general expansion of the western economies, of western commerce, even of western commerce in the produce of warm lands. The Levant, which in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries had been indispensable to Europe, was by the middle of the eighteenth century struggling to compete with other, better equipped suppliers in filling only a small corner in the needs of Europe.

The Ottoman Economic Mind and Aspects of the Ottoman Economy

HALİL İNALCIK

I. THE RISE OF THE OTTOMAN COMMERCIAL CENTRES

It was a deliberate policy of the Ottoman government that was primarily responsible for the development of Bursa, Edirne (Adrianople) and Istanbul, successive Ottoman capitals between 1326 and 1402, 1402 and 1453 and from 1453 onwards, into major commercial and industrial centres. The measures which the Ottomans took to this end varied.

Following a very old tradition of Middle Eastern states, the Ottoman government must have believed that merchants and artisans were indispensable in creating and developing a new metropolis. It used every means to attract and settle them in the new capitals. By granting tax exemptions and immunities the imperial government encouraged them to come and settle or in a summary fashion forcibly exiled them to the capital.

After the conquest of Constantinople Mehmed II made every effort to convert the ruined city into a real metropolis, the seat of a universal empire, and in his policy of settlement he gave central importance to bringing into the city merchants and artisans. He was furious when in the fall of 1453 he learned that well-to-do people in Bursa did not comply with his order to come and settle in Istanbul. In 1475 after the conquest of Caffa a group of rich merchants were exiled and settled in Istanbul in a district where they numbered 267 families in 1477. With the same end in view he encouraged the Jews in Europe to migrate to his new capital and their number reached 1,647 families in 1477. When later under Bayezid II the Ottomans welcomed an exodus of Jews from Spain, Italy and Portugal who were settled in the main ports of the empire the idea was always that their commercial activities would bring prosperity to these ports. Jews made up an important part of the population of Istanbul in the sixteenth century (by 1535, 8,070 families) and turned Salonica into one of the most developed commercial and industrial centres of the empire. In 1554 the house of Nasi, the Ottoman Fuggers, came and settled in Istanbul under the special protection of Suleiman I. The method of forcible settlement was used by Selim I who drove to Istanbul about 1,500 merchants, artisans from Cairo and Tabriz.

In rebuilding the Ottoman cities and regenerating commerce and the economy, the construction of *'imarets*, each a complex of religious and

commercial institutions, played a decisive part. Always established as a pious foundation, an *'imaret* consisted of religious and charitable institutions such as mosque, *medrese*, *mekteb*, hospice and hospital on the one hand and mercantile establishments such as *bedestan* (*bezzazistan*), caravanserail, *han*, covered bazaars, market places on the other. The latter group was designed to provide for the expenses of the former. As in classical Islamic cities, the bazaars and industries of an Ottoman city developed around the *bedestan*, which was a building serving as a stronghold in the centre of the city to store and guard the precious merchandise as well as the fortunes of the ordinary citizens. It was also employed as the city hall for important transactions and exchange. Many Ottoman towns owed their development into commercial centres to their having a *bedestan*. In the seventeenth century Evliya Çelebi divided the Ottoman cities into those with a *bedestan* and those without it. Similar complexes were also built on the important trade routes and later on gave rise to thriving cities.

Caravanserails, *hans* and *zaviyes* in the cities or on the routes completed the system, which was designed to facilitate the caravan trade and make the trade routes converge on the capital city. The interesting point was that the state took a keen interest in promoting it. In 1459 Mehmed the Conqueror convoked the high dignitaries to his presence and required them to build *'imaret*-cities wherever they liked in Istanbul. Thus the main districts of Turkish Istanbul came into being with their monumental religious institutions as well as bazaars and *hans*. On the other hand the *bedestan* and *'imaret* which Minnet-oğlu Mehmed Beğ built at the beginning of the fifteenth century at Tatar-Pazarcığı became the nucleus of the thriving city with the same name in Bulgaria. The *uc-beğis* like Minnet-oğlu were responsible for the building of several provincial towns. The state encouraged such foundations, especially by granting property rights on the lands which were to be made *waqf* for them. It should be noted that in most cases such land was *mawāt*, waste or abandoned land, and the founder of the *'imaret* undertook to bring it under cultivation. The usual procedure was as follows: the founder came to the Porte with a project, saying that if such and such lands with property rights were granted, he would revive them by settling there people who were sometimes the founder's slaves and by building dams and digging canals; and the revenues of the land were to be assigned as *waqf* for the upkeep of the *'imaret*. Thus such projects gave rise to commercial centres and to the creation of new farm lands and villages in the countryside. Incidentally, the letters of Rashīd al-Dīn give examples of such projects in Iran under the Ilkhānids. The idea goes back apparently to ancient Iran as reflected in *Siyāsatnāmes* and Ṭabarī's account of the Sassanian kings. The state's main concern was to extend the sources of revenue for the treasury.

Zaviyes of dervishes, with the obligation of sheltering travellers in the

cities and on the routes, were established on the same principles and must be considered as part of the same system. In early Ottoman history they played a pioneering role in Turkish settlement in the newly-conquered lands, and many Turkish villages in western Anatolia and the Balkans came into being around *zaviyes*. On the original *waqf* lands granted by the Sultan, the dervishes themselves or their slaves provided labour to bring them into cultivation.

When in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries most of the *waqfs* of *zaviyes* lost their original function, they were returned to the state's ownership. These reforms caused widespread social and political reactions in the empire. But it is interesting to add that when Suleiman I wanted to bring back prosperity to the major trade route from Iran to Erzurum, it was found necessary to restore the *zaviyes* on this route.

To come back to the rise of commercial centres in the Ottoman empire, it can safely be said that the Ottomans tried to bring about a route system around their capital cities, and that many of their conquests were motivated by the desire to take control of certain trade routes.

II. THE OTTOMANS AND THE TRADE ROUTES

With the fall of the Mongol Ilkhānid empire in Iran in the early fourteenth century, and the rise of the Ottomans in western Anatolia, the political, and subsequently, the commercial centre of gravity gradually shifted to western Anatolia. Concomitantly there was a change in the pattern of commercial routes. Bursa, which until the end of the fourteenth century was both the political and commercial centre of the Ottoman domains that stretched from the Euphrates to the Danube, became the most important trading city of Anatolia. It was the hub of the Anatolian commercial network. The former emporia of western Anatolia, such as Palatia, Altoluogo (Ephesus) and Smyrna, had already fallen under Ottoman control in 1391, and were now linked to Bursa. Caravans arriving from Iran now reached these seaports by way of Bursa. Moreover, by extending his domains eastwards as far as Erzincan, through Amasya and Tokat, Bayezid I (1389–1403) took control of this caravan route. Iranian silk caravans began to penetrate overland as far as Bursa. In the fifteenth century the cities of Amasya and Tokat, located on this route, became the most important political, economic, and cultural centres in Anatolia after Bursa.

The Ottomans did not neglect the trade routes in the southerly direction. In 1391 Bayezid I incorporated into his domains Antalya and Alanya, the principal ports of entry in southern Anatolia for Indian and Arabian goods. The main overland route followed by this trade was the ancient Aleppo-Adana–Konya–Istanbul road that cut diagonally across Anatolia. Complete Ottoman hegemony over this route that connected Bursa with the southern

countries was established in 1468 when the Ottomans put an end to the Karamanids.

Muslim traders could now come to Bursa from Iran and Arabia in complete security. In addition, European traders from Venice, Genoa and Florence operating from Istanbul and Galata, which had been the most important centres of the Levant trade, now found Bursa the closest market in which they could purchase eastern goods and sell European woollens. This situation must have been apparent quite early, for Ibn Baṭṭūṭa mentioned, around 1330, that Orhan was considered the richest of the Turcoman sultans in Anatolia, and as early as 1352 the Genoese had concluded a commercial agreement with the Ottomans. At the end of the fourteenth century Schildtberger compared Bursa's silk industry and trade to that of Damascus and Caffa. He noted that Iranian silk was sent from Bursa to Venice, and to Lucca, which was then the centre of the European silk industry.

Bursa's development stemmed primarily from the Iranian silk trade. The silk industry in Europe experienced a great expansion in the fifteenth century, and Bursa became the international market place for the raw material upon which that industry depended, the esteemed silk of Astarābād ('Strava' in Italian) and Gīlān in northern Iran. J. Maringhi, the representative in Bursa of the Medicis and other Florentine houses, noted in 1501 that every year numerous silk caravans arrived in Bursa from Iran. In his letters is reflected the anxiety with which the merchants awaited the arrival of those caravans, and the eagerness with which the goods were bought in sharp competition. The rewards were handsome, for in Italy each *fardello* (about 150 kgr.) fetched seventy to eighty ducats profit. About a thousand silk looms in Bursa consumed five *fardelli* of silk a day. The price of silk rose constantly, fifty *akça* in 1467, seventy in 1488, and eighty-two in 1494. An average caravan brought about two hundred *fardelli* of silk. The table below gives the value of customs receipts from silk in Bursa for various years:

Year	Gold Ducats
1487	120,000
1508	100,000
1512	130,000
1521	40,000
1523	50,000
1557	70,000

The sudden decline after 1512 is a result of the wars with Iran. Although an upward trend is discernible after the peace of 1555, the level is far below that of the fifteenth century.

Even after Istanbul became the capital of the empire, Bursa continued to flourish as a principal trade centre of the empire for another century. Her rival in the silk trade, Aleppo, had been of importance for a long time. The silk caravans from Iran would arrive at Aleppo by way of Erzurum, following the Euphrates valley, or more often along the Tabriz–Van–Bitlis–Diyarbekir–Birecik route. In 1516–17 the Ottomans assumed control of these routes and of the Aleppo market as well. As a result, all outlets for Iranian silk open to Europeans were now in Ottoman hands. Not content with control of the outlets, the Ottomans attempted in the sixteenth century to place the north Iranian centres of silk production, such as Shīrvān and Gīlān, directly under their own domination.

Iranian silk, however, was not the only item traded in Bursa. Musk, rhubarb and Chinese porcelain assumed an important place among the merchandise coming to Bursa from China and Central Asia. Iranian merchants sought to take back with them mainly European woollens, precious brocades and velvets, and especially gold and silver specie, since it was scarcer and had a higher value in Iran.

A description of the diagonal land route from Damascus to Bursa in 1432 has been left to us by the noted traveller Bertrandon de la Broquière. He had joined in Damascus a three thousand camel caravan of pilgrims and merchants returning from Mecca. The Turkish group in the caravan included many notable men and was placed by appointment of the sultan under a merchant of Bursa. De la Broquière reached Bursa after a journey of some fifty days. There he found Florentine as well as Genoese merchants from Pera who were interested in buying spices.

Goods in transit on this caravan route tended most often to be merchandise light in weight and expensive in price, such as spices, dyestuffs (indigo and gum lac), drugs, and textiles. This caravan trade was totally in the hands of Muslim merchants. Among them was Abū Bakr, a substantial merchant of Aleppo, who in 1500 had brought to Bursa a shipment of spices worth 4,000 gold ducats, and Mahmud Gavan of India who in the 1470's annually sent his commercial agents to Bursa with Indian merchandise. In 1481 some of his agents even passed over the Balkans to trade textiles and other goods.

About 1470 Benedetto Dei, a Florentine, was able to claim that his fellow citizens could provide in Bursa not only cotton and wax, but also spices. From the reports of Maringhi we know that spices were exported to Italy from Bursa, however small the quantity. In 1501 he wrote to his associate in Florence that he had consigned three sacks of pepper to him, and if he wanted, he could send more. As it turned out, however, the difference in price between Bursa and Florence was not large enough compared to the profits obtainable in the silk trade. Maringhi wrote in 1503 that the price of pepper might go up to twenty-seven gold ducats a *kantar*

(about 56 kilos) in Pera if new supplies did not arrive. The official price in Edirne in 1501 was only eighteen gold ducats a *kantar*. Connected with this crisis, of course, was the fact that at this time the Portuguese had already circumnavigated Africa and had begun to transport spices by sea. Antwerp received its first shipment of spices over this new route in 1501.

Selman Reis' famous report of 1525 demonstrated how the Ottomans reacted to the threat. In his report he tried to emphasize how easy it was for the Ottomans to wipe out the small Portuguese garrisons from their fortified posts on the Indian Ocean in order to re-establish the traffic between India and the Red Sea and thus to restore the state's revenues accruing from the spice trade in Egypt. He suggested the necessity for the Ottoman government to extend its rule over the Yemen and Aden, which would give it complete control of Indian trade. He further added that these conquests would bring to the Ottoman treasury hundreds of thousands of gold pieces and jewels every year as tax revenue. The port of Aden, he said, was visited by fifty or sixty ships every year and the tax revenue of this trade amounted to 200,000 gold ducats a year. He further argued that Sawākin, the rival of Aden, and Jidda would yield a huge amount of revenue for the Ottoman treasury if the Ottomans established their control there. Interestingly enough all his arguments to persuade the Ottoman government to take action against the Portuguese related to profits for the treasury. This is not the place to discuss the Ottoman struggle against the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean. It is now an established fact that the spice trade through the Middle East continued to be as important as before all through the sixteenth century.

Contemporary Venetian observation on Suleiman's policy of making Istanbul the centre of the world spice trade needs comment. It was a fact that half of the spices reaching Cairo and Damascus were conveyed to the Turkish markets, especially to Bursa and Istanbul, and from these cities it was re-exported to the Balkans and to the northern frontiers via Akkerman, Kilia and Caffa. On the other hand when in 1562 the English negotiated with the Shah of Iran to establish a direct trade route through the Caucasus and Russia, the Ottoman diplomatic mission then in Qazvīn insinuated that the Ottoman government would consider it a sign of hostility. But none of these attitudes was actually translated into a well-defined policy on foreign trade or the economy of the empire which could be compared to what we find in the same period in the West. The benefits of the state treasury and the needs of the internal market seem to be the only concern of the Ottoman government. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the deterioration of Ottoman finances and increase of various duties and exactions at the ports of arrival were among other causes of the rising prices of Indian goods and Persian silk in the Ottoman markets which made the

English and Dutch intensify their efforts to establish direct relations with India and Persia.

The wars with Persia in the sixteenth century seriously affected the silk trade and had profound repercussions on the economies and finances of the two countries. The first stage began with Selim I's imposition, as a weapon of war, of a commercial blockade. He intended to prevent the Persians from acquiring war materials, silver and iron, and, by forbidding the trade in silk, to reduce the Shah's income from dues, one of his main sources of revenue. But the blockade had no effect, since most merchants began using the routes through Aleppo and Iskenderun. Thereupon Selim I resorted to more violent measures. Arab, Persian and Turkish merchants with stocks of Persian goods had their goods confiscated. The silks and cloths of all Persians at Bursa were confiscated and listed, and the merchants themselves were transported to Rumeli and Istanbul in 1515. The import and sale of Persian silk was forbidden. Anyone proved to have sold silk was fined its value. When Suleiman I came to the throne he released the merchants and restored their goods or paid them compensation. Nevertheless the ban on the import of and trade in silk by Persian merchants was maintained for a time. This blockade had important effects: it increased state control of the sale and distribution of silk; the scarcity and high price of silk obliged many merchants and weavers to go out of business; instead of Persian and Turkish merchants, Armenians began to gain control of the trade; and finally the government encouraged the production of silk within the Ottoman empire. When the silk routes were reopened under Suleiman, the industry again became dependent on Persian silk, and there was a new expansion in the trade and manufacture of silk. Yet in this reign too, during the wars with Persia, the Ottoman government imposed restrictions on the movement of gold and silver currency into Persia: the consequent shortage of silk harmed the Bursa industry and led to a fall in the revenue derived from it. In the ensuing period of peace the silk trade flourished again, but in the long period of war from 1578 to 1639 silk became an important political weapon for each side. As early as 1579 the Ottoman revenue from the trade had been halved, and the Ottomans again imposed a strict control on the export of gold and silver. In 1586 the shortage of silk had left three-quarters of the looms of Bursa idle, and the quality of the fabrics produced had begun to decline. The peace of 1590 extended Ottoman sovereignty over the silk-producing regions of Ganja and Shīrvān north of the river Kura. In the following year the ruler of Gīlān, Aḥmad, attempted to exchange Persian for Ottoman protection. The restrictions on the export of gold and silver caused an acute shortage of currency in Persia. Before Shah ʿAbbās launched his counter-attack in 1603, he sought means (no doubt at the suggestion of the Sherley brothers) to export Persian silk direct to Europe, via the Indian Ocean, whereby the English would escape the need to pay customs in the

Ottoman empire and the Shah would deprive his enemy of a rich source of revenue. In 1610 he sent an embassy to Lisbon and exported 200 loads of silk by sea, hoping to prove that this route was cheaper. When the attempt to make an agreement with Spain failed, the Shah turned to England, and in 1617 Sir Thomas Roe opened negotiations with the Shah. Of the 3–4 million gold pieces which Persian silk cost annually, England undertook to pay two-thirds in goods and one-third in coin. In order to maintain control of it, the Shah made the silk trade a state monopoly and forbade the export of silk to Turkey. The Ottomans and Venice—the two states most affected —watched these developments with anxiety. In 1619 and 1622 consignments of silk were indeed sent to England by sea. After the Ottoman-Persian peace of 1618, Persian silk was again exported to Aleppo, Bursa and Foça. Shah ʿAbbās's policy was not followed by his successor, who abolished the state monopoly of silk, and the use of the Indian Ocean route did not develop as was expected mainly because England was reluctant to provide the gold and silver currency required for it. Nevertheless in 1633 the Venetians were concerned at learning that English merchants were buying large quantities of silk at Bandar ʿAbbās. In 1664 the French too were attempting to divert the Persian silk-trade through the Persian Gulf and Surat.

The Ottoman government often used the trade privileges which it granted as a political asset. The grain of western Anatolia, Thrace, Macedonia and Thessaly was vitally important for feeding Venice and the cities of Northern Italy. In his excellent study M. Silberschmidt demonstrated how Bayezid I (1389–1403) in his relations with Venice could influence Venetian diplomacy by regulating grain export. Showing himself generous by letting Venice export grain from his dominions, Mehmed II (1451–81) kept Venice unsuspecting about his intentions before the siege of Constantinople.

It can be said that the capitulations were often granted on political considerations rather than economic. It was true that the Ottomans could not do without European cloths, an indispensable luxury for the higher classes, English tin and steel, and especially bullion on which the finances of the empire relied. So I think there is some exaggeration in saying that the Ottoman empire was economically self-sufficient. But it was equally true that from the outset, when the Ottomans favoured the Genoese against the Venetians by granting the capitulations of 1352, down to those granted to England in 1581 and to Holland in 1612, the Ottomans believed that they were favouring and supporting the friendly nations against the hostile ones by giving them trade privileges. I think one should first consider changes in Ottoman political attitudes to understand the fluctuations in the trade of a particular western nation in the Levant. Also it must be added that the extension of the capitulations to the western nations was very beneficial for

the Ottoman economy in the sixteenth century, for such a policy kept the Levant markets alive and enabled the Ottoman Empire to compete successfully with other routes for the trade in spices and silk. In the early seventeenth century it was argued in England that the Levant Company was more important than the East India Company. The English capitulations were granted just at the time when England renewed its attempts to set up a trade route through Russia, the Caucasus and Iran to Hormuz.The fact that the Ottoman market consumed a large amount of cloth made a great difference for the English who were trying to pay for oriental goods with as little bullion as possible. It was along the same line that Naʿīmā, the Ottoman chronicler of the early eighteenth century, wrote: 'People in this country must abstain from the use of luxury goods of the countries hostile to the Ottoman empire and thus keep currency and goods from flowing out. They must use as much as possible the products of native industries . . . One may argue that such a policy might result in a decrease in the customs revenues, but one must not forget that if foreign merchants spend the money they earn by selling their goods here to buy what they need of Ottoman products, the money remains within the country. Moreover duties are paid more than once on these transactions. The European merchants import woollen cloths and buy for export wool, mohair, alum, gallnuts, potash and other goods, and pay for them at Smyrna, Payas, Ṣaydā and Alexandria with shiploads of silver and gold. This money is spread over the country, especially in Ankara, Ṣaydā, Tripoli and the Lebanon. But the Muscovites sell us expensive furs but purchase nothing in the Ottoman dominions and keep the money for themselves. Also we spend so much for Indian goods but Indians purchase nothing here. As a matter of fact they have nothing to buy here. Consequently incalculable fortunes are amassed in India. The same can be said about the Yemen from which we import coffee.' It is interesting to note that Naʿīmā avoided mentioning among the goods exported to Europe wheat, cotton, textiles and hides the export of which in the traditional thinking of the Ottomans was not desirable as they were necessities for the internal market.

In peace as in war the Ottoman government forbade the export of certain goods. In the list were usually included cotton, wax, leather, hides, grain. The idea was to protect the domestic market and prevent scarcity and higher prices.

III. THE OTTOMAN GOVERNMENT AND THE GUILDS

The attitude of the Ottoman government towards the guilds and domestic commerce is of particular interest in understanding the Ottoman economic mind.

The Ottoman guild system (called *esnaf*, *hirfet* or *lonca*) was actually a

continuation of the *akhī* organization with this difference that the independent and powerful position of the guilds in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries weakened under the centralist system of government of the Ottomans.

Let us first have a glance at the internal organization of an Ottoman *hirfet:* the number of *ustas* (from *ustādh*, master-craftsman) was limited. They elected from among themselves a council of control known as 'the Six', *Altılar*, who were, in descending order, the *shaykh*, spiritual head, the *kâhya* (from *katkhudā*), the *yiğit-başı*, *işçi-başı* and two *ehl-i hibre*, experts. The local kadi would confirm the election and register the result in his official *sicil*. The Sultan's diploma was to be obtained for the *kâhya*, actual leader and representative of the *hirfet* as was the *akhī* in earlier times. The principal duties of this council were to ensure that regulations concerning the quality and prices of manufactured goods were enforced, to carry out the examinations for promotion from apprentice (*şagird*) to journeyman (*kalfa*, from *khalīfa*) and from journeyman to master, to issue licences (*icaze*), to investigate and settle disputes and malpractices in the guild, to represent the guild in dealings with the government, and most important of all to prevent competition and underhand practices in the employment of workmen and in the buying of stocks. In carrying out these duties the *kâhya*, usually acting as the principal officer, the *yiğit-başı*, and his assistant the *işçi-başı*, would investigate complaints and make a report to the *ehl-i hibre*, on the basis of which they made the final decision. The guild cooperated closely with the government, and if there was any resistance to the decision of 'the Six', the latter could call upon the local state officers to enforce it. The regulations of the guild were confirmed by the Sultan, so becoming an *ihtisab* law, and as such, their application became the responsibility of the kadi. The work-people were divided into three main groups: *kuls* (slaves), *şagirds* (apprentices) and *ecirs* (wage-earners). The masters sold their products at specified shops in the market and were not permitted to sell their goods elsewhere. When one branch of a *hirfet* expanded, its members could easily form themselves into a new *hirfet* but the Sultan's diploma for recognition was required.

The government's control of a guild was carried on through various agents such as the local kadi, the *muhtesib* and various *emins*, agents of the Sultan. In Istanbul in certain professions the *kâhyas* had first to obtain a high official's certificate to get the Sultan's diploma. For example, the chief architect at the Porte was authorized to give such certificates to *kâhyas* elected by the guild of architects. The government usually respected the decision of the guild. There are indeed many instances in which the guilds imposed their own choice instead of a *kâhya* favoured by the local authority.

The disputes in a guild or between guilds or malpractices and deviations from the rules often made the government interfere in the affairs of the guilds. Almost without exception the Ottoman government adopted the views of the guilds about new trends against the rules. In the thriving cities of Bursa and Istanbul masters working outside the guilds and cheaper production to meet growing demand for goods at popular prices appeared to be the two principal threats against the guild system. Usually the guild denounced them at the Porte as working without licence and producing defective goods in violation of the regulations. The government interfered in favour of the guild and tried to restore the old regulations apparently without great success. A firman reduced the number of looms weaving brocade from 318 to 100 in 1564 but a new inspection in 1577 found 268 looms still working. Measures were taken to prevent hoarding of raw material. A special market or hall was assigned for each major item such as wheat, butter, honey, cloth, silk, leather and it was brought, weighed, taxed and then distributed to the representatives of the *hirfets* there. For the necessities such as wheat and meat for the Istanbul market the government established a close supervision from the producer in the provinces down to the retailers in Istanbul in order to provide a regular and sufficient supply of these goods and eliminate speculators. For purchase on a large scale in the provinces the government appointed rich persons, sometimes without their consent. The strict regulation and close control of domestic trade and industry was dictated, as seen above, by the government's major concern to meet the needs of the population at normal prices. Under the Islamic *ḥisba* rules the community was to be protected from unjust practices in the market. Especially in a city like Istanbul where a shortage or abnormally high prices of basic goods might rouse the military and the common people against the government all this was of vital importance with far-reaching political implications. We have also seen above how concern over scarcity and high prices made the government forbid the export of certain goods and thus affected foreign trade. In general the export of goods was not something desirable. When not forbidden, goods for export were subject to customs duties as high as those for import.

Conclusion

The Ottoman economic mind was closely related to the basic concept of state and society in the Middle East. It professed that the ultimate goal of a state was consolidation and extension of the ruler's power and the only way to reach it was to get rich sources of revenues. This in turn depended on the conditions making the productive classes prosperous. So the essential function of the state was to keep in force these conditions.

The society is, in this philosophy of state, divided into the ruling class who are not engaged in production and consequently pay no taxes and the subjects who are engaged in production and pay taxes. The latter is subdivided into city-dwellers engaged in commerce and industry and peasants

engaged in agriculture. In the Middle Eastern state the belief prevailed that the peace and prosperity of the state depended on keeping the members of each class in their own place. It was such a concept of state and society that was prevalent in the minds of the *kuttāb*, actual administrators in a Middle Eastern state formulating all the measures to be taken. It called for an economy and economic organization the ultimate aim of which was to increase the state revenues as much as possible without impairing the prosperity of the subjects and to keep the traditional organization of the society from alteration.

By developing commercial centres and routes, encouraging people to extend the area of cultivated land in the country and international trade through its dominions, the state performed basic economic functions in the empire. But in all this the financial and political interests of the state were always prevalent and the Ottoman administrator could never have realized within the political and social system in which he lived the principles of a capitalistic economy of the Modern Age; while Europe, equipped with the knowledge and organization of such a system, came to challenge the Middle Eastern empire of the Ottomans.

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Materials of War in the Ottoman Empire

V. J. PARRY

THE material of war assigned to an Ottoman army in the field or to an Ottoman fortress on the frontier of the empire was varied and complex in character. Documents relating to the campaign against Vienna in 1683 list in detail the *âlât-i âhen*, i.e., implements of iron, requisitioned from the mines at Samokov in Bulgaria and elsewhere: picks, shovels, hammers, axes, mattocks and also nails of diverse kinds—e.g., *meteris kazması*, *ferhadi lağım kazması*, *bir yüzlü balta*, *iki yüzlü balta*, *kassa mismar kuhle*, *mismar mertek*, *mismar nazlı mertek*, *mismar orta sayış*, *mismar zağra*, *mismar lofça*, *mismar tahta* and the like (Grzegorzewski, docs. no. 2 and 30).

On their conquest, from the Ottomans, of the Hungarian fortress Alba Regalis (Székesfehérvár, Stuhlweissenburg) in 1688 the Christians acquired, *inter alia*, a large number of guns (*colombrine*, *falconetti*, *moschettoni*, *schioppi di Gianizzeri*), quantities of lead and of quick-match (*miccia*, i.e., *fitil*), bombs, grenades, chests of musket and pistol balls, new cartridge cases, powder-horns, small leather sacks (for gunpowder), instruments (*siringe*) for extinguishing fires in time of assault, hooks, pikes, hoes, shovels, gun-carriages, carts, axle-trees of iron, waggon-wheels *alla Turca*, timber, anvils, bellows, nails, cables, ropes, stores of cotton, sandbags made of animal hair, copper cauldrons (including one full of *olio Petroglio*), pitch, etc. (Zenarolla, 99–105; cf. also Fekete, *Siyāqat-Schrift*, i, 692–8: a list, dated 1643, of the munitions then at the Ottoman fortress of Egri (Erlau) in Hungary).

A list of the spoils which fell to the Christians after their defeat of the Ottomans at the battle of Peterwardein in 1716 includes lead, hand-grenades of metal, quick-match, saltpetre, horseshoes, camel and ox hair, sheepskins, halberds, scythes, cotton, Janissary powder-flasks, bellows for heating cannon-balls, munition carts, waggon-jacks of wood, anvils, cannon and mortars, buffaloes, camels, drag-ropes, etc. (*Mon. Hung. Hist.*, *Scriptores*, xxvii, 585–6).

Often the source references are brief and incomplete. There is mention, for example, of (*a*) wood drawn from the forests of Ada (Ada Bazarı) and used to make stocks for the muskets of the Janissaries (Uzunçarşılı, ii, 13, note 2); (*b*) timber from the forests of 'Resina' and 'Iskente' in Moldavia—a hard, fine, striped wood called in Turkish 'Sarma Agagdzi' and employed, in the Crimea, for the butts of muskets (Peyssonel, i, 114–15); (*c*) timber for the artillery waggons (*top ʿarabaları*), which came from the region of

Studies
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