cultivation near the village of Yenice, submitted by Ferîdûn Aḥmed Beg and the Grand Vizier Soḳollu Meḥmed[12]. They proposed jointly to spend their own money to build a dam and canals to secure water from the Sakarya river. The total length of the canals is estimated at 17,000 *ẕirâ'* or 12,876 meters. They proposed to grow rice by irrigating the land fallen into disuse near the village of Çaltı and others, and predicted to be able to sow 75 *mud* of seed in the area (one rice *mud* = 256.4 Kgr.). The maintenance of the dam and the canals was to be performed by the founders.

They therefore applied for a firman through the department of finance granting the Sultan's permission for the project. The total amount to be sown was fixed at 50 *mud* for Meḥmed Pasha and 25 *mud* for Aḥmed Beg. The produce was to be shared equally between them and the *re'âyâ* and others who chose to work for them. The tithe due to the *tîmâr*-holders was to be paid by the peasants out of their share. From their share, Meḥmed Pasha and Aḥmed Beg vowed to meet the expenses for burning three candles or candalabra at the mausoleum of Aḳ-Şemseddîn, as well as to construct a caravanserai and five fountains in the town of Göynük. Meḥmed Pasha promised to expend funds for the repair of the caravan highway ruined by the flooding of the Sakarya river as well as for repairing a damaged dam in a nearby village (Nerdivanlu). Those

[11] See H. İnalcık, «Servile Labor in the Ottoman Empire», *The Mutual Effects of the Islamic and Judeo-Christian Worlds: The East European Pattern*, eds. A. Ascher, T. Halasi-Kun and B.K. Király, New York, 1979, pp. 25-52; and «Rice Cultivation». The researchers who focused on the Ottoman agrarian system have not given a due attention on reclamation activities and its relevance to the formation of big *çiftlik*'s. A marxist interpretation of the formation of big *çiftlik*s in the classical period of Ottoman history is introduced by Vera P. Mutavčieva, *Agrarian Relations in the Ottoman Empire, XV-XVI. Centuries*, Sofia, 1962 (in Bulgarian), provides some insightful analyses.

[12] The text in Ö.L. Barkan, «Vakıflar ve Temlikler», *Vakıflar Dergisi*, II, pp. 364-5. Here, A. Ferîdûn is the famous author of the *Münşe'ât al-Salâṭîn* and Soḳollu Meḥmed, Grand Vizier, 1566-1579.

farmers who would use the water supplied by them for their own cultivation of cotton and other staples would be required to surrender one half of their harvest. In the case that the land leased by Meḥmed Pasha was worked by workers paid by him, the whole produce belonged to him. The Sultan gave his approval by a decree through the department of finance on the condition that the *tîmâr*-holders and the *re'âyâ* of the area consented, and that when reclaimed, the land would be cultivated by the *re'âyâ* only when they agreed to work there as paid hands and not as forced labor. Also, the peasants' share of the produce was to be surrendered to them according to a proportion predetermined in a document.

The Spread of Big Farms: *Muḳâṭa'a-Mâlikâne* System

Along with the expansion of plantation-like farms of *mawât* origin, there emerged processes leading to conversion of *mîrî* lands into big farms in some areas especially during the Celâlî disturbances of the end of the sixteenth century[13]. According to a justice decree, dated 1609[14], influential people among the military, including *ḳapı-ḳulu* in the provinces, appropriated for themselves lands abandoned by the villagers as a result of the *Celâlî* disorders. Settling in them slaves or hired men, they converted them into their own private estates. Because of the general shortage of labor, lands of this sort were usually fenced and turned over to livestock raising, thus becoming veritable ranches. Use and appropriation of peasants' lands abandoned in the periods of internal disorders had became normal procedure in converting the *re'âyâ-mîrî* lands into estates of big landholders. (Incidentally, livestock raising, for the same reasons, constituted prevalent economic activity on many big farms of *mawât* origin, too).

Also, extensive lands of *mîrî* origin were converted to *waḳf*s or privately-owned farms mostly as a result of administrative inefficiency in the decline period. Many villagers in debt lost their fields to the local notables and military chiefs through a simple decision of the local

[13] Mustafa Akdağ, *Celâlî İsyanları, 1550-1603*, Ankara 1963, pp. 37-44; Fikret Adanır, «Die Makedonische Frage», *Frankfurter Historische Abhandlungen*, no. 20, Wiesbaden 1979, pp. 35-41.

[14] H. İnalcık, «Adâletnâmeler», *Belgeler*, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, II-3/4, 1967, pp. 126-7.

court[15]. Thus, usurers, mostly town-based military or ulema took over the possession rights of the *re'âyâ* on *mîrî* lands, and over time, as a result of administrative inefficiency, such lands turned into privately owned properties. Also, a special process developed from the leasing of state-owned lands which led to conversion of *mîrî* lands into big farms: from the earliest times the practice was established that abandoned arable lands of *mîrî* status commonly called *mezra'a* or *ḫâlî çiftlik* in the survey books were rented by the state to the individuals. These types of lands became part of the private estates, owing to the inefficiency of government book-keeping or abuse of the *muḳâṭa'a* system in the decline period. In fact, the most important development came with the changes in the *muḳâṭa'a* or leasing-out system. During the decline period after 1600, under financial constraints the treasury leased out a growing number of *mîrî* lands to individuals for a life term, and later, on a hereditary basis which was called *mâlikâne*, so that such holdings became virtually like property, leasers actual landlords, and peasants their tenants. In other words, a whole class of lease-holders (*eṣḥâb-i muḳâṭa'a*), now intervened between the state and peasants. *Çift-ḫâne* as a system continued to exist as the predominant organization of agricultural production on these lands, but the relationship between landholder and farmer underwent a profound change. Now leaseholders who substituted for the state were naturally inclined to maximize their share in production and squeeze the *re'âyâ* labor to achieve their goals. Under a short lease, this resulted in the ruin of the area and degeneration of *çift-ḫâne* units. For a remedy, the state introduced an extension of *iltizâm*, or farming-out period, primarily with the expectation that the leasers would be more concerned with the continuous prosperity of the area and the *re'âyâ* under their control.

The leasing-out system became more widespread than ever during the decline period, practiced not only by the state treasury, but also by higher members of the ruling group, palace favorites, governors, and apanageholders, who were all a kind of absentee landlord. Most of the leaseholders in the provinces emerged as a new class of provincial notables, ayans (*a'yân*) who as on-the-spot operators, controlled a greater part of *mîrî* lands as *muḳâṭa'a* or *mâlikâne*.

[15] Examples in the registres of cadi courts: see, S. Faroqhi, «Land Transfer, Land Disputes and Askeri Holdings in Ankara, 1592-1600», *Mémorial Ömer Lûtfî Barkan*, Paris, 1980, pp. 87-99.

The *A'yâns* and *Çiftliks*

Along with their control as lease-holder of the lands under the old *çift-ḫâne* system, the ayans also emerged as a new type of «entrepreneur» in land reclamation and expansion of plantation-like farms. They were economically motivated to maximize their revenues under both the impact of an expanding external market, and under the pressure of pecuniary needs in order to sustain their position as tax farmers and heads of local mercenary forces[16].

It is assumed that in the decline period the Ottoman economy and social structure were transformed from being based on an Asiatic Mode of Production to being completely dependant on European capitalism which entailed fundamental changes in the conditions of agricultural production and peasant-landlord relations[17]. This hypothesis cannot be substantiated with the available documentary evidence. The process of conversion of the *mîrî* or waste lands into plantation-type *çiftliks* as a result of commercialization of agriculture and subsequently, growing alienation of the peasants from the land and more intensive exploitation of cultivators by landholders were developments which affected only certain regions which were particularly exposed to external conditions in the Ottoman Empire[18].

The Ottoman land regime, despite these developments in certain areas remained unchanged in its basic *çift-ḫâne* structure as revealed by contemporary Ottoman documentary evidence. It appears that we are not justfied in seeing in the Ottoman land regime a parallelism with what was happening in other East European countries under the impact of the

[16] See H. İnalcık, «Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Empire», *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History*, eds. T. Naff and R. Owen, London and Amsterdam 1977, pp. 27-52.

[17] Çağlar Keyder, «The Dissolution of the Asiatic Mode of Production», *Economy and Society*, V-2, pp. 178-96; H. İslamoğlu and Çağlar Keyder, «Agenda for Ottoman History», *Review*, I-1, 1977. I. Wallerstein's capitalist world economy and peripherilization theory had a strong impact on interpretations on dynamics of Ottoman social change, see note 18.

[18] In his recent work, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe*, Cambridge, 1981, pp. 1-44, Bruce McGowan examined these points in detail on the basis of Ottoman archival materials. There, he tried to show what particular areas were affected by the «commercial revolution» of the eighteenth century; cf. I. Wallerstein «The Ottoman Empire and the Capitalist World Economy: Some Questions for Research», *Social and Economic History of Turkey, 1071-1920, Papers presented to the First International Congress on the Social and Economic History of Turkey*, Ankara, 1980, pp. 117-22.

European-capitalist world economy[19]. Apanage like land grants with large income which were usually granted by the Sultan to the members of the court and of the ruling class from *mîrî* lands and even *mâlikâne* leases should be distinguished from the plantation-like *çiftlik*s since the apanages were simply the fiscal-administrative re-arrangement in the possession of the lands which did not necessarily bring about a change in the *çift-ḫâne* system. As far as their economic organization was concerned, they were not different from the lands where production was based on the *çift-ḫâne*. Thus, the large apanages cannot be included in the category of big farms under study unless their possessors reorganized these lands as plantation-like *çiftlik*s, which was a rare case since most of these appanage-holders were in a position of absenteeism, simply leaving the collection of their incomes to their agents (*kethudâs* or *voyvada*s), usually chosen from among the influential local people. When the system of collection of income or state revenues through such local agents or tax-farmers became a widespread practice from the seventeenth century on, these agents emerged over time as ayans, provincial notables controlling sources of revenue and thence land-holding and agriculture in the provinces. In the eighteenth century, the period 1760-1808 in particular, witnessed the rise of ayans which coincided with the growing European demand and higher prices for agricultural products of the Levant as a result of what is called the commercial revolution in the West. During the new period, the ayans brought under their control much of the *mîrî* lands under the *çift-ḫâne* system as *muḳâṭa'a* or tax-farming leases[20], but at the same time, under growing western demand, they began to open much abandoned or waste land to agriculture, and it was mostly on the latter category of lands that we find plantation-like farms.

The Plantation-like *Çiftlik*s in the XVIIIth Century

Our notion of the plantation-like *çiftlik* in the Ottoman Empire comes mainly from Cvijić, Busch-Zantner, and Stoianovich[21]. Physical descrip-

[19] Henri Stahl, *Traditional Romanian Village Communities*, trans. D. Chirot and H.C. Chirot, Cambridge University Press, 1980.

[20] See my, «Centralization and Decentralization ...» referred to in note 10.

[21] J. Cvijić, *La Péninsule balkanique*, Paris 1918; R. Busch-Zantner, *Agrarverfassung, Gesellschaft und Siedlung in Südosteuropa unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Türkenzeit*, Leipzig 1938; T. Stoianovich, «Land Tenure and Related Sectors of the Balkan Economy, 1600-1800», *The Journal of Economic History*, XIII, 1953, pp. 398-411; *idem.*, «The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant», *The Journal of Economic History*, XX, 1960, pp. 234-313.

tions of *çiftlik*s were made by travellers in the nineteenth century: a *çiftlik* was composed of a manor where the landlord or his agent resided, a number of huts for quartering laborers, a stone tower (a new indispensable element) for defense against rival ayans, the stalls for the animals, storehouses, a bakery, and a smithy. The plantation-like *çiftlik* consisted of a whole village, or one might say that the big farm was, as a rule, a *çiftlik*-village. As far as socio-economic features of the new *çiftlik* are concerned, the following definition is given. The *çiftlik*, Stoianovich says[22], «marks the transition from a social and economic structure founded upon a system of moderate land rent and few labor services to one of excessive land rent and exaggerated service». Stoianovich also adds that sharecropping with field, transportation, and other services supplement the rent given to the landlord. He labels this development as an «internal colonialism». He also points out that the new plantation-like *çiftlik* spread in the regions with special geographical conditions such as coastal plains and interior basins along the arteries of communication and involved staple agriculture with irrigation. Furthermore, he draws attention to the fact that the expansion of the *çiftlik* system was interrelated with the growing demand of European markets for the agricultural products of the Ottoman Empire. For example, cotton was the main staple for export from the Serez plain in Macedonia, where some three hundred villages were divided among several ayans, by the last decades of the eighteenth century. In the Balkans, Thessaly, Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace, the Maritsa Valley, Danubian Bulgaria, the Kossovo-Metohija basin, the coastal plains of Albania and parts of Bosnia are mentioned as areas where the *çiftlik*-village spread by the end of the eighteenth century. It should be added that such expansion coincided with the land reclamation and improvement activities in these areas[23]. In other parts of the Empire, in Egypt, Syria, and in the coastal plains of southern and western Anatolia, parallel developments took place in an earlier or later period[24].

[22] «Land Tenure ...», pp. 401-2.

[23] Now see B. McGowan, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-70.

[24] Mustafa Soysal, *Die Siedlungs- und Landschaftsentwicklung der Çukurova*, Erlangen, Vorstad der Fränkischen Geographischen Gesellschaft, 1976, pp. 38-90; Th. Kotschy, *Reise in den cilicischen Taurus über Tarsus*, Gotha 1958; G. Baer, *A History of Landownership in Modern Egypt, 1800-1950*, London 1962; A. Abdul Rahman and Y. Nagata, «The Iltizam System in Egypt and Turkey», *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, XIV, Tokyo, 1977, pp. 169-94.

In the last three decades, the use of Ottoman archival materials has shed new light on the question concerning the emergence of the *çiftlik* system in the Ottoman Empire. Now the questions of how and why changes in the social structure in the rural areas and in the internal reorganization of agricultural production occured have been examined in more detail and on a more solid basis. For instance, we are now able to scrutinize the extent to which ownership of land and growing control of labor by the land-owner were developed in connection with the rise of the new *çiftlik* system. In addition, we are now more aware that the spread of market-oriented large farms coincided with a parallel expansion of land reclamation and improvement activity in the marginal lands, pastoral and flooded lowlands in particular. We also now know that most of the new *çiftlik*s with their plantation-like structures came into being on such lands, beyond the old *mîrî* lands with their traditional small-sized *çift-ḫâne* units.

Here we shall take up the region of western Anatolia in order to more closely examine the *çiftlik* formation in the eighteenth century. Detailed lists concerning the *çiftlik*s of two great ayans, Ḥâcî Meḥmed Agha, *mütesellim* of Teke in southwest Anatolia and Ḳara ʿOṣmân-zâde Ḥüseyin Agha, *mütesellim* of Saruhan in western Anatolia shall be examined here. Drawn up in the years 1815 and 1816 respectively, these lists from the estate books show the private properties left by the two ayans upon their deaths[25]. The *çiftlik*s entered in these lists of inheritance cannot be *muḳâṭaʿa*s or state-owned lands leased out by the treasury though originally they might have been so.

Both men were *mütesellim*s, or agents acting on behalf of the governor or treasury in collecting revenues and performing some other financial and administrative functions in the *sancaḳ*[26]. *Mütesellim*s were usually selected from among the local notables with influence and wealth, and they, in turn, used their connections with the government in increasing their local influence and wealth, especially in terms of land. In both cases, the total value of their hereditary properties reached approximately a

[25] Yuzo Nagata, *Some Documents on the Big Farms (çiftliks) of the Notables in Western Anatolia*, Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1976.

[26] For *mütesellim* see my «Centralization», referred to in note 16; also Y. Nagata, *Muhsin-zâde Mehmed Paşa ve Ayanlık Müssesesi*, Tokyo, 1976; Y. Nagata, *Materials on the Bosnian Notables*, Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1979.

quater of a million groush (253,000 groush for Ḥüseyin Agha and 251,000 groush for Meḥmed Agha) which represents a large fortune for the time. The composition of their fortunes was similar. It consisted of arable land, livestock, buildings, equipment, and crops (for their relative importance see Tables I and II).

The annual profit rate in relation to the capital invested was much higher in Hüseyin's *çiftlik*s (1/10, 1/6, 1/3) than in Mehmed's (1/50, 1/10, 1/7). The highest rate was realized by cash crops (cotton production in the *çiftlik*s Kara-Agaçlı[1], and Ulu-Bara in Hüseyin's estate and rice grown on Meḥmed's *çiftlik*, Çeltükci). The high profit rate must have been due to the fertility of soil as well as to closeness to the Izmir market in the case of Ḥüseyin's *çiftlik*s.

The value of the land in Hüseyin's *çiftlik*s varied between approximately 11 and 30 *groush* per *dönüm* (1 *dönüm* equalls 920, sq. meters). In Meḥmed's *çiftlik*s, it was much lower (2-4 *groush* per *dönüm*). The value of land suitable for cotton and maize growing was highest (in the *çiftlik* Kara-Agaçlı 33 *groush* per *dönüm*).

The size of *çiftlik*s varied between about 600 and 1700 *dönüm* in Hüseyin's and between 700 and 13,000 in Meḥmed's estates. In the latter, the average size was 8000 *dönüm* or 734 hectares while in the former about 1000 *dönüm* or 90 hectares. According to Christo Gandev[27], *çiftlik*s in the Vidin region on the Danube varied between 30 and 500 hectares.

Evidently, high productivity and high value of land in Western Anatolia accounted for the smaller size of *çiftlik*s. Ḥüseyin's estate was made up of 8 *çiftlik*s, while Meḥmed's were 12 *çiftlik*s of various sizes. It is to be noted that in some *çiftlik*s, uncultivated fields were quite numerous (in *çiftlik*s Mihâili and Ulu-Bara, for example). The estate of Ḥüseyin included three types of *çiftlik*s: those with fields in which the produce belonged entirely to the landlord, those combining fields of the former with fields rented to the *reʿâyâ*, and those *çiftlik*s which were simply leased to tenants.

It appears that the first type of *çiftlik* was the standard type with all the features of a plantation-like large farm. Since the share of labor was not deducted from the yield in the final accounts, we assume that the produce in these *çiftlik*s belonged entirely to the lanlord, and that labor was wage-labor. With the second type of *çiftlik*, part of the fields were rented

[27] See note 37.

to the *re'âyâ* who met the rent by surrendering part of the produce at the rate of one *ölçek* (i.e. measure or *kile* equal to 25.656 Kg) of barley and a half *ölçek* of wheat per *dönüm*. In the *çiftlik* Kayışçılar, the rent was paid in cash (at a predetermined rate). The first type of *çiftlik* comprised everything to make it a complete production unit: animal force for ploughing, threshing, and transport, ploughs, wagons, and other tools, stables, storehouse for crops, simple houses and shacks to accommodate agricultural workers (*çiftci odaları*) and even grocery shop. Horse breeding also seemed to have been an important occupation on most of the *çiftlik*s of Ḳara 'Oṣmân-zâde Ḥüseyin. In the capacity of *müteselim*, Ḥüseyin had to maintain a small security force, and during the wars, had to increase their number and join the Sultan's army.

After land, pairs of oxen for ploughing proved to be the most important and costly component of a *çiftlik*. It can be said that each *çiftlik* in Ḥüseyin's estate employed one pair of oxen for every 140 or 160 *dönüm* of land (Mihâili and Ulu-Bara were not typical in this respect since there existed too many uncultivated fields at the time of recording). In Meḥmed Agha's estate, the ratio shows too great a difference from one *çiftlik* to another to give any example. Apparently, in the *çiftlik*s Hacılar and Çeltükci, cattle breeding was an important occupation. Epidemics appear to have caused great losses of oxen with disruptive consequences for agriculture. Meḥmed Agha lost 26 oxen out of 40 on the *çiftlik* İmhan before the listing.

Because of the high costs of maintaining agriculture and the shortage of agricultural labor in many areas, *çiftlik* owners preferred to convert their farms into cattle ranches or dairy farms (*mandıra*) supplying oxen for neighboring villages and dairy products to nearby towns. The rate of profit were much higher in such *çiftlik*s and most of these *çiftlik*s were found near cities. Examples can be given not only for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but as far back as the sixteenth century. At any rate, cattle and sheep breeding had always been an important occupation in the large *çiftlik*s, unlike the ordinary *re'âyâ çiftlik*s[28]. Yegen ûeḥmed Agha, voyvoda of Tire, had several *çiftlik*s devoted predominantly to cattle breeding[29]. In the *çiftlik* Kara-Yunuslu, for example, there were 113 cattle and 28 horses, but little agriculture.

[28] H. İnalcık, «Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire», *The Journal of Economic History*, 29, 1969, pp. 97-140.

[29] Y. Nagata, *Some Documents*, pp. 5-11.

In the *çiftlik*s directly exploited, we find a diversified agriculture with wheat, barley, cotton, and maize being the main crops cultivated. In Ḥüseyin's two *çiftlik*s (Kara-Agaçlı and Ulu-Bara), cotton, however, made up the greater part of the income. Even there, though, we cannot speak of a monoculture. Cotton was one of the principal export items of the region since the fifteenth century[30]. There were also vineyards and orchards which made up only a small part of the *çiftlik*s.

The greater part of the land on the majority of the *çiftlik*s of Ḥüseyin were rented to the *re'âyâ* or free peasants. Usually, the rent was paid in kind from the produce of the land and sometimes in cash (in Kayışçılar). The third type of *çiftlik* leased by Ḥüseyin brought an important income as *mu'accele*, i.e., down-payment made at the moment of leasing and as *îcâr* or yearly rent. This type of *çiftlik* was of relatively small size, 150, 250, or 1200 *dönüm*. In the directly exploited fields (first type), hired hands seem to have been the standard form of labor, with the landlord supplying all means of production: land, seeds, plough, oxen, beasts of burden, as well as accomodations. The totality of the yield belonged to the landlord. Mentioned in the *çiftlik*s of Ḥasan Agha in Central Anatolia, in the lists published by Yuzo Nagata[31], sharecropping was a traditional form of agrarian labor, and seems to have been replaced by hired labor on the more advanced market-oriented *çiftlik*s in western Anatolia.

Most of the *çiftlik*s of the Ḳara 'Oṣmân-zâde family had the physical features of a typical *çiftlik* as portrayed by western travellers. Our estate lists include costly *ḳonaḳ*s, i.e., mansions with kiosks and coffee rooms with separate watch towers of stone or earth. In addition, there were *çiftci odaları*, or rooms for farmers, stables, and storehouses.

Big *Çiftlik*s in the Vidin Region

In a study published in 1943[32], I examined the emergence of the big *çiftlik* owners in the Vidin region and concluded that the Bulgarian peasant insurrection of 1850 broke out primarily as the result of the socio-economic conflict between peasants and *çiftlik* owners. The key process which gave rise to the emergence of big *çiftlik* owners in the Vidin

[30] H. İnalcık, «Osmanlı Pamuklu Pazarı, Hindistan ve İngiltere: Pazar Rekabetinde Emek Maliyetinin Rolü», *Middle East Technical University, Studies in Development*, Special Issue, II, 1979-1980, pp. 13-6.

[31] «Some Documents ...», pp. 18-23.

[32] *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, Ankara, 1943 (with a summary in French), pp. 90-2.

region of northwest Bulgaria was the leasing out by public auction of state-owned lands to individuals. This type of lease was applied from the earliest times in the Ottoman Empire to the state-owned arable lands which were not actually in the possession of the *re'âyâ* and not under cultivation. The treasury leased such lands, wherever available, to increase state revenues. Such lands, referred to as *muḳâṭa'a*, were given to individuals on the basis of perpetual lease inherited only by direct male lineage, as was the case with the *re'âyâ çiftlik* possession. The possession document was called *tapu*. At the time of the lease, the lessee made a down-payment to the treasury called *icâre-i mu'accele*. This corresponded to *tapu* paid by the *re'âyâ* to get possession of *mîrî* land, and it amounted to only one year's income of the land in question. Anyone willing to pay the *icâre*, or rent, could take possession of such land. This was a general practice known as far back as the fifteenth century when it first appeared in Ottoman land surveys. Urban people willing to make profitable investments acquired *muḳâṭa'a* lands. For them, profitability was a decisive factor and so usually when such *muḳâṭa'a* lands proved to be profitable producing such marketable crops as rice, cotton, and sesame, as well as favorably located for transportation, they found lessees among city dwelling investors. In Vidin, there was nothing new in this respect. What was new was that in the period 1760-1850, Central European markets began to offer higher prices for the agricultural products of this Danubian province with easy transportation possibilities[33]. The vast uncultivated arable land belonging to the treasury now became an attractive investment area. The treasury, however, leased the land only to the Muslim aghas since the area was a strategically sensitive one. Such landholdings, each comprising a whole area of a village was called a *çiftlik*. According to a document[34], the Christian peasants did not have land in their possession because the Vidin province was located on the frontier and the Muslim population consisted of only a few thousand. So, in order to encourage their concern with the safe-keeping of the fortress of Vidin, each village in the area was given with a *tapu* to an agha, notable or commander of a garrison unit. Furthermore, a special regulation forbade the sale of the *mîrî* lands to Christian peasants.

[33] The expansion of market coincided with the extension of the capitulary privileges to western nations, see «Imtiyāzāt» (H. İnalcık), EI²,| IV; see also McGowan, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-44.

[34] H. İnalcık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, p. 95.

THE *ÇİFTLİK*S OF ḤÂCÎ MEḤMED AGHA, *MÜTESELLİM* OF TEKE

*Çiftlik*s	Fields (in *dönüm*)	Animals	Outfittings				Produce (in *yük*)			Value (in groush)
			cart	storehouse	seeds	cottage	wheat	barley	millet	
1. İmhan, *Nâḥiye* of İstanos	8000	40 oxen, 14 left after epidemic	2	4	millet 32 *keyl*		243	162	39	20,000
2. Kargın, *Nâḥiye* of İstanos	9324 (155 plots) 1 orchard	11 oxen		2	millet 20 *keyl*	40	197	157	51	20,000
3. Manay, *Nâḥiye* of İstanos	9500	8 oxen 2 unfit			wheat 16 *keyl* millet 20 *keyl*	3	120	37	31	10,000
4. Çoban, *Kaẓâ* of Elmalı	950	23 oxen		2			237	79	53	15,500
5. Kızılagaç, *Kaẓâ* of Kızılkaya	8000	24 oxen, 11 left after epidemic	2	2	millet 58 *keyl*	22	200	141	10	20,000
6. Pınarbaşı, *Kaẓâ* of Tefenni	13,000 1 orchard	50 oxen	1		wheat 47 *yük*, barley 10 *yük*, millet 5.5 *yük*	16	75	1.5	71	10,000
7. Pınarbaşı, *Kaẓâ* of Kemer-Hamid	8900 5000 pastureland	7 oxen, 2 cows, 13 horses		2		19				12,500
8. Hacılar, *Kaẓâ* of Burdur	1800	66 oxen, 5 donkey 3 buffalo, 1 horse	1			2				15,000
9. Çeltükci, *Kaẓâ* of Aglasun	12,000 3 vineyards	234 oxen					798	584	118	60,000 rice yield not included
10. Ivazköy, *Kaẓâ* of Aglasun	?	142 oxen				—	278	263		30,000
11. Zivind, *Nâḥiye* of İstanos	10,000	22 oxen, 1 cow, 97 goats			—	55	624	411		25,000
12. Yuva, *Nâḥiye* of İstanos	700 (7 plots)	10 oxen	2	2	millet 26 *keyl*	—	—	—		15,000
									Total	253,000

1 *keyl* = 14 *oḳḳa* = 17,959 kg

Another innovation in the system was the growing tendency to consolidate possession rights of the aghas on the *muḳâṭa'a* lands, thereby making them actual proprietors. This tendency was reinforced by the liberal views on land ownership introduced by the reformers of the nineteenth century under Western influence. When, in 1839, the Rescript of *Tanẓîmât* abolished *corvée*[35] the Bulgarian peasants did not want to perform *corvée* services which actually were regarded as corresponding to the rent. The aghas argued that the rent was to be remitted, since they said, the Ottoman subjects are «lawful possessors and proprietors (*mâlik ve mutaṣarrıf*) of their land, no one can occupy and cultivate someone else's land without consent and compensation».

It was through renting from the aghas that the Christian peasants were able to get and cultivate the land on these *çiftliks*. On the other hand, the lands still directly under state control were farmed out, first to tax farmers who, as a kind of middlemen, rented them to the peasants. Thus, in both cases peasants were simple rent-paying tenants. After the declaration of the *Tanẓîmât* reforms in 1839, the state tried to stop the sale by *tapu* of state lands to aghas. The Sultan's special order was required for the validity of such sales, but still the aghas managed to obtain possession of twenty villages after the date. Also, conversion of commons, pasture land, and forest areas (the possession of which was acquired by the *tapu* system) into *çiftlik* land seems to have gained momentum during this period.

The *ücret-i arâḍî* or rent on the aghas' *çiftlik* lands was not a simple rent but involved various payments and services which were actually the combination of some old feudal customs. The peasant had to perform for the agha *corvée* services for two months a year, and deliver a certain portion of his produce, namely 25 *oḳḳa* or 31 kg from each crop he grew, 30-40 *oḳḳa* of maize per cart, one *oḳḳa* cheese for every ten sheep in addition to one cartload of wood or 12 groush instead, and 3/10 groush per *dönüm* of vineyard.

There were additional dues paid to aghas for beehives, pasture land, etc. The total sum of all the payments made by the peasant was estimated to be equal to or even greater than the taxes paid to the state. The obligations established by custom for the stewards or agents of the aghas were to be added to all this. In sum, the so-called *aġalıḳ* or *ġospodarlıḳ* regime in

[35] See H. İnalcık, «Application of Tanzimât and its Social Effects», *Archivum Ottomanicum*, V, 1973, pp. 97-128.

the Vidin region was characterized by a combination of the new *çiftlik* system with the old Ottoman feudal customs. The continuation of the feudal services and dues made the conditions particularly onerous for the peasants in this region. The Bulgarian *knez*es, notables who coveted the position of Muslim aghas on the prospering *çiftlik*s, provided leadership for peasants' rebellions in the region in the 1840's. The peasant protest was primarily against *corvée* services, and feudal customs and dues in particular, since the declaration of the *Tanzîmât* reforms promised to put an end to the old Ottoman regime throughout the empire.

The reaction of the *Tanzîmât* administration to the situation is particularly interesting. The administration first abolished the *corvée*s. Upon the protest, however, of the aghas who argued that they had the ownership of the land, and since the *corvée*s corresponded to the rent (*haḳḳ-ı arâḍî*), the government asked both sides to reach an agreement between themselves. The aghas could not give up the labor with the most favorable conditions for themselves. Without the labor, the *çiftlik*s could not continue. The ultimate goal of the peasants and even more so of the *knez*es was to get possession of land which originally belonged to the state. For these reasons, a real reform could not be worked out. Only the *corvée* service for cultivation was abolished in return for an increase in the proportion of the produce to be delivered to the agha. The *Tanzîmât* administration, under the influence of the western view of land possession and proprietory rights, eventually espoused the view of the *çiftlik* owners, while the Christian *re'âyâ* were aware of the original state ownership of the *çiftlik* lands. In other words, *Tanzîmât* liberalism, though against *corvée*, confirmed and reinforced the rights of the landowners on land. Under the *Tanzîmât*, the old Ottoman *tapu* system or leasing state lands on a permanent basis was in the process of turning these lands into a real proprietorship for the aghas. Later, the hereditary rights on such lands were further extended and the aghas' exploitation of the peasant labor worsened. In 1850, a government report[36] confessed that the aghas «reduced the peasant almost to slavery» on their *çiftlik*s. The inspector sent to investigate the situation proposed as the only radical reform to prevent the renewal of the insurrection the abolition of the *gospodarlık* regime and leasing the land to the peasants. The down-payment (*mu'accele*) made by them would be used to compensate the dispossessed aghas. The proposal became law, but the government

[36] *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, p. 98.

confirmed the state's proprietary rights on all such lands. As under the *tapu* system, the peasant was now to acquire permanent tenancy rights by making a preliminary down-payment (*mu'accele*). This simply meant the return to the old *çift-ḫâne* system, and the replacement of the aghas by the *re'âyâ* on state lands.

The *re'âyâ*, however, did not want to recognize the state's rights either, and claimed a pure and simple transfer of the land without having to pay any rent or lease money. These details from the Vidin region can illustrate how explosive the social implications of the *çiftlik* system were in the Ottoman Empire.

Christo Gandev, who studies the *çiftlik* regime in the same area through local sources from the cadi court records of Vidin[37], gives more details about the internal organization of the *çiftlik*s and the relationship between the Christian farmers and Muslim landowners. According to the more typological interpretation of this historian, the new *çiftlik* system which emerged in this region under the economic incentive of the central European market by the second half of the eighteenth century had all the characteristics of «une mode capitaliste d'exploitation». In other words, the new *çiftlik*s were created by urban investors of every social background with the purpose of producing export crops for the Austrian market. The uncultivated state lands or waste lands were bought, and transformed into freehold land properties. The labor force was supplied by the growing numbers of landless«prolétarisé» peasants who worked in the *çiftlik*s as paid agricultural workers, or sharecroppers. Seasonal wage labor was also hired at the harvest time. Profit being the only concern of these capitalist landlords, the rent was increased and inferior working conditions were imposed upon the workers, while in the typically feudal *çiftlik*s, regulations and customs put restrictions on the exploitation of labor. The agricultural workers on the new «capitalist» *çiftlik*s constituted a mass of serfs cruelly oppressed and exploited. In the Vidin region, Gandev continues, the average size of a *çiftlik* varied between 30 and 500 hectares. Besides the landlord's mansion and a large courtyard, a typical *çiftlik* included shacks for workers, storehouses, stables, mills, slaughterhouses, presses, etc. On these *çiftlik*s, the number of oxen for ploughing varied from 5-12, while large herds of sheep, cattle, and horses were bred. Thus, the new «capitalist» type *çiftlik* was a plantation-like farm in its purpose and organization.

[37] Ch. Gandev, «L'apparition des rapports capitalistes dans l'économie rurale de la Bulgarie du nord-ouest au cours du XVIII[e] siècle», *Études Historiques*, Sofia: Académie des Sciences de Bulgarie, 1960, pp. 207-220.

Gandev's observations on the organization of the *çiftlik* in terms of physical arrangement, employment, and the relationship between landlord and labor suggest similar features in the *çiftlik*s in Rumelia and Anatolia. But I cannot agree with his theory about the origin and evolution of the new *çiftlik*s which had to do more with the *mîrî* and *muḳâṭa'a* than reclamation of new lands.

H. İ.

POSTSCRIPTUM

In his important paper based mainly on French consular reports, Gilles Veinstein, «Āyān de la région d'Izmir et le commerce du Levant (deuxième moitié du XVIII[e] siècle)» (*Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée*, XX, 1975, Aix-en-Provence, 131-147) rightly emphasizes that «si les deux āyān (Karaosmanoğlu Muṣṭafā and Araboğlu) doivent bien leur fortune au blé et au coton, ce n'est pas, selon le consul (Charles de Peyssonnel), en tant que producteurs mais en tant que gouverneurs, qu'autorités administratives, fiscales, qu'ils en profitent ; ici, comme dans tout le reste de sa correspondance, il ne montre aucunement en eux ces propriétaires de vastes *çiftlik* travaillés par une main-d'œuvre servile, ou même de «réserves» de type féodal, développant sur une grande échelle, en fonction du commerce européen, les cultures d'exportation, dont on nous brosse parfois le portrait» (p. 136). Yuzo Nagata's article on the *çiftlik*s of the Karaosmanoğlu (Ḳara 'Oṣmân-oğlu) family came only one year after Veinstein's (see G. Veinstein's review of it: *Turcica*, XX, 296-7).

The list of the *çiftlik*s privately owned by Muṣṭafa's successor Hüseyin Ḳara-'Oṣmân-zâde did not, of course, include the *mırı muḳāṭa'a*s (state-owned lands under tax farming); but they still amounted to a large landed property, obviously organized, at least in part, into certain farms in several villages the organization of which appears quite different from the traditional peasant family farm.

I still fully agree with G. Veinstein on the point that Muṣṭafā Ḳara-'Oṣmân-zâde, founder of the family fortune, called by Peyssonnel as «le plus riche et le plus avide de l'Empire ottoman» (Veinstein, 138), owed his fortune mainly not to the production of his *çiftlik*s but to his financial operations as usurer, tax-farmer and controller of trade between European merchants and Turkish producers.

While G. Veinstein says that «il faut décidément écarter à propos de ces aghas l'image de grands propriétaires fonciers» (p. 137 note 28) and distinguished them from the ayans of Rumili (those of Serez, p. 136-137) they nevertheless can be compared, in their capacity of controlling land and production — and trade — under the system of *muḳāṭa'a-iltizâm*, with the ayans in the other parts of the empire. In the rest of his paper, G. Veinstein gives ample evidence of this from the reports of the Peyssonnels.

The second important point G. Veinstein makes on the basis of the evidence provided by the French consular reports covering the period 1748-1778 is that the increasing importance for the rising cotton industries in France of the cotton of Western Anatolia in addition to the traditional wheat exports constituted the basis of the economic-financial activities and wealth and power of these ayans (for cotton see my article in note 30).

It is safe to say that in the eighteenth century changes were definitely taking place, under the impact of Europe, in certain coastal areas of the Ottoman Empire which ultimately led to the reorganization of agrarian production. I believe the evidence supplied by the French consular reports do not contradict but rather confirms the characteristics of these changes which we tried to demonstrate in our paper.

Also, mention should be made of a typical situation which G. Veinstein stresses in his paper. It is extremely interesting to observe through consular reports the peculiar conflict of interests between the ayans who were trying to maintain their control or «monopoly» on the export trade of principal staples — cotton and wheat — from Western Anatolia and the French who were trying to break this «monopoly» by attempting to penetrate into the producing areas and buy these goods at lower rates (G. Veinstein, pp. 138-42). At times, the French tried to reach their goal by approving the Porte's centralization policies against the ayans. But in general, foreign trading nations found the ayans more cooperative and useful for their trade for the very reasons the Porte had allowed them to survive. In other words, the ayans had a long term interest and concern in protecting agriculture and trade in their respective areas while governors and tax-farmers with shortterm tenure were, as a rule, trying to realize quick gains without being much concerned with long-term prosperity of the area under their authority.