The Ottoman Succession and Its Relation to the Turkish Concept of Sovereignty

A GLANCE at the tree of the Ottoman Sultans will show that until the death of Ahmed I (1603-1617) the throne always passed from father to son; it is only after that date that we see the accession of brothers. Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall attempted to explain this phenomenon in the following manner: the Ottomans followed the seniority principle, inherited from the time of Chinggis Khan, whereby the throne devolved first upon the eldest son or, if there were no son, upon the oldest living relative of the deceased ruler.[1] Because of the practice of fratricide, however, the need to invoke the latter proviso did not arise until 1617 when, for the first time upon the death of a Sultan, a brother was found to be still living. Rejecting this explanation, Friedrich Giese put forth the view that there was no law or principle governing Sultanic succession among the Ottomans.[2] Similarly, Wilhelm Radloff had earlier given examples showing that no established rules for succession prevailed among any of the Turkish peoples.[3] Finally, László Ferenc viewed the problem from a wider perspective, stating conclusively that among the Turks, "every member of the ruling dynasty has a claim on the right to rule, there exists neither a *primogenitura* nor a *senioratus* principle of succession."[4]

More recently, proponents of both the *senioratus* principle, whereby the eldest member of the ruling family assumes the throne, and of the *primogenitura* principle, whereby only the eldest son has the right to succeed, have come forward. Zeki Velidi Togan, for instance, stated that "because the title of great khan passed to the eldest brother, the area of his residence would become the center of the state. This practice was prevalent also among the Karakhanids, successors to the Kök Türks."[5] Togan elsewhere stated, rather ambiguously, "Among the Karakhanids the right to Kaghanship, according to old Turkish traditions, belonged to the eldest prince of that segment of the family which was predominant."[6] Osman Turan stated

that among the Anatolian Seljuks the throne belonged to the eldest son.[7] Ibrahim Kafesoğlu observed that with the Khwarezmshahs, the eldest son and candidate for the throne was generally appointed to the province of Jend.[8] In fact, the practice of giving the eldest son domain over Jend, a frontier province of Khwarezm, was connected with a different matter, as will be shown below.

Among the oldest sources on the subject of succession, the following statement from the inscription of Bilgä Kaghan, ruler of the Kök Türks, has given rise to argument: "In accordance with the the *törü* (law), my uncle succeeded to the throne."[9] If *törü* is understood here to mean the law as established by the Kaghans, it could be assumed that succession practices were spelled out by this law. According to Giese, however, it is not possible to reach a definitive conclusion on the basis of this evidence.[10] Other passages of the Bilgä Kaghan inscription relating to succession must also be considered. After the death of his uncle, Bilgä Kaghan says of himself: "Because it was God's will and it was my destiny, I assumed the status of kaghan."[11] Here it is only God's will that is mentioned. This statement is also noteworthy: "My ancestors Bumin Kaghan and Isämi Kaghan ruled over men; then their younger brothers became kaghan, and then their sons."[12] This can only refer to a historical situation. The fact that among the Kök Türks succession to the throne was a matter of destiny, left in the hands of God, is shown by the following story from a Chinese source, the *Chou Shu:*

> They wanted to make one of the brothers leader, and all together they went to the foot of a large tree and made the following agreement: whoever could jump the farthest up the tree would assume the leadership. Although A-shih-na's son was the youngest, he managed to jump the highest, so they agreed to accept him as their leader.[13]

Numerous examples show that in Turko-Islamic states sons and brothers had an equal right to the throne. For an overall view of the problem, the genealogies published by Halil Edhem Eldem[14] and E. de Zambaur[15] show that there is insufficient evidence of a seniority principle. According to M. A. Köymen, in early Seljuk history "the oldest living member of the family" assumed the leadership, with the title Yabghu. Nevertheless, after the victory at Serahs, Tughrul was made head of the newly founded state, in preference to his brother

Chaghrı Beg and his uncle Arslan Yabghu. Subsequently the sultanate devolved upon the family of Chaghrı Beg; nor did the descendents of Arslan Yabghu abandon their claim to the Great Seljuk throne.[16] Chaghrı Beg's eldest son Kavurd laid claim first to the throne of his brother Alp Arslan and then to that of his nephew Malikshah.

Neither is there any evidence of the existence of any law or custom regulating the royal succession among the Khwarezmshahs.ᶜAlâeddîn Muhammad (1200-20) passed over both his eldest son Jelâleddîn and his second son Rukneddîn in designating his youngest son Kutbeddîn heir apparent. Then, while fleeing the Mongols in 1220, he replaced him with the seemingly more capable Jelâleddîn.[17]

Among the Anatolian Seljuks, the Sultan chose one of his sons as heir apparent without consideration of age. On condition that they remain loyal to the Sultan who exercised authority in the capital city, the other sons would be given the title *malik* and appointed to govern in the various provinces of the realm. The presence of an heir apparent did not prevent the other brothers from claiming a right to the throne upon the death of the Sultan. Before his death, ᶜIzzeddîn Kılıch Arslan II (1156-92) designated his youngest son Ghıyâseddîn Kaykhusrav as heir apparent. The latter's personal virtues were mentioned as the only motive for his preference over his brothers. His elder brothers refused, out of jealousy, to accept his appointment and, gathering around Rukneddîn Süleymân, raised the standard of revolt. Upon the death of Kılıch Arslan II (1192), Rukneddîn besieged Konya and seized the throne from his brother.[18] On the death of Rukneddîn (1204), in spite of the fact that his son Kılıch Arslan III had been proclaimed Sultan, the young man's uncle Ghıyâseddîn Kaykhusrav seized the throne with the aid of the frontier lords.[19] On his death in 1211, his eldest son ᶜIzzeddîn Kaykâvûs I (1211-19) ascended the throne. His brother, ᶜAlâeddîn Kaykubâd, refused to recognize him and took up arms against him.[20] On the death of ᶜIzzeddîn Kaykâvûs I, the problem of who should succeed to the throne once again arose. For some time, no decision could be made between his brother Tughrul Shâh, his middle son ᶜAlâeddîn Kaykubâd, and his youngest son Kay Ferîdûn. Eventually the choice fell upon ᶜAleddîn Kaykubâd (1219-37).[21]

An examination of the principle of succession among the Mongols is necessary for the present study because the Mongols both continued the traditions of the old Turkish empires of Central Asia in their purity, and exerted an immense influence upon the public institutions of Anatolia and the entire Middle East.[22]

No fixed rules governed succession among the Mongols.[23] Sons of *Ka'an*'s wives *(khatun)* with equivalent origin and standing possessed the same degree of claim to the throne. But in 1282, Tegüder Ahmed, the Ilkhanid ruler of Persia (1282-84), declared, in opposition to his nephew Arghun (1284-91), that the eldest son had a greater claim than the others. Having become a Muslim, however, Ahmed had turned away from the tradition and come under the strong influence of the Muslim community. Even if the *ka'an* did choose an heir apparent, after his death his choice was considered no obstacle to a different prince's accession to the throne.[24] The Mongol *kuriltay* which chose Ögedey (1227-1241) acted in accordance with the wishes of Chinggis. Ögedey's words to his older brother Chaghatay after the election merit attention: "I sat on a throne prepared for me by my father, Chinggis Khan; is it not possible that later some will ask, behind my back, 'on the basis of which of his virtues did he merit the throne?' If my brother is in agreement, I would like to continue the war against the Altan Khan, of the Kitans, which my father began but did not finish."[25] His statement clearly shows that among the brothers personal virtue and achievement were considered requisite for rule. Being heir apparent, achieving precedence by timely arrival at the *kuriltay,* and most important of all, securing the support of the influential tribal chiefs through personal relations and negotiations, were the principal means of acquiring the throne.

Similarly, foreign observers indicate even in the fifteenth century that no established principles or laws governed the Ottoman succession. Dukas states, "Whomever kingship passes to, whether from father to son or from brother to brother, in short to whomever fortune aids, the *kuls* give faithful allegiance to this new leader."[26] Angiolello, who lived in the Ottoman palace from 1470 to 1481, writes, "Bâyezîd and Jem, the two sons of the Sultan [Mehemmed II] . . . each claimed to succede his father. The entire matter was who could first arrive at Istanbul. The greater part of the palace people would easily recognized him as Sultan whether he was a minor or had reached the age of majority. Whoever would take possession of the imperial treasury would arrange everything in his favor."[27] Theodore Spandugino, writing around 1510 about the struggle between Bâyezîd and Jem, says that the two were considered equal candidates for the throne.[28]

In conclusion, it can be said that a tradition limiting succession to the throne to a particular member of the dynasty never existed in Turkish states. It is true that from time to time certain tendencies

appeared, such as the designation of an heir apparent or the preference for an elder or a younger son. But the fundamental principle was always that the succession to the throne should be left to divine dispensation. All other traditions and practices remained secondary to this one. Once a member of the dynasty actually seized the throne, by whatever means, there was no further theoretical or legal question of his legitimacy. Unaltered by the centuries, this fundamental attitude was related to Turkish conceptions that were deeply rooted in ancient religious beliefs concerning the nature and origin of sovereignty, and was more readily apparent in those Turkish tribes which remained closer to their Central Asian traditions. We shall consider below the relationship of this concept of sovereignty to the present subject.

In the Orkhon Kök Türk inscriptions, the Proto-Bulgarian inscriptions and the Uyghur documents,[29] dating from the seventh through the ninth centuries, the titles of the kaghans reveal a belief not only in the divine origin of sovereignty, but in their own divine origin, and state that they are the bearers of *kut. Tengride bulmush, tengride kut bulmush,* or *kutlugh* are repeatedly encountered as components of the titles. The idea that the king had come down from God can be traced back to the Hsiung-nu, who provide the first example of the organization of a Central Asian nomadic empire, in the third century before Christ. Especially noteworthy are the following words attributed to Bilgä Kaghan in the Orkhon inscriptions: "*Tengri yarlıkadukın üchün [ö]züm kutım bar üchün kaghan olurtım.*"[30] Thus he ascribes his position as kaghan to divine grace and his own personal *kut.* In the Secret History of the Mongols,[31] written about 1240, Chinggis Khan states, "With the strength given to me by Eternal God *(mengü tengri)* I gathered the entire nation under my rule." Likewise the formula "by the power of Eternal God" *(mengü tengri küchündür)* is always to be found as the title of the Mongol khans in their documents and seals.[32]

What is the meaning of *kut,* which seems to have such an important place in the Turko-Mongol concept of sovereignty? Mahmûd al-Kashgharî gives as equivalents *ughur* (auspiciousness), *dawlat* (power), *baht* (fortune), *ṭâliᶜ* (luck), and *saᶜâdat* (felicity).[33] Ziya Gökalp says that kut is like mana in primitive societies, a magical power that influences everything and bestows a sacred significance.[34] In shamanism *kut* is used in the sense of life-element or spirit. It is usually described by the Turks and Mongols as a column of light that descends

from the heavens. From it the lineage of the kaghans were created. A kaghan bearing *kut* is sacred. Among the Khazars the kaghan, like the *kam* (shaman), came from a sacred family and would not show his face to the people.[35]

In the religio-political gathering in which Temuchin, under the title Chinggis Khan, assumed the leadership of the central Asian nomadic empire, he was proclaimed by the shaman Kököchü to have been sent down as *ka'an* by the Heavens God.[36] Chinggis and his sons believed that they had been granted sovereignty over all the earth. The title Chinggis *ka'an* itself came to take on the meaning of universal emperor.[37]

The only lineage suited to bear the title *ka'an,* kaghan,[38] which presumed universal sovereignty, was one which had been sent by God.[39] All the Turkish and Mongol dynasties which claimed this title linked themselves to such a lineage, tracing their family trees back, whether legitimately or not, to a common ancestor. The dynasty of the Kök Türks, referred to in the Chinese sources as the sons of A-Shih-na,[40] the T'u-Ko' of the Hsiung states of northern China,[41] the Mongol Altan- Urug,[42] and the Oghuz Turkish dynasties who traced their genealogies to Oghuz Khan, all claimed a common ancestor. From the time of Deguignes onward, specialists in Turkish history have repeated that the legendary Oghuz Khan was most likely the great Shan-yü of the Hsiung-nu, Mete.[43] Just as the Danubian Bulghar Khans are linked by ancestry to the Shan- yü of the Hsiung-nu,[44] so according to the Chinese sources is the royal family of the Kök Türks (T'u-kiüe) considered to be from among the Hsiung-nu.[45]

The kaghan's lineage has an origin which is sacred, deriving from God. Usually the kaghans were thought to be the children of a princess impregnated by a light emanating from the heavens. Such a belief prevailed among the Uyghurs, the Khitays, the Kirghız, and the Mongols.[46] According to the *Secret History of the Mongols,*[47] Alan-ho'a (Alangoa) was thus impregnated, and the children whom she bore became "the *ka'ans* of all mankind."[48] Chinggis Khan was accounted to be of this descent. Another belief has it that the lineage of the kaghans descends from the coupling of a wolf, sent by God, with a prince or princess. This legend, ascribing lupine origins to sovereigns, can be traced back as far as the Wu-sun in the second century before Christ.[49] It is found among the Kök Türks and other Turkish tribes, as well as among the Mongols.[50]

Both of these beliefs, in a light or a lupine origin, have been linked to shamanism. Ziya Gökalp thought that the wolf was originally a totem. If so, how did it happen that a totem which was originally considered the forefather of the entire nation or tribe came to be considered the progenitor of a specific, dominant kaghan family? Gökalp attempted to answer this question by viewing it as the result of a socio-political transformation from the level of clan to that of territorial state. In this process the public guardianship was centralized, and devolved upon the ruling family, which had adopted the totem.[51] The standard of Chinggis Khan incorporated the totem of his tribe, the Sülde. He believed that he would conquer the world because of this pennant. Whatever the source of the idea, it is apparent that both the kaghanate and the kaghan family were accounted sacred and of divine origin. The titles they employed,[52] the ceremonies surrounding the royal accession, and the supernatural qualities ascribed to the kaghan all demonstrate this clearly.[53] Such an explanation, which finds the sources of authority to be rooted in ancient magical-religious beliefs, makes futile any human attempt to organize and establish laws for the accession to the kaghan's throne. The throne belongs to the A-shih-na, the sons of Oghuz Khan. God ordained it, as he likewise determined which son would ascend the throne. God's will was manifested in the power and success he gave to his chosen one; that was the divine confirmation.

Where this belief was strongly held even powerful leaders such as Noghay, Mamay and Idigu (Edike) did not presume to take the title of khan. Even Timur, who founded a world empire, did not take upon himself this title. In the inscription on his grave, however, his family is traced back to Budhunchar, the son of Alangoa by divine impregnation, on the one hand, and on the other hand to the family of the Prophet.[54] This last point shows that Islamic considerations had gained equal importance. Idigu also traced his line back to the Caliph Abu Bakr.[55] In the Kıpchak steppe, where Islam was beginning to take hold, only the Prophet and his caliph possessed prestige equal to that of the old Turco-Mongol tradition.

Among the Ottomans, various views prevailed regarding the origins of the dynasty and its sovereignty. As expressed in various historical narratives, each interpretation naturally bears the mark of a certain environment, period, or political viewpoint. In spite of their legendary character, these narratives are important for the particular

traditions and biases they express. As has been shown, the oldest of such narratives appeared toward the end of the fourteenth century[56] and proposed that ʿOsmân, or his father Ertughrul, was given his rulership by the Seljuk sultans or, alternatively, that ʿOsmân was selected to succeed the last of the Seljuk sultans. This story dates from the period of Bâyezīd I (1389-1402), when the Ottomans were for the first time thinking of their history as a single continuum, and reflects the Ottoman ambitions and claims of that time. In other words, it attempts to show Timur on the one side, and the Egyptian Mamluks on the other, the legitimacy of the Ottoman expansion in Anatolia. In essence this claim is based on the Islamic conceptions of caliphate *(khilâfa)* and public guardianship *(walâ')*. The Seljuk sultan, who was seen to have received his authority from the Caliph, delegated it in the form of an emirate to the frontier begs, among them ʿOsmân or Ertughrul. Upon his investiture with certain symbolic instruments of sovereignty, *âlât-i mulûkiyye* (patent, flag, sword, horse and drum), ʿOsmân assumed authority over a territory. In other versions of this narrative, it is said that sword of ʿOsmân, the third Caliph, was sent to the Ottoman chief, or that the last Seljuk sultan made ʿOsmân the heir apparent. The story must have originated in and been fostered by palace and *ʿulemâ* circles. We know that Bâyezid I, influenced and inspired by the same circles and seeking to legitimize his claims to authority in Anatolia, asked the Abbasid Caliph in Egypt for the title Sultân al- Rûm, Sultan of Asia Minor (Rûm).[57] This title was one previously granted to the Seljuk sultans by the Caliphs of Baghdad.[58] Alongside this Islamic interpretation of their origins, which can be traced back to the conditions of their ascendancy at the time, another explanation is found, which later gained strength.

The narrative which puts forward this second interpretation appears in historical works which date from the first reign of Murâd II (1421-51)[59] and is clearly linked to the traditional Central Asian theory of the Turkish state. According to it, ʿOsmân Ghâzî was a descendant of Kayı Khan, the son of Gün Khan, the eldest son of Oghuz Khan. ʿOsmân's tribe was the Kayı tribe and he its hereditary leader. ʿOsmân's lineage was adapted into a forged genealogy that went back to Oghuz Khan.[60] This interpretation finds its strongest proponent in Yazıjı-zâde ʿAlî,[61] in whose works we find Turkish traditions woven into the history of the Ottomans and even of the Anatolian Seljuks in a manner representative of the concerns of the period. Thus he writes:

> Gathering together in council *(kuriltay)* the Turkish begs on the frontier ascertained what the Oghuz traditions were and they proclaimed as Khan ʿOsmân Beg, son of Ertughrul of the Kayı . . . by the requirement of the Oghuz traditions as they were handed down from Gün Khan; so long as the line of the Kayı survives, the khanate and sultanate *(pâdishâhlık)* must not pass to the line of the rulers of any other clan.

We know that the Ottoman dynasty favored and adopted this interpretation to such a degree that under Murâd II, for the first time, the seal of the Kayı clan began to be stamped on Ottoman coinage.[62] I believe it is incorrect to see this trend simply as representative of romantic concerns. Its true purpose must be viewed as an attempt to strengthen the Ottoman dynasty in the face of the threats and claims of Timur and his sons, and also to express to a certain extent a commitment to the traditions prevalent among the Turkish tribal groups of the frontiers. Finally, it should also be noted that Timur's invasion was followed by a strong revival of nomadic state traditions in all the countries of the Near East.[63]

During the first half of the fifteenth century, the Timurids proclaimed their precedence and sovereignty over the Ottomans. Acting as a representative of the sons of Chinggis Khan, Timur allowed the Ottomans, whom he described as frontier lords, legitimate authority only over the frontier lands outside the traditional boundaries of the Seljuk state, and expected submission and obedience from them, as in Ilkhanid times.[64] Bâyezîd I refused to accept those claims and took, as a challenge, the title of Sultan of Rûm, but he was crushed by his opponent. His sons and all the Anatolian begs then recognized Timur's suzerainty. Timur's son Shâhrukh wanted to maintain this situation. In works written in the East during this period, the Ottoman dynasty was portrayed as of unknown, low-class origins.[65] Only friendly rulers, such as Jihân Shah of the Karakoyunlu, placed any value in the genealogy that tied the Ottoman sultan to Oghuz Khan.[66] Murâd II did not dare to deny Shâhrukh's claims of suzerainty.[67] In 1435, when Shâhrukh sent ceremonial robes to the Anatolian rulers, including Murâd II, and demanded that they wear them as a sign of their allegiance, the Ottoman Sultan, though unwilling, felt obliged to see that the order was carried out. The Arab source that reports the

event notes, however, that the Ottoman Sultan effected this at a private, not an official, meeting, and did not accord it much importance.[68] Under these conditions it is evident why in this period the Ottomans placed so much importance upon the Kayı and Oghuz Khan traditions. The Ottoman Sultan was trying to raise himself to the level of those Turkish and Mongol dynasties that were then ruling the Eastern world. In other words, he aspired to legitimacy as defined by the Turco-Mongol state traditions.

At the same time, the Sultan's claim was specifically addressed to the Turcoman ghâzîs on the Ottoman frontiers and the Turcoman groups in Anatolia. The Karakoyunlu and the Dulkadırlı Turcomans accepted this Ottoman position. It is worth noting here that when the Ramadânid dynasty gained importance during the struggle against the Mamluks during the reign of Bâyezîd II (1481-1512), Ottoman historians espoused the theory of kinship between the Ottomans and the Turcoman tribes to whom the Ramadânids belonged.[69] Thus, in general, the Ottoman Kayı genealogy had a response among the Turcoman groups faithful to the Central Asian traditions.

Finally, the old Turkish frontier traditions remained vibrant on the Ottoman frontiers in Rumelia. Whether in the frontier regions of Skopje, Karinabad-Deliorman, or Serez-Tirhala, a major part of the frontier forces consisted of Turcoman-Yürük groups who had emigrated from Anatolia.[70] Their ideal of a leader-beg is emphatically portrayed in the works written outside the palace environment and addressed to the ghâzîs themselves, the *Tevârîkh-i Âl-i ᶜOsmân,* and in the history of ᶜAshık Pasha-zâde.[71] The ideal leader is described as one who, as among the Khazars, does not seek to accumulate goods and treasures and, although poor, is scrupulously just. Just as we find in the Orkhon inscriptions, the leader's concern is to clothe and feed his people. In fact, among the Ottomans, we find public feasts, *toy,* resembling those of Central Asia pointed out and emphasized during this period.

One of these narratives, which contains many elements from Central Asian legends and concerns the rise to power of Sultan Orkhan, is particularly pertinent to the present subject. According to this narrative, ᶜOsmân had a dream in which a tree grew out of his belly and covered the entire world; in the morning, the sheikh whose guest he was interpreted the dream to mean that God had granted to his bloodline authority over the world. The story gives as the reason for this divine favor the reverence that ᶜOsmân had shown to the Holy

Qur'an before going to sleep that night. Alongside this Islamic motif, which is wholly explicable in these ghâzî surroundings, other motifs, such as God's bestowal of earthly dominion in a particular symbolic way, the interpretation of this symbolic message by a holy man, and elements such as a dream and a tree, can be traced back in each case to folklore of Central Asian origin.[72] In fact, as Fuad Köprülü has shown, this tradition was used earlier in relation to other Turkish-Islamic dynasties.[73]

What is important for us here is that the Ottomans appropriated it. In the Islamic world, the view that the right to sovereignty over an Islamic community was granted directly to sultans by God and that the active seizure of sovereignty constituted, in effect, a divine designation, had gained acceptance in the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries. The old caliphal view, the theory that sovereignty was delegated by the Caliph, no longer prevailed. It is accepted that the Turkish state tradition had an influence on this change.[74] In any case, Central Asian Turkish traditions are to be found persisting in the Ottoman dynasty's interpretation of the origin of its sovereignty. The question of the succession is connected to this general interpretation. That is to say, the Ottomans believed that it was God, not human laws or organizations, who determined that sovereignty should be in one line, in one member of a ruling family and, finally, in one people and territory.

The selection of a kaghan at a *kuriltay* is strong evidence that among the Central Asian Turks and Mongols there was no specific law of succession. We find that among the Kök Türks, the Mongols of Iran, and the Golden Horde, kaghans were proclaimed from among princes of those branches in which predecessors had become khans a few generations earlier. *Kuriltays* were meetings attended by the members of the ruling family, important military leaders, bureaucrats, and vassal princes, and were quite different from a real electoral council. Much is known about the institution of the *kuriltay* as it continued in its basic form in the Crimean khanate.

In the Crimea, the primary role in the selection of the Khan was played by the four strongest tribal heads, the *karachu* begs, and in particular their leader, the beg of the Shirin tribe. These tribes would commonly take to arms when they did not want to recognize the khan placed over them by the Ottoman *pâdishâh.* The situation was much the same among the Mongols of Iran and the Golden Horde. That is, in general, a prince who had the support of a strong beg would become khan, and the *kuriltay* remained in practice a semi-religious ceremony

of accession and allegiance which followed the lines of old shamanist traditions. The begs and vezirs who had the allegiance of military forces most often determined who was to accede to the throne. Such was the case among the Kök Türks.[75] Upon the death of the Anatolian Seljuk ʿIzzeddîn Kaykâvûs (1220), the most important military commanders and the vezirs, gathering together with the *"tughrâî ve munshî-i khâss"*, discussed whom they would designate as Sultan. In the end, the word of the principal commander, Seyfeddîn Ay-Apa, was followed.[76]

Among the Ottomans, the Grand Vizir generally played the primary role in this matter. If we look at the earlier period, however, we see that the frontier lords were capable of acting quite independently of the center in these affairs and at times even determined who was to be the possessor of the throne (especially during the interregnum and the reigns of Mehemmed I and Murâd II). In the old Ottoman traditions, according to Yazıjı-zâde on the one hand and Neshrî on the other, it is put forward that ʿOsmân Ghâzî was chosen beg at a tribal meeting. The relevant passage in Neshrî reads as follows:

> Some of the nomads *(göcher-evler)* wished to make ʿOsmân their beg, and some wished to have ʿOsmân's uncle, Dündar, the brother of Ertughrul; but his own tribe preferred ʿOsmân and sent out word [of this] secretly, and when Dündar came out among the people he saw that they preferred and gave obeisance to ʿOsmân, whereupon he renounced his claims to the beglik and proclaimed his allegiance to ʿOsmân.[77]

In contrast to this, ʿÂshık Pasha-zâde[78] reports that Orkhan assumed the position of beg at a conference of *akhi*s. On the death of Murâd I, "the begs gathered together and came to an agreement. They deemed Bâyezîd the proper one to take his father's place."[79] Vizirs played as major a role in the accessions of Murâd I and Murâd II as did the testament of the sultans' fathers. In subsequent periods, the sultans made it their habit to announce in their *fermans* of accession that they had succeeded to the throne with the favor of God and the "common agreement of the possessors of the power of decision, gathered together in council." But by this time what is under consideration is no longer the Turco-Mongol tradition of *kuriltay* but the totally Islamic institution of homage *(bayʿa)*. Even if consideration of power

and interest played an active role in the old *kuriltays* and in the councils of vezirs and emirs gathered in Seljuk and Ottoman times for the selection of a sultan, nevertheless the principle that God's will determined the outcome was deemed fundamental. Presumably, therefore, such councils cannot be compared to the Roman Senate, which transferred to the emperor the rights of authority that were the proper possession of the people.

Whether or not the mothers of siblings who were rivals for the throne were of noble lineage was a matter of considerable consequence. Among the Kök Türks, Ta-lo-pien, in spite of his brother's testament in his favor, was not chosen to rule because his mother was not of noble birth. Instead, his nephew An-lo became kaghan.[80] Among the Mongols, too, the mother's origin had an influence on the rights of the crown prince.[81] There are indications that this was true among the Ottomans in the early period. For example, the Arab historian Ibn Hajer reports that Savjı (this must be Yaʿkûb) was not granted the throne because his mother was a Christian.[82] Shükrullâh, who held various important positions in the Ottoman palace in the first half of the fifteenth century, noted in his history whether the mother of each crown prince was a concubine *(jâriye)* or a free-born lady of noble origins *(beg kızı)*. Nonetheless, it is certain that by the fifteenth century, the Ottomans did not give the matter much importance, although the Karamanids, more closely bound to ancient Turkish customs, still took this distinction into consideration. We should also note that this factor was not decisive among the Kök Türks, either.

THE DYNASTY AND THE APPANAGE *(ÜLÜSH)* SYSTEM

A principal feature of the Turkish concept of authority is the tenet that authority does not reside with one particular member of the khan family, but rather with the whole of the family. Omeljan Pritsak is the most recent researcher to show that steppe empires are formed from a confederation of tribes in accordance with an established model, and that among the various levels of the confederation authority is divided among the members of the kaghan family.[83] The same principle can be observed among the Hsiung-nu, the Kök Türks, and in the Mongol Empire of Chinggis Khan. Since we have relatively extensive information on this last group, our examples will come from them.

Unquestionably, the notion that the country is the joint possession and inheritance of the kaghan family and the division of the country

among the members of the dynasty can be linked to the nomadic tribal ethos and organization. According to Mongol law existing prior to Chinggis Khan, the sons would split up the inheritance of their mothers and fathers, and the youngest son would inherit the house and possessions of the father.[84] By the terms of the Oyrat law of 1640, the sons were the benefactors of the father's estate, the youngest of them inheriting the hearth of the father.[85] Children who married and left the household while their fathers were still alive would receive their share of the inheritance, but the youngest son would always remain attached to the hearth. According to the Yasa of Chinggis Khan, on the other hand, the eldest son would receive more than the youngest son in the division of property. Each member of the family of the kaghan, which remained a single unit, had a claim on the public revenue.[86] Conquered territories were considered the private possession of the ruler, denoted as *injü*. This property would be divided among the members of the dynasty. Aside from these *injü*s, to be found scattered in various parts of the empire, certain other areas, designated as *yurt*s, were given over to the command of princes.[87] While still alive, Chinggis Khan gave to his eldest son, Jöchi those lands stretching west from the Irtish river towards eastern Europe, that is, that section furthest from the central *ulugh yurt;* to his second son, Chaghatay (Cha'adai) he gave the area comprising present day Turkestan and Afghanistan; to Ögedei he gave Jungaria; and his youngest son Tului, in the central *yurt,* took Karakorum and Mongolia, the core of the Mongol Empire. By the end of the thirteenth century, these regions had become, in effect, independent khanates. What is important to note here is that the empire was divided among the members of the dynasty according to tribal rules of private property.

The conventions regarding the apportioning of the country among sons are clearly reflected in the epic of Oghuz Khan. In the Uyghur version of the Oghuznâme, those brothers sent to the west are considered subordinate to those sent to the east.

In the period before the Great Seljuks had emerged as a political power, when they were still active on the Jend frontier (beginning of the eleventh century), we see that Seljuk's sons and grandsons operated within certain defined areas. Thus, the eldest son Mikâ'il was sent at this time to the *ghazâ* areas on the frontier.[88] The Great Seljuks and the Anatolian Seljuks conscientiously followed the practice of parcelling out the country among the members of the dynasty into specific areas of dominion. When Mikâ'il died while his father

was still alive, Isrâ'il Arslan became head of the family. Later the furthest frontier district in the west, Anatolia, was left to his grandsons as appanage. The division of his domains among his sons by the Anatolian Seljuk Kılıch Arslan II while he was still alive (ca. 1195) is particularly worthy of note. Each son behaved as an independent ruler within his own domain.[89] Zeki Velidi Togan links this division of the country to the *ülüsh* system.[90] Abdülkadir Inan, who studied the *orun* (position) and *ülüsh* (apportioning) system in tribal law, has shown that when the tribes set up camp, the tents of the sons were arranged according to a definite rank arrangement.[91] The youngest son stayed in the centrally located tent of his father, while the tent next in importance to the central tent was the tent of the eldest son.

Ibn Battuta, who visited the Turcoman principalities of Anatolia in the 1330s, emphasized the method by which the country was apportioned among the sons.[92] These traditional ways were more strongly practiced in the Anatolian principalities than they had been in the Seljuk sultanate, which was under strong Iranian influence.[93] It was natural that this be so in the frontier Turcoman states, where Central Asian traditions survived in their purer forms. We will now discuss several aspects of the way in which this system was applied among the Ottomans, one of the frontier states which rose to prominence on the stage of world history.

According to an anecdote in Neshrî it was after a victory over the forces of the Byzantine Empire that ʿOsmân Ghâzî rose to the command of a genuine political organization and structured his state.[94] At that time "he gave the sanjak of Karajahisar to his son Orkhan Ghâzi", and "he gave the position of *subashi* to his brother Gündüz . . . he kept one son, ʿAlâeddîn Pasha, by his side."[95] In all the old traditions we find that ʿAlâeddîn Pasha was ʿOsmân's youngest son. He kept him by his side, while to his elder son Orkhan he gave the frontier sanjak in the east. Later, Orkhan came to the western frontier and captured Bursa in 1326. In 1331, after Orkhan was ruler himself "he gave Bursa to one son, Murâd Khan Ghâzî, naming it the Beg Sanjak, and Karajahisar he gave to the son of his uncle, Gündüz."[96] Later, when Akcha Koja died, Orkhan gave his frontier area to his eldest son Süleymân.[97] "He gave the sanjak of In-önü to Murâd Ghâzî, who was his youngest son."[98] Meanwhile, Süleymân continued his conquests on the Izmit borderlands. When the principality of Karesi was annexed Orkhan "brought forward his elder son Süleymân Pasha and [gave] him title to Karesi-eli."[99] Beginning his conquest of Rumeli from there, Süleymân then became the beg of the Gallipoli marches.

Murâd I (1362-1389) gave to his eldest son Bâyezîd the newly acquired frontier land of Küahya and, in 1373, he left his youngest son Savjı at the center.[100]

Süleymân, the son of Orkhan, is the only Ottoman prince to have been a *sanjakbegi* in Rumelia. The nearly contemporary sources clearly indicate that the important conquests he made on this front gained him unparalleled prestige and power.[101] One should also note that, in 1373, Savjı was the instigator of a rebellion in Rumelia. Thereafter one sees that crown princes were always appointed to the capitals of the old principalities in Anatolia. Mehemmed I, Murâd II and Mehemmed II all sent their eldest sons to Amasya, which gained importance during this period because of events on the eastern frontier.

In short, there is no question but that the appanage system in all of its major characteristics lived on among the Ottomans. In particular, one sees that the most important border lands were given to the eldest son and that, in the beginning, the nuclear area, the *beg-sanjagı,* was put in the hands of the youngest.

DESIGNATION OF SUCCESSION

We have seen that in the Central Asian feudal empires, in which tribal customs prevailed, the concept of sovereignty and of the nature of rule determined the form in which this authority was transferred. We have also seen that a number of internal developments and outside influences brought about changes in the fundamental tradition. The kaghan, when his absolute authority was established, gained the right to institute an organic law, *töre* and *yasa* and, based on this, to secure the transfer of authority directly to his own sons, or by selecting one of them to be the heir apparent, and to ensure that this son succeeded to the throne.

The designation of a successor is thought to have been an ancient practice in the Turkish and Mongol states of Central Asia. We know, for example, that in 759 A.D. the Uyghur ruler selected his eldest son as heir apparent.[102] Chinggis Khan chose his third son Ögedei as heir apparent and had his other sons confirm this.[103] When Chinggis Khan died, the Mongols, fiercely loyal to the memory of the great world conqueror, met in assembly and placed Ögedei on the throne, thereby carrying out the terms of the will. "They placed under his command the bodyguard and central regions of the state."[104] We know of cases also, however, where heirs apparent designated by Mongol Khans were not confirmed by the *kuriltay,* and others were brought to the throne in their place.[105]

Among the Anatolian Seljuks, the designated heir apparent was often removed from the throne by his brothers. A noteworthy case is that of Mesᶜûd I, who, when he divided the realm among his three sons, proclaimed Kılıch Arslan heir apparent and sovereign over the others, with the title of Sultan of Konya. He sat Kılıch Arslan on the throne in front of all the emirs and placed the royal crown on his head. All the emirs then knelt down in front of Kılıch Arslan and gave the ritual oath of allegiance. Upon his father's death, Kılıch Arslan ascended the throne. Nevertheless, his authority was not recognized by his brother Shâhinshâh.[106] Here we see the designation of heir, even the oath of allegiance, losing its binding legal character upon the death of a ruler. Indeed, we know that with the death of a ruler, laws and legal dispositions lost their validity and were accounted without authority until once again confirmed by a new ruler.[107] Brothers would sometimes come out in opposition to the choice of one from amongst them as heir apparent and would revolt against it.[108] They considered the appointment of an heir apparent to be an infringement upon their own rights, for each considered himself to be, God willing, a nominee for the throne.

The Old Ottoman traditions tell us that ᶜOsmân designated Orkhan as an heir of sorts. He also said, "Let my son Orkhan find majesty during my lifetime."[109] When ᶜOsmân died, Orkhan's brother ᶜAlâeddîn said to him, "When my father was alive, he entrusted the kingship to you."[110] On their deathbeds, Murâd I and Mehemmed I designated their eldest sons as heirs, leaving this as their last testaments.[111] Murâd II relinquished the throne to his son Mehemmed II in 1444, and when he returned to power two years later, Mehemmed was understood to be heir apparent.[112] Mehemmed the Conqueror and his successors, however, did not dare to take a stand openly in favor of one of their sons. Such displays of partiality were to bring the sons of Bâyezîd II and of Süleymân the Lawgiver into open conflict with their fathers.

In conclusion, both in the Ottoman state and in the Turkish states which preceded it, heir apparency was never firmly established as the method by which Sultanic authority was transmitted. The belief that the entire dynasty shared jointly in the possession of the realm, and that it was God who selected the actual ruler, was still too strong to ignore.

THE ELDEST SON AND THE RULING BRANCH

It has been pointed out above that the first Ottoman sultans were all eldest sons and that the eldest son was chosen heir apparent. Was this simply a coincidence, or was it the result of a particular tradition? We have already made clear the favored position of the eldest son in the appanage system. Among the Kazaks, tents ranked in order of importance from the father's to the eldest son's and then to the eldest brother's sons.[113] We might repeat here that the eldest son received the largest share of the inheritance and that in the apportionment of the realm he was granted the most important frontier region. Finally, we find that in the *Oghuznâme,* Kayı, the eldest son of Gün Khan, who was in turn the eldest son of Oghuz Khan, and his descendents, are shown as the legitimate successors.

The Old Ottoman sources report the following conversation between Orkhan and his younger brother after the death of ᶜOsmân:[114]

> ᶜAlâeddîn Pasha said, "this country is yours by right; it needs as its shepherd a *pâdishâh*.... And these sheep are for the public banquets of the *pâdishâh*. Now, what do we have that might be divided up." Orkhan Ghâzi said, "Come now, you be that shepherd." ᶜAlâeddîn Pasha said, "Brother, our father's prayers and support are with you; for the same reason that in his time he had you lead the army, now the shepherdship is also yours."

(Neshrî adds, "While you are alive what would there be for me to do; you are my elder brother, to take my father's place."[115]) From this anecdote we see first that rulership and realm were seen as the joint inheritance of the entire family, both brothers being felt to have equal claim to them. Second, a basis for preference between the two was supplied by the fact that, in the ᶜAshık Pasha-zade version, Orkhan had been given command of the army by ᶜOsmân Ghâzî and, in the Neshrî version, that Orkhan was the elder brother.

By receiving the most important frontier region during this early period, the eldest prince was unquestionably put in an advantageous position, as is evident from ᶜAlâeddîn's reply to Orkhan. In that period, the state's most powerful forces were in the frontier region. The elder brother who found himself in possession of the frontier

region was not only *de facto* in the strongest position, but his military experience would also be far greater than that of his brothers. (One might recall here that the Seljuk ruler Ghıyâseddîn Kaykhusrav seized the throne from his nephew Kılıch Arslan with the backing of the frontier lords.) Orkhan's brother was in no position to deny Orkhan the throne. Murâd I, because he was at the head of the frontier forces when his father died, was successful in putting down those brothers who came against him. Bâyezîd, the eldest son of Murâd I, gained great renown and importance as a military leader even while his father was still alive. At the war council held before the battle of Kosova, Murâd gave him the right to speak first. Bâyezîd was, in everybody's eyes, the obvious candidate for the throne. On his deathbed, Murâd willed the throne to him. In short, we can speak here of a situation that actively favored the eldest brother.

It was also within the confines of traditional practice in Turkish states for the brother of the deceased Sultan to be installed on the throne.[116] In this fashion, numerous branches might develop within a dynasty, each stemming from the accession of a relative other than a son. We have seen how rulers tried to make use of the practice of designating an heir as a means of securing the throne for their own sons. Often this measure was unsuccessful. Among the Great Seljuks and especially among the Mongols of the Golden Horde, the princes of the various branches of the dynasty waged prolonged and bloody struggles over the throne.

In the Ottoman case, the struggle for the succession after the death of Bâyezîd the Thunderbolt was not only carried out among his sons, but also continued among his grandsons. That is to say, the dynasty split into different lines, each descending from one of Bâyezîd's sons, all of whom had been rulers. The Ottoman chronicles use the title of Sultan for Chelebi Mehemmed (I) alone, seeking to hide the legitimate claims of the other contestants. Contemporary Egyptian Mamluk sources, however, speak of Süleymân (1402-11) and Mûsâ (1411-13) as the successors of Bâyezîd.[117] The son of Süleymân (I), Orkhan, put forth a claim to the throne against his uncle, Mehemmed I, and was able to muster support from among the Ottoman begs. Nevertheless, the throne remained in the hands of the offspring of Mehemmed I until the reign of Ahmed I (1603-17), passing always from father to son. What made this in fact possible was the establishment of the practice of fratricide.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PRACTICE OF FRATRICIDE

The establishment of the practice of fratricide can be closely linked to a fundamental change in the Ottoman concept of sovereignty. We have tried to show to what extent the Ottoman concept of sovereignty was tied to Central Asian traditions. Despite this fact, it is evident that often these traditions lost their original strength and meaning and retained only a symbolic significance, or that under diverse influences their whole character was altered. In fact, in the later development of the Ottoman state, a more impersonal, absolute and indivisible perception of the authority of the ruler became predominant. In a parallel fashion, totally different notions of how authority should be transferred became prevalent. The first important stage in the state development was the transition from a feudal principality to a sultanate. Süleymân Pasha, son of Orkhan, pushed into Rumelia, beyond the sea, transforming that province into the new Ottoman frontier region, and after his widespread conquests in Thrace, emerged as a second figure of power. Murâd I gave the position of *beglerbegi* of Rumelia to his tutor, Shahin, who had come up from among the palace slaves, and subjected the powerful frontier beg Evrenos, who had maintained a semi- feudal status on the furthermost frontier, to his command. Murâd I also built up a janissary corps loyal to his own person that would support the central authority in its struggle against the frontier lords. The rebellion of Savjı in 1373 showed that, despite these measures, the frontier forces still predominated.[118] The centralization measures, begun in the time of Murâd I, greatly increased in tempo during the reign of Bâyezîd I. As a result of the changes made in palace organization and in administrative and financial methods, and of the expansion and strengthening of the *kapıkulu* system, the Ottoman Beg was transformed from a frontier lord (in Arab sources, *sâhibu 'l- ujât)* to a Great Sultan *(sultânu 'l-aᶜzam)* possessing centralized absolute authority. We have mentioned that Bâyezîd I sought a patent *(manshûr)* of sultanate from the Abbasid Caliph in Egypt. Ibn Hâjer tells us that never before Bâyezîd had any Ottoman ruler been honored with the title of sultan or *malik.*[119] The frontier lords, who were strongly bound to the old traditions, and conservative circles in general, reacted strenuously to these developments, reactions which found powerful expression in the anonymous popular chronicles.[120]

With Timur, the traditions of Central Asia were once again brought back to Anatolia. Timur divided the Ottoman territories among the

sons of Bâyezîd as autonomous regions. Under Chelebi Mehemmed (I), who reunited the Ottoman lands under one sultan, the Ottoman state returned to its natural path of development. Protesting the breakup of the *status quo* established by his father, Timur's son Shahrukh sent a letter to Mehemmed in which he compared the Ottoman regime with the Central Asian tradition in these noteworthy lines: "As required by the Ottoman law *(töre),* you have removed from contention all of your brothers. This type of activity between blood brothers is not in accordance with the Turco-Mongol *(Ilkhânî)* traditions." Mehemmed I replied,

> Your advice with regard to brothers is well taken. However, from the very beginnings of the Ottoman state, our forefathers have used the hand of experience to solve their problems . . . One realm cannot shelter two pâdishâhs. And in particular, the enemies that surround us are always watching for an opportunity.[121]

By the time of Mehemmed I, the custom of assigning appanages *(yurtluk)* to uncles and brothers, seen in the anecdotes concerning ᶜOsmân Ghâzî, had been totally abandoned. Only the sons of the ruler were sent to the provinces, and the real control in those regions was in the hands of the tutors *(lâlâ)* who accompanied the princes. These *lâlâs* (previously, *atabegs*) were, for the most part, loyal slaves (kul) who had come up through the palace services. The princes controlled only those revenues *(sâlyâne)* and *tîmârs* which had been assigned to them by the central authority. Dispensations, similar to pious foundations *(evḳâf),* and freehold land, which Orkhan's son Süleymân had lavishly distributed in the frontier province of Koca-eli, were found only rarely in later times. In short, these princes were in a vastly different position than that of the tekins and shehzâdes observed in other Turkish states. By way of contrast, one might recall that the sons of Kılıch Arslan II ruled their own provinces without consulting the central council *(dîvân).*[122] In the reigns of Bâyezîd II and Süleymân the Lawgiver, the practice of assigning sanjaks to princes gave rise to such extreme crises that finally, in the name of the absolute and centralized authority of the Ottoman ruler, modifications were introduced into this old Turkish practice. First, under Selim II (1566-74) and Murâd III (1574-95), only eldest sons were assigned a province.Then, under

Mehemmed III (1595-1603), even this practice was abandoned. The practice of fratricide is yet another example of divergence from old Turkish traditions of state.

When we speak here of fratricide we do not include the execution of brothers or other members of the dynasty guilty of rebellion or other actions deemed to be criminal. Rather, we refer to that practice or law which condones in advance the execution of members of the dynasty, not because they have been shown to be criminally guilty, but because they are by their very existence natural contestants for the throne.

Among the Arsakids of ancient Iran, where any member of the dynasty could rightfully be chosen ruler, the king would execute the members of his immediate family as a way of ridding himself of rivals.[123] In the Turkish and Mongol Central Asian steppe states, however, the execution of members of the dynasty was not considered proper unless they had committed some grave offense. The Ilkhanid Ghâzân (1295-1304) hanged five princes of the royal family in 1296, with the justification that they were conspiring against him.[124] In 1282 Teküdar Ahmed (1282-84) considered the execution of all of his Christian and Buddhist relatives simply to ensure that none of them would come to the throne. Among the Anatolian Seljuks one finds the same manner of fratricide as that practiced by the Ottomans. When Kılıch Arslan II succeeded to the throne (1155) he had his middle brother, whom he perceived as a rival, drowned.[125] Ghıyâseddîn Kaykhusrav II held his brothers in prison until he succeeded in producing a male child, then killed them. In conformity with an ancient Turkish custom, they were strangled with a bowstring.[126]

Writing in about 1493, Neshrî claimed that fratricide was an "old tradition" among the Ottomans.[127] According to one anecdote, when ᶜOsmân Ghâzî came to power, he took no immediate action against his rival uncle, but later accused him of disloyalty and had him killed.[128]Nevertheless, it has been established that in both ᶜOsmân's and Orkhan's reigns brothers and uncles received appanages *(yurtluk)* in diverse regions of the country. It would appear that Murâd I put to death his two brothers, Khalîl and Ibrâhîm, who revolted against him.[129] When his own son, Savjı, raised a revolt and tried to seize power, Murâd punished him by having him blinded.[130]

It was at Kosova in 1389, where Bâyezîd I had his brother killed on the field of battle, that we first encounter the Ottomans practicing fratricide simply as a way of eliminating potential rivals for the throne. A number of special circumstances show this action to have

been justified and necessary. Yaᶜkûb was in command of one part of the army, and the outcome of the battle with the Serbians could not yet be determined. Furthermore, it appears that the powerful men of state played a decisive role in bringing Bâyezîd to the throne and in having his brother killed.[131] The long and bloody struggle for the throne among the sons of Bâyezîd I, and the upheavals caused by rival claimants for power all the way up to 1453, reinforced the opinion that the removal of princes from contention was necessary for the safety and unity of the state. In the course of these struggles, ᶜIsâ, Süleymân, Mûsâ, and finally Mustafâ were all eliminated by execution, but their sons, who succeeded in escaping to Byzantium, Hungary and Albania, all continued seriously to threaten the security of the state. From this point of view the period 1403-1453, because of its far-reaching implications for Ottoman history, is a period of crucial importance.

According to Byzantine chroniclers (Ducas and Chalcocondyles), it appears that before his death Mehemmed I took a number of precautions to ensure that his sons would be spared civil war and inevitable death: Murâd was to be made Beg of Rumelia and Mustafâ Beg of Anatolia; his sons Yûsuf, eight years old, and Mahmûd, a year younger, were, according to an understanding reached with the Byzantines, to be entrusted to the Emperor. Murâd did not, however, hand the children over to Byzantium, but rendered them unfit for the sultanate by depriving them of sight and imprisoning them in Tokat. When he felt that his authority had been well established, he brought them back to Bursa and attempted to win their allegiance.[132] When Mehemmed II came to the throne, he drowned his brother Ahmed, who was still an infant.[133] Thus it was Mehemmed the Conqueror who first had his brother, who was innocent under ordinary circumstances, executed.

This same sultan inserted into his law code *(kânûnânme)* an article by which fratricide was made permissible *(jâ'iz)*.[134] The social conscience of the time does not seem to have opposed the incorporation of this custom into the law code. Chalcocondyles, speaking of the crisis of 1444, wrote that there was nothing the people of the Ottoman Empire feared more than internecine warfare.[135] Ducas added, "It has become a custom for revolt to break out at each change of Turkish rulers."[136] Presumably the common people, the men of state, and the *ulema* all looked with approval upon a measure that would prevent the warring between brothers that had threatened the existence of the state and opened the way to civil war and the destruction of lives and property. In his history, Karamanlı Mehemmed Pasha, who was

Grand Vizir at the time that Mehemmed the Conqueror's law code was drawn up, approves of the execution of his brother Yakûb by Bâyezîd I, saying that had he remained alive, great turmoil would have resulted.[137] Also noteworthy is the statement, attributed to Sharâbdâr Ilyâs, who was responsible for the capture and execution of young Mustafâ, brother of Murâd II, that

> Even if formally I committed treason, still in essence I remained loyal. If I had allowed it, these two would have ravaged the entire country by their struggle. Harm to the royal family is preferable to harm to the public welfare; in fact, this action was in line with ancient tradition.[138]

The reference to "public order" *(nizâm-i ᶜâlem)*, by which fratricide was justified in the law code of Mehemmed II, merely reiterated that view.

The absence of any principle by which one brother might be preferred to another meant that neither the army nor the masses had grounds for refusing obedience to whichever actually took the throne.[139] For this reason the most effective weapon in the struggle against rival claimants for the sultanate was the proclamation that these contenders were not of the Ottoman line, that they were false pretenders *(düzme)*.

The Ottomans firmly believed that God determined who would possess the sultanate. When Chelebi Mehemmed, during his campaign against his brother Mûsâ, arrived at Edirne, the townspeople said to him, "We will not surrender to you the town and fortress; God the beloved being willing, you will confront each other, and whoever then receives the *devlet* (fortune, state power) will also receive the fortress . . . when the Sultan (Mehemmed) heard this, he agreed."[140] War was thought of as an ordeal by which God's decision regarding who would rule was made known. Mehemmed defeated and killed Mûsâ. The unhappy fate of the Ottoman princes was always met with resignation, as the foreordained result of a divine decree, beyond their control. When father and son came face to face in battle order, as did Bâyezîd II and Selîm, and Süleymân the Lawgiver and Muṣṭafâ, they believed themselves to be not acting of their own free will, but subject to an abstract force, to the will of God and *devlet*.

By the fifteenth century, as a result of particular historical circumstances, the concept of royal authority as absolute and indivisible had become established among the Ottomans.[141] No longer was the state

thought of as the joint property and inheritance of the dynasty. The *pâdishâh* was seen, like a caliph or an emperor, as the bearer of an absolute and abstract authority. State power was believed to manifest itself in the person of one ruler, the unique and absolute source and support of positive law and all forms of privilege and dispositions. In this interpretation, which equated state and ruler, and in which the notion of authority pulled immeasurably more weight than did territorial and human components, the state came to be seen simply as an absolute and indivisible will. Having removed in this manner the tribal traditions of statehood, in a fashion similar to Roman development, a notion of absolute and abstract authority was attained. The struggles for the throne which fill the first centuries of Ottoman history might, in fact, be interpreted as the clash between the traditional concept and the more rational concept of state and sovereignty. In the later stage of development, the old traditions of statehood lost relevance and strength to such an extent that the establishment of the principle of succession according to seniority was easily realized.

NOTES

1. J. von Hammer, *Histoire de l'empire ottoman*, trans. J. J. Hellert (Paris, 1837), vol. 8, pp. 237-38. In the Crimean Khanate, the eldest succeeded to the throne; see Seyyid Muhammad Riza, *Al-sabᶜu 's-Sayyâr fi Akhbâr-i Mulûk 'ut-Tatar*, Kazan, 1832, p. 262.

2. Friedrich Giese, "Das Seniorat im osmanischen Herrscherhause," *Mitteilungen zur Osmanische Geschichte* 2 (1925), pp. 248-56.

3. W. Radloff, *Das Kudatku bilik des Jusuf Chass-Hadschib aus Bälasagun,* vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1891), p. LII, cited by Giese, "Seniorat," p. 249.

4. László Ferenc, "A kagán és családja," *Körösi Czoma Archivum,* 3/1 (1941), pp. 1-39, trans. ,Ş. Baştav, "Kagan ve ailesi," *Türk Hukuk Tarihi Dergisi* 1 (1944), p. 42.

5. Z.V. Togan, *Umumî Türk Tarihine Giriş* (Istanbul, 1946), p. 42.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

7. Osman Turan, "Kılıç Arslan II," *Islâm Ansiklopedisi* (cited hereafter as *IA*), vol. 6, fas. 63 (1954), pp. 682-703.

8. Ibrahim Kafesoğlu, *Harezmşahlar Devleti Tarihi (485-617/ 1092-1229)* (Ankara, 1956), pp. 84, 92.

9. H. N. Orkun, *Eski Türk Yazıtları*, vol. 1 (Istanbul, 1936), p. 37, I D 16.

10. Giese, "Das Seniorat," p. 250; Orkun, *Eski Türk Yazıtları*, p. 37, I D 16.

11. Orkun, *ibid.*, pp. 26-27, I C 9.

12. *Inisi kaghan bolmısh erinch, oghlıtı kaghan bolmısh erinch* (Orkun, *ibid.*, p. 30, I D 4-5).

13. B. Ögel, "Doğu Göktürkleri hakknda vesikalar ve notlar," *Belleten* 21 (1957), p. 87.

14. H. Edhem (Eldem), *Düvel-i Islâmiyye* (Istanbul, 1927). This is a translation, with significant additions, of the work of S. L. Poole, *The Mohammadan Dynasties* (Westminster, 1893).

15. E. de Zambaur, *Manuel de Généalogie et de Chronologie pour l'histoire de l'Islam* (Hanover, 1927).

16. M. A. Köymen, "Büyük Selçuklu imperatorluğunun kuruluşu," *Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi* 15/1-3 (1957), p. 120, 178ff., 15/4 (1957), pp. 99-100.

17. Kafesoğlu, *Harezmşahlar Devleti*, p. 283.

18. Ibn Bibi, *Al-Awâmiru 'l-ʿAla'iyya fi 'l-Umûri 'lʿAlā'iyya*, ed. N. Lugal and A.S. Erzi, vol. I (Ankara, 1957), pp. 30-50. Osman Turan, "Keyhusrev I," *IA*, vol. 6, fasc. 62 (1954), pp. 613-20.

19. Ibn Bibi, ed. Lugal and Erzi, vol. 1, p. 109ff.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 159-63; Osman Turan, "Keykubad I," *IA*, vol. 6, fasc. 63 (1954), pp. 647-61.

21. Ibn Bibi, *Ibid.*, pp. 273-78.

22. See Fuad Köprülü, in *Türk Hukuk ve Iktisat Tarihi Mecmuası*, I, p. 184; and *idem*, "Ortazaman Türk Hukukî Müessesseleri," in II. *Türk Tarih Kongresi* (Istanbul, 1943), pp. 412-14; Togan, Giriş, p. 330.

23. Bertold Spuler, *Iran Mogolları*, Turk. trans. C. Köprülü (Ankara, 1956), pp. 280-83.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 274, 276.

25. *Manghol-un Niuça Tobça'an (Yüan-cha'ao pi-shi): Mogolların Gizli Tarihi*, trans. A. Temir, vol. 1 (Ankara, 1948), p. 192.

26. Ducas, *Bizans tarihi*, trans. V. Mırmıroğlu (Istanbul, 1956), p. 84.

27. Donado da Lezze (J. M. Angiolello), *Historia Turchesca*, ed. I. Ursu (Bucharest, 1909), p. 164: "Seguitando la nostra Historia tornaremo a Baiasit et Gien, figliuoli del Gran Turco, che ciascuno di loro pretendeva di succedere al padre et il tutto era chi fosse primo a giongere a Constantinopoli che facilmente per la maggior parte dalla

corte saria stato accettato, cos'il minore di tempo com'il maggiore, che si havesse havuto il tesoro havrebbe stabilito il tutto."

28. Spandugino, *Petit Traicté de l'origine des Turcz*, ed. Ch. Schefer (Paris, 1896), p. 43.

29. On the Kök Türks, see Orkun, *Eski Türk Yazıtları*, 4 vols. On the Proto-Bulgars, see K. H. Menges, "Altaic elements in the Proto-Bulgarian Inscriptions," *Byzantion*, no. 21 (1951), pp. 85-118. On the Uyghurs, see A. Caferoğlu, "Tukyu ve Uygurlarda Han Unvanları," *Türk Hukuk ve Iktisat Tarihi Mecmuası*, 1, pp. 105-19.

30. Orkun, *Eski Türk Yazıtları*, vol. 1, pp. 26-27, I C 9. The Ottoman Sultan Murad IV declared in his accession decree that he had ascended to the throne by the grace of God, through his "personal abilities, his boundless other all-encompassing talents, and with the unanimous approval of the state dignitaries and religious authorities."

31. A. Temir trans., pp. 135-36.

32. Spuler, *Iran Mogolları*, p. 296.

33. See *Divanü Lûgat-it-Türk*, trans. B. Atalay, vol. IV (Ankara, 1943), p. 388; the date of writing was 1077.

34. Ziya Gökalp, *Türk Medeniyeti Tarihi*, pp. 33, 66, 72, 141, 159, 193, 199.

35. Compare Z.V. Togan, *Ibn Faḍlan's Reisebericht* (Leipzig, 1939), Exk. 100a, pp. 271ff.; Abdülkadir Inan, *Tarihte ve bugün şamanizm: Materyaller ve Araştırmalar* (Ankara, 1954), pp. 37, 156; among the Seljuks of Anatolia the title *Ulugh Kutlugh Inanch Bilge* was used for Vizirs (see Ibn Bîbî, pp. 16, 29). In the *inshâ'* manual *Kavâ'idu 'r-resâ'il ve ferâ'idu 'l-fedâ'il* (see the MS. Esad Efendi no. 3369 in the Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul), the title *Kutlugh Bilge* was used for lords. It appears that the title *Oghurlu*, used alongside *Kutlu* among the Seljuks of Anatolia, carried a similar meaning. The kaghan was killed when disasters befell the state by the Khazars, believing that *kut* (fortune) had deserted him. In Turkish-Islamic states, among them that of the Ottomans, the word *kut* lost its old shamanist significance and took on an Islamic content, in many cases being interchangeable with *mübarek*.

36. B. Y. Vladimirtsov, *Cengiz Han*, trans. H.A. Ediz (Istanbul, 1950), p. 54.

37. See Osman Turan, "Cingiz adı hakkında," *Belleten* 5 (1941), pp. 267-76.

38. No clear and concise conclusions have been reached concerning the titles *Kaghan, Ka'an, Kapkan, Khan, and Khakan*, their

origins and meaning. See László, "Kagan ve ailesi," F. Altheim and R. Stiehl, "Qagan und Verwandtes," *Südost-Forschungen* 15 (1956), pp. 69-85. With regard to Denis Sinor's thesis concerning the distinction between *Qapgan* and *Qavqan* (Sinor, "Qapqan," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* [1954], pp. 174-84), we note that in a letter written to Shahrukh, Sultan Murad II used the title *Khavkan* (see the MS. of the *inshâ'* manual of Sarı Abdullah, Esad Efendi no. 3333, p. 364, in the Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul). See also A. Caferoğlu, "Han unvanları," pp. 117-19.

39. Togan, *Ibn Faḍlan*, Exk. 100a.

40. B. Ögel, "Doğu Göktürkleri," p. 87, from the Chou-Shou.

41. See Mustafa Köymen, "Hsiung-nu'ların Tuku (T'u-ko) kabilesi," *Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi* 3/1 (1944), p. 56; Omeljan Pritsak, "Die sogennante bulgarische Fürstenliste und die Sprache der Protobulgaren," *Ural-Altaische Jahrbuch* 26/3-4 (1954), pp. 219-220.

42. Spuler, *Iran Mogolları*, p. 280.

43. Togan, *Giriş*, p. 405.

44. Pritsak, "Sogennante," p. 220.

45. Liu Mau-Tsai, *Die chinesischen Nachrichten zur Geschichte der Ost-Türken (T'u-küe). Göttingen asiatischen Forschungen,* vol. 10 (Wiesbaden, 1958), p. 5.

46. B. Ögel, "Uygurların menşe efsanesi," *Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi,* 6/1-2 (1947), pp. 20-22.

47. A. Temir trans., p. 8.

48. E. Herzfeld, "Alangoa," *Der Islam* 6 (1915), pp. 322ff. Herzfeld rejects the theory of a relationship between the Alangoa legend and the story of Mary, the mother of Jesus (the thesis of Östrup), finding rather a connection to the Alexander tradition.

49. Ögel, "Uygurların menşe efsanesi," p. 97. The motif of the princess who marries God, manifested in the form of a wolf, appears among the Kao-ches.

50. M. Fuad Köprülüzade, *Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi* (Istanbul, 1920), pp. 56-75. B. Y. Vladimirtsov, *ibid.*, trans. Abdülkadir Inan, p. 84. On the diffusion of the wolf legend, see Inan, "Türk rivâyetlerinde 'Boz-kurt'," *ibid., Türkiyat Mecmuası* 2 (1926), p. 131.

51. Gökalp, *Türk Medeniyeti Tarihi*, pp. 88, 193.

52. The title "son of the Heavens God" for the emperor was widespread within Far Eastern cultural bounds. The Turkish and Chinese interpretations of sovereignty have not been sufficiently researched. On the Chinese concept of state and sovereignty, see O. Franke, *Aus Kultur und Geschichte Chinas* (Peking, 1945), pp. 271-312.

53. Togan, *Ibn Faḍlan*, Exk. 100a, pp. 273ff.

54. Herzfeld, "Alangoa," p. 322.

55. ʿAbdulgaffâr, "ʿUmdetu' t-tevârih," *TOEM,* supplement, p. 204; Abdülkadir Inan, "Orun ve Ülüş Meselesi," *Türk Hukuk ve Iktisat Tarihi Mecmuası* 1, p. 125.

56. See H. Inalcık, "The Rise of Ottoman Historiography," *Historians of the Middle East*, eds. B. Lewis and P. M. Holt (London, 1962), pp. 152-67.

57. P. Wittek, citing Ibn al-Furât, in "Le Sultan de Rūm," *Annuaire de l'Institut Orientale,* 6 (1938) Brussels .

58. *Ibid.*

59. See note 57.

60. The most comprehensive study of these genealogies is that of Paul Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1936); see also M. Fuad Köprülü, "Osmanlı Imparatorluğu'nun Etnik Menşei Mes'eleleri," *Belleten* 7 (1943), pp. 284-303.

61. On the work of Yazıjızâde ʿAlî, *Târikh-i Âl-i Seljuk* (see the MS. Revan no. 1390, in the Topkap Sarayı Library, Istanbul), see A. S. Erzi, "Ibn Bîbî," *IA,* 5, fas. 47 (1950), pp. 715-17.

62. Halil Edhem (Eldem), *Meskükât-i Osmâniyye* (Istanbul, 1934), pp. 58, 68; M. Fuad Köprülü, "Etnik Menşei," p. 294; Faruk Sümer, "Kayı," *IA,* 6, fasc. 60 (1953), pp. 461-62.

63. The invasions of the Mongols and of Timur left a deep impression on the Islamic world. Similar developments were seen in the Maghreb and in Spain. These developments cannot but have had an impact on the thought of Ibn Khaldûn, who assigned a major role to tribal solidarity in the establishment of the state. Yazıjızâde wrote, "Whether Arab, Persian or Turk, kings emerge from the nomadic elements of each nation. All who study histories are aware of this underlying fact."

64. See M. Halil Yınanç, "Bayezid I," *IA,* 2, fasc. 15 (1943), pp. 369-92.

65. In ʿAzîz Astarâbâdî's *Bazm u Razm*, dedicated to Kadi Burhâneddîn (ed. Istanbul, 1928, p. 382), the son of ʿOsmân is considered a "simple Mongol." But this source considers nomadic Mongol and Turk to be the same; compare p. 340. And according to Timur's offical chronicle, the *Zafernâme* (trans. N. Lugal [Ankara,

1940], p. 260) he is reported as saying to Bâyezîd I, "We know your origins and ancestors . . . you are making grandiose claims."

66. Shükrullâh, *Behjetü 't-tevârîkh* (Istanbul, 1949), p. 51.

67. Letter from Murâd to Shâhrukh, MS. Esad Efendi no. 3333, f. 23a-28b; note also the letters reproduced in the *Münshe'âtu's-Salâṭîn* of Feridun Beg, vol. 1 (Istanbul, 1274/1857) pp. 150, 192. See also my "Murad II," IA vol. 8, fasc. 86 (1959), pp. 598-615.

68. Ibn Tagribirdi, *An-nujûm az-żâhira*, ed. Popper, vol. VI-2, p. 734.

69. Oruj, at the beginning of the Manisa MS.

70. See M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, *Rumeli'de Yürükler, Tatarlar ve Evlâd-i Fâtihân* (Istanbul, 1957); Ö. L. Barkan, "Osmanlı Imparatorluğunda bir Iskân ve Kolonizasyon Metodu olarak Sürgünler," *Iktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 15, map.

71. 'Āshık Pasha-zâde, *Tevârîkh-i Âl-i ᶜOsmân*, ed. Friedrich Giese, *Die altosmanische Chronik des ᶜAşikpaşazade* (Leipzig, 1929), pp. 34-35; *idem, Die altosmanischen anonymen Chroniken*, vol. 1 (Breslau, 1922), p. 31.

72. See above, note 51; on the tree motif see B. Ögel, "Uygurlarn menşe efsanesi," p. 20; Ziya Gökalp, *Türk Medeniyeti Tarihi*, pp. 54, 69, 71, 94.

73. M. Fuad Köprülü, *Les origines de l'empire ottoman* (Paris, 1935), p. 23.

74. H.A.R. Gibb, "Constitutional Organization," in *Law in the Middle East*, ed. Khadduri and Liebesny (Washington, 1955), p. 21. But Gibb adds the influence of ancient Iran.

75. See Liu Mau-Tsai, *Chinesischen Nachrichten*, p. 44.

76. Ibn Bîbî, p. 273.

77. Neshrî, *Ǧihānnümā. Die altosmanische Chronik des Mevlānā Meḥemmed Neschrī*, ed. Franz Taeschner, vol. 1, (Leipzig, 1951), p. 25.

78. 'Āshık Pasha-zâde, ed. Giese, p. 34.

79. Oruj, *Tevârîkh-i Âl-i ᶜOsmân*, ed. Franz Babinger, *Die früh-osmanischen Jahrbücher des Urudsch* (Hannover, 1925), p. 26.

80. See Liu Mau-Tsai, *Chinesischen Nachrichten*, pp. 44-45.

81. Spuler, *op. cit.*, pp. 276-77.

82. Ibn Hajer, *Anbâ'ül-Ghumr*, trans. Şevkiye Inalcık, *Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi* 6 (1948), events of 799 A.H.

83. Pritsak, "Sogennante," pp. 218ff.

84. C. Alinge, "Mogol Kanunları," trans. C. Üçok, *Ankara Hukuk Fakültesi Mecmuası* 11 (1954), pp. 297-98.

85. *Ibid.*

86. Vladimirtsov, *op. cit.*, p. 86, note 84.

87. Togan, *Giriş*, pp. 278-79.

88. M. A. Köymen, "Kuruluş," p. 119.

89. Osman Turan, "Kılıç Arslan II," p. 696.

90. Togan, *Giriş*, pp. 201, 278.

91. Inan, "Orun ve Ülüş meselesi," p. 127.

92. Ibn Battuta, trans. Şerif Paş, vol. 1, pp. 311-56.

93. See I. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilâtına Medhal* (Istanbul, 1941), pp. 143-86; H. Edhem, *Düvel-i Islâmiyye*, pp. 269-320.

94. Neshrî, ed. Taeschner, vol. 1, pp. 32-34.

95. ᶜOsmân's campaign resulted in a victory over Muzalon at Bapheus. Pachymeres' Bapheus must be identical with the battle described by Neshrî (p. 32) under the heading *"Istiklâl-i ᶜOsmân Ghâzî"*. Bapheus must have been located between Yalova and Izmit. Since Hammer this place has been misidentified with Koyun-hisarı, with the result that all the information on the battle of Koyun-hisarı, which opened the way to the Ottoman invasion of the Bursa plain, was mistakenly transferred to the battle of Bapheus.

96. Neshrî, ed. Taeschner, vol. 1, p. 46.

97. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

98. Oruj, p. 15. Khalil and Ibrâhîm had probably not yet been born at that time.

99. Neshrî, ed. Taeschner, vol. 1, p. 47.

100. Saᶜdeddîn, *Tâju 't-tevârîkh*, vol. 1 (Istanbul, 1279), p. 100.

101. See Ahmedî, *Iskendernâme*, ed. N. S. Banarlı, "Ahmedi ve Dasitan-i Tevârîkh-i Âl-i Osman," *Türkiyat Mecmuası* 6 (1939), pp. 119-20.

102. Ögel, "Uygur Devletinin Teşekkül ve Yükseliş Devri," *Belleten*, 19 (1955), p. 351.

103. *Mogolların Gizli Tarihi*, trans. A. Temir, p. 96.

104. *Ibid.*, p. 191.

105. Spuler, *Iran Mogolları*, pp. 280-81.

106. Osman Turan, "Kılıç Arslan II," p. 688.

107. The Ottoman law required that not only the appointment diplomas of officials and military personnel, but all documents related

to land possession as well, be renewed by the new sultan. For this reason the Ottoman lands were, in principle, to be resurveyed at the accession of each new sultan. Thus, all laws originating in the personal decree of the sultan were affirmed. Likewise, foreign states were obliged to renew their treaties with the new sultan. On the concept of law among the Ottomans, see my "Osmanlı hukukuna giriş," *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 13 (1958), pp. 106-107.

108. One example from the Seljuks of Anatolia is the rebellion of the sons of Kılıç Arslan II against their father.

109. ᶜAshık Pasha-zâde, 30.

110. Neshrî, ed. Taeschner, vol. 1, p. 43.

111. *Behjet't-tevârîkh,* ed. Th. Seif in *Mitteilungen zur osmanische Geschichte* 1 (1920), p. 45; compare Oruj, ed. Babinger, p. 45; Anonymous, ed. Giese, vol. 1, p. 55; Neshrî, ed. Taeschner, p. 147. On Murâd I, see Ibn Hajer, *Anbâ' ü l-Ghumr,* p. 350.

112. See my *Fatih Devri Üzerinde Tetkikler ve Vesikalar,* vol. 1 (Ankara, 1954), p. 106.

113. Inan, *op. cit.,* p. 127. Among the Kırghız, on the death of the khan the elder brother succeeded to the throne, or in his absence the eldest son, and in his absence the brother's eldest son.

114. ᶜAshık Pasha-zâde, ed. Giese, p. 34.

115. Neshrî, ed. Taeschner, p. 43.

116. This has been noted among the Kök Türks, see above. On other Turkish states, see H. Edhem (Eldem), *Düvel-i Islâmiyye,* pp. 218, 223, 226, 235, 241.

117. Al-ᶜAynî, *ᶜIkdu 'l-Jumân,* events of 807, 813 and 814 A.H.

118. There is no reliable study of Savjı, concerning whom the Ottoman narratives and Byzantine sources differ with regard to fundamental points. According to Chalcocondyles the events took place in Rumelia, and the frontier lords in that region played a major role; see N. Jorga, *GOR,* I, 251-52.

119. *Anbâ'ü 'l-Gumr,* p. 192.

120. Anonymous, ed. Giese (Breslau, 1922), pp. 31ff.

121. Feridun Beg, *op. cit.,* vol. 1, pp. 151-52.

122. Ibn Bîbî, p. 31.

123. A. Christensen, *L'Iran sous les Sassanides* (Copenhagen, 1944), p. 24.

124. Spuler, *op. cit.,* pp. 107, 274. As soon as Öljeytü received the news of the death of his brother Ghâzân Khan, he had his uncle's sons, Alafrenk and Horkodak, whom he considered rivals, killed (Spuler, p. 119).

125. Osman Turan, "Kılıç Arslan II," p. 682.

126. The tradition of strangling with a bowstring rather than spilling the blood of a member of the dynasty was, on the one hand, connected with the tribal blood taboo. M. Fuad Köprülü (in *Türk Hukuk Tarihi Dergisi,* 1 [1944], pp. 1-9) has traced this tradition to the belief, among the Turks and the Mongols, that "the dynasty was of divine origin," and its blood was holy.

127. Neshrî, ed. Taeschner, 1, p. 153.

128. *Ibid.,* pp. 25, 29.

129. In the *vakfiyye* of Orkhan Ghâzâ dated the end of Rebîᶜü'l-âhır 749 A.H. (Arşiv Kılavuzu [Istanbul, 1938], plate 1), his sons are, in order, Süleyman, Murad, Khalîl and Ibrâhîm. I. H. Uzunçarılı (*Osmanlı Tarihi,* I, 160) was of the opinion that when Murad took the throne he did away with Khalîl and Ibrâhîm.

130. See above, note 118.

131. Neshrî, ed. Taeschner, vol. 1, p. 83; Anonymous, ed. Giese, vol. 1, p. 27.

132. See my "Murad II," *IA,* VIII, pp. 598-99.

133. On his flight, conversion to Christianity and the proposals to use him in a Crusade against the Conqueror, see Franz Babinger, "<<Bajezid Osman>> (Calixtus Ottomanus)," *La Nouvelle Clio* 3 (1951), no. 9-10, pp. 349-388.

134. Law code of Mehemmed the Conqueror, *TOEM,* supplement (no. 2, 1330), p. 27: *"Ve her kimesneye evlâdımdan saltanat müyesser ola, karındashların niẓâm-i ᶜâlem ichin katletmek münâsibdir, ekser ᶜulemâ dakhi tejvîz etmishtir, annla ᶜâmil olalar."*

135. Chalcocondyles, p. 352.

136. Ducas, Bonn ed., p. 226.

137. Trans. M. H. Yinanç, *TOEM,* 14 (1340), p. 92.

138. Neshrî, ed. Taeschner, vol. 1, p. 153.

139. *Ibid.,* p. 152.

140. *Ibid.,* p. 138.

141. On this, see my "Osmanlı Pâdişâhı," *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi,* 13 (1958).