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Turkey and Europe: A Historical Perspective

The earliest known Neolithic site of Hacılar and Çatalhöyük, dating back to 7000 BC "stands out as an incomparable prehistoric centre of culture. It was here that man created one of his first great works of art" (Prof. Dr. Ekrem Akurgal, *Ancient Civilisations,* p. 3). Agriculture was then practised, as revealed by the excavations. Anatolian civilisation seems to have been retarded and remained at the stage of a village civilisation until 2500 BC when the Bronze Age started with the Hatti. The Hatti gave their name to Asia Minor which was then called the Land of the Hatti. Before the Hittites, an Indo-European people, began to arrive from 2200 BC, the Hatti had reached a high level of urban civilisation, writing in cuneiform from the beginning of the eighteenth century BC. The Hatti's cultural influence, particularly in religion and state organisation on the Old Hittite Kingdom (1750-1450 BC), was paramount. The Hatti language was different from all other Near Eastern languages. In its basic structure it has common characteristics with the Altaic or Turkic language family.

Other known inhabitants of Asia Minor before the Hittites were Luvians, an Indo-European people living in southwest Anatolia. The Hurrians, whose language showed an Altaic structure, occupied the southeast around 2000 BC. They came under the strong influence of Babylonian culture. The Hurrians were followed by the Mitanni, an Indo-European people in eastern Anatolia. The newcomers, the 'people of Hatti', from which the Old Testament name Hittite was derived, spoke an Indo-European language called Nesian (Hittites called themselves *Nesi* or *Naşi).*

With the invasion of these Indo-European tribes between 2200 BC and 2100 BC, a new period began in Asia Minor. The Hittites founded the first strong state uniting the whole of Asia Minor under their rule (1450-1200 BC), and annexed Aleppo and Babylon. The name Asia comes from the Hittite word *Assuwa.* In Syria they clashed with the Egyptian empire of Ramses II in 1299 BC, leading to the the earliest known peace treaty signed at Qadesh, 1299 BC. At the excavations in the Hittite city of Kültepe there came to light the first state archives of mankind.

Scholarship underlines the artistic and cultural influence of the early Asia Minor civilisations on Aegean and Greek culture (Akurgal, *Orient und*

Okziden, Baden-Baden, 1966). Archaeological excavations, to which in the 1930s Atatürk gave impetus, delivered solid evidence that before the Aegean culture flourished in Ionia, Anatolia had become the cradle of great civilisations. Atatürk regarded the Hittite state as the prototype of the modern Turkish state in Asia Minor with its territorial boundaries and its capital in the central plateau.

While the central plateau and mountainous east came under the strong influence of the highly developed Mesopotamian civilisations in the early periods, later on Western Anatolian cultures, as uncovered in Troy and the western coastal areas, represented a different cultural tradition coming from the Aegean. In fact, throughout its history Anatolia became the bridge for the transmission and fusion of oriental and Western cultures from the Bronze Age to the present time. The Ionian civilisation in western Anatolia was a product of the coexistence of Greek people with the natives of Asia Minor (Akurgal, *Ancient Civilisations,* p. 17).

Scholarship has established that no fewer than seventy languages have been used in Anatolia up to the present time and that more than twenty different ethnic groups live today in Turkey. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Caucasus, the Crimea, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Greece and Albania, who felt themselves to belong to the Turkish culture came and were settled by the government in various parts of Anatolia. It is suggested that every third person in Turkey today belongs to one of these refugee groups. The explanation is that under the Turkish states which succeeded each other in Anatolia and the Balkans in the course of the last millennium, all of these indigenous and immigrant peoples acquired a common Turkish identity. Very long coexistence and common historical experience under a unified state structure gave rise to one Turkish culture and a common culture is the solid foundation of the Turkish nation today. Ideological attempts to break up this unity are against the historically formed, organic existence of the Turkish nation of today.

The Ionian civilisation, which gave to the Graeco-Roman civilisation the principle of national thinking and science, flourished in western Anatolia with Greek colonies on coastal regions and a highly developed trade during Hellenistic and Roman periods, blending Greek civilisation with the Orient's wisdom and mysticism, Anatolia then appeared as the world's richest and most advanced region. The ruins of magnificent cities from this period witness to this golden age of the peninsula.

In the following period, Asia Minor became the scene of an inconclusive struggle between the Caliphate and the Byzantine Empire, and declined until the time when, under the Seljuk sultanate of Konya, it recovered its past prosperity. With the Seljuks, the Turkish-Islamic period of Asia Minor began.

The great Seljuk empire in the east, encompassing central Asia and Iran, vigorously continued the struggle against the Byzantines who lost the final confrontation at the battle of Manzikert in 1071. Then, the whole peninsula to the Aegean was flooded with Turkish tribes.

The first period of the Turkish invasion and settlement under the local Turcoman dynasties ended with the unification of Asia Minor, except for the western regions. Under the Seljuks of Konya, the peninsula rose once again to be one of the most prosperous and advanced areas of the world and at the crossroads of the then flourishing east-west trade (trade privileges, for example, were granted to Venice in 1220). Anatolian cities of the Seljuks can be compared to those of the Graeco-Roman period, with the difference of their oriental characteristics. The Seljuks built on trade highways magnificent caravansaries comparable to Western cathedrals. In the classical period of this refined civilisation, Konya became the most celebrated centre of oriental mysticism with Mawlana Jalaleddin Rumi and other great mystic philosophers of the thirteenth century. Under the Seljuks, Islamic religion and civilisation became prevalent in Asia Minor.

The task of Islamisation was completed under the second period of the Turcoman principalities, which arose on the frontier areas and conquered Byzantine western Anatolia. The Ottoman state in its first stage was one of these Turcoman principalities. The frontier military tradition and the Seljuk cultural heritage made it possible for the Ottomans to create one of the most powerful and enduring empires of the world, replacing the Byzantine Empire in İstanbul and the Balkans.

Although ethnic and cultural identity in Anatolia has been Turkish for the last millennium, it represents in fact a synthesis of ' various cultural and ethnic heritages which have been juxtaposed and fused in the long history of the peninsula. Archaeological and anthropological research shows that in daily life, beliefs, language, toponymy, arts and anthropological features of the Turkish nation today there are numerous elements from the bygone people and their civilisations. Five main periods in this long evolution can be identified: I. the Hatti and Hittite period, 2500-900 BC; II. the Urartian civilisation in eastern Anatolia and Phrygian, Lydian and Carian civilisations in western Anatolia, 900-300 BC; III. the Minoan and Ionian-Greek civilisations in Western Anatolia and the Aegean, a Persian interlude (546-334 BC), and Hellenistic civilisation, 900-30 BC; IV. the Roman and Byzantine period, 30 BC-AD 1071; V. Turkish Asia Minor-a. the Seljuks and Turcoman principalities, 1071-1307, b. the Ottomans, 1307-1923, and c. the Turkish Republic, 1923 onwards.

1. The Ottoman Empire's Place in World History

In this synopsis an attempt will be made to review Turkish-European relations in past political, economic and cultural perspectives. The dividing line in these relations is, without doubt, the rise of the modern nation-state of Turkey.

In the period 1250-1500, the Levant, that is the eastern Mediterranean region with its hinterland of economically integrated countries, was the world's most lively region for the exchange of goods and ideas between east and west before the great European discoveries. The Ottomans unified under their rule the entire region conquering first Anatolia and the Balkans from the Euphrates to the Danube and from the Crimea to the Aegean islands in the period 1300-1453. In 1453 they conquered Constantinople/Istanbul despite the threat of a Western crusade, thus creating a compact empire around the imperial capital and the Straits. In the early sixteenth century they annexed to their Empire the Arab lands of Syria, Egypt, Arabia and the Yemen (1516-1517), thus taking under their control the trade and pilgrimage routes through the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, which involved them in a long struggle against the Portuguese. In the east, at various dates they extended their rule as far as Tabriz (1517, 1534, 1585), Georgia (1549) and the Caspian Sea (1585) in an effort to establish full control of the silk route from Tabriz to Bursa and from Tabriz to Aleppo. By annexing Iraq (1534) and gaining access to the Gulf (1534) they participated, along with the Portuguese and the Iranian Safavids, in the flourishing trade of the Indian Ocean through Hormuz, Basra and Baghdad.

In 1453, the full control of the Straits (the Dardanelles, Marmara Sea and the Bosphorus) gave the Ottomans a strategic position in establishing full control over the trade of the Black Sea and East European countries (for instance the conquest of the Genoese colonies of the Crimea in 1475, and the first commercial agreement with Muscovy in 1497).

The first Ottoman grant of trade privileges, or capitulations, to the Genoese in 1352, and subsequently to Venice and Florence, guaranteed the continuation of the grand commerce of these maritime republics with the Levant, thus securing the economic prosperity of Renaissance Italy. The Ottoman sultans extended the same trade privileges to France in 1569, to England in 1580 and to the Netherlands in 1612. At one time, half of the foreign trade of France was with the Levant, while England's Levant Company, pioneer of such trade companies, established the basis of that country's commercial expansion in the world and of its capitalistic development. In those early centuries when the Ottoman emperors represented a superpower in the East, they granted such privileges only to those nations judged as friendly. Capitulations became a kind of bilateral, binding treaty only when Russia elicited such capitulations in 1783.

Extended at each renewal and practically mandatory, the capitulatory privileges with a low rate of three per cent customs dues became a means for the European economic exploitation of the Middle East and were responsible for the collapse of its native handicraft industries in the period 1600-1900. In the 1840s, England's exports to the Middle East jumped to one-third of its whole foreign trade. In brief, it can be said that in the period 1500-1990, the Ottoman Empire, whose territory comprised Asia Minor, the Balkans and the Arab lands of the Middle East, played one of the most crucial roles in the economic development of Europe.[1]

2. The European State-system and the Ottoman Empire, 1500-1815

Medieval Europe was supposed to make up one unified *Respublica Christina* under the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor. This unity began to dissolve with the rise of national monarchies in the fifteenth century. Then, the crucial issue in the realignment of the rising powers in Europe was, on the one hand, how to keep the balance of power among the rival national monarchies and, on the other hand, how to keep the balance of power between the national monarchies and the Holy Roman Empire under the Habsburgs. In the sixteenth century the Ottoman Empire, rising as a superpower in the east, in rivalry with the Habsburgs, played a crucial role in the struggle.

In his struggle against Emperor Charles V, the French King Francis I (1515-1547) admitted that the only power capable of checking Charles V's domination of Europe was Süleyman the Magnificent (1520-1566). Francis's successor Henri II (1547-1559) had to borrow, through the Jewish banker family of Mendes, large sums of money from the Ottomans to finance his wars against the emperor. Again, the French prince Henri was able to gain the Polish throne (1573) only with the strong support of the Ottomans who opposed a Habsburg-backed king in Poland. The Ottomans also encouraged and promised aid to the Protestants in Germany as well as to the Dutch in rebellion against the Habsburgs in the Low Countries. Historians today unanimously underline the fact that Protestants obtained significant concessions from the emperor because of the impending Ottoman pressure from the east. Later on, when Elizabeth I (1558-1603) of England was under threat from the Spanish Armada, she tried to stir up Ottoman naval action in the Mediterranean against Spain. Examples can be multiplied to demonstrate how significant a role the Ottoman state played in maintaining the balance of power in Europe in the sixteenth

[1] For the Ottoman Empire's economic relations with Europe now see H. İnalcık, ed. with Quataert, D. *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire,* Cambridge University Press, 1994.

century. In general, the Ottoman state pursued a policy aiming to ensure that none of the European powers became powerful enough to unify Europe under its domination.

In the end, two superpowers, the Ottoman and Habsburg empires, reached a kind of balance in east-central Europe and the Mediterranean, and made a truce in 1547 which stabilised the Ottoman territories in Europe and opened a new period of balance of power in Europe. Following the Catholic reaction and the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) in Europe, the France of Louis XIV (1643-1715) challenged the emperor, which emboldened the Ottomans to resume their expansionist policy against the Habsburgs, The Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683 resulted in a coalition around the Habsburgs against the Ottoman Empire (the Holy League of 1684). England and the Netherlands, worried by the French advances in the Rhine valley, were endeavouring to achieve peace between the Ottomans and the emperor. English and Dutch pressure on the Habsburgs during the peace negotiations at Karlowitz in 1699 were duly appreciated by the Porte which subsequently granted to them new commercial privileges. This was the beginning of England's special influence in the Ottoman Empire which would last until 1878. This is also the date at which the Ottomans finally recognised European superiority in military technology and decided to imitated. European experts were invited to modernise the Ottoman army.

During the long war of 1683-1699 another very important development took place-the Russian Empire, joined the Holy League and entered the Black Sea region by capturing Azov (Azak) in 1696. Now Istanbul itself was under threat. Equally important was that Russia then was admitted into the European state-system as a result of its joining the Holy League, whereas the Ottoman Empire remained outside the system until 1841.[2]

3. Russian imperialism, the Ottoman Empire, the West, and the so-called Eastern Question

In the eighteenth century, Russia, now officially recognised as part of Europe, pursued a plan of replacing the Ottoman Empire in İstanbul, the tsar claiming to be the protector of the Christian populations of the Balkans. Weakened and threatened by Russia and the Habsburgs, the Ottomans, along with the Western powers, now became more than ever an advocate of the balance of power in

[2] For Ottomans and the European state system, see H. İnalcık, *The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire,* Bloomington, 1993; H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600,* London, 1973; D.M. Vaughan, *Europe and the Turk, A Pattern of Alliances,* Liverpool, 1954.

Europe. This Ottoman policy became particularly apparent in the protest against Poland's partition between Russia, the Habsburgs and Prussia (1772-1795). Once more, the Western powers, France and England, joined the Porte in this policy. In the wake of the Russians' spectacular military successes against the Ottoman armies during the war of 1768-1774, the Russian annexation in 1783 of the northern Black Sea countries, inhabited mostly by Muslim peoples of Turkic origin, alarmed the whole of Europe. Russia now had an exclusive trade monopoly in the Black Sea and had become an imminent threat to İstanbul and the Straits. The Porte now sought aid and guarantees from Western powers for its territorial integrity. This new situation was labelled in European diplomacy as the Eastern Question, showing Western concern to preserve the Ottoman Empire, considered necessary for the European balance of power. (Incidentally it is totally misleading and is a mistake in Western literature to call the Ottoman Empire simply the Turkish Empire; identifying the Ottoman state-a patrimonial, dynastic empire-with the present-day nation-state of Turkey, which came into existence in 1923. This mistake is often responsible for the unjust anachronistic treatment by European states of the issues concerning modern Turkey.) This Western policy, however, did not go so far as to make the Ottoman state a member of the European state-system under the guarantees of international law. It was mainly religious ideology that was responsible for the Europeans denying the fact that the Ottoman state had long become part and parcel of the continental state-system. However, it is to be noted that Protestant countries, particularly England, overriding the Pope's prohibition of the sale of strategic materials to the 'infidel', used to export to the Ottoman Empire high quality powder and steel as early as the sixteenth century. It is also to be remembered that the Ottoman government systematically supported Lutherans and Calvinists throughout Europe. In the Ottoman Empire, too, while pragmatic-minded bureaucrats put the state's interests above everything else, the *ulema,* representing Islamic ideology, endeavoured to impose, most of the time without success, their influence on state policies.

4. European Security Systems and the Ottoman State, 1815-1878

One century before the establishment of the League of Nations and the United Nations, Fürst von Metternich, the Austrian statesman, considered Europe not as a continent in which separate nations and states were in constant struggle against each other, but as one single integrated European republic. This unity, he said, could be achieved only by the "co-operation of the states", not through the control of one dominant state. As a protection for and guarantee of the peace and existing monarchical order in Europe, a league of the four leading

powers should have the right of supervision over revolutionary movements anywhere in Europe. At the Congress of Vienna the Quadruple Alliance of 1815, in accordance with the Metternich System, made the decision to assemble annually to review the situation in Europe, thus creating a permanent mechanism to maintain the status quo established in Vienna. Regardless of the specific nature and function of the Metternich System, all its arrangements can be considered as the precursor of the international organisations of the twentieth century. [3]

The Porte was not represented at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The Ottoman statesman and historian, Cevdet Pasha, notes[4] with regret that the Ottoman Porte then failed to seize the opportunity to participate in the Congress of Vienna. Since, he argues, in a later stage of the congress all those European states which were connected with the issues discussed in one way or another sent their delegates, obviously the Ottoman state also had the right to participate in the negotiations, at least on the problems directly concerning the Ottoman Empire. Unfortunately, he points out, the Porte was deeply engaged in so many urgent problems within the Empire-the struggle against the rebellious provincial notables in particular-that such important external events escaped the government's attention. Charles Talleyrand, the French diplomat, Cevdet adds, raised the issue of an agreement among the European Great Powers about a joint guarantee for the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire in the instructions sent to the French delegation. Ottoman participation in the Congress, Cevdet suggests, might have been useful in checking Russia's ambitious plans. Along with the French and the Austrian governments the English government, too, supported the idea that "the Ottoman Empire should be included in the general treaty guaranteeing the status quo in Europe which [Canning, British statesman] hoped would be a result of the congress."[5] Upon Russia's rejection, the idea of a general guarantee for the Ottoman Empire was dropped.

It was to isolate the Ottoman Empire from Europe that, in the Holy Alliance of September 1815, Tsar Alexander I insisted on the Christian nature of the Alliance. Let us add here that down to our days, such a policy is the cornerstone of Greek diplomacy against Turkey. Predicting the future, Metternich's overriding concern was that the dismemberment of the Ottoman

[3] H. R. von Srbik, (1925), "Metternichs Plan der Neuordnuung Europe 1815/15", *Mitteilungen des österreichischen Instituts für Geschichtsforschung,* 60, 109-126; H.W. Schmals, *Versuche einer gesarnteuropalischen Organisation, 1815-1820,* Aarau, 1940; H. Tuncer, *Metternich'in Osmanlı Politikası (1815-1848),* Ankara, 1996.

[4] *Tarih-i Cevdet,* 2nd edition, İstanbul, vol. XI, 1309 H., 156-161, 181.

[5] Anderson, *The Eastern Question,* 47-8.

Empire in the Balkans and the ensuing collapse of the European balance of power, would result in a general war.

Developments during the Egyptian crisis of 1832-1833 fully justified Metternich's apprehensions. The Russian Empire had reached a dominant position in European politics following the fall of Napoleon, hoping to replace the Ottomans in İstanbul. In 1832, in the desperate situation caused by Mehmed Ali of Egypt whose armies had invaded Anatolia, Mahmud II (1809-1839) had to recognise Russia's special status in respect of the Straits with the treaty of Hünkar-İskelesi in 1833, virtually making the Ottoman sultan a vassal of the tsar and changing the European balance of power in favour of Russia.[6] The tsar had profited from the hesitant policy of Western powers during the first phase of the Egyptian crisis. During the second phase of the Egyptian crisis (1837-1839), France's pro-Egyptian attitude obstructed Western co-operation over the problem of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In the critical situation in the wake of the Ottoman defeat at Nizib (June 24, 1839), on the initiative of England and Austria, the Great Powers including Russia, France and Prussia, delivered a unanimous note to the Porte and assumed the responsibility of bringing a solution to the crisis. Thus, the concert of Europe was restored in the face of the dangerous situation in the east which seriously threatened the balance of power in Europe, and aimed at neutralising Russia's exclusive position. England, which had obtained vast commercial privileges in the Ottoman dominions through the treaty of 1838, decided to support effectively the integrity of the Empire and the *Tanzimat* reforms. This was the beginning of the period covering the years 1839-1878 when England's influence in the Ottoman Empire became preponderant in all fields. All the Great Powers, except France, agreed among themselves in London (July 15, 1840) to force Mehmed Ali to abandon his plan of an Arab empire matching the Ottoman sultan's. At this point, although rivalry among the members of the European concert continued, the concern to keep the balance of power in Europe brought them together, the fate of the Ottoman Empire having become the most important issue in nineteenth century European politics.

Actually, policies or excuses for interference in the internal affairs of secondary states followed by the Great Powers in the period 1815-1878 were not very different in essence from those of our time, except that they are now globalised to control world issues which can lead to a general war.

[6] In the secret article of the Hünkar İskelesi treaty it is specified that in return for Russia's military aid to the sultan, "the Sublime Ottoman Porte shall confine its action in favour of the Imperial Court of Russia to closing the strait of the Dardanelles, that is to say, to not allowing any foreign vessels of war to enter therein under any pretext whatsoever."

In 1841, a very important document signed by the five powers with France joining the Alliance re-established the old status concerning the Straits, superseding Russia's privileged position. "The ships of war of the foreign powers" were prohibited to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus and the five Great Powers would "engage to respect this determination of the sultan, and to conform themselves to the principle above declared." The particular importance of this agreement was that the Great Powers were united in accepting the principle as binding on themselves, which became part of the public law of Europe. It is interpreted as the first step toward the Ottoman Empire's inclusion in the European concert. This became apparent when the tsar attempted to make the sultan recognise his protectorate over the Christian subjects of the sultan in 1853. The British and French governments decided to support the Porte against Russia (the Crimean War, 1854-1856). By the treaty of Paris (March 30, 1856) the Great Powers admitted Turkey into the European concert. Article VII says: "Their majesties engage, each on his part, to respect the independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire".

In return, the Porte promised (The Hatt-i Hümâyûn of 1856) fundamental reforms to improve the conditions of its subjects. By a special agreement, Britain, France and Austria jointly guaranteed Ottoman sovereignty and territorial integrity and infraction of them was to be a *casus belli.* Historically, this meant the culmination of the long process of integration of Turkey with Western Europe.

5. Ottoman Reforms and the Emergence of Modern Turkey

The westernising reforms of the *Tanzimat* period (1839-1877) were responsible for the adoption of a series of Western law codes, judicial organisation with secular law courts, introduction of the French-style provincial administration (1864), and, for the so-called *millet* system, which made it possible for the Christian minorities to have their own religious autonomous administration with representative councils. These liberal westernising reforms culminated in the declaration of a constitution and the convocation of a parliament in 1876-1877. However, the disastrous war of 1877-1878 with Russia, during which the Western powers remained neutral, resulted in the loss of large territories in the Balkans. Dismemberment of the Empire created such a deep disillusionment amongst the Turks that, under Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909), a strong Islamist reaction against Western influence became state policy. Also, radical changes were happening in European politics and the balance of power in the wake of the Berlin Congress (1878), with the emergence of a unified Germany

and the ensuing triple alliance making Russia a partner of the Western powers. Taking advantage of the Ottoman helplessness in the wake of the Russian advances in the Balkans and the Caucasus, England managed to take the lion's share in the partitioning of the Empire by occupying Cyprus (1878) and Egypt (1882) as well as penetrating the Gulf and the Red Sea. Thus, the security of the British Empire was believed to be guaranteed. These changes also entailed a complete re-orientation in Ottoman foreign policy. Abandoned by the West, faced with Russian imperial ambitions and the Greek *Megali Idea* of restoring the Byzantine Empire, the Ottomans turned to Germany (Kaiser Wilhelm II's visit to İstanbul in 1899).

The events in the course of World War I, the defeat of the Allied fleet at the Dardanelles in particular, showed the world the key strategic importance of Turkey and the Straits. Another historic importance of the struggle at the Dardanelles was that Turks found, in the person of a young, brilliant soldier named Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk) a national hero who was destined to be the deliverer of the homeland of the Turks in Asia Minor and Europe from the Greek invasion in 1919-1922. At the end of World War I the prime minister of Greece, Eleutherios Venizelos, a consummate diplomat, succeeded in obtaining the full support of the Allied powers for the realisation of the Greek dream of reviving the Byzantine Empire. On 15 May 1919, the Greek forces landed at İzmir under the protection of an Allied fleet, an episode which vividly recalled the Navarino operation of one century earlier. The story of the ensuing events is well known. Dictated by the Allied powers, then occupying the capital of the sultanate, the Treaty of Sèvres of 1920 (articles 65-83) granted Greece İzmir and its hinterland, and distributed large territories in Asia Minor as booty to the Allied powers. No one then could anticipate that the use of the Greeks for the Allied scheme of partitioning the Turkish homeland would be a fatal mistake, and would arouse the whole Turkish nation in staunch resistance to the Allied verdict. Following a three-year struggle (1919-1923) a new nation was born. The point to be stressed is that in his fight against the Greeks and the victors of World War I, as well as against the Caliph's manoeuvres in occupied İstanbul, Mustafa Kemal always made sure that important decisions went through a national Assembly on the principle of the absolute sovereignty of the Turkish nation. Thus, the War of Independence signified a national revolution which asserted the Turkish nation's determination to end the Ottoman dynasty's imperial-patrimonial rule once and for all, and to join on equal footing the club of the European nation states. In 1922, Arnold Toynbee, then visiting the Turkish-Greek front, declared that the Turks were fighting there with Western ideals against the West itself. In the peace conference of Lausanne (July 24, 1923), the Turkish delegation's insistence on equality with European states was the recurring theme of every issue discussed. Capitulatory privileges, which

had reduced the Ottoman Empire to the conditions of a semi-colony of the Western powers, became the subject of the most heated discussions causing the rupture of the negotiations for three months (the recent attempt to give Turkey secondary status in the European Union is interpreted as another sign of how Europe still regards Turkey as the continuation of the Ottoman Empire). During the period of 1923-1928 the Grand National Assembly (GNA) in Ankara, acting as the sole representative of the Turkish nation enacted, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, a series of revolutionary laws all aiming to make Turkey a modern nation state, democratic and secular. Atatürk and his *inkilâpcı* group in the GNA, considered the total westernization of the country as the absolute precondition for Turkey's becoming a member of the Western family of nations. Atatürk introduced his revolutionary *inkilâb*s one after another: Declaration of the Republic (October 29, 1923), abolition of the caliphate (March 24, 1924), adoption of the Swiss civil law (October 4, 1926); the law for a unified secular education (March 2, 1926); changes in the constitution to secularise the state (1928); the adoption of the Latin alphabet (October 1, 1928), and finally reforms making the Turkish citizen appear as a European and to give him a national Turkish identity. The last *inkilâb*s about the alphabet or dress may be looked on as symbolic, but in fact they are crucially important for cultural, social and political identity in a traditional society. Seeing stiff resistance from a deeply traditional society, Kemal's attention turned to the education of the youth of the country. The enactment of the law of the 'Unification of Education' of 1926 must be looked on as one of the most prudent *inkilâb*s. His hope was that youth brought up under an absolutely national, secular education system would be the guarantee of the new Turkey. Through educational and cultural institutions, Atatürk hoped to create out of a traditional community a modern nation on the model of Western nations.

7

The Turkish Impact on the Development of Modern Europe

Since a Euro-centric view of history in the West began to be replaced by a true world history concept, the history of the Ottoman Empire, which lasted in a very important part of the world for over five centuries, is attracting new interest. A number of contributions recently made in Europe and America on the problem of the place of the Ottoman Empire in European history can be considered as a sign of this growing interest. Although some of these new studies were still not free of certain biases, mainly because they did not make use of the Ottoman evidence, they, however, explored new ideas and had new orientations.

Under the light of these publications we are now able, for instance, to speak of how the Ottoman state became an important factor in the balance of power of European politics. Even during the first stage of the Italian wars from 1494 to 1525 the Ottoman state was an important part in Italian diplomacy. Fr. Babinger and J. Kissling in their studies based on the Italian archival material, and S. Fisher, Pfefferman, Schwoebel, D. Vaughan in their more general treatment of the subject showed how the Italian courts maintained diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Sultan. It is true that the Western archives do not yield much on the subject, for political and military matters were concealed in such negotiations and never put in writing. But sometimes even if an Ottoman military intervention was not really desired the rumor of a secret alliance was used as an intimidation. Hard-pressed Italian states used as a last measure the threat of calling on the Ottomans. In 1525 the French followed actually this Italian policy when their king was made prisoner by the Emperor. The Ottomans welcomed this opportunity to invade Hungary in 1526 and open a sea front against the Emperor in the Mediterranean in 1532 just as in the past they had exploited the situation in Italy against Venice. From 1480 onwards the Ottomans always thought of an invasion of Italy. Two factors made them hesitate for a decisive move, the possibility of resistance of a Europe united under the Pope and Emperor, and their own naval weakness to open an overseas front. In 1537, however, Suleyman thought it was the time for such a move. As early as 1531 the Venetian ambassador was writing to the doge, "Sultan Suleyman says, 'To Rome, to Rome,' and he detests the Emperor for

his title of Kayser (Caesar), he, the Turk, causing himself to be called Caesar." Ottoman attempts to capture from the Venetians strongholds along the Adriatic coast and the isle of Corfu in 1537 and 1538 were in fact a preparation for the invasion of Italy. France was then an ally of the Ottomans. They were reinforced by the French navy at the siege of Corfu. But the King and Emperor saw the great danger for the whole of Christendom in Europe. In July 1538 Francis made peace with Charles V at Aigues-Mortes and what is more he promised to take part in a crusade against the Ottomans. Two months later Barbarossa, Grand Admiral of the Sultan, succeeded in routing a powerful crusading fleet at Prevesa. Then, this victory became useless without French alliance.

What I am trying to emphasize is that the Ottomans became an active part in the second stage of the Italian wars and there was a moment when the Western contenders for Italy saw that the balance of power was lost in favor of the Sultan. It must be added that the Ottomans fully appreciated the value of the French alliance and also supported the King financially. In 1533 the Sultan sent Francis a sum of one hundred thousand gold pieces to enable him to form a coalition with England and German princes against Charles V. Two years later the French King asked the Sultan to send him a subsidy of one million ducats. Later on in 1555 the French King Henri II, pressed for money, floated a loan in France with the interest increased from 12 to 16 percent, and at this time many Turks, pashas among them, found it profitable to invest in this loan. The King borrowed 150,000 scudos from Joseph Nasi, Jewish tax farmer of the Sultan. On his part the French king appreciated the Ottoman Alliance as the principal power to check the Habsburg supremacy in Europe. In 1532 Francis I admitted to the Venetian ambassador that he saw in the Ottoman Empire the only force guaranteeing the continued existence of the states of Europe against Charles V.

In brief one can say that the Ottoman Empire played an important role in the balance of power in Europe in the sixteenth century and consequently in the rise of the nation-states in the West. This role continued with the Ottoman support and encouragement to the English and Dutch in the period after 1580 when these nations proved to be the champions of European resistance to the Habsburg attempts at supremacy.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries support for Protestants and Calvinists was one of the fundamental principles of Ottoman policy in Europe. Already in 1552 Suleyman tried to incite the Protestant princes in Germany against the Pope and Emperor. He said in his letter to them that he himself was about to embark on a campaign and promised on oath that they would not be harmed when he entered Germany. Melanchton was directly in touch with the Patriarch of Istanbul, who was in effect an official of the Sultan. Later on in a letter to Lutheran princes in the Low Countries and in other lands subject to

Spain, the Sultan offered military help and saw them as standing close to him, since they did not worship idols, believed in one God and fought against the Pope and Emperor. Under Ottoman rule Calvinism was propagated freely in Hungary and Transylvania, which became a Calvinist and Unitarian stronghold in the seventeenth century. It is convincingly argued that Ottoman pressure on the Habsburgs was an important factor in the extension of protestantism in Europe.

Further, it should be pointed out that the Ottomans contributed to the rise of Muscovy by supporting, as a great power in the politics of Eastern Europe, the Muscovy-Crimean alliance against the Jagellons and the Golden Horde, which then tried to establish or restore their hegemony in the region. When the Ottomans realized the danger for their Black Sea and Caucasian interests in the Muscovite supremacy and expansion in the middle of the sixteenth century it was too late.

Now, I would like to deal in a more detailed way with the economic relations of the Ottoman Empire with Europe.

Speaking of the Ottoman economy one can certainly not ignore the attitude of the Ottoman ruling class towards the productive classes and the problem of its economic policy in general.

At the outset it must be emphasized that the Ottoman state was not a nomadic empire the models of which could be found in the Euroasian steppes. It was a typical Middle East empire with all its age-old adminiistrative principles and institutions. It was concerned primarily with the protection of the settled populations under its rule and promotion of their agricultural and commercial interests. It should be added that this policy was not based on purely economic reasoning but mainly on the financial ends of the state. Even if in the thirteenth century nomadic elements in the Ottoman frontier society played a certain role, the Ottoman state had soon become a typical Islamic sultanate with the basic structure of a Middle East state. Its legislation and actions leave no room for doubt on this point. We know, for instance, that the longest internal struggle the Ottoman state had to make in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries stemmed from the basic fact that it endeavoured in the interests of the settled population to take under control the seminomads of the Uzun-Yayla in Inner Anatolia and of the Taurus range from the Euphrates to Western Anatolia.

The economic system of the Ottoman empire and its basic economic principles derived from a traditional view of state and society which had prevailed since antiquity in the empires of the Middle East. These principles, since they determined the attitude and policy of the administrators, were of considerable practical importance.

In the Muslim state, as in earlier states in the Middle East, all classes of society and all sources of wealth were regarded as being obliged to preserve and promote the power of the ruler. Hence all political and social institutions and all types of economic activity were regulated by the state in order to achieve this goal. The populace was regarded as forming two main groups—those who represented the ruler's authority (the administrators, the troops, the men of religion), and the ordinary subjects, *ra'āyā'*. The former were not concerned with production and paid no taxes, while the latter were the producers and tax-payers. A main concern of the state was to ensure that each individual remained in his own class; this was regarded as the basic requisite for politico-social order and harmony.

To increase revenue from taxation the governments of Near East States appreciated the necessity of developing economic activity and promoting the greatest possible increase in production from all classes of the *ra'āyā'*.It was recommended that cultivated land should be increased by the digging of canals and that trade between different regions should be promoted by the construction of roads, bridges and caravanséeries, and by ensuring the safety of travelers.

Within the class of the producers, the tillers of the soil and craftsmen were subject to a code of regulations distinct from that of merchants; the methods of production and profit margins of the former were under strict state control, since, in this view of society, they were the classes who produced the essential necessities of life and whose labors therefore were most intimately connected with the preservation of social and political order. That a peasant or a craftsman should freely change the methods of production was not countenanced; his activities were permitted only within the limits of the ordinances laid down by the state. In Near East society, it was only the merchants who enjoyed conditions allowing them to become capitalists. "Merchant," *tüjjar,* in this context, means the big businessmen who engaged in interregional trade or in the sale of goods imported from afar. Craftsmen who in the cities sold goods manufactured by themselves and trades-people who sold these goods secondhand fell outside the category of "merchant." The merchant class was not subject to the regulations of the *hisba*, that is, rules of the religious law to ensure fair deal in the market.

In an Ottoman Mirror for Princes, Sinan Pasha's *Ma'ārifnāme* written in the second half on the fifteenth century, the ruler is advised:

> Look with favor on the merchants in the land; always care for them; let no one harass them; let no one order them about, for through their trading the land becomes prosperous, and by their wares cheapness abounds in the world; through them the excellent fame of the Sultan is carried to surrounding lands, and by them the wealth within the land is increased.

Going through the state papers issued by the Ottoman Chancery one is struck by the fact that the administration was always most concerned in applying the principles summarized above.

The Ottoman government's concern for promoting commerce and protecting the interests of the merchant class found its expression in various ways.

It was mainly with the purpose of encouraging trade that the Sultans granted capitulations to the foreigners. It should be emphasized that a capitulation had never been considered as a contractual bilateral document and it maintained its character of a grant of concession by the Sultans until the eighteenth century when they had to give the same privileges to the Habsburgs and Russia. Before this actual change the Sultan retained the authority to decide unilaterally when the pledge of friendship on the opposite side was broken and the capitulation rendered void.

Once its nature as a concession granted by the Sultan is established a capitulation was, however, granted with certain political, financial and economic expectations. The determining factors were usually the opportunities of acquiring a political ally within Christendom, of obtaining scarce goods such as woolen cloth, tin, steel and paper, and especially bullion and increasing customs revenues, the principal source of hard cash for the imperial treasury.

The Ottoman empire was not self sufficient economically as it is sometimes claimed. It was vitally important for its economy and finances to import western silver. Its import was encouraged by tax exemption and measures were taken to hinder its flow to the Eastern countries where gold was cheaper. The Europeans knew well that the Ottomans were dependent on their commerce in the Levant and when they had to bargain for a special privilege in the capitulations their chief weapon was to use the threat that they were going to boycott the Ottoman ports.

A new period in the economic history of the Ottoman Empire started with the annexation of the Arab countries between 1516 and 1550 which actually gave it the control of the trade routes between the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. It is now commonplace knowledge that the Near East continued to receive spices directly from India and Southeast Asia throughout the sixteenth century. According to the Ottoman records, in 1562 customs levied on spices transported from Mecca to Damascus alone amounted to 110 thousand gold ducats. What is interesting to note is that most of the spices imported there

went to Bursa and Istanbul to be shipped further north. To give an interesting example, in 1547 we find a Hungarian merchant in Bursa selling kersey and buying a great quantity of spices.

In this period the newly rising nation-states of the West, France, England and the Netherlands, became most anxious to get trade privileges in the Ottoman Empire. The belief was that the Levant was, as in the past, the most promising field for economic growth. It was not solely on religious grounds that the Marrano family of Mendes, then controlling the spice trade in Europe, came to settle in the Ottoman capital in the 1550s.

The Ottomans had always favoured the rival nations, first the Genoese, then the Ragusans and Florentines against the Venetian dominance in the Levant trade in the fifteenth century.

As to the Western nations, the French made their first progress in Syria and Egypt after Selim's renewal of the Mamluk capitulations in 1517. But they really began to replace the Venetians in the Levant trade only after the Ottoman-Venetian war in 1570-73. Incidentally, the so-called French capitulations of 1536 had never been concluded. The first official Ottoman capitulation to the French is dated 1569. The other Western nations were then to sail and trade under the French flag. At the beginning of the 17th century the volume of French trade in the Levant rose to thirty million French livres, making up one half of France's total trade at that time. Later on when the English and Dutch proved to be even stronger rivals of the Habsburg power than the French, the Ottomans did not hesitate to favor these nations too by granting them capitulations, to the English in 1580, and the Dutch in 1612. Except during the civil war between 1642 and 1660 the English had the lead in the Levant trade in the seventeenth century. According to a contemporary source the Levant market for the English cloth which was the main article for export, expanded by one-third and was one-fourth of all English manufactures exported to the Levant. As W. Sombart put it, without recognizing the significance of the Levant trade for Western economic expansion it is difficult to comprehend the rise of Western capitalism.

The capitulatory privileges were gradually extended so much that Paul Masson and R. Mantran, two French specialists on the Levant trade, could unanimously assert that in the seventeenth century there was no other state in the world practicing a more liberal policy than the Ottoman empire towards foreign merchants.

The Ottomans had then no idea of the balance of trade, an idea that we find for the first time in a clearly defined form only in the mercantilist England of the sixteenth century. Originated from an age-old tradition in the Middle East, the Ottoman trade policy was that the state had to be concerned above all with

the volume of goods in the internal market so that people and craftsmen in the cities in particular would not suffer a shortage of necessities and raw material. Consequently, imports were always welcomed and encouraged and exports discouraged. Hence sometimes we find higher customs rates for exports and even prohibition of the export of such goods as wheat, cotton, hides and beeswax. As for silver and gold no customs dues were levied to encourage their importation and every step was taken to discourage exportation. The Ottomans were definitely bullionists, a stage preceding true mercantilism in the West. The difference with the mercantilist nations of the West was that the Ottomans clung to the guild system as the mainstay of the state and society while Europeans saw in the export of manufactured goods a pirincipal means of getting bullion from outside. In order to achieve a favourable balance of trade they intervened in domestic industries and trade organizations to develop them on capitalistic lines and to export more and more goods and conquer more and more overseas markets. Incidentally, one might speculate that the increasingly unfavourable balance of trade of the West in the fifteenth century pushed them perhaps in this direction and caused a mercantilistic policy to develop, since they had no important commodities other than cloths and minerals to export to the East. The capitulations were complementary to this pattern and it is noteworthy that the mercantilistic nations of the West had been concerned in the first place to found their Levant companies and obtain capitulations. Unwittingly the Ottomans became a part of a European economic system which gave rise to modern capitalism.

followed orders from Istanbul. While Ottomans reminded them of Islamic solidarity, and the fact that the ultimate safety and well-being of both countries depended on close cooperation on all fronts, Crimean *mirzas* argued that their own homes and families were in immediate danger when they left Crimea to be defenseless in front of a possible Cossack or Russian invasion.

The danger became imminent when during the Long War Russian armies came to invade the Crimea twice and occupied Azak. In the 18th century the peninsula was, in fact, invaded three times and became the scene of massacres and deliberate destruction by Russian armies. During the disastrous war of 1768-1774, the *mirzas*, seeing the Ottomans totally incapable of defending the Crimea, sought to compromise with the Czar. The Russians first appeared to support Crimean independence against the Ottomans in 1774 which proved to be only a stratagem to invade the Crimea and all the territories belonging to the Khanate from Dniester to Circassia in 1783. The Russian governments adopted a systematic policy to drive out and annihilate the Tatar-Turkish Muslim population in the Crimea in order to transform the peninsula into a Russian base for further expansion in the south. Russian rule over the Crimea saw the shameless plunder of the lands of the Crimean Tatars, a cynical policy to force hundreds of thousands of Tatars to leave their homes to migrate to Turkey, and a systematic policy to eradicate Turkish-Tatar culture in the land.

9

Mutual Influences Between Europe and the Ottomans

I. Mutual Cultural Influence

Acculturation and cultural borrowings are separate processes.[1] According to one perception, acculturation means a change in the system of basic values determining a culture. Religion determines the system of basic values in traditional societies.[2] Some sociologists and historians claim that the European culture is a synthesis of humanism and the Christian religion. Some historians agree on the point that European civilization with its rational and humanistic character is a common heritage of mankind, and for this reason, it can be the basic culture of every secular society. Naturally, it is impossible for those who claim that culture is a value system to accept this final interpretation. In the end, the question of cultural change depends on how we understand and interpret culture. Muslims in the classical period considered anything coming from the Christian world (from Europe which they called *Kâfiristan* [the country of the infidels]) to be disgusting and the conservative circles regarded the imitation of the *Frenks* (Europeans) to be blasphemy. The first change in attitude towards European civilization was realized after the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, which documented the Ottoman defeat against Europe.

As far as the exchange of cultural elements is concerned, this is a continuing process among all cultures.[3] When we speak of cultural elements, we mean all the cultural entities from weapons to fashion and public administration. Although the Ottomans accepted technical elements only up

[1] B. Barber, *Science and the Social Order* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1952); R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1949), part 4; G. Agoston, "Muslim-Christian Acculturation: Ottomans and Hungarians from Fifteenth to the Seventeenth Centuries", *Chrétiens et Musulmans à la Renaissance,* 293-303.

[2] Ziya Gökalp, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization,* trans, and pub. Niyazi Berkes, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959; C Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 97-125.

[3] M. D. Sahlins, *Evolution and Culture,* Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1960; E. E. Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change,* Homewood: Dorsey, 1962.

until the nineteenth century, thereafter they started to borrow from the West for the purpose of administration, laws and even customs. Along with these, there were also close cultural borrowings prior to the nineteenth century.[4]

It is necessary to consider those who separate cultural elements and value systems, in other words, those dependent on religion and those that are neutral.[5] Rejection of the elements that determine the cultural identity of the West is strong, especially in the period of collapse. We can place all of the technical and technological means and positive sciences within the neutral category. The manufacture of weapons, everything from the printing of currency to the customs administration, are included into this category. The Ottomans did not fear the West during their period of expansion and did not hesitate to borrow from the West. Ever since the beginning, they had not hesitated to adopt innovations that would aid in increasing their military efficiency. On the other hand, the techniques which we call neutral, moreover the items of trade, are also a part of a culture and those who use them enter into a process of acculturation.[6] The Ottoman upper class, when adopting cultural trends from the West, at the same time, like it or not, also started to imitate the customs related to life style and for this reason, the reactions of the traditional and conservative masses of people also emerged in the same period.

A cultural element does not spread solely due to its intrinsic value. The prestige of the individual or society that carries it is essential. The Ottomans adopted things related to the Western life style and value system only after the Treaty of Karlowetz in 1699. Prior to Yirmisekiz Mehmed Celebi,[7] no Ottoman felt or expressed admiration for the Western culture and civilization as he did. In other words, in the eighteenth century the West became an admired and imitated prestige-culture. In the homes of the important people at that time, along with roccoco architecture, Ottoman interiors started to be furnished in European styles. Thus, a hierarchy appears in the borrowing of cultural elements. The first and most important borrowings have been in weapons. Instruments for defense have a special importance in cultural exchange. A society, upon seeing that its own existence is under threat beyond its value

[4] N. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey,* Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964, 23-82. It gives summary on the subject of the cultural elements taken by the Ottomans from the West.

[5] Z. Gökalp (see footnote 2); E. M. Albert, "Value Systems", *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences.*

[6] A. Appadurai, ed., *Social Life of Things, Commodities in Cultural Perspective,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

[7] G. Veinstein, *Le Paradis des Infidèls,* Paris: F. Maspero, 1981; F. M. Göçek, *East Encounters West, France and the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century,* New York and London, 1987.

system alone, does not hesitate to obtain the weapons of the adversary. Here instinct and rational thought supersedes socio-psychological factors and value judgments. Ottoman Turkish history has provided clear examples of these. Actually, Islamic law, at the very beginning, has determined its definite behavior on this point: It is not against religion to imitate the weapons and the tactics of the adversary to defeat them.

The first sciences that were adopted from the West are also those related to defense. The *Mühendishane*s (Schools of Engineering) were opened in the eighteenth century as schools where positive sciences related to military sciences were taught.[8]

Texts in military technology, Western medicine and geography, because of their practical use have been transferred in the seventeenth century in the form of translations into Turkish,[9] but were only put into the school curricula of the vocational schools in the nineteenth century.

The Islamic ulema, who favored reforms, by exceedingly expanding the concept of weapons and instruments, included all kinds of means, science and technique into this concept which provided for the survival and benefit of Islam and the Islamic society. Ever since the birth of the Ottoman State, it entered into a process of acculturation with Europe according to this principle. The retreat in Rumelia against the invasion of Crusaders in 1444 was transformed into panic. The Ottoman rulers at that time did not hesitate to adopt the weapons and tactics of the adversary at that time. The *Wagenburg* war tactic, for example, was adopted at that time[10] and became one of the most important factors of the Ottoman conquests.

However, modern Turkey, which accepted the principles of science and socio-cultural necessities along with Western technology, as a whole, is a natural and final link of this development.[11]

When treating the conditions that played a role in the adoption of cultural elements, we briefly pointed to socio-psychological factors, such as need for defense, imitation, prestige and exoticism, that is, curiosity and admiration for foreign cultures. Besides these conditions, the conditions and factors such as

[8] K. Beydilli, *Türk Bilim ve Matbaacılık Tarihinde Mühendishane, Matbaa ve Kütüphane (1776-1826)* (The school of engineering, printing press and library in the history of Turkish science and printing [1776-1826]) (İstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 1995).

[9] A.A. Adıvar, *La Science chez les Turcs Ottomans* (Paris, 1939).

[10] See *Gazavât-i Sultan Murâd b. Mehemmed Hân* (The military expeditions of Sultan Murâd b. Mehemmed Hân), eds. H. İnalcık, and M. Oğuz (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1978).

[11] "Atatürk'ten Düşünceler" (Thoughts from Atatürk), ed. E.Z. Karal (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 1969), 49-51.

trade that provides social contact from the material aspect, port cities which are open to foreign trade,[12] existence of intermediary groups between the two cultures, exile and migration, religious conversion or the employment of foreign experts are also extremely important. Capitulations, settlement of Western merchant communities in port cities such as Galata, İzmir, Thessaloniki and Beirut, the Levantines, the intermediary Greeks, Jews, Armenians and finally converts to Islam have played a definite role in the cultural exchange of the Ottomans.[13] In the classical period in the fifteenth to sixteenth centuries, those who were exiled and converted to Islam were important carriers of culture. The Jewish migration from Spain to Turkey in 1492 paved the way for a significant technology transfer in the textile industries, weapons manufacture and other fields. Accepting exiled groups provides for a forced and rapid culture transfer instead of a long social acculturation (for example, the artists brought from Tabriz and Cairo by Sultan Selim I).

The Ottomans applied this method and also organized artists in groups at the court from various nations. In the art of painting and decoration the Anatolian Turks engaged in activities under the name of *Tâife-i Rûmîyan,* the Persians under the name of *Tâife-i Acemiyân* and the Europeans under the name of *Tâife-i Efrenciyân.* The physicians were also subject to such a differentiation. At the court engineers, artists and other technical persons from among the Europeans were collected in a section under the name of *Efrenciyan.* This system changed in the eighteenth century. The Europeans started to be employed as teachers at the vocational schools.

The socio-psychological and material conditions prepared for the transfer of modern scientific methods as an element of culture. However, it is essential for a certain socio-cultural ambience to have emerged in that society, which would guarantee the establishment and continuation of these methods. A modern observatory was established towards the end of the sixteenth century in Istanbul, but it did not survive. Also, in the eighteenth century, the printing press and the school of engineering was not sustained. Positive sciences had not developed in the Ottoman milieu, and therefore, neither technology transfer nor technological innovations took place.

The bureaucrats played a definite role in acculturation in Ottoman history. While the ulema tried to provide for the definite integrity and control of the religious law, the bureaucrats were subject to pragmatic thoughts such as the

[12] Çağlar Keyder, et al. *Doğu Akdeniz'de Liman Kentleri* [The port cities at the Eastern Mediterranean], İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayını, 1993.

[13] See H. D.-Grégoire, *Le Divan Magique,* Paris, 1998; L.T. Fawaz, *Merchants and Migrants in Nineteenth-Century Beirut,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

imminent needs of the state and society. For the bureaucrats, especially after 1700, to take all kinds of measures to provide security to improve the state was more important than anything else. Until that time, weapons, defense facilities and military tactics were being provided through practical methods through apprenticeship. In the eighteenth century, the reformist bureaucrats observed that this was not sufficient. The French, who were seeking an ally in the East against the Habsburgs and Russians, communicated to the Ottoman high officials at that time, that they were ready to teach Western technology, thus, the political and military interest of the West also played an important role in Ottoman Westernization. The positive sciences developed in Europe were introduced for the first time as a subject of systematic teaching at the schools of engineering.

In summary, it is necessary to study the Ottoman Westernization-modernization movements within the following framework. First was the period when the traditional guild system was dominant in the arts. Besides extensive state military production facilities, cannon factories, shipyards, potassium nitrate factories, steel works, mines and mints were among the most important organizations influenced by Western technology.[14]

In the reform period after 1700, Western methods were borrowed directly and finally positive sciences were employed through the state initiative. However, the need for military defense was always the main reason for the borrowings. After the 1839 Tanzimat period, the administrative methods and regulations also started to be borrowed and a serious dispute with the traditional system of values emerged in this period. At that time, the New Ottomans were saying that we are going to modernize by adopting the technology of the West, but we will reject their value system. Ziya Gökalp tried to incorporate this in a sociological system. Those who asserted that acculturation can be realized as a socio-cultural milieu and those who considered it to be necessary to develop a certain social structure for a complete modernization, merged this cultural policy only in the Republic period.

When it comes to Ottoman influence on the culture of Europe, the borrowings and influences can be treated separately. The borrowings as the result of direct contacts are clearly observed in the use of natural substances and manufactured goods. The influences on Europe are exoticism, romantic visions concerning the East, social customs, fashion, art, literature and forms of behavior. Besides the Turkish Ottoman exoticism accepted by the privileged

[14] *Osmanlılar ve Batı Teknolojisi, Yeni Araştırmalar, Yeni Görüşler* [The Ottomans and Western Technology, New Studies, New Views], ed. E. İhsanoğlu, İstanbul: 1992; D. Quataert, *Ottoman Manufacturing in the Age of the Industrial Revolution,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

class in France, it is necessary to differentiate these types of cultural borrowings of the French people in a more extensive manner. According to D. Gregoire, it is possible to mention the oriental influences, even in village circles.[15]

There was an "Ottoman" colony in France. Besides, a small number of Muslim Turks who went from the Ottoman domains in one way or another to France and settled there, Eastern Christians and Jews, played an intermediary role in cultural value transfers.

Ottoman ambassadors, starting from the fifteenth century and up until the end of the sixteenth century, visited the Italian states and France. As the result of the keen curiosity aroused about the clothing and customs by these visits, a Turkish fashion started among the high classes in these countries. The people would gather in the streets and watch with great interest the ambassador parade at the arrivals and departures of ambassadors. The visit of Yirmisekiz Mehmed Çelebi, the Ottoman ambassador, in Paris in 1720 was a significant stage in the spread of the Turkish fashion. According to what Herbette, the French ambassador, reported about Esseyid Ali Efendi, who lived in Paris as the resident ambassador in France in 1797, "Paris became almost one of the Istanbul districts". Grand visits like these were depicted in the paintings of the French artists. Actually, the French court tried to benefit from these visits in order to show off its prestige to the world and its people.

E. Charrière said that the frequent visits to Istanbul of the French ambassadors in the sixteenth century also paved the way to become acquainted with the life and culture of the Turks. Francis I especially wanted to hear details about Turks. At that time, every European state wanted to learn the secrets of Ottoman military superiority. Important information was provided about the Ottoman State and Turkey in the sixteenth century in the published works of certain ambassadors (J. Maurand, N. de Nicolay, B. de Montluc, Pierre Belon, Monsieur d'Aramon, Charles Du Fresne Du Cange, Jean Chesneau) and were complemented by detailed reports[16] of the Venetian Residents at the Sublime Porte. The reports of the ambassadors, because they used Greek and Armenian translators in Istanbul, also contain a lot of intentionally distorted information against the Turks. On the other hand, because the local non-Muslim dragomans could not always be trusted, by taking the *Giovanni della lingua* in Venice as an example, a school was established in Paris in 1721"during the reign of Louis XIV with the name of *Jeunes de Langues* to teach the French Ottoman Turkish

[15] *Le Divan Magique,* see footnote 13.

[16] E. Alberi, *Le relazioni degli ambasciatori Veneti al Senato durante il secolo decimosesto,* Florence, 1839-1863; André Laval, *Voyages en Levant pendant Its XVIe, VIIe et XVIlle siècles,* Budapest, 1897.

and the Eastern languages at an early age and the young men taught here would be sent to serve at the embassies and consulates. At the same time, with this school, the foundation was laid for serious scholarship on the Eastern languages and cultures. Concomitantly, translators connected to the Council of State and the Translation Bureau in the nineteenth century became counterparts of this trend..[17]

Besides official visits, the children and servants brought to France with the French ambassadors or consuls when they returned to France, were converted to Christianity by giving them Catholic religious training in Paris. Of course, it is known that female slaves cum servants who had received Turkish-Ottoman training were also brought to France in this manner. Exoticism in the eighteenth century has become more widespread with the influences of the Turkish Fashion *(turquerie).* We know that in 1700, 12 scholarships were granted to Armenian children to be trained in the Catholic religion in Paris. Even around the beginning of the seventeenth century permission was given for Jesuit and Capuc hin missionaries to engage in activities in Ottoman domains. They spread Catholicism, especially among the Armenians and Greeks. These Greeks and Armenians, because they knew the Turkish language and cultural traits were also used as translators. The following is an interesting incident: In 1743, the King permitted Marechal de Saxe to form a unit composed of Turkish, Tatar, Wallachian and Polish cavalrymen.

We also observe Muslim merchants who went back and forth to Marseilles and Southern France as Turkish-Ottomans or who settled there. In 1728, the Paşa of Crete intervened upon the cheating by the French of some Muslim merchants who imported olive oil to Marseilles. The French authorities were being careful about such incidents, fearing that counter-measures could be taken against their merchants in Ottoman domains. Particularly, the Greeks, Armenians and Jews drew attention as merchants. Armenians formed the most important Eastern Christian colony. We know that in the fifteenth century, Muslim merchants and agents were also settled in Italy and that the famous *Fondaco dei Turchi* palace was allocated for the residence of Muslim merchants.[18]

The following is another interesting incident: It is mentioned that there were women of Turkish origin in the court of the French Queen Marie de Medicis, who were weaving Turkish carpets for her. In this manner, in 1568 in Paris the Muslim carpet makers had formed a corporation of weaving Turkish

[17] Frederic Hitzel, *Enfants de langue et drogmans: Dil Oğlanları ve Tercümanlar,* İstanbul 1995; and C. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte. 1789-1922,* Princeton, 1980.

[18] Ş. Turan, *Türkiye-İtalya İlişkileri* [Turkey-Italy relations], vol. 1, İstanbul, 1990.

rugs. This production appears to have been completely halted in the seventeenth century.

Especially in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, a rather large Muslim colony in France was formed of Turkish galley slaves. Around the end of the seventeenth century more than one thousand persons were used as galley slaves in the French fleet. Among these, 20 percent were Turks. Turks were particularly preferred as strong oarsmen. Most of these galley slaves were purchased slaves. The galley slaves were able to participate in the social life freely. We see them running coffee shops and as boatmen. Thus, they were in daily contact with the local people in Marseilles. It has been recorded that some of them sent money to their families at home. The Turkish galley slaves wore red fezzes and thus, they were distinguished from the others. Also, an interesting group is composed of Frenchmen who had become prisoners of the Ottomans and lived among the Turks and later were saved by ransom. Moreover, there were French people who had stayed for a long period of time in the service of the consuls and ambassadors at the Ottoman ports and who later returned to France. Naturally, they carried the customs that they have observed there to their own countries. In the meantime, clergymen and missionaries had an important place in cultural exchange. These missionaries, by collecting alms, were carrying out special activities to bring back to their countries the Christians who had been taken prisoner in the Ottoman State.

Besides the French, who obtained free trade privileges in the entire Ottoman Empire with the 1569 capitulations, after Lepanto (1571) the Ottomans, by realizing the importance of the English and Dutch against Spain on the seas, granted capitulations to the English in 1580 and the Dutch in 1612. M. Fontenay[19] examined an important report by the French E. G. d'Ortiers on trade with the Levant in 1686-1687, which determined that in the annual balance sheet Western merchants brought goods worth 3, 735, 000 *gruş* and purchased goods worth 4, 735, 000 gruş in return (1 gruş is about two thirds of a gold coin). The Western merchants were paying for the trade deficit with gold and silver currency. There was a fierce competition among the French, English and Dutch at the Levantine ports and all of them were dependent on the capitulation privileges given by the Ottoman sultan. The sultan, when granting these privileges, primarily took into consideration the political and military usefulness for the Ottomans of that Western state. Towards the end of the

[19] For capitulations see "İmtiyāzāt" (privileges) in M. Fontenay. "Le commerce de occidentaux dans les écnelles du Levant vers la fin du XVIIe siècle", *Chrétiens et Musulmans à le Renaissance,* 337-370; for the eighteenth century see E. Eldem, *French Trade in Istanbul in the Eighteenth Century,* Leiden: Brill, 1999.

seventeenth century, the English were ahead in this trade and the French and Dutch were about equal.

Trade relations of the Turkish-Ottoman world, especially with France, were extremely active. The importance of this trade is set forth in research made in the archives of the Chamber of Commerce in Marseilles, which was the center of this trade. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries half of the French trade was composed of trade made with the Levant. Especially, the work written by Paul Masson on this trade, by making use of these archives, contains interesting details.[20] We learn from the palace inventories that starting from the fourteenth century, Western Anatolian carpets were imported and used as a luxury item in the palaces in France. The carpets were used not only on the floors, but also on tables and chairs. The carpet trade, starting from the fourteenth century, constituted a significant portion of the trade not only with the French, but also between the European countries and the Ottoman Empire. The valuable Gördes, Uşak and other carpets shipped to Central Europe via *Erdel* (Transylvania) are displayed today in a rich collection at the Braşov Cathedral in Transylvania. The designs and colors of the Turkish carpets were admired by the German, Italian and Dutch master painters (Lotto, Carpaccio, Holbein, etc.) and were copied in their paintings. Today, we learn the characteristics of the old, lost Ottoman art of carpets from these paintings. In the lead of the other articles which had an important place in the trade made with Europe was alum (Kütahya and Şebinkarahisar alum) used in the dyeing of cloth and it brought significant gains to the Ottoman Empire. Besides this, pearls from the Persian Gulf were an important trade item. Animal products, especially wool and leather made up for a significant portion of this trade. Beeswax, vegetable dyes, the coral from Tunisia, and the processed morocco leather were among these. Vegetable products, and up until 1630 Indian spices imported to Europe from the Levantine ports constituted a prosperous trade item. Exports from the Ottoman Empire of items such as saffron, opium, Yemen coffee which was an important trade item, rice, dates, dried fruits, figs, raisins, olive oil and wine, exported in large quantities from Western Anatolia and the Aegean islands were particularly significant. The situation changed considerably in the eighteenth century. This trade lost its former importance with the goods coming from India and Arabia. For instance, sugar, coffee and cotton were now raised in the colonies in America. Moreover, it is known that Brazilian coffee was imported to the Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Yemen coffee was exported to Europe as the best quality coffee.

[20] P. Masson, *Histoire du Commerce Français dans le Levant,* vols. 1-2, Paris, 1928; R. Paris, *Histoire du commerce de Marseille,* Paris, 1997.

Besides the wool industry, the history of the European silk and cotton textile industry cannot be comprehended without taking into consideration Levantine influence from the aspect of weaving, dyeing techniques and design.[21] Up until the eighteenth century, Europe imported coarse and fine cotton goods from India and the Ottoman Empire. Cotton goods started to be consumed by the masses of people in Europe after 1700 and when consumption reached great dimensions, each of the mercantilist European states established a cotton industry and started to imitate Oriental products. Europe could not compete in price, because the labor costs were low in this industry in India and Turkey. Then, the Europeans started to think about how to overcome this competition in labor cost and this economic pressure led the inventors to discover the steam engine in the cotton industry. This situation in Europe has been one of the important factors of the industrial revolution. The secrets of the "Turkish crimson" in dyeing, were solved only after extensive efforts and secretly bringing non-Muslim experts from the Ottoman lands to Europe. [22]

Stages in Mutual Cultural Influence

The history of European cultural influences on the Ottomans appears in the early periods and should be discussed in the following stages. The first was in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries along with Byzantine and Greek influences and especially, when the Italian influence was strong. Extensive conversion to Islam of the Greeks, marriages with Greek women and extensive employment of the Greeks in political, financial and commercial fields by the Conqueror, left unerasable traces in the life and culture of the Ottomans.[23] In the fifteenth century, the strong influence represented by the Italians on

[21] *Oriental Carpet and Textile Studies, II, Carpets of the Mediterranean, 1400-1600,* eds. R. Pinner, and W. B. Denny, London, 1986; for information about the items belonging to the Turks in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the valuable collection at the palace of the Nancy Duchy see Paulette Choné, "Le portrait du Turc, les artistes devant le reve héroique de la Maison de Lorraine (XVI-XVIIe siècles) ", *Chrétiens et Musulmans à la Renaissance,* 61-75.

[22] Flachat, *Observations sur le commerce et les arts d'une partie de l'Europe et de l'Asie, de l'Afrique et même de Indes orientales,* Lyon, 1766.

[23] Theodore Spandouynes, *On the Origin of the Ottoman Emperors,* trans. D. M. Nicol, Cambridge, 1997; D.M. Nicol, *The Last Centuries of Byzantium, 1261-1453,* Cambridge, 1993; N. Jorga, *Byzance après Byzance,* Bucharest, 1935; A. Ducellier, "Byzantins et Turcs du XIIe au XVI siècle," *Chrétiens et Musulmans à la Renaissance,* 11-49; H. İnalcık, "The Status of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch under the Ottomans," *Essays in Ottoman History,* İstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 1998, 195-223; F. W. Hasluck, *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans,* vols. 1-2, Oxford, 1929.

Ottoman life and culture, has not yet been the subject of a thorough study.[24] The Conqueror, like the Italian patron princes in art, was protecting the Greek and Italian scholars and artists in his palace. In addition, he established a palace library of the works of the ancient Greek and Latin classics. Even if it were an exaggeration to define (Deismann) the Conqueror as a Renaissance ruler, very important cultural influences of the Italian Renaissance cannot be denied. It is hardly a coincidence that great Italian painters such as Gentile Bellini visited the Ottoman palace and some of them to presented major projects to the Ottoman sultan (Leonardo da Vinci's bridge and other construction projects were found in the Topkapı Palace and were published).[25] The Conqueror had the walls of the palace decorated with the frescoes of the Italian painters. The *alla turca* fashion in Italy can be considered to be the first stage of the *turquerie* (Turkish fashion) in the West. Tursun Bey, who wrote the history of the Conqueror, states that besides the *Rûmî* and *Hatayî* styles in art, there is also the Italian influence known under the name of *tavr-i Frengi* (European style).

The Venetians and Genoese established independent colonies in Constantinople and Galata, in the Crimea, on the Aegean islands and in Greece during the period of collapse of the Byzantine Empire and prohibited the local population from participating in major overseas trading.[26] Mehmed the Conqueror abolished the political control of the Italians in the Levant, but considered it to be necessary to continue economic relations with them. Venice, which had a quasi trade monopoly between the Near East and Europe, thanks to the capitulations providing free trade in the Levant during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is indebted to this cooperation for its prosperity and brilliant cultural successes during those centuries.[27]

When the Conqueror entered into war against the Venetians in the period between 1463-1479, he granted the Florentines commercial capitulations and displayed a close interest in them. The Florentines who exchanged the valuable woolen cloth in Bursa with Persian raw silk, owed, to a great extent, their affluence and prosperity to this trade in the fifteenth century. This trade

[24] Ş. Turan, *Türkiye-İtalya İlişkileri* [Turkey-Italy relations], vol. 1, İstanbul, 1990; F. Babinger, "Maometto II il Conquistatore e l'Italia," *Revista Storica Italiana* 63, 1951, Turkish translation, "Fatih Sultan Mehmed ve İtalya" [Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror and Italy], trans. B. S. Baykal, *Belleten* 17/65 (1953): 41-82.

[25] F. Babinger, "Vier Bauvorschläge Lenonardo da Vincis an Sultan Bayazid II," *Nachr. Der Akad. Der Vissens. in Göttingen,* Phil. Hist. Kl. No. 1, 1958.

[26] M. Balard, *La Romanie Génoise,* vol. 2 (Paris, 1978), 572.

[27] H. İnalcık, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Ekonomik ve Sosyal Tarihi I, 1300-1600* [The Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, I, 1300-1600] (İstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 2000), 283-296.

developed further after 1463. In the 1500s, Florentine companies which exported woolen cloth, including the Medici family, had trade agencies in Pera, Bursa and Edirne. The Florentines at Galata celebrated the Conqueror's victories against Venice. Moreover, at one stage the Sultan attended a feast given at the mansion of *emino* Carlo Martelli at Pera and displayed a close interest.

In this period, technological exchange between Italy and the Ottomans was at an advanced level. Sultan Bayezid II brought engineers from Genoa to have them build the largest ships which sailed in the Mediterranean. Almost all of the Ottoman maritime expressions are borrowed from Italian.[28] The Italy-Ottoman trade was vital for both sides and the first European communities in the Middle East emerged in this manner.[29] It is mentioned that a total of five thousand families from Venice were settled in the Middle East at the end of the fifteenth century.

As a result of these close relations, it is understood that a type of "Europeanization", even in the life style and customs, was rather widespread among the upper class Ottomans in the fifteenth century. In the Ottoman anonymous history books, reflecting the reactions of the ordinary conservative people, those who had their beards and moustaches cut like the Europeans were strongly chastized. [30]

In later centuries, besides the Italians, other Europeans also came and settled to a great extent in the port cities and these relations reached great dimensions in the nineteenth century when trade relations were intensified. In the nineteenth century in Istanbul, the European banks, insurance, pier, etc. companies increased, especially after the Crimean War (1853-1856). At that time, Galata assumed the appearance of a cosmopolitan European port city, like Marseilles. The first municipal assembly and services were realized at Galata with the initiative and participation of the Europeans.[31] In the period between 1800 and 1912 the Christians and Europeans constituted 20-30 percent of the population in Thessaloniki, another port city.

The Greek, Armenian and Jewish translator families, who had served at the European embassies and consulates in the previous centuries and who had

[28] A. Tietze, H. Kahane, and R. Kahane, *Lingua Franca in the Levant,* İstanbul, 1988.

[29] For Italian-Ottoman trade see W. Heyd (1936), Ş. Turan (1990) and H. İnalcık (2000).

[30] *Anonim Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osman* (Anonymous history of the Ottoman Dynasty), ed. F. Giese (Breslau, 1922), reign of Yıldırım Bayezid.

[31] For Galata in the nineteenth century see C. White, *Three Years in Constantinople or Domestic Manners of the Turks in 1844,* vols. 1-3, London, 1845; E. Eldem, D. Goffman, and B. Masters, *The Ottoman City Between East and West: Aleppo, Izmir and Istanbul,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

obtained a number of exemptions from the Porte, formed a Europeanized domestic community called *Levantin* (Levantine) at Galata in the nineteenth century. Greeks, Armenians and Jews from other districts in Istanbul settled at Galata in the nineteenth century. The schools of the Europeans and Levantines at Galata (Alliance Israelite Universelle, Dames de Sion, etc.) provided European education and also attracted the children of wealthy Muslim families. We also observe developments similar to these in port cities such as Thessaloniki, Beirut and Alexandria. These European and Levantine communities, which were gradually becoming more crowded, brought social services such as churches, schools, theaters, libraries, restaurants and beer halls, that are peculiar to European city life to the districts where they lived and the Ottoman upper classes started to frequent these places and to imitate the customs of "European" life. The Englishman Charles White, who lived in Istanbul in the 1840s, wrote that the members of the Ottoman upper classes no longer shopped at the traditional *Kapalı Çarşı* (Covered Bazaar), but they preferred to shop at Beyoğlu.[32] A common French language at Galata started to be spoken as *lingua franca* and a completely European-like life style started to be imitated. In the Tanzimat Westernization period, the youth in the distant Anatolian cities as well, showed a great desire to go to Europe and to learn French.

Regarding mutual influence, the Italian period was followed by the French period between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Ever since the French-Ottoman alliance against the Habsburgs started around 1525, the Levant trade of France prospered and the cultural mutual influence started, even though limited.

II. The Italian Wars (1494-1559) and the Ottomans, the Balance of Power System in Europe, the Ottoman-French Alliance (1525-1547)[33]

The Italian Wars period (1494-1559), was a time of difficult wars between the Holy Roman-German Emperors and France, aiming at domination in Europe. In 1519, the French Valois and the Habsburgs, which were the two strongest dynasties in Europe confronted each other for the crown of the Empire. Charles V became the inheritor of a world empire as a result of his family connections. In addition to Spain and Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium of today, the

[32] Charles White, *Three Years in Constantinople*, vol. 1, see footnote 31.

[33] The following work includes French archival documents on the French-Ottoman relations between 1527-1647: E. Charrière, *Négociations de la France dans le Levant,* vols. 1-4 (Paris, 1848-1860); in general see the section written in volume 1 of this work: "Osmanlı Tarihinin Dönemleri" [The periods of Ottoman history].

Spanish colonies and Burgundy in France, were also united under his crown. In 1519, Charles V and Francis I, the French king, were candidates for the crown of the Empire. Both of them were promising that they would go on a crusade against the Turks. At that time, all of Europe was in fear of an Ottoman onslaught. The German electoral princes elected Charles V as the emperor. As of that moment, to capture the rich, but divided Italy, was the basic objective of both of these rulers. Plans for the Crusades were postponed. Venice, Florence, the Papacy, the Kingdom of Naples and Milan joined either one side or the other in this struggle in Italy. The 1494-1559 Italian wars brought a new concept onto the agenda in the relations between states in the history of Europe. Now, the basic issue was as follows: Emperor Charles V had the ambition of uniting Europe under the sovereignty of a single empire, as it was the case in the Middle Ages. The subject matter of propaganda used the most for this political goal was to protect Europe against the Turks and to start a crusader campaign. Whereas, at that period, national states, such as France and England, had emerged, and each state was determined to defend its own independence against the emperor. The French, English and German princes did not consider it a drawback to engage in relations with any foreign power that would support their independence against the emperor. In other words, at that time, a policy of balance among independent states, a European system of states, had emerged.[34] England was one of the states that closely watched such a balance policy. The English King Henry VIII called this policy the *bascule policy* by siding with the weak against the strong. On the side of the European states, that were seeking balance, the Ottoman State that was arising as a world power in the East, would play an important role as an actual member of this system of states.[35] Every state, which felt itself threatened by the Emperor, would apply to this super power in the east or would threaten to use it. In response to the crusader threat, the Ottoman State would strongly support this balance policy to keep Europe divided. Thus, in this connection, it would become a part of the European states system all on its own. Led by France, the European states would try to guarantee the balance as an ally of the Ottoman Empire in response to the colossal empire of Charles V in the period between 1525-1559. We will discuss below these developments in somewhat further detail.

[34] C. Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe,* Princeton, 1975.

[35] The dramatic meeting between these two "super powers" in Europe led the great German historian L. von Ranke to write a book: *The Ottoman and the Spanish Empires in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,* trans. W. R. Kelley, London, 1843; J. Elliott, "Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry: The European Perspective", *Süleyman the Second and His Time,* İstanbul: ISIS, 1993, 153-162; for details see Kenneth Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571),* vols. 1-4, Philadelphia, 1976-1984; for a good summary see D. Vaughan, *Europe and the Turk,* Liverpool, 1954.

a. The Ottoman State is the Protector of France

Charles V inflicted a terrible defeat on the French army at Pavia in Northern Italy and took the King as prisoner (24 February 1525). The prisoner King was brought to Madrid by Charles V and put in prison. France, like it or not, sought its salvation by applying to the great power in the East, to the Magnificent Sultan Süleyman. The Emperor freed Francis I on 14 January 1526, with the condition that he would abandon his aspirations in Italy. The request for help by the mother of the French King and the response sent by Sultan Süleyman were found in the French archives and published.[36] The text is below.

> Ben ki, Sultanus'selâtîn ve burhânu'l-havâkîn tâc-bahş -i husrevân-i rûy-i zemîn zillulâh fi'l-ardayn Akdeniz'in ve Karadeniz'in ve Rumeli'nin ve Anadolu'nun ve Karaman'ın ve Rum'un ve vilâyet-i Zulkadriyye'nin ve Diyarıbekr'in ve Kurdistan ve Azerbaycan'ın ve Şam'ın ve Haleb'in ve Mısır'ın ve Medine'nin ve Kudüs'ün ve külliyen diyâr-i Arab'ın ve Yemen'in ve dahi nice memleketlerin ki âbây-i kirâm ve ecdâd-i izâmım anârallâhu berâhinehim kuvvet-i kâhireleri ile feth eyledikleri ve cenâb-i celâlet-meâbım dahi tîg-i âteşbâr ve şemşîr-i zafer-nigârım ile feth eyledüğüm nice diyârın sultanı ve pâdişâhı Sultan Bayezid Han oğlu Sultan Selim Han oğlu Sultan Süleyman Han'ım.

You are King Francis of the French province:

> Dergâh-i selâtin-penâhıma yarar adamın Frangipan ile mektup gönderip ve bazi ağız haberi dahi ısmarlayıp memleketinize düşman müstevlî olup, elân habsde idüğünüzü i'lâm edüp halâsınız hususunda bu cânibten inâyet ve meded istid'â eylemişsiz, her ne ki demiş iseniz, benüm pâye-i serîr-i âlem-masîrime arz olunup 'alâ-sebîli't-tafsîl ilm-i şerîfim muhît olup tamam ma'lûmum oldu. İmdî padişâhlar sınmak ve habs olunmak 'aceb değildir, gönlünüzü hoş tutup azürde-hâtır olmayasız. Öyle olsa, bizim âbâ-yi kirâm ve ecdâd-i 'izâmımız nevver-

[36] It is known that in a letter written by Ferdinand 18 days after the Pavia battle, Francis I was thinking to request help from the Sultan and that he had established relations with the Bosnian Pasha; see Charrière, 113, note I; this letter has been published in Charrière and in *Paléographie Universelle* (Paris, 1839) and by R. Yinanc, *DTCF Dergisi* 8-12 (1975), 96.

allâhu merâkidehim dâimâ def-i düşmân ve feth-i memâlik için seferden hâlî olmayup biz dahi anların tarîkine sâlik olup herzamanda memleketler ve sa'b ve hasîn kaleler feth eyleyüp gece gündüz atımız eğerlenmiş ve kılıcımız kuşanılmıştır. Hak subhâne ve ta'âlâ hayırlar müesser eyleyüp meşiyyet ve irâdeti neye müteallik olmuş ise vücûde gele. Bâkî ahvâl ve ahbâr ne ise mezkûr ademinizden istintâk olunup ma'lûmunuz ola; şöyle bilesiz. Tahrîren fî evâil-i şehr-i âhiru'l-rebî'ayn li senet-i isnayn ve salâsîn ve tis'amia. Bi makâm-i dâri's-saltanat-il 'aliyye al-Kostantaniyye el mahmiyye el mahrûse.

The English version of this letter is as follows: "You have sent a letter with your ambassador Frangipan to the gate where the rulers take shelter and also sent some verbal news to inform us that your country is under enemy occupation and at present you are in prison and you are asking help from us for your release. Whatever you said, is submitted to the feet of our throne holding the world under his rule. I have been informed about all the details. It is not something to be amazed about for the rulers to be defeated and taken prisoner. Keep your spirit up and do not be sad. Under these conditions, our great ancestors -May God shed light on all of their graves- never refrained from expeditions to always repulse the enemies and to conquer countries. We are also on their course and are always conquering countries and precipitous fortresses. Day and night our horses are always saddled and we carry our swords at our waists. May the great God give good fortune. Whatever God wishes, it will happen. Please know that you can ask and learn from the messenger you sent about all other news and situations other than these.

This correspondence was written in the first days of the fourth month of the lunar year in AH 932 (January 1526) at the court of the sultan in Constantinople."

In the introductory section of this letter, Süleyman describes the grandeur of his sultanate and mentions France as a province compared to his country and its ruler as an ordinary King without using any title. Only a "verbal news" was sent by the ambassador about the decisions taken to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of it.

Süleyman kept his promise. According to Nasûh Matrakî, the court historian of the period, the Sultan decided on the 1526 Hungarian campaign for the following reason: The "King of the French province" who was taken prisoner, "took refuge" in the sultan "to show that he is ready to serve with respect" and sent an ambassador and wanted the sultan to make a campaign on the King of Hungary, who was an ally of Charles V. According to Matrakî, the King said, "we will obey him and be one of his servants". It was known at the

Ottoman palace that Charles V and Francis I had been struggling for the title of emperor of the Holy Roman Empire in Europe.

After conquering Hungary (the battle of Mohács, 29 August 1526), Süleyman found Charles V and his brother Ferdinand against him as rivals and a period of wars that lasted for one and one-half centuries was started for the supremacy in Europe and the Hungarian Kingdom between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs. In Vienna, while Archduke Ferdinand claimed that he was the legal inheritor of the Hungarian King Louis II (1516-1526), who died in the Mohács battle, Sultan Süleyman claimed his sword right, saying that by being defeated in the battle all of the rights of the Hungarian king were removed and that Hungary belonged to him.[37]

In the period between 1526 and 1547, the difficult struggle between the Emperor and the Pope with the Ottoman State continued on two fronts, on the land front in Central Europe and on the sea front in the Mediterranean while a Sacred Alliance would be formed in 1538 against the Ottomans with the efforts of the Pope.

When Ferdinand defeated the newly elected Hungarian King John Zápolya and entered Budin, Zápolya requested help from Süleyman. The Sultan recognized Zápolya as the sole king of Hungary and stated that he would come to help with his army (1527). The Grand Vizier İbrahim Paşa said to Zápolya's ambassador, "We will make Budin a second Istanbul"; he was announcing plans for the future against the Habsburgs. The following spring Sultan Süleyman declared to Ferdinand's ambassadors that besides the Hungarian Kingdom, all the rulers of the Christian world, including France, Poland, Venice and Transylvania, were actually under the protection of the sultan. In 1527, Sultan Süleyman was openly claiming his supremacy over the entire Western Christian world against the emperor and was referring to Emperor Charles V as only the "King of Spain" in diplomatic contacts and correspondence. The Siege of Vienna in 1529 demonstrated the objective of Sultan Süleyman's claims. The European Empire claim of the Ottoman sultan was also proven with the ordering in Venice in 1532 of a magnificent imperial crown and the *regalia,* representing the symbols of the Western rulers (throne with jewels, scepter, gold chain hung on the neck, etc.).[38] All of these were

[37] For what İbrahim Pasha said to Ferdinand's ambassador see J. von Hammer, *Devlet-i Osmaniye Tarihi* [History of the Ottoman State], Atâ trans., vol. 5, İstanbul, AH 1330, 77-81.

[38] See Otto Kurz and especially Gülru Necipoğlu, "Süleyman the Magnificent and the Representation of Power in the Context of Ottoman Hapsburg-Papal Rivalry," *Süleyman the Second and His Time,* eds. H. İnalcık, and C. Kafadar, İstanbul: Isis Press, 1993, 163-194.

being realized with the suggestions of Aloisio Gritti,[39] the illegitimate son of the Doge of Venice, who was the Sultan's adviser in European matters and the Grand Vizier İbrahim Paşa, who had the nickname of "Frenk" (European).

Besides the Ottoman symbols of sovereignty following the Central Asian and Persian tradition, such as the horsetail attached to a standard as a sign of rank, horse and flag, military band, plumed ornament attached to the turban, the sun and moon motif on materials and buildings, depiction of the bird of paradise on rugs and baldachins, now the *regalia* of Europe came to express the new concept of empire dreamed of by the sultan. The imperial crown, which was made for Sultan Süleyman who claimed to unite in his person the Eastern and Western Empire, like "Alexander the Great", was made in Venice and was delivered on 12 May 1532 to the Grand Vizier İbrahim Paşa just at the start of Sultan Süleyman's campaign to Vienna.[40]

Charles V had been declared the Holy Roman Emperor in a great ceremony at Bologna in 1529 and after he was coronated in Rome in 1530, his emperorship was celebrated with a magnificent parade in the company of Pope Clement VII. In 1532 during Sultan Süleyman's German campaign, in the brilliant parade made in the presence of the Habsburg ambassadors in Niş, Süleyman was challenging Charles V for the *regnum mundi* (rule of the world).[41] According to the ambassadors at the parade in Niş, Süleyman "was sitting on a golden throne and was wearing a *keyserliche kron* (imperial crown) on his head worth 115 thousand golden ducats". Süleyman, during this fifth campaign in 1532, summoned Charles V to a major battle and said that the emperorship is determined by the sword at the battlefield. The sultan departed from Istanbul on 25 April 1532 with 300 cannons and a 100 thousand strong army. The small (Köszeg) fortress near Vienna detained him between 8-28 August. Charles V was not there. The campaign season had passed. The attack on Vienna was given up. A 16 thousand strong army under the command of Kasım Bey advanced into the interior of Germany and let terror loose. The following year a cease-fire was signed between the Sultan and Charles V and Süleyman went on a campaign to the east to conquer Tabriz and Baghdad.

In 1532, on the sea front, Charles V's fleet struck a surprising blow to the Ottomans and seized Coron, an important port on the southern coast of Morea.

[39] For the importance of Aloisio Gritti in the European foreign relations of the sultan see A. Decei, "Aloisio Gritti au service de Soliman Le Magnifique d'après des documents turcs inédits (1533-1534)," with the contributions of C. Feneşan, and J. L Bacqué-Grammont, *Anatolia Moderna-Yeni Anadolu,* vol. 3 (1992), 1-103.

[40] For a comparison of this four layered magnificent crown, for which 115 thousand gold coins was paid, with the crowns made for the emperor and pope see G. Necipoğlu, footnote 38, 163-170.

[41] Ibid., 170-181.

Ferdinand and Charles V used Coron as a trump for peace with Süleyman. Upon the fall of Coron, the Ottoman State Council realized the necessity of making definite decisions for the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean was becoming the main scene of the struggle against Charles V. Barbaros Hayreddin (Barbarossa), the sea wolf, who had terrorized the Christians in the Mediterranean and who captured Algeria, was summoned to Istanbul and received by the sultan. He was appointed as the captain of the entire Ottoman fleet with the title of *Kapudân-i Derya* (Captain of the Seas). Thus, the fleet of the state and the fleet of the pirates were united under a single command. Barbaros recaptured Coron the next year and settled in Tunisia. When Süleyman was on his Persian campaign (1533-1536), Charles V came and occupied Tunisia.[42] During the difficult struggle in the Western Mediterranean against Spain, the Ottoman Council of State considered an alliance with France necessary. Negotiations between the two states started with the ambassadors sent by the Captain of the Seas in July 1533. At that time, Charles V, encouraged by his successes in the Mediterranean, announced that he would capture Istanbul at the head of the Christian Crusader armies.

In 1537 the Ottoman State was in a state of war with Venice. The struggle in the Mediterranean gained prime importance. After the loss of Tunisia, diplomatic relations with France were accelerated and the French ambassador Jean de la Forest came to Istanbul in February 1535. Among the articles of the alliance, it was included that the Ottoman fleet together with the French naval forces would attack Sicily, Sardinia, Naples and Spain, which were held by Charles V and would recapture Tunisia. Francis I would occupy Italy and enter Lombardy, while the Ottomans would occupy Naples. Thus, the Ottoman State assumed an active role in the Italian wars and was determining its own share of the spoils. Ever since the conquest of Otranto by Mehmed the Conqueror in 1480, the Ottomans had always kept the invasion of Italy an option in their plans of conquest. In May 1537 a 160 galley fleet under the command of Lûtfî Paşa weighed anchor and sailed into the Mediterranean. The French and Ottomans would meet in the Adriatic and the Sultan's army would make a landing on Corfu Island and from there would invade southern Italy. It was mentioned in the Venetian senate that Sultan Süleyman showed the target by saying, "to Rome, to Rome'. At this date, there was no doubt that Sultan Süleyman was determined to invade Italy. During this operation, Barbaros attacked Apulia in southern Italy and the French occupied Savoie in October. Money and supplies were sent from Istanbul to the French fleet, which had

[42] S. Deswarte-Rosa, "L'expédition de Tunis (1535)," Chr*étiens et Musulmans à la Renaissance,* Actes de 37. Colloque International du CESR (1994), eds. B. Bennassar, and R. Sauzet (Paris, 1998).

come to the Aegean Sea. The Ottoman-French alliance against the Sacred Alliance in 1538, showed that the period of the Crusaders had finally come to an end. The fleet of the Sacred Alliance advanced to the vicinity of Preveza to reach the Aegean Sea and there the great sea victory of Barbaros against Andrea Doria was realized on 27 September 1538. Superiority of the Ottoman navy in the Mediterranean in the period between 1538 and 1571, was an accomplished fact.

b. Ottoman-French Cooperation in the Mediterranean

The Ottoman State finally made peace with Venice in October 1540 and it was invited to join the French-Ottoman alliance against Charles V. When Süleyman set off on a new campaign against Charles V's forces in Hungary in 1541, Barbaros was cooperating with the French fleet at sea. Against the powerful fleet of the Emperor under the command of the Genoese Admiral Doria, the French fleet could only withstand them with the cooperation of Barbaros.

It is worth mentioning that the Emperor and Francis I were engaged at the same time in a war of propaganda against each other for Christian Europe. Accusing Francis I for making an alliance with the great enemy of Christendom and for betraying the religion, Charles V was distributing pamphlets in French for this purpose. Francis I continued to deny the alliance, however secret negotiations with the Ottoman government were being carried out through ambassadors. This war of propaganda between Francis I and Charles V was actually aimed at the German princes in Germany. Charles V was expending great efforts to obtain the military aid of the princes against the Ottomans, while Francis was declaring that he was avoiding activities that might encourage Sultan Süleyman. Francis I, in a letter he sent on a January 1543[43] to the German princes gathered at Nuremberg, emphasizes the unity of the western Christians that he called "the Christian republic", reminded that he had promised to join the Crusader Army against the Turks with an army of 30 thousand persons and declared that he did not make an "alliance and cooperation" with the Ottoman sultan, but only a temporary cease-fire. As for Charles V, he was claiming that he could not continue the war against the Turks because of the attacks of Francis I, who had been incited by the sultan. The French king rejected the accusations and asserted that Charles V with his attacks against the Turks was actually provoking them in order to gain fame in

[43] Charrière, vol. 1, 558-559; the letters written by Antoine Arlier between 1527-1547 contain interesting information. It summarized the letter of Sultan SüIeyman to Francis I, see J. N. Pendergrass, *Correspondence d'Antoine Arlier humaniste languedocien (1527-1547)* (Geneva, 1990); for a summary see R. Sauzet, "Les relations entre Chrétiens et musulmans du midi de la France," *Chrétiens et Musulmans à la Renaissance.* 263-274.

the Christian world. Francis I made promises to the German princes that he would be siding with Germany against the Turks, as required by his title of Tres *Chretien.* In fact, Francis I, in the peace agreements he made intermittently with Charles V, was promising to join the Crusader campaigns. In spite of all the propaganda, there was no doubt that the fight was actually a struggle for domination and balance in Europe.

Barbaros Hayreddin at Toulon

In the spring of 1543, when Sultan Süleyman departed once again from Istanbul to march to Hungary, the Ottoman fleet under the command of Barbaros Hayreddin sailed and a very interesting and new phase of the Ottoman-French alliance started.

Sultan Süleyman was aware of the duplicities of Francis I and was trying to dissuade the king to abandon this hypocritical stance through his ambassadors, however in the end, he behaved with understanding and refrained from applying too much pressure and in spite of everything, he did not want to lose this valuable alliance, which was keeping the Christian world divided. Barbaros' fleet arrived at the Italian shores that summer. In fear, the Pope in Rome requested intermediation from Francis I. Upon this, Hayreddin was able to purchase the necessary provisions for the fleet and avoided attacking the Papal territories. According to the agreement, from the moment Barbaros entered into French waters, the necessary provisions for the fleet would be provided by the French. The fleet arrived at the port of Marseilles on 20 July 1543. The Ottoman fleet was composed of 110 galley ships, 40 small galley ships and 3 large-sailed ships with high freeboards. Barbaros saluted the city with cannon fire. The Captain of the Seas was met with a splendid ceremony in Marseilles. The people, who heard that he would arrive in the city, came running from distant places and were anxiously waiting to see this legendary pirate close up. At the banquet given by the city dignitaries, Barbaros sat with grandeur in *a* chair like a throne in front of the French, who were watching him with eyes full of curiosity.

While Francis I was fighting against Charles Vs forces in Flanders, he wanted the Ottoman fleet together with the French fleet to go and capture the city of Nice. Doria was waiting for them with 140 ships. Charles V was in Genoa. In the meantime, four French galley ships, which went to Nice, were captured by the enemy. Barbaros informed the sultan that it was necessary to spend the winter in France to continue the operation the following year. Ambassadors traveled between Istanbul and Paris and at the end of the negotiations it was decided to have the Ottoman fleet spend the winter in the

port city of Toulon. Francis I had promised that the supply needs of the Ottoman fleet and the salaries of the crew would be paid by his government. The sultan had spent 1,200,000 gold ducats for the building of this fleet (in this period, the entire budget of the Ottoman State was 9 million ducats). Preparations were incomplete when Barbaros reached the port of Toulon. The entire population of the city would be vacated so that the Ottomans could stay there. It was impossible to bring provisions from Istanbul under the winter conditions. The feeding and wages problem of the Ottoman fleet, whose personnel numbered around 30, 000, caused unpleasant disputes with the French authorities, who claimed that the Turks were trying to wangle money without reason. Certain French sources even said that the Ottomans pillaged the city, while other French sources praised the obedience and discipline among the Turks.[44]

At that time the city of Nice belonged to the dukes of Savoy and was under the protection of Charles V. The joint Ottoman-French fleet bombarded the city. Polin, the French ambassador, who was present at the fleet, requested a guarantee from Hayreddin that the buildings would not be damaged. Barbaros paid attention to this. The defenders, who were in a difficult position, informed Polin at one stage, that if the Ottomans soldiers would withdraw, then they would surrender. The Ottomans withdrew, but the French started to fight again. Barbaros was furious because the French were slack and not trustworthy. He took his fleet and withdrew to a nearby island because of a storm. In the meantime, in September Doria came with his fleet to the aid of the Nice fortress, however, he was forced to withdraw against Barbaros. The Ottoman fleet, before withdrawing from the field of operation, secured the surrender of many fortresses surrounding Nice and delivered them to the French. After the operation, Barbaros went to Toulon with his fleet to spend the winter (9 October 1543). The city was vacated on 8 September. The value of everything was recorded and the city council set aside an allocation of only 20, 000 gold coins to feed the Turks. From the correspondence between Istanbul and Barbaros, it is understood that the Sultan was worried about the security of the fleet. It was almost impossible for the fleet to return because winter was approaching. Generally speaking, feeding the crew was one of the most difficult tasks during long journeys.

In general, logistical needs were provided for the Ottoman fleet for only a six-month campaign. The sultan believed that the French would provide the provisions and wages in Toulon, which had been guaranteed by the agreement.

[44] C. Isom-Verhaaren, "Ottoman-French Interact 1480-1580: A Sixteenth Century Encounter" (Ph. D. diss., University of Chicago, Department of History, 1997); for the Ottoman fleet at Toulon see Charriere, vol. 1, 570 ff.

The Ottoman sailors were settled in the houses in the city and suburbs of Toulon. King Francis I had granted a ten-year tax exemption to the people in the region. Nevertheless, great difficulties were encountered in finding provisions for a crew of 30, 000. Barbaros had to borrow money from the local French merchants. Although the Ottoman fleet could not capture Nice, according to the reports of the French ambassador at that time, Southern France was protected against an attack, thanks to the Ottoman cooperation. The operation resumed in the spring of 1544. Barbaros sent a 22 ship fleet to attack the Spanish coasts. He himself, with a major portion of his fleet, advanced towards Sardinia and Corsica.

The points asserted in a speech made in Venice by Jean de Montluc, who was sent there in 1542 as an ambassador, is noteworthy. According to Montluc, the emperor was responsible for all the destruction and disasters suffered by Christendom. Montluc reminded that the emperor himself and his brother Ferdinand sent ambassadors to Istanbul and held secret talks with Sultan Süleyman, and the Habsburgs paid an annual tribute to the "Grand Turk". Montluc asked, "Does not the 30,000 gold coins given to the Sultan constitute support against Christianity?" and he dwelled on the fact that the alliance with the Sultan was a mandatory action in the political sense. The French ambassador also drew attention to a historical event: Ludovico Sforza, the duke of Milan, used Sultan Bayezid's forces against his rivals in Italy. Also, he added that in the same period, Emperor Maximilian provoked the Turks against France. He says the following after reminding about the cruelties imposed by the emperor's soldiers against the Venetians in 1544: "This great and powerful army, composed of soldiers (Turks) foreign to our religion, were sent to help His Majesty, the French King. There has not been any complaint about the Turks hurting anyone. They have behaved politely. They paid for everything they got for their living". The French ambassador clearly expressed in his speech that a brand new concept prevailed at that time in Europe, which was the concept of balance among states. According to him, the Emperor's men used the alliance of the French King with the Sultan as an excuse to show that the Emperor was right in attacking France. While the Emperor pretended to defend the cause of Christendom, on the other hand, he did not hesitate to make an alliance with the English King Henry VIII, who was a rebel and heretic against the Pope. In addition, the Emperor did not consider that there were any problems in acting together with the Protestant German princes. All these arguments put forward by Polin are interesting from the aspect of showing how the new concept and status in European diplomacy at that time was dominant within the political balance policy. He wanted the alliance with the Muslim sultan to be interpreted by his contemporaries as a requirement of this balance policy in Europe. The Ottoman Council of State also perceived it in this

manner. In the work called *Süleymannâme,* written for the Sultan, the Ottoman view about this alliance is very interesting. According to this source, the Emperor forced France into an alliance against the Muslims with the ambition of becoming the "Kaiser", that is, the ruler of all of Europe. For this reason, the alliance of Süleyman, the sultan of Islam and the French King became a necessity. He says that if France would be dissuaded from this alliance, then it would be unavoidable for the entire Christian world to unite as a single front against the Ottomans. For that reason, the view of the Ottoman historian expresses clearly that the Ottomans were also forced to follow a balance of power policy in Europe. It shows that the alliance of the Ottomans with a Christian state was perceived as a requirement of *realpolitik.*

The French palace at that time considered the Ottoman sultan to be the "greatest ruler in the world".[45] King Francis I has confessed to the Venetian ambassador that the Ottoman Sultan was the sole power to guarantee the independence of the European states.

Up until the Cateau-Cambresis Peace Treaty, that ended the Italian Wars in 1559, the French King Henry II (1547-1559) considered the alliance with the Ottomans as the foundation stone of his policy. He obtained a significant amount of financial support along with military support from the Ottomans. The Ottoman alliance against Habsburg superiority continued to be the traditional policy of France that could not be abandoned. Naturally, the Ottomans also obtained great benefits from this alliance. As a contemporary Ottoman historian stated, keeping European Christianity in a divided state and preventing a Crusader assault planned by the Pope and the emperor, were the basic principles of the European policy of the Ottomans.

III. Revolution in War Technology: Upsetting the Balance Between Europe and the Ottomans

An approach from a broad spectrum in Europe-Ottoman relations in the fields of politics, economy, culture and military showed that the mutual influence between Europe and the Ottomans was actually quite extensive and profound. The Ottoman-French alliance played a definite role in the emergence of the

[45] Pierre de Bourdeille, *Oeuvres complètes,* ed. L. Lalande, vol. 11, 179; On the Süleyman's Bender inscription (1538) the awareness of the world state is expressed as follows:

Gemiler yürüden bahr-i Frenk ve Magrib ve Hinde
Şeh-i Bagdad u Kayser-i Rûm Mısr'a Sultanım

(I am the Sultan who is ruling over Egypt, the Caesar of the lands of the Eastern Roman Empire and the Shah of Baghdad and I am the Sultan who sent fleets to the seas of the Western Mediterranean as well as to the Indian Ocean.)

European political map in modern times. Also, the influence of the sixteenth century Ottoman-Middle East in the formation of the European capitalist economy is definite. However, the Ottoman State gradually began to decline and started to be considered in the West as a traditional, backward Medieval state against a rapidly rising Europe in every field in respect to the military and technology, in the period following the sixteenth century.[46]

It is a fact that from the beginning the Ottomans were of close interest for Europe in the political as well as in the military field. Starting from the thirteenth century states in Europe began to fight their wars by hiring professional mercenary military companies rather than using feudal armies.[47] First of all, these mercenary companies were operating under the name of *condottieri* in Italy. One of the companies organized by a *condottiere* and providing service for a fee was the Catalan company of the famous Roger de Flor, that was used in the service of Byzantium between 1303-1304 against the Turks who invaded Western Anatolia. On the other hand, because the Frontier Türkmens (Turcomans) were considered to be among the best warriors in this period, the Byzantine and Balkan states hired Türkmen mercenary companies (the most famous of these was the İshak company which cooperated with the Catalans and captured Athens together with them).[48] These mercenary professional Turkish warriors became known as *Turcopouloi* in Byzantium and Rhodes in the fourteenth century. Italian city states competed with each other to use the mercenary Turkmen soldiers.[49] As we have seen above, when the 500 strong Turkish garrison left at Otranto by Gedik Ahmed was forced to surrender to the King of Naples in 1481, they entered into his service and provided effective services against the Papal forces. The Ottomans were the first to establish a standing army that received pay from the treasury of the sultan and were always under his command.

Sultan Orhan (1324-1362) created a *yaya ordusu* (infantry army) among the Türkmens who were his own people in the first period of his *beylik* (beylic).

[46] The Venetian documents reflect this change very well, see L Valensi, *Venise et La Sublime Porte* (Paris: Hachette, 1987).

[47] M. E. Mallet, *Mercenaries and their Masters, Warfare in Renaissance Italy* (Totowa: Roman and Littlefield, 1924). "Feudal armies are in principle, 'noble armies'.When, however, a feudal society faces a danger that its traditional army cannot match to enlarge its armed forces... this problem is solved with mercenaries or peasantry"; A. Boros analyzes this situation well for Hungary, "The Militia Portalis in Hungary before 1526." *From Hunyadi to Ràkoczi* (Brooklyn, 1982), 63-80; G. Rázso, "The Mercenary Army of King Matthias Corvinus," ibid., 125-140.

[48] K. M. Setton, *Catalan Domination of Athens, 1311-1388* (London, 1975).

[49] See H. İnalcık, "The Question of the Emergence of the Ottoman State," *International Journal of Turkish Studies,* 2-2 (1981-1982), 71-78.

IV. The Ottomans and the Protestant World

The Topkapı Palace documents clearly show that when the Ottomans invaded Hungary in 1526 and confronted the Habsburgs in Central Europe, they became active observers closely watching the actions of Charles V and Ferdinand and followed the political developments in Europe. Thus, they were trying to make use of every kind of separatist power or movement emerging in Europe in their competition for supremacy against the Habsburgs. In June 1533 İbrahim Paşa said to the Austrian ambassador, "The Christian world has never been as divided as it is today".[78]

An Ottoman intelligence report (Topkapı Palace Archives, No. E. 7671)[79] presented to Sultan Süleyman the Lawgiver gives information to the sultan about Martin Luther and his struggle against the emperor. According to the report, "A man called Martin Luther created a religion by himself and opposed the invalid belief of the cursed Spanish king, collected thirty thousand soldiers" and fought against the Spanish at "San Borgo near Bazilya". Among the other information given in the report is the news that Andrea Doria sailed from the Genoese port against the fleet of "Hayreddin Reis" near Morocco, 12 French galley ships sailed from the port of Marseilles, "Megali Mastura" (Great Master of the Knights) set sail from Malta with seven galley ships, and an army (two thousand cavalry and ten thousand infantrymen) belonging to the Spanish King (Emperor Charles V) at Lombardia, which belonged to the duchy of Milan. According to the report, this force was standing by to assist if there was an action by the Ottomans on Apulia in Southern Italy. The Spanish King (Emperor) himself was watching the situation in Vienna with eight thousand of his soldiers. Evidently, the Emperor did not have any other soldiers. The Spanish King received one million florins from the duke of Milan and returned to his country. The King also made peace with Venice. Venice paid 200 thousand gold coins to Spain and 100 thousand gold coins to Ferdinand, the archduke of Vienna. The merchant also added the news that the Emperor "made peace with France in appearance, but the hostility in their minds was not lost".

[78] Hammer, vol. 5, 138, see footnote 63.

[79] This report was published by Dr. C. Isom-Verhaaren: "An Ottoman Report about Martin Luther and the Emperor: New Evidence of the Ottoman Interest in the Protestant Challenge to the Power of Charles V," *Turcica* 28 (1996): 299-318. The report gives the Sultan information supplied by an Albanian merchant from Ergiri-Kasn named Dhuka through an Ottoman officer at Drac. Merchants were always used as a source of intelligence. Dhuka, who engaged in the trade of Ankara mohair, was in Europe between 1527-1530 or 1527-1531.

In summary, the report enlightens the Ottoman government on the soldiers and fleet of Charles V and that he made peace with Milan, Venice and France (the 1529 Cambrai peace) and reports that Charles V was keeping his soldiers together in Northern Italy against an Ottoman invasion of Apulia or an attack against Vienna.

This information was important for the Sultan, who had returned to Istanbul from the siege of Vienna in 1529. It is understood that Dhuka relayed the information through an Italian and that he received rather accurate information about Italy. However, the information related to Germany and Luther is not valid. The news is that Luther fought against the emperor's forces in a place called "San Borgo near Bazilya". According to Isom-Verhaaren, this news could be related to the peasant rebellions in Germany between 1524-1526. Actually, in 1529 the German Protestant princes initially refused to help Ferdinand against Süleyman, but upon Ottoman siege of Vienna in the summer of 1529, they were forced to promise military aid to Charles V at the Diet of Augsburg.

The next year in 1531 the Protestants formed a hostile front against the emperor with the Schmalkaldic League, but there was no war at that time. The fighting mentioned in the report is related to the incidents at Basel (Bazilya in the document) in Switzerland. There, the proponents of religious reforms destroyed the images in the city and took control of the city. They made alliances in February 1529 with the German Protestant princes and France. In response to this, in 1530 the Swiss Catholic cantons sought alliance with Ferdinand in Vienna.

In 1531 the reformists in Switzerland formed an army led by Ulrich Zwingli and fought against the Catholics. Thus, all of these incidents in the report were attributed to Luther. As Dhuka stayed in Europe for three years, the information of the report must be for the years 1529-1531 and it must have been narrated in a confused manner in the report of the Ottoman State agent at Drac.[80] Naturally, the Ottomans must have followed these movements in Germany and against Ferdinand in Switzerland with close interest. It is noteworthy that the Ottoman palace perceived the importance of the Protestant movements from the aspect of Ottoman strategy, even at those early dates. Even in 1529, the Protestant princes in Germany became aware of the benefits of the Ottoman pressure for themselves in their resistance against the Emperor and Ferdinand.[81] Historians, in general, concur on the fact that the Ottoman pressure on the Habsburgs played a definite role in the spread and

[80] Isom-Verhaaren (pp. 301, 310) shows a tendency to accept the date of the report as 1530.

[81] S. A. Fischer-Galati, *Ottoman Imperialism and German Protestantism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), 35-37; Isom-Verhaaren, 310.

establishment of Protestantism and that helped the advancement of the Ottomans in Europe.[82]

Towards 1540, John Zápolya in Hungary and Transylvania under the protection of the Ottomans, the French King, and the Protestant princes in Germany were in contact with each other against the superior power of the Habsburgs. These rulers were considering the Ottomans as a counterweight against the Habsburg hegemony.[83] The emperor could not cope with the Ottomans without receiving military assistance from Germany. For that reason, for the first time the emperor was forced to sign an agreement with the Lutherans in Nuremberg in the summer of 1532. After this, under Ottoman pressure, the emperor made concessions to the Protestants eight times. The *Türkenfurcht* (Fear of Turks) in Germany was a reality and an Ottoman invasion was felt to be a close threat. It was such that *Türckenglocken* (Turkish Bell) and a Turkish Tax were established against the threat. In 1502, the first newspaper, *Newe Zeitung,* was published to give news about the Turks. In the anonymous *Türcken pluclein* treatise, the author said the following:[84] "The best course for the Christian World is to bow and pay tribute to the powerful Sultan. We can trust him to govern us with justice and magnanimity."

The influence of Islam on Lutheranism was recognized in the West. Paul Anderbach, due to freedom of worship, individualistic attribute of belief and other similarities, considered Protestantism to be a type of Islam.[85] In the Unitarian belief that spread in Hungary, the thought of a single God as opposed to the doctrine of the Trinity was dominant. Luther in the treatise he wrote in 1530 called *Libellus de ritu* et *moribus Turcorum,* compares the Turks with Christians and accepts them as having virtues such as being humble, living

[82] S.A.Fischer-Galati, see footnote 81; C. M Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism during the Reformation,1578-1608* (New York, 1972); K. M. Setton, "Lutheranism and the Turkish Peril," *Balkan Studies,* vol. 3 (1962), 133-168; C. Göllner, "Die Türkenfrage in Spannungsfeld der Reformation," *Südost-Forschungen* 34 (1975), 61-78; K. M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571),* vol. 4 (Philadelphia, 1984); J. Pannier, "Calvin et les Turcs," *Revue Historique* 62 (1937); 268-286.

[83] Setton, "Lutheranism," 137.

[84] Ibid., 138; About the anonymous original work called Viaje de Turquia on the threat of the Ottomans for Europe a Turkish image in Spain in the middle of the sixteenth century see J. Perez, "l'affrontement Turcs-Chrétiens vu d'Espagne, Le Voyage en Turquie," *Chrétiens et Musulmans a la Renaissance,* 255-263; about this work see Paulino Toledo, "Türkiye Seyahati" (Trip to Turkey) (Ph. D. diss., Ankara University, Faculty of Language, History and Geography, 1992).

[85] Setton, "Lutheranism," 158; for the views of Solomon Schweigger, a Lutheran pastor, who visited Turkey, on Luther and the Holy Koran see C. Gauthier, "Un allemand à Constantinople, 1571-1581, Critique du Coran par un pasteur Lutheran," *Chrétiens et Musulmans à la Renaissance,* eds. B. Bennassar and R. Sauzet (Paris, 1998), 163-175.

simple lives and being honorable (Luther read the Holy Koran from its translation and tried to prove that Islam is not a true religion). Luther, by stating a point that is accepted by historians today, said that the living conditions of the peasantry in Eastern Europe were so bad that they sometimes welcomed the Turks as saviors. During the rebellions between 1437-1438 of the Transylvanian villagers against their masters, the forces of Sultan Murad II occupied this country and did not encounter serious resistance. It is known that many villagers from Salzburg and Würzburg escaped to the Turkish side and many German soldiers joined the Ottoman army.[86] Sultan Süleyman requested information about Luther from an ambassador and said that he could be a benevolent master for Luther. When this conversation was relayed to Luther, he made the sign of the cross and said, "God save me from such a benevolent master" *(Tischreden,* vol. 2, 508). Another point indicating how much the times had changed is the following: Luther did not approve of the Pope's *Bellum Sanctum* (Sacred War) against the Turks, and he resembled the attacks of the Turks to natural disasters that were God's punishment of the Christians. Earlier, he said that to resist the Turks was to oppose the will of God. Many people in Germany did not approved the fact that the war against the Turks was a religious war. It was said that the Pope provoked Charles V against the Turks in the Crusader campaign to fulfill his own political interests in Italy.[87] Melanchton, Luther's right-hand man, made contacts with the Greek Orthodox Patriarch in Istanbul in 1559 and sought a religious agreement.[88] The Ottomans were following with interest the struggles of Luther and the Lutherans in Germany. It is noteworthy that the spread of Protestantism is the period when the peasant rebellions spread. As Luther had stated, the propaganda that the Ottomans treated the peasants well, must have reached very distant places in the West. Luther treats the Ottoman pressure in Europe in the framework of his own struggle against the Pope. However, as a German and Christian, he actually perceived the struggle against the Turks and the union among Christians as a matter of life and death. Luther wrote three treatises on the resistance against the Turks. According to him, the Turks were the "Servants of the Devil". The Turk in the eschatology of the German monk was depicted as

[86] Setton, "Lutheranism," 161; It appears that the propaganda that the Ottomans behaved well towards the peasantry spread as far as Germany. A German writer said, 'a poor man who has to struggle for a morsel of food, rather than living under these types of Christians, prefers the Turks'; for the policy of the Ottomans towards the peasant subjects see H. İnalcık, *An Economic and Social History,* vol. 1, 143-154; G. Veinstein, "Retour sur la question de la tolerance ottomane au XIVe siècle," *Chrétiens et Musulmans à la Renaissance,* 415-426.

[87] Setton, "Lutheranism," 141-146.

[88] S. Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity* (Cambridge, 1968).

an Antichrist. The 1529 Vienna siege created a deep anxiety in Luther. In the letters he wrote to Erasmus he advised that the European states should put an end to the wars among themselves and unite against the Turks; the Germans should run to the aid of the Emperor.

On the other hand, the Protestant belief was receiving protection and spreading quickly in the regions where the Ottomans were dominant. Even when Luther was still alive, the Lutheran preachers were going in great numbers to Ottoman Hungary and the new sect was rapidly spreading among the villagers. The hatred of the Catholics against the Protestants was so deep that it was being said that they were even worse than the Turks for Christianity. In time, Transylvania became the center of the most radical Unitarian Protestantism and Bethlen Gabor (1613-1629) and I. Rakoczi (1630-1648), the Transylvanian princes, played an important role in the Protestant front against the Catholics during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). This struggle against the Habsburg dominance by the Protestants, coincided with the period (1617-1656) when Ottoman power was at an ebb, and thus it was a blessing for the Ottoman State.[89]

V. Europe wants to Know the Ottomans

One of the earliest treatises written about the Ottomans in the West is the work of Nicola Sagundino that was written in 1456 for Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, later Pope Pius II (1458-1464). In this treatise, Sagundino mentions Sultan Mehmed's plans to conquer Rome with the claim of being the inheritor of the Roman Empire as the conqueror of Constantinople. Pius II, the humanist Pope, in his letter to the Conqueror, which remained as an essay, wrote that if he became a Christian, then, he would acquire the right to this title.[90] For the history of the reigns of the Conqueror and Bayezid II, the work of Gian-Maria Angiolello covering the period up until 1514, is more important because it included the observations of an eye witness. Angiolello served for years as the *içoğlan*, (boy being educated for service at court) in the Ottoman palace. The work of Theodoro Spandugino Cantacusino, who was from an aristocratic Byzantine family and who went and settled in Venice after the

[89] For details see, *From Hunyadi to Rákózi: War and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary,* eds. J. M. Bak, and B. K. Király (Brooklyn, 1982), 189-508.

[90] J. C. Margolin, "Réflexion sur le commentaire du Père Celestin, Pierre Crespet de la lettre du Pape Pie II au Sultan Mahomet II," *Chrétiens et Musulmans à la Renaissance,* 212-239.

conquest of Constantinople, is also important. He wrote this work[91] to encourage the Christian world for a Crusader campaign and presented it in 1509 to the French King Louis XII, and in 1519 to Pope Leo X. The Spanish version was dedicated to Charles V in 1520. It appears that the author made use of the Ottoman chronicles. In this work, he proposes to the French King that he should consider the Safavids as the strongest rival against the Turks.

The work entitled *Tractatus de moribus condiconibus et nequicia Turcorum* is especially important as a work that is a source of information on making the Ottomans known to the Western world and on Islam. Luther wrote a foreword to its German translation.

Due to the gradually increasing interest in the Ottomans as of 1453, Francesco Sansovino gathered the main works written in Italy on the Ottomans in a collection entitled *Historia universale dell'origine, guerre, et imperio de Turchi* (Venice, 1560). His work was reprinted seven times until 1654.

The Ottoman Political System Discussed by European Political Writers

The advances of the Ottoman Empire, the threat of invasion of Rome and Italy caused profound reverberations in the Western world and especially in Italy, and many books on Ottoman history and organization were published.[92]

[91] For the English version with the most recent interpretations see D. M. Nicol, *On the Origin of the Ottoman Emperors* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[92] T. Spandugino (Spandouyn), Gian-Maria Angiolello, F. Sansavino, G. A. Menavino, G. Postel, P. Giovio, B. Ramberti, L Bassano, P. Belon, P. C. du Fresne du Cange, S. Schweigger, O. Busbecq, N. de Nicolay, B. Baudier, W. Dillich, J. Chesneau, H. Dernschwam, H. de Beauvau, J. Thévenot and others; for a complete bibliography see C. Göllner, *Turcica, Die Europaischer Türckendrücke des XVI Jahrhundert, 1551-1606,* vols. 1-2 (Bucharest and Berlin, 1961); for the Turkish image in French literature see C. Rouilard, *The Turk in the French History, Thought and Literature, 1520-1660* (Paris, 1938); in Spanish literature see A. Mas, *Les Turcs dans la litérature espagnole,* vols. 1-2 (Paris, 1967); "... La Peau de Mahomet... Images du Maure et de l'oriental dans le spectacle anglais de La Renaissance, " *Chrétiens et Musulmans à la Renaissance,* 189-212; T. Reyhanlı, *İngiliz Gezginlerine göre XVI. yüzyılda İstanbul'da Hayat* (Life in İstanbul in the sixteenth century according to the English travelers) (Ankara, 1983); see Jacques-Auguste de Thou, *Histoire Universelle de Jacques-Auguste de Thou depuis 1543 jusqu'en 1607,* 16 vols. (London. 1734), of the 10 thousand pages in this work, 900 pages are allocated to the Ottoman Empire and the Turks; see C. Michaud, "Les Turcs dans l'Histoire Universelle de Jacques-Auguste de Thou," *Chrétiens et Musulmans à la Renaissance,* 241-253; R. Schwoebel, *The Shadow of Crescent: The Renaissance Image of the Turk, 1453-1517* (New York, 1967); M. Soykut, *Image of the "Turk" in Italy* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2001).

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