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THE QUESTION OF THE EMERGENCE OF THE OTTOMAN STATE

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The foundation of the Ottoman Empire has been a major question in modern historiography. How a small frontier principality on the Seljuk-Byzantine borderland developed into one of the most powerful empires of modern times still puzzles historians. How did it happen that this state, embodying two imperial heritages, Islamic and Byzantine, created a long lasting empire in Asia Minor and the Balkans? Herbert Adams Gibbons presents a theory of religious conversion as the answer to the fundamental question of the demographic, cultural, and institutional origins of the Ottoman state.[1] Though popularized widely in general histories, this theory barely stands up to the criticisms of the philologically-grounded historians specializing in the field, such as M. Fuad Köprülü, Paul Wittek, and Friedrich Giese.[2]

Subjecting the early sources on the origins of the Ottomans to a thorough analysis, these specialists proposed the theory of a Turkish-Seljukid origin of the Ottoman state for population, culture, and state traditions. But among these specialists controversy arose over the question of the basic structure of the early Ottoman society. While Köprülü suggested that it was predominantly tribal in character, Wittek considered it a military frontier society with a peculiar frontier culture. In fact, Wittek believed that it was basically the traditions of the Islamic military frontier organization that provided the socio-political foundations of the Ottoman state and that the Islamic tradition of Holy War gave it its dynamism for conquest and innovation. Both scholars stressed the central role of the Turcomans (Türkmens), pastoral nomads in the frontier society, without attempting to investigate the structure and internal changes of that society in the period of state formation. Köprülü's fundamental work on the socio-religious conditions of the Turcomans in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Anatolia, although illustrating many significant points, did not answer the question of how this society was transformed to a polity, or how Osman Ghazi became a military-political leader and the founder of a new state and dynasty.

The early Ottoman traditions have not been thoroughly and critically examined from this point of view. In this first paper I shall try to investigate, first, the fundamental cause of the social change on the frontier as a result of immigration and population pressure and, second, the primary factors leading to the state formation in this frontier society at the turn of the thirteenth century.

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[1] *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford, 1916).

[2] See Köprülü, *Les origines de l'empire ottoman* (Paris, 1935); Wittek, *The Rise of The Ottoman Empire* (London, 1938); and Giese, "Das Problem der Entstehung des Osmanischen Reiches," *Zeitschrift für Semitistik und verwandte Gebiete* 2 (1924): 246-71.

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The Turkish Exodus to the West in Response to the Mongol Invasion (1221–1300) and the Emergence of Osman Ghazi.

The spectacular Turkish expansion into western Anatolia can be linked in the last analysis to the Mongol invasion and rule of the Middle East in the thirteenth century. There is considerable historical evidence supporting the view that this invasion caused an exodus of both the Turcoman tribes and the settled populations from Transoxiana, Iran, and Azerbaijan into Asia Minor. In the wake of the spread of Mongol control over Asia Minor (recognition of Mongol suzerainty in 1235; the Mongol invasion of Central Anatolia under Bayju in 1243; and, finally, the establishment of direct Mongol administration after 1277) a massive population movement toward the western frontier zone of the Seljukid state of Anatolia was set under way, and this continued throughout the thirteenth century.

The important stages of this movement are known. In the 1230s the Mongols drove out a number of Turcoman tribes from Maragha and Arran and from the Mughan plains in Azerbaijan, an area that was to become the favorite winter quarters of the Mongol tribal forces in Iran.[1] Along with the Mongol pressure, the search for good pasture lands for their herds in marginal areas and the opportunity for booty raids into neighboring Christian lands led many of the Turcoman tribes to the mountain ranges in the remote frontier (*uj*) zones. Pressed by the Turcoman demands for *yurt* (a delimited area with summer and winter quarters) and confronted by their depredations on agricultural areas, the Seljukid central government hastened to drive them out toward the frontier areas, where they formed a large Turcoman belt in the northern, southern, and western mountain ranges of Asia Minor. In 1240, however, a terrible Turcoman insurrection shook the Seljukid state to its foundations.[4]

In 1256 the Mongol general Bayju asked the Seljukid sultan, Izzeddin Kaykawus II, to assign him summer and winter quarters in Anatolia for his army tribes to settle in. This was after Hulagu Khan had ordered the evacuation of Arran and Mughan plains to make way for the Mongol imperial army. The sultan rejected Bayju's demand. The ensuing battle ended with the defeat of the Seljukid army and their evacuation of the best pasture lands in the Tokat-Amasya area, including the lush Kazova plain. This event brought a new flow of Turcoman immigrants into the western border areas. Kaykawus eventually fled to Byzantium (1261), but the Turcomans continued their support for him

[1]A large part of the Turcomans, however, stayed in Azerbaijan, see Z. V. Togan, *Umumi Türk Tarihine Giriş*, 2d ed. (Istanbul, 1970), p. 255. The first Mongol troops to settle in Arran and Mughan were reported to be 30,000 or 40,000 strong, excluding their families; see B. Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran* (Berlin, 1955), pp. 403–404; on the immigration of 5,000 to 6,000 Khwarazmian soldiers, mostly Turcomans, from Iran, see *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, s.v. "Keyhüsrev II" (by O. Turan, pp. 624–27 in vol. 4). The terrible Turcoman uprising in the Malatya-Amasya region in 1240 was a direct repercussion of these immigrations; see C. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey* (London, 1968), pp. 136–37; O. Turan, *Selçuklular Tarihi* (Ankara, 1965), p. 211; and F. Sümer, "Anadolu'da Moğollar," *Selçuklu Araştırmaları Dergisi*, vol.1 (Ankara, 1969), pp. 8–9.

[4]See the most recent analysis of this event in a *gesta et vitae* of the hero of the insurrection, Ahmet Yaşar Ocak's *Babâîler İsyanı* (Istanbul, 1980); Ashik Pashazade's compilation of early Ottoman traditions, in *Osmanlı Tarihleri*, ed. N. Atsiz (Istanbul, 1949) (also translated by R. Kreutel in *Vom Hirtenzelt zur Hohen Pforte* [Graz and Vienna, 1959], chaps. 1 and 2), details the wanderings of Osman's tribe and the receiving of a *yurt* and reflects the actual experience of such groups of pastoral nomads. For the policy of the Seljukid state toward the nomadic groups, see F. Sümer, *Oğuzlar (Türkmenler), Tarihleri, Boy Teşkilatı—Destanları* (Ankara, 1967), pp. 155–97.

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and his sons against the Mongols. The following thirty years were an era of struggle in Anatolia—a struggle that brought still more immigration. The figures provided by the Arab geographer Ibn Said (d. 1274 or 1286) give at least a general idea of the relative distribution of the Turcomans on these frontiers: 200,000 tents in the Tonguzlu (or Ladik, ancient Laodicaea) region, 100,000 tents in the Kastamoni (Paphlagonia), and 30,000 tents in the Kütahya (Cotyaeum).[5]

The next period of massive population movement in Asia Minor began in 1277 when the native Seljukid aristocracy and their Turcoman supporters allied themselves with the Mamluks of Egypt and rose up to fight a Holy War against the "impious" domination of the Mongols. Now the aggressive spirit of *jihad,* resuscitated by the victor over the Mongols, Sultan Baybars of Egypt, appeared to generate within Anatolia intense enthusiasm for the battle against the Mongols, especially among the frontier Turcomans.[6] Hard pressed by the Mongol forces, the most warlike and mobile elements of the frontier Turcomans moved further west and south and directed their energies for Holy War in raids (*ghaza*) against the inadequately protected territories of Byzantium in western Anatolia and in Lesser Armenia in Cilicia. In order to establish direct Mongol control in Seljukid Anatolia, fresh Mongol forces, actually whole tribes, were sent to settle there after 1277, again mostly in the Amasya-Tokat region.[7] By the end of the thirteenth century these forces amounted to five *tümen* s (50,000 men) and several *ming* s (one *ming* was 1,000 men).[8]

The civil war in the Ilkhanid Empire (1291–1295) and a series of rebellions on the part of several Mongol military governors in Anatolia (Tughachar and Baltu in 1297; Sülemish in 1298–99) with the ensuing repressions resulted in the immigration of more Turcomans and, now, of certain Mongol tribes as well, putting further pressure on the frontier.[9] During this period the expansion of the Turcoman tribes toward the lower

[5]See P. Wittek, *Das Fürstentum Mentesche* (Istanbul, 1934), p. 2; Barbara Flemming, *Landschaftsgeschichte von Pamphylien, Pisidien und Lykien im Spätmittelalter* (Wiesbaden, 1964), p. 3; and S. Vryonis, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century* (Berkeley, 1971), pp. 191–94, 260–87, 444–97. From the earliest times western Anatolia had been a region populated by large groups of Turcomans; there were 120,000 tents in the region by 1189, according to Salimbene (cited by Vryonis, *Decline*, p. 191).

[6]For the rise of the spirit of *jihad* under Baybars, see E. Sivan, *L'Islam et la Croisade, Idéologie et Propagande dans les Reactions Musulmanes aux Croisades* (Paris, 1968), p. 165, ("La préeminence accordée à gihad anti-mongol à cette époque").

[7]On the uprisings in central Anatolia, the capture of Konya by the Turcomans of Karaman in 1277, and Gaikhatu's reprisals, see B. Spuler, *Die Mongolen*, pp. 84–91; C. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, pp. 284–300; F. Sümer, "Anadolu'da Moğollar," pp. 33–63. The basic source for this period, *Musamarat al-Akhbar,* is published by Osman Turan (Ankara, 1944).

[8]In 1320 the Mongol governor, Timurtash, had under his command "nine *tümens* of Mongols and Turcomans"; see *Al-ʿUmari's Bericht über Anatolien*, ed. F. Taeschner (Leipzig, 1929), p. 32. Later on these Mongols, along with the Turcoman tribes in the Amasya-Sivas region, played a major role in the rise of the states successively founded by Eretna and by Kadi Burhaneddin (1330–1397), who claimed, as heirs to the Ilkhanids, a dominant position in Asia Minor. On Eretna, see, Z. V. Togan, *Umumi Türk Tarihine Giriş*, 2d ed. (Istanbul 1970); and on Burhaneddin, Y. Yücel, *Kadi Burhaneddin Ahmed ve Devleti* (Ankara, 1970). When Timur forcibly led these Mongol tribes back to Turkestan, their number was estimated at 30,000 or 40,000. For the Mongol tribes remaining in the area, see Sümer, *Oğuzlar*, pp. 132–47.

[9]Early Ottoman traditions mention Chawdar-Tatar as attacking the Ottomans from the rear in the Eskişehir area; they were apparently established further south in the territory of the Germiyanids. For Chawdar-Tatars, see Sümer, *Oğuzlar*; p. 118, and Togan, *Umumi Türk Tarihine Giriş*, pp. 242, 488; for Mongol settlement in general, see Sümer, *Oğuzlar*, pp. 44, 115–47.

Sangarius (Sakarya) River and their relentless raids into the Byzantine province of Mesothynion (the peninsula of Nicomedia) were recorded by the contemporary historian Pachymeres. He related all this to the disorders which took place in the Paphlagonian frontier area between the Sangarius River and Kastamoni, a state of affairs which led to Mongol interference.[10] Osman Ghazi, the founder of the Ottoman state, is mentioned for the first time in Byzantine sources as the leader of these vigorous raids by Turcomans into the Byzantine territory at the most advanced section of the frontier at the turn of the fourteenth century.

The weakening of Mongol power in Iran under Abu-Said (1317–1335) did not abate the volatile struggle in Asia Minor, as the Mongol governor, Timurtash (1318–1327), in command of strong forces in central Anatolia, now tried to gain actual independence by strengthening his control over the border areas.[11] It should be added that Timurtash also adopted the Islamic Holy War ideology and even approached the Mamluks in an effort to overshadow the Turcoman *ghazi* leaders who had gained such great prestige in Asia Minor through their exploits against the Byzantines. Timurtash was particularly harsh in dealing with the *begs* who had, by now, established viable principalities in the former Seljukid frontier region. As to the newly established *ghazi* principalities of western Anatolia, they remained mostly beyond Timurtash's reach; and now, more than ever before, they directed their actions toward the Byzantine lands on the coasts. The period of 1291–1330 was indeed a crucial one for the Turkish expansion into the Aegean world.

In about 1330, Al-ʿUmari's two sources estimated that the sixteen Turcoman principalities established by that time could mobilize over half-a-million cavalrymen—the figure given by Baiaban the Genoese—or over a quarter-of-a-million—according to Haydar al-Uryan.[12] In addition, they mentioned an unspecified number of infantry. The figures were obviously greatly exaggerated. However, if we remember that the majority of these forces consisted of Turcoman tribesmen, the figure given for each individual principality can be interpreted as the relative number of fighting tribesmen dependent upon a particular lord or ruler. It is noteworthy that the highest figures in these accounts were given for the Menteşe-oghlu (100,000 in Caria), the Aydın-oghlu (70,000 in Ionia), the Osman-oghlu (Ottomans—40,000 in Bythinia), the Karasi-oghlu (over 40,000 in Mysia), and the Sarukhan-oghlu (18,000 in Lydia)—all of whom were operating in the area captured from the Byzantines in western Anatolia between 1260 and 1330.

To sum up, a new Turkey with great demographic potential and a heightened Holy War ideology, was emerging in the old Seljukid frontier zone east of a line from the mouth of the Dalaman (Indos) River to that of the Sakarya (Sangarius). A thrust by this explosive frontier society against the neighboring Byzantine territory in western Anatolia and in the Balkans was almost inevitable. The expansion was accomplished in the following stages: (1) it began with the seasonal movements of Turcoman nomadic groups into the Byzantine coastal plains; (2) it was intensified by the organization of small

[10] *Cambridge History of Islam*, vol. 1, ed. P. M. Holt, A. K. S. Lambton, and B. Lewis (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 266–67; and Elizabeth Zachariadou, "Pachymeres on the Amouroi," *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 3 (1977): 57–71.

[11] We know, for example, that he settled Mongol tribes in the areas of Konya, Niğde, and Aksaray, thus pressuring the Turcomans of Karaman; see Sümer, *Oğuzlar*, pp. 91–92; on Timurtash, see *Al-ʿUmari's Bericht*, pp. 51–52.

[12] *Al-ʿUmari's Bericht*, pp. 34–46.

raiding groups under *ghazi* leaders, mostly of tribal origin, for booty raids or for employment as mercenaries; (3) it continued with the emergence of successful leaders capable of bringing together under their clientship local chiefs to conquer and then establish *beyliks* (principalities) in conquered lands on the model of the principalities founded in the old Seljukid frontier zone; and finally (4) with the involvement of these *ghazi-beyliks*, with their definite political and economic aims, in the regional struggle for supremacy in the Aegean and in the Balkans, the previously undirected thrusts of the war bands became focused on new goals.

The Formation of Ghazi-*Mercenary Bands*

As a result of economic pressure in the predominantly nomadic society of the frontier, the pursuit of economic activities supplementary to stock raising was seen to occur before the period of large scale settlement. Lumbering and carpet making became specializations among the nomads of the southern and western parts of the area, as the market for these commodities expanded in Egypt. In fact, carpets, lumber, and other forest products such as nut-gall later on would constitute the main export items of the ports of Antalya (Satalia), Alaiye (Candelore), Finike, Balat (Palatia), and Ayasoluk (Altoluogo) under the Turcoman principalities.[13]

The slave trade, with the growing demand from the large markets in Asia Minor, Iran, and in the Arab lands and the generally rising price of slaves during this period, appears to have had far reaching consequences for the frontier society. Enslavement of the neighboring "infidels" became a most profitable business as well as a "pious" act. Thus it was that between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries the Turkish chronicles and the *gesta et vitae* literature, as well as Christian sources, placed great emphasis on the enslaving activity of the *ghazis*.[14] The continuous raiding for slaves and the opportunity for employment as mercenaries appears to have brought about a specialization and social differentiation in the Turcoman frontier society.

Even if it is not to be taken as a truly historical account, the Ottoman tradition on the origins and rise of Osman Ghazi is of particular interest, for it aids one in understanding how, in a Turcoman clan of pastoral nomads, a *ghazi* can emerge to create a subordinate band of mounted warriors and comrades (*nöker* or *yoldash*) constantly occupied with raiding the lands of the "infidel".[15] The distinction and the dominant position of the war leader in the clan was further enhanced by the "coming under his flag" of ever increasing numbers of *gharibs* (rootless wanderers of various origins). These were always warmly welcomed by the leader and became "his people," his clients, personally

[13] See W. Heyd, *Histoire du Commerce du Levant au Moyen-Age*, vol. 1, ed. F. Raynaud (Leipzig, 1936), pp. 534–54; Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, "Sept Traités Inédits entre Venise et les Emirats d'Aydin et de Menteşe, 1331–1407," *Studi Preottomani e Ottomani. Atti del Convegno di Napoli* (Naples, 1976), pp. 229–40; and C. Foss, *Ephesus After Antiquity* (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 141–67.

[14] See H. Inalcik, "Servile Labour in the Ottoman Empire," in *The Mutual Effects of the Islamic and Judeo-Christian Worlds* (New York, 1978). Even in the court history of Tursun Beg (ca. 1490) (*The History of Mehmed the Conqueror*, ed. H. Inalcik and R. Murphey [Minneapolis and Chicago, 1978]), the success of a campaign was measured not only by the political results obtained but also by the number of slaves captured.

[15] See *Osmanlı Tarihleri*, pp. 97, 107 ("Osman Gazi'nin yanında yarar *nökerler* oldular"); for *nöker*-ship, see also H. Inalcik, "The Khan and the Tribal Aristocracy," *Harvard Ukranian Studies* 3-4 (1979–80): 447–58.

attached to him and called by his name: Aydınlı, Sarukhanlu, Osmanlı, or Mihallu. The process entailed a dissolution of tribal kinship ties, with the exception of those of the leader's family, who kept and consolidated their privileges within the peculiar pattern of agnate kinship.[16] The Holy War ideology, as much as the success of the actual raids, reinforced ties within the band to produce a cohesive social group centered around the leader. Consequently, dervishes embodying the *ghaza* ideology and bringing to the leader's authority the spiritual sanction of Islam were ever present within the frontier society.[17] In actual fact, the pattern of the change was a very old one, dating back to the Central Asian Turks.[18] What happened in the second half of the thirteenth century was an unprecedented extension of the process, apparently as a result of population pressure, coupled with the central government's loss of control over these Turcomans and with the collapse of the Byzantine defenses in western Anatolia. Now Turcoman war bands occupied themselves as mercenary companies in the service of the Christian governments throughout the Balkans as well as in staging booty raids.

The increase in horse breeding in the *uj* areas can be considered both cause and effect of this transformation.[19] The territory where the Turcomans had their *yurt* were congenial to horse breeding, and horse breeding in Anatolia showed considerable development during this period. Horse prices were quite low; and as the fame of Anatolian Turcoman horses spread, they came to be in great demand in neighboring countries.[20] Until the mid-sixteenth century, horsemanship, along with peculiar Turco-Mongol tactics, constituted the basic military advantage of the Turcoman and Ottoman troups facing western armies.[21] Infantry continued to exist, its ranks filled by soldiers drafted from among the Muslim *reaya* (the tax paying subjects) in the early Turcoman principalities as well as in

[16] The partitioning of conquered lands among the members of the *beg's* family, with the eldest son taking the *uj* area for independent action, followed the customary law of the Turks and Mongols; see L. Krader, *Social Organization of the Mongol-Turkic Pastoral Nomads* (The Hague, 1963), pp. 250-52. For indigenous Turcoman institutions, see W. Irons, "Nomadism as a Political Adaptation: The Case of the Yomut Turkmen," *American Ethnologist* 1 (1974).

[17] On the role of the dervishes, M. F. Köprülü's studies are essential. For a bibliography, see *Fuad Köprülü Armağanı* (Ankara 1953); but special mention should be made of "Anadolu'da Islamiyet," *Edebiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 4-6 (H. 1338-1340), and "Abdal," *Türk Halk Edebiyatı Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 1 (Istanbul, 1935), pp. 23-56.

[18] For *ghaza* and mercenary bands in Central Asia, see V. Barthold, *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion*, 2d ed. (London, 1968), pp. 209-254. From the eleventh century on, when Anatolia became one of the most important fronts against the Christian world, many warlike Turkish tribes were attracted there by the opportunity for booty and mercenary employment; see Vryonis, *Decline*, chaps. 2 and 3. Even in the Seljukid hinterland some of the mercenary chiefs became quite conspicuous as early as the 1250s. In 1256 a certain *Shihna* fought in the capacity of a leader of a mercenary Turcoman group in the Seljukid army; see Flemming, *Landschaftsgeschichte*, p. 39.

[19] See D. Sinor, "Horse and Pasture in Inner Asian History," *Oriens Extremus* 19 (1972): 171-84. Two horses were needed per raider, as Mihailović observed in *Memoirs of a Janissary*, ed. B. Stolz and S. Soucek (Ann Arbor, 1975), pp. 177, 234. As raiding became the principal occupation in the *uj*, the numbers of cavalry in the Turcoman forces were increased. Ibn Bibi tells us how the Turcomans of Karaman, who had fought on foot in earlier times, had by now become cavalrymen; see Flemming, *Landschaftsgeschichte*, p. 38.

[20] See *Al-'Umari's Bericht*, pp. 23, 35, 42; for the export of horses from Anatolia, see Zachariadou, "Sept Traités Inédits," p. 231; also see F. Thiriet, *Régestes des Délibérations du Sénat de Venise*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1958), p. 107. Horse prices went up in Syria at times when export of horses from Anatolia slackened; see Ibn Taghribirdi, *Nujum al Zahira*, ed. W. Popper, vol. 7 (Berkeley, 1929), p. 201.

[21] See, for example, the description of the battle of Nicopolis in A. S. Atiya, *The Crusade in the Latter Middle Ages* (London, 1938), pp. 446-55; and see also K. U.-Köhalmi, "Der Pfeil bei den innerasiatischen Reternomaden und ihren Nachbarn," *Acta Orientalia* (Acad. Scient. Hung.) 6 (1956): 109-161.

the early Ottoman state; but cavalry (*sipahi*), was the foundation of the military elite, and Cavalrymen enjoyed full membership in the ruling class; riding was considered a privilege, and was denied to the ordinary *reaya* in these societies.

The role, at this early stage, of the tribal war bands as mercenary companies, occasionally referred to as *bölük* in Turkish, must be emphasized. At this time, Turkish mercenaries were generally eastern Mediterranean—just as were the Almogavars in the western Mediterranean. By 1300 the decline of the fief-holding feudal cavalry had become universal throughout the Mediterranean world. The governments in Italy and in the Balkans had by now learned from experience that the hiring of mercenary companies was by far the most preferable course open to them.[22] In the Balkans the governments even competed against each other to attract the Turcoman mercenary companies, who, for their part, were often satisfied with mere booty, especially in the form of slaves. These companies were considered militarily the most efficient not only because of the superiority of their weapon, the famous Turkish bow, but also because of their unique organization and their proved professionalism, the product of long experience in fighting together.[23] It seams that the Byzantine government under Andronicus II was justified in trying to recover (through extraordinary impositions on the fiefs) the state revenues accumulated in the hands of the provincial gentry, who proved to be no longer militarily efficient. By such means the government was believed to have accumulated funds sufficient to hire the mercenary companies of Alans, Kipchaks, Turks, or Catalan-Almogavars.[24]

As an alternative to the *ghaza* raid, the opportunity for overseas employment with the prospect of taking rich booty must have encourage the formation of more and more mercenary *bölük*s among the frontier Turcomans. Once such a company came into being, it had to continue as such. Grim experiences in overseas Christian countries, sometimes ending in terrible massacres, taught them the advantages of assembling in still larger groups, as a kind of confederation, under an able leader. This evolution led to the emergence of the *beg*s, the founders of the frontier principalities. The detailed account of Umar Ghazi's activities provides a clear picture of this process. The cooperation of Turkish *bölük*s with the Catalan company in Thrace and Greece between 1305 and 1311 should also be viewed as a result of it.[25] But the larger the groups, the greater the difficulty of finding adequate provisions through simple pillage within a limited circuit of land.[26]

[22] Mercenaries were first recruited as individuals in Italy, the mercenary company as such emerging only late in the thirteenth century; see M. Mallett, *Mercenaries and their Masters* (Totowa, N.J., 1974), p. 18.

[23] In view of their peculiar organization, they can even be considered as the prototype of the permanent standing armies associated with the Ottoman Porte and Mamluks of Egypt, two military Muslim states which emerged as a response to the Mongol and Crusade threats. It is to be remembered that in France the first standing army was formed from reorganized mercenary companies.

[24] Angeliki E. Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins* (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 89-93, 117-20, 187-88.

[25] K. M. Setton, *Catalan Domination of Athens*, 1311-1388 (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), chapt. 1; D. Jacoby, "Catalans, Turcs et Vénitiens en Romanie (1305-1332)," *Studi Medievali*, ser. 3, 15 (1947): 217-61; for Umur's military organization, see H. Inalcik, "The Rise of the Turcoman Maritime Principalities in Anatolia, Byzantium and the Crusades," (forthcoming).

[26] In the stage prior to their enrollment in the *beg*s' armies the Turcoman bands usually took their families along with them on distant raids.

The mercenaries were indispensable to the governments employing them during the first half of the fourteenth century. But their ever-present inclination toward pillage, their readiness to change sides when promised better conditions—all natural features of the mercenary institution—made instability a predominant feature of international politics in the Balkans during this period. There was a parallel situation in Italy during the same period of great mercenary use, 1320 to 1380. Attempts to use feudal forces or militia against the mercenaries invariably ended in pitiful defeat. For example, a sizeable Turkish mercenary force of 5,000 men hired by Michael Palaeologus to fight against the Franks of the Morea first won him success; but when they changed sides in 1264, the Franks gained the upper hand.[27] Along with other freebooters, Turks were also enrolled during this period in the Byzantine navy.[28]

In the critical years of the Turkish advance in western Anatolia, the Byzantine government hastened first to hire the Alan mercenaries, 7,000 in number, who were seeking employment after the execution of Nogay in 1299;[29] the famous Catalan company was hired in 1304. Although pledging to fight for the Cross or for Islam, Catalan and Turkish mercenaries easily came to terms among themselves about pursuit of their common interests. More than once the Byzantine government (and later on Cantacuzenus), weakened and financially strapped by decentralizing forces, tried to satisfy the mercenaries in their service by directing them to pillage in unfriendly neighboring countries: not only Bulgaria and Serbia, but also the Greek lands which were thought to be rebellious. Cantacuzenus considered it to be, even for the Byzantine state itself, a privilege and a piece of good fortune to secure the continued support of Turkish forces from Anatolia—as long as they remained uninterested in conquest or settlement in the Balkans.[30]

At this juncture, Turkish groups acting as *ghazi* raiding parties or mercenary companies had joined together and come under the command of powerful leaders such as Umur Ghazi of the Aydın dynasty and Orkhan and his son Süleyman Paşa of the Ottoman house; and only through these leaders could the Byzantines hope to acquire sizeable mercenary aid from Anatolia. These Turkish *beg*s were thus the real beneficiaries of "their services as loyal friends of the Byzantines" (to put it in the terms of the Byzantine sources). Through alliance with the Byzantines, the Turcoman *beg*s could provide employment and booty for the ever-growing number of *ghazi*s gathering under their flags

[27] D. Zakythinos, *Le Despotat Grec de Morée* (Paris, 1932), pp. 39-40; see also G. Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State*, trans. Joan Hussey (Oxford, 1956), p. 403.

[28] H. Ahrweiler, *Byzance et La Mer* (Paris, 1966), p. 231.

[29] Other nomadic groups in Nogay's clientship, mainly Kipchaks (Cumans), pushed by the Mongols of Tokta (Tokhta) Khan, fell upon the lower Danubian regions. These relatively small but militarily superior groups played a decisive role in the political developments in the Balkans in the fourteenth century. The rise of the Shishmanids in Bulgaria and the formation of the principalities of Moldavia and of Dobrotich (Dobruja) were closely connected with the spread of the Cumans in the area. Cumans were often employed as mercenary forces by the indigenous governments. On the Cumans in Anatolia, see Wittek, *Mentesche*, p. 13; on their role in the formation of Romanian states, see L. Rásonyi, "Contributions à l'histoire des premières Cristiallisations d'état des Roumaines, "*Archivium Europae Centro-Orientalis*, vol. 1 (Budapest, 1935), pp. 221-53.

[30] John Cantacuzenus pointed out that it was merely a military necessity to employ them, as many Byzantine emperors and generals did before him; see *Historiarum Libri*, IV, vol. 3 (Bonn, 1832), p. 36.

to raid on an increasingly larger scale in the Balkans. Umur was not interested in either conquest or settlement on overseas lands. However, Süleyman Paşa found conditions favorable for such policies, and in 1352 he declared his epoch-making decision to change direction by occupying Tzympe, a bridgehead on the European side of the Dardanelles.

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