MAJEED R. JAFAR

UNDER-UNDERDEVELOPMENT

A Regional Case
Study of the Kurdish Area
in Turkey

HELSINKI 1976

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PREFACE

The present work treats of an underdeveloped area within an underdeveloped — or developing — country; hence, the title is "Under-Underdevelopment". The research was conducted within the disciplines of economics — underdevelopment — and social policy — regional policy. The analysis of the subject matter was carried out within its historical and political contexts. Its purpose is the study of socio-economic conditions and trends and social dilemmas prevailing in the area.

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METHODOLOGICAL NOTES

This study is composed of two sections, namely, a general one concerned with theoretical questions, which forms the framework and the basis for arranging the other empirical section. The former, attempts to discuss and analyse such theoretical works as relevant to the analysis and understanding of the empirical section. It endeavours to synthesise Myrdal's theory of underdevelopment, theoretical formulations on regional planning, and Galtung's theoretical thoughts on (political) power relations and structures. These works will be, if necessary, modified, supplemented by other theoretical works, and their shortcomings will be indicated. This means that the main concern of this study is with questions and problems related to development and underdevelopment, regional planning and political relations and structures.

The latter section, the empirical case study, deals with observations and data pertaining to the Region and with the conditions and trends prevalent there. The material in this section is organised in such a way as to highlight questions raised in the theoretical section. The empirical section is treated in a manner that would indicate the extent to which the theoretical framework is consistent with the empirical observations and data, as well as the modifications in the theoretical section which are necessary to introduce.

This study does not basically concern itself with other branches of knowledge, other disciplines, which may have an indirect bearing on its subject matter, such as sociology, anthropology, culture, and ecology, even though some variables usually treated within these disciplines are here touched upon briefly. This is so because these variables were thought to be relevant, for either highlighting some other variables, or for a better understanding of them and their importance. Therefore, readers who expect this study to deal with these disciplines will unfortunately be disappointed.

The other limitations of the study are that firstly, the data used is rather less up to date than might be desired. This may prompt criticism that the data does not reflect reality. This may or may not be the case. Nevertheless, the data does reflect reality for the time it covers; they also indicate the main trends prevailing in the Region and its relation with the centre. Besides, the study is not meant to be more up to date than the observations it contains. This is a limitation which the writer is fully aware of and which, in his opinion, does not reduce much of its relevance. The study covers the period up to 1970, except in a very limited number of cases, where more up-to-date information was thought important to include in order to increase the understanding of the Region's conditions and trends.

Secondly, it has treated some variables more extensively than others. The importance of the various variables covered by the study is a matter of judgement that is open to disagreement. Some people might deem certain variables less important than the writer has thought, or, conversely, that some other variables which the writer had analysed briefly, are from their viewpoint more important. This disagreement is natural and should be anticipated because of the value-judgement involved.

Thirdly, prominence is given to the historical background of present conditions in the Region. This may be open to criticism too. However, "reality starts with history", as Titmuss has pointed out (Titmuss, 1971, 93).

A methodological procedure used in this study may also be open to criticism, namely, the use of averages pertaining to the country as a whoe, as data on the Region, since these averages may conceal wide ranges of differences. This criticism is preliminarily valid. However, we are still on the 'safe' side, since the Region generally ranks low among the regions of the country. Therefore this procedure seems permissible. This procedure is

followed only when specific data on the Region is hard to come by.

An aspect of this study that has led to some discussion, is that of comparison. The question involved is that, how basic and necessary is the procedure of comparison, in and for a scientific study.

There are two points to be borne in mind. Firstly, the procedure of comparison, in the sense of studying a number of cases and comparing them, in order to discover to what extent the theories employed explain, and are consistent with, the empirical observations collected; this is a question of methodology. Secondly, the procedure of comparison in the sense of studying a number of cases, spread both over time and/or in spece, in order to discover the presence or non-presence of differences between and among various cases; this would be a comparative study. Although the two senses overlap, this distinction is useful for the purposes of this discussion.

The use of a large number of cases, in order to find out the validity of theories used, is not necessary for the purposes of this study, for two reasons. Firstly, the theories and hypotheses used in this study constitute the framework for the empirical section; in other words, this study's primary aims are not to discover new theories, but rather to modify the ones employed by it. Secondly, regardless of how many cases covered, theories and hypotheses cannot be proved or refuted, since without covering all cases, i.e. if one case (or a few cases) is left out, the universal validity of these theories and hypotheses cannot be ascertained (because the cases left out may not be consistent with them). A more important procedure would be to consider a case, and deal with it in such a critical manner, as to be able to point out how and where the theories and hypotheses employed are not consistent with the available empirical observations.

The study of a number of cases or variables spread in space and over time will be to go beyond the limitations set for the study, 'a case study'. Firstly, comparisons are actually used between the sub-set (or sub-system), the Region, and the set of which it constitutes a sub-set, namely Turkey. Secondly, comparison of all or a few of the variables considered in this study, with their counterparts in other areas, (outside Turkey) at present or at some time in the past, is not necessary for a case study such as this one; such a procedure would be important for a comparative study. The sub-title of this study clearly indicates that it is limited in its ambitions and it is a case study, not a comparative one.

Thirdly, the use of the procedure of comparison for the discovery of any differences that may exist between similar cases seems to be, in this case, a waste of effort. It is more appropriate to consider cases on their own merit, rather than on the basis of comparing them to other cases. To take an example from the level of living measurements, suppose that the indicator of pupil attendance ratio, at elementary school level, of the component of education in region a, of country X, is 40 % and in region b of country Y it is 30 %. Comparing the ratios of 40 % and 30 %, would not increase our understanding of conditions, in either region, other than that region b is worse of than region a. But this may be misleading if the general ratio in country X happens to be 70 %, whereas it is 30 % in country Y. Another point to be emphasised is that both regions are worse off, in the sense that both have lower levels than the 80 % norm.[1])

It might be asked, what then is the relevance of this study? Actually it is relevant in at least five ways. Firstly, there is the academic drive towards knowledge, and the understanding, of the working of human societies and communities or some aspects the-

[1]) Comparisons of this type have, occasionally, far-reaching policy implications, since it is argued in these cases that because region a is better off than region b, it should be contented and should not ask for improvements; arguments, or rather tactics, of this type are often used in order to achieve certain political or propagandistic aims.

reof. Secondly, it points out a number of social dilemmas existing in the Region and in Turkey. Thirdly, it makes a modest attempt at putting forward some resolutions to (some of) these dilemmas. Fourthly, it is relevant for policy decision-making and for understanding some aspects of the process of decision-making under complex, sensitive political circumstances. Last but not least, it is relevant for the understanding of conditions and circumstances in some areas of one of the most volatile and critical spots in the world as well as for predicting some of the future developments there.

ON VERIFICATION

Simple statistical verification is used in order to find out the extent to which the theoretical assertions (or the hypotheses used in the theoretical section of the study) are in agreement with the observations collected. This procedure is used because sufficient agreement or disagreement between the hypotheses and the observations, as shown by the data, is immediately obvious, without the need to resort to more sophisticated mathematical statistical and/or econometrics methods.

When there is lack of statistics or when the variables under consideration are not quantifiable (such as a change in the use of language) or when there are present unique events (such as wars or disasters) then historical varification is used. This verification consists of detailed analysis of historical events and processes and in discovering the degree of consistency between the hypotheses used and the observations derived from this analysis. (Lange, 1963, 125—129).

ON VARIABLES AND OBSERVATIONS


For the purposes of both analysis and verification, there are three strategies of dealing with variables covered by the study. First, Strategy I. It is possible to choose a few variables (or, in the extreme case, one) and collect as many observations on them as possible (spread over both space and time). Second, Strategy II; to consider as many variables as relevant to the study and collect a limited number of observations (at least one) for each of them. Third, Strategy III; to consider as many variables and observations as possible. These strategies can be presented as a matrix.

Since, in Strategy I, as pointed out previously, it is not possible to make all-embracing, universal observations, cevering both space and time, the question of absolute verification remains an open one. Observations or observable events (both in time and space) not recorded or observed, may prove the hypotheses used as not being consistent with reality. Thus hypotheses are always open to modification or replacement by more embracing ones. Therefore, this strategy is not very helpful in proving or refuting hypotheses, i.e. for verification. As to analysis, its main and most serious defect, is that the (few) variable(s), for which as many observations to be collected as possible, must be isolated from the set of the variables operating in the (social) system. Furthermore, the variable will be affected by our choice. Thus, this strategy separates the variables it considers from their 'natural environment' and cuts them off from other variables; it takes them out of their context.

Therefore, it is somehow artificial and not very useful for the understanding of human societies and social dilemmas having complex, interlocking and mutually interacting array of variables.

The third strategy, that of considering all variables at operation and collecting all possible obseravtions on them, is not practicable and may even prove impossible. Even if attempts were made to approximate it, the method would probably prove both costly and time consuming.

Therefore, the strategy employed in this study is a trial to approximate Strategy II. As large a number of variables as feasible and as relevant to the analysis are used in this study and a number of observations are



collected for each. These observations are either statistical and/or historical. The observations collected should, hopefully, be relevant to the analysis and understanding of conditions, circumstances and trends prevailing in the Region. This strategy has the following advantages:

(1) Conclusions drawn on their joint basis are less likely to be affected by our choice of variables, than if the analysis had been confined to fewer variables.
(2) It is likely to average out the errors in measurement.
(3) It is, moreover, likely to reduce the level of 'noise' in the data. (Srikantan, 1973, 276).

In the final analysis, the choice of a certain strategy will depend on the theoretical framework of the empirical research. Some theories, such as Myrdal's theory of underdevelopment, require the use of Strategy II, because of the many variables it takes into consideration and because it uses observations on all these variables, whereas other theoretical formulations that attempt to explain a phenomenon, or problem, or a trend on the basis of a single factor (for example, explaining business-cycles by the periodic occurance of sunspots) will resort to Strategy I.

ON HYPOTHESES:

The word 'hypothesis' is used in many ways. However, it is used here as meaning: (a) an assertion, or (b) a logical deduction from a certain set of assumptions. A hypothesis can be tested against empirical observations and thus it can be shown to disagree with the observations or to be consistent with them.

As Lipsey and Steiner point out, a hypothesis can neither be proved nor falsified for two reasons. Firstly, because of the limited number of observations that can be made. And, secondly, because of the presence of an error of measurement. Therefore, "virtually all economic hypotheses and predictions are statistical ones and not deterministic ones. (i.e. they are expected to hold only with some margin of error)" (Lipsey and Steiner, 1966, 52).

They also maintain that, "the hypotheses in economic theory are hypotheses about the relations between two or more things" (Ibid, 26).

Oskar Lange defines a hypothesis as "an unverified scientific assertion (law or theory)" (Lange, 1963, 125, fn. 41).

J. A. Schumpeter uses the word 'hypothesis' in a similar meaning. He maintains that, "Now, the facts observed enter theory as hypotheses or assumptions or "restrictions", that is to say, as generalised statements induced or suggested by observations". He points out that hypotheses, laws and principles, mean one and the same thing "the difference ... is only that in the first case we do not, in the second, we do, feel fully responsible for the validity of our statements about them". (Schumpeter, 1954, 576–7).

Hypotheses are of various kinds. There are (a) deterministic hypotheses which are "expressed as if they held exactly", and (b) statistical hypotheses which contain an "error term" or some margin of error, i.e. the relations they express are not absolutely exact.

There are also (a) universal hypotheses which state that "whenever certain specified conditions are fulfilled, cause X will always produce effect Y", and (b) conditional hypotheses which are bounded by either space and/or time.

Hypotheses can also be either (a) inductive ones, or (b) deductive ones. (Lipsey and Steiner 1966, 26, 29–30 and 51).

PURPOSES OF THE STUDY

The main purpose of this study is to find out to what extent the validity of certain theories of development and underdevelopment and of regional planning is universal, i.e., to what extent they explain the observations collected on, and related to, the Region.

The main theoretical work used for this purpose is Myrdal's hypothesis of the circular causation of social problems and changes and their cumulative processes. In addition, a theoretical work by Szentes is used. On the regional level, Hilhorst's and Richadson's works are incorporated within the framework of Myrdal's hypothesis. Galtung's mini theory of power, relating to the political aspect of reality, is also incorporated therein.

Since the main hypothesis of Myrdal's rests in turn on two hypotheses, viz, inequality and the flow of resources to the centre(s) of expansion from the "unfavoured", or peripheral, region(s), the procedure adopted here, in connection with the empirical section, is to give an account of prevailing conditions of each element and indicator (variables) covered, in order to show the degree of inequality between the centre(s) and the Region and also to point out the flow of resources, from the latter to the former, and its magnitude, whenever data are possible to come by.

The study also aims at pointing out the dilemmas (social, political, economic and cultural) created in the Region by historical accidents (or 'locational constants' and 'locational preferences') and policy measures, and the ways to solve (some of) these dilemmas.

I. DEVELOPMENT AND UNDER-DEVELOPMENT

1. GENERAL

The world today is a divided world; it is divided in many ways, one of which is the division indicated by the sharp inequalities and differentiations in the economic, social, political and cultural dimensions of societies. There exist today, by and large, two distinct groups of countries: the developed ones, experiencing rapid progress and having high levels of living, and the underdeveloped ones, stagnating or developing slowly and having low levels of living. The former group of countries constitutes a tiny minority, whilst the latter, the vast majority of the world's population. Generally, inequalities and differentiations between the two groups have tended to be steadily windening rather than narrowing. This trend has led to some sort of regrouping on an international level, more and more on the basis of levels of development achieved and less and less on other bases; embryonic though it still is, rudiments of such a trend can be discerned in recent developments in the world already.[2])

In addition, within both groups, inequalities and sharp differentiations do exist between regions of individual countries, though the degree of inequalities and differentiations and their trends, are dissimilar in the developed countries from those in the underdeveloped ones. (Myrdal, 1969, 33).

These inequalities and differentiations among countries and within individual countries, are not only economic inequalities and differentiations, as some writers on the subject tend to think, but rather they extend indeed much further to embrace all aspects of societies' and their individual members' life, whether economic, social, political or cultural, even though the economic dimension is the more easily quantifiable and thus susceptible to measurement and analysis; they are easier to point out. Therefore, any discussion of underdevelopment and development ought to take into consideration all the pertinent dimensions pertaining to them, regardless of whether they are economic or non-economic, in order to, first, gain better understanding of, and insight into, the problems involved, and, second, to avoid making the discussion sterile or futile. However, since the variables of each dimension are too numerous to manage in a study such as this one, selection from among them becomes imperative. In selecting pertinent variables for discussion and analysis, the criterion of relevance is resorted to. In other words, the variables dealt with shall be relevant to the particular aspect of development and underdevelopment being analysed and discussed. (Myrdal, 1969, 29—31). Thus, value judgements creep into the analysis and discussion; a fact that cannot unfortunately be avoided.

Underdevelopment and development are defined in many ways, in almost as many as there are writers on the subject.[3]) However, underdevelopment and development are generally considered, whether explicitly or implicitly, as problems of differences in levels of incomes per head or standards of living. Developed countries are defined as being rich countries having high levels of income per capita and/or standards of living; this is contrasted with the underdeveloped countries, which are seen as poor, having 'so very much

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[2]) The latest Algiers Non-aligned Conference is an event in point; it was attended by countries having different economic and political systems but having one main feature in common: all being 'underdeveloped' or 'developing'. On the other hand, 'détente' and 'rapprochement' and closer economic ties between the super-powers and other powerful countries in Asia and Europe are examples of recent "get-togetherness" of countries having different economic and political systems but sharing the property of being "developed". There is also the group of oil producing countries, underdeveloped but experiencing rapid large increases in their revenues from oil. They are, however, a special case.

[3]) See Part One of Szentes's 'The Political Economy of Underdevelopment 1971'.

lewer' levels of income per head.[4]) This notion of underdevelopment and development is variously expressed in such succinct trifles as "a country is poor because it is poor", or "poverty becomes its own cause".

However, development and underdevelopment are *otherwise* defined as problems of socio-economic structures of societies and their relationships with the outiside world. Szentes, for example, defines 'economic underdevelopment' as being *"the complex socio-economic product of a specific development*, of a development *which has been most closely interrelated with the development of the capitalist world economy* as a whole, and which has been *determined* mainly by the latter, the external factor". (Szentes, 1971, 127). Szentes further maintains that "economic underdevelopment" contrary to its literary sense and usual interpretation — does *not* mean simply a lower level in the evolution of productive forces, or merely a falling behind, a loss of tempo or time in economic or social development, *nor* does it represent a lower 'stage' in the general and natural process of growth (though this was or might have been the case *prior to* the rise of colonialism and capitalist world economy" (Szentes, 1971, 127). Even though he emphasises that 'economic underdevelopment' does not mean simply lower levels in the evolution of the productive forces of society, Szentes actually considers "economic underdevelopment" and the underdevelopment of society's productive forces as one and the same thing and suggests that the development of the latter means the liquidation of the former. or, as he expresses it, "State intervention in the *underdeveloped countries* develops, as we have seen, to liquidate economic underdevelopment, that is, to eliminate the factors hindering the rapid development of the productive forces" (Szentes, 1971, 312).[5])

Terefore, development is neither higher levels of per capita income or levels of living, even though it usually entails both, nor a question of socio-economic structure and a society's external relationships, though these play their crucial role in either facilitating or hindering the development process. Development may be defined as the progressive incorporation of mankind's stock of, and new advances in science and technology, into the fabrics of society in general and into its productive forces in particular.[6])

It is possible, on the one hand, that a country has (very) high levels of per capita income, yet is an underdeveloped country (Libya and Kuwait, for example). On the other hand, changing or modifying the socio-economic structure of an underdeveloped country does not mean that that country has

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[4]) Myrdal, in his Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions starts with the observation that "a few countries are highly developed economically and have very high levels of average real income per head... more than two thirds of the people in the none Soviet world live in countries where real income per head is only a tiny fraction of what it is in the highly developed countries" (Myrdal, 1969, 3). Several such statements are made thoughout the abovementioned book. However, the defining of underdevelopment and development in terms of levels of income and living is criticised by Myrdal in his work **An International Economy**, p. 164; these criticisms are referred to in section 5 of this chapter. In addition to these criticisms of defining underdevelopment and development in terms of standards of living, the case of Kuwait and Libya (and some other oil-producing countries) may be mentioned as examples of countries having 'very high levels of income per head' yet not considered developed countries.

[5]) Attributing underdevelopment to mainly external factors seems to detract attention from the equally, and rather more, crucial internal factors. This is an example of misplaced emphasis and a mistaken ordering of importance. External factors cannot operate in a society unless internal factors allow them, in whatever form or manner, to do so and/or these internal factors are susceptible to manipulation by the external ones. Moreover, it is difficult to accept such sweeping generalisations because the external factor may, and sometimes does, stimulate development within a country.

[6]) Richardson points out that the findings at the national level is "that technical progress tends to make a larger contribution to the growth rate than growth in factor inputs." (Richardson, 1973, 27).

become, or is already developed. To look at the issue from another angle, the history of the developed countries, both capitalist and mixed economies, as well as socialist has been, in a way, a history of incessant incorporation of science and technology into the fabric of their societies in general and productive forces in particular; (education has changed from being based on theology for the few, to the mass transfer of knowledge based on science and technology; medicine and medical care and treatment shifted from rituals and magic etc, to products of science and technology; production moved from manual labour and simple hand or animal driven tools to machines and instruments based on science and technoloby; clean and purified water, nutritious and more hygenic foodstuffs, transport and communications, higher productivity, more freedom from natural conditions, for example, are all applications and products of science and technology. This statement ought not to be construed to mean that all applications of science and technology are creature comforts; however, all material and a good deal of non-material creature comforts are in fact applications or products of science and technology). It therefore follows that, in order to successfully start and/or sustain the development process, the underdeveloped countries and regions have to place more emphasis on both science and technology and their applications. Since the principal performer of technology, which is itself the application of science, is industry, and the main supplier of skilled manpower to both technology (or, in other words, industry) and science is the educational system of society, emphasis on science and technology means in practice emphasis on both industrialisation and the educational system of society (OECD, 1971; Myrdal 1969; and UN, 1963).[7]) And here lie the fundamental differences between developed and underdeveloped countries and regions. Whereas in the former the industrial sector and educational system are active and expanding, in the latter they are either lacking or stagnant. The experience of 'old' regions in developed countries points toward the same conclusion.

"The essence of a social problem is that it concerns a complex interlocking, circular and cumulative change" (Myrdal, 1969, 14).

Development and underdevelopment are the outcome of complex interlocking, spiral and cumulative processes.[8]) According to this hypothesis, which constitutes the basic theoretical famework of this study, a change of, or in a variable pertaining to one of society's dimensions, produces supporting changes rather than countervailing changes and it moves

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[7]) Myrdal maintains that "As industrialisation is the dynamic force in this development, it is almost tautological to state that the poorer regions remain mainly agricultural..." (Myrdal, 1969, 29). This stand is supported by the UN, 1963, which stresses that "There was indeed complete agreement that industrialisation must be the corner-stone of their [i.e. the underdeveloped countries'] future economic structure, and that it holds the key to economic, social and political progress. The words of Mr Nehru were recalled: "In our times, no country, unless it has a developed industry, can enjoy complete independence". (UN, 1963, 4).

Myrdal further strongly emphasises that "To have any chance to be successful in economic development, the underdeveloped countries must give the highest priority to the provision of schools and universities for training scientists and conducting scientific research in all fields" (Myrdal, 1969, 99). This opinion is shared by U. Thant, ex-Secretary General of the UN, in his foreword to the UN, 1963, in which he emphasises that "Applied science can be the most powerful force in the world for raising living standards..." (UN, 1963, VII).

The OECD publication suggests that "The education system, which supplies the manpower for technology [and] industry, the principal performer of technology..." represent two limitations on the rate at which the system of science and technology can change (OECD, 1971, 16).

[8]) The term 'spiral' is preferred to 'circular' since it more accurately expresses the idea to be expressed; the former denotes a dynamic change moving in a three-demensional space whilst the latter indicates a movement on a two-dimensional plane. It should, however, be noted that the circular causation process as used by Myrdal is circular not in the sense that it is ring-like, moving the system on the same plane (this will be equivalent to the notion of equilibrium that Myrdal is tyring to dethrone) but rather it is circular in the sense that it is sprial-like, moving the system upwards and downwards as well.

the system (i.e. the totality of society's dimensions within spatially defined boundaries) in the same direction as the first change, rather than creating a situation of equilibrium or stability of forces within the system or moving it to an opposite direction. The secondary change(s) become themselves causes of other changes, and so forth leading to a spiral-like movement of the entire system, in the course of which movement, everything becomes cause and effect of everything else.[9]) In addition, the changes in any variable, resulting from the primary and secondary changes operate to produce changes in other variables. Changes in the other variables produce change(s) in the primary variable; in other words, there are feed-back effects reinforcing the original changes. However, these changes do not only move the system in the same direction as the original change(s), but also move it much further than that change, since these changes "often tend to gather speed at an accelerating rate", as Myrdal maintains. Nevertheless, under certain conditions, a change in the system may result in counter-acting or countervailing changes. But such changes are few and in the nature of exceptions to the general hypothesis stated above.

The spiral and cumulative processes set in motion by changes applied to, or taking place at some point of society's system, move the entire system upwards or downwards and not merely on the same plane. This situation is the "normal case"; however, it is conceivable that the upwards and downwards movements of the system can be brought to a relative halt by some exogenous changes, having the power of bringing the system to such a halt, or by applying policy measures aimed at stopping these movements. Under such conditions, the situation does not, however, represent normal or natural tendencies or functioning of the system; they are not tendencies or functions endogenous to the system itself, moving it towards a situation of equilibrium. Besides, the application of changes exogenous to the system and of policy interferences can accelerate its movements further than the case would be should "normal" conditions prevail; normal should be understood to mean the absence of interference.

The hypothesis of complex interlocking,

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[9]) Certain aspects of Myrdal's 'circular' causation have been criticised by Szentes, who considers "the great progress Myrdal made [in the notion of vicious circles] seems to be vitiated by his statement — which, by the way, reveals the influence of the vicious circle idea — that it is useless to look for one basic, primary factor, "as everything is cause to everything else in an interlocking circular manner". (Szentes, 1971, 54).

[10]) Example of the operation of the hypothesis: suppose that the change is an increase in the number of primary school pupils in an area.

Short-run
increase number of teachers
↓
expanding teacher training schools (TTS)
↓
increase number of teachers at TTS
Long-run
expand secondary schools
↓
expand secondary school teachers
↓
expand teacher training schools
↓
expand universities

Increased number of pupils leads to the expansion of the educational system as a whole. Futhermore, a 10 % increase in primary pupils for example will require more than 10 % increase in number of teachers because this increase meets only the requirements at the primary level; there will be need for teachers at the secondary, university and teacher training school levels. In other words the change here is accelerating and cumulative.

The expansion in the educational services means that graduates will be absorbed in either primary, secondary or tertiary industries or they may remain unemployed. In the first case there is a movement of the whole system upwards. In the second case, large unemployment leads to pressure (and unrest) for the creation of new jobs, or the expansion of one or another of these industries. In both cases, the expansion will lead to increased demands on the educational system to provide skilled labour and technocrats. This means that the primary level has to be expanded and thus the whole educational system expands again. This is the manner in which the hypothesis of the interlocking, spiral and cumulative change operates (in simplified terms).

spiral and cumulative changes (processes) and their feed-back constitutes the main and fundamental hypothesis of this study. Since within these processes all variables and changes operate in mutual interactions, distinction between economic and non-economic variables and changes is not warranted as long as these factors and changes are "relevant" to the specific aspect(s) of development and underdevelopment being considered.[10])

A distinction between two aspects of the development process, namely the instrumental aspect and the goal aspect, can be introduced.[11])

The former refers to the various tools (primarily industry and education), functioning as main vehicles of change in the system. These tools include the various industrial sectors of the economy, such as the primary, secondary and tertiary industries. The latter refers to the explicit or implicit goals, or the long term consequences of the development process, which are indicated by the different components of the level of living, such as nutrition, shelter, health and educational services. However, this distinction should not be construed as representing actual distinctions in reality, or to be non-overlapping, but rather as a construct for facilitating the analysis.[12])

2. REGIONAL INEQUALITIES AND UNDER-UNDERDEVELOPMENT

Within individual countries, be they underdeveloped or developed, capitalist or socialist or of mixed economy, inequalities are found among the various regions constituting their spatial systems in both levels of development achieved and levels of living.

The reasons to which the existence and persistence of these inequalities can be attributed, are dissimilar in the different groups of countries mentioned above, since the nature and properties of the 'regional problem' vary in different countries; there are resource regions, resourceless regions, old regions, lagging regions, and metropolitan regions (Hilhorst, 1971, 82—91).

These inequalities evolve through historical developments (processes) characterised by being complex, interlocking and spirally operating causations having cumulative effects. These processes, brought about by mutually interacting external and internal changes, move (in the course of the historical development) the system upwards in some region(s) and downwards in others. It is a feature of these processes that, unhampered, they lead to increased inequalities among regions. The fundamental media through which these processes evolve are the forces of the market and their free play and agglomeration. As Myrdal emphasises "The free play of the forces in the market normally tends to increase rather than to decrease, the inequalities between regions" (Myrdal, 1969, 26.)[13])

The free play (i.e. unhampered by policy interferences) of the market forces leads to spatial concentration and clustering of econo-

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11) This distinction has been suggested by O. Riihinen of the University of Helsinki .

12) Education, for example, is typically included in the goal aspect, whereas in fact it should and does belong in both the instrumental and goal aspects of the development process simultaneously, since the neglect of education as an instrument of development usually tends to create bottlenecks for industry, which is itself a crucial element in the instrumental aspect.

13) According to Hilhorst, a country's spatial system is defined (using Perroux's concept of domination) by the existence of a number of interrelated spatial sub-systems, one of which acts as the dominant sub-system (the center), the other sub-systems performing the role of the dominated. Domination has two components: an extractive component, which enables the center to gain net profits from its relations with the dominated sub-systems(s) and to make use of existing channels of power to promote its own development, and a distributive component. The latter component becomes operative usually only when and if the center's interests or needs require it. Moreover, 'it is assumed that political power can and will be used to the economic advantage of the most powerful. The hypothesis can be anvanced that the extractive component in domination is of overriding importance when the dominated sub-systems are relatively underdeveloped because it is especially in such a situation that the center can more easily forge structures that allow relations of domination to work in an extractive manner. This is what we understand by a centre-periphery situation" (Hilhorst, 1971, 36—37).

mic activities (as well as cultural activities) in certain regions or localities and away from other regions and areas of the same country, thereby creating economic and cultural oases amidst economic and cultural deserts. This concentration of economic activities in a region may, sometimes, be a result of some favourable natural conditions, favourable to the kind of activities concentrated in that region at present or at some other time in the past. Generally, spatial concentration of economic and cultural activities is mainly due to a "historical accident" that some activity was once started in an area where it met with success rather than in some other area(s) of the country where it could have met with equal or even greater success.[14]) Once a start is made and succeeds, the ensuing increasing internal and external economies, especially agglomeration economies brought about by cumulative processes, support and sustain the development process in the 'favoured' area at the expense of other areas of the country, which may simultaneously experience stagnation and in some cases even regression.[15])

The 'natural' tendencies towards regional inequality, generated by the free play of the forces in the market, through the spiral causation of the cumulative processes, are not counteracted by the movements of labour, capital, goods and services, but on the contrary, the movements of these factors and resources are the media or vehicles by which the cumulative processes referred to above evolve and unfold, moving the system (in the sense defined here on page 12) upwards in the favoured area(s) and downwards in the unfavoured ones. The net outcome of these processes, under such circumstances, seems to resemble a zero-sum game; should the favoured area gain, which is usually the case under the unhampered free play of the market forces, the other areas, necessarily lose.[16])

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[14]) Richardson underlines the close relationship between Friedmann's center-periphery approach and Myrdal's cumulative causation approach in that "both stress the cumulative and self-reinforcing advantages of the initially established locations in the process of development, with particular stress on the role of agglomeration and other external economies." (Richardson, 1973, 57).

It is noteworthy in this context that Myrdal's "historical accident" is analogous to Richardson's "locational constants", which include: an immobile natural resource, a long-established city, and particular sites having special advantages. Because these locational constants are arbitrary, as Richardson points out, the spatial structure of the economy of a country can be irregular and distorted. (Richardson, 1973, 173). However, Myrdal's "historical accident" is more general than Richardson's "locational constants" in that the latter is specifically a spatial concept, whereas the former could be spatial, sectoral, political or military.

[15]) Agglomeration economies, as a general concept, "refer to the economies of size and concentration"; they may be: social agglomeration economies; household agglomeration economies; or business agglomeration economies. These economies perform a number of functions, including: "(I) to boost the rate of technical progress and productivity; (II) to attract industry and capital into a region or a metropolitan area; (III) to influence the decisions of households whether or not to migrate (either by attracting migrants to large cities or by affecting the locational preference function); (IV) to improve the efficiency of the intra-regional spatial structure". (Richardson, 1973, 175—196). However, agglomeration economies are, as Richardson points out, difficult to define and measure. (ibid, 210).

Hoover differentiates between three agglomeration (deglomeration) factors, viz, (I) large-scale economies within a firm -enlargement of production at one point; (II) localization economies for all firms in a single industry at one location -enlargement of total output of that industry at that location; and (III) urbanization economies for all firms in all industries at a single location -enlargement of total economic size (population, income, output, or wealth) of that location for all industries taken together. (Isard, 1972, 172—188).

[16]) This is an example of the operation of the spiral causation. Frank maintains that "the non-realisation and unavailability of investment of 'potential' economic surplus is due essentially to the monopoly structure of capitalism". This is brought about by the appropriation of this surplus and/or wasting it on luxury consumptions. Moreover, expropriation and appropriation evolve in a chain-like fashion which extends from international metropolises to the national centers, from the national centers to the regional centers, and from there to local centers, and so on. At each stage the economic surplus is expropriated from the lower-level center(s) and appropriated by the higher level one for its own development, thus development is generated for the few and underdevelopment for the many and thus a situation of polarisation into metropolitan, national, regional, etcetera, centers and national, regional, etcetera, peripheral satellites. (Frank, 1969, 6—7).

Labour, capital, goods and energy, tend to move or flow from the unfavoured areas of a country to the area(s) experiencing economic expansion, i.e., the center(s) of expansion (the word 'flow' is used here in the sense that the movement from the periphery to the centre is much larger than the movement in the other direction; in this sense 'flow' is different from 'exchange').

Migration of population to the centre of economic expansion tends to be selective. It thus tends to distort the structure of the population of the losing region, particularly its age structure. The centre of expansion attracts the most active and vital segments of the population from other regions.

The banking system in a country, acts as the instrument by which the savings, and potential investments, of the periphery are siphoned off to the centre of expansion.[17]) This siphoning off of savings takes place as a result of expansion at the centre of expansion, where returns on capital are more secure (though not necessarily higher) and investment opportunities are more readily available and the investing 'agencies' are relatively more experienced; (to this should be added the 'good life' at the center of expansion attracting the wealthy and intellectuals). This situation pertains regardless of whether the banking system is dominated by national or foreign banks.

Trade is the medium that facilitates the flow of goods, basically primary products, from other areas to the centre (and industrial finished products from the center to those areas) thereby not only creating unfavourable balance of payments for those other areas but also thwarting whatever handicrafts and industry may exist there, which may 'compete' with 'imported' goods. This situation leads to the transformation of other areas into producers and suppliers of primary products and markets for the industrial products and services of the centre. This transformation leads, on the one hand, to the further industrialisation of the centre (and further development of its culture) and, on the other, to the increased domination of agricultural and raw material production in other areas; furthermore, even the agricultural sectors of the other areas remain less developed than its counterpart in the centre (Myrdal, 1969, 26—29). ('Periphery', 'unfavoured areas', and 'other areas' are here used interchangeably).

THE 'BACKWASH EFFECTS' AND 'SPREAD EFFECTS'

Of particular interest for the purposes of this study are raw material producing and exporting areas, or, as Hilhorst calls them, 'resource regions', by which is understood areas or "regions whose economies could be based upon the large scale exploitation of their natural resources" (Hilhorst, 1971, 83).

The situation of, and in, resource regions producing primary products for which demand exists on the national and/or international markets is more complicated since the exploitation of these resources in the underdeveloped countries usually requires access to foreign investment and expertise as well as outlets to the world markets. This international element in the resource region is important, not only from the economic point of view, but also from the political one as well. This further complicates the situation. These properties of the resource areas are referred to by Hilhorst, who maintains that "The short term aspects of this regional devel-

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17) 'Capital' is used here to refer to mobile (or movable) rather than fixed capital. However, some forms of fixed capital can be transfered from one area to another; in this case the transfer would be relocation, such as the relocation of industrial machinery.

Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that regional location of investment is independent of regional savings rates, due to two factors: (a) the potentially high mobility of capital (savings), and (b) regions being open economies, (Richardson, 1973, 158). It is also important to remember that risk aversion reinforces the advantages of already established (central) locations rather than untried ones. As Richardson puts it, "The uncertainty and incomplete information that characterise location decisions, discriminate in favour of centralised locations. So also does the need to save time in making location decisions." (ibid, 55—56).

opment problem normally involve access to international markets and 'know-how', as well as the availability of long term credits. It is for these reasons that large scale natural resource development has a distinct international dimension which often tends to complicate the issue considerably" (Hilhorst, 1971, 84).

In the resource region, especially where the international element or dimension is present, resource flows are actually multiple in a sense, in that the flow of resources is not confined to the national centre(s); it extends to the international centre(s) as well. The flow of resources may take one of two patterns: either to the national centre and international centres directly and simultaneously, or to the national centre as a first stage and then from there to international centres. However, in both cases, most of the income accruing from the exploitation of the resources is typically retained by the national centre, or at least that part of it which is not retained by the international centres. In other words, the retention of this income is effected by both the national and the international centres. Consequently, the resource region itself is deprived of these incomes and thus of sources of potential investment. This situation creates, in addition, dependence of the resource region on both national and international centres for markets, know-how and credits.

What is involved here is a question of the scale of flow of resources out of the resource area. In the absence of the international element, the scale would most probably be lower than in its presence.

Regional inequalities within individual countries are not the result of spiral causations of cumulative processes of economic factors alone, but are also the result of non-economic factors which operate to maintain the downwards or check the upwards movement of the system. Some of these non-economic factors at operation in the periphery are: loss of part (and in extreme cases, all) of the active population of the area through migration to the centre; high fertility; distorted age structure of the population; poor roads, railways, means of communications, and other public facilities and utilities; poor and inadequate health services, both public and private, preventive and curative; lack of, or poor education facilities; lack of centres of population agglomeration; and so forth.[18])

The combined results of all these economic and non-economic factors and changes in them are called by Myrdal the 'backwash effects' of economic expansion at the center. These effects are similar to Hilhorst's extractive component of domination (cf. here, foor-note 13).

However, besides these backwash effects of economic expansion at the centre, there are the so-called "spread effects" representing the spill-over of the expansionary momentum from the centre to other areas of the country. This spill-over takes place as a result of the enlargement of the market at the centre of expansion itself, for the agricultural and raw material products of other areas (or as a result of agglomeration at the centre). Myrdal's spread effects are similar to Hilhorst's distributive component of domination. It should be noticed, however, that the spread effects, like the backwash effects, operate not only from the national centre but also from the international centre(s).

In those areas where the extractive industry is large enough and employs a substantial number of workers, consumer goods industries may spring up, and if the expansionary momentum is powerful enough to overcome the backwash effects emanating from the centre of expansion, that region has a chance of becoming a new centre of self-sustained economic expansion. However, such a region

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18) Richardson points out one of these non-economic factors, or rather groups them together under, "locational preferences". For example, the "locational preferences for firms tend to perpetuate concentration and agglomeration since many firms refuse to relocate away from centres of agglomeration even in cases when more profitable sites are available elsewhere." (Richardson, 1973, 197).

has to overcome the backwash effects generated from both the national and international centres, a condition few areas may be capable of meeting (cf. here foot-note 13).

REGIONAL INEQUALITIES AND THE ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION

Since the turn of the century, but particularly since the 'Great Depression', an unprecedented expansion of the role played by the State in the life of society, especially its economy, has occurred.

The role of the State in the underdeveloped countries has been crucial in initiating and/or protecting the development process of their countries, whether through direct economic operations by the public sector or though protection, encouragement, or assistance to the private sector. In a number of cases the State was obliged to interfere directly in the economic dimension of society in order to promote development when it had become apparent that the private sector was not able to promote and/or sustain the development process. These policy interferences by the State have now become a common feature in the underdeveloped countries and are generally accepted.

In those countries inhabited by a population belonging to diverse ethnic groups, state policy interferences and the location of economic (particularly industrial and cultural) activities, have in many cases shown a tendency reflecting the influence of the ethnic spatial distribution of the population, which has either been explicitly (or awaringly) taken into consideration, or has indirectly (or implicitly) affected these policies. This can be deduced from the actual spatial distribution of these activities and the implementation of new ones.

Situations in which the ethnic distribution of the population has played its role in the location of economic activities have been observed by other writers, such as Hamilton, who suggests that "man's thinking on the location of industries is formed under pressure from a vast array of human practices, prejudices, law and systems. Nationalism, imperialism and other political realities provide the true framework within which the location, distribution and spread of industries are encouraged, facilitated, restricted or prohibited (Odell. 1963; Hamilton, 1964 A, 46–64). Similarly, the attitude of communities, as Wallace and Ruttan (1960, 140), Paterson (1963, 130) and Hiner (1965, 23–24) point out, can attract or repel or select industries on both the regional and local levels. 'Anomaly' industries or locations may result from specific ethnic distributions (Alexander, 1963, 308 and 309)", (quoted in Chorley and Haggett, 1970, 368).

'Anomaly' locations and industries, resulting from specific ethnic distributions, are observable in many parts of the world;[19]) this anomaly obtains whether the anomalous locations and industries are explicitly created through policy interferences or come about through the operation of the 'vicious spirals' (this term is preferred to 'vicious circles' for the same reasons stated here in footnote 8) leading to the same effects.[20])

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[19]) The following list gives only some examples of this observation: (a) Africa: Eritrea (Ethiopia), Southern Sudan, Africans in South Africa and Rhodesia; (b) Asia: East Pakistan (Bangla Desh), Kurdistan (Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey); (c) Europe: Basque country (Spain and France) Catalonia (Spain), Slovakia (Czechoslovakia); Monte Negro (Yugoslavia) and (d) Amerindians (South America). However, the Basque country in Spain seems to be more industrialised and thus an exception; and in Yugoslavia the ethnic factor now seems to play a diminishing role. (Minority Rights Group, Reports Nos. 5, 9 and 15). However, the list is admittedly probably selective and very short; therefore, research in this field (on a comparative basis) seems interestnig and useful.

[20]) The fashion in which the position of ethnic minorities seems to come about may be represented in a very simplified way as follows: the group is usually a conquered community; this leads to severe (or mild) economic and other dislocations and the treatment of the population with contempt, as all defeated peoples are treated by their conquerors — the area is neglected — its economy stagnates — it becomes poorer — its population alienated and apathetic — social, cultural, political and administrative stagnation and regression — this is interpreted as proof that the group is 'inferior' to the majority — further contempt — and so on: the spiral moves downwards.

Relations between the centre of economic expansion and other areas of the country are characterised by the exercise of power, economic, political and cultural, by the centre and execution of the centre's decisions by other areas (heretofor referred to as peripheries). In other words, these are relations of domination by the centre and subordination by the peripheries, in all, or almost all economic, political, social, administrative and cultural decision-making processes and structures. John F. Friedmann, for example, considers the relations between the centre and periphery as being basically 'colonial' in nature.[21]) Hilhorst, as pointed out previously, admits that political power can be, and is, used to the economic advantage of the centre, which is the most powerful sub-system in the spatial system within an individual country.

In addition to this general pattern of relations between the centre and periphery, areas inhabited by an ethnically different population typically experience both the centre-periphery situation and lack of means and channels to exert pressure on the centre, because the latter usually tends to harbour (sometimes rather strong) suspicions about the minority and its aspirations; besides, the minority itself sometimes lacks effective leadership and viable communication channels and thus it tends to experience apathy and alienation.[22]) Of course, the minority is sometimes used as a 'scapegoat', when the centre feels insecure or weak (whether politically, economically or militarily, or even sometimes culturally). Within this context, it becomes necessary to deal with power in general since, as mentioned above, relations between the centre and periphery are determined and dominated by power structures and relations.

Johan Galtung, in his analysis of power, differentiates between power-over-others and power-over-oneself. The latter is referred to as 'autonomy', by which is meant "the ability to set goals that are one's own ... *and* to pursue them", not goals imposed from without. The former refers to power exercised by the power wielder over others. A nation (or a community or an individual) lacks power-over-itself, either because it is an object of power-over-others or because it lacks internal development, i.e., maturity into autonomy.

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21) "First, the centre-periphery relationship may be described as essentially a 'Colonial' one. The emergence of a polarised structure will normally be accompanied by a series of displacements, from the periphery to the centre, of the principal factors of production, labour, capital, entrepreneurs, foreign exchange and raw materials in unprocessed form... Second, insofar as the periphery remains a producer of primary, chiefly agricultural, materials, the secular trend in the interregional terms of trade will, on the whole, continue to be favourable to the centre... Third, growing regional inequalities will give rise to political pressures intended to reverse the traditional flow of resources to the centre and to help raise per capita incomes in the periphery to a level of approximate equality with the rest of the nation". (Friedmann, 1966, 12—13; quoted in Hilhorst, 1971, 6—7).

22) Two main patterns are observable that determine a minority's standing in society: (a) Today's minorities that have been aborigines of the country in which they live and who have been reduced to the status of minority as a result of a foreign invasion(s) and colonisation (in the sense of settlement) tend to have a lower standing — economically, politically and culturally — than the dominant majoirity (examples: Africans in the Sudan, Red Indians in North America, Amerindians in South America, Aborigines in Australia, Lapps in Finland, Norway and Sweden, and Kurds in Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey): (b) Today's minorities that are settlers in the country and whose settlement was a result of foreign occupation or under the patronage or protection of a foreign power tend to assume an equal or higher standing — economically, politically and culturally — than the majority (examples: Indians in East Africa, Swedes in Finland, French in Canada, Indians in Thailand, Lebanese and Syrians in the Caribbean, Arabs in Zanzibar (until recent political changes).

In the final analysis, a minority's standing in a country is typically determined by economic, political (including military) and cultural power and resources available at the disposal of that minority, or its patron. That a minority's standing is dependent upon, and determined by, the power and resources it commands is attested to by the very terms used to describe it or its relations; the case of the use of language in Finland, for example, is usually referred to as the 'language war' (cf. P. K. Hämäläinen, 1969). Or witness the power struggle, including military violence, involved when a change of a minority's standing is in question. Recent examples: the Kurds in Iraq, Bengalis in previously East Pakistan and, Africans in Southern Sudan and Turks in Cyprus.

Galtung makes a further differentiation of power, a differentiation "between three *power channels*, three types of power-over-others: ideological, remunerative and punitive"; the first is 'power of ideas', the second the "power of having goods to offer, a 'quid' in return for a 'quo' "; and the third the "power of having 'bads' to offer, destruction; also called force, violence".[23]) According to the model suggested by Galtung, the three types of power come through: culture (ideological power), the economy (remunerative power) and the military (punitive power). However, to be effective, these types of power must be transported or communicated. To effectively reach the power-receiver, all three types of power ought to be co-ordinated; it is the polity or politics which performs this function.

However, to reach the power-receiver and affect him or it, some sort of submissiveness on the part of the power-receiver is presumed (in ideological power), an element of dependence (in remunerative power) and a certain degree of fear (in punitive power). The opposites of submissiveness, dependence and fear, i.e., self-respect, self-sufficiency and fearlessness represent autonomy or power-over-oneself.

In the case of the periphery, especially if it happens to be inhabited by an ethnic group different from the majority, both power-over-others and power-over-itself are lacking because it is both a periphery and it thus lacks internal development.

Thus, since the peripheral region cannot direct equal power in the direction of the center, its only alternative is to develop power-over-itself, i.e., it requires immunisation against the power directed towards it from the centre, by refusing to be a power-recipient only. In other words, it needs to become autonomous in order to exercise power related to issues concerning regional questions, such as regional development, and at the same time to balance the power emitted by the center, i.e., there is need for a bi-directional flow of power.

The sources of power are resources and structures. Resource (or difference in the distribution of resources) power, deriving from something one is and/or has, means differences in command over resources and their distribution.[24]) Structural (or relation) power is power derived from position in a structure.

The combination of exploitation (the exchange relation), fragmentation (divide and rule) and penetration ("getting under the skin" of the dominated) may be called imperialism, dominance, or structural power. This situation obtains through dependence. Structural power or dominance serves to eradicate autonomy. It should be emphasised that "dominance and equality are structures and they are each other's contradiction . . . Dominance is certainly not a step on the road to equality as the (neo)-colonialist philosophy of paternalism and tutelage will have it. But equality may arise as a reaction to dominance",[25]) concludes Galtung. (Galtung, 1973, 47).

The distance factor normally tends to reduce the scale of factor movements between countries and regions. However, the friction of distance, or the distance factor, is not a symmetrically operating element in the spatial system. The degree of the friction of distance is dependent on the level of development of the road and transport system in a country, which system is itself, in turn, determined by the level of development a country or

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23) "In the first case, one is powerful because the power-sender's ideas penetrate and shape the will of the power-recipient. In the second case, one is powerful because one has a carrot to offer in return for a service; salary for work, beads for a signature on a scrap of paper, giving away a country or two, tractors for oil. In the third case, one is powerful because one has a big stick ready if the object does not comply so that one can destroy him or his property". (Galtung, 1973, 33—34).

24) At least in the short run, resources may become a source for rendering an area or a country an object of power-over-others instead of a source of power.

25) The section on power is more or less an outline of Galtung's 'mini-theory' of power, (Galtung, 1973).

region has actually attained, and to a lesser extent on the density of population in that country or region.

Therefore, in an area lacking well developed road and rail systems and modern transport and not densely populated, the friction of distance presents an obstacle to the development of that area. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that in many resource areas the friction of distance seems to generally operate in one direction, in that raw materials and factor movements are generally uni-directional, from the periphery to the center, whilst movements in the opposite direction, i.e., from the centre to the peripheral (resource) area(s), of factors necessary for that area's development (such as know-how, technology, education, health services, etcetera) are both negligible and slow. Hence the operation of the friction of distance is asymetrical — the friction of distance seems, in other words, to check the functioning of the 'spread effects' but does not seem to be a significant factor in the operation of the 'backwash effects'.

The resource region or area becomes important and its development becomes an actuality once its resources are discovered and their potentials assessed by the center. The development of such an area will depend on how essential its integration into the national spatial system is considered by the centre (and how this will affect the center's further development).

When and if the centre decides on the exploitation of the resource region's resources, the population factor enters the picture, in that population density in the region becomes an important factor in determining both the degree of exploitation of the resources (and the possible development) of the region. In 'fairly densely populated' areas an infrastructure, i.e., some economic and political structure, already exists, which must be reckoned with. This situation renders the economic factor involved in the exploitation of the region's resources, (in terms of costs) less acute, since an infrastructure already exists. But, at the same time, it leaves the political factor to be accounted for. In sparsely populated regions, the political factor is less complicated and can thus be safely ingnored, whereas the economic one becomes more acute, in the sense that the exploitation of the region's resources requires the setting up of necessary infrastructures since such infrastructures "will be virtually absent" in such a region.

The situation becomes more complicated when considering the fact that large amounts of investments and know-how, and access to national and world markets may be required. Thus, the exploitation of the resource region's resources tends to have regional, national and in many cases international aspects at the same time, which aspects must be reckoned with simultaneously.

According to Hilhorst, the sparsely populated region is characterised "by the absence of a hierarchy of cities", a poor transport system, usually having "no more than one well developed connection with the national transport system", and the economic and social infrastructures being minimal or at a low level of development. "Under these conditions", concludes Hilhorst, "the only economically feasible development strategy seems to be that of concentration of national activities in an effort to bring about Perroux's agglomeration effects, with the objective of expanding the region's economy through spread effects emanating from this concentrated group of national activities. Spreading the national activities over the region's territory seems impossible under the given circumstances as it would require considerably more structural investment than can normally be financed under conditions of scarcity of capital". (Hilhorst, 1971, 84—85). It is necessary, furthermore, to strive for increasing returns on capital through concentrating both direct productive investment and investment on infrastructures as far as feasible.

For the fairly densely populated areas or regions already having an economic and political structure, the spatial strategies available for implementation are more numerous and

the selection of one or the other depends on the centre's objectives. If the objective is to expand the region's economy, assuming the existence of a regional centre sufficiently well situated and developed, the strategy is to disperse available investment in national activities over the secondary and tertiary centers of the region and to lower-order places as well. If the objective is to consolidate the spatial economy of the region, investment and the setting up of additional infrastructures in the region will have to be concentrated, rather than dispersed. In this case the investment "will preferably be concentrated in the weaker segment of the region [a] either in one place, or [b] along a transport route". (Hilhorst, 1971, 85). In the former case, the strategy of growth centres is advocated, whereas in the latter case the strategy of growth axis is recommended. Howener, the former strategy is preferable because of the resulting agglomeration economies.

Regardless of the strategy adopted, a maximum access, as far as economically possible within a certain period of time, to information and markets to a majority of the region's population centers, rather than to a few centers, is a fundamental objective in order to achieve:

(1) the spread of modern technology and science as much as feasible;
(2) the enlargement of markets for producers of lower-order regional centers; and
(3) making the lower-order centers more attractive for local as well as migrant producers from the region's periphery.

In other words, the objective is "to enable a higher degree of freedom in economic and social decision-making at lower levels of regional hierarchy" (Hilhorst, 1971, 86) (the objective being, in Galtung's words, to achieve 'autonomy' or 'power-over-itself' by the region).

THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND UNDER-UNDERDEVELOPED REGIONS

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, development and underdevelopment are generally considered as two relative concepts. One country or a group of countries is related to another country or group of countries in certain variables or dimensions, whether economic, social, political or cultural. Those countries having greater magnitudes than an arbitrarily fixed level are called developed and those having lower levels are designated underdeveloped, developing, poor, backward, etcetera.

Therefore, in terms of the concept of sets, the whole world may be considered as a universal set having two subsets: the subset of developed countries and the subset of underdeveloped countries. The set of underdeveloped countries has as many subsets as there are underdeveloped cuontries "since each individual element of (a set) can count as a distinct subset of (the set)" (Chiang, 1967, 14). The set of an individual underdeveloped country (which is itself a subset) can, thus, have as many subsets as there are regions therein (a region in an underdeveloped country is a subset of the subset representing that country). Since the set representing that country is called underdeveloped, its subset may be referred to as under-underdeveloped (or sub-underdeveloped, the former being preferable). Hence, the designation of underdeveloped regions in underdeveloped countries may be under-underdeveloped regions as distinct from 'underdeveloped' regions in developed countries usually called depressed areas or lagging regions.[26])

In addition to this 'formal' difference, underdeveloped countries and under-underdeveloped regions differ in some other ways. However, most of these differences find their origin in the fact that under-underdeveloped regions are subsets of underdeveloped countries.

Although Myrdal[27]) as well as Frank[28]) maintain that regional and international

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26) Analogous terminology is used in sociology; there are groups and sub-groups, etcetera (cf. H. M. Johnson, 1960, 6—9).

inequalities and underdevelopment are similar, actually some important differences between the two do exist that concern both the degree and intensity of Myrdal's 'backwash effects' and the scope of policy interferences available at the disposal of the appropriate authorities to check and direct the free play of the forces in the market and/or speed up the 'spread effects'; they also differ in terms of power.

First, because of the relative virtual absence of any obstacles, (save the friction of distance) in the way of the free movement of mobile factors and resources within an individual country, there is, in general, no restriction on the flow of factors and resources from the periphery to the center of economic expansion, whereas internationally, not only is the friction of distance greater, but also numerous barriers to the flow of factors and resources out of individual under-developed countries do exist, such as passport and immigration regulations, foreign currency regulations and controls, and trade restrictions (protection), for example.

Secondly, within an individual country, all factors and resources may and can move freely, from the periphery to the centre, whereas between countries mainly resources, particularly primary products, flow on a large scale and under restrictions, capital and other factors flowing on relatively limited scale. Even the movements of these resources and factors can be stopped by the underdeveloped country (or countries) involved, subject to international agreements, whilst the flow of factors and resources from the periphery to the center cannot be stopped, except by the center itself, or, otherwise, the stoppage invites violent reactions from the centre.[29])

The first point emphasizes the question of obstacles or barriers, the second stresses the degree of openness that determines the extent of the folw of factors and resources.

Thirdly, the 'national' center may undergo losses to the outside world through trade and other relations (on the nature and magnitudes of these losses, cf: Myrdal, 1969, 51—52; Szentes 1971 section on Income Drain and Losses; and Frank, 1969, 6—8). The 'national' periphery undergoes, in addition to losses to the outside world indirectly through the national centre, losses to the national centre(s) directly as well, through labour, capital, goods, energy and entrepreneurs flow (the flow is more substantial in the case of resource regions). In a sense, the periphery undergoes multiple losses on two stages, the first to the 'national' center and the second to the outside world either directly and/or indirectly through the centre.

Fourthly, a dependent 'country' which desires independence, i.e., wants to do away with its dependence, may, and usually can, adopt and pursue policy measures aimed at modifying the degree of dependence or entirely terminating it, and to interfere with the free play of the forces in the market, regardless of whether such measures are agreed to, or opposed by, one outside state or the other (usually, but not always, subject to international agreements). An underdeveloped country or group of countries can use their resources to achieve objectives other than economic ones (political, for example) or play one developed country or group of countries off against other countries (or country). Such measures include nationalisation of concerns owned by foreigners, protection, ban on emigration of skilled and

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27) Myrdal maintains that "international inequalities are, of course, not dissimilar from the regional inequalities within a country... there is a very close causal interrelation between them" (Myrdal, 1969, 10). The two inequalities are causes "of each other in the circular way of the cumulative process" (ibid., 50).

28) Frank insists that "indeed, the exploitative relation which in chain-like fashion extends the capitalist link between the capitalist world and national metropolises to the regional centers (parts of whose surplus they appropriate), and from these to local centers... Thus at each point, the international, national, and local capitalist system generates development for the few and underdevelopment for the many". (Frank, 1969, 7—8).

29) The embargo on oil exportation by the Arab Governments in 1973 is a recent example; in this case, even international agreements were powerless.

non-skilled labour, etcetera. As for the 'national' periphery, such a scope for action is generally not available.[30]) Regional development policies are usually formulated by the center; their implementation requires the centre's financing, planning, and execution, or at least its consent. The implementation of regional policy and planning is usually carried out under the strict and direct control by the center itself. However, regional and so-called 'national' (which, by the way, typically means the centre's) interests need not be and are not always necessarily identical or similar and thus not necessarily in harmony, spatially or temporally. These interests may even be conflicting.[31])

The afore-mentioned differences between underdeveloped countries and under-underdeveloped regions are of crucial importance in practice, particularly in countries populated by diverse ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups that assume lower standing in the economic, social, political and cultural life of society. This becomes more obvious when the following observations are taken into account: (a) Friedmann's observation that the center-periphery relation is basically a colonial one; (b) Myrdal's observation of racial and cultural differecnes creating strict segregation in the colonies and dependencies; and (c) Alexander's observation that anomalous industries and locations tend to develop as a result of specific ethnic distributions. Colonialism, segregation and anomaly, added to a region's lack of power-over-itself, tend in practice to shackle the region and render it an easy spoil for the 'national' center and sometimes to the international centres as well.

The situation of an under-underdeveloped region (or area) and its relations with the centre have the following features:

1. Lack of barriers leads to relatively unrestricted flow of its mobile resources and factors to the 'national' and sometimes international centre(s).
2. Its relative openness leads to relatively unlimited flows of these resources and factors.
3. These flows entail (substantial) losses of income and potential investment and of factors and know-how.
4. Lack of power-over-itself by the area.
5. Lack of scope for exercising pressure on the centre to bring about development, and virtual lack of viable policy instruments at its disposal.
6. The center uses its political power to its own economic (and other) advantages.

On the national level, the center in almost all underdeveloped countries is endowed with nearly absolute power. This is due to the political structures existing in these countries, which are characterised by 'centralisation'. Centralisation means that the regions have no or very limited power, whether political, economic, or cultural.

The centre is usually the seat of the 'central' government, i.e., the centre of decision-making, the centre of power. Those making decisions on the location of economic and cultural activities usually tend to view 'national interests' as the interests of the centre, where most, if not all, of them reside. This is not necessarily, but often, done consciously. Besides, the centre, usually the capital city and its region, is seen by these decision-makers as the symbol of the 'nation' and often actually the 'nation' itself (miniaturised) Because of this, but also because of the

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30) Myrdal stresses that "the one great asset its liberation from colonial domination will have bestowed on it, is its liberty to regulate its life according to the interests of its own people" (Myrdal 1969, 62). It is precisely this liberty that regions typically lack.

31) Richardson mentions th following differences between "a region" and "a nation": (a) "a region is much more 'open' than a nation", i.e., a larger segment of factors and resources are imported and exported on the regional level than on the national one; this is a distinction of degree; (b) "crossing national borders involves overcoming barriers ... that do not arise when crossing regional borders"; this is a distinction of kind; and (c) "regional policy makers ... do not have the policy instruments that are available to national governments." (Richardson, 1973, 9—13).

prestige factor, the center is given most of the attention of the decision-makers and the money of the country.

The rest of the country is neglected. Often, the center tends to be unable to sustain its own development through its own internal resources. The rest of the country, but in particular those areas having natural resources, are the sources of money for the center's development. Since these areas are underdeveloped as well, a road is opened to link the resource area with the center. The exploitation of the resources, furthermore, requires skilled man-power, electric power, and water supply; the man-power is imported from the center (and even from abroad sometimes), power lines are extended or local power generating plants are constructed, and water purification plants are supplied. But, mostly, these remain enclaves. The imported man-power would require housing, schools, medical care and the other urban amenities it used to have at the center. These are also provided.

The exploitation of the area's resources now becomes a reality. These resources are first exported to either the national center, abroad or to both. However, insofar as the producing area is concerned, the income accruing from the production and exportation of its resources is retained at the center (or abroad), the center exerting no effort and showing no desire to invest (all or) part of this income in the producing area itself for the purpose of developing it. This may be due to the fact that this income is all spent on the center itself. Any complaint by the area concerned, that the center is neglecting its affairs, is usually countered by claims that it is not in the 'national interest' to invest in that area or that the center is doing its best by pointing to the few projects it had implemented in order to make the production and exportation of the area's resources possible. Should the area try to go beyond mere complaint and attempt to exert pressure on the center, it cannot make this pressure effective because it lacks the power to do so and such attempts are counteracted by immediate strong measures by the center since the center tends to view such attempts as threats to its position or to the 'national interests', which very often means the same thing.

The area, in a way marginal to the center but at the same time its resources being important to the centre and its development, becomes more problematic to the centre once this importance is recognised. On the one hand, an enclave in that area, in a way a necessary by-product of the exploitation of its resources, means endowing it with some measure of power, but more importantly with awareness of its relative situation and relations with the centre. This awareness comes about through the channels of communications and information established by the centre as part of the enclave for the purpose of resource exploitation. On the other hand, the centre is apprehensive of delegating any of the power it wields to the area. At the same time the development of the centre itself and its region absorbs most of the state resources allocated for development. In other words, there is only 'take' rather than 'give and take'. In addition, if the area happened to be inhabited by a people ethnically or religiously different from the majority it becomes in an even more disadvantageous position. Decisions on the location of economic and cultural activities are made by men, who are bound to be influenced by prevailing customs, practices, mayopia, prejudices, fear, ignorance, stereotyping, scapegoating, and other traits of humanity. Typically, the presence of these factors operates to the disadvantage of minorities in general.

Thus, an under-underdeveloped area is typically, as Friedmann maintains, a colony of the centre. But it is a special type of colony. A colony that very seldom can break the bonds of domination binding it. Neither can it adopt policy measures of its own to regulate its life according to its own economic, political or cultural potentials and interests.

3. INTERNATIONAL INEQUALITIES AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

Inequalities and underdevelopment are not only observable within individual countries but also among countries. The two are aspects of, as Myrdal and Frank suggest, the same processes and are in a way indicators of basically the same problems, even though some differences exist between them.

It is underdevelopment and inequalities between countries that have been attracting much of the attention and energy of economists, sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, and others, whereas regional underdevelopment, in the underdeveloped countries, has been and still seems to be an almost 'virgin' field of enquiry.

Striking differences in levels of development achieved, and in standards of living, divide the world at present. As a UN publication points out, "One-tenth of the peoples of the world enjoy about 60 % of the world's income, while 75 % of them have less than 10 % at their disposal . . ." (UN, 1963, 3). The explanation of these inequalities and differences lies in the hypothesis put forward at the beginning of this chapter, namely, the hypothesis of the free play of the forces in the market operating within the complex, interlocking, spiral causation of the cumulative processes.

FACTOR MOVEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL INEQUALITIES

Contrary to some theoretical formulations, trade and capital movements are media through which the spiral causation of the cumulative processes evolve, upwards in some countries and downwards in others. These movements thus create development for countries with well established industries and underdevelopment for countries with predominantly agricultural and/or raw material production.

International trade, under conditions of the free play of the market forces, is the vehicle by which the flow of primary products from underdeveloped countries to the developed ones, and the industrial products from the developed to the underdeveloped countries are effected, on terms usually unfavourable to the balance of trade and balance of payments of the underdeveloped countries. Most of the primary products originating in the underdeveloped countries usually meet inelastic demand in the world market; besides, the prices of these products are characterised by large fluctuations. Unregulated imports of manufactured goods into the underdeveloped countries from the developed ones may undermine whatever handicrafts and industries the underdeveloped countries may have, since these handicrafts and industries cannot successfully compete with imported goods. Thus, an underdeveloped country's trade relations with the outside world under conditions of the free play of the forces in the market are one of the main factors in the transformation of that country into a market for the developed countries' manufactured goods and a source of primary products for their industries or consumption. Such relations have been made possible through political and/or economic domination.

Capital movements, under the same conditions, have been basically a movement from the underdeveloped to the developed countries, even though some capital has been moving from the developed to the underdeveloped countries. The latter movement has, however, been meagre and dwindling as more and more investment opportunities have become available in the developed countries themselves, as a result of their rapid development, and of the scientific-technological revolution, and as the risks of overseas investments have become greater. Without the imposition by the underdeveloped governments of exchange and other controls, capital movements out of the underdeveloped countries might be on a larger scale than they have actually been because returns on capital may be (higher and) more secure and because capital itself is generally more secure and more easily transferable in the non-socialist developed countries than in the underdeveloped ones in general.

Even though labour movements on the international scene are important both in the form of unskilled and skilled labour (brain-drain), these movements "can be safely ignored as a factor of importance for international economic adjustment as between underdeveloped and developed countries" as Myrdal suggests (Myrdal, 1969, 54).

Myrdal's 'backwash effects' of economic expansion are particularly strong on the international scene because, on the one hand, trade and capital movements under the free play of the market forces are generally disadvantageous to the underdeveloped countries, and, on the other hand, they are not counteracted by the 'so very weak spread effects' that may emanate from the developed countries as a result of their development. The weakness of the spread effects is, in addition to the existence of international boundaries and barriers, mostly a reflection of weak spread effects within the individual underdeveloped countries themselves, as Myrdal points out.

Colonialism and domination have been the instruments facilitating the operation of the backwash effects among countries. Metropolitan countries (metropolises) not only used their colonies and dependent countries (dependencies) as markets for their manufactured products, but also often adopted special policy measures aimed at inhibiting the establishment and/or growth of indigenous industries. Imports of manufactured goods led to the destruction of existing home industries and handicrafts. It has been colonialism and domination that made possible the transformation of the dependencies into suppliers of cheap primary products to the metropolises. Cheap local labour made the prices of such products low; in addition, absence of, or very low taxes and duties, low royalties paid to the host country, and other factors have made prices of primary products from dependencies low. In the final analysis, the exploitation of the dependencies' natural and human resources has been to serve the interests and development of the metropolises at the expense of the former, in the sense that the latter deprived the former of its sources of potential investments. This deprivation was fundamentally due to the nature of power relations and structure between them.

However, in order to exploit their dependencies' natural and human resources, the metropolises were compelled to invest in infrastructures, import skilled labour and enterprise, build some roads and means of communications, introduce some medical services and schooling on a limited scale, and create structures and institutions that could serve the afore-mentioned purpose. These measures have had very weak spread effects in the dependencies and remained in the nature of enclaves; this has been due basically to the fact that the imported skill-labour and enterprise and modern science and technology remained segregated from the indigenous labour force and population due to racial and cultural segregation and differences in wages and modes of living, and the nature of economic relations between the two sides. Attention is here drawn to the striking similarities between relations of under-underdeveloped areas with their "national" center(s), and those of the underdeveloped countries with their metropolis(es). Nevertheless, these extremely weak spread effects (Myrdal, 1969, 58) have been concentrated both spatially and socially and their effects thwarted by the nature of power relations between the two sides.

Under such circumstances of strict segregation inhibiting cultural exchanges, even the transfer of scientific and technological skills and knowledge has been inhibited.[32]) Therefore, economic and cultural activities generated by metropolises in their dependencies tended to form enclaves within these dependencies, having very little spread effects on their economy and society.

In addition, an important concern of the metropolises has always been the maintenance of 'law and order", social stability

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32) There are no a priori reasons to assume away similar effects stemming from similar relations on the "national" level. In other words, colonialism and dependence need not be supposed to be present only between countries; they may as well be and are found within countries. (See K. Misra, 1972).

and the status quo. This concern stemmed from the fact that law, order and social stability are some of the conditions required for the effective exploitation of the dependencies' natural and human resources. In practice, this meant maintaining the status quo and consequently the identification by the metropolises with the privileged social groups in the dependencies' societies. These groups, whose privileges depended on the preservation of the status quo as well, found their allies in the metropolises. The interests and privileges of both sides and their preservation had no need for economic, social or cultural development leading to social mobility and thus threatening these very interests and privileges. nor did they hold any ideas or ideals of equality because equality meant the termination, totally or partially, of these interests and privileges.[33])

4. CRITICISM OF MYRDAL'S MODEL

Myrdal's theory of development and underdevelopment has been criticised by Szentes on the basis that Myrdal restricts regional and international inequalities attributable to the free play of market forces to the laissez-faire situation only. This restriction, according to Szentes, gives the impression that Myrdal's conclusions "that there is a tendency inherent in the free play of market forces to create regional inequalities, and that this tendency becomes the more dominant the poorer a country is" — (which Myrdal considers as "two of the most important laws of economic underdevelopment and development under laissez-faire") — "have been operating in today's underdeveloped countries from the very outset (or that they cannot work any longer in the advanced capitalist countries under "controlled" and "regulated" capitalism)". Szentes considers this restriction the weakest point in Myrdal's analysis of development and underdevelopment. (Szentes, 1971, 103). Szentes also criticises Myrdal's "circular causation" as pointed out in footnote 9 above.[34])

Moreover, Salvatore levels the following criticisms to Myrdal's theory:

1. Myrdal's theory, Salvatore maintains, only points out that resources flow from the poorer regions (countries) to the richer ones without showing whether or not "these same resources could and would be effectively used within the disadvantaged region." What he says he means is that, "resource availability is a necessary but certainly not a sufficient condition for development." (Salvatore, 1972, 520–21).

However, Myrdal does not say or imply that resource availability is a necessary and sufficient condition for development; what he maintains is that the flow of resources from the poorer regions (countries) widens inequalities between them and the richer ones. This will take place, under the specified conditions, regardless of whether or not these resources would or could be effectively used in the poorer regions. The issue involved is not where these resources could or would be effectively used, in the poorer or richer

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[33]) Szentes offers a somewhat more elaborate presentation of the backwash effects of colonialism and domination; these effects take the form of income drain and losses, direct income drain (which is that part of the national income produced in the dependency but appropriated by the metropolis(es) through capital export), and indirect income drains and losses through trade and financial-monetary relations between dependencies and metropolises (Szentes enumerates seven forms of these drains and losses). In addition, the forms of dependence on metropolitan centers by dependencies are "direct economic dependence; trade dependence; financial dependence; and technical dependence". Myrdal, however, refers to economic and political dependence, even though in his analysis of underdevelopment he implicitly alludes to the other forms of dependence.

[34]) However, Riihinen points out that Szentes's criticism of Myrdal's conclusions is not well founded, since Szentes is criticising conclusions arrived at mainly through empirical observations on theoretical basis alone. This is not acceptable because empirical observations cannot be refuted by theoretical arguments alone (private communication with Professor O. Riihinen, Social Policy Department, University of Helsinki).

regions; the issue is that these flows deprive the poorer regions of the necessary conditions for, and thus hinder their development (prospects).

2. Salvatore denies that "traditional economic theory" states that the free play of the forces in the market brings about equality to factor returns, between regions.

He maintains that the free play of these forces may or may not be *"the direct cause or the explicit vehicle"* for the widened regional inequalities; widened inequalities may, he further maintains, result "entirely from factors purely internal to each region" (ibid, 522).

However, since the market mechanism — rather than policy interferences — effects the flow of the poorer regions' resources, and since this flow leads to increased inequalities as between the poorer and richer regions, in underdeveloped countries it is consequently mainly the free play of this mechanism sometimes reinforced by policy measures which cause wider regional inequalities.

3. Salvatore maintains that Myrdal does not give "any indication whatsoever to the steps or techniques to follow in order to apply the theory to concrete cases." His conclusion that, "a theory which has no empirically measurable content is not a very useful theory" (ibid, 523) does not apply in this case, since Myrdal's not specifying steps and techniques for applying his theory does not mean that it is useless, or that such steps and techniques are not available — Salvatore himself has actually empirically applied a modified version of the theory to Italy. It seems that Salvatore's misunderstanding of Myrdal's theory, his preoccupation with "real per capita income" approach, (his concern with the case of "an underdeveloped region in an otherwise developed country"), and his short-run perspective have led him to modify (' refine and extend") Myrdal's theory and, on the basis of this modified version, to conclude that, on the basis of the Italian case, "the net effect of the operation of the market mechanism, contrary to Myrdal's ... theoretical speculation, functioned in a way which was beneficial to the South [of Italy]." (ibid, 535—36).

5. DEVELOPMENT AND THE LEVEL OF LIVING

Is development desirable? And why? These two questions can be properly answered when considering the so-called "environmental problem" in the underdeveloped countries and

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35) Although Myrdal recognizes that "the most seriously and most immediately threatened by the environmental crisis" are the underdeveloped countries, he maintains that the Founex Report did not give "due importance" to two major environmental problems, namely, climate and papulation explosion. Myrdal contends that climate, directly and indirectly, affects man, animal, soil and various materials, and thus is "generally a serious impediment to development". Concerning population explosion, Myrdal asserts that this is the "key factor in the environmental problem" because "natural resources have to be considered in relation to the size of the population which is to be provided for. And pollution is also in many ways a function of the density of population". (Myrdal, 1974, 210—211).

When discussing climate, it is important to distinguish between macro- and micro-climates. The former refers to the natural cimate, which is at present outside the effective control of man. The latter is the climate of the indoor work and living places. Micro-climate can be more and better adjusted to man's comfort as the development process progresses and subsquently as levels of living rise. Finland is an example of such an adjustment of climatic conditions which are not anly impediments to development but also threatens life itself.

As for population explosion, there is evidence that as the levels of development attained increase, rates of increase of papulation decelerate. Of course, the element of time is important, but it must be recognized that social problems cannot be solved overnight. This evidence is observable on the international scene as well as within single underdeveloped countries, (such as Turkey where the more developed western areas have, by and large, lower rates of increase of population than the "backward" east). Myrdal actually recognizes this observation indirectly when he observes that governments in the underdeveloped countries trying to spread the use of birth-control methods have "to reach out in the villages and the city slums where people are often illiterate, very poor, underfed, often not in good health, and, as a result, generally apathetic". (ibid, 212). This means that these governments will have to reach out in the under-underdeveloped areas within the relevant spatial units considered.

under-underdeveloped regions. It should be made clear from the outset, that the nature of the "environmental problem" in the underdeveloped countries, is fundamentally different from the "environmental problem" in the developed countries; whilst the problem in the former group of countries is one of the consequences of the development process itself, it is in the latter the result of the lack of development. (cf: *Development and Environment*, 1972).[35])

As the report of the Panel of Experts at the Founex's Conference on the Human Environment points out, the environmental problem in the underdeveloped countries is predominantly a problem that indicate "the poverty and very lack of development of their societies". It is not "merely the "quality of life", but life itself is endangered by poor water, housing, sanitation and nutrition, by sickness and disease and by natural disasters". (Ibid, 6). To ameliorate and eventually eliminate some or all of these consequences of underdevelopment in the underdeveloped countries and regions, these countries and regions have no other alternative but to develop their economies and societies. The development process will entail the elimination of some (probably many) of these consequences of underdevelopment; it will lead to higher levels of living, i.e., to improved water, housing, sanitation and nutrition conditions. In addition, and in terms of power, the development process, when and if it is well implanted and sustained, will tend to endow these countries and regions with power-over-themselves, or autonomy, and virtually some element and degree of power-over-others as well, thus changing the power relations and structures inhibiting their further development.

However, the development process will itself tend to create environmental problems similar to those present-day developed countries are experiencing nowadays. These problems include, among others, polluted air and water, noise, traffic congestion, and nature destruction. These problems are consequences of "the creation of large productive capacities in industry and agriculture, the growth of complex systems of transportation and communication, the evolution of massive urban conglomerations", which "have been accompanied in one way or another by damage and disruption to the human environment". (ibid, 5). These consequences of the development process may be reduced, but at great costs, which the underdeveloped countries cannot afford at the initial stages of their development and probably for a long time afterwards. Therefore, the answer to the questions posed at the beginning of this section is that development is desirable because it leads to the amelioration of many of the "environmental" consequences of underdevelopment discussed above.

One point worth mentioning here is that the development process is usually accompanied by changes in the indigenous culture of the underdeveloped countries and regions. Whether these changes are desirable or, if not, avoidable, is a controversial question.

If culture is understood to mean the totality of acquired habits, customs, skills, traits, knowledge, etcetera, by the individual as a member of society, then it as well as society at large, undergo changes, and it is inevitable that culture changes constantly. Culture is thus understood as a dynamic concept not a static one.

The development process, meaning complex interlocking changes and being spiral and cumulative, will inevitably lead to further cultural changes. In a sense, the development process will only accelerate cultural changes. Some of these cultural changes are imperative since the preservation of old habits, customs, etcetera, may, and in many cases do, constitute obstacles to the development process. This process will also require that members of society acquire new skills, knowledge, habits, etcetera (these are in a sense the transitory components of culture).

Therefore, some of these changes should be welcomed as some traits of the "old" culture are really wasteful, and these traits may not fit in with the new conditions and

may be harmful. However, a good many cultural traits, usually referred to as "national culture" (which may be considered as the permanent components of culture) do persist and can be preserved and developed (or suppressed and destroyed) through policy interferences and pressures by groups or the State. The concern for vanishing or vanishable transitory cultural components is really a waste of energy and to some extent a misunderstanding of the issues involved. According to the definition of culture expressed above, the development process by itself alone will not lead to the extinotion of basic, permanent cultural components, such as language; what cause their disappearance are policy interferences. As Jenkins puts it, "One fact emerges that cannot be overestimated. It is that cultures are the most permanent part of man apart from his biological make-up. Culture includes language, literature, history, and ontological and epistemological beliefs that include religion and philosophy." (Jenkins, 1971, 50).

The long-term outcome or goal of the development process in the underdeveloped countries is to secure for the broad masses of the population an acceptable level of living, not in terms of high consumption propensities, but rather in real terms, based on socially and objectively determined magnitudes and standards of elements constituting the level of living, usually referred to as "components" or "indicators". The selection of these components and the determination of their indicators, and these indicators' quantitative levels, are not entirely "objective", meaning that they can be determined regardless of prevailing circumstances in the particular societies, in, or for which, they are suggested. It seems that there is generally a close relationship or correlation between a society's level of living and the level of development it has actually achieved. Higher levels of the development process are normally accompanied by higher levels of living, and vice versa.[36]) This does not mean or imply, that the various components and indicators of the level of living change linearly, or have the same pattern of change as the development process itself.

However, development does not imply only higher levels of living but as mentioned above, the elimination of the consequences of underdevelopment itself and also the modification or termination of the power relations and structures related to it. This proposition may be contrasted with what most of the literature on development and underdevelopment usually considers to be the goal of development, namely, higher levels of per capita income.

Development and underdevelopment are usually defined in terms of levels of income per capita. These levels of income are not seen as indicators or manifestations of levels of development but rather as causes, sometimes fundamental or even sole causes, of development and underdevelopment. (This statement should not be construed to mean or imply the denial of interaction and feedback between levels of income and levels of devel-

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[36]) As pointed out above, development is here understood to mean "the process of progressive incorporation of mankind's stock and new advances in science and technology into the fabric of society in general and into its productive forces in particular." Since improvements in the level of living indicates this very process, in a sense, development and the level of living are two aspects of the same process. Improved levels of living means: improved health services (through advances in medical sciences and technologies), increased supplies and improved quality of foodstuffs (through the introduction of new agricultural methods, impletments, fertilizers, etc. which are products of science and technology), improved shelters and services of dwellings (through the introduction and improvements in water mains, purified water, electric power, sewer systems, etc. which are again products of science and technology). Even leisure and human rights can be seen in the light of science and technology; (improved communications and channels of information and education lead to awareness of existing inequalities and facilitates the struggle for equality and human rights (this is why totalitarian regimes of various colourings impose "information blackout" and very strict control on information flow and channels). Therefore, development and levels of living are closely related and reinforce each other in a cumulative manner.

opment attained). The notion that development and higher levels of income are one and the same thing is weak on at least two planes. Firstly, higher levels of income in the developed countries are much more recent than their development process (historically higher levels of living followed higher levels of development). And secondly, for the underdeveloped countries to develop, they must direct as much as feasible of their national incomes to the development process, at least in its initial phases, and thus they must try to avoid and check any tendency towards immediate increases of levels of income, or "initial welfare" according to Myrdal. This is not always possible because of other factors being involved, such as political factors and expectations built in false understanding of the development process.

Although Myrdal makes several references (Myrdal, 1969) to the effect that development is the raising of average per capita income, he indeed cautions against and criticises this same notion in another work of his, namely *An International Economy*, 1956. Myrdal points out in the latter work, that, what the developed countries do is a powerful spur to the underdeveloped countries' carving for a quick rise in their consumption level – to their demand for "initial welfare" without the delay for savings and investment". This is done, according to Myrdal, by:

(a) defining development as a drive for higher levels of living;

(b) giving wide publicity through modern mass media and other information channels to their own high levels of living; and,

(c) active rationalisation of their own situation by the formulation of minimal standards of various elements of the level of living, such as food, housing, health and education. (These so-called "minimal standards" are actually, as Myrdal suggests, normative and attainable in the developed countries but they are "sky high" and unattainable in the underdeveloped countries). Furthermore, these rationalisations bestow the authority of science on the definition of development as rising levels of living (Myrdal, 1956, 164).

Nevertheless, the long-term goal or outcome of the development process in the underdeveloped countries will be the raising of general levels of living of the broad masses of the population. What this means in practice is that basic needs, both material and non-material, of the population, such as food, shelter, health, education and human and cultural rights need be satisfied and cultivated.[37]) The urgency of the satisfaction of these needs is due to their fundamental effects on the development process itself in the underdeveloped countries and regions, as an undernourished, poorly sheltered, sick and illiterate population and labour force is hardly capable of effectively and efficiently carrying out and sustaining a development plan or process (lack of skilled labour and technocrats, a direct result of lack of educational facilities, has tended to create bottlenecks for many an underdeveloped country attempting to implement its development projects, for example; or many an underdeveloped country torn apart in political instability, unrest, civil wars or recurrent coup d'états and changes of and in government, find themselves putting aside their development projects and shelving their economic plans in favour of short-term political objectives strived for by the "rulers" of these countries.)

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37) "Satisfaction" is used here in a utilitarian rather than a hedonic sense. This implies that to satisfy needs means to meet the material (things: food, clothes, etc.) and non-material (such as education, human rights, and leisure) needs. As Uusitalo points out (Uusitalo, 1975, 8—10), there are two main differences between the utilitarian and hedonic senses, which concern: (a) the position of causality in either of them (in the former, a central part of it is formed by a "causal component", whereas in the latter, this coponent is only peripheral), and (b) the utilitarian sense relates to material and non-material "things", "acts", and "deeds", whilst the hedonic one refers to the "state of mind". (von Wright, 1968).

It is of course possible to embark on the development process and at the same time keep levels of living constant, or even lower. But this will call for "sacrifices" and usually entails "human sufferings".

In this context there seems to be a paradox and a dilemma. Initially it was pointed out that the development process requires the underdeveloped countries to allocate as much as feasible of their resources to the development process and avoid and check any tendencies towards "initial welfare" or high levels of living. Later, it is maintained that for the development process to be initiated and sustained there is need for better food and shelter, for education and health services and for the satisfaction of human and cultural rights. However, what needs to be underlined is that a balance must be struck between the amount of resources at the disposal of society or the state to be allocated for the satisfaction of those needs (the satisfaction of which will spur the development process) and the amount to be allocated to the development process per se. In reality, both are components of the same process, but a balance must be struck between them in order to achieve maximum results and avoid bottle-necks.

Since the level of living in a society and society's level of development are correlated, the range of needs to be satisfied and the degree of satisfaction of these needs depends on the level of development a society has actually achieved; they can be raised as the level of development increases. In the short-run, however, an underdeveloped country cannot afford to satisfy the whole range of needs adequately and equally, without undermining or delaying its own development efforts. In order not to hamper its development efforts, an underdeveloped country gives priority to what society (or the government or the state) considers as basic material and non-material needs, not necessarily by patterning these needs and their satisfaction after (or emulating) the developed countries, but rather by determining minimal levels suitable to their circumstances and affordable by society at the given level of development.[38] [39] As far as non-material needs are concerned, their immediate satisfaction to the fullest possible extent is both desirable and possible from the outset, since sweeping them aside without satisfaction is inimical to the development process itself because of the many repercussions this will have on the social and political situation in those countries which situation is the framework within which the development process unfolds and evolves, and because their satisfaction seems to be actually economically more feasible and favourable than leaving them unsatisfied.[40]

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[38] For example, the most "objective" looking indicator of the component of nutrition of the level of living, i.e. caloric needs, in fact depends on such factors as age, sex, body structure, type of work, outer temperature, and others. (UN, 1954, 6).

[39] It seems that Salavuo and Johansson recognise that the components of the level of living and the various items consumed tend to change as time passes, or, in other words, as the level of development achieved changes. (Roos, 1973, 183).

[40] Many, if not the majority, of the underdeveloped countries seem to expend significant amounts of their government's budgets on those "arms" of the State entrusted with "dealing" with dissatisfied social and political groups or "regions", such as the police force, intelligence, special forces, armed forces, etcetera. Intuitively, it seems reasonable to hypothesise that the more non-material needs left without satisfaction, the greater the need by the State to resort to the creation and use of these "arms" and vice versa. If this is the case, the satisfaction of these needs seems more rational even economically in both the short- and long-terms. An example of these non-material needs is nationalism at a certain stage of development of human communities and/or societies. Myrdal maintains that "nationalism as I have suggested, has an important function to fulfil in welding together the masses and inspiring them to a common purpose and a unified policy, and this becomes even more important in the virtual absence of a functioning world government". (Myrdal, 1969, 66).

Various proposals have been put forward concerning the elements to be included in a level of living and how to measure this level. For example, the *Report on International Definition and Measurement of Standards and Levels of Living of the United Nations (UN)*, 1954, has selected twelve components to be included in the level of living suggested in the Report; these components include: health, food and nutrition, education, conditions of work, employment situation, aggregate consumption and saving, transportation, housing, clothing, recreation and entertainment, social security and human freedoms. *(UN,* 1954, Chapter II). In the *UN Report On International Definition and Measurement of Levels of Living: An Interim Report* of 1961, the number of components suggested was reduced to nine; aggregate consumption and saving and transportation of the former Report were left out altogether and conditions of work and employment situation were combined into a single component. However, the human freedoms component suggested by the previous report was retained by the new one. But in the suggestions made by Drewnowski, the components proposed were further reduced to seven; conditions of work and employment, aggregate consumption and saving, and human freedoms were dropped; a new component, environment, covering clothing, travel, etcetera, was added. (Drewnowski, 1970). The component of human freedoms or rights entered the picture again as a component of the level of living in a new guise, in Johansson's component of "political resources". Johansson admits in his *Om levnadsnivåundersökningen* that his "political resources" component seems to correspond to the UN Report's "human freedoms" even though he could not ascertain that they meant the same thing because these freedoms were not specified by the UN Experts in precise terms (Johansson, 1970, 36). Therefore, the two components "political resources" and "human freedoms" can only be supposed to mean the same thing because the latter has been so very vaguely defined. (ibid, 37).

The UN's 1954 Report emphasises the importance of what it calls non-material "factors" or "elements" of the level of living,[41]) but found them difficult to measure.

In the Report's words, "The Committee emphasised the view, however, that non-material factors should also be included, and that, for example, the satisfaction of cultural or educational wants, the enjoyment of art and music and political rights, may be deeply significant for the interpretation of comparative levels of living". (UN, 1954, 5). However, "The Committee was *obliged* to conclude that non-material elements are very often not manageable from the point of view of measurement, although highly important from a conceptional point of view" (ibid, 6).[42])

The UN's 1961 Working Party was of the same opinion as that of the 1954's Committee. It stresses, in its *Interim Guide*, that "there has been considerable agreement on the importance of this component [human

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41) "Human needs and wants, however" suggests the UN Report, "range from common biological needs — as food, water and protection from cold — to culturally-defined motivations and wants which may differ from society to society or from individual to individual. Into the picture enters the whole field of desires and values for which man may be striving: desires for particular types of food, drink, housing and clothing appealing to taste; for access to educational and recreational facilities ... for security safeguards covering the risks of illness,unemployment and old age etc". (UN, 1954, 5). One may inquire if some of these individual desires are not actually societal needs. In an underdeveloped country or region, the desire for education by individual members of society may be indeed low, but at the same time society's need for educated individuals, i.e., skilled labour and technocrats, may be quite great and lack of these can constitute formidable bottlenecks for the development of that society.

42) It seems legitimate to inquire whether Drewnowski did abandon the human rights component because of his pre-occupation with the statistical measureability of the level of living or because of the "international point of view". The first reason can be excluded on the basis that he retained other non-material components.

rights], but doubt as to how it could be measured in quantitative terms. The Working Party agreed to retain this component but considered it *still impracticable at the present, from an international point of view, to recommend specific indicators*", (UN, 1961, 13), underline added). It is interesting to observe that the Working Party justifies its not recommending indicators for the human rights component on the basis of "impracticability" resulting from an "international point of view" and not on other grounds.

Therefore, it can safely be concluded that human rights or freedoms do legitimately belong in the level of living and that its exclusion from this level seems to find its origins more in political difficulties than in difficulties of formulating specific indicators for this component or in difficulties of measurement.

It is furthermore questionable whether the formulation of specific indicators for the human rights component is actually impracticable. The issue of human rights can be treated in the same way as the other components of the level of living. As the whole spectrum of human needs, cannot be included in a measurement of a level of living (because it will become unmanageable), resort to selection of some of the elements of such a level becomes imperative. Therefore, human rights can be measured in terms of three indicators:

(a) economic, social and cultural rights;
(b) civil and political rights; and
(c) minorities' rights.

The first indicator is based on the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 16, 1966; the second indicator on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations on the same day; the third indicator has, however, been separated from the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 27) and presented here as a separate indicator because Article 1 of both Covenants reads that "(1) All peoples have the right to self-determination...", because Article 55 of the Charter of the United Nations reads that "with a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations, based on respect for the *principle of equal rights and self-determination*, the United Nations shall promote..."; and last but not least, because the standing and treatment of minorities in any specific society, tends to reflect and indicate to a large extent, the degree of respect in practice that society (or its state) shows to human rights in general and because minorities seem to be found in almost every country of the world.[43]) (Jenkins observes that, "... almost all poor nations have "minority problems, which involve more than a quarter of their populations"). (Jenkins, 1971, 30).

The Human Rights component may have the following indicators (the list of indicators is only a pointer towards a possible solution and is by no means final; other and better suggestions may improve on it or make a new start):

(1) ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS

(a) The right to just and favourable conditions of work, such as equal pay for equal work, holidays with pay, a specific number of working hours per week, for example. These can in fact be measured since they are quantifiable.
(b) Right to unemployment insurance and pension. This can be measured by mea-

[43]) Furthermore, Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of the United Nations of 1966, reads, "in those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language". (Robertson, 1972, 211).

suring their degree of coverage, both spatially and professionally. (As in Drewnowski's scheme, here can be two classes: class B = covered and class D = not covered).

(c) Right to form and join trade unions and right to strike. May be measured through whether trade unions are allowed in a country, or part thereof, or not, the number of workers joining these unions, and whether the right to strike is recognised or not (classes B and D).

(d) Right to participate in cultural life. Can be measured by the frequency of attendance at, or use of, or participation in prevailing cultural activities in society, such as cinema, theatre, museums, festivals, seasonal occasions, carnivals, use of national costume, language, etcetera.

(e) Right to education and health services. Can be measured on a spatial basis (the correspondence between the proportion of these services in various areas of a country and the proportion of that country's population living in each area, or by the location quotients of schools, taking population as base), or on a social group basis.

(2) CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

(a) Freedom from torture. Can be measured by the number of torture cases in a country in a year, for example. Amnesty International, for example, has become an international body that collects information on this particular subject which can be used. (Classes B and D).

(b) Freedom from slavery and forced labour. Can be measured by finding out whether these exist or not and on what scale (Classes B and D).

(c) Freedom from imprisonment for debt. Can be measured by the number of persons imprisoned for this reason (Classes B and D).

(d) Freedom of movement and choice of residence. Can be measured by ascertaining whether restrictions on the freedom of movement and choice of residence by citizens exist or not and the number of people affected by these restrictions, if any. (Classes B and D).

(e) Freedom of opinion and expression. This can be measured by the number of people prosecuted for reasons connected with their opinions ("destructive elements" and "dissidents" are common expressions nowadays for undesirables who hold unwelcome opinions), by censorship on domestic intellectual activities and its frequency. (Classes B and D).

(3) MINORITIES' RIGHTS

(a) Right to schooling in the mother tongue of the minority. This is measurable by the percentage of those taught in their mother tongue to total number of minority.

(b) Printed material, such as books, newsprints, journals, magazines, etcetera, in minority's mother tongue. This can be measured through whether these materials are available or not, (Classes B and D), and on what scale.

(c) Radio and television programmes in the mother tongue of minority. Can be measured as in (b) and by the proportion of time allocated to programmes on the minority's affairs (Classes B and D).

(d) Other cultural activities, such as songs, music, films, theatre, etcetera, by the minority and its language. Measured in the same way as in (b). (Classes B and D).

(e) Magnitude of restrictions on communications by the minority; it can be measured as follows:

(1) black lists: number of books and other printed material, songs, whe-

ther on records, tapes and other material placed on these black lists;

(2) prohibitions on the import and distribution of scientific and cultural material (Classes B and D);

(3) number of persons prosecuted for participation in, or possession of, cultural activities or material. (Classes B and D).

The elements here proposed for inclusion in a component of "human rights", is only a preliminary and tentative suggestion aimed at showing that such a component is actually measureable. However, it is recognised that the stumbling block, in the way of its inclusion, is not its immeasurability, but rather disagreement concerning its content, which has important and strong political elements.[44])

LEVEL OF LIVING AND "COMMAND OVER RESOURSES"

Johansson has suggested that a level of living measure should include, in addition to needs, a component that will account for what Titmuss calls "command over resources". According to Johansson, the present practice and theorisation of basing levels of living on needs alone face many difficulties and problems, such as what these needs are, what the means to satisfy them are, and when they are to be considered satisfied. He, therefore, asserts that he has found a solution by constructing the level of living, first in terms of the "individual's command over resources", or resources at the individual's disposal, and secondly, in terms of satisfaction of needs. (Johansson, 1970, 27). The list of components he suggests for inclusion in this level of living covers: health, dietry habits, housing, conditions for growing up and family relations, education, employment and conditions of work, economic resources, political resources, leisure and recreation.[45])

The inclusion of resources, besides needs, into the level of living may be criticised on two levels:

(1) If the introduction of resources into the level of living is accepted, one may inquire about the reason(s) for limiting these resources to economic and political resources alone. Once economic and political resources are introduced, which presupposes the existence of society in which these function (for a solitary Robinson Crusoe, economic and particularly political resources do not make much sense), and once it is recognised that an individual's level of living is dpendent on the society that individual happens to be a member of, then cultural resources ought to be added as well.[46]) Cultural resources will include: culture in a narrow sense, language and ideology -all these elements are components of culture as broadly defined in this work.[47]) It only seems appropriate to quote

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44) For example, it has taken the "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe" (whose Final Act was signed in Helsinki on August 1, 1975) more than two years of hard and intensive negotiations and bargaining to arrive at a number of principles, that have something in common with the indicators of human rights suggested here. The Final Act indicates that the "International point of view" has somewhat been overcome, theoretically.

45) Elements of the so-called ethnocentrism seem to creep into the level of living notion and in the suggested components for inclusion in that level; food, for example, changes into "dietry habits" because in Johansson's country, Sweden, "nutrition is no longer as pertinent a factor as are patterns of diet". (Roos, 1973, 183, footnote 2).

46) Thus resources become parallels to the three sources of power-over-others, namely, power derived from: something one is (cultural resources), something one has (economic resources), and position in a structure (political resources).

47) For example, the English language, used almost all over the world, is a cultural resource in non-English speaking countries (individual resource; it is an international resource for the English-speaking countries); the Swedish language in Finland (a national resource); television programmes that, as a cultural resource, shape attitudes and function to create real or illusionary needs and wants, is a very potent cultural resource. (Europe, East and West, imports about one-third of its TV programmes, South America about nine-tenths, and Africa more than one-third; the chief exporting country being the USA. (Tapio Varis, **International Systems of Production and Distribution of Culture**, a summary); these are cultural resources.

Galtung once again in the present context; he stresses that, "structural power really becomes operational when one nation gets under the skin of the other so that it is able to form and shape the inside of that nation", (Galtung, 1973, 43–44). It is precisely this role that culture performs and thus becomes a resource for those who can deploy and employ it.

(2) The notion of resource components is actually another way of looking at the need-satisfaction components of the level of living. The level of living in terms of needs and the degree of satisfaction of these needs, looks at the issue from the angle that the objects of the level of living are consumers or receivers of satisfaction, whilst the resource approach to the level of living, considers the objects of this level as "producers" or as "actors" and users of resources. In other words, both approaches are leading to the same result but in a parallel fashion. Therefore, including needs and resources as additive, rather than parallel components of the level of living, implies duplicity and means double counting of different aspects of the same elements. For example, the degree of satisfaction of needs indicated by the components of nutrition shelter, health, education, etcetera, is not only directly dependent upon, and determined by, how much command an individual – and society – has on primarily economic resources, but also on political and cultural resources as well. Now if the satisfaction of the needs for nutrition, shelter, health and education is first calculated and then the economic, political and cultural resources are calculated, and the values resulting from the two calculations are added together, the result will show an exaggeration resulting from what is called in national accounting "double accounting".[48]) As a matter of fact, a similar situation is present in the calculation of the national income; it can be calculated in terms of factor payments, or expenditures (these two ways of calculating the national income may be said to be analogous to "satisfaction of needs" in the level of living, since in both of them man is observed as a "passive receiver", a consumer) or value of final goods and services produced (this would seem analogous to "command over resources" in the level of living where man is seen as an actor). (Lipsey and Steiner, 1966, 538–543).

Therefore, it can be concluded that the "needs" and their satisfaction and the "command over resources" approaches to the level of living measurement, can be two alternative ways of measuring these levels and that they cannot be used simultaneously, in the same measurement, in the form of different components, unless it is made clear that they are alternative ways of measurement and that their inclusion in the same measurement of the level of living index, will lead to double counting.[49])

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[48]) Education for a child, for example, depends on: (a) the economic resources the family commands, such as income and wealth; (b) political resources it commands, such as position in a social, professional or other structure; (c) cultural resources, such as command over the language, used as a medium of instruction, by the child itself and its parents, for example. Should these resources happen to be more "plentiful", the child will, normally, have access to and obtain better and higher education than another one that happened to be born in a family having command over less resources. In the calculation of levels of living, using the "needs" approach, the component of education of the former will be higher than that of the latter, as are "their" resources.

In the unitary level of living index, adding the numerical value of the component of education and that of "resources" will mean double counting. If, however, this procedure is abstained from, the presence of two components indicating the two aspects of the level of living as parallel but not as additive ones leads to better understanding of that level.

[49]) It is important to keep in mind that "command over resources" indicates ability (or potential) to satisfy needs rather than actual satisfaction whereas "satisfaction of needs" indicates actual satisfaction. For further comments on Johansson's ideas, see Uusitalo, 1975.

HUMAN RIGHTS AS A COMPONENT OF THE LEVEL OF LIVING

Drewnowski's approach to the level of living measurement excludes "human rights" as a component. As mentioned above, this component was an integral part of the level of living suggested in the UN Experts' reports of 1954 and 1961 as well as in Johansson's. Since its exclusion seems to rest on "impracticability" caused by or resulting from an "international point of view", which is not an acceptable justification from a scientific standpoint, and because it meets the criteria set forth for the selection of components for the level of living,[50]) it can be dealt with within the "needs" approach. It can also be approached within the framework of "command over resources". As a resource, human rights represent inherent elements of the political and cultural resources which greatly influence economic resources, in the same way the former resources are influenced by the latter; and the deprivation of human rights is in fact a dis-resource. Human rights can further be treated in terms of power since their presence means access to power-over-oneself and in a sense, power-over-others as well, i.e., the exercise of mutual power. It can, furthermore, be approached in a still more abstract manner, in terms of equality and justice, which seem to be "generally accepted norms", or at least all quarters concerned, claim that such ideas constitute the essence of what they are striving to achieve.

A MEASUREMENT OF THE LEVEL OF LIVING

A method for the measurement of the level of living in real terms and in terms of satisfaction of material and non-material needs of the population of a society, has been suggested by Drewnowski.

The index of the level of living suggested, is composed of a number of components, each of which representing a distinct class of human needs, the satisfaction of which contributes to the general level of satisfaction expressed in the level of living index. These components cover the whole spectrum of human needs. However, their number is kept small for practical reasons. The quantitative expression of these components is made through a number of indicators, representing the quantitative facts (or variables) of each particular component, which aims at full coverage of the various elements making up that component. Since these elements are numerous, selection from among them becomes imperative in order to render them manageable. Being quantitative, these indicators are non-comparable (because the units used in measuring them are physical and thus different); therefore they ought to be transformed into indices, i.e., into comparable units. The transformation should take into account, not only the average value of the indicators calculated per capita in relation to some critical points, but also its distribution among the population.[51])

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[50]) These criteria are: (a) "its importance in the well-being of the individual according to generally accepted norms" (the importance of human rights in indicated by the UN Charter and the UN's Covenants mentioned above; this fact reflects, in addition, that they are generally accepted); (b) "how widely its deficiency in relation to "felt" needs constitutes a problem" (wars of independence, liberation, revolutions, etcetera, show that the deficiency of human rights does constitute a problem, and a big one, that is); (c) "the extent to which its deficiency could be remedied by human action" (no-one can reasonably maintain that lack or deficiency of human rights is an eternal element in the nature of things); and (d) "its susceptability to statistical measurement" (in this respect human rights are not basically dissimilar from the other non-material components of the level of living suggested by various quarters, such as leisure, security (Drewnowski, 1970, 69), conditions for growing up and family relations (Johansson; cf. Roos, 1973, 195), or recreation and entertainment (UN, 1954 Report).

[51]) "In performing the transformation, it is assumed that the value of the "O point" of the indicator corresponds to the O value of the index and that the value of the "M point" of the indicator corresponds to the 100 value of the index". Values obtained in this manner are then corrected for the distribution element. This is done by multiplying the value obtained by the distribution co-efficient which "is assumed to be d=1-k", k being the co-efficient of concentration obtained from the Lorenz curve.

Next, the critical points are determined. These points "are supposed to represent characteristic levels of satisfaction of needs expressed by each indicator". These points do not express degrees of satisfaction but, presumably, they state needs. Three critical points are suggested by Drewnowski, namely, "survival point" (i.e. "level of the indicator at which population could barely survive"), "minimal level" (i.e. "level of minimum well-being" which refers to a level that is the acceptable minimum at which life is tolerable), and "full satisfaction" (a level considered entirely satisfactory). These critical points have a social character and element although they may appear entirely objective.

Information on the distribution of indicators among the population is then incorporated into the calculation of the index of the level of living. Such information becomes irrelevant when the distribution is fully equal. However, the more unequal the distribution, the smaller the value of the index will be. Several methods of incorporating the distribution element into the index are possible; one method, according to Drewnowski, is to divide the whole range of indicators "into a number of sub-ranges and determine the number (or percentage) of the population which enjoys the satisfaction of needs within that sub-range". The larger the number of sub-ranges the more exact the picture of distribution is, and vice versa. This manner of incorporating the distribution element into the indicators may be expressed by the Lorenz curve.

When the indices have been obtained for each indicator, these partial indices can be aggregated into a "unitary level of living index" or they may be used as a "set of non-aggregated variables representing the level of living". If the former procedure is followed the problem of weighting arises. There are two methods of dealing with it: first, by using equal weights for each indicator (this method is advocated by Drewnowski), i.e., the index of the indicator is calculated as an arithmetic means of the component indices, and secondly, by using a sliding weights method which depends on the values of the component indices; "the lower the index, the greater the weight of the component should become".

The index of the level of living suggested by Drewnowski is composed of two groups of components, seven components, and twenty-one indicators.

I-Basic needs group, which has the following components:

(1) Nutrition: composed of three indicators: (a) calories intake; (b) protein intake; and (c) precent of non-starchy calories.

(2) Shelter: has three indicators: (a) services of dwellings; (b) density of occupancy; and (c) independent use of dwellings.

(3) Health: has the indicators of: (a) access to hospitals; (b) access to medical care; (c) extent of preventive action.

(4) Education: has the indicators of (a) school enrolment ratio; (b) school output ratio; and (c) teacher/pupil ratio.

II-Protection and environment, have the following components:

(1) Leisure: has the indicator of "leisure time".

(2) Security: is made up of the indicators of (a) security of the person; and (b) security of the way of life.

(3) Environment: is composed of the following indicators: (a) communication; (b) travel; (c) sport (participation) (d) cultural activities (forms: music, theatre, cinema, visual arts; reading); (e) clothing; (f) physical environment (criteria: air, cleanliness, roads, lighting, green space, architecture, landscape). (Drewnowski, 1970).

However, Drewnowski's index of the level of living suffers from a serious shortcoming, namely, its exclusion of the human rights component. This shortcoming can be made up in the manner suggested above. Adding the human rights component to Dre-

wnowski's measurement of the level of living will actually improve upon it and at the same time will render it more suitable for indicating actual reality.

SUMMARY:

Having analysed and put together the theoretical framework of this study, which is based mainly on Myrdal's hypothesis, that a social problem concerns a complex interlocking, circular and cumulative change and his hypotheses: of the flow of resources, from underdelveloped regions and countries, to the developed ones; of the existence of inequalities between the two groups of countries and regions; of "backwash effects", and of "spread effects"; which is supplemented by other theoretical works, such as Galtung's mini-theory of power, Hilhorst's theory of regional planning, and some theorisation on "minorities" and their standing in society. It is now time for a few words on how this framework is related to the empirical section of this study.

The empirical section begins with the historical background to present conditions and trends prevailing in the Region (and in Turkey in those matters having a bearing on the Region). The historical background will provide the context within which present observations can be evaluated and related together.

This is followed by an analysis of the Region's resources — both human and natural — and their flow out of the Region. The Region's human resources and its flow will be analysed under "Population and Settlement Patterns". The Region's other resources including natural resources, will be analysed under "The Economy of the Region and the Flow of its Resources". It is believed that the historical background should be followed by present trends and conditions in the Region in order to provide continuity in the exposition of the subject matter, and to point out changes in the Region's conditions.

Regional policy in Turkey is discussed and analysed under "Regional Policy in Turkey". This chapter aims at finding out the impact of regional policy ostensibly pursued by the Turkish State since the beginning of the 1960s and how this has affected the situation and trends in the Region.

Finally an attempt is made to indicate, and not to calculate, some of the components and indicators and variables of the level of living prevailing in the Region. This attempt will aim at collecting as much data as possible to come by and as relevant to the subject matter and supplement them with observations and impressions that help to give an over-all and preliminary picture of the level of living in the Region. The chapter on the level of living was placed at the end of this study because it is a derivative aspect of the Region; it depends on the other dimensions of the Region, such as its economy, natural and human resources, its power relations and structure, and the attention accorded to it by the center as indicated by the center's regional policy. The level of living is also a summing up, an indicator of the level of development the Region has actually attained.

A conclusion and an appendix are added. The former serves the purpose of pointing out the most pertinent properties, features and trends in the Region and their future direction and its future options and expectations. The latter serves the purpose of acquainting the reader with the Kurds and their history, particularly in the Region. The appendix is actually too short to give an adequate picture of the history of the Kurds, but this is not thought to be a too serious deficiency since interested readers can refer to the books and articles on the Kurds mentioned in the bibliography.

APPENDIX A

THE REGION

The area covered by this study is located in the eastern and south-eastern parts of Turkey. This area, which is referred to here as the "Region", is made up of 14 of the country's 67 provinces, namely the provinces of Adiyaman, Agri, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Elazig, Erzincan (Erzinjan), Hakkari, Mardin, Mus (Mush), Siirt, Tunceli (Tunjeli), Urfa, and Van. The Region is geographically both contiguous and continuous and has, generally, the same or similar natural conditions.

The total surface area of the Region is 157,137 km², constituting 20.3 % of the total area of Turkey. Its topography is, by and large, mountainous. The mountain ranges are mostly rugged, rough and high. The highest peak reaches a height of 5,165 meters (called Great Ararat). Water resources are bountiful. Many rivers flow through the Region, the longer ones being: Euphrates, 1,110 km (in the Reigon only); Tigris, 523 km; and Aras, 441 km. A number of lakes are found there as well, the largest being Lake Van (which covers an area of 3,738 km² and is 1,646 m above sea level), and the highest being Lake Balik (which is 30 km² in area and 2,250 m above sea level).


The plains of the Region have a subtropical climate, whilst the valleys a continental climate. The annual average rainfall ranges between 500 mm and 1,000 mm, being 300 mm in some areas and 2,000 mm in others. In some parts, especially the eastern, mountainous areas of the Region, winter is severe and snow fall is heavy. Based on data pertaining to five provinces of the Reigon, the highest annual average temperature recorded is 42.5° centingrade and the lowest −23.4° centigrade, the variation being 76 ° centigrade.

The forests of the Region, covering, according to Ghassemlou, approximately 13.8 % of its surface area, are comparatively thin, and are gradually getting thinner, receiving no protection from the state, and being, at the same time, very uneconomically exploited by the population, as fuel and as fodder for livestock, especially goats. (Ghassemlou, 1965, 18).

Although geological explorations have recently been active and expanding, the Region has not yet been thoroughly explored. The minerals that have already been exploited are: petroleum, chrome, copper, lead, and zinc; exploration for gas has been active. Besides these minerals, the Region may contain other minerals, such as iron ore, lignite and manganese in commercial amounts.

In this study, the Aegean region covers: Canakkale, Balikesir, Manisa, Izmir, Mugoa, Denizli, Burdur, and Isparta.)

MAP 1: The Region and Turkey



Copied from Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 1968, p. 255.

APPENDIX B

A NOTE ON TURKISH STATISTICS

The data used in this study, which are mostly obtained from Turkish official statistics, ought to be viewed as rough, general magnitudes and trends rather than exact figures. Turkish statistics and statistical methods have been subject to criticism by many writers. The following examples only point out some of these criticisms and may suffice to bring home the point.

(1) Data pertaining to health services in the Region, such as the number of physicians, dentists, etcetera, given in the *Annuaire Statistique 1960–1962* and the *Statistical Yearbook 1968* are inconsistent for the same years. For example, the former gives the number of physicians (both specialists and general practitioners) in the Region for 1961 as 320 whilst the latter gives a figure of 335 for the same year.

(2) L. A. Kaprio, in the *"Health of Mankind"*, acknowledges the existence of large errors in Turkish statistics on health personnel. He contends that "Two major census studies were completed in detail, one for physicians and another for nurses and midwives ... These figures show gross errors of from 3.6 % to 23 % in the more easily counted categories of professional health workers. Such errors could result in grave mistakes in health and medical planning". *(Health of Mankind, 1967, 226).*

(3) F. W. Frey has been made to give up some of his investigations because of "lack" of data on the Kurds, data which is easily available on the rest of the population, as can be observed from the following statement: "Equally frustrating is the impossibility of investigating Kurdish representation [in the Turkish National Assembly]. Some moderately well informed inferences regarding Kurdish background can be made for a few deputies, but substantial and reliable information is so lacking that I have not been able to pursue the investigation with profit". (Frey, 1965, footnote 23, 147).

(4) When discussing her study on income and costs of farming in Central Anatolia, E. Hirsch makes this observation: "The sample was found to include an unrepresentatively large number of large farms, apparently because many enumerators put respect for wealth and status (accorded to a person in the sample) above the scientific principle of random selection." (Hirsch, 1966, 136).

(5) W. W. Synder has noticed that "... There have been differences of opinion within the Turkish administration about [estimates of growth rates], but nothing so serious as the dispute about the absolute level of economic activity. The State Institute of Statistics (SIS) is responsibel for publishing the National Account, but the SPO [State Planning Organisation] uses its own estimates. The principal, but not the only, difference arises from an estimate of the net value added by agriculture, which the SIS reports to be about 10 % higher than the SPO's figure. The SPO generally adopts the rates of growth estimated by the SIS, a dubious compromise under the circumstances, and acknowledges that the growth rates do contain some non-significant measurement errors". (Snyder, 1969, footnote 12, 70–71).

(6) M. D. Rivkin contends that "It is extremely difficult to authenticate the reliability of statistical information in a developing nation, even one such as Turkey where statistical services have been performed for many years. As much as possible, therefore, I have tried to use gross figures which indicate general order of magnitude and relationships. The reader is cautioned to view the numerical material presented here primarily as rough estimates of quantities and trends, not as precise measurements". (Rivkin, 1965, 3).

II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO PRESENT CONDITIONS AND TRENDS IN THE REGION

Problems of development and underdevelopment have bacome more conspicuous and acute, and thus a matter of some concern, since World War Two, even though they have existed long before. They have probably come into being on the heels of the transformation of the Western economies into the capitalist system, but more certainly in the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution. The developed countries of today have since then been experiencing a process of gradual but persistent incorporation of science and technology into the fabric of their societies in general and their means of production and labour force, i.e. their productive forces in particular, whilst today's underdeveloped countries remained geared to ancient "technology" and a divorce between their productive forces and science and technology. Progressively, this process has created inequalities between the two groups of countries and has tended to successively widen it ever since.

In order to elucidate some of the causes of under-underdevelopment in the Region and underdevelopment in the country, correctly and rationally, evidence and observations, i.e. reality rether than dogmas or predisposition are accorded utmost supremacy and consideration. Of course, this is done within the theoretical framework set forth at the beginning of this study. Since "reality starts with history", as R. H. Titmuss stresses (Titmuss, 1971, 93), it becomes necessary to analyse the historical roots of present conditions in the Region and the country.

The analysis of under-underdevelopment in the Region cannot reflect the whole reality if it is not carried out within the context of the larger geographical area and political entity of which it has formed a part for a long period of time, namely, the Ottoman Empire and, since after World War One, the Republic of Turkey.

The discussion of the historical roots of under-underdvelopment and underdevelopment will be organised as follows: first, the basic features of the economic, social and political systems of the Ottoman era will be briefly enumerated for their crucial importance as internal factors impeding the development of the Region and country; second, the penetration and control of the Ottoman economy and empire by the developed countries will be discussed in some detail (this discussion will be divided into three parts: (a) from the 16th century until the 19th; the period which represents the gradual penetration of the empire's economy by the developed countries; (b) from the 19th century until World War One; the period during which the empire had been controlled by the developed countries; and (c) since World War One until the beginning of the 1960s); and third, the historical background to the Region's under-underdevelopment will be analysed more specifically.

BASIC FEATURES OF THE OTTOMAN ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS

There are basically three viewpoints concerning the nature of the economic, social, and political structure in general and the land tenure system in particular of the Ottoman era. These viewpoints are briefly the following:

(a) That the system was basically similar to Western European feudalism.[52])

(b) That the system was fundamentally different from Western European feudalism in some important aspects, but still feudal.[53])

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[52]) Examples of exponents of this viewpoint are: C. Cahen, "L'évolution de l'iqta du IX au XIII siecle", in **Annales** (Economies-Societés-Civilisations), 1953; A. Ben Shemesh, **Taxation in Islam,** Vol 1, Leiden, 1958; and E. Herzfield, **Archeological History of Iraq,** London, 1935 (Ashraf in Cook, 1970, 110, footnote 14); and Ghassemlou and Lutsky.

[53]) Examples are: Lambton; A. Poliak, "Le Feodalité Islamique", **Revue des Etudes Islamiques, 1936; Løkkegaard, Islamic Taxation in the Classic Period** (Ashraf in Cook, 1970, footnote 15).

(c) That the system was characterised by specific features and properties that distinguished it from Western European feudalism and other forms of feudalism; this viewpoint gives a specific name to the system to indicate its independent entity. [54] [55] It is variously called the "Asiatic mode of production", "hydraulic civilisation", "agromanagerial society", or "oriental despotism", by exponents of this standpoint.

The following enumeration of the basic features of the Ottoman system, will show that it was fundamentally different from Western European feudalism, regardless of the name one may choose to attach to it.

These features and salient properties are:

(1) The decisively dominant role of the central government (or state) in the economic life of society, both as an undertaker of irrigation works and/or as regulator of water supply and as owner of most of the land; thus the centralisation of power and the despotic nature of this power. (Cf. Marx, 1964, Witfogel, 1967, Lambton, 1969, 28 and 100, and Cook, 1970, 209).

(2) The predominance of the community over the individual, who seldom had an existence independent of the community, be it the family, tribe, village or guild. This situation had led to the lack and virtual danger of taking initiative in the economic or social fields by individuals. (Cf. Robinson, 1963, 58 and 60, Lewis, 1968, 33—34 and Marx 1964).

(3) The so-called "feudal landlords" seldom had the right of ownership to the land and at most had a right of use or possession; they normally functioned as "representatives" (or "bureaucrats") of the central government or the ruler. Only in later periods could they pass land in inheritance to their successors, in which case the consent of the ruler was necessary. Besides state or ruler's land, tribal and communal ownership of land was common (Cf. Lambton, 1969, 30, 53, 60, 63, 65 and 77; Brockelmann, 1960, 295; Robinson, 1963, 52—53; and Marx 1964).

(4) Frequent resort to, and common practice of, capricious confiscations of property owned by individuals in towns and country by the central, and sometimes local, rulers as well; this practice rendered even the right to possession and use in the land tenure system insecure. (Cf. Lambton, 1969, Lewis, 1968, 33—34; Vanly, 1971, 14; and Al-Ta'akhi daily, Oct. 10, 1972).

(5) Taxation and the assessment of taxes were made in lump sums and frequently farmed on whole village communities or even provinces; taxes were imposed on land, the produce of land, water and mines; tax assessments tended to be normally harsh and were raised from time to time by various methods; the same taxes were sometimes levied several times over in the same year. (Cf. Lambton, 1969, 28, 41, 47 and 83; Lewis, 1968, 33; and Fisher, 1968, 321).

(6) Recurrent invasions and conquests and wars reduced the economy of the empire and its provinces and caused many economic and social dislocations and displacements. They have had far-reaching consequences for the empire and its economy. Marx draws attention to the crucial importance of warfare and conquest for the economy when he states, "Note especially the influence of warfare and conquest [in the Asiatic mode of production]. While, e.g., in Rome this is an essential part of the economic conditions of the community itself, it breaks the real bond on which the community rests in the Asian countries". (Marx, 1964, 83). The many invasions and conquests have brought to the area destruction and depopulation. (Cf. Lambton, 1969,

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54) Examples are: Marx; and Witfogel.

55) Ahmad Ashraf disputes the notion that Iran has been a feudalistic country in the Western European sense; cf. revelant parts in his essay "Historical Obstacles to the Development of a Bourgeoisie in Iran" (in M. A. Cook, 1970, 309—313). A. Abdel-Malek emphasises that the Egyptian was "not a feudal system of the European type" but rather what he calls "'oriental' feudalism". (Abdel-Malek, 1968, 54—57).

Brockelmann, 1960, 295, Ghassemlou, 1965, and Marx, 1964, 83).

The afore-mentioned account of the basic properties and features of the Ottoman economic, social and political systems, indicates that the Ottoman system was not conducive to the development process and that its properties constituted formidable impediments and obstacles to development. Property rights and wealth were insecure, and frequent resort to confiscation, extortion and harsh taxation encouraged hoarding and wasteful spending. Law, order and security of the person, property and the market place were often lacking, factors which disrupted the functioning of trade and exchange. The taking of initiative was discouraged, leading to the persistence of the status quo. Under such conditions, development, implying and creating change and mobility was not attainable. The situation was further aggravated in later periods of the empire, when new features of its system were unfolding; the most important of these were: (a) high propensities to consume in a luxurious, wasteful and fantastic manner by Sultans and other minor rulers (Lutsky, 1969, 26); and (b) tremendous increase in the superstructure of the State. "The palace the bureaucracy, the religious hierarchy... and a parasitic class of tax-farmers and absentee landlords" (coupled with the fact that since the beginning of the 17th century the Ottoman sultans had been "an astonishing series of incompetents, degenerates and misfits") were a real burden on the empire's economy. (Lewis, 1968, 31 and 23 respectively).

However, to these internal factors impeding the development of the empire and its constituent areas, ought to be added an external factor which, on the one hand, made the prospects for the development of the empire dimmer but, on the other hand, constituted a stimulus, an exogenous inducement, to and for, the Ottoman system to change in the direction of meeting new challenges arising from Western European ascendancy. This external factor was the penetration and then control of the Ottoman empire by the developed countries.

THE PENETRATION AND CONTROL OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE BY THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

FROM THE 16th TILL THE 19th CENTURY

The penetration of the Ottoman economy by the developed countries, through the medium of trade, started as early as the 16th century. During that century, the Ottoman economy suffered many financial and economic crises, the effects of which were to last for a long period of time, and which resulted from "the flow of precious metals from the New World [which] reached the Eastern Mediterranean... The financial impact on [the Ottoman economy] of this sudden flow of cheap and plentiful silver from the West was immediate and catastrophic", maintains Lewis. (Lewis, 1968, 29). To deal with this flow of silver, the Ottoman currency was devalued by the authorities. The devaluation of currency put in train a long-lasting financial crisis, the economic and social consequences of which, for the empire and its constituent areas were extensively damaging. As a consequence to the currency devaluation, Ottoman primary products, on the one hand, became very cheap for European traders; exports from the empire increased steadily as a result. On the other hand, indigenous crafts and manufactures experienced steady decline. Imports of manufactured goods from Western Europe expanded, leading to more decline of local manufactures and further expansion of imports on the heels of that decline. As Lewis points out, "Fiscal pressure and economic dislocation, accentuated by large-scale speculation and usury, brought distress and ruin to large sections of the population [of the empire and its constituent areas]". (Lewis, 1968, 29).

This penetration of the Ottoman empire was actually observed and recognised by the Ottomans themselves as early as the beginning

of the 17th century.[56]) From the 17the century onwards Dutch and British establishments were founded in many parts of Asia and the routes of world trade were diverted to the open seas (as a result of advances in science and technology especially in navigation), thus depriving the Ottomans of an important part of their trade.

In addition, the Capitulations, the trade privileges the Ottoman sultans had granted during the 16th century to France, Venice, Florence, Naples, Hungary and other European countries, and which later were re-affirmed during the 18th century, had had tremendous adverse effects on Ottoman trade and economy and had led to increased Ottoman dependence upon these countries. According to the Treaty of Capitulation between France and the Ottoman empire signed in 1740, for example, Frenchmen had the right to travel and trade in any part of the empire. They and their goods were exempt from all forms of taxation except a three per cent ad valorem import and export duty. French official representatives in the empire were recognised as enjoying full jurisdiction over French citizens in the empire, none of whom might be arrested unless a French official representative was present. (Fisher, 1968, 250).

England, Austria, the Netherlands and, later on, Russia, obtained similar treaties from the empire. These countries' representatives in the empire were granted the privilege of selling "bara'ats" — i.e. "notices of investiture", to Ottoman subjects bestowing on these subjects the same privileges the real citizens of these countries enjoyed in the empire under the provisions of these capitulations. In this manner, larger and larger parts of the empire's foreign trade were outside the effective control of the Ottoman government and were exempt from taxes Ottoman citizens engaged in like activities were obliged to pay. (Fisher, 1968, 250). In other words, the Capitulations facilitated the flow of Ottoman raw materials to the developed countries as a result of their economic expansion's backwash effects.

In the final analysis, the 17th and 18th centuries had been a period of slow, gradual and persistent disintegration of the Ottoman empire and its economy and its penetration by the developed countries. Disintegration and penetration were closely interlocked and inter-acting.

FROM THE 19th CENTURY TILL WORLD WAR I

During the 19th century the penetration of the Ottoman empire's economy by the developed countries became effective control; not only did the empire's economy come under their control, but also more or less the whole empire, through a number of financial transactions in the form of loans; trade was another medium of control. Use, or threat of use, of military force played its part too in imposing this control.

Ottoman territories became open markets for products made in the developed countries and suppliers of primary products to these

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[56]) This fact can be discerned from the following excerpt written in 1625 by Omar Talib, an Ottoman "observer"; he states that "now the Europeans have learned to know the whole world; they send their ships everywhere and seize important ports. Formerly, the goods of India, Sind and China used to come to Suez, and were distributed by Muslims, to all the world. But now these goods are carried by Portuguese, Dutch, and English ships to Frangstan, and are spread all over the world from there. What they do not need themselves they bring to Istanbul and other Islamic lands, and sell it for five times the price, thus earning much money. For this reason gold and silver are becoming scarce in the lands of Islam. The Ottoman Empire must seize the shores of Yemen and the trade passing that way; otherwise before very long, the Europeans will rule over the lands of Islam", (Quoted in Lewis, 1968, 28), which they actually did. It is interesting to observe that Lewis reports "cheap and plentiful" silver in the empire at the end of the 16th century whilst Talib reports "scarcity" of silver and gold at the beginning of the 17th century. It seems that abundance of these metals had created their scarcity in a cumulative process through a downwords spiral causation: abundance — devaluation — low home prices and high foreigh prices — increased imports and exports — balance of payment deficit (differential prices) — loss of metals.

countries, i.e. the flow of resources became on a larger scale. These territories, moreover, became less and less isolated from the developed countries politically.

In 1838, the Commercial Convention of Balta Liman was signed between the Ottoman government and Britain. According to this Convention British traders were allowed to import goods into the Ottoman empire upon the payment of a five per cent ad valorem duty. As for exports from the empire, these traders were permitted to export Ottoman goods upon payment of a twelve per cent charge. (Fisher, 1968, 298). France and the Netherlands obtained similar privileges during the same year. The signing of this Convention marks the beginning of a great increase in trade between the Ottoman empire and Europe. British exports to the empire, for example, increased from about one million pounds sterling in 1827 to over two and a half million pounds sterling in 1849; British imports from the empire consisted of agricultural produce and livestock products, such as mohair, wool, cotton, sheep, carpets, opium, raisins and figs.

At the beginning of the second half of the 19th century, the Crimean War broke out between the Ottomans and the Russians. To meet her mounting military expenditures, the Ottoman government contracted a number of loans with various Western European countries. The terms of these loans were very burdensome and harmful to Ottoman finance and economy. In 1854, the first of these loans of three million pounds sterling was contracted at six per cent annual interest rate, the Ottoman government actually receiving 2,400,000 pounds sterling according to Lutsky. The loan was "handled" in London. In 1855, 1858, 1860, 1862, 1863, 1865 (two lonas), 1869, 1870, 1871, 1872, 1873, and 1874, new loans were contracted on similar terms to the one of 1854. (Lutsky, 1969, 319). By 1874, the total sum of these loans was some 212 million pounds sterling, of which the Ottoman government actually received, according to Lutsky, only 120,480,000 pounds, that is 56.8 % of the nominal value of these loans, (Ibid). Between 1890 and 1908, twelve more loans were contracted, amounting to 45 million Turkish Liras (TL). By 1914, the total amount of foreign loans was 152,300,000 TL.[57])

The Ottoman government had, at times, been made to contract loans with some European countries, even when there existed no need or desire on the part of the Ottoman government to do so. When, for example, an Ottoman prime minister (or grand vizir) was reluctant to contract a loan or was some sort of an obstacle to contracting a loan, he was removed and replaced by another prime minister more willing to contract the loan. The removal and replacement of prime ministers for the sake of contracting loans was effected through the interference of foreign diplomats or traders, such as, for example, Palmer, a British trader, who used their influence to bring about this removal

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[57]) The reason why the Ottoman government continued to contract loans after the Crimean War was over was, in Lutsky's view, that the money was used for financing the "railways which were built on the basis of kilometric guarantees. This meant that when the Porte [the Ottoman sultan or government] distributed concessions on railway construction, it guaranteed the concessionaire fixed revenues from each kilometer of the line. The difference between the actual sum received and the guaranteed sum of the revenues was met by the Treasury. These kilometric guarantees became one of the chief means for the usurious plunder of Turkey and her Arab domains by foreign capital. To pay for the kilometric guarantees colossal sums were needed, which the Turkish Government sought by contracting foreign loans ... The state revenues had to be mortgaged as security for the loans ... The more revenues Turkey had to spend to pay off the interest on the loans, the more she needed new loans. Despite the fact that taxes were raised the peasant economy was completely ruined and petty officials and officers and clergy failed to receive their salaries". (Lutsky, 1969, 319—320); (however, it is more appropriate to speak of the Ottoman empire in this period than of Turkey as it is at present).

and replacement, according to Fisher. (Fisher, 1968, 308).[58])

The contracting of loans had resulted in, first, the financial dependence of the empire on the developed countries; secondly, it constituted a flow of financial resources, at least in the long-run when these loans were paid; and thirdly, it was used as a lever to obtain concessions in other areas, such as railroad construction (referred to above in footnote 57), which was itself one way of siphoning off some of the Ottoman financial resources.

As a consequence to, and in the aftermath of, these loans, a growing financial crisis was unleashed, the effects of which were felt all over the empire. As Fisher puts it, "The burden of the foreign debt left the treasury a diminishing sum to meet expenses of government. Officials who went unpaid resorted to corrupt practices, while the government adopted harsher methods of taxation to keep the treasury in funds. Peasants everywhere were squeezed and provinces stirred with uneasy patience". (Fisher, 1968, 308). This is an instance of a change in the system that caused, through the spiral causation, the movement of the entire system in the direction of the original change, notwithstanding that it was meant to countervail it. In other words, to face the diminishing sums in the treasury, the Ottoman government resorted to borrowing (i.e. to loans) in order to counteract the financial shortages felt. Instead of reducing the financial problem, the loans actually made it more acute, i.e. moved it in the direction (of crisis) originally caused by the Crimean War. Not only was it moved in the same direction, but also it moved the system downwards. Thus, the need of the Ottoman Government to resort to harsher methods of taxation, which caused problems of non-financial nature, such as revolts, and eventually bankruptcy.

However, prior to the time when this long series of loans was contracted, Ottoman economy had been experiencing an economic crisis in the form of an inflationary trend. The rate of the Ottoman currency to the pound sterling, for example, dropped from 23 in 1814 to 104 in 1839; the Ottoman currency was changed 37 times for silver issues and 35 times for gold issues in the course of 30 years (from 1808 to 1838). As Lewis emphasises, "The effects of these changes on the economy of the empire and on the standard of living . . . were disastrous." (Lewis, 1968, 111).

Nevertheless, the total effects of these crises were not equally felt in the different geographic areas of the empire or by the various social groups of Ottoman society. Their main burden fell upon the peasantry and upon outlaying provinces. As for the rulers, both grands and petits, they continued their extravagant and fabulous existence.[59])

It is worth mentioning that, besides foreign loans, internal loans were also made to meet the various expenditures of the state. This situation resulted in a tendency for the financial crisis to be more acute.

Finally, the inevitable end arrived; in Octo ber, 1875, the prime minister of the empire announced that foreign debt obligations

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58) The 19th century had witnessed some attempts on the part of some of the Ottoman sultans to bring about some change and adopt some measures, that have been called "reforms", in order to face the challenge emanating from the developed countries. The main aims of these "reforms" were, however, political centralism (which, in reality, meant the tightening of the grip on the provinces of the empire by the central authorities) and tightening the tax screws, increasing revenues to the central treasury; and "reforming" the land tenure system. In the field of land tenure, these "reforms" were basically in the interest of large land-holders whose de facto use and possession of the land were, as a result of these "reforms", converted into ownership rights. The actual cultivators of the land were reduced to share-croppers, hired agricultural labourers or shepherds. Communal lands belonging to whole tribal or village communities became, by various means, private properties of the influential members of these communities, such as chief-tains or merchant-landowners. (Cf. Lewis, 1968, and Ghassemlou, 1965). These developments could be viewed as flows, on the social level. These flows, in turn, caused greater inequalities between various social groups involved in this process.

could not be honoured in full, thus declaring insolvency. Fisher considers this announcement as the beginning of a "new era of wide" European control of the Ottoman empire "to be unleashed a few years later". One of the consequences of this financial crisis was the tightening of the "tax screw" upon the provinces, which resulted in "open revolts" in some of them, including the Region. (Fisher, 1968, 321). Some of the reasons for the Ottoman state going bankrupt were the contracting of foreign loans, inflation, and balance of payment troubles, resulting from European penetration of the economy of the empire especially in the form of loans and kilometric guarantees. Furthermore, relations between the empire and Europe since the end of the 16th century had generally been disadvantageous to the former's economy, as a result of advances in science and technology in Europe, such as the invention of the compass, improved navigation, industrialisation, and increased military power, in addition to the discovery of the New World.

As Fisher points out the industrialised European countries found in the countries of the Middle East a source of both foodstuffs and raw materials, i.e. primary products, which they could obtain in exchange for their manufactured goods. The results were ruinous for the area's handicrafts and manufactures. As a consequence "Many an eastern village experienced an economic crisis from which it never recovered", emphasises Fisher further. (Fisher, 1968, 229).[60]) This is another of the backwash effects of expansion in Europe on the Ottoman economy.

Within twenty years, i.e. from 1880 to 1900, the empire's imports increased by about 34 % and her exports by 75 %, as Table 1 indicates.[61])

Table 1: The Ottoman Empire's Imports and Exports in 1880 and 1900 in Million TL.[1])

Year	Imports	Exports	Deficit
1880	17.8	8.5	9.3
1900	23.8	14.9	8.9

[1]) Lutsky, 1969, 325.

Trade relations between the Ottoman empire and Europe had been on unequal terms, on terms disadvantageous to the former's economy; these trade relations are considered by Lutsky as being of a "specific colonial character" (Lutsky, 1969, 325) and by Fisher as rendering the empire "an economic colony of Western Europe". (Fisher, 1968, 299).

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[59]) In a sense, there are two floors of development taking place with some time lag. First, trade routes were diverted to open seas, which deprived the Ottoman empire of part of its trade. Then the flow of cheap metals caused inflation, devaluation and crisis. Imports and exports expanded. The Capitulations further helped increase trade between the Empire and the European countries.

And second, what the Ottoman state, the center, did in response was to transfer some of the burdens resulting from these difficulties and developments to the provinces. It tightened its grip on these provinces (centralisation); tightened the tax screw; resorted to extortions and confiscations; and so forth. These measures had aggravated the already worsening conditions in these provinces to the degree of causing the outbreak of open revolts and violence.

The explanation of this observation may lie in the fact that a crisis (especially financial or economic) facing the center was largely transferred to other areas of the country, usually to those areas enjoying least power, such as outlaying, frontier provinces (such as the Region); to isolated areas which had no influence on or with the center. The unevenness of "distribution" of a crisis or burden, is due to lack of, or weak, integration and unequal distribution of power among the various areas of a country. Or, the empire was not a "system" of integrated parts.

[60]) It ought to be observed that Ottoman imports from Europe were mainly textiles, whilst her exports to the latter were mainly silk, mohair, wool, cotton and sheep. This actually meant that Europe was importing some of the raw materials for its textile mills from the empire at cheap prices and then re-exporting them in manufactured form to the empire at higher prices. This is another form of the flow of Ottoman resources.

[61]) German exports to the empire increased from 6 million Marks in 1882 to 35 million Marks in 1895, i.e. by about sixfolds within thirteen years.

It is noteworthy, that not only foreign trade was under the effective control of the European countries, but also domestic trade. The Capitulations made such control of home trade possible.[62])

Besides foreign loans and debts, foreign investments in the empire were another way of controlling the empire's economy and facilitating the flow of its resources. Foreign investment was mainly in public debt. In addition to 'foreign capital investment' in the public debt, there was, by 1914, an estimated 63,400,000 pounds sterling foreign investment, such as, in railway construction (39,100,000 pounds), banking (10,200,000 pounds), and industrial investment (5,500,000 pounds). Foreign investment in the industrial "sector" of the empire's economy amounted to 8 % of the total foreign investment (excluding public debts) in the empire. (Lutsky, 1969, 326).[63])

SINCE WORLD WAR I TILL THE BEGINNING OF THE 1960s

Immediately before World War I, the number of industrial firms in Turkey has been estimated at 282 factories, of which 55 % were located in Istanbul, the capital, and 22 % in Izmir. 60 % of these factories were food processing and textile industries. Most of them were owned by foreigners or minority groups, such as Greeks, Armenians, and Jews.

However, 8 government-owned factories were in being, mostly connected with military supplies and were located in Istanbul and its vicinity (Rivkin, 1965, 32).

According to Ottoman industrial statistics of 1913, there were in the country 269 machine-operated plants, employing some 17,000 workers. (Eren, 1963, 124).

Nevertheless, Turkish industry was mostly destroyed or severely damaged during World War I and the "war for independence", and the minority groups' entrepreneurs had mostly left the country. By 1927, modern industry was, for all intents and purposes, next to non-existent, less than 4 % of existing factories employing 10 workers or more each. (Rivkin, 1965, 65).

In 1913, Turkish factories using modern machinery employed some 17,000 persons; they numbered 252 factories. (Rivkin, 1965, 102). However, Robinson recognises the fact that World War I and the "War of Independence" resulted in the destruction or wearing out of most, if not all of these factories and in the weakening of the country's labour force. In 1923, there was a total of 341 "mechanised factories", most of them ill-equipped and small. (Robinson, 1963, 103).

Even though the above-mentioned statistics pertaining to the size of the industrial "sector" of the Ottoman's economy show some discrepancy and the terms used are somewhat different, the conclusion to be drawn from

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[62]) This was effected though the Capitulations which conferred upon any Ottoman subject who bought from a consul or an ambassador, of a country having a treaty of Capitulation with the Ottoman government, the rights of a national of that country as stipulated in the Capitulation treaty; the purchase of these rights was made by buying a bara'at, a certificate of investiture, from an ambassador or consul. These rights included exemption from all local taxes an Ottoman subject had to pay if engaged in like business; fixed tariffs that were usually lower for "foreigners" than for Ottoman subjects; and they and their property were safe from confiscation. Therefore, Ottoman citizens entering trade activities sought and bought these certificates, thus becoming "foreigners" in their own country in order to enjoy these privileges. Consequently, as Fisher concludes, "all significant trade within the Ottoman Empire devolved into foreign hands". (Fisher, 1968, 299—300). And thus the functioning of trade as a vehicle facilitating the flow of the resources of the Empire.

[63]) In addition to the meagre foreign investment in the industrial "sector" of the empire's economy, attempts had actually been made by some Ottoman sultans and governments to construct industrial plants in the empire, mainly around the capital Istanbul. Sultan Abdülmecid, 1830—1861, initiated and encouraged the building of about 150 factories. However, only three out of the total 150 factories could survive to the present, most of them having been "closed or abandoned, sometimes after only a few months' work", according to Lewis. Private industry was mostly foreign-operated and controlled. "It was inevitably limited", he concludes. (Lewis, 1968, 458—459).

them is that at the beginning of the Republican era in Turkey, there existed some industrial plants, most of them being small, ill-equipped and worn out, located mostly in Istanbul and its environs and in Izmir. In other words, the so-called initial conditions (cf. Ishikawa, 1967, 99 ff.) prevailing in the whole country were not fundamentally dissimilar. As Robinson puts it, "there was, in 1919, virtually no modern industry [in Turkey], except a very few foreign-owned plants and utilities in the Istanbul and Izmir areas..." (Robinson, 1963, 63). Therefore, any inequalities in the distribution of industrial plants in the various areas of the country have been the outcome of developments and policies taking place and implemented since the start of the Republican era in Turkey.

During the first decade of the Republican regime, little industrialisation was realised in the country. It is maintained by some writers on Turkey, that during this period the field was left to the private sector to initiate industrialisation with the encouragement and assistance of the government. The government was later obliged to interfere and play an active and direct role in the industrialisation process, because of both the failure of the private sector and as a response to the late 1920s and early 1930s world economic crisis. (Robinson, 1963, 110).

The 1920s also witnessed the establishment of a number of specialised banks, such as the Is Bank in 1924, (state-induced, privately-owned business bank), and the Bank of Industry and Mining in 1925. Moreover, the law for the encouragement of Turkish private industry was enacted in 1927 aiming at the promotion of private enterprises in the industrial field, through the granting of generous concessions and other supporting measures by the State. However, "all in all, it thus seems safe to conclude that the law induced relatively little new industrial investment", concludes Robinson. (Robinson, 1963, 106).

Thus, a new policy in the field of industrial development was adopted during the 1930s. This policy is usually referred to as "étatism", reflecting the dominance of the state in the process of development which was then synonymous with industrialisation. The crisis situation of the Great Depression and past experiences had revived the "anti-Western and anti-capitalist feeling" among Turkey's rulers. The success of the neighbouring Soviet experience, in planning and industrialisation, not only encouraged these rulers to involve the state directly in the economy of the country, but also gave birth to three industrial development plans, namely, those of 1934–39, 1937–1942, and 1946–1950.

The foundations of the new policy were included in Mustafa Kemal's (the then President of the Republic) manifesto of April 20, 1931, the third article of which reads, "Although considering private work and activity the basic idea, it is one of our main principles to interest the state actively in matters where the general and vital interests of the nation are in question, especially in the economic field, in order to lead the nation and the country to prosperity in as short a time as possible." (Quoted by Lewis, 1968, 286).

The policy was later clarified by its formulator in a speech he delivered at the Izmir Fair in August, 1935, where he declared that, "the system of étatism applied in Turkey, is not a system copied and translated from ideas that socialist theoreticians have been putting forward since the 19th century; our étatism takes as its basis the private initiative and personal aptitude of individuals, but at the same time, taking account of all the needs of a great nation and a broad land, and of the fact that so much still remains to be done, it rests on the principle that the state must take charge of the national economy". (Quoted by Lewis, 1968, 287).

The policy of étatism had been deemed so crucial and fundamental by the government that it was written into the country's constitution in 1937. (Robinson, 1963, 108).

An industrial development plan was prepared in 1933, approved in 1934, and com-

pleted in 1939. Its main aim was the establishment of a number of industrial plants for, basically, import substitution. A loan worth $ 8 million was given to Turkey by the Soviet Union in 1932 to help finance the implementation of some of the plan's projects. Other loans were also made during the 1930s; these were: a private American loan in 1930; British Government loans in 1938 and 1939; and a French and a German loans in 1939. (Robinson, 1963, 107).

Etatism and the five-year plans did not by any means render the Turkish economy a planned one, according to the SPO. The first plan, for example, was a technical plan aimed at supplying the country with "large-scale basic industries", the SPO maintains. (SPO 1963, 10). In addition, many location policies adopted by the government were erroneous and the Turkish economy was, in the words of Thornberg, "like a poorly managed capitalist economy in which most of the capital happens to be supplied by the government". (Thornberg, 1949, 39; quoted by Lewis, 1968, 287).

Just before the out-break of World War II, there existed in Turkey, 414 large manufacturing establishments, 7 of which were located in the Region, representing 1.7 % of the total, whereas 15.5 % of the total was located in the Aegean region.

However, during the period of 27 years, from 1923 to 1950, "little investment occurred . . . in the far eastern region . . .", i.e. in the Region, according to Rivkin. (Rivkin, 1965, 70).

Post World War II period witnessed some expansion in the industrial sector of the economy of the country. This expansion was due to foreign, mostly American, investment, in co-operation with the local private sector. Again, this investment was realised mostly in the western part of the country, besides the capital, Ankara, and some coastal areas. Fisher maintains that the large American aid to Turkey, which began in 1947, was the main reason for the rapid economic development in the country. (Fisher, 1968, 511). Even though Fisher maintains that "in the years after 1946 Turkish industry grew up by leaps and bounds", and claims that "new industries, in part founded by foreign capital in partnership with Turkish capital, were sprouting in all regions of the country" (Fisher, 1968, 511 and 512, respectively), available observations and statistics do not justify his claims as far as the Region is concerned.

Between 1948 and 1962, Turkey received some $ 3,800 million in aid from the USA alone — $ 1,600 million in economic help and $ 2,200 million military assistance. (Robinson, 1968, 180). However, between 1949 and 1959, Turkey lost an estimated $ 1,211 million as a result of deficits in her foreign trade. Eren maintains that "Foreign aid kept Turkey from bankruptcy". (Eren, 1963, 135).

Since the establishment of the Republican regime, the encouragement and consolidation of the private sector has been a cornerstone in the economic policies of the various Turkish governments. It had been a common belief, among the rulers of Turkey, that the consolidation and encouragement of the private sector, could and would, bring about a speedy industrialisation and modernisation of the country, or what is called by Turkish writers, "Westernisation". However, the belief was shaken in the 1920s due to internal and external factors.[64]) As a result, the Turkish governments resorted, temporarily it seems, to the so-called "étatism" policy, which lasted until the end of the 1940s. This policy has been gradually abandoned, since World War Two, in favour of giving more scope to the private sector.

Altogether, the public sector in Turkey accounted for about 40 % of the total value added in manufacturing industry in 1972.

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[64]) Such as the Lausanne Agreement which forbade the Turkish government from imposing protective duties for a certain period of time, the Great Depression, war destruction, the flight of entrepreneurs and capital from the country, lack of initiative on the part of the private sector, and last but not least, the punitive military expeditions against the Kurdish population in Turkey.

Nevertheless, the Second Five Year Development Plan, 1968–1972, proclaims the policy of encouraging "the private sector to take over manufacturing in the long run". *(Confidential Report I, 1972, 27).*

The abandonment of étatism by Turkish governments after 1950, had been considered one of the main causes for the economic crisis (in the form of a chronic inflationary trend and large balance of payments deficits) facing the country. This, besides other political circumstances, had led to a military coup d'état in 1960 and the subsequent rehabilitation of the policy of étatism; the new regime created the State Planning Organisation and instructed it to draw a fifteen-year development plan and inserted into the country's constitution the commandment that economic, social and cultural development henceforth should be realised by plans.

Turkey is still today dependent on the developed countries both economically and militarily. This is a recognised situation. The American weekly "Newsweek", maintained that Turkey is "a military and economic dependent" of the USA. *(Newsweek,* July 3 1972, 48). This dependence is also indicated by Turkey's trade relations with the developed countries, as shown in Table 2. These trade relations, like most trade relations between the underdeveloped and developed countries, are generally characterised by the predominance of export of primary products from Turkey and the import of manufactured goods from the developed countries. The Turkish balance of payments has been experiencing deficits for a long period of time, as a result of imports exceeding exports. The third form of dependence is the large number of Turkish workers working (or seeking employment) in Western Europe.

Table 2. Turkey's Imports from and Exports to a Number of Developed Countries in 1963 and 1967, Per Cent[1 2])

	1963		1967	
Country	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
USA	31	14	18	18
W. Germany	15	17	20	16
England	11	13	13	7
Italy	5	12	7	7
Total	62	56	58	48

[1] SIS, 1968A, 310–311.

[2]) The ratio of imports to exports for the countries covered by the table has increased from 111:100 in 1963 to 121:100 in 1967; in other words, the relative position of the country has deteriorated during this period.

Summing up the previous account and analysis of the Ottoman Empire and Republican Era, it can be concluded that scientific discoveries and technological inventions and innovations led to improved navigation. This in turn led to a shift in trade routes, from land to open seas, and to the discovery of the New World. The shift in trade routes deprived the Ottoman Empire of part of its trade and the discovery of the New World led to the influx of cheap metals into the Empire, leading to inflation and devaluation of Ottoman currency.

Because of conditions prevailing within the Empire itself, the effects of both the reduction in trade and the influx of precious metals caused severe dislocations in Ottoman economy and society. The measures adopted by Ottoman authorities to counteract the problems, created by these factors, actually led to their acceleration. The devaluation of the Ottoman currency and the influx of cheap metals led to inflation in the Empire. Devaluation made the prices of Ottoman raw materials lower, thus increasing their flow on a larger scale. The importation of foreign manufactured goods led to the gradual destruction of local manufacture and handicrafts and thus to increased imports. Increased imports and war caused an increasing need for loans. To these loans were attached conditions that further facilitated the flow of Ottoman raw materials and the increase of its dependence on the developed countries. These, and the Capitulations, made the Ottoman Empire an (semi-)open "system". This (semi-)openness made the backwash effects of expansion in Europe more directly operative in the Empire. But, at the same time, factors operative within the Empire itself greatly reduced the spread effects of that expansion. In other

words, even though the spread effects were felt in the Empire, taking full advantage of them was impeded by internal factors (discussed at the beginning of this chapter).

However, the backwash effects of expansion in Europe and the influence of spread effects were unevenly felt in the various areas of Ottoman territory. Most of the backwash effects were transferred from the centre of the Ottoman Empire (Istanbul) to other areas of the Empire, through taxation, extortion, confiscations and centralisation of power. And because the spread effects are felt through contacts with centres of expansion, areas with direct and close contacts with these centres felt these spread effects much more than other remote areas. Since the Region was remote and had little, and late, contact with Europe, the spread effects had been hardly felt there. Some of the backwash effects felt by the Empire were transferred to the Region through the afore-mentioned media. And thus the worse-off position of the Region in relation to the western areas of the Ottoman territories. During the Republican Era, the situation did not witness basic changes in the main trends; the flow of the Region's resources continued and inequalities persisted. Only that the flow was facilitated by the opening of new roads and railways and increased and improved channels of information. There was, however, a change in the flow from being basically financial, to being increasingly primary products, such as agricultural produce and raw materials, and more recently manpower.

THE ROOTS OT THE REGION'S UNDER-UNDERDEVELOPMENT

During the first half of the 16th century the Region (as well as some other areas of Kurdistan) came under Ottoman rule as a result of bitter campaigns with the Iranians. These campaigns had left the Region in utter devastation, so much so that the Ottoman sultan and government of the time had great difficulties finding someone amongst their followers "who desired to assume the obligations bound up with these areas devastated by incessant military campaigns", as Brockelmann puts it. (Brockelmann, 1960, 295).

During the period when European penetration of the Ottoman Empire was just beginning, i.e. during the 16th and 17th centuries, the Ottomans had been themselves looking for trade routes that passed through the Region, along which one of the important trade articles of those times was transported, namely, silk. The silk caravans coming from Iran, a main source of silk at that time, would reach Istanbul passing through Erzurum and following the Euphrates valley, or more frequently, along the Tabriz (Iran)-Van-Bitlis-Diyarbakir-Birecik (Urfa)-Aleppo (which was the base of operations for numerous European merchants. (Inalcik, in Cook, 1970, 211, and Steensgaard, 1974, 31–35).

Available historical sources on the Region (actually relatively scarce) indicate that at the beginning of the 17th century, the Region's agriculture was relatively prosperous; the towns flourishing; trade, crafts and cultural activities thriving; architecture, urbanism, medicine, education and handicrafts and commerce developing; and the merchants of the Region "possessed great capitals" and had "trade relations with foreign countries", wrote the Turkish geographer Evliya Celebi, who visited the Region at that time. (Quoted in Vanly, 1971, 11–12).

However, this relative prosperity and development, in terms of their times, were brought to a halt by the Ottoman invasion and its aftermath and by the long campaigns between the two regional strong powers of the time, the Ottomans and the Iranians, who were fighting a war, the battle-field of which happened to be the Region. Thus the Region was reduced from actual self-rule, though nominally recognising the suzerainty of foreign rulers, to an outlaying, dependent frontier buffer zone separating the two strong powers, and from relative prosperity to destitution.

As part of the Ottoman empire, the Re-

gion suffered all the problems and shortcomings of Ottoman government, such as harsh taxation, confiscation, extortion, arbitrariness, absence of order and security, etcetera. Besides, the Region experienced the same hardships and crises experienced by the empire, as a result of the external factors discussed above. But in addition, the Region experienced decline because of its reduction to an outlaying, frontier buffer zone.

During the 19th century, the Region began to export agricultural produce, livestock and their products, and forest products on an unprecedented scale. These exports included wool, hides, eggs, cattle, sheep, black nuts, Arabian gum, cotton and carpets.[65]) These were first exported to Ottoman large towns such as Istanbul and Aleppo, and then were sold there to British and other foreign traders. (Fisher, 1968, 299). In other words, the flow of the Region's resources increased in scale and was carried out in two stages, first to the main towns of the Empire and from there to foreign countries.

However, it is noteworthy that trade between the Region in general and the foreign markets (as well as Ottoman markets) was carried out by non-resident merchants. It was carried out through the mediation of Turkish, Persian, Armenian and even Russian merchants. Wholesale merchants located in Istanbul or Aleppo or Tiflis would buy local goods from smaller indigenous merchants or, occasionally, through their own agents directly from local producers, and sell them on the international market. In like manner, small indigenous merchants used to buy foreign goods for the local market through these wholesalers located in the Ottoman big towns. (Ghassemlou, 1965, 114).

The expansion of foreign trade relations and the increase of exports (or flow of resources) from the Region "brought a flow of ready money" for the merchant group who tended to use this money in real-estate and land purchase. Thus a new group of merchant-landowners emerged in the course of this development. A new free-hold "class" came into being which controlled much of the countryside by purchasing land and estates, bidding for land leases (Tapu), and lending money to the peasantry and small land-owners. Most of the peasantry were reduced, as a result of this development and the "reforms" carried out by the Ottoman authorities (referred to above), to share-cropping tenants "with no rights at all", hired agricultural labourers, shepherds and herdsmen. "As well as government taxes, he [the peasant] had to pay part of the crop as rent, and sometimes render personal services in addition", maintains Lewis (Lewis, 1968, 450; and Ghassemlou, 1965, 105).

Again, it is observed that the flow of "resources" was not only on the spatial level but also on the social level. Inequalities resulting from these flows are also observed on both levels.

Besides these conditions and trends, the Ottoman central authorities did resort to capricious confiscations of the property of local princes, merchants and landowners. Information exists on at least two cases of large-scale confiscation carried out by Ottoman authorities in the Region.[66])

Thus it is clear that the situation and trends prevailing in the Region, as far as development is concerned, were more disadvantageous than those prevailing in the empire as a whole. The Region's resources since it became part of the empire, were flowing to the "national" centre through trade, harsh taxes, confiscation and extortion and abroad through trade. The Region has constituted a source of revenues for the central treasury, since the Ottomans controlled the Region, whether form agriculture, manufacture, or trade. (Inalcik, in Cook, 1970, 207).

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[65]) Ghassemlou maintains that over three million sheep and goats were exported annually to Istanbul, Aleppo, Baghdad and Tiflis; at the beginning of the 20th century, some 20 million eggs were exported yearly from Kurdistan to the port of Samsun on the Black Sea, Turkey. (Ghassemlou, 1965, 104).

In addition, the economy of the Region, both agriculture and handicraft and manufacture, was severely damaged in the course of the many invasions, conquests, wars and internal conflicts, the battlefield of which happened to be the Region; (this resulted in great economic and social dislocations, the consequences of which were felt for a prolonged period of time) and as a result of openning up to the developed countries through trade relations.

What was left of the Region's resources, savings (or surplus) after these wars and flows (through trade, treasury revenues, confiscations and extortion) was mostly hoarded (to avoid further confiscations and plunder by the Ottoman authorities). The Region's economy came to virtual standstill; it became stagnant and experienced decline.

The outcome of these developments has been under-underdevelopment in the Region and relative development in the "national" centre(s) of economic expansion in the country, such as Istanbul and Izmir (and, later, Ankara).

The flow of the Region's resources to the Turkish "national" centre(s) has been continuing up to the present, only it has become more extensive than it used to be previously, due to the opening up of roads and railways, improved communications and channels of information on the Region's resources. Inequalities between the Region and those centres have also increased. The existence and continuation of this flow is recognised by the centre (the state). The SPO admits that, "Today even the meagre funds, accumulated with difficulty, in the socially and economically underdeveloped regions [i.e. the Region] are flowing into the developed regions, together with the enterprising people. This flow increases the poverty of these regions and widens the great differences existing between the developed and underdeveloped regions". (SPO, 1963, 49).

Besides inequalities between the Region and the "national" centres being "great" and widening, and resources having been and still flowing from the Region to these centres, the centre enjoys absolute monopoly of power. In terms of Galtung's "mini-theory" of power referred to above the centre in Turkey is, indeed, powerful. Vis-à-vis the Region, it has "monopoly on idea-propagation . . on the goods and on the bads [i.e. on economic resources and military power]. In addition, it has monopoly on means of communication . . ." (Galtung, 1973, 34).

Under such conditions, the Region is a powerless object of power-over-others wielded by the centre. Thus, the Region can neither exercise counter-power, in the form of anti-power, to bring about a balance of power, nor exercise pressure to any viable extent. Therefore, the exercise of power is, for all intents and purposes, unilateral and unidirectional, by the centre alone. Besides, the Region is lacking power-over- itself, i.e. lacking autonomy. This has been brought about by the centre through long periods of do-

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66) The first case took place in Bitlis during the 17th century and is reported by the Ottoman Turkish traveller and geographer Evliya Celebi, who happened to be present at the scene of the event. The prince of Bitlis, according to Celebi, was an industrious manufacturer and a learned man; he had 44 workshops of various types and a large library; in 1666, he was deposd by the Ottoman Sultan Murad IV and his wealth was looted by a general Malik Ahmed Pasha, the sultan's nephew and military governor of Kurdistan. The booty consisted of 80 sacks of gold, 10 caravans of mules, 10 caravans of horses, etc. "As for the cultural and artistic treasures of the unhappy Kurdish prince, they are lost for ever. Celebi tells us that he could only save one precious manuscript, that a soldier was trying to slash with his knife", states Vanly (Vanly, 1971, 14).

The second case of confiscation took place in the Mardin-Urfa area of the Region at the beginning of the 20th century. The victim this time was Ibrahim Pasha al-Milli, a local leader. The booty consisted of the Prince's livestock (11,000 camels, 10,000 sheep, 6,000 horses and 1,200 buffaloes), 2 million Turkish gold liras stored in two chests, and whatever goods were found by the looters in the Prince's store houses. The cost of the cattle taken alone is estimated at 500,000 Turkish liras. The looters were the government's troops, and were acting, most probably, on orders from Istanbul (Othman al-Ta'akhi, October 10 1972).

mination, which has created some degree of fear among the Region's population (brought about by the many punitive military expeditions and campaings against the Region, in the aftermath of the revolts and unrest breaking out in some parts of it, and continuous threats by the centre backed by military might);[67] a shade of submissiveness (as a result of the punitive expeditions and "monopoly on idea-propagation" by the centre creating scapegoats, stereotypes, and alienations;[68]) the idea-propagating apparatus of the centre (and the country) has been used to systematically degrade the language, culture, history and even the physical features of the Kurdish population, the majority of the Region's population);[69]) and dependence through penetration by the centre of the Region and the obstruction of its economic, social, cultural and political development, and simultaneously by the creation (through the idea-propagating apparatus at the disposal of the centre, and the educational system) of the illusion that they, the Region's population, would become "civilised" and "westernised" only by abandoning their way of life, their language, and their culture, and by imitating the centre.[70])

The previous reading of the historical outline of developments in the Region, Turkey and the Ottoman Empire indicates that the forces leading to the development of the center (Istanbul and later Ankara) and underdevelopment in the Region have been at work for a long period of time and still are. Although it can be argued that Istanbul had an initial advantage of being on, or near, sea routes and the crossroads between Asia and Europe, the role played by the State in the concentration of economic and cultural activities in Istanbul cannot be safely ignored. Inalcik points out that the Ottoman Sultans offered extensive incentives to craftsmen, financiers and traders to (re) locate their activities in Istanbul, when it became the capital of the Empire; sometimes they attempted to force such location by decree. (Inalcik, in Cook, 1970, 207). Thus, the "historical accident" and "locational preferences" and subsequent agglomeration and other economies made Istanbul the main industrial, commercial and cultural (in addition to political power) center in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. At the beginning of the 20th century, the "historical accident" was repeated with success in Ankara (but failed in its other aim of checking and reducing the growth rate of Istanbul).

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67) The President of the Republic of Turkey is reported to have called the Region's population "incorrigible" and threatened that if they "will not keep quiet the army will not hesitate to bombard their towns and villages: there will be such a huge blood bath that they will be swallowed up with their country". (Dagens Nyheter, November 11, 1960, quoted by Vanly, 1971, 41). Moreover, Nieuwenhuijze contends that minorities in Turkey have been given the following ominous "formula": "adjust or be eliminated". Its application to the Armenians led to their elimination; when applied to the Kurds it caused "upheavals" among them. (Nieuwenhuijze, 1971, 346).

68) Vanly and the **Area Handbook** refer to some examples of alienation. The **Area Handbook** states that "... many of the Kurdish nobility are moving into towns and cities as absentee landlords, are becoming university educated, and are attempting to conceal their Kurdish ancestry". (**Area Handbook**, 1970, 77). Vanly gives as an example university students coming from the Region to attend the University of Istanbul; many of these students "boast often in bad Turkish and with a marked "Dogu" [eastern] accent of being "pure Turks" and to scornfully reject their Kurdish origin". (Vanly, 1971, 50).

69) This fact can be discerned from, for example, a leaflet issued by a "Preparatory Committee" in one of the Region's towns in 1967. It states, inter alia, that "you [the Region's population, Kurds] are at least as honourable as the others [Turks] and your language [Kurdish] is as respectable as the other languages. You must tell the others [Turks] that your language is respectable and that you are an honourable man". (Quoted in Vanly, 1971, 46). To defend their human dignity and integrity, the Kurds have to go to these lengths. Otüken, a Turkish magazine, could write with full impunity that the Kurds "do not have the faces of human beings" and that they should migrate to Africa to join creatures half human and half animals who live there. (Quoted in Vanly, 1971, 43—44, Otüken N.o 40, April 1967).

70) Myrdal underlines the importance of political factors in the development process of regions and countries. The main reason for the underdevelopment of Southern Italy, for example, was according to Myrdal, the political unification of Italy, which resulted in the "liquidation of the political and administrative centres in Southern Italy", whereas those in the North remained tools in the hands of industrial interests there; these centres in the North gained, as a result of unification, hegemony over the whole country and used it to its own economic advantage. (Myrdal, 1969, footnote 1, 28).

III. THE ECONOMY OF THE REGION AND THE FLOW OF ITS RESOURCES

In this chapter are discussed and analysed the main components of the economy of the Region. This will be done by analysing the various economic activities carried out there. The analysis will be arranged according to the "industrial origin" of these activities. Simultaneously, the (out)flow of resources, (primary products), produced in the Region will also be analysed. This arrangement of the material serves two purposes. First, it introduces the main components of the Region's economy, and secondly, it allows the application of the analytical tools of the theoretical section; it also allows an investigation of the degree of consistency between the theoretical and empirical parts of this study.

The arrangement of the material will be as follows: first discussed and analysed is "Primary Production" covering agriculture, "livestock", and mining. This is followed by an analysis of "Secondary Production", covering manufacturing, building and power. Finally, "Tertiary Production" or services, covering commerce, transport and communications, power, water and sanitary and other services, will be referred to.

It is hoped that this arrangement will help facilitate the presentation and analysis of the material.

1. PRIMARY PRODUCTION

Three industries are introduced here, namely, agriculture, livestock and mining and quarrying. Primary production is predominant in the Region's economy both as the employer of the bulk of the Region's labour and as the population's main source of income. The predominance of agriculture reflects one of the general observations related to underdevelopment, namely, that the more underdeveloped a region (or country) is the larger the proportion of its labour force being engaged in agriculture, and vice versa.

AGRICULTURE[71])

The main economic activity in the Region is by far agriculture, both as the occupation of the overwhelming majority of the active population[72]) and as the chief source of income. Of the total active population of the Region, 82.9 % were engaged in agriculture in 1965, compared with 71.9 % of the active population of the rest of the country being engaged in similar activity in the same year, the difference between the two being 11 percentage points.[73]) The land area under cultivation in the Region was approximately two million hectares in 1966 and about two and a quarter million in 1969, 83 % of which being used for the cultivation of cereals, mainly wheat and barley, 4.5 % for pulses, chiefly lentils, 2.6 % for industrial crops, 1 % for vegetables and 9 % for grapes and other fruits (calculated from SIS, 1968 B and 1969 A).

The predominance of cereal production and the insignificance of industrial crops and vegetables indicates the Region's one-crop-dominated agriculture and economy, (i.e. its dependence on mainly one crop), low income of the farming population, and imbalanced diet of the population. The situation in the Region can be compared with that of the Aegean region, situated in the western part of Turkey, to show the degree of the one-crop-domination in the Region's agriculture. In the Aegean region (whose cultivated land was about two million hectares in 1966 and 1969) 58 % of the land was cultivated with cereals, 5 % with pulses, 25 % with industrial crops, 3 % with vegetables and 9 % with

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71) All data and figures on agriculture pertain to agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing; this is so due to the manner in which data are organised in Turkish statistical publications. Fishing is insignificant in the Region, however.

72) Active population refers to that segment of the population which is fifteen years old and over.

73) 22.5 % of the population of "localities" having 10,000 inhabitants or more in the Region were engaged in agriculture in 1965.

grapes and other fruits (calculated from SIS, 1968 B and 1969 A). Some of this difference may be attributable to different climate conditions. But most of it indicates inequality in the development process in both regions.

Percentage of land cultivated with various produces in 1969:

produce	The Region	the Aegean region
cereals	83.0 %	58.0 %
pulses	4.5	5.0
industrial crops	2.6	25.0
vegetables	1.0	3.0
grapes and other fruits	9.0	9.0
	100.1 %	100.0 %

Agricultural production in the Region is characterised by much lower levels of yield per area unit of most of the agricultural products, particularly of wheat and barley, (the main agricultural produce of the Region) than the country-wide levels. Wheat yield (output/hectare) in the Region was 950 kilograms per hectare (kg/ha) in 1967 and in 1969 it was 850 kg/ha, compared with 1250 kg/ha in the whole country in both 1967 and 1969. As for barley, its yield in the Region was 1100 kg/ha and 1200 kg/ha in 1967 and 1969 respectively, whereas it was 1400 kg/ha in the entire country during the same periods.[74]) (calculated from SIS, ibid).

Agricultural yield in 1967 and 1969:

Produce	yield (output/hectare) the Region		the whole country	
	1967	1969	1967	1969
wheat	950	850	1250	1250
barley	1100	1200	1400	1400

Low yield and productivity in agriculture of the Region is due to a number of factors having spiral causations operating in a cumulative process.[75]) These factors include, among others, primitive agricultural methods, out-dated technology, illiteracy and the land tenure system.

The main agricultural products in the Region are the following, in order of volume: wheat, barley, grapes, lentils, millet, and nuts. Production varies from year to year, depending primarily on prevailing natural conditions. Table 3 shows the amount of production of each of these products and their proportion to the total amount of production of the respective products in the country as a whole.

It is noteworthy that one of the high-income cash-crops, or industrial crops, which shows high yield in the Region, has been used by the centre, or more precisely by the central government, to achieve not only economic advantages, at the expense of the Region, but also political objectives in the form of pressure on the Region's population, in the wake of the 1925, 1930 and 1937 uprisings; this crop is tobacco, the production of which represented 1.1 % and 2.6 % of the total tobacco production in the country in 1966 and 1969 respectively (cf. footnote 74 below).

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74) Yield of tobacco ranged between 352 and 915 kg/ha in other parts of Turkey, but 1337 kg/ha in the Region in 1966, and between 275 and 1228 kg/ha in other parts of Turkey compared with 1955 kg/ha in the Region in 1969. However, the Region's production represented a very small fraction of Turkey's total production of tobacco.

75) The manner of the spiral causation could be presented (in a simplified way) as follows: out-dated technology and obsolete agricultural techniques — low yield and productivity — low incomes, — dependence on money-lenders, merchants, large land-owners — indebtedness to money-lenders, merchants or large land-owners leads to the alienation of land by peasants and small holders to these groups in whose hands land concentrates (insolvency is a usual outcome under the given circumstances) — since most large land-owners are absentee land-owners, this usually leads to the neglect of the land — this in turn leads to lower yield and productivity since the incentive to increased productivity is lacking because the income accruing from production is shared with the land-owner — lower incomes — inability on the part of the majority to obtain modern agricultural technology and techniques (because of low incomes and illiteracy) — this leads to the continuous use of out-dated technology and primitive techniques and so on and so forth the spiral moves on and is difficult to reverse without exogenous interference.

Table 3. Agricultural Products of the Region in 1966 and 1969[1]


Products	1966 Production (tons)	1966 % to total in country	1969 Production (tons)	1969 % to total in country
Wheat	1,358,900	14.2	1,078,900	10.3
Barley	502,400	13.2	503,000	13.4
Lentils	52,300	52.3	53,700	50.1
Grapes	541,000	14.5	655,000	18.0
Millet	39,500	65.8	37,100	66.3
Nuts[2])	17,153	15.5	19,331	17.7

[1]) compiled from SIS, 1968 B and 1969 A.
[2]) includes pistachios, almonds and walnuts.

Production of most products in agriculture indicates high tendencies towards spatial concentration mostly dictated by natural conditions, (cf. Map No. 2). The main agricultural area is the south-western part of the Region, where the production of cereals is concentrated, this part being less mountainous than the rest of the Region.

Agricultural techniques and methods used in the Region are to a great extent out-dated. Crop rotation is practised on a very limited scale, half of the cultivated land being left fallow to gather moisture and natural fertilisers; natural fertilisers, namely manure, is wasted as fuel; slow traction animals, such as the cow or ox are used instead of the horse; improved seeds, irrigation projects, drainage canals, etcetera, are lacking.

In addition, most of the implements used in agricultural production are obsolete. These obsolete tools include, among others, wooden ploughs and threshing sleds. However, mo-



Map 2: Spatial Distribution of Agricultural Products in the Region, 1969

dern, technologically advanced implements, such as tractor drawn ploughs, cultivators, grain drills, trailers, threshers and combines are used on a very limited scale and in certain parts of the Region, mostly in the south-western part, particularly in the Province of Urfa. This may be another factor accounting for the spatial concentration of agricultural production (volume-wise) in this part. Even though the area sown (with cereals, pulses, industrial crops, melon and watermelon, and grapes) in the Region represented about 13 % of the total area sown in the country, wooden ploughs used in the Region amounted to 20 % of the total in the country in 1969, (and 19 % in 1967), threshing sleds to 13.5 % in 1969 (but 12.7 % in 1967) whereas modern implements, such as tractor drawn ploughs represented 5.1 % of the total in the country, tractor drawn cultivators 8.1% and tractor drawn grain drills 7.8 % in 1969. (calculated from SIS, 1968 C and 1969 B).

The proportion of agricultural implements in Turkey in use in the Region in 1969:

implements	% of total implements in Turkey in use in the Region
wooden ploughs	20.0
threshing sleds	13.5
tractor drawn ploughs	5.1
tractor drawn cultivators	8.1
tractor drawn grain drills	7.8

The consequences of this situation are reflected in low agricultural yield, productivity and income in the Region. "The value added, per worker, in agriculture in 1971, averaged only one fifth the average in other sectors", of the economy of Turkey (*Confidential Report I*, 1972, 14) and most probably less in the Region. In addition, the per capita rural population agricultural product, was about 450 Turkish Liras (TL) in the Province of Hakkari, 510 TL in Bitlis and 715 TL in Diyarbakir (all Provinces being in the Region) as compared with 1100 TL in the country as a whole (and as compared with 2086 TL per capital gross national product in the country as a whole at the beginning of the 1960s). (SPO, 1963, 49).

LAND TENURE

In the Region, as in the rest of Turkey, the present land tenure situation "is far from clear". Cadastral surveys are proceeding slowly, and title to much of the land has yet to be registered. However, large land holdings, as large as, or larger than, 700 ha, are common. In 1952, 2 % of families owned 30.5 % of the total cultivable land, whereas 59.5 % of families owned only 18.6 % of the land, 20 % of families having an average holding of one hectare each (these data pertain to 9 of the Region's 14 provinces) (SIS, 1960–62, 230).

According to a sample report from the 1970 census, covering the whole country and providing data on 3.1 million holdings of up to 100 ha, amounting to some 13.2 million ha, i.e. half of the entire cultivated land in the country, 60 % of families held 18 % of the land, compared with 4000 families holding 4–8 million hectares. (*Confidential Report I*, 1972, 21). According to the same source, the number of small holdings, i.e. 3 hectares or less, has actually increased by over 200,000 units from 1963 to 1970, "probably as a result of land division through inheritance". (Ibid)[76])

In an article published in 1965, Hirsch ends her study of land and income distribution in Turkey, with the conclusion that the main determinant of the degree of inequalities in the distribution of farm income, is the unequal distribution of land. Whilst 10 % of families earned 50.1 % of the net

[76]) For further data and information on this subject cf: SIS, 1960–1962, 230; Robinson, 1963, 275; **Confidential Report I**, 1972, 21; and Hirsch, 1966, 146).

income from farm operations (both crop and animal operations) 50 % of families earned only 12.8 % of the net income. (Hirsch, 1965, 146).[77])

According to another report, agricultural income in Turkey differs widely among regions; they are lowest in the eastern provinces, i.e. the Region, and highest in the coastal regions, central Anatolia being intermediate. (*Confidential Report I*, 1972, 14).

However, per capita incomes vary within the Region itself. If the average per capita agricultural product in the whole country is considered as equal to 100, it would amount to 41 in Hakkari, 48 in Bitlis and 65 in Diyarbakir. (SPO, 1963, 49).

Besides, the Turkish system of taxation has tended to favour the high-income group in agriculture. The average sale price of land suitable for farming rose by 360 % from 1950 to 1960, whereas total land taxes increased by only 146 %. But, the increase in total land taxes was, however, due to the increase in land subject to taxation and not to any increase in the rates of taxes or tax assessments. (Ibid)[78])

In addition to being contrary to the idea and ideal of "social justice" and "equality", the present land tenure system constitutes one of the main impediments to increasing production and yield and productivity. This is due, basically, to the great inequality in income distribution, resulting from unequal land distribution. The low-income groups cannot afford the highly expensive modern, technologically advanced agricultural implements; neither have they access to information on modern techniques because of both lack of such information and of wide-spread illiteracy among them. On the other hand, large land-owners, mostly absentee land-owners, tend to neglect their lands, their main interest in it being the collection of their shares in the production or the proceeds thereof; besides, the bulk of the high-income group's income comes from real-estate speculation rather than from agricultural operations, as mentioned above.

The fact that the existing land tenure system constitutes one of the main impediments to increasing production and productivity is recognised by the centre, as well as by the "experts". The SPO admits that the present "system of land ownership hinders increased production and is contrary to the goals of social justice; it must therefore be reformed". (SPO, 1963, 47—48). A group of experts, reporting to an international financial organisation, recognise that "present ownership and tenure arrangements are one of the barriers to innovation and raising agricultural productivity". (*Confidential Report I*, 1972, 19—20). Therefore, a land reform has been recognised as having been due to rectify this impediment.

Several "attempts" at land reform have been made in Turkey. However, these "attempts" have proved unsuccessful, totally or partially. For example, the 1945 Land Reform Bill fixed the upper limit of land ownership at 500 dünüm (4 dünüms are equal to one hectare); in 1950 the National Assembly raised

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77) The SPO indicates that about 90 % of the people working in agriculture earned about 48 % of the total agricultural income in the country, whilst 52 % of the agricultural income remained in the hands of about 10 % of landowners at the beginning of the 1960s. (SPO, 1963, 45—46). Inequalities in income distirbution is attributed by the SPO to differences in the source of incomes, the source being chiefly real-estate for the high-income group and labour for the low-income groups. (Ibid).

78) Myrdal's hypothesis of spiral causation and the flow of resources from the periphery to the centre can be applied not only spatially, but also between various social and income groups. The analogue of the "centre" in the spatial analysis would be the high income group in the social and income group analysis; whereas the analogue of the "periphery" in the former, would be the low income group, in the latter.

Within agriculture, land and income are unequally distributed. The high income group experiences the upward movement of the cumulative process, caused by higher sale price of land and the low income group go through the downward movement caused by the land division through inheritance, as mentioned above.

If this extension of Myrdal's hypothesis is correct, one would expect a decrease in the relative share of income of the low income group.

this limit to 5000 dünüm, thus reducing the lands available for distribution.[79])

After the March 1971 disguised coup d'état, there has been once again talk about land reform. During April 1972, a land reform bill was submitted to the Turkish National Assembly. The bill presumably fixes the upper limit of land-ownerhip at between 30 and 100 hectares for irrigated lands, and between 47 and 200 ha for non-irrigated lands, the limit varying according to region, soil, crop, and climate. In July of that year, a "preliminary measure law" was passed by the Assembly creating an under-secretary of land reform. However, this law excludes forests, vineyards, tea, nuts and fruits plantations from agricultural lands to be affected by the land reform law. *(Confidential Report I,* 1972, 19–20).

DISGUISED UNEMPLOYMENT IN AGRICULTURE

One of the factors affecting productivity in agriculture is the high level of disguised unemployment, i.e. that portion of the active population engaged in agriculture that can be transferred away, without causing reductions in levels of production and thus leading to increased productivity. Disguised unemployment amounts, on average, to about four fifths of the total active population engaged in agriculture, in the lowest activity month of January, and about one tenth in the highest, or peak, activity month of July. (SPO 1963, 49). (The percentages apply to the whole country).[80])

The presence of such a large redundant labour force in agriculture, causes increased on-farm or auto-consumption and thus hampers market transactions and activities. It also leads to low productivity, since the same amount of production can presumably be achieved with less labour. In other words, this disguised unemployment leads to low productivity, low income, and smallness of the market, all factors affecting the development process.

Agricultural production is a typical example of the operation of the spiral causation of the cumulative processes. To begin with, incomes of the majority of the farming population is low, whilst a minority controls the larger part of agricultural income. This inequality of income distribution is caused by inequality in the ownership of land. A substantial part of the Region's perishable agricultural produce (such as fruits) is wasted because of lack of roads and transport, especially in outlying areas. Low income leads to lack of savings and investment. This lack of investment means inability to use modern technology and scientific methods in the production chain, either by buying or hiring them. The situation is made worse by the widespread illiteracy among the farming population. Lack of modern technology and methods and wide-spread illiteracy lead to the continued use of old implements and practices. These, and the high disguised unemployment, lead to low yield and productivity. Low yield and productivity mean low income. The picture becomes more complex when considering the break-down of small holdings through inheritance and the need to borrow cash occasionally from money-lenders as these lead to decreased per capita incomes of the majority of the farming population, and to the alienation of land.

Thus the operation of spiral causation. However, the operation of the cumulative processes of this causation seems to be accelerated by other factors, such as a large migration from the Region, which created changes in the Region's population's age structure in an unfavourable way, by taking away those belonging to the most active segment of that population, and thus reducing the size of the active population segment.

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[79]) It seems that the land reform issue has been a tool variously used in power politics in Turkey, to rally support, to topple opponents or to gain control over critical situations.

[80]) An international organisation's report states that unemployment in the rural areas of Turkey amounted to 10.9 % (Confidential Report I, 1972, 11).

It is not only inequality in income distribution and land ownership that characterised the agricultural sector. Agricultural resources do flow out of the Region. One way the flow is brought about; is through the absentee large landowners. These typically reside either in Istanbul or Ankara, or other towns located outside the Region. Their shares in the agricultural production, usually in the form of cash but sometimes in the form of products, are transferred to them. Even some large landowners residing in the Region tend to "invest" their savings in real estate speculations or other forms of investment outside the Region, generally in Istanbul and/or Ankara. Another form of flow is the export of agricultural products, such as nuts, lentils and millet.

However, there are some large landowners who employ modern technology in the agricultural production process. These are concentrated in the south-western part of the Region, particularly in Urfa. Nevertheless, they may be safely considered as enclaves having very little spread effects (or diffusion effects) on the surrounding agricultural areas of the Region.

LIVESTOCK

Livestock production constitutes an essential occupation of a large segment of the Region's active population and an important source of their income as well. According to B. Darkot, a Turkish geographer, the chief source of income in the Region (or what he calls eastern Anatolia) at the end of the 1940s, came from cattle-breeding, including cattle, butter and wool. (Quoted in Ghassemlou, 1965, 86).

Ghassemlou maintains that the main occupation of the semi-settled segment of the population of the Region is livestock breeding. It presumably constitutes the sole means of livelihood for this segment. Livestock production is, further, an important supplementary occupation of the farmers of the Region. For the semi-nomads, or semi-settled, plant production is virtually absent. Even in those areas where plant production is practised, it assumes a second-rate importance as a subsidiary to livestock production and helping only to meet local needs. (Ghassemlou, 1965, 87).

The importance of livestock and livestock production in the Region, as well as to the whole country, can be seen in Table 4. About one fifth of the livestock and livestock production of Turkey is located in the Region. Milk production in the Region amounted to 17.7 % in 1966 and 18.4 % in 1969 of the total milk production in Turkey; wool, hair and mohair to 20.1 % and 23.1 % in 1966 and 1969 respectively (SIS, 1968 B and 1969 A).


However, as in agriculture, production and productivity in this branch of production are very low, too, and fluctuate widely from year to year as well as from province to province.

Table 4. Livestocks in the Region in 1969[1]

Livestock	Number	% to total in country	Rate of increase from 1966 to 1969
Sheep	8,066,570	22.2	13.6
Goats	4,678,855	23.1	9.4
Cattle	2,817,907	19.6	23.8

[1]) SIS 1968 B and 1969 A

Production and processing techinques and technology are obsolete. Wastage is very high and prevalent. Animal by-products are mostly wasted. The production, processing and utilisation of milk, for example, is wasteful and the incomes derived for the milk producers are consequently low. The bulk of milk production is processed (by outmoded techniques and technology) into yoghurt, white cheese and butter, either on the spot, by the household or in primitive dairies. No modern creamery had existed in the whole Region before 1963 and probably not before the Second Five Year Plan's project of locating seven creameries in the Region during 1972—73. (TIB, 1972, 11—12). These creameries are located in the Region, being one of the country's major producers of milk, to meet the shortage of (or increased demand for) milk and milk products at the centre. This is an



Map 3: Spatial Distribution of Livestock in the Region, 1969

example of the "spread effects" resulting from the expansion of markets at the centre. At the same time, it represents a flow of resources out of the Region, if the income accruing from it is not re-cycled into the Region.

The Region's livestock is spatially, as well as among different income groups, unevenly and unequally distributed. The eastern provinces of the Region have the bulk of the livestock and the number thins out westwardly, i.e. the western provinces are relatively poorer in livestock than the eastern ones, the central provinces being intermediate, as Map 3 shows. Besides, low-income groups usually have a few heads of livestock, the production of which they consume and which typically does not reach the market, i.e. it does not contribute to their incomes directly, because it is auto-consumed.

MINING

Mining and quarrying engaged 7,874 persons, i.e. 0.5 % of the total active population of the Region, the counterpart proportion for the rest of the country being 0.7 %, in 1965.

Mining exhibits a high degree of spatial concentration, 82 % of those engaged in mining in the Region being employed in the provinces of Elazig and Siirt. The former is the site of chrome, copper and lead mines and the latter of petroleum wells.

The main mining activities in the Region are in the petroleum, chrome, copper and lead and zinc production which will be briefly analysed below.

PETROLEUM

The Region is virtually the sole producer of petroleum in the country, production between

1955 and 1972 amounting to about 27 million tons. The annual production has been steadily increasing; production has increased from 178,000 tons in 1955 to 3,600,000 tons in 1969 and a programmed production of 4 million tons was planned for 1972.

In 1971, exports of petroleum products amounted to some 2.5 million dollars; the expected and planned export for 1972 was $ 10 million.

The bulk of the petroleum production is exported from the Region to the centres of economic expansion in the country. In 1966, i.e. 11 years after production started, a small refinery, having a capacity of processing 15,000 barrels a day, was located in the Region (Longrigg, 1968, 324–25). However, it was being operated at lower than full capacity presumably for "lack of local outlets" (SPO, 1963, 438). Nevertheless, this did not seem to be an obstacle to enlarging its capacity to 800,000 tons/year (*Middle East and North Africa*, 1969, 746), and again to 1.1 million tons/year in 1968–1972 (TIB, 1971, 21). Only 6 % of the country's total petroleum refining capacity has been located in the Region.

However, a pipeline having a capacity of 3.5 million tons/year came into service in 1967, connecting the oilfields in Siirt in the Region, to Dörtyol on the Mediterranean. Since the Region's petroleum production does not meet the country's total local consumption of this product, it may seem strange at first that the pipeline was constructed at all. However, the answer is found in the fact that "through the NATO infrastructure, petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) pipelines have been constructed in both Greece and Turkey" (*Area Handbook*, 1970, 395).

Petroleum exploitation in the Region is carried out by both the centre, i.e. the Turkish state and private sector, and foreign concerns. The exploiters of petroleum include: the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (51 % state-sponsored), Mobil, Shell and Ersan, a Turkish private company. (*The Middel East and North Africa*, 1969, 745–6).


The bulk of the Region's oil production is either exported to the "national" centers or, in small amounts and as products of petroleum, to foreign markets. However, the proceeds from these exports are retained by the national centre, both by the state and private companies, and by foreign concerns, and are seldom re-cycled into the Region's economy.

CHROME, COPPER, LEAD AND ZINC

Turkey is the world's second largest producer of chrome. Turkey's and the world's largest and richest chrome mines are situated in the Region, in the province of Elazig. Chrome production amounted to 757,000 tons in 1970 and 916,000 tons in 1971. However, little chrome is actually used in the Region, almost the entire production being exported. Chrome exports accounted for "the greatest foreign exchange earner among mining exports", of Turkey. (*The Middle East and North Africa*, 1969, 745). These exports have increased from $ 7.2 million in 1967 to 17.5 million in 1971, and were planned to reach $ 20.0 million in 1972. (According to TIB, Elazig's chrome production was expanded to 220,000 tons/year ore and 130,000 tons/year concentrate (TIB, 1972, 8).

Copper is mined by the state-owned Etibank in Elazig (and in some other areas of Turkey as well). Production of raw (or blister) copper amounted to some 24,000 tons, of which 16,000 tons were exported, mainly to West Germany, the United Kingdom and the USA. These exports earned for Turkey $ 17 million in foreign currencies. (*The Middle East and North Africa*, 1969, 745, and the *Area Handbook*, 1970, 289). However, the Second Five Year Plan contains a project for expanding the capacity of Elazig's Ergani copper mines to 1,200,000 tons/year mineral (TIB, 1972, 8).

Lead and zinc are being mined in Elazig too. Test production of both began in 1953, production being largely exported. The Second Five Year Plan included a project to increase the production of lead to 8,000 tons/year



Spatial Distribution of the Region's Mineral Resources, 1968.

(lead concentrate) and of zinc to 6,000 tons-year (zinc concentrate). (TIB, 1971, 12).

In addition to these minerals, others are found in the Region as well. The exploitation of some of them is at present in the exploration and feasibility study phases, such as natural gas, whilst others are still at the exploration phase, such as iron and coal, phosphate, lignite, and nickel.

The spatial distribution of the Region's minerals is shown on Map 4.

The conditions and trends prevailing in the mining sector of the Region's economy are not basically different from those in the agricultural sector. The Region produces a number of minerals. Very little, if any at all, of this production is locally used and consumed. These minerals are exported to other areas of Turkey and abroad. The proceeds from this exportation are retained by the Turkish State and private sector, and foreign companies. Thus, the Region has very little benefit from the flow of its resources, since these potential investment sources are not available for its further development, even though some employment is available for its labour force in these mines.

This flow is not only depriving the Region of an important and substantial source of potential investment, but also leads to increased inequality between it and the rest of the country, or, at least, the centres of expansion, since the proceeds (or part of them) from the flow of the Region's resources are invested in these centres. This will lead to the further development (upward movements) of these centres (partly at the expense of the Region) and to stagnation in the Region itself. This flow also leads to the depletion of the Region's mineral resources, without any significant contribution to its development process.

2. SECONDARY PRODUCTION

Under this heading, manufacturing, building and electricity, gas and water industries will be discussed. Prominence however, will be given to the manufacturing industry for a couple of reasons, viz., manufacturing industry constitutes the dynamic force in the development process, as pointed out previously, and data on the subject are relatively easier to come by.

MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY

First attempts at industrialisation in Turkey were made during the Ottoman era. They met with failure, however, due to, inter alia, both competition from the industrialised countries and absence of protection at home. (Lewis, 1968, 458–459). At the close of World War One, existing industrial plants, located in the western part of the country, were very few, producing light consumer goods and mostly owned by foreigners and minority groups' industrialists. What plants survived the First World War, suffered extensive losses and damage during the war for independence and most of the minority groups' industrialists left the country. By 1927, only 4 % of existing plants employed 10 workers or more each. (Rivkin, 1965, 32, 65). In 1923, there were found in Turkey 341 mechanised factories, the majority of which being small and ill-equipped. (Robinson, 1963, 102–103).

The number of large manufacturing establishments,[81]) in the Region was 27, constituting 0.9 % of the total number of these establishments in the country. However, the proportion of new establishments being located in the Region has been steadily declining since the Second World War. At the end of the War, 1.7 % of large manufacturing establishments were located in the Region; 1.3 % of new establishments built during the war and a mere 0.7 % of new ones constructed between 1945 and 1963 were located in the Region.[82])

The active population engaged in manufacturing industry in the Region in 1963 accounted for 2.7 % of the total active population of the Region, whereas the active population engaged in manufacturing industry to total active population in Turkey as a whole was 7.1 % in the same year.

A comparison between the Region and the Aegean region in Western Turkey, reveals the magnitude of inequalities (or concentration) in the location, or spatial distribution, of large manufacturing industry among the various regions of the country and discloses that the Region is the disfavoured one in the country, both in the ordinary sense of the word and in the sense used by Myrdal. In 1963, the Aegean region was the site for 14 % of the total number of large manufacturing establishments (LME) in the country. These LME engaged 8.4 % of the Aegean region's active population. The active population of the Aegean region engaged in LME accounted for 16 % of the total active population engaged in LME in the whole country. (All data on LME are compiled and calculated from SIS, 1964).

"Share" of the Region and the Aegean region in the LME in Turkey in 1963:

Area	Number of LME located in the respective area as per cent of total in the country	per cent of active population engaged in LME in respective area to total in the country
Region	0.9 %	2.7 %
Aegean	14.0 %	8.4 %

There is some concentration in the spatial distribution of LME within the Region itself too. All of the 27 LME in the Region were

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81) Establishments employing 10 workers or more.

82) For example, despite the fact that the Region accounted for about one fifth, i.e. slightly over 655,000 tons in 1969, of grape production in the country, wine producing plants were, according to the SPO scattered all over the country except the Region, where no such plants were found. (SPO, 1963, 214).

located in five of the 14 provinces of the Region.[83])

Out of the 27 LME located in the Region, 11 were owned by the state, i.e. "State Economic Enterprises, Local Administration, Municipalities, and Villages"; 12 were entirely owned by real or judicial persons or companies with Turkish citizenship, i.e. by the private sector; and of the rest, 50 % by the former and 50 % by the latter. However, no foreign capital was invested in the manufacturing industry in the Region, a sharp contrast with the participation of foreign capital, with Turkish state and private capital, in investments in the "extractive" industry of the Region.

The privately owned LME were, by and large, family-owned enterprises. As a result of this, ownership and administration were intertwined. The main difficulties facing this sector were scarcity of credit (stemming partly from their being family-owned, partly from a tendency to "invest" in real-estate transactions and speculations by private capital, and partly from lack, or insufficiency, of state credit facilities in the Region) and scarcity of skilled labour and management.

SMALL MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS (SME)

The manufacturing industry in the Region is made up predominantly of small establishments. These SME are predominant both in regard to their number and to the number of employees they engaged. Four fifths of the total employees in the manufacturing industry in the Region, i.e. 25,438 persons, were engaged in the SME. However, the SME contributed to only about 20 % of the value added in the manufacturing industry.

The basic features and properties of SME can be summerised in the following (cf. SPO, 1963, and Ishikawa, 1967):

(1) The place of work is small and units established are scattered in location.
(2) The owner bears the whole responsibility for his unit; he, moreover, participates in the production process with his own labour.
(3) The primary factor of production is manual labour, sometimes supplemented by one or two machine tools.
(4) Though significant with regard to number of employees, their total production is small.
(5) The value of production per employee, i.e. productivity, is very low compared with that in LME.
(6) (Very) limited technological knowledge and absence of organisation.
(7) Their main purpose seems to be the maintenance of their families' livelihoods, i.e. of the owner's as well as his employees' and/or apprentices'.

From the afore-mentioned features and properties of SME in the Region, it becomes obvious that these establishments cannot at the present time and under the prevailing circumstances play a significant role in the development of the Region; on the contrary, much of the SME will not survive the development process. Only those SME using relatively modern technology and geared to maintenance and repair functions related to modern technology, seem to have a chance to survive and develop as the development process gets under way.

COMPOSITION OF THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY IN THE REGION

The LME in the Region are predominantly light, consumer goods industries. Many of them are agriculture-oriented industries. The 27 LME located in the Region were composed of the following industries:

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83) These provinces are: Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Elazig, Erzincan and Siirt; the data presented cover LME for which data are revealed. Whether other LME were located in the Region in 1963 cannot be ascertained due to the fact that data pertaining to other provinces of the Region, if found at all, are lumped together under "other provinces" for "confidentiality" in Turkish census publications.

(1) 3 tobacco manufacturing establishments, each employing an average of 70 employees.
(2) 8 food manufacturing establishments, each employing an average of 230 employees.
(3) 2 beverage establishments, each employing an average of 126 employees.
(4) 5 textile manufacturing establishments, (data on employment are incomplete in the Census publication).
(5) 1 transport equipment manufacturing establishment, employing 53 employees.
(6) 2 establishments, manufacturing non-metallic minerals, (except products of petroleum and coal), one employing 306 employees (no data on employment in the other were available).
(7) 1 establishment, manufacturing basic metals, employing 1,850 employees.
(8) 1 establishment, manufacturing rubber products, (no data on employment are available).
(9) 2 establishments, manufacturing metal products, (except machinery and transport equipment), one employing 5 employees.
(10) 1 establishment, manufacturing chemicals and chemical products, employing 28 employees.
(11) 1 establishment, manufacturing products of petroleum and coal, employing 372 employees.

Besides the light, consumer goods producing establishments, many of the establishments located in the Region are connected with primary production, such as petroleum and other raw material refineries.

Most of the Region's industries are what Luttrell calls "market-located plants", such as beverage, "neutral or multi-choice plants" such as tobacco, or "resource-located plants", such as basic metals. The role these plants or establishments play in the development of a region can be said not to be crucial. "Propulsive", or what Luttrell calls "complex-oriented plants", the presence of which in a region is fundamental for its development and for bringing about "spread effects", are conspicuously absent in the Region. (Luttrell, in Kuklinski, 1972, 243–262).

The absence of propulsive industries (in the sense of generating "spread effects") in the Region, means that the Region can hardly overcome the "backwash effects" of economic expansion at the centre, nor can it benefit much from the "spread effects" of that expansion.

The spatial distribution of LME in the Region is shown on Map 5, which indicates that these LME are spatially concentrated in the northwestern area of the Region. They are, in other words, concentrated at the sites of raw material resources and population centes.[84])

This concentration of LME in Elazig and Diyarbakir reflects the effects of agglomeration factors and economies resulting from (or causing) the relatively large population sizes of the towns of Elazig and Diyarbakir.

The location of LME in the Region indicates both the inequality in the spatial distribution of LME within the country and the flow of resources out of the Region. The comparison made above clearly shows that the Region has fared unfavourably in the spatial distribution of LME as compared with the Aegean region, for example. Its "share" in the LME being unfavourable is based on both the availability of basic raw materials, power and labour and on the comparison between the proportion of the country's LME located in the Region, and the Region's population proportion to the total population in the country. In other words:

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[84]) The fact that Turkish statistical sources report the non-Turkish population in Elazig, for example, as constituting less than 25 % of the Province's total population may explain the concentration of LME in this Province, or it may be a reflection of this fact. One should not forget that the Province is the site of a number of raw materials as well. This may have led "officials" to decrease the reported number of non-Turks in this Province by various means.


$$\frac{LMEr/LMEc}{Pr/Pc} = < 1$$

LME = number of large manufacturing (industrial) establishments
P = population
r = the Region
c = the country


Besides, most of these LME are either ubiquitous establishments, such as beverage manufacturing, or raw material refining plants.

The basic role of the raw material refining plants is to facilitate the flow of these materials to the country's centre(s) of expansion or abroad.

The location of linked (complex-oriented or propulsive) industries in the Region would have furthered the development of its economy and community and brought it up or nearer to the level reached by other regions of Turkey. By linked industries, is meant industries having forward linkage and backward linkage with raw material refining ones. (An example of a forward linkage is petrochemical industry in relation to petroleum refining. The petrochemical industry would most probably have given rise to a host of other industries.) The forward and backward linkages are aspects of the spiral causation operating to give rise to the cumulative processes that would move the Region's economy upwards. However, this upward movement has been impeded by the non-location of industries in the Region, although economic and social conditions in its large urban centres seem to be as conducive to such industries as other areas. Raw materials are available. A labour force in the towns is readily available and can draw on the (redundant) labour force in agriculture. What needed are skilled labour and capital. The former can be provided by the educational system in the Region, which is controlled by the central Government. The latter can be met by either the private or public sector. The private sector would need protection, encouragement and support from the State. In the final analysis and under the conditions prevailing in the



Location of Large Manufaturing Establishments in the Region, 1963.




Map 6: Floor area of new buildings (m^2) (calculated from SIS, 1960—62)

Region, it is the State that is responsible for the provision of both skilled labour (indirectly through the educational system) and capital (directly by State investment or indirectly through support for the private sector). Lack of action in this direction by the State is difficult to explain in economic terms alone, for the above-mentioned reasons. The more reasonable explanation would be that the non-location of industry in the Region, and the forgoing of economic benefits, that would have been gained from locating industries in the Region, is caused by non-economic factors. At least one of these factors is the ethnic composition of the Region's population.

THE BUILDING INDUSTRY

The building industry engaged about 1.8 % of the active population of the Region in 1965, compared with 2.6 % of the active population of the whole country being engaged in like activity. The industry's relative stagnation can be readily deduced from the following facts: firstly, ordinary bricks and tiles were manufactured all over the country except in the Region (SPO, 1963, 250); secondly, there existed in the country 13 cement mills, with a total production capacity of 3,100,000 tons, whereas the only mill located in the Region had a capacity of 85,000 tons (ibid); and, thirdly, building and construction activity in the Region is tiny compared with the provinces of Istanbul and Ankara and the Aegean region, for example, as Maps 6 and 7 show. Stagnation of this industry in the Region can be attributed to, inter alia, and in addition to the above mentioned two factors, lack of investment. Real estate speculation in such places as Istanbul and Ankara attracts some of the Region's savings. This is due to the secure (and high) returns on "investment" in this field in these places. The flow of investment sources out of the Region, is an important factor in the stagnation of this industry in the Re-



Map 7: Floor area (m^2) of new and additional buildings (According to building permits) (SIS, 1968 A, 215)

gion and it creates inequalities among the various regions of the country in the building industry.

ELECTRICITY

The largest dam and hydroelectric plant in Turkey is the Keban dam located in Elazig, in the western part of the Region. The construction of the dam began in 1965 and was due for completion in 1975. The hydroelectric plant has an initial capacity of 620,000 Kws, rising to one and a quarter million Kws on completion. It will double the entire present electric generation capacity of the country. But, however, "the power generated [from this plant] *will go first* through a 400 mile grid system *to the industries of the north-western part of the country*, but is intended that the dam will also serve as the power basis for the development of the eastern part of Turkey..." (*The Middle East and North Africa*, 1969, 746; underline added).[85])

In addition, electric power is generated locally from a number or small generators using fuel, or from small hydro-electric plants. However, consumption of electric power in the Region is, indeed, very low in comparison with consumption in other areas of the country. The low level of consumption of electricity in the Region is to some extent an indication of low levels of available production as well. Consumption of electricity for domestic purposes, for the electrification of public roads and for industrial use, is extremely low and its increase between 1955 and 1962 had been negligible. Table 5 illustrates the degree of inequality in the consumption of electric power between the Region and a number of other areas in the country. This inequality does not only indicate low levels of industrial activity but also low levels of living in the Region. Here

85) A Keban-Ankara power transmission line, 2 x 550 km, was under construction (started in 1966 due for completion in 1973), and another line, 100 km, was due for completion in 1972, which runs from Keban to Malatya, contiguous to the western border of the Region.

Table 5. Consumption of Electric Power in Turkey[1]) in 1955 and 1962 (Kwh per capita)

Area	Year	Domestic Consumption	Electrification of Public Roads	Industrial Use	Total
Region	1955	1.7	0.4	0.3	2.4
	1960	1.9	0.4	1.7	4.0
	1962	1.4	0.6	1.2	3.2
Aegean region	1955	5.8	1.0	22.5	29.3
	1960	9.7	2.0	31.5	43.2
	1962	7.6	2.0	37.6	47.2
Ankara province	1955	24.1	3.6	41.1	68.8
	1960	44.1	4.0	71.9	120.0
	1962	36.0	7.3	65.3	108.6
Istanbul province	1955	70.1	10.2	177.9	258.2
	1960	89.6	12.6	222.1	324.3
	1962	69.5	12.2	251.5	333.2

[1]) Compiled from SIS, 1960—1962, pp. 321—329.

again, the functioning of the spiral causation (and its cumulative processes) is evident. Lack of power is one of the factors that keep industries away from the Region. It also greatly limits the educational process and its expansion. Both lead, through a long spiral causation and in addition to other factors at play, to the stagnation of the Region's economy. On the other hand, availability of power may play a non-insignificant role in attracting industries and facilitating the expansion of the educational system and thus lead to an upward movement in the Region.

The actual operation in reality of the spiral causation is, of course, a complex one. The analysis here is a simplification. Low level of power consumption is both an indicator of a low level of development, and, at the same time, lock of power is an impediment to the development process.[86])

It is also one of the backwash effects of expansion in other areas of the country because the power generated in the Region is transfered (by the State or State controlled agencies) to these areas. But the construction of, and power generation from, the Keban Dam is also an instance of the spread effects of actual or planned expansion of the north-western area of Turkey. This spread effect does not seem to have resulted from the expansion of the market there, but rather from lack (at present) of other economically feasible sources of power there. It must be emphasied that such type of spread effects remain in the nature of "enclaves" only, and is disadvantageous to the Region and its development.

3. SERVICES OR TERTIARY "PRODUCTION"

This sector engaged in 1965 over 8 % of the active population of the Region, as compared with 11.4 % in the whole country.[87]) This sector engaged about four times more of the active population than those engaged in the manufacturing industry in the Region, whereas for the whole country the proportion was about one and one half times only.

[86]) It is noteworthy that the 1971 Yearly Programme included a village electrication project; however, the proportion of the number of villages in the Region to the total covered by the project is 4.9 % and of investment funds allocated to the project 2.9 %, although about one fifth of the total number of villages in Turkey are situated in the Region.

[87]) If to this sector are added those whose "activities are not adequately described" the percentage becomes 12.7 % for the Region and 17.8 % for the whole of the country. This may be justifiable on the basis that these activities include petits jobs that could not be covered by the categories set in the census publications.

ELECTRICITY, GAS, WATER AND SANITARY SERVICES

These services employed a little over 1,400 employees in 1965, i.e. about 0.1 % of the total active population of the Region. The low number of employees in these services indicates their scarcity and unavailability. This in turn affects the level of living of the Region's population in an unfavourable way, particularly the shelter (services of dwellings indicator) and health components of that level.

This scarcity is brought about by three factors: Firstly, by the flow of power and energy sources out of the Region (electricity and petroleum); secondly, by the inequal distribution of investments in these services by the State; and, thirdly, by the lack of infrastructures for the distribution of these services.

The counterpart percentage of employees in the whole of the country was 0.2 %, or in other words, twice as large as in the Region. Therefore, the conclusion that these services are more available in the rest of the country than in the Region becomes obvious.

COMMERCE

Regrettably, quantitative information on trade in the Region, between the Region and the centre, between the Region and the other regions of the country apart from the centre and between the Region and the rest of the world proved hard to come by. However, the direction of the movement of goods and services from the Region may function as an indicator, which may suffice to bring home the situation and trends in this field.

The Region exports raw materials, such as petroleum, chrome, copper, lead and zinc, and electric power, as well as livestock and agricultural products to the other areas of the country, particularly the centre; it also exports some quantities of these products to the outside world.

As Ghassemlou pointed out, trade between the Region and foreign and 'national' trade centres has historically been carried out by non-resident merchants. "Although the Kurdish commercial bourgeoisie expanded rapidly, it remained dependent on the merchants of the dominant nation. This state of affairs applies even to the present", concludes Ghassemlou. (Ghassemlou, 1965, 114–115). Since these non-Kurdish intermediaries are mostly not domiciled in the Region, it follows that the profits and other returns acruing from the trade transactions carried out in this manner do not return to the Region and are thus lost to it as a potential source of investment. Thus, trade functions as a vehicle facilitating both the flow of resources and the siphoning off of the Region's investment sources to other areas of the country.

This dependence of trade on merchants belonging to the dominant nation, is further perpetuated by the tendency of some Kurdish merchants of the Region to leave the Region altogether; they usually tend to migrate to the major commercial centre of Istanbul to become major merchants or industrialists there. (Vanly, 1971, 36). This situation is a result of these merchants' striving to conceal their ethnic and regional origins in order to 'pass'; to imitate and associate with their counterparts belonging to the dominant nation; to enjoy the facilities and amenities of urban life; and to increase their fortunes.

Commerce, including banking, insurance and real-estate, engaged, in 1965, over 30,000 persons, i.e. 2.0 % of the active population of the Region, compared with 2.9 % in the whole country.

Commerce, functioning as a vehicle facilitating the flow of resources, especially goods, is an important variable in the spiral causation leading to the further expansion of other areas of Turkey, at the partial expense of the Region. Merchants of the Region generally tend to invest in the tried centres, such as Istanbul, Ankara, or other centres of expansion, presumably because of higher and more secure returns and other factors. When emigrating from the Region, most merchants

transfer their wealth, especially liquid wealth, with them. Both of these actions on the part of merchants (and banks, insurance companies, and real-estate firms) deprive the Region of its potential sources of investment. But at the same time they contribute to the development of the receiving area(s). In this sense, their development is at the (partial) expense of the Region. Thus, trade leads to an upwards movement in the receiving areas' economies and to stagnation or downwards movement in the Region's economy.

This situation and trend are indications of the operation of agglomeration factors in the large cities of Turkey (especially Istanbul and Ankara) which tend to attract factors and resources from the Region. This is due to the fact that risk-aversion and uncertainty tend to favour the already tried centers (Istanbul and Ankara) and disfavour the untried Region, since returns to investments in these centers are more secure (even if they may be lower than in the Region). Besides, urban amenities and cultural attractions favour these centers.

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

Means of communications are limited and inadequate in the Region. Proper communications facilities had been lacking until recently when a radio network was established at the request of CENTO. (*Area Handbook*, 1970, 355).

Postal, telegraph and telephone services suffer, besides being inadequate and confined to the large cities and towns, operational defects and much delay. The quality, speed and reliability of these services leave much to be desired. (SPO, 1963, 354—55).

Railroads, highways and roads are deficient and this deficiency is considered, by some experts, as one of the main factors holding back the Region from catching up with the rest of the country in the development process. Most of the highways have been constructed and expanded for mainly military purposes, with little or no attention to the role these highways and railways might have played in the development of the Region.[88])

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88) In 1927, there were no railroads in the Region; between 1927 and 1950, some railroads had been constructed. "Development experts have criticised Turkey for an overemphasis on railroad construction during the period: local road-building material was plentiful while steel for rails... had to be imported; the single-track nature of the system held only limited capacity; and the high cost... might have been spread more effectively over a wider network of highways", Rivkin maintains. (Rivkin, 1965, 64). Why were these railroads built? Rivkin provides the answer to this question. He reflects the attitude of the Turkish authorities when he mentions that, "the still-present threat of revolt... during the 1930s rail transport was the quickest, most efficient means of transporting large troop convoys". (Rivkin, 1965, 64—65).

After World War II, the emphasis shifted from railroads to roads, as the US military mission to Turkey recommended in 1947. This shift of emphasis was due to military considerations too; the railroads did "not meet the military manoeuvrability needs" of a country that was going to have a major role in NATO; it did not meet Turkey's hoped-for potential "as an important grain exporter to the West", either. Road construction began in 1948 (following a report by a US Bureau of Public Roads team of 1947, which became the blueprint of the programme that had been started). "A striking conceptual similarity exists between the highway plan [and the road construction that appeared in 1960] and the railroads developments of the 1930s", maintains Rivkin. (Rivkin, 1965, 106).

However, most of these roads run "parallel almost exactly" to existing railroads, and the rest were "shortcuts between cities already connected by rail". In other words, the consequences of building the highways to the development of the Region were not significantly different from those of the railroads before it.

"Investment" in these military highways increased from 2.9 % of the total budget in 1950 to 7.8 % in 1959, the total being equal to total public investment in agriculture. Table 6 shows the great emphasis Turkish governments have placed on these highways.

Table 6. "Investment" in Highways in Turkey[1]) 1950—1960

Year	As % of Investment in Communications	As % of Government Investment in Economic Development
1950	57.5	20.3
1956	75.2	36.5
1960	72.5	34.5

[1]) Excluding personal and administrative expenditures; quoted in Rivkin, 1965, 108.

Roads and highways in the mountainous areas of the Region are still sparse and many are mostly poorly surfaced, narrow, having sharp curves and steep grades, and maintenance being poor. Besides, "while the major cities and towns are fairly well served by the highway system, the majority of the country's ... villages have no improved roads linking them with state highways or the nearest town", maintains the Area Handbook (*Area Handbook*, 1970, 323); moreover, "In many cases, highways were extended to villages which had no goods for the urban markets...", according to Rivkin (Rivkin, 1965, 110). Rivkin concludes that the greatest "comparative advantages" of these highways went to "centres whose advantages were highest already" (ibid).

A substantial part of the Region's roads are not suitable for transport during the winter season when snow and rain block these roads.

Besides the inadequacy and poor conditions of many roads in the Region, means of transport, i.e. automobiles, buses, and trucks, were scarce and much lower per 10,000 of the population than in other areas of the country in 1962 as Table 7 indicates. However, animal transport is still very common, particularly in the rural areas of the Region.

Transport and communications (including storage) engaged about 17,000 persons, i.e. 1.1 % of the total active population of the Region in 1965, the counterpart percentage in the whole country being 2.1 %.

Transport and communication in the Region are both relatively insufficient and inefficient. They function, apart from the military use they were meant to serve, as arteries facilitating the flow of the Region's resources by reducing the friction of distance. The pipeline leading from Siirt to the Mediterreanian coast, discussed under Mining, is the artery facilitating the flow of petroleum from the Region. Highways and railroads facilitate the transport of the Region's raw materials and emigrants out of the Region. In other words, they facilitate the functioning of the backwash effects of expansion at the centre(s). However, their role in the functioning of the spread effects is dubious. At the early phases of development this role had been insignificant because of other factors at play, but later on they may play a significant role. In short, the existence of an adequate transport and communications system is a necessary pre-requisite for the initiation and sustenance of the development

Table 7. Vehicles per 10,000 Inhabitants in the Region and some other areas of Turkey in 1955 and 1962.[1])

Year	Automobiles				Buses				Trucks			
	R	Ae	An	I	R	Ae	An	I	R	Ae	An	I
1955	3	13	46	68	1	4	4	4	7	14	25	46
1962	4	20	91	123	2	8	10	11	12	25	62	77

[1]) Compiled from SIS 1960—1962, pp. 465—474, R = Region; Ae = Aegean region; An = Ankara province; I = Istanbul province.

Automobiles include private and official, taxis and cars. Buses include private and official and municipal buses. Trucks include private and state or official trucks.

process. But, its presence is not sufficient that such a process will be taking place.[89])

SERVICES

These services include: government services (at the central, provincial, municipal and village levels); community and business services (education, medical and health, religious, welfare institutions, legal, business and consulting); other business services (advertising, photocopying, etcetera, chambers of commerce, boards of trade unions and other labour and professional organisations, and chemical analysis laboratories); recreational services, and personal services.

The services mentioned above engaged over 75,000 persons, i.e. about 5 % of the total active population of the Region, compared with 6.2 % in the whole country. It is noteworthy that this category of services is the second largest (in the number of employees engaged) in the Region after agriculture.

To this category may be added those classified as "activities not adequately described" which include the military (except the gendarme), mobile individuals who failed to provide sufficient information about their affiliation to enable their classification, self-employed and others. (SIS, 1965, 569). Should this procedure be acceptable, the service category would be engaging 9.5 % of the active population of the Region in 1965.

89) Richardson points out that, "Transport costs and efficiency in the transportation sector is an important precondition for maximising a region's growth potential." (Richardson, 1973, 57). In the case of Turkey, the transport system between the Region and the center seems to be rather relatively developed; theoretically this may lead to either polarization (flow of factors and resources from the periphery to the center) or dispersion (or "spread effects" of expansion at the center). However, in the case of the Region, the existence of a relatively developed inter-regional transport system has led to polarisation, because, inter alia, the transport (and communications) system within the Region itself is rather underdeveloped, which has been checking its development (potential).

4. SUMMARY

Table 8 shows the proportion of the various production categories of the economy of the Region and the different categories in each industry as they appeared in 1965. Agriculture is by far the largest category; this fact represents one of the features of under-underdevelopment of the Region and, at the same time, is a feedback that contributes to its under-underdevelopment. Low productivity, auto-consumption, wide-spread disguised unemployment and under-employment, primitive technology and techniques employed in the production process, lack or absence of modern scientific methods, lack of, or poor transport system, illiteracy, and the nature of the land tenure system are a few of the factors that keep agriculture underdeveloped, and which are simultaneously the consequences of this under-underdevelopment and contributors to its perpetuation.

The second largest category after agriculture is the "services". This category, being mostly non-productive in the strict sense of the word, is very large, reflecting not the development of the Region but its under-underdevelopment through high disguised unemployment and under-employment.

Manufacturing, the dynamic force of development, is conspicuously small in terms of employment and number of large establishments.

The conclusion to be drawn from the above-mentioned analysis of the situation and main trends in the Region is that it has been experiencing substantial flows of its resources, both natural and human. These flows are made possible and facilitated by the transport and communications system existing in the Region and connecting it with the country's centres of expansion and which are carried out through the transport system, trade and the banking system. The transport system reduces the friction of distance, trade being the medium of transferring goods, and the banking system being the instrument that siphons off the Region's savings.

Table 8. Active Population of the Region by Economic Activities, 1965[1])

Sectors (a)	Number of Employees in Region (b)	% of Sector in Region (c)	% of Sector in Country (d)	Gap (e)
1. Primary Production	1,284,654	83.4	72.5	+10.9
A. Agriculture	1,276,780	82.9	71.9	+11.0
B. Mining	7,874	0.5	0.6	— 0.1
2. Secondary Production	62,353	4.0	9.7	— 5.7
A. Manufacturing	34,252	2.2	7.1	— 4.9
B. Construction	28,101	1.8	2.6	— 0.8
3. Tertiary Production	123,687	8.1	11.4	— 3.3
A. Electricity, Gas, etc.	1,406	0.1	0.2	— 0.1
B. Commerce	30,062	2.0	2.9	— 0.9
C. Transport and Communications	16,972	1.1	2.1	— 1.0
D. Services	75,247	4.9	6.2	— 1.3
4. Activities Not Adequately Described	70,351	4.6	6.4	— 1.8
Total	1,541,045	100.1	100.1	

[1]) SIS, 1965, pp. 570—573.
(c) per cent of employees in production category in the Region to total active population of the Region
(d) per cent of employees in production category in the country to the total active population of the whole country
(e) the gap in percentage points between (c) and (d)

These flows of the Region's resources are one of the backwash effects of development at the country's centres of expansion.

These flows moreover, constitute some of the favourable factors to these centers' development (their upwards movement). But they are, at the same time, some of the basic impediments to the Region's development (stagnation, or downwards movement). The spread effects of the expansionary momentum at the centre(s) of expansion are as yet lacking or insignificant. Whether they would need longer periods of time to make themselves felt is to be seen. However, the spread effects ought to be distinguished from projects initiated, by the central government, in the Region, for the purpose of facilitating the flow of its resources. These projects have mainly remained as enclaves, having little effect on the rest of the Region's economy and community.

The situation and trends, as they were in the mid-1960s, were that the Region was losing its economic (and some of its human) potential. The loss of potential is an unfavourable factor to its future development. Since the flow of resources was continuous, and may have since increased in scale, the future development of the Region is doubtful, especially if present conditions and trends countinue to prevail. This means that not only are the inequalities between the Region and the rest of the country large and substantial, but also that they would most probably tend to increase rather than decrease, until the process is checked and/or reversed by exogenous factors, such as state interference.

IV THE REGION'S POPULATION AND SETTLEMENT PATTERN

1. POPULATION

Under this heading a number of important features and characteristics of the population of the Region will be analysed and its main trends pointed out.

POPULATION SIZE, RATE OF INCREASE, AND DENSITY

The population of the Region numbered 3,693,246 in 1965, constituting 11.8 % of the total population of the country. Its population in 1940 was 1,829,095, representing 10.3 % of the total population of the country. Between 1940 and 1965 the Region's population had more than doubled (increased by 102 %), whereas the population in the rest of the country, had increased by 80 %, during the same period.

Table 9 shows the population of the Region from 1940 to 1973 and the proportion of its population to the total in the country, every five years. The table indicates that this proportion had been slowly but steadily increasing, until 1965 when the trend began to reverse, due to large scale emigration.

Table 9. Population of the Region, 1940—1973[1])

Year	Number	% of Region's Population to Total in Country
1940[2]	1,829,095	10.3
1945[2]	1,868,928	9.9
1950[2]	2,174,038	10.4
1955	2,749,576	11.4
1960	3,206,405	11.6
1965	3,693,246	11.8
1970[3]	3,978,675	11.1
1973[4]	4,160,414	10.9

[1]) Compiled from SIS, 1965, 5—6
[2]) Excluding the province of Adiyaman
[3]) Calculated on the basis of information provided by **Confidential Report I**, 1972
[4]) Assuming that 1965—1970 trends continued.

The average annual rate of increase of the Region's population has shown great variations for the 1940—1965 period. This rate had changed from 0.4 % during 1940—1945, to 4.7 % during 1950—1955. However, the more or less stable, annual "natural rate of increase", seems to have been around 3 % and the great variations can be attributed to exogenous factors, the most important among them being population movements, emigration, deportation and resettlement.

Prior to 1945 there had been a systematic pursual of population deportation on a relatively large scale, from the Region, or some of its constituent provinces, to the other parts of Turkey, in order to achieve certain political objectives (discussed elsewhere in this study). As an integral part of this policy, immigrant Turks from other countries were settled or encouraged to settle in the Region.[90])

Table 10 indicates that the natural rate of increase of population in the Region is high and usually higher than its counterpart in the country, except when the rate has been reduced through migration from the Region, to other parts of the country, or increased through settlement or re-settlement.

Table 10. Annual Rate of Increase of Population in the Region and Country, 1940—1970

Period	Annual Rate of Increase in Turkey, Per Cent[1]	Period	Annual Rate of Increase in the Region, Per Cent[2]
1941—44	1.06	1941—45	0.4[1]
1946—49	2.17	1946—50	3.0
1951—54	2.78	1951—55	4.7[1]
1956—59	2.85	1956—60	3.0
1961—64	2.46	1961—65	3.0
1965—70[3]	2.55	1965—70[4]	1.5

[1]SIS, 1968A, p. 29
[2]SIS, 1965, pp. 5—6
[3]**Confidential Report I**, 1972, p. 10
[4]Ibid., p. 11; the source attributes the low annual rate of increase of population in the Region during this period to the east-west migration.

[90]) In 1940—45, the Turkish government's policy of population deportation, from the Region, to combat the political movements considered dangerous by the government, was still pursued. In 1950 and 1951 a great number of "Bulgarians of Turkish ethnic origin" and Turks from Yugoslavia, were resettled in the Region, to increase the percentage of Turks in its population. **(Worldmark Encyclopaedia of the Nations**, 1965, 343).

Population density in the Region is approximately half of that in the rest of the country, being 17, 20 and 24 inhabitants per km² in 1955, 1960 and 1965 respectively in the Region and 35, 40 and 45 in the rest of the country.[91]) However, population density varies greatly within the Region itself, the variation becoming greater, the smaller the administrative unit chosen for calculation. Of the Region's provinces, Hakkari had the lowest density of 9 persons/km² and Elazig the highest of 35 persons/km². Of its "districts", the lowest density was 5 persons/km² and the highest 111 persons/km², in 1965.

The Region's population is relatively small. But, it has more than doubled within 25 years. This observation indicates differences in conditions prevailing in these areas. Fertility rate is higher in the Region than in the country; so is also mortality rate (cf. F. Shorter, 1968). But the net increase is still higher in the Region than in the country as a whole, which means that fertility is relatively much higher. However, some of this natural increase has recently been offset by a large emigration from the Region.

The Region is relatively sparsely populated and density there is half of its counterpart in the rest of the country. This means, that the Region is not experiencing population pressure and is not likely to do so for a long time to come. But it also means, as pointed out in the first chapter of this study, that the economic costs of the development process in the Region would be relatively higher than if it were more densely populated. The low density is reflected in the lack of an adequate infrastructure in general, in the Region. (Low density is also an unfavourable factor in the political game, especially in the Region where rugged mountain ranges make contacts between the scattered communities difficult, and thus lead to the fragmentation of any efforts on their part, to pressure the central government into action, directed towards the development of the Region).

AGE STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION AND ITS SEX COMPOSITION

The population of the Region is a relatively young population. The segment aged 0—14 years constituted more than 48 % of the total in 1965. The segment aged 65 and over represented 3.2 %of the total. The active population, i.e. the productive segment aged 15—65 years, constituted 48.8 % of the Region's total population. However, the active population of the Region is actually less than 48.8 % of the total, since the female part, particularly in the towns and cities, is mostly non-productive, i.e. they largely do not participate in the production process for the market (as distinct from domestic activities at home).

In the rest of the country, the situation is considerably different. The segment of population aged 0—14 represented 41 % of the total, that aged 65 and above 4 %, and that aged 15—65 the remaining 55 %, in 1965. In other words, the age structure in the rest of the country is more favourable than that in the Region. The situation in the Region may be even less favourable now, due to the large-scale migration from there to the western part of the country (since 1965), since migration tends to attract the most active segment of the population.

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[91]) However, data pertaining to the 1955—1965 period indicate that the rate of increase in population density in the Region was higher than its counterpart in the rest of the country:

Area	Rate of increase (%) during:	
	1955—1960	1960—1965
Region	17.6	20.0
Rest of Turkey	14.0	12.5

Age structure in the Region and the rest of Turkey, 1965:

age segments	Region	rest of Turkey
0—14	48.0	41.0
15—65	48.8	55.0
65 +	3.2	4.0
	100.0	100.0

The age structure of the Region's population also constitutes a strain on its disposable production. Less than half of this population participates in the production process; they must provide for themselves and the rest too. In the long run, and should the present trend of mass emigration continue and the age structure not change in a more favourable way, this structure will constitute an impediment to the Region's development.

However, this structure is bound to change, because of emigration, changes in fertility and mortality rates, levels of living, and health and educational services. The pattern of change would probably continue to be unfavourable, for some time to come.

The division of the population, according to sex, shows that the male part constitutes more than half of the total population of the Region and that the proportion of males appeared to show a tendency to increase between 1955 and 1965. The male population of the rest of the country, constituted more than half of the total population too, but slightly less than its counterpart in the Region, as Table 11 illustrates.

Table 11. Population by Sex, Per Cent, 1955—65

Year	Region		Rest of the Country	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
1955[1]	51.7	48.3	50.7	49.3
1960[2]	51.7	48.3	51.0	49.0
1965[3]	51.9	48.1	50.8	49.2

[1]and[2] SIS, 1960—62, p. 55
[3]SIS, 1968 A, p. 31

BIRTH, FERTILITY AND MORTALITY RATES

In an article, F. Shorter arrives at the following conclusions: "The approximations for the two omitted regions [among them the Region] assume higher mortality than for the average of the areas already covered, because the two combined, are more predominantly rural, and one of them is the less developed eastern part of the country". (Shorter, 1968, 11).

Table 12. Crude birth and fertility rates and index of fertility in and around 1960 for various subdivisions of the population[1])

Subdivisions	Birth Rate (A)	Total Fertility Rate (B)	General Fertility Index (If) (C)
Metropolitan	.0237	3.07	.26
Rural Regions (D)			
1 - North Central	.0523	7.14	.59
2 - Aegean	.0397	5.59	.46
3 - Marmara	.0398	5.78	.47
4 - Mediterranean	.0536	7.93	.65
5 - North East	.0563	7.94	.66
6 - South East (E)	.0564	8.00	.67
7 - Black Sea	.0511	6.98	.58
8 - East Central	.0566	7.69	.64
9 - South Central	.0497	6.94	.57
Turkey	.0442	6.18	.51

[1]) Shorter, 1968, pp. 13 and 17

(A) Birth rates were derived from age distributions of the census of 1960, assuming child mortality as estimated from the reports of women aged 20—34, concerning proportions dead among children born.

(B) The conversion to total fertility, were based upon age distributions of women aged 15—49, in 1960, and standard age specific fertility schedules, for the three main subdivisions of the population. The latter were derived from a combination of current fertility data, by age of married women, from the 1963 survey, and from proportions married shown in 1960 census.

(C) General fertility (If): B (Fi Wi)

B = the annual number of births. It is assumed that all births occur within marriage.
Fi = the age specific fertility schedule of **married** Hutterite women. This is the highest known such schedule and provides the base, or "potential fertility" to which other populations are compared.
Wi = the number of women in the ith age interval.

(D) For the regional subdivisions of the rural subdivisions, the lack of urban data on a comparable regional basis, prevented interpolation being made. Consequently, the regional estimates are for village

populations of 2,000 and less, assuming the age distribution of the villages to be the same as for places with a population of up to 10,000.

(E) Including the Provinces of Van, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, Bitlis, Mus, Urfa, Diyarbakir and Bingöl. (The Province of Agri is included in the North-east subdivision of the table and the Provinces of Erzincan, Tunceli, Elazig and Adiyaman, in the South-central subdivision of the table).

Table 13. Regional Differences in Population, Number of Births and Birth Rates by Regions, Turkey, 1967[1])
(in thousands)

Region	Population	Number of Births	Birth Rate
West	8,347	255	31
North	6,230	232	37
South	4,157	152	37
Central	8,387	395	47
East (a)	5,380	296	55
Total	32,501	1,330	41

1) N. H. Fisek, 1968, 581 (Source: Turkish Demographic Survey for four Regions. "For the East we have estimated the birth rate by reverse projections from the 1965 census, assuming current mortality similar to that of Central Anatolia").
(a) The "East" region includes the Region.

The above indicates that the Region has higher mortality, (both child and adult) than the rest of the country. It also has higher fertility (and birth) rates (Tables 12 and 13). Both of these indicators reflect differences in prevailing socio-economic conditions and levels of development. Higher fertility and mortality rates are (cor-) related with underdevelopment. And as the development process reaches higher levels these rates usually tend to diminish.

The higher the level of development attained, the lower the rates of mortality and birth. This is so because higher levels of development mean higher levels of health and educational services and nutrition, which lead to lower mortality rates. At the same time, higher levels of education and increased levels of information on contraceptives and contacts with developed societies (and other factors) lead to lower birth rates in general.

ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION OF THE REGION

The population of the Region is ethnically and linguistically composite. Even though Turkish official data sources are particularly unreliable in this respect, data provided in these publications will, however, be used here as rough indicators only.

Kurds constituted 49.8 % of the total population of the Region; Turks 45.2 %; and Arabs 4.9 %; and others the remainder, according to the 1965 censuses. (Compiled from SIS, 1965, 184—185).

However, the proportion of Kurds, Turks and Arabs in the Region varies greatly between "rural" and "urban" areas. In localities having more than 10,000 inhabitants, Kurds constituted 12.2 % of the total population, Turks 80.4 % and Arabs 7.5 %, in 1965. In localities having 10,000 inhabitants and less, Kurds made up 58.4 % of the population, Turks 37.4 % and Arabs 4.3 %.

Ethnic composition of the Region's population, 1965

Ethnic groups	Localities having 10,000 inhabitants or more	Localities having less than 10,000 inhabitants
Turks	80.4 %	37.4 %
Kurds	12.2	58.4
Arabs	7.5	4.3
	100.1 %	100.1 %

Table 14. "Official" Kurdish-speaking Kurds in Turkey 1945—1965

Kurdish Acknowledged As	1945[1])	1955[2])	1960[3])	1965[4])
Mother Tongue	1,477,000	1,680,000	1,848,000	1,430,000
Second Tongue	?	681,000	712,000	940,000
Total	1,477,000	2,361,000	2,560,000	2,370,000

[1]) Hostler, 1957, 17
[2]and[3] compiled from SIS, 1960—1962, 78
[4]) Compiled from SIS, 1965, 166—167

In addition, official data pertaining to the number of Kurds in Turkey have shown inconsistency over the years, as Table 14 indicates.[92])

It is interesting to observe, that the number of individuals acknowledging Kurdish as their mother tongue, decreased by 418,000 from 1960 to 1965, whereas those acknowledging it as a second language, increased by 128,000.

This situation reflects prevailing political conditions in the country and the government's tolerance of, and attitude towards, the Kurds. At the beginning of the 1960s, the pressure on Kurds in Turkey was slightly relaxed and a degree of tolerance was observable, as far as Kurdish cultural activities were concerned. This relaxation of pressure encouraged the population to express their identity. However, the pressure returned, after a short period of time, to its previous level. (For more details see section on historical background).

To explain this sudden drop of 23 % (within 5 years) of people acknowledging Kurdish as their mother tongue, on the basis of these people's assimilation, is not very logical, since the process of ethnic assimilation requires at least one generation, rather than 5 years.

BIRTH CONTROL AND FAMILY PLANNING

Until the beginning of the 1960s, there existed in Turkey, no birth control measures or family planning, even though the rate of increase of the population had been high; on the contrary, the General Health Protection Law of 1930 considered illegal the importation and sale of all forms of contraception and all objects considered preventive of fertilisation and aids usable for abortion. Furthermore, the 1926 Penal Code of the country considered induced abortion a crime. A 1930 amendment to that Code banned the dissemination of any information about contraceptive practices and forbade sterilisation. (SPO, 1963, 61).

A law coming into force in 1965 did, however, permit family planning, provided that the planning is done by the family itself and that the decision to determine the number of children it wishes to have remains the family's privilege. In addition, birth control

[92]) The manner in which data on the linguistic composition of the population are arrived at, is through censuses. The censuses are based on questionnaires. To fill in these questionnaires, one has two choices: either to do it oneself (or a member of one's family), or through the enumerators. Since illiteracy is widespread in the Region, the second procedure is the more common one. Whether the enumerators write exactly the answers given to them depends on many personal and official inclinations, prejudices, preferences, mood, etcetera. There is no reason to believe that neutrality prevails under such circumstances. Furthermore, the answers given need not be the right ones. There is fear, of physical, psychological, social or economic persecution, to say the least, if one says one is a Kurd (or not a Turk); there is also fear of loss of prestige and favour with the officialdom. Lastly, there is the question of who a Kurd is; is it one who declares himself a Kurd, or one who was born of Kurdish parents? One ought not to exclude the real possibility of outright fraud and meddling with statistics in the initial, intermediate, or final processing phases of data collection, classification and publication.

devices, such as the pill and intra-uterine devices (IUD), became legal. However, their use was still confined to the big cities of the western and central parts of the country on a small scale. All told, from April 1965 till the end of 1967, only 83,701 IUDs had been inserted, in the various provinces of the country.

It need be underlined that birth control, or population control in general, is an issue that is highly politically charged. Birth control is not merely an economic and social issue or a humanitarian question but is, in addition, a political (and military) one. The dissemination of birth control devices and methods, has differential effects, both spatially and among social groups. In Turkey, where population control has been deemed imperative, from the economic point of view, the introduction of birth control and family planning had been blocked by the government, or the National Assembly, for fear that their introduction will be an important factor in altering the ethnic and linguistic composition of the population in the eastern part of the country, i.e. increasing the proportion of "minorities" in the total population, since these devices and methods will be used on a larger scale in the western area, (followed by the central part) of the country, where literacy and education in general, as well as information channels, are more available and levels of living are higher than in the eastern part. (SPO, 1963, 64).

POPULATION MOVEMENTS IN THE REGION:

Under this heading the population movement out of the Region and within the Region itself will be briefly analysed.

POPULATION MOVEMENT INTER-REGIONALLY

The Region has recently experienced population movements on an unprecedented scale. Emigration and immigration have been steadily increasing since the inception of the Republican era. However, emigration has by far out-stripped immigration, creating during the 1965–1970 period, a sharp drop in the annual rate of population increase in the Region, from the "normal" 3 % to 1.5 %. *(Confidential Report I,* 1972, 11)


According to the 1965 Census of Population, some 258,909 persons born in the Region, were residents of areas situated outside the Region. The overwhelming majority of them, i.e. 209,931 persons (or 81 %), were residents of cities having more than 100,000 inhabitants (40.6 % were residents of Istanbul, 18.0 % of Ankara, 13.1 % of Adana, and 4.3 % of Izmir). The majority of these migrants originated from localities in the Region having 10,000 inhabitants or more. Map 8 shows the direction of emigration from the Region and the proportion of emigrants received by each province in the country.

The Census publication also shows that over 100,000 inhabitants of the Region were acually born elsewhere.

During the 1965–1970 period, the annual rate of population increase in the Region had been 1.5 %, compared with an average of 3 % during the previous 20 years, as mentioned above. The difference between the two rates is accounted for by the large east-west migration, i.e. from the Region to the more developed areas of the country, or in other words, to the "national" centres of expansion. *(Confidential Report I,* 1972, 11–12)[93]

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93) Some of the emigrants originating in the Region move on from the western part of the country to some Western European countries in search of work. In 1971, the number of workers in the whole country applying for jobs abroad was 1,200,000 workers (no figures on how many of them were from the Region were forthcoming). (Confidential Report I, 1972, 12–13). In the same year emigration to foreign countries absorbed one-fourth of the new entrants on the labour market in Turkey. Three fourths of these emigrants had gone to West Germany and the rest to France, the Netherlands and Austria. (Ibid).




Out-migration from the Region to cities having 100,000 inhabitants and more, 24. 10. 1965.

The population movement in the Region has far reaching economic, social, cultural and political consequences. It is, firstly, a flow of the Region's human resources; it, further, affects unfavourably, the age structure of the Region's population, because most of these migrants are from the active segment of the population. It, secondly, breaks up extended families, which are the common form of family in the Region, and affects the whole social fabric of the community. It, thirdly, may lead to the assimilation, by pressures of various types, of the Kurds when they are uprooted from their lands and transplanted in a new environment, in which they have to abandon much of their cultural background in order to survive, or "pass". And, finally, the political consequences for the Kurds in Turkey, of a decreasing Kurdish population in the Region, would seem to be precarious in the long-run, from the point of view of preserving the national identity and culture of the Kurds. However, emigration functions as a safety valve for the State by avoiding and/or controlling some of the economic, and political problems that would have arisen in the absence of such a safety valve and which might have created difficulties for the central Government. Therefore, a concerted effort on the part of the central Government to check migration, should not be expected, as this would be contrary to the Turkish government's long- and short-term policies, towards the Region.

POPULATION MOVEMENT INTRA-REGIONALLY

Population movement, within the Region itself, has been significant and tended to converge, up to 1965, on Diyarbakir and Elazig (where the largest two cities of the Region are situated) and Siirt provinces. These three provinces are the sites of most of the mining and manufacturing industries located in the Region, and thus may be considered as relatively more developed than the rest of the Region.



Movement of Population to main destination Provinces in the Region, 24. 10. 1965 (percent).

Some 25.4 % of migrants within the Region moved to Diyarbakir, 15.5 % to Elazig, 15.2 % to Siirt, 8.2 % to Urfa, and 6.5 % to Van. Most of these migrants, or about three quarters, had originated from localities having 10,000 inhabitants or more. Map 9 illustrates the directions of migration within the Region, and the proportion each receiving province accounted for.

The direction of migration in the Region seems to generally have the following pattern: from rural areas to small towns, from these towns to the large cities within the Region itself, from the Region's large cities to the big cities of the country, and finally from there to Western European cities. Robinson has noticed a similar pattern of migration taking place in Turkey as a whole.[94])

2. THE SETTLEMENT PATTERN

The overwhelming majority of the population of the Region lives in villages.[95]) The village population constituted about four fifths (79.9 %) of the total population of the Region in 1955 and three quarters (74.5 %) in 1965. Though a decrease in the proportion of the village population is obvious, the difference between the proportion of village population in the Region and the rest of the country, has in fact, increased from 9.7 percentage points in 1955 (being 79.9 % in the former and 70.2 % in the latter) to 10.1 percentage points in 1965 (being 74.5 % in the former and 64.4 % in the latter). (Compiled

[94]) Robinson observes that "the tendency [was] for most of the dynamic elements in the population [of Turkey] to gravitate from village to town; from town to provincial seat; and from provincial seat to Ankara, Izmir and Istanbul [the largest cities in the country]". (Robinson, 1963, 199). However, the last stage of emigration, namely to Western Europe, is not mentioned by Robinson probably because when his book was published (1963) migration to Western Europe was insignificant.

[95]) Villages are officially defined as "subdistricts or Muhtarliks outside the municipal boundaries of provinces' and districts' centres".

Table 15. Localities Having 10,000 Inhabitants and More in the Region and in Turkey 1940—1965[1]

	1940	1945	1950	1955	1960	1965
Region						
(1)	218,500	211,500	251,500	339,500	438,000	649,000
(2)	11	11	13	14	15	24
(3)	19,900	19,200	19,300	24,250	29,200	27,100
(4)	12.0	11.3	11.6	12.3	13.7	17.6
Rest of Country						
(5)	18.8	19.2	19.6	23.8	27.5	31.4
Gap Between						
(5) & (4)	6.8	7.9	8.0	11.5	13.8	13.8

[1]) Compiled and calculated from SIS, 1965, 27—31
(1) Total population of the localities
(2) Number of localities
(3) Average population size of localities
(4) Per cent of the Region's localities' population to the Region's total population
(5) Per cent of the rest of the country's localities' population to total population of the rest of the country

and calculated from SIS, 1960—62, 56—59; and SIS, 1965, 7—26).

In SIS, 1965, a city is defined as an area "within municipal boundaries of provinces' and districts' centres". This definition of a city depending entirely on its geographical position, is arbitrary and is not relevant or significant, for the purposes of development in the Region, or the country.[86]) A more relevant and somewhat more significant, though still arbitrary, method is to define a city on the basis of the size of population, which implies its present or potential economic base and agglomeration. Therefore, a city will be defined here, as a locality having 10,000 inhabitants, or more. (The terms "urban" and "urbanisation" will be used to refer to these cities).

URBANISATION

The process of "urbanisation" in the country has been rather rapid since the inception of the Republican era. However, the spread of "urbanisation" has been very uneven between the various areas of Turkey. The "inequality" in "urbanisation" between the Region and the rest of the country, has more than doubled during the 1940—1965 period, i.e. it had increased from 6.8 percentage points in 1940, to 13.8 percentage points in 1965, as Table 15 illustrates.

However, within the Region itself the process of "urbanisation" has not been evenly spread, being faster in the central and western parts and slowest in the eastern and northern areas.

The majority of the urban centres in the Region have populations ranging from 10,000 to 25,000 inhabitants, followed by centres having populations ranging from 25,000 to 50,000 inhabitants. Until 1960, there was no city having 100,000 inhabitants in the Region; nevertheless, in 1970 there existed three cities, each having 100,000 inhabitants or more (these cities were: Diyarbakir, having 139,000 inhabitants, Elazig, 108,000 and Urfa, 100,000).

The significance of urbanisation (in terms of the number of population) is that it is an indicator of the level of development attained by a region. It seems that the more developed a region is, the larger the segment of its urbanised population, and vice versa. But at the same time, increased urbanisation speeds up the process of development itself through agglomeration (econ-

[86]) Following the official definition, there existed in Turkey in 1965 six "cities", each having a population of less than 900 persons, whereas there existed at the same time 203 villages having 6,400 inhabitants each. (SIS, 1965, 34—35).

omies). Thus the significance of urbanisation, as an indicator of the level of development achieved, in a region, and at the same time as a boost to its development.

The low level of urbanisation in the Region, in comparison with the rest of the country, should be understood within this context.

BASIC FEATURES OF THE "URBAN" CENTRES IN THE REGION

Many of the urban centres in the Region lack basic urban facilities and amenities; many either lack drinking water facilities or running water, or otherwise these facilities are insufficient and/or require substantial reconstruction. Existing facilities are likely to deteriorate for lack of investment funds.[97]) Almost all investment and current and capital expenditures are provided for by the centre, i.e. the central government. The share of a municipality in the total investment funds allocated by the centre for municipalities is fixed by law. The percentage share a municipality is entitled to have is based on that municipality's population's proportion to the country's total urban population, as defined in the census publications. *(Confidential Report III*, 1972, 5). Since the Region's urban population constitutes only a small fraction (less than 7 % in 1965) of the total urban population in the country, its share in the investment funds, referred to above, is consequently meagre.

As a consequence of such a situation, many urban centres in the Region have no investment or expenditure accounts for even sanitation services.

Sewer systems are virtually non-existent in many urban centres of the Region, and those that do exist, are in bad condition. Most buildings are old and dilapidated and the various local administrative buildings are gathered together in the provincial seats. Electric power and gas supply, drinking water facilities, bus services and roads, slaughter houses and cold storage facilities, libraries, market places and public baths in most of the Region's "urban" centres, are either non-existent, or are in bad condition. Some of these centres lack even a town plan. (SPO, 1963, 370—78). In addition, some 22.5 % of the inhabitants of localities having 10,000 people or more, (the criterion chosen for defining a city or urban centre in this study) in the Region, were engaged in agricultural activities, as an economic activity and means of livelihood, in 1965. Therefore, it may be said that many of the Region's "urban" centres were actually big villages. This is only an indicator of the level of development it has reached.

The historical development, of the population size of the provincial seats of the Region, is given in Table 16 and is plotted in Diagram 1, to indicate that many of them are still big villages (as footnote 96 of this study shows, there were indeed 203 "villages" having 6,400 inhabitants each in the country in 1965).

The absence of a large, viable city ("A consensus view is that a city having a minimum critical size of 250,000 population may be necessary to exercise a generative function on regional growth performance." Richardson, 1973, 78) in the Region and the lack or shortage of urban amenities are two of the critical factors checking its development. Because of the lack of agglomeration economies in the Region in comparison with the large cities of Turkey, its towns are less attractive sites for the location of economic activities, than the large cities of the country. As Richardson points out, "The key agglomeration economies for promoting regional development are urbanisation economies rather than technical interindustry linkages, or other narrowly defined technological external economies." (Richardson, 1973, 75). However, the two forms of economies are closely related and the former are, to a large extent, a product of the latter. This fact is (partially) explicitly re-

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97) The SPO admits that "it is impossible for local administration to finance the services they have to perform with the revenues collected". (SPO, 1963, 438)

Table 16. Population Size of the Region's Provincial Seats, 1935—1970[1])

Seat	1935	1940	1945	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970[2]
Diyarbakir	35	43	41	45	61	80	103	139
Elazig	23	25	24	29	42	60	79	108
Urfa	32	35	36	39	48	60	73	100
Erzincan	16	12	13	18	24	36	45	n.a
Van	9	12	14	14	17	22	31	n.a
Mardin	23	23	19	19	24	28	31	n.a
Siirt	16	17	16	16	21	23	24	n.a
Agri	6	8	9	10	17	20	24	n.a
Adiyaman	10	12	10	12	14	16	22	n.a
Bitlis	10	12	11	11	15	17	19	n.a
Mus	5	6	5	7	11	12	16	n.a
Bingöl	1	1	2	4	7	9	12	n.a
Hakkari	2	2	2	3	3	4	6	n.a
Tunceli	1	1	1	2	2	4	6	n.a


[1]) Compiled from SIS, 1968A, 32—35
[2]) Confidential Report II, 1972, Table 3
n.a = not available

congnised by Richardson when he states that, "... with respect to agglomeration economies some of these economies arise from interindustry linkages ..." (Ibid, 81).

Furthermore, as von Böventer points out, "... there are two important factors which strengthen the viability and the growth potential of a given center -agglomeration economies and the existence of an economically strong hinterland." (von Böventer, 1970, 916—17).

TRANSHUMANCE IN THE REGION

Part (it is difficult to ascertain the size of this part) of the population of the Region is "semi-nomadic", i.e. there is found there "transhumant migration by whole communities after they have acquired fixed holdings, where part of the year is spent ..." (De Planhol, 1959, 53, and also Eberhard 1953). The existence of this form of subsistence and its persistence to date, is due basically to economic imperatives, in that the need for pasture for the livestock of these communities that is not adequately available all the year round in the site of dwelling cannot be satisfied at present without seasonal movements. These communities are usually very poor and the greatest part deprived of mos of these modern living amenities available ir the Region. The termination of this form o subsistence, depends on the modernisation o



agriculture and livestock production, which in turn depends on over-all development in the Region.

3. CONCLUSION

The Region seems to be relatively sparsely populated. Therefore, it would amount to tautology to state that it does not experience population pressure. However, the annual rate of increase of the population has been rather high even though this has been offset in recent years by emigration. Emigration, due to its selective nature (and the high proportion of the segment aged 0—14 in the population) has affected (and will affect, if it continues at the present rate) the age structure of the Region's population, particularly the size of the active population (size of the labour force). This situation has adverse consequences on the development process, in that it will tend, in the long run, to at least create an unfavourable relation between the Region's labour force and available resources. (Myrdal, 1969, 27).

APPENDIX

ON THE NUMBER OF KURDS IN TURKEY

The number of Kurds and the area of Kurdistan in Turkey (as well as in the other countries controlling parts of Kurdistan) has been made a puzzle, in the sense that accurate data are suppressed, data provided in Turkish official publications are inconsistent, and every writer on Turkey tends to give a different figure from others, if the writer mentions the Kurds at all.[98]) Some examples may suffice to illustrate the point, remembering the facts given in Table 14 of this study, which are plotted in Diagram 2.




Diagram 2: Number of people declaring Kurdish as Their Mother Tongue (Table 14)

(1) Robinson estimates the number of Kurds in Turkey at 2—4 millions at the beginning of the 1960s (Robinson, 1963, 38).

(2) Eren, who speaks of Kurdish-speaking Turks, claims that they number "over a million" (Eren, 1963, 244).

(3) *The Area Handbook* refers to what it calls "more than half the world's three million Kurds" live in Turkey, i.e. they number more than 1.5 million (Area Handbook, 1970, 76).

(4) Adams claims that the "Kurds, however, do not amount to more than 7 % of the population", i.e. about 2,200,000 in 1965 (Adams, 1971, 310).

(5) Van Nieuwenhuijze gives two estimates; he mentions that "The total [Kurdish population in Turkey] is usually set . . ." at 2 million, (p. 259), out of a total of 4 to 4.5 million Kurds; but on page 557 he maintains with more conviction that

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98) However, some writers curiously quote data pertaining to the number of Kurds in past years without mentioning the year to which the data refer, as though implying that the Kurdish population is stagnant and does not increase over the years.

the Kurds in general "count well over ten million" (Van Nieuwenhuijze, 1971).[99])

From the Kurdish point of view, as reflected in the writings of Kurdish economists and political scientists, the area of Kurdistan in Turkey covers (according to Vanly, 1971, 4) about 225,000 km² and this area's population number was 6,250,000 in 1965, 1,500,000 of them being non-Kurds ethnically. As to the total number of Kurds in Turkey as a whole, this is estimated by Vanly at 6,750,000, which is greater than the above figure because Kurds have been deported from the Region or emigrated to other areas of the country (Vanly, 1971, 7).

As to the total number of Kurds in Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria, i.e. all over Kurdistan, this is estimated by Vanly at 14,400,000 in 1965 and 16,450,000 in 1970 (Vanly, 1971, 5). However, it should be remembered that even Kurdish writers do not agree in their estimates of the Kurdish population or with regards to the area of Kurdistan. Some tend to offer higher figures, others somewhat lower. However, the final judgement as to the actual and accurate number of the Kurdish population depends on the carrying-out of reliable and honest censuses in the countries where the Kurdish people are found.

However, it is worth repeating that it is extremely difficult, and may even prove impossible from a scientific viewpoint, to accurately ascertain the exact number of the Kurdish people in Turkey (or elsewhere) at present, since accurate censuses are lacking. Therefore, all figures given on the population of Kurds, whether by Kurds, by non-Kurds and by governments ruling in the countries where Kurds are found, remain in the category of (unverifiable) estimates. One can only hope that this situation will change and change soon.

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[99]) The number of Kurds in Turkey given by a writer generally tends to perform the function of an indicator that reflects the writer's attitude towards the Turkish authorities; the lower the number of Kurds in Turkey he or she tends to give, the better (the safest course to follow is to ignore them altogether) since the question is politically (very) touchy for these authorities.

V. REGIONAL POLICY IN TURKEY

INTRODUCTION

Regional policy in Turkey, was in the 1960s in its early stages, i.e. it has been a conscious and purposive policy measure (or at least proclaimed as such), since the beginning of the 1960s. Its principles and outlook had been discussed by the SPO (SPO, 1963). Earlier, such a conscious and purposive policy had neither been proclaimed, nor pursued. However, military considerations and a desire by the new Republican regime, to break with Istanbul as the seat and symbol of the ancient regime, resulted in the dispersion of some of the ubiquitous industries and military material producing establishments, away from the frontier areas and toward the central and western areas of the country, even at the expense of foregoing regional (and economic) efficiency, in some cases. Some writers on Turkey seem to read too much into this and tend to exaggerate their significance, to the extent of claiming that Turkish leaders at the time, "were considering the emergence of new growth areas" in the country, and they assert, without justification, that a regional development was pursued by those leaders.

Rivkin claims that "Ataturk [President of Turkey, 1923—1938] did consider emergence of new growth areas as an objective of decentralisation policy". (Rivkin, 1965, 91). However, he also maintains that the area development measures (which included the creation of a new capital (Ankara), some imporvements in provincial seats, extension of railroads to outlaying provinces and the establishment of a number of state-owned industrial plants in the interior, and which constituted the major investment efforts of the Ataturk period) "were not expressed as part of a consistent decentralisation policy". Therefore, he suggests, as a justification for his asserting that there was an area policy, that one should "read between the lines". (Rivkin, 1965, 44—45).

Nevertheless, Rivkin admits that "political and strategic considerations held, however, at least equal significance". (Rivkin, 1965, 91). Actually strategic and political considerations held supreme significance; indeed the raison d'être for this policy was no doubt military — political. He further admits that "care, concentration, and sustained attention" were applied by the centre to Ankara, but not to areas important for their resources. These areas were left outside the centre's catering, on the basis of political considerations. (Rivkin, 1965, 92). What this means in fact, is that the centre was actually concentrating its efforts, investment and attention on the centre itself.[100])

Robinson makes similar, but stronger, claims. He asserts that many of the industrial establishments, built during the Kemalist regime, "were planned with the idea of regional development more in mind, than immediate financial profit". (Robinson, 1963, 112). It would be more consistent with available evidence, to state that these establishments were planned with strategic and political considerations more in mind, than immediate financial profit.

However, he neither elaborates on the point he makes, nor offers evidence to verify it. He is more explicit on a later period of the Republican regime. Robinson asserts that "perhaps corollary to this entire pattern of change was regional planning and development. Turkish leadership by 1959 was moving quietly in this direction ... Although there have been no public pronouncements on this point, Turkish authorities were thinking by late 1959 in terms of blanketing the country with 12 regional authorities ..." (Robinson,

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100) The "centre", is used in this study, to mean both the "centre of expansion" and the central Government or State. Although the two need not be identical, they are in this case often (nearly) the same. The centre of expansion in Turkey at the time, was actually Ankara, the centre of political power and the seat of the central government.

1963, 231). The latter assertion contradicts the former one because if there was "the idea of regional development more in mind" earlier, why should the same idea in the minds of the new leadership be considered as a "corollary to this entire pattern of change"? There was either no change, or there was change and the previous leadership did not have "the idea of regional development in mind".

Therefore, the conclusion to be drawn is that regional policy and planning in Turkey was in its early stages. This conclusion has, indeed, been arrived at independently, by a group of experts, writing in 1972 for an international organisation. They state in their report that, "traditionally, Turkey's approach to planning and investment decision-making, has been largely sectoral; planning for urban areas or regions is a relatively new concept. In the early 1960s, the Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement, assisted by the OECD and the UN, made one foray into the field of planning on a metropolitan and regional scale". (*Confidential Report II*, 1972, Annex 4, 1).[101])

The present organisational framework of planning in Turkey, has emerged in the aftermath of the 1960's coup d'état (or revolution). The new regime created the State Planning Organisation (SPO). The new organisation's first duty was to draw up a fifteen-year programme and put it into effect. In Turkey, economic, social and cultural development must be based on a plan, according to the country's constitution. The plan must be "prepared and executed by the newly formed SPO", maintains Snyder. (Snyder, 1969, 58–59). Regional policy seems to have been one of the products, or more precisely by-products, of the creation of the SPO, since it was its *First Five Year Development Plan*, which pronounced the main outlines of regional policy in the country. However, it is noteworthy that the organisational framework of the SPO itself, has had no place in it for regional policy, even though one of its objectives, albeit a vague one, was ostensibly to achieve "equality between [social] groups and regions" in the country.

REGIONAL STUDIES

The first measures adopted by the SPO, to carry out its regional policy, was to conduct regional studies, i.e., studies on the various regions of Turkey. Regional studies that have been carried out are of two types: centralised studies and regional studies.

The former are studies conducted at the centre and are mainly concerned with the indexing of the various regions of the country, on the basis of data pertaining to economic and social conditions, prevailing in these regions. The indexing is primarily made on a provincial basis. These indices are used, according to an order of priority based on them, as criteria for the allocation of investments and the distribution of services. The priority ordering is based on the volume of economic activity, level of social services, state of transport and communication and municipal services, actually found in the provinces. In this fashion, provinces were ordered according to a "national average". The next step, was to group various provinces, according to their respective indices, into geographical regions. These regions were then ordered according to the "importance of their economic and social levels". It is difficult to reconcile the pronounced objective of achieving "equality between regions" in the country, and the priority ordering based on the above-mentioned indices. What this system of priority ordering amounts to, is to allocate more investment funds to the region(s), that already have higher levels of economic activity, social services, municipal services, and transport and communications, and less to those regions which have less. In other words, the system will lead to the

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101) The UN's **Regional Planning** states that "... regional planning as a concept was new in **Turkey**" even though "its importance has been **recognised** earlier". (UN, 1973, 41).

further development (an upward movement) of the better-off regions and stagnation, or even downward movement, of the worse-off ones because of the backwash effects, which the upward movement of expansion at the better-off regions, will generate. Moreover, this will lead to wider inequalities between these regions, rather than to equality, which the designers of this policy proclaim as their goal.

The latter are studies also undertaken at tha centre, but the experience and knowledge of provincial and/or regional experts, was drawn upon. These studies were primarily pilot studies, and were first undertaken in "Eastern and South Eastern Anatolia, which are backward regions . . ." as the SPO puts it.

REGIONAL POLICY AND ITS AIMS

Regional policy is uderstood by the SPO, as a tool which "serves to ensure development, based on an inter-regional balance, the distribution of public services, on lines designed to promote a more equitable income distribution, rational development of regions, according to their potential resources and to find solutions to excessive urbanization and population problems." It is, furthermore, considered as a complementary tool; a tool that complements sectoral planning of the whole economy of the country. Regional policy, is, moreover, viewed as an instrument that helps to maximise the increase of national income and that promotes its equitable distribution.

Approaches to regional policy as pronounced by the SPO are:

(a) The first approach to regional policy conceives regional planning as being complementary to vertical sectoral planning and studies concerned with resources and economic activity on a countrywide scale. The secotral planning takes into account, in this approach, regional conditions and regional objectives when distributing investments and services. Then the sectoral plans and studies are reviewed and necessary adjustments are made in them, in order to bring them into harmony with the economic and social objectives of regional planning.

(b) The second approach to regional policy conceives regional planning as being autonomous, i.e. being independent of sectoral planning. Detailed regional studies cover a whole region in question, its resources and the type of regional activities planned to be initiated in it, as well as the implementation of these activities. Nevertheless, countrywide development and regional development programmes are inter-related, in such a way as to harmonize them.

The main aims of regional planning are briefly the following:

(a) To bring about a better balance between incomes, "based on the distribution of the population in proportion to resources", and economic activities in the regions. However, in determining investments and their geographical location, the "principle of inter-regional development" is the over-riding criterion.

(b) To allocate resources, i.e. giving priority in the allocation of investment funds, to regions exhibiting "high social and economic potential".

(c) To eliminate regional imbalance and to accelerate the development of "backward" regions.

The implementation of regional policy in Turkey, is based on two considerations, viz:

(a) The "establishment of equilibrium between macro-economic values as required by the plan targets"; and

(b) "The adoption of special measures to supplement the allocating function of the price mechanism".

These "special measures" are related to the creation and development of a capital

market, tax credit policies and foreign trade policies.

In other words, the main consideration is given to the free play of market forces. As mentioned above, it is precisely this free play of the forces in the market, that tends to create and perpetuate regional inequalities and the development of the "favoured" regions (or the centre of economic and cultural expansion) at the expense of the periphery or "unfavoured" regions. In the words of the SPO, "... general regulatory measures, which will merely provide a framework for the price mechanism and not impede its functioning, will be resorted to, as far as possible. Inappropriate interventions, which are likely to disrupt the equilibrium of the market, will be avoided and the few indispensible interventions, such as determination of import programs, will be on a rational basis".

The mental framework of the designers of regional policy in Turkey, seems to still revolve round such challenged concepts, as market equilibrium and non-intervention in the free play of the forces in the market, which Myrdal has shown to be the main generator of inequalities between regions. (Myrdal, 1969, 12 and 26).

TYPES OF REGIONS IN TURKEY

There are in Turkey, according to the SPO, three types of Regions:

(a) Regions of Potential Development;
(b) Backward Regions;
(c) Metropolitan Areas.

It is noteworthy, that investments and services are allocated to the various regions of the country, on the basis of primarily economic considerations. Other considerations, such as social ones, are to be taken into consideration, only if and when, they entail minimum economic "sacrifice". What this implies, is that the "backward" regions are to remain backward, despite the third aim of regional planning mentioned above, (that of the elimination of regional imbalance and the acceleration of the development of the backward regions) because economic considerations taken alone, favour regions that are already relatively more developed (or "regions of potential development") and which enjoy agglomeration (or external) economies, an industrial structure and are more accessible than the backward ones, lacking an industrial structure, agglomeration (or external) economies, and are less accessible.

ORGANISATIONAL SETUP OF REGIONAL POLICY

It is, as mentioned above, significant that the highest central body, i.e. the SPO, responsible for the preparation and execution of "economic, social and cultural development" in the country, did not contain any organisation for regional policy within its framework. The central agency at the centre, charged with regional development, was an obscure department within the General Directorate of Planning and Construction, at the Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement. This is only an indication that regional policy was not given the importance claimed to have been given it.[102])

The above-mentioned Ministry, has divided Turkey into 8 regions and 19 sub-regions. The Department of Regional Planning within the Ministry, was responsible for integrating physical and sectoral planning concepts and co-ordinating investment on a regional basis.[103])

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[102]) However, the UN's **Regional Planning** mentions, in passing, that "... regional planning in Turkey was already entering the implementation stage under the Ministry of Construction, before it became the responsibility of the unit in charge of national planning". (UN, 1973, 41).

[103]) Rivkin states his impressions on the above-mentioned Ministry in these words: "The writer was attached to the Ministry between 1960 and 1962 and learned firsthand, of the lack of power and responsibility". (Rivkin, 1965, footnote 9, 222).

Thus it is clear that regional problems of both "national" and regional importance, are decided upon and implemented at the centre whilst the regions concerned are themselves accorded very minimal scope of action and decision-making. As the group of experts puts it, "In keeping with Turkey's highly centralized system of government, agencies at the national level were given unusually strong roles in urban and regional development". (*Confidential Report II*, 1972, Annex 4, 1).

It is obvious that an effective regional policy (and development) requires co-ordination, both on the regional level and at the centre. This implies that the division of the country into regions, by various governmental agencies at the centre, is to be co-ordinated and a uniform division is adopted by all the agencies at the centre, whose activities, or part thereof, have a direct bearing on regional development efforts. In other words, the existence of a multiple system of regions in the country, means the absence of such a co-ordination at the centre. The outcome of this lack of co-ordination has been the existence, in Turkey, of numerous regional (sub-)systems, each made by one or the other of the centre's agencies. Thus, there were at least seven different regional (sub-)systems in operation simultaneously, each concerned with an activity having direct bearing on regional development and policy, as shown in Table 17.

REALITY AND FRIVOLOUS PROCLAMATIONS

On the basis of the above-mentioned methods and basic principles of regional policy, the prospects for the development of the Region, let alone its catching up with the developed areas of the country, in the economic, social and cultural fields, are nebulous and remote at present. To start with, leaving regional development to the free play of the market forces and mechanisms, will only lead to further inequalities, between the regions of the country and to further development of the better-off (favoured) ones and underdevelopment of the worse-off (unfavoured) ones. The theoretical framework and historical background analysed in this study and the numerous experiences in various countries, justify this forecasting. (Cf. Myrdal 1969 and 1956, Luttrell, in Kuklinski 1972, and Frank 1969). In addition, labelling, and thus implicitly stigmatising the Region, as "backward" and at the same time excluding it from the "regions of potential development", means that it is actually excluded from those regions earmarked to receive investment funds, services and attention from the centre.[104])

Table 17. Regional (Sub-)Systems in Turkey

Regional (Sub-)Systems	Number of Regions	Source
Agriculture	9	SIS (1969 B)
Regional Planning	8	Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement
Regional Offices	18	State Hydraulic Works
Regional Offices	15	Bank of Provinces
Regional Offices	14	General Directorate of Roads, Water and Electricity
Health Regions	16	Ministry of Health and Social Welfare
Area Development	7	Rivkin (1965), quoted from Turkish geographical Sources

104) Richardson points out that, "The choice of policy instruments and how strongly they are applied, will be influenced by many considerations: the "normal" degree of government intervention in economic affairs; the quality of entrepreneurship and the structure of corporate organisations, particularly in lagging regions; the value goals and socio-cultural traditions of the society; the size and complexity of the fiscal sector; the nature and extent of economic planning, if any; the degree of geographic mobility of labour and capital; the country's constitution, political structure and scope for public consultation and participation." (Richardson, 1973, 227).

Observations available, indicate that the Region's resources have been, are and will continue to be, flowing out of the Region. The flow of population, increasing rapidly in recent years, (including labour force in the form of skilled and unskilled labour, rich merchants and potential entrepreneurs, professionals and technocrats and the intelligentsia in general), capital, raw materials (such as petroleum, chrome, copper, lead and zinc), electric power, and agricultural and livestock products, was analysed elsewhere in this study. This flow, which constitutes an irreplaceable loss to the Region, and a net gain for the receiving ones, is recognised and admitted at the centre (by the SPO). How the centre envisages the development of the Region, which the centre classifies as backward, can be discerned from its adherence to market mechanisms. The measures the centre tends to adopt, to stop or modify the scale of flow of factors and resources from the Region, include "Certain indirect measures [which] will also be taken to prevent local capital and entrepreneurs leaving the backward regions and to encourage the flow of capital and entrepreneurs to these regions. These measures will tend to reduce the cost of setting up and operating projects undertaken in backward regions, by the private sector. For this purpose, industrial sites will be set up in certain backward regions, and cheap land, power, and credit will be made available for projects to be set up in them". (SPO, 1963, 52) However, it is noteworthy that the SPO's First Development Plan pronounces no measures, as to how the flow of resources from the Region, other than "local capital and entrepreneurs", will be stopped or modified in such a way as to make it less harmful to the Region's economy and its short- and long-term development; neither does it mention how the location of the State sector's projects are to affect the development of the backward regions.

Therefore, the conclusion to be drawn, is that there is reason to expect that the flow of factors and resources, from the Region, will continue under present circumstances and may well increase in the future, so that the regional problem, the problem of regional inequalities and regional backwardness in Turkey, will become more acute and more difficult to remedy.

A NEW APPROACH

It must be remembered that the experience of Turkey itself, at the start of her efforts at industrialisation and development, had convinced power-holders at the centre, that the "certain indirect measures" adopted (only on a larger scale and more generous then than now), to encourage the private sector to initiate (and sustain), the industrialisation of the country, did not succeed, because these measures could not bring about the results desired from them. Therefore, the State undertook direct measures to industrialise the country. The totality of these measures has been called "étatism", as mentioned above.

There is no reason to believe that what the private sector of the country could not accomplish, with more generous and extensive concessions and protection from the State and under relatively much more favourable conditions, the private sector can now accomplish in the Region. On the contrary, the odds against the Region's private sector are more formidable than those facing the private sector of the country in the 1920s and 1930s. This is so because the Region is an open subsystem in a (semi-)closed system; because the Region cannot be afforded protection from the rest of the country; and because the flow of its resources to the centre(s) of expansion in the country, face very few barriers.

Therefore, what is needed, if the centre really aims at the elimination of regional imbalance and the acceleration of the development of the backward regions, is, in addition to these "certain indirect measures", a new étatism; an étatism on a regional scale. What this means is that the state must directly interfere with the forces (of the

market) which cause the flow of resources out of the Region on terms unfavourable and detrimental to the Region's development and to allow the Region decision-making powers on regional questions. This will require the following measures:

(1) Scaling down (or at least regulating) the size of the flow of human and natural resources out of the Region.

(2) Investing the income, or at least a substantial part of it, accruing from the production and export of raw materials and other primary products from the Region, in the Region itself.

(3) The concentration of investment on industrialisation and expansion of education in the Region, for the crucial role they both play in the development process.

(4) Allowing for regional decision-making power in questions related to the Region; autonomy is the first step in this direction. As stated above, regional planning without regional decision-making power (or autonomy) is meaningless.

(5) Taking into account both economic and social considerations in the allocation of investment funds; regional efficiency and the elimination of regional inequalities must be the criteria, on the basis of which projects are to be located (efficiency = value added/inputs), instead of basing them on the present system of indexing, derived from actually existing economic activities and services in the regions, which favours the relatively more developed ones.

(6) The fact that the Region is inhabited by a nationality, different from the rest of the country's population, ought not to be taken into account, by the centre, as a factor influencing the location of development projects, as the case seems to be at present.

In concluding the analysis, it seems only appropriate to quote Robinson again. Robinson forcefully suggests that "One might have thought that the eastern wilderness [the Region] woud have been considered a frontier and would have drawn many of the more dynamic elements of the Turkish population, in search of fortune, fame, and adventure. As a matter of fact, the reverse was the case . . . all along, one heard a great deal in Turkey, about the development of the eastern provinces, for the unevenness of the nation's development was — and is — of critical importance in that much of its unexploited natural wealth — water, minerals, and land — doubtlessly lies in those highlands". (Robinson, 1963, 119—120).

If the Region has been so critically important for the country's development, because of its "unexploited natural wealth", why has it been neglected for so long and used only as a source supplying the centre(s) of expansion with some resources for their own (the centres') development? The answer can be found in the following quotation: "For the Turkish community-at-large, the social scale has two dimensions; the Kurds are near the top of one and the bottom of the other. When evaluated by Western-inspired criteria, as is often the case in Turkey, the Kurds are perceived as illmannered, rude, backward illiterates; they are placed . . . on the bottom of the social ladder. When the Turks seek a source of unique self-identity, however, they point to the romanticised image of the noble, manly, dedicated warriors, their own and the Kurds. Thus, the Kurds stand near the top. On the one hand, the Kurds are romantically admired; on the other, they suffer many social disabilities and are often viewed with cautious suspicion". *(Area Handbook, 1970, 80)*. It is this "cautious suspicion" which the centre harbours, that accounts for the exclusion of the Region from the centre's development schemes and projects, unless it (the centre) is compelled, by sheer necessity,

to locate industrial or other projects in the Region.[105])

Under the combination of "cautious suspicion" and "social disabilities", and extreme, antisocial, isolationist, conservative and racist regime, and lack of decision-making power, in addition to under-underdevelopment being powerfully interlocked, and generating itself over and over again, the spiral generated, by one of the above-mentioned factors and reinforced by the others, is very hard to break. In a cumulative process this has led, and still leads, to the persistence of underdevelopment in the Region and development at the centre(s) of expansion, at the expense of the Region.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FROM WITHIN

Is it feasible that the Region could be developed, under present conditions, by efforts exerted in the Region itself alone?

Before answering this question, the following observations should be remembered: first, the SPO, the agency at the centre, responsible for preparing and executing "economic, social and cultural development" plans, in the whole country, had no place in its organisational set-up for regional development, nor was this considered a fundamental aspect of its activities; second, incomes accruing from the flow of the Region's human and natural resources, such as chrome, copper, lead and zinc, petroleum and electric power are controlled and mostly retained at the centre, through or by, the following state agencies: the General Directorate of Etibank, the General Directorate of Turkish Petroleum Corp., and the General Directorate of the Turkish Electricity Board (in addition to the non-resident private sector and foreign companies); and, third, agricultural income in the Region has been, on the average, half of its counterpart in the country as a whole, and the value added, per worker in agriculture, in 1971, averaged only one fifth the average value added, in the other sectors of the country's economy.

Bearing these observations in mind, one can now proceed to answer the above-mentioned question.

Turkey is divided into provinces, which are in turn subdivided into districts (there are 14 provinces and 111 districts in the Region).

The highest authority in a province is the governor, who is appointed by the President of the Republic, upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior. Besides being the representative of the central government in the province, the governor presides over a local body, which is mainly concerned with trade and industrial matters and which is made up of a provincial assembly and a number of service departments in the province. It is the governor who assembles provincial requests for administrative and development funds and forwards them, after having compiled them into the form of a provincial budget, to Ankara for approval. (*Area Handbook*, 1970, 193).

Therefore, it may be expected that the governor might be able to perform a co-

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105) This "cautious suspicion" has been accentuated by the nature of the political structure in the country. As Karpat, a Turkish political scientist, suggests, "the extremely egocentric, isolationist wing of the nationalist movement, advocating a conservative, anti-social elitist nationalism, prevailed in Turkey until the end of World War II ... This extreme antisocial nationalism, which had strong traces of racism, survived well into the 1950s ... Meanwhile, social tensions rose steadily because of uneven economic development and inequitable distribution of national income. Consequently, the Democratic Party government [1950—1960] indiscriminately supported all rightist currents appearing under the name of nationalism and used them to silence groups clamoring for social justice. Many of the "nationalist" publications were subsidised from secret State funds ... After a few months [of the May 1960 coup d'état] of uneasy silence, however, the extreme nationalist and racist groups attempted to resume their activities, apparently encouraged by a group of officers in the ruling junta ..." (Karpat, 1968, 361). The solution these "nationalists" suggest for the Region's problems and its population is simply that the Kurds should go away from Turkey because Turkey is the country of Turks only. (Otüken magazine, No. 40, April 1967; quoted in Vanly, 1971, 43—44).

ordinating function on the provincial level. But in fact, this is only apparent. As Rivkin points out, "In practice, however, exercise of a co-ordinative function, by the governor, is next to impossible". The fundamental difficulty involved is that while the governor presents the province's budget as a "package", the Minister of the Interior in Ankara, does not deal with it as such, but sends each section of it to the particular agency or ministry concerned, on a sectoral basis. Thus, what was a package, that might have been related in its component parts, typically becomes (completely) unrelated when it returns to the province from Ankara. In other words, the centre typically performs a dis-co-ordinating function as far as the provinces are concerned. (Rivkin, 1965, 136–137).

Further, provincial governors in Turkey, "are trained to carry out directives sent down from above, and they rarely act as co-ordinators of economic and social growth", Rivkin suggests.[106]) (Rivkin, 1965, 137).

Furthermore, very little scope for initiative-taking is allowed in the provinces, by the centre. This is more evident in provinces spatially remote from Ankara, the capital of the country. Even minor decisions in the provinces suffer delay, awaiting advice or orders from the centre. As the *Area Handbook* maintains, "Difficulties in communications and co-ordination among ministers [concerning provincial matters] may lead to misunderstanding and confusion, as requests and orders go up and down channels". (*Area Handbook*, 1970, 192).

Bureaucratic rigidity, over-centralisation, lack of provincial decision-making power, and very weak and dependent private sector, and being an un-protected, open sub-system make the question of development from within, and by the Region itself alone, extremely difficult and next to impossible.

LOCATION QUOTIENTS, LOCALISATION CURVES AND REGIONAL INEQUALITIES

In this section an attempt is made to calculate the location quotients of a number of large manufacturing establishments in 4 areas: two regions (the Region and the Aegean) and two provinces (Istanbul and Ankara), using the population of the respective areas as the basis for calculation; in these calculations, the method used is the one suggested by Isard (Isard, 1960, 123–6 and 255–8).

The procedure followed in calculating the location quotients is:

(1) the proportion of the number of employees, in a given industry in the respective area, to total number of employees in that industry, in the whole country;
(2) the proportion of the respective area's population to the total population in the country, is calculated (this represents the base for calculating the location quotient); and
(3) the former proportion is divided by the latter one.

In other words, if:

the number of employees in the respective area in industry X = a

the number of employees in the whole country in industry X = b

the proportion of the respective area's population to total population in the country = c

the location quotient = $\frac{a/b}{c}$

The location quotient has a magnitude of 1, when the distribution of the given industry is completely equal, population being the base for calculation; if it is less than unity, this would mean that the respective area has less than its "fair" share of that industry, and if it is more than unity, this would

106) Furthermore, the Region suffers the fate of all colonial areas, namely, that it tends to become a dumping ground for the misfits and the failures; the ambitious career-makers would prefer to stay at or near the center of power (in the capital city).

indicate that it has more than its "fair" share.

Population is here used as base, because it serves the interest of this study in welfare conditions and criteria, and because it indicates per capita distributions.

The location quotients of all industrial establishments, except those of petroleum and basic metal (both primary products), are lower in the Region than the other areas covered and are much less than unity (or 1). This implies that the Region has a low share in the large industrial establishments of the country, as measured on the basis of the Region's population proportion, in the total population of the country.

The localisation curves are plotted by:

(1) ranking areas according to their location quotients; and

(2) plotting these areas by rank, on a cumulative basis.

The localisation curves measure area (or regional) concentration of industries compared to the base magnitude, the population of each respective area. The farther away the curve is from the 90° diagonal line, the more concentrated an industry is, or, in other words, the more unequal the distribution is.

The localisation curves show that there is large spatial concentration of industry, in both the provinces of Istanbul and Ankara and the Aegean Region. Concentration in the province of Istanbul, can be explained by the "historical accident", that industries have historically (since the beginning of the Ottoman Empire) been located there. As for the province of Ankara, concentration is due to the central government's policy of location since the start of the Republican regime. As for the Aegean Region, concentration can be accounted for by both the "historical accident" and the central government economic and location policy, or "locational preference".

The data compiled in Table 18, should be considered in the light of the fact, that they are not complete, due to what the SIS calls "confidentiality". Thus, they ought to be viewed as rough indicators and not precise figures. In Table 19 the location quotients of the above-mentioned areas are calculated.

Table 18. Employment in LME in certain Areas of Turkey, Nov. 1, 1963[1])

LME	THE AREAS					
	The Region	Aegean Region	Istanbul Province	Ankara Province	Rest of Country	Total in Country
1. Food	2128	13523	10087	4618	35273	65629
2. Beverage	261	575	2204	847	728	4615
3. Tobacco	143	3655	5477	—	7489	16764
4. Textile	1055	22885	31971	—	48827	104738
5. Chemical	27	1343	7694	1471	3990	14525
6. Petroleum	372	—	—	22	1428	1844
7. Non-metallic Minerals	306	1283	9192	653	8854	20288
8. Basic Metals	1962	—	2042	1742	7212	12958
9. Metal Products	5	312	10815	8660	1720	21512
10. Transport Equipment	54	575	6094	1078	9769	17570

[1]) Compiled from SIS, 1964, 919—954

Table 19. Location Quotients of Certain Areas in Turkey Using Population as Base

LME	The Region (A)		Aegean Region (B)		Istanbul Province (C)		Ankara Province (D)		Rest of Country (E)	
1. Food	3.24 / 11.8	0.3	20.6 / 12.4	1.7	15.4 / 5.2	3.0	7.0 / 7.3	1.0	53.76 / 63.3	0.8
2. Beverage	5.66 / 11.8	0.5	12.46 / 12.4	1.0	47.8 / 5.2	9.2	18.4 / 7.3	2.5	15.68 / 63.3	0.2
3. Tobacco	0.85 / 11.8	0.07	21.8 / 12.4	1.8	32.7 / 5.2	6.3	-	-	44.65 / 63.3	0.7
4. Textile	1.0 / 11.8	0.08	21.86 / 12.4	1.8	30.54 / 5.2	6.0	-	-	46.60 / 63.3	0.7
5. Chemical	0.2 / 11.8	0.02	9.3 / 12.4	0.8	53.0 / 5.2	10.2	10.1 / 7.3	1.4	27.40 / 63.3	0.4
6. Petroleum	20.2 / 11.8	1.7	-	-	-	-	2.2 / 7.3	0.2	77.60 / 63.3	1.2
7. Non-metallic minerals	1.5 / 11.8	0.1	6.32 / 12.4	0.5	45.3 / 5.2	8.7	3.2 / 7.3	0.4	43.68 / 63.3	0.7
8. Basic metals	15.1 / 11.8	1.3	-	-	15.7 / 5.2	3.0	13.4 / 7.3	1.8	55.80 / 63.3	0.9
9. Metal products	0.02 / 11.8	0.002	1.45 / 12.4	0.1	50.3 / 5.2	9.7	40.3 / 7.3	5.5	7.93 / 63.3	0.1
10. Transport equipment	0.3 / 11.8	0.03	3.3 / 12.4	0.3	34.7 / 5.2	6.7	6.2 / 7.3	0.9	53.50 / 63.3	0.9

Next, the data calculated in Table 19 are plotted on Diagrams 3, 4 and 5 (using the Lorenz curve) to produce the localisation curves.

Inequality in the spatial distribution of large manufacturing establishments, is reflected in both the table and the diagrams mentioned above. The table also shows that there is great industrial concentration in the province of Istanbul, which accounts, in terms of employment, for about half the LME in beverage, chemicals, non-metallic minerals, and metal products in the country, and about a third of tobacco, textile, and transport equipment as well.




Diagram 3. Localisation curves for food, beverage, tobacco and textile LME, population being base.

The concentration of large manufacturing establishments, in the province (or rather mostly in and around the city) of Istanbul, has caused acute problems for the province itself and for the country as a whole (Istanbul has the metropolitan area type of regional problems of national importance). The city's metropolitan problems are dealt with and alleviated, through funds diverted from other parts of the country, or borrowed from abroad, since the city budget has been experiencing a chronic deficit.[107]) The problems of Metropolitan Istanbul are the result of the recent and past policies of industrial concentration, by the state and the unregulated private sector.[108])

The consequences of the concentration of industry, other economic activities and population, in addition to urban services, amenities and cultural activities, have far reaching effects on the Region, through the backwash effects this concentration and expansion have been generating. Investment funds have been (and still are being) diverted toward the further development of the Istanbul area and/

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107) Istanbul Metropolitan Area has the following features (most of them are agglomeration economies and diseconomies): Between 1950 and 1968 the number of its industrial establishments has tripled (from 470 to 1450) and the urbanised area doubled; about 40-50% of import-export trade and 70 % of "national" imports were accounted for by the Area; it accounts for 50 % of all tourists in Turkey; its share in Turkey's GNP in 1968 was estimated at 20 % and growing at an annual rate of about 11 %; annual growth rate of the industrial sector was about 7.4 % between 1960—1965; about 15 %of total value added to GNP and 25 % of value added by industry, were accounted for by the Area; between 1960 and 1965 the city generated about 21 % of all new jobs in Turkey, 80 % of them in manufacturing and commerce. The Area's population was 2,793,000, or about 8 % of the total in the country, in 1970.

The Area's acute problems resulting from the concentration of industry and population are: water supply (being the most acute); water contamination, both surface and ground waters used for drinking and hygienic purposes, is so wide-spread that it caused the outbreak of cholera in 1971 in the Area: sewers are lacking, particularly in low-income areas; solid waste disposal is inadequate; power networks and electric power are insufficient; urban transport services are choked; unauthorised squatter settlements (gecekondu) are mushrooming all over the Metropoliton Area, occupying about half of the built-up area of the Area and housing between 35 % and 40 % of the total population of the Area. (Confidential Report II, 1972).


108) In the words of the Confidential Report II, "Past lending operations in the [Istanbul Metropolitan] Area have been primarily for the development of private industry, financed through the Turkish Industrial Development Bank (TSKB). Since 1950, the Bank/IDA has helped to finance nine such projects, totalling about $ 128.00 million. It is hoped that the project [Istanbul Urban Development Project I] will prepare urban development projects suitable for future Bank/IDA financing". (Confidential Report II, 1972).

The Istanbul Urban Development Project and others related to the Metropolitan Area of Istanbul involve a loan and a credit totalling some $ 40.00 million from the IBRD. (The last sentence of the above quotation indicates that the centre is still pursuing (or unable to change) the same erroneous policy of spatial concentration of industry in the Istanbul Area, a policy, the damaging consequences of which, are just beginning to appear).

or the solution of its problems, caused by the concentration of economic activities and population there, instead of being spent on the development of "backward regions" in the country, among them the Region.

Istanbul attracts a large number of migrants from the Region. It also attracts much of the savings and other resources of the Region, which are invested in its industries, trade, or real estate speculations. These are only examples of the backwash effects generated, as a result of (or the consequences of) the expansionary momentum and agglomeration in Istanbul.


These consequences of concetration at Istanbul, could have been avoided or at least scaled down by locating new industries in other areas of the country, such as the Region. Such a policy of location, would have both helped develop the Region and at the same time, at least reduce, some of the problems the Istanbul Metropolitan Area has been experiencing.



Manufacturing of Chemical and Chemical Products ———————— (CP)
Manufacturing of Non-Metallic Mineral Products (except Products of
Petroleum and Coal) I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I (NMP)
Manufacturing of Products of Petroleum and Coal — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — (P and C)

A = The Region
B = Aegean Region
C = Istanbul Province
D = Ankara Province
E = Rest of Country

Diagram 4. Localisation curves for chemical and chemical products, non-metallic mineral products and products of petroleum and coal, population being base.



Manufacturing of Transport Equipment
I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I (TL)
Manufacturing of Basic Metal Industries
———————— (BM)
Manufacturing of Metal Products (except Machinery and Transport
Equipment) — — — — — — — — — — — — (MP)

A = The Region
B = Aegean Region
C = Istanbul Province
D = Ankara Province
E = Rest of Country

Diagram 5. Localisation curves for metal products, basic metals and transport equipment, population being base.

VI. INEQUALITIES IN THE LEVELS OF LIVING BETWEEN THE REGION AND THE REST OF TURKEY

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter will be analysed the inequalities existing (and the trends that can be deduced from available observations) in the level of living, between the Region and the country as a whole. In other words, the goal aspect of development, discussed above in the theoretical section, will be analysed in terms of general observations, rather than precise data.

The level of living in a country or a region, seems to be a function (or a correlation) of the level of development actually achieved, by that country or region. However, this does not mean that all the elements normally included in the level of living, are linear functions of the level of development; some elements tend to increase initially and then change form, (nutrition becomes patterns of diet), others become less important, relatively, whilst still others more important.

Furthermore, the level of living is simultaneously, both a consequence and a cause of underdevelopment. Poor nutrition, shelter, health and education, are the consequences of underdevelopment, in the sense that the more developed a country becomes, the more these needs are satisfied; at the same time, the non-satisfaction of these needs, holds back the development prosess, as a hungry, exposed, sick and illiterate society, cannot effectively initiate and sustain the development process.[109])

In the following pages, a tentative attempt is made to give a preliminary account, of the various components of the level of living, suggested by Drewnowski, and here amended to include human rights as a separate component. However, some of the indicators of these components will be dealt with quantitatively as well. It will become clear, as the analysis progresses, that these components and indicators are not dealt with in equal length, i.e. some will be treated in more detail than others. This is due basically to the fact that, detailed data and information on particular components and indicators has been hard to come by. In addition, certain components and/or indicators, are deemed more vital for the development process in the Region at present, than others, and thus they receive relatively more attention.

HUMAN NEEDS

These are needs, the satisfaction of which, is deemed vital for the maintenance of society and its individual members, such as nutrition, shelter and health, and for the development of society, such as education.

NUTRITION

This component, as suggested by Drewnowski, is made up of three indicators: calorie intake, protein intake and percentage of non-starchy calories. However, this component is treated here, without going into detailed and quantitative analysis of its various indicators because data have been hard to come by. Nevertheless, a tentative, general and brief

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109) This statement might be criticised on the basis that underdevelopment is caused basically by external factors, i.e. by colonialism, dependence and the attachment of the underdeveloped regions, to the world markets. It can be pointed out that once colonialism is abolished and the underdeveloped countries become politically independent, the functioning of the external factors becomes largely dependent on internal factors; the external factores cannot continue to function, unless internal factors and conditions are such. that they allow the external factors to function and that they render the country an object of these external factors. Indeed, Myrdal makes a similar point, when he states that "Basically, the weak spread effects, as between countries, are thus, for the large part, only a reflection of the weak spread effects, within the underdeveloped countries themselves, caused by their low level of development attained". (Myrdal, 1969, 55).

account, may suffice to indicate the state and trends of nutrition, among the population of the Region.

The main source of diet, of the population of the Region, consists of cereal grains (predominantly wheat and barley) in the form of bread or "burgul", a substitute for rice. In addition, and particularly among the pastoral communities, dairy products, such as milk, yoghurt, white cheese and butter, supplement the main diet. As for meat, an important source of protein and other elements, it "is scarce during the year and is normally considered a luxury". (*Area Handbook*, 1970. 115). Vegetable and fruit consumption is low, as indicated by the area sown and allocated for these products. Therefore, it may be said, that the diet of the Region's population is inadequate and not balanced.

However, the diet of the population becomes poorer, the farther afield from "urban" centres, the population lives. In other words, inequalities in the diet are observable, both among various social and income groups and among different areas of the Region. The population inhabiting remote mountainous areas are worse-off, than others living in the "urban" centres, or rural areas, in their vicinity. They live largely on yoghurt and black barley bread. They sometimes go for days without food. (Kinross, 1954, 92).[110])

Since the diet of the population of the Region, is primarily dependent on the Region's agriculture and livestock, and since both are in turn underdeveloped, as observed above, this diet will continue to be inadequate and imbalanced, as long as the Region's agriculture and livestock remain in their present state.

110) Kinross further mentions that he had been informed that some of the transhumant communities of eastern Van, have actually had to eat grass, because of lack of food for a prolonged period of time. (Kinross, 1954, 92).

SHELTER

In the Region (as in the rest of Kurdistan) there are found three forms of dwelling, one transportable, the other two fixed. The former is the black tent of the transhumants (and nomads), usually made of goat's hair. The latter two forms are, the leaf hut, constructed and used for a single summer, and the permanent house built of various materials. In the rural areas, among the settled, transhumant and nomadic communities, it is common practice, that domestic animals belonging to the occupant of the dwelling unit, are allotted a certain space within the unit, either by dividing the unit into two parts, one for the household and the other for the animals, or otherwise the bottom floor is allotted to the livestock and the upper floor is reserved for the use of the family, if the unit happens to be two-floored. (Alamdar, 1970, pages without numbers). This is a practical and economical practice, but is hazardous to the health of the occupants of the dwelling unit.

In Turkey, average occupancy per room, in towns, exceeds 2 persons and in villages, 3 persons (the averages concealing wide-range variations), and most probably more in the Region, because of the factors mentioned under the "Building Industry".

About one third of housing units in Turkey, in towns, is leased and the other two thirds are occupied by their owners. (SPO, 1963, 385).

The black tent in particular, and most of the fixed housing units, do not offer enough protection from the severe cold and snow of winter (it should be remembered that the temperature drops to as low as minus 42° centigrade in winter); many of the fixed dwelling units and the tents lack basic amenities, such as running water, electricity, sanitational and hygienic requirements (such as lavatories, baths, and sewers). To cope with the severe winter conditions, dwellings are usually built with small and few windows.

According to Adams, 56 % of Turkey's urban dwelling units, had inside or outside

water supply in 1960, as compared with only 2.2 % of dwellings in rural areas, in 1963 (Adams, 1971, 10). But the SPO gives somewhat different figures, on villages and parishes with water supply, at approximately the same time period, as can be seen in Table 20, which shows that 41 % of these villages and parishes, were supplied with water. (It should be observed that the former figures, pertain to "dwelling units", whilst the latter to "villages and parishes").

centre(s) of expansion in the country, and reluctance on the part of the State to change the situation.

HEALTH SERVICES

Although many diseases are common in the Region; one fifth of live births die within one year of their birth; 2.5 % of the population suffer from tuberculosis, trachoma and measles (the latter two being widespread and tending to become epidemic among vil-

Table 20. Number of Villages and Parishes in Turkey with and without Water Supply at the Beginning of the 1960s[1])

Area	No. of Villages & Parishes	Number of Villages and Parishes: (a) With Water	(b) Without Water	Per Cent of (4) to (2)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Rest of Country	48,060	23,540	24,520	50
12 Provinces in the Region	11,372	4,653	6,719	59

[1]) SPO, 1963, 369 (figures on Region exclude Agri and Erzincan but include Malatya).

In 1960, some 2.4 % of dwelling units in the rural areas of the country had electricity, whereas 85.3 % of dwelling units in the urban areas had electric power (Adams, 1971, 10.[111]) However, the use of electric power for domestic consumption is very unequal between the Region and other areas of the country, as Table 5 of this study clearly shows.

The shelter component, of the level of living in the Region, further indication, to the low level of development it has achieved; the vast inequalities between the Region and the other areas of Turkey, in the supply of services for dwellings, are both a reflection of the "disfavoured" position the Region has at the centre, and a result of unequal levels of development in the various areas of the country.

These inequalities are caused by both the flow of the Region's resources (sources of power, savings, entrepreneurs, etc) and the underdevelopment of its building industry, as seen above. The low level of development of this industry in the Region, is caused by the backwash effects emanating from the lage children); more than half of the villages and small towns have no, or inadequate running (drinking) water; and the diet is poor and imbalanced; the Region is very poor in health services per capita and in comparison with the rest of the country; these services are, further, concentrated in big towns, usually the provincial seats, the rural areas and communities being left to the mercy of their devices; and they are, furthermore, wasteful.

The central government is obliged, by the constitution of the country, to improve health conditions all over the country without favouratism or discrimination; within the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, responsible for providing health services, a General Directorate of Health and Social Welfare, is the agency responsible for planning and operating health services and implementing this obligation. Though "the Directorate has a Director of Health Services in each province with regional responsibilities . . . many of the Directorate's functions are highly

[111]) See footnote 86 for further information on this point.

concentrated", states the Area Handbook. (*Area Handbook*, 1970, 112).

The lack of health services in the Region and the inequalities in the provision of these services, between the Region and the rest of the country, can be seen in Table 21.

Most of these health services are concentrated in the big cities of the Region. For example, the rural areas, where three fourths of the Region's population live, are served by less than one fifth of available physicians. Dentists and hospital services are even more concentrated.[112])

The distribution of health services in the country and within the Region is very unequal. In 1955, for example, four provinces in the Region had no specialist physician and two provinces had one each. In the same year, five provinces had no dentist, one province one, and two had two each. In 1965, two provinces were still without specialist physicians, two provinces without dentists and three had one each. (SIS, 1960—62 and 1968A).

Table 22 indicates that, in addition to existing inequalities between the Region and the rest of the country, the actual number of physicians in some provinces of the Region, on which data was possible to come by, had a declining trend between 1953 and 1959, whereas their number has substantially increased in other areas of the country, where these services were already much more available than in the Region.

Table 21. Number of Inhabitants per "Unit" of Health Services in The Region and Country in 1965[1])

Area	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)[2]	(7)	(8)	(9)
Region	6667	100000	10000	6667	6250	1200	100000	500000	500000
Country	2680	16667	6667	7143	6667	600	20000	125000	333333

[1]) Compiled from SIS, 1968 A, 69—95

[2]) According to the SPO, "30 % of existing beds cannot be utilised, for various reasons, and full use is not made of the rest." (SPO, 1963, 361)

(1) physician
(2) dentist
(3) nurse
(4) midwife
(5) health official
(6) hospital bed
(7) pharmacy
(8) health centre
(9) infirmary

Much waste has resulted from the present organisation of health services in the country and Region. This is due to fragmentation in organisation and lack of co-ordination and co-operation, among the various organisations responsible for offering health services. (SPO, 1963, 361).

112) It has become fashionable among some Turkish writers and foreigners writing on Turkey, to attribute the causes of the existence of almost any social problem, be it economic, sociological, political, cultural or even technical, to religion, directly or indirectly, with or without justification. Even though the influence of religion in society is not denied, the attribution of the causes of any and every social dilemma to religion seems to function like a "smoke screen", to disguise the real causes giving rise to these problems, and as an indirect justification for the centre's short comings and failure to carry out its proclaimed objectives. **The Area Handbook** is an example; in discussing health services in Turkey, it begins with an attempt to persuade the reader, that people in Turkey have not accepted modern medicine, because of religious influences, but at the end of the same paragraph, it admits that "even more remote villages in the late 1960s were receptive to mass immunisation or village sanitation programs and **sought** modern medical aid, **if available**, in the event of sickness". **(Area Handbook**, 1970, 112; emphasis added). The key words in the above statement are "if available". Of course, if they are not available, at a convenient proximity, no-one will seek them. It is only surprising to maintain, that the population is averse to modern medicine when it is not available within an economically and geographically feasible proximity.

Table 22. Number of Physicians in some Provinces of Turkey in 1953 and 1959

Provinces Outside the Region	1953	1959	Provinces in the Region	1953	1959
Ankara	593	1048	Bitlis	21	14
Izmir	429	670	Agri	18	16
Adana	150	205	Bingöl	14	12
Eskisehir	100	121	Mus	13	11
Isparta	30	43	Hakkari	10	7

Another example of the extent to which the Region has been disfavoured, is the number of hospital beds per 10,000 inhabitants, in the country, as reflected in Table 23. Table 24 supplements Table 23 by indicating the number of additional beds, for every increase of 10,000 in the population, between 1950 and 1959. Again inequalities between the Region and the rest of the country are indeed vast, and the trend was towards vaster inequalities.

Table 23. Number of Hospital Beds per 10,000 Inhabitants in some Provinces of Turkey and the Region in 1959

Provinces Outside the Region	Number	Provinces in the Region	Number
Isparta	40.7	Bitlis	6.5
Ankara	33.7	Mus	5.9
Izmir	27.2	Agri	3.9
Eskisehir	22.7	Hakkari	2.9

The increasing inequalities in health services, between the Region and the rest of the country, can also be observed in the number of physicians, dentists, nurses and pharmacies between 1955 and 1967, as Table 25 illustrates.[113])

Table 24. Number of Additional Beds in Provincial Hospitals for Every Increase of 10,000 in the Population During the 1950—1959 Period in some Provinces of Turkey and the Region[1])

Provinces Outside the Region	Number	Provinces in the Region	Number
Isparta	165.0	Mus	15.1
Ankara	62.7	Hakkari	8.6
Izmir	60.5	Bitlis	8.5
Eskisehir	31.4	Agri	5.9

[1]) Tables 22, 23, and 24 are from SPO, 1963, 50 and 51.

[113]) However, inequalities in the number of hospital beds had been diminishing between 1960 and 1967, although the inequality is still very vast, the number of hospital beds per 10,000 people being 8.4 in the Region and 16.7 in the rest of the country.

Table 25. Size of Inequalities (Gap) in Health Services per 100,000 Population between the Region and the Rest of Turkey, 1955–1967[1])

Year	Physicians	Dentists	Nurses	Pharmacies
1955	20	3	5	3
1960	27	5	8	4
1965	22	6	5	4
1967	23	6	6	5

[1]) SIS 1960–1962 and 1968 A

It is noteworthy, that Table 25 indicates, that the size of inequalities in 1967 is wider than that in 1955, despite the fact that the SPO's First Five Year Development Plan, has resolved to bring about a more equitable distribution of services, provided by the State, in order to achieve justice and equality between social groups and regions; the Plan covered the 1963–1967 period. This general trend towards increasing inequalities, between the Region and the rest of the country, is only a confirmation of basically the same trends in the other components of the level of living.

However, the health services available in the Region, are very unevenly spatially distributed, as well as differentially obtainable by various income and social groups. The uneven spatial distribution of some of the health services in the Region, can be clearly seen in Table 26. With the exception of the province of Elazig's Hospital Beds, no province in the Region approached the "national" level of the health services, mentioned in the Table; they are all substantially below that level.

EDUCATION

Here, a number of indicators will be analysed. Additionally, the problem of language will be indicated.

ILLITERACY

A high rate of illiteracy characterises the Region in the field of education; it is particularly widespread among the rural population. Among the Region's population 6 years old and over, the female population, particularly in the countryside, is the most illiterate, the rate being 93 % in 1965 (one province having as high a rate as 99 %, three provinces 97 % each, and four 96 % each). Urban female population is slightly better-off than its counterpart, in the rural areas, though it has a rate of illiteracy of 72 % (one province having 97 %). The male population, in both the rural and urban areas is more literate than the female. Table 27 indicates the rate of literacy in the Region, in the Aegean region, in the western part of the country, and in the country as a whole; the table illustrates, how wide inequalities are, between the

Table 26. Number of Population per Health Service "Unit" in 1965 in the Provinces of the Region and in Turkey[1])

Provinces	Physicians	Dentists	Hospital Beds	Pharmacies
Adiyaman	19,092	nil	2,703	133,644
Agri	4,186	49,392	1,887	123,481
Bingöl	9,408	75,261	1,667	150,521
Bitlis	57,502	154,069	2,041	154,069
Diyarbakir	4,033	47,592	775	52,880
Elazig	6,206	29,339	251	46,104
Erzincan	4,458	64,647	1,099	86,195
Hakkari	6,995	83,937	2,778	nil
Mardin	9,253	79,576	3,030	99,470
Mus	5,678	99,358	1,667	198,716
Siirt	8,276	264,832	2,128	88,277
Tunceli	11,012	nil	2,041	nil
Urfa	8,669	112,700	1,389	75,133
Van	5,035	66,710	1,667	133,420
Region	6,667	100,000	1,200	100,000
Turkey	2,680	16,667	600	20,000

[1]) Compiled from SIS, 1968 A, 69–95
"nil" refers to the fact that the service is not available.

Region and other areas of Turkey; the size of inequality in literacy, among the male population of the Region, and the country, is more than 50 %, and among the female population over 300 %.[114])

Table 27. Rate of Literacy in the Region, Aegean and Turkey in 1965[1])

Area	Village Population		City Population		Total Population	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
The Region	31	7	66	28	41	11
Aegean Region	63	34	74	67	69	43
Turkey	55	23	79	52	64	37

[1]) Compiled from SIS, 1965, 270—281

Since the beginning of the Republican Regime in Turkey, the rate of illiteracy has had a declining trend, both in the Region and the rest of the country. However, the size of inequality between the Region's rate of illiteracy and the "national" rate has more than doubled since then, even though some irregularity in the size of the inequality is observable. The rate of literacy was 10 % (or 10.5 %) in Turkey in 1927. Assuming, for the sake of illustration, that the rate in the Region was then 0 %, the size of inequality can be said to have been 10—10.5 percentage points, at that time. The degree of inequality increased to 26 percentage points in 1950, 20 percentage points in 1960 and 22 percentage points in 1965. In other words, the relative position of the Region, has actually deteriorated between the two dates.[115]) In addition, the actual number of illiterate people in the Region, has been steadily increasing despite the increase in the rate of literacy; it was 1,984,896 in 1950, 2,590,823 in 1960, and 2,703,456 in 1965. These figures indicate that the increase in the rate of literacy, has not kept pace with the rate of increase of the Region's population. Table 28 shows the various rates of literacy in the Region and in Turkey, and the degree of the inequality between the two areas in the period between 1927 and 1965.

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[114]) As the **Area Handbook** points out, "Urban dwellers are more literate than rural, and the degree of literacy increases from east to west... Literacy is determined from answers given when someone is asked if he can read and write, so the above statistics may be considered inflated. The level of education completed might be a better indication of the actual literacy level in the country..." (**Area Handbook,** 1970, 128). Following this suggestion, the degree of "inflatedness" in the Region is about 50 %, as Table 34 indicates).

[115]) The increase, in the rate of literacy in the Region, after 1950, was due to changes in the tactics used by the Turkish government, as a result of changes in the political party in power. Prior to 1950, the belief among the rulers of Turkey had been that the most effective method of controlling (and assimilating) the Kurds, was to keep them illiterate. But the new political party, assuming power in 1950, adopted a somewhat different approach to achieve the same strategic objective, namely the Turkification of the Kurdish people in Turkey; "the Democratic Party strove for co-operation and gradual assimilation of the Kurds, primarily through Turkish-language training in the schools. This [is a] change in government policy...", maintains the **Area Handbook.** (**Area Handbook,** 1970, 76—77). The change in policy, can be better appreciated when considering the position of minorities in Turkey in general. As Van Nieuwenhuijze puts it, "From minorities in the Middle East sense (permanently distinct components of a multiverse), they become minorities in the modern European and North-American sense (special groups whose adjustment to overall society is incomplete and whose participation is therefore, as yet, problematic in a number of ways)". This change was the result of the change from the Ottoman Empire, being viewed as the land of Muslims inhabited by numerous millets, to Turkey becoming the habitat of one Turkish nation, as imagined by Turkish rulers. "This change of status was by no means a boon for those

Table 28. Rates of Literacy in the Region and Turkey 1927—1965 in Per Cents

Area	1927[1]	1950[2]	1960[3]	1965[4]
Region	n.a	8.7	19.2	26.8
Turkey	10 or 10.5	34.6	39.6	48.8
Degree of Inequality	10 or 10.5	25.9	20.4	22.0

[1]) Rivkin, 1965, 61 (10 %), Area Handbook, 1970, 127 (10.5 %)
[2]) Sir R. Bullard, 1958, 491
[3]) SIS, 1968 A, 40—41
[4]) Ibid., 42—43

SCHOOL ENROLMENT

It is not only that the rate of literacy is much lower in the Region, than in the rest of the country, but also that the proportion of school-age population attending schools, is much lower in the former than in the latter; this situation will tend to keep inequalities vast and reflects the fact that little is being done by the central Government, responsible by law for providing education, to improve

concerned. Under the pressure of the moment, they [the minorities] faced an ominous choice, that was bound to leave them as losers (by traditional standards) either way: **adjust or be eliminated.** This formula was not altogether new [in Republican Turkey]. It had previously been applied to the Armenians [who were practically eliminated from Turkey]. Its application caused an upheaval ... amongst the Kurds ... Statistically disguised as mountain Turks for years, the Kurds in Turkey remain under constant pressure to adjust". (Van Nieuwenhuijze, 1971, 346). However, the prospect of the second "choice", i.e. elimination, is not altogether remote. The President of the Republic of Turkey's interview with the Swedish daily (Dagens Nyheter, Nov. 11, 1960) was referred to above. It is interesting that the President speaks of "their towns and villages", "they" and "their country", as though he were referring to a foreign people and not to one that is supposed to constitute part of the people of the country. And here lies the irony and dilemma of the Turkish official stance towards the Kurds. Since the Kurds do not (for the Turkish rulers) exist in Turkey (they are "mountain Turks" now and not "they") and since Turkey is wished to be seen as a uninational state, despite hard facts, it follows that every Kurd speaks and understands Turkish; therefore, instrucation in schools in the Region is in Turkish, not in Kurdish, the language spoken as mother tongue (according to the Turkish official Statistical Yearbooks and Censuses of Population) by 1,850,000 inhabitants of the Region in 1960. This dissonance between the language of instruction, and the language spoken by the population of the Region, constitutes a formidable impediment to the spread of education in the Region, and consequently adversely affects the development process there. What the centre seems to be attempting o achieve, is not education and development, but rather assimilation. A six-year-old child who speaks only Kurdish, is faced, together with its parents, with a difficult choice (if there is a choice at all): either education accompanied by assimilation and ethnic alienation (ethnocide) or no education at all. (It is noteworthy in the present context to remember that education in Turkey has been, by law, compulsory since 1924). The consequences of this dissonance, between the language of the community and of schooling, had been observed earlier. Kinross, for example, contends that "education has now reached Hakkari itself, since the policy of the Turks, is no longer to suppress, but to civilise these unruly highland clansmen. But as few of the teachers spoke Kurdish and few of the pupils spoke Turkish, its progress was slow". (Kinross, 1954, 126). The statement should be corrected in that even if teachers could speak Kurdish they were not allowed, and are not now, to instruct in that language). The same situation prevailed in the rest of the Region. Kinross mentions another example of the problem. In Van, as he relates, where "the people, he [a teacher] said, were all Kurds, who did not speak Turkish and did not want education [in Turkish]. So of course they remained poor". (Kinross, 1954, 111).

Another problem limiting the spread of education in the Region is the great number of communities that are spatially scattered. In addition to the cities and towns, there were about 11,400 villages and parishes in the Region in 1963 (SPO 1963, 369); the number of primary schools was only 2,980, secondary schools 77, lycee 14 and technical and professional schools, corresponding to secondary school level, 59. Since, as stated previously, the urban areas are in a privileged position, compared with rural areas, it follows that four fifths of the Region's villages and parshes were without primary schools, in 1963; the situation now may not be significantly different. As for lycee schools, there was an average of one in each province in 1963; however, the provinces of Mardin and Van, inhabited by over 664,000 people and having an area of 31,829 km^2 were reported by, SIS 1960—62, to have 1 lycee each, but they were also reported as having neither students nor teachers in those schools. (SIS, 1960—1962, 154—158). The experience of Finland, where communities are spatially spread over a large area, shows, as Prof. Riihinen has pointed out in a discussion, that the spread of communities over a large area, is not a real impediment to the provision and expansion of schools and education in general.

the situation, or to implement the compulsory education law of 1924.[116])

The ratio of pupils attending primary schools, to the primary school-age population was, in 1965, twice as large in the whole country as in the Region, and the ratio at the lower-level secondary schools, about three times as great. These observations are indicated in Table 29 parts A and B. As a further example of low school enrolment in the Region, in comparison with the rest of the country, Table 30 compares the ratio of pupils attending primary schools, per 100 inhabitants, in a number of provinces situated in and outside the Region, on which data were possible to come by.

The ratio of school-age population, to pupils actually attending schools, is equivalent to what Drewnowski calls "school enrolment ratio". The norms suggested by Drewnowski, for the various levels of education, i.e. primary, secondary and tertiary levels, are 80 %, 20 % and 5 % enrolment respectively. It is noteworthy that the actual enrolment ratios, for the elementary school level in Turkey, was in fact 80 %, whereas the ratio in the Region was only half the norm, i.e. 42 %. The secondary school level ratio in the country was again about equal to the norm, being 19.5 %, whilst it was approximately one third of the norm in the Region. (No data were possible to come by on the third ratio).[117])

Table 29. School-age Population and Pupils Actually Attending Schools in the Region and in Turkey 1962—1965

A Area	School-Age Population 7—12 Years Old (1)	Number of pupils Attending Schools (2)	Ratio of (2) to (1) (%) (3)
Region	623800 (1965)[1]	264150 (1962—63)[2]	42
Country	4480000 (1963)	3567000 (1963)	80
B			
Area	School-age Population 13—15 Years Old (4)	Number of pupils Attending Schools (5)	Ratio of (5) to (4) (%) (6)
Region	263900 (1965)[3]	18190 (1962—63)[4]	6.9
Country[5]	1985000 (1963)	378000 (1963)	19.5

[1]Compiled from SIS, 1965, 44—46
[2]Compiled from SIS, 1960—1962, 143—147
[3]Compiled from SIS, 1965, 44—46
[4]Compiled from SIS, 1960—1962, 149—153
[5]SPO, 1963, 404

116) The foundations and framework of the present system of education in Turkey, were laid in 1924. The school system is as follows: primary schooling lasting for five years and by law compulsory for all the population aged 6 to 11 years; secondary schooling, lasting for 6 years and subdivided into orta okul (lower level secondary or secondary) lasting three years, and lise (lycee or upper level secondary) also lasting for 3 years; technical and vocational, teacher-training, university, etc.

117) It should, however, be observed that the age groups belonging to each level, in Turkish publications, and according to Drewnowski, do not coincide. Primary school level population covers those aged 7—12 years in the former, and 5—14 years in the latter, and secondary school level, covering those aged 13—15 years in the former, and 15—19 years in the latter.

Table 30. Number of Pupils Attending Primary Schools in a Number of Provinces in Turkey and Region per 100 Population[1])

Provinces Outside the Region	Number	Provinces in the Region	Number
Isparta	11.5	Bingöl	6.1
Eskisehir	11.5	Bitlis	5.4
Izmir	10.7	Mus	4.7
Adana	10.7	Agri	4.6
Bursa	10.1	Hakkari	1.4

[1]) SPO, 1963, 51 (The source does not provide the year to which the data pertain, but they most probably pertain to the beginning of the 1960s).

Table 31 illustrates the degree of inequality in the distribution of schools and in school enrolment in different areas of the country, the Region being at the bottom.

Table 31. Schools per 1000 Population in the Region and Some Other Areas of Turkey, 1962—1963[1])

	The Region	Aegean Region	Ankara Prov.	Istanbul Prov.
Primary School Students	78	129	134	111
Secondary School Students	6	12	25	28
Lycee School Students	1	4	10	12
Technical and Professional School Students	3	5	8	6

[1]) Compiled from SIS, 1960—1962, 143—168.
No more up-to-date data were possible to come by, because SIS, 1968 A does not give data on schools by provinces.

TEACHER/PUPIL RATIO

The only data on the teacher/pupil ratio that have been possible to come by, pertain to the 1960—61 and 1962—63 school years. Available data pertain, furthermore, to primary, secondary, lycee and vocational school levels, i.e. to the primary and secondary levels only.

Actual ratios for both the Region, and the country as a whole, fall somewhere in between Drewnowski's M point norm and F point norm, but nearer to the former norm for primary school level, and the latter norm for the rest.[118]) This can be observed from the following two tables (32 and 33).

Table 32. Primary School Level Teacher/Pupil Ratio in the Region and Turkey, 1960—62 and 1962—63[1])

Year	The Region	Turkey	Drewnowski's M Point Norm	Drewnowski's F Point Norm
1960—61	1/35	1/46	1/50	1/25
1962—63	1/44	1/45	1/50	1/25

[1]) SIS, 1960—62, 143—168

[118]) It is noteworthy that the trend within the three-year period 1960—1963, is towards smaller teacher/pupil ratios in the country and larger ratios in the Region, for all school levels except vocational school level in the country, and secondary school level in the Region.

Table 33. Secondary, Lycee and Vocational School Levels Teacher/Pupil Ratios in the Region and Turkey, 1960—61 and 1962—63[1])

Level	Area	1960—61	1962—63	Drewnowski's M Point Norm	Drewnowski's F Point Norm
Secondary:	The Region	1/23	1/20	1[1]30	1/15
	Turkey	1/24	1/23	1/30	1/15
Lycee:	The Region	1/15	1/21	—	—
	Turkey	1/18	1/17	—	—
Vocational:	The Region	1/14	1/16	—	—
	Turkey	1/13	1/14	—	—

[1]) SIS 1960—1962, 143—168

INEQUALITIES AND UNEQUAL OPPORTUNITIES

Some of the consequences of the shortcomings, of the educational system in the Region, and the explicit policy of discrimination, pursued by various successive Turkish governments, in the Region, are reflected in Table 34, which shows the proportion of populations, of the different areas of the country, who have completed one school level or another. Only one tenth of the Region's population had completed some level of schooling in 1965, against 26 % in the rest of the country, more than 30 % in the Aegean region, 37 % in the province of Ankara and more than 50 % in the province of Istanbul. The economic and social consequences of this situation are far-reaching. It holds back the Region's development process, but it boosts the development of the other areas mentioned above.[119])

Table 34. Population by Last Graduated School 1965 (11 years Old and Over; % of the Population of Respective Area)[1]

Area	Primary	Secondary	Lycee	Vocational	High School & Faculties	Total
The Region	8.2	1.0	0.2	0.5	0.2	10.1
Rest of Turkey	20.9	2.8	1.0	0.9	0.6	26.2
Aegean Region	25.9	2.3	0.7	0.9	0.4	30.2
Ankara Prov.	24.4	4.8	3.1	2.1	2.5	36.9
Istanbul Prov.	33.8	8.0	4.7	1.9	2.3	50.7

[1]Compiled from SIS, 1965, 294—297

[119]) In addition to the total number of population that has graduated from some levels of school, i.e. 376,221 persons, and the total number of students attending primary schools in 1962—63 i.e. 264,150 pupils, the rate of literacy in the Region bacomes 17.3 % (following the method suggested by the Area Handbook mentioned above) instead of 26.6 % derived from SIS, 1965 which gives the literacy rate of 41 % for the male population, and 11 % for the famele population of the Region; (the overall rate was obtained by multiplying the 41 % by 52 %, the percentage of male population in the total, and 11 % by 48 %, the proportion of the female population). This means that the ratio of literacy in the Region, to that in the rest of the country, is 55:100 according to the method used by SIS (1965), but 39:100 according to the above-mentioned calculation.

In addition to unequal opportunities for obtaining schooling, between the Region and the rest of the country, there is inequality between rural and urban areas, and between the various income groups of the Region's population. The least opportunities are offered to the poor transhumant communities.[120])

SCHOOLING, EDUCATION AND LANGUAGE

Substantial progress in education in the Region, cannot be reasonably expected to take place, unless the main problem of language is recognised and solved, by the State, by admitting the realities of the situation and the rights of the Region's population to schooling in their language, a right recognised internationally .

However, the prospects for such recognition and solution are very slight and remote under present circumstances. Therefore, continuing poor levels of schooling and inequalities between the Region and the rest of the country are to be expected.[121])

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120) The existing system of education in the country, schools and curricula, suffer a number of short-comings and deficiencies. Most of the material taught at schools bears little connection to the practical needs or the environment of the Region; it is abstract, it neglects the economic, social and environmental needs of the Region; it does not prepare puplis for future prospective employment in the Region; technical and vocational schools are limited, particularly agricultural and pastoral schooling; and finally it tends to be chauvinistic in content. Further, there is a gap "between primary, secondary and technical education [levels] ... They did not [and probably still do not] operate to complement each other". The follow-up, after the five-year primary education is poor, constituting a sort of social loss, since the economic and social consequences of this level are negligible, according to Eren. In the villages, weekly classwork in primary schools lasted for 18 hours, the class schedule being arranged by teachers themselves, to suit "the seasonal time requirements of the villages", and in the towns, 26 hours. However, "Village school teachers complain of official indifference to truancy, and inadequate funds with which to equip, staff, and maintain existing shools". Furthermore, "for instance, all schools lacked chemical and biological laboratories and only one third had physics labs. Some lacked even maps and blackboards". Moreover, "The summer vacation, extending from May to October, was too long. The daily school hours were too short. Attendance was poor. "Many girls were kept away" from schools. The problem of retaining teachers in the villages remains acute. (Eren 1963, 184—210, and Robinson, 1963, 195—200).

121)The insistence of the Turkish authorities on pursuing the policy of Turkifying the Kurds, will only have grave repercussions on the peaceful co-existence and co-operation between the two nations and peoples; the Turkish rulers need be reminded of the consequences of similar policies pursued in Pakistan, and elsewhere. Turkification of minorities, especially of the Kurdish people, is not a novelty in Republican Turkey. It had been tried by the mediaeval Ottoman rulers, largely to no avail. However, the same mediaeval Ottoman policy has been pursued with intensification by the Young Turks and with still more intensification and fervour, only with a clear-cut racist flavour, by the rulers of Republican Turkey. These rulers employed outright forcible methods and deceit, to achieve the Turkification of the Kurdish people. During the period of his campaigning to expel foreign troops from the country, Mustafa Kemal, President of modern Turkey until 1938, "made a great effort to win the confidence of the Kurds during this period". (Kinnane, 1964, 27). But at the very same time, plans for the future of the Kurds in Turkey were being drawn in the opposite direction. "The National Pact, however, pre-figured the later [Turkish] Government policy, denying the very existence of the Kurdish nationality: the pact declared the area unoccupied [by the Allies' forces] on 30 October 1918, to be inhabited by Ottoman-Muslim majority, united by religion and race". (Ibid).

When the position of the Kemalist regime had been consolidated, Turkification became a basic objective of the regime, in the Region. Hostler contends that "In Kemalist Turkey, the Turkification of all non-Turkish ethnic elements was accelerted. Linguistic, ethnic, and religious differences were diminished; non-Turkish speaking groups were encouraged to renounce their non-Turkish nationality, language and religion. In outlying minority groups, such as the Georgian-speaking Lazas and numerous Kurdish tribes, some pressure was employed. Lewis acknowledges this "second-class" citizenship: "You will note the growing feeling of "Turkishness", as being the key to status in the Turkish nation, was exclusive. It had in it, very little room for those residents of Turkey who were not Turkish in language... This is not written into law but is expressed in the ordinary attitudes and mores of the land and embodied in the ideology of Turkish Nationalism". (Hostler, 1957, 112).

To maintain that the Kurds and minorities in Turkey, have been (and insofar as the Kurds are concerned still are) second-class citizens, is a euphemism, to say the least. They have been publically regarded as servants and slaves. Mehmut Essad, Minister of Justice, for example, declared in an election campaign in 1930 that "We live in Turkey, the freest country in the world...

As pointed out previously, the educational system in a country or region is one of the twin factors (education and industrialisation) which are the most important in the development process. The state of education in the Region, and its general trends, are indicators of the general situation in the Region. The great inequalities between the Re-

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The Turk is the sole ruler and only master of this country. Those not belonging to the pure race of Turks have one, and only right here: the right to be servants, the right to be slaves". (Millet Daily, September 19, 1930, No. 1655; quoted in Ghassemlou, 1965, 20). It is only ironic, that such a racist outcry is made by a person whose office bears the name "justice"; it is also amusing that a country can be "the freest in the world" when about one-sixth of its population are considered slaves and servants.

In pursuing such a policy, Turkey is not honouring its international obligations and is violating the Lausanne Agreement, ratified by the country in 1923. Article 38 of the Agreement reads, "The Turkish government promises to guarantee fully, the lives and rights of all inhabitants of Turkey". Article 39 of the Agreement reads, "No limitations shall be made to free usage of any language by a citizen of Turkey, whether in private relations, in trade, religion, press, publications of any kind, nor in public meeting". (Rambout, 1947, 25, and Ghassemlou, 1965, 58). However, it seems that by calling the Kurds "mountain Turks", the Turkish authorities may have convinced themselves that they did not actually violate the Agreement.

This policy is also contrary to the Turkish Constitution, Paragraph 12 of which reads: "before the law everybody is equal notwithstanding his language, his ethnic membership, his sex, his political conviction, his religious denomination. No privileges must be accorded to any person, family, group or class". And Paragraph 20 of the Constitution reads: "everyone enjoys liberty of thought and opinion. Everyone has the right to express and spread his thoughts and opinion by word, in writing, images, or in any other way, either alone or with others. Nobody can be forced to express his thoughts and his opinion". (Quoted in **Kurdistan, 1969, 8**).

However, in 1932 a law was enacted "by which hundreds of thousands of Kurds were deported, to areas where they constituted 5 % of the population, in order to exterminate or assimilate them". (Ghassemlou, 1965, 57).

Besides, very elementary cultural rights are denied the Kurds in Turkey. For example, the Feb 14, 1967, issue of the Official Gazette No. 12527 published a decree by the Turkish government to the effect that "... it is illegal and forbidden to introduce to, or distribute in the country, materials in the Kurdish language of foreign origin in any form including published, recorded, taped, or material in any similar form". (Quoted in the Kurdish Journal, 1969, 50). In early 1969, for example, a Kurdish writer, E. Bozarslan, was arrested, and later charged, on two accounts: one for publishing a Kurdish elementary textbook, and the other for having translated into Turkish a Kurdish epic and prepared for its publication. Bozarslan faced 8 to 15 years imprisonment with compulsory settlement afterwards, according to the Articles on which he was charged, namely, Articles 141 and 142 of the Introduction Law No. 3038 of 1936. (The Kurdish Journal, 1969, 50).

Another, more striking example, is what happened to Dr Ismail Besikci, ethnically a Turk and a former professor of political science at the University of Erzurum, and later at the University of Ankara. His "crime" was that he questioned the myths held by Turkish rulers concerning the Region and its population. In February 1971, he published an article in the Turkish magazine "Ant" on the "Underdevelopment of Eastern Anatolia". Earlier in 1969 he wrote a book entitled **The Situation in Eastern Anatolia: Its Social, Economic, and Ethnical Causes.** (Vanly, 1971, 3—4). On June 25, 1971, Besikci "was taken into custody for having undertaken socio-economic research work on Eastern Anatolia and the Kurdish people. He was tried by the First Military Court of Diyarbakir MLH [Martial Law Headquarters] and condemned to 13 years and 7 days imprisonment and 3 years exile... on August 14, 1972. **(File on Turkey,** 1972, 165). This is how the Turkish authorities are trying to bring about more equality among the regions of the country and fulfil "social justice". This attitude by the Turkish authorities, reflects the manner in which they go about solving the problems facing the Region, through obscurantism.

Treating the previous issues in this section and within this context, was deemed necessary for an accurate assessment of the circumstances surrounding education in particular, and culture in general, in the Region, and to appreciate the observation that some Kurdish communities, tend to show isolationist attitudes and that some Kurds in Turkey, tend to reject the learning of Turkish and thus prefer illiteracy to schooling in something other than their own language as a counter-measure, in self-defence and self-preservation. (Kurdistan, 1970, 19, and the Kurdish Journal, 1969, 51).

The language issue is, indeed, recongnised by the centre as acute, yet no serious attempt is being made to find a sensible solution to it. The Turkish daily "Hurriyet", for example, lamented vociferously in October 1960, probably expressing the distress of the Turkish authorities, for the failure of their policies, that "the Kurds do not know Turkish! In Istanbul we are making campaigns telling, "Citizens speak Turkish"; but in the east, the question of language is a tragedy". (The Kurdish Journal, 1969, 50).

Turkification has not been, however, entirely ineffective. "The Kurdish intellectual... faced with this tragic and apparently hopeless situation, often finds refuge in Turkification, neglecting his duty of leadership to his more common compatriots, to whom even the luxury of Turkification is not offered". (Kurdistan, 1970, 19).

gion and the rest of the country, are a reflection of the reluctance to act by the central Government, over the years. Education is a key to the development of the Region. And unless it is solved, no development (as distinct from evolution) can reasonably be expected within a reasonable period of time. But the solution of the question of education is a political issue. It concerns the basic political attitude of the central government, towards the Kurds, as either a non-existent or at least suspect group. In the former case, the logical extension of the non-existence of the Kurds, is lack of necessity for a solution (for the language problem in particular), since no problem of this sort exists. In the latter, the viewing of the Kurds by the Government or State as suspect, refects deep-rooted weaknesses, fear and lack of self-confidence, rather than logical reasoning. The Kurds in Turkey are also a comfortable sociological, political and economic "scape-goat". They have been used in this capacity a few times by the Turkish Governments and Army.

Therefore, it would be naive to expect a change toward improvement in this attitude, and policy in the near future, notwithstanding the fact that Turkey is a signatory to the European Charter of Human Rights. It is unfortunate and tragic, that the only hope of a change at present seems to lie in the use of force by the Region's population, because pressures are building and, at the same time, there is lack of outlets and options. The experience of the Kurds in Iraq have shown that treaties, whether international or national, declarations or agreements, bear no weight, unless they are backed by a force that can defend them, or bring about their implementation. The same seems to be true in such underdeveloped countries as Pakistan, Sudan, Ethiopia and others. The experiences of many a minority, in the underdeveloped countries, is a testimony to this inevitable conclusion.

PROTECTION

The component of "protection" is dealt with here as a whole, i.e. the individual indicators are not analysed separately. This procedure is due, firstly, to lack of data and other non-quantitative information on "leisure", and, secondly, because this indicator is not deemed to be of as great importance as the security indicator. As will become obvious, there is some overlap, between this component and the additional one suggested here, namely, "human rights". However, "security of the person" and "security of the way of life", do not cover all the elements and aspects covered by human rights.[122])

Lack of security of the person and the way of life in the Region, is indicated by the recurrent occurence of semi-famine situations,[123]) numerous and easy dismissals from work, especially of unskilled workers;[124]) limited scope and spatial coverage of social security;[125]) constant threat to the majority of the population as a distinct nation, to either adjust (be assimilated) or be eliminated;[126]) threat of use of force against the population, if they do not comply with the wishes, whims and policies of the government, and State;[127]) ban on the use by Kurds of the Kurdish language, imposed by the central government;[128]) the imposition of second-class, or even lower, citizenship status on the Kurdish population;[129]) ban on all cultural material in the Kurdish language of foreign origin, in any form;[130]) persecution of, and ban on, authors and works by Kurds,

122) Drewnowski recognizes this fact; Drewnowski, 1970, 69
123) Cf. Kinnane, 1964, 34 and Kinross, 1954, 92
124) Cf. Eren, 1963, 154
125) Cf. SPO, 1963, 101 and SIS, 1968 A, 138
126) Cf. Van Nieuwenhuijze, 1971, 346
127) Gf. Dagens Nyheter, November 11 1960
128) Cf. e.g. Hostler, 1957, 112
129) Cf. Hostler, 1957, 112 and Ghassemlou, 1965, 20
130) Official Gazette No. 125 27 of February 14, 1967

or on the Kurds and Kurdistan;[131]) constant pressure on the population to change their way of life, in order to be able to participate in "modern Turkey";[132]) and last but not least, constant pressure on the population to deny and/or conceal one's ethnic identity and pretend to be a "pure Turk", in order to be able to "pass" and be admitted into the dominant nation.[133])

All the afore-mentioned observations, made by non-Kurds, are evidence to the fact that security of the person and security of the way of life of the Kurds, are not only threatened but are actually being violated. Most of these violations are examples on breaches of the fundamental provisions of the European Charter of Human Rights,to which Turkey is a signatory.

These violations and threats to the population's security, are not only important per se, but also for the crucial role they play in creating an atmosphere radically unconducive to the development of the Region. Insecurity in an area, creates general apathy among its population and sometimes flight to other areas where security is, or may seem to be, less threatened (the large-scale emigration from the Region and attempts by some migrants to conceal their ethnic origin, can be understood in the light of this observation; in a real sense, emigration is a flight from insecurity).

In the final analysis, insecurity of the person and of the way of life, is an impediment to development. Simultaneously, underdevelopment itself, is an ever-present threat to the security of the person (through disease, malnutrion (or famine), illiteracy, etc). However, underdevelopment is, in a way, a preservant of the way of life, in a very narrow sense of the word, since underdevelopment presupposes the relative lack of change; lack of change means the continuation of the prevailing way of life, in this narrow sense. However, this narrow and static sense of "way of life", is rejected in this study. Development will tend to protect the way of life, of the Region's population, by reducing dependence on the centre(s) of expansion. Reduction of dependence, creates self-sufficiency and self-respect, which in turn tend to preserve the community's way of life under changing conditions.

ENVIRONMENT

The problem of environment is present in both the underdeveloped and developed countries. However, as was pointed out earlier, the nature of the environmental problem, in the two groups of countries is quite different. Whilst the environmental problem in the developed countries is a consequence of the uncontrolled or undirected or unplanned development process, it is in the underdevloped countries the result of lack of development.

This aspect affects the degree of enjoyment of physical environment. The Region seems to be relatively a newcomer to the

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131) The case of the introduction of tractors is key 1972, for some examples

132) Cf. Fisher, 1968, 517

133) Cf. Area Handbook, 1970, 77 and Vanly, 1971, 50

134) The case of the introduction of tractors is an example. According to Eren, the economic optimum for Turkey, allowing for co-operative use, has been 8,000 tractors (Eren, 1963, 113), whereas in 1970 there were over 105,000 tractors in the country. This situation has had adverse social effects (according to Robinson's estimates based on an examination of several areas in Turkey where tractors had been introduced, each tractor had displaced an average of 8 persons. (Rivkin, 1965, 104)) and economic effects (the cost of maintenance and spare parts for tractors introduced in Turkey was in 1960, according to Eren $ 40 million: $ 15 million for spare parts and replacements and $ 25 million for fuel; Eren maintains that "increased production from mechanisation hardly added to Turkey's earnings from exports to meet these additional imports", (Eren, 1965, 113)), and environmental consequences. The latter were: (1) the loss of top soil on both good and marginal lands, because of the deep-furrowed cultivation made possible by tractors; and (2) the extension of cereal cultivation into marginal lands that had been pastures, causing both serious problems of soil erosion and over-grazing on the remaining pasture lands, causing in turn, more extensive soil erosion and shortage of pasture for livestock.

type of problems experienced by the industrialised countries. However,the beginnings of deterioration are observable.[134])

Other indicators of this component, such as communication, travel, sport, cultural activities and clothing, the satisfaction of which, according to Drewnowski, "consisting of taking advantage of these possibilities, i.e. in the actions of the population itself", are less available in the Region than in the rest of the country. For example, the wearing of the Kurdish national dress by men is not permitted in Turkey; the population participation in, and taking advantage of, cultural activities in the Region, is minimal because of the many (statutary and other) restrictions imposed on such activities, especially if they were Kurdish. As for communication, travel and sport, taking advantage of them, seems to be limited due to lack of facilities for these activities, and the economic and social factors involved.

Means of communications in the Region are limited and those in existence are either established and used for military purposes, or otherwise suffer many defects. (Cf. section on Transport and Communications).

Travel has been restricted in certain areas of the Region, which have been declared "closed areas", and for certain groups of the population of the Region who have been evicted from their places of domicile and forced to live in areas fixed by the authorities. In addition, means of transport in the Region are limited, especially in the rural areas, as pointed out above.

Whether to consider human rights as an element of the level of living, or whether it is at all, an element thereof, is a matter of some disagreement, as mentioned above. Are human rights an element of the level of living of human communities and their individual members? If this element is conceived as a need, that can be satisfied by human action, then it does constitute part of that level. However, should it be considered as a criterion, for the level of development a society has actually attained (and thus of the level of living itself), then it should be discussed under a separate heading.[135])

It sholud be noticed that the components and indicators suggested by Drewnowski, refer to elements of the level of living that are actually commonly recognised, and his concern is focused on the determination of generally acceptable criteria, for their present or actual state, and their measurement, and, implicitly, on how they should be.[136]) Whereas Drewnowski's components and indicators, are implicit on the normative aspects of the level of living, the human rights component is explicit on this point.[137])

As for overlapping, this problem will be faced regardless of how the components and indicators of the level of living are chosen, and regardless of their number, because reality is not neatly partitioned into distinct, non-overlapping compartments. The level of living suggested by Drewnowski, has certain overlapping among its components and indicators.

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135) Should human rights be considered as a criterion of levels of development achieved and levels of living, one is faced with the difficulty that in Nazi Germany, which was as developed as the rest of the developed countries of the day, and had a similar level of living to those enjoyed by other developed countries, flagrant violations of human rights and dignity were a common practice, by the authorities, at least.

136) Even though the "survival point", "minimal point" and "full satisfaction" presumably state needs, they actually are normative in a sense; the survival point implies a level which must not be transcended and full satisfaction a level that should be strived for.

137) In addition, the components of the level of living are inter-connected and mutually influence each other (feedback) in a spiral and cumulative process; education improves health and dietary practices and shelter; these are conditions which in turn positively influence education and make it more effective. Higher levels of education and its spread among the population and areas of a country or region lead, in turn, to better health conditions and so forth.

For example, the "school enrolment ratio" indicator, overlaps with "reading" as a form of "cultural activities", (the former determines the rate of literacy in society, which in turn determines the ability and habits of reading).

The human rights, that will be taken up in this section, are those rights covered by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which has been elaborated upon by the International Covenants of 1966 (the Civil and Political Rights Covenant and the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant). No doubt, these Covenants and the Decleration do overlap with each other and with some of the components of Drewnowski's level of living. However, whilst the level of living sets quantitative criteria or norms (in the form of critical points), the Declaration and Covenants, put forward principles and ideals to be respected and strived for, by all signatories. Education, for example, and cultural activities as used by Drewnowski, take the issue of language, the medium of expression in most cultural activities, for granted, whilst the human rights component explicitly takes it up, as an element of the level of living.

The discussion of human rights in the Region, will be somewhat "negative" in content, in the sense that violations of these rights will be briefly alluded to. Most of these violations have already been referred to previously in this study and need not be repeated here. (Cf. "Protection" in this Chapter).

The principle of self-determination, constituting Article 1 of both the afore-mentioned Covenants, which reads, "all peoples have the right to self-determination . . ." is denied the Kurds; the restrictions referred to under Protection above are further examples of violations of human rights. In addition, forced labour (cf. Ghassemlou, 1965, 59) torture and inhuman treatment (cf. File on Turkey 1972, for an account of the torture of the whole community of Silvan in the Region), propagation for war and incitement to national and racial hatred (cf. Vanly 1971), and the denial of the rights of the Kurds as a minority, have been observed in the Region.

The very denial of the existence of the Kurds in Turkey, is a violation of human rights. The various violations of human rights in the Region, by the State of Turkey can be elaborated on at length. However, this has been deemed unnecessary, since the sources referred to above give evidence on these violations and of concrete instances occuring in the Region, at various time periods; and because the main concern of this study has been with economic and social issues.

CONCLUSION

The level of living (in terms of the various available economic, social, transport and municipal services) in the Region, is much lower than its counter-part in the rest of the country. A study, carried out at the centre, of available services in the various provinces of the country, at the beginning of the 1960s, has revealed that all the provinces in the Region, had averages far below those in the western and central provinces. The SPO acknowledges that, "A combined index has been prepared to show conditions in provinces, with respect to various economic, social, transport, and municipal services. If the average for Turkey is taken to be 100, the indices of the 67 provinces range between 18 and 258 . . . The location, according to regions of the provinces, with indices above the national average, is given in Table [35]" (SPO, 1963, 358).[138])

138) "The average for Turkey", "national average" and "the average of the country" are used interchangeably.

Table 35. Population of Provinces with Indices above the National Average and as Per Cent of Total Population[1])

Regional Location	Population of the Regions in 1,000,000	Population of the Provinces of the Regions with Indices above the average for Turkey in 1,000,000	% to Population of the Regions	% to Total Population
Marmara	5.2	2.2	42.6	8.0
Aegean	2.9	1.1	36.5	3.8
Karadeniz	5.6	0.6	10.1	2.0
Akdeniz	2.9	1.2	41.7	4.3
Inner Anatolia	6.4	1.7	26.7	6.1
East Anatolia	3.0	—	—	—
South East Anatolia	1.7	—	—	—

[1]) SPO, 1963, 359

The Region falls in the East Anatolia and South-East Anatolia regions, mentioned in the above table. None of the Region's provinces is above the "Average for Turkey", in terms of the above-mentioned services, and most if not all, are much below it.

The table also reveals the degree of inequality between the Region and the rest of the country; most probably, provinces with as low an index as 18 are located in the Region.

In terms of income, the Region fares no better than it does in terms of services. According to SPO, if taxes, particularly income taxes, are used as an index of economic activities and income levels, the share of taxes paid by the developed regions of the country has increased in the total tax revenues, whilst the share paid by the under-underdeveloped regions (the Region) has actually declined as Table 36 shows. (This is yet further evidence, of the situation and of trends, which indicate that inequality between the Region and the rest of the country, is widening).

In Turkey, as the SPO argues, agricultural income has virtually not been subject to income taxes. Using taxes alone, as an index of economic activities and income levels, may therefore be objected to. However, agricultural income in the provinces having a low income subject to taxation, tends to be low too, retorts the SPO. If the per capita agricultural income in Turkey, is assumed to be 100, it would be 41 in Hakkari, 48 in Bitlis and 65 in Diyarbakir. These indices indicate that agricultural income, in provinces with a low volume of tax payments, are also below the average (agricultural) income level of the country as a whole. (SPO, 1963, 49).

Table 36. Changes in Tax Payments of Various Provinces of Turkey, (%)[1])

Provinces	1	2	3	4	5	6
Outside the Region						
Bursa	1.70	2.60	+53	1.5	2.3	+53
Adana	2.10	2.80	+33	2.5	3.1	+29
Ankara	11.70	12.40	+ 6	10.4	10.8	+ 4
In the Region						
Diyarbakir	0.50	0.37	—25	0.39	0.41	± 5[2])
Hakkari	0.035	0.024	—38	0.04	0.027	—33
Bitlis	0.10	0.083	— 8	0.09	0.07	—33

[1]) SPO, 1963, 50
[2]) "The position is not changed by the large production taxes paid by the Ergani Copper Installations in Diyarbakir".

1 Income tax paid by provinces in 1951—1952 as per cent of total income tax.
2 Income tax paid by provinces in 1958—1960 as per cent of total income tax.
3 Changes in the share of provinces in total income tax between the two periods.
4 Total tax paid by provinces in 1950 as per cent of total tax revenue.
5 Total tax paid by provinces in 1960 as per cent of total tax revenue.
6 Changes in the share of provinces in total tax revenue between the two periods.

Now that it has become fairly clear, that problems in the Region are by no means simple ones and that they are complex ones, it must be reiterated that the various elements analysed in this study, are interlocked. They affect each other in a spiral fashion, to produce movements of the totality of elements in (the system of) the Region, either upwards or downwards. Not only are the Region's resources flowing to the country's centres of expansion, and that inequalities exist between the Region and the rest of the country, but also that the flow tends to increase, both in regard to the already discovered resources and to new resources, and that the inequalities tend to increase rather than decrease. This state of affairs and these trends, are the result of the backwash effects caused by the expansionary momentum at the centre(s) of expansion and reflect, at the same time, the very weak spread effects of this momentum. It also reflects the lack of action on the part of the state to rectify the situation. They also affect relations between the Region and the centre, in the direction of more dependence by the former on the latter and thus to even less power-over-itself by the Region. This means that the reversing of present patterns of flow and inequalities, by means of political pressure, which assumes that the Region has power-over-itself (autonomy) and can exert some measure of pressure on the centre, is becoming more remote. The centre is actually tightening its grip on the Region and its resources, and any move in the Region towards checking the flow of its resources, or towards the lessening of inequalities in services and incomes, between the Region and the rest of the country, is immediately countered by the centre and labelled as "separatism", or as "attempts to break down the unity of the Turkish State". This situation is a striking example of a much more common, but untouched upon, feature prevailing in many an underdeveloped country, namely, of internal colonialism (as distinct from "colonialism" as commonly used). This sort of colonialism, is, moreover, much more difficult to eliminate, since what happens within the boundaries of a State, is considered an "untouchable" issue, an "internal matter". Of course, generally speaking, all States have an inherent interest in such an arrangement. External colonialism can be easily pointed out and be combatted; internal colonialism is called the "internal affairs" of a country, however colonialist the state or government of that country is. And here lies the dilemma of oppressed minorities and nationalities living in a paranoid multinational state; they cannot free themselves of the bonds that a larger, neighbouring nationality has tied them to. In the final analysis, and from the point of view of the minority or nationality concerned, they would have been much better off were they colonised by a distant nation or country. In this case, they could free themselves sooner or later from the bonds of such a colonialist.

For all intents and purposes, the Region is only a colony of the centre in Turkey. It is a typically classical case of "traditional" colonialism, with one difference: "traditional" colonialism is usually conceived as being international, whereas this is an intra-national case. All the problems it faces, vis-a-vis the centre (or central Government), are problems usually associated with colonialism in its traditional meaning. This colonialism is a colonialism that is recognizable and recognized but few are willing to call it by its real name, and to voice their disapproval of it, as they do with the "traditional" form of colonialism.

The main reason accounting for this apparent reluctance may be found in the "distance factor". Similar situations are viewed in the one case as "colonial", whereas in the other as "internal affairs", the basic difference between the two situations being the spatial separation in the former and spatial contiguity in the latter. This differentiation between the "colonial" and "internal affairs" situations, is typically made even where the colonisers and colonised are different in language, religion or other elements of culture, economy and polity, and where the

colonisers aim at achieving similar, if not identical, economic advantages and political subjegation usually associated with "traditional" colonialism, such as the exploitation of the natural and human resources of the colonised; depriving the colony of (almost) all its decision-making powers; ethnic and cultural seggregation; ignoring and neglecting (and even hindering) the development of the colony's economy and society; using the colony as a dumping ground for the misfits and failures; and applying all the "tactics" usually used by "traditional" colonialism, such as "divide and rule". Sometimes, the "non- traditional" form of colonialism is referred to as "internal colonialism" or "intrastate imperialism". As a matter of fact, the overwhelming majority of these cases are actually originally external, but subsequent (usually) forcible annexation (contiguity facilitating this annexation) of the colony to the "colonisers' mother country", has led to the addition of such adverbs of place as "internal" or "intra" to colonialism and imperialism. Although this point is not one of the main themes of this study, it did emerge as an inevitable conclusion.

The dilemma of the Region is, in the final analysis, that its fundamental development problems can be solved (only) by the State, but this State, is the very instrument maintaining its under-underdevelopment and hidering its development.

VII CONCLUSION

Having reviewed the historical background of present realities and trends in the Region, and analysed them, it is time to bring together the empirical observations and data in order to find out the degree of consistency, between the theoretical framework, put forward at the beginning of this study, and the empirical observations, and to point out what modifications and additions this framework would need, in order that it would more appropriately explain the data and observations, presented in the empirical section.

To start with, there is need for more studies and theorisation on regional problems in underdeveloped countries.[139]) The nature and form of these problems differ from their counterparts in the developed countries. This is so, because of the set or system, of which each is a sub-set or sub-system. The nature and structure of the set or system, greatly influences and determines the nature and forms of the problems each sub-set or sub-system has, as well as their solution.

In addition, it is not apt to use theories on underdeveloped countries, to explain problems of regional under-underdevelopment. Although there are a number of similarities between these regions and countries, the nature and properties and form of their problems differ in important ways. First of all, an individual underdeveloped country is more or less a closed system, whereas an under-underdeveloped region is, for all intents and purposes, an open system. Of course it must be remembered that the environment of the former system is the world at large, whilst the environment of the latter sub-system is the individual underdeveloped country concerned (which is a sub-environment of the larger environment). This fact has far reaching consequences for such a region concerning its resources, both natural and human, and its contacts with the sub- and universal environments. These consequences have already been analysed in this study.

Besides, there is the problem of "scale" between underdeveloped regions and countries. Theories advanced to explain problems in underdeveloped countries cannot be employed on a regional level, unless the problem of "scale" involved is solved.[140])

It is difficult to make broad and sweeping generalisations, on the nature of problems connected with these resources, and of

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139) Srikantan has carried out a study of regional "differences" in Turkey. His main findings and conclusions are given below. "In this study" maintains Srikantan, "the differences in the social, urban and demographic transitions, among the five major regions of Turkey — the Black Sea, Aegean, Marmara and Mediterranean regions, Central Anatolia and Eastern Turkey — have been examined. The background characteristics, indicate that the Aegean-Marmara region [in the western part of Turkey] is most modern in social, urban and demographic variables, and Eastern Turkey is least modern" (Srikantan, 1973, 287). By "modern" the writer means improvements to health and education and level of living, industrialisation, economic development and improved transport and communication; decline in fertility, greater use of family planning, increasing age of marriage, etcetera, and changes in social norms and individual behaviour, attitudes and values consonant with changes in other fields. (Srikantan, 1973, 276).

The main sources for these differences are traced by Srikantan to (a) cultural-historical factors; (b) modernisation; (c) urbanism (urban way of life); and (d) **"planned change"**, meaning that certain areas have been given "intensive official efforts", which implies that this was done at the neglect of other areas. "Regional differences in Turkey owe their origin to" the following factors, maintains Srikantan:

(a) geographic features — "a terrain serrated by many mountains and irrigated by few navigable rivers";
(b) the isolation of the rural areas from the social, economic and political life of Ottoman Turkey;
(c) **lack of homogeneity in the Ottoman Empire whether political, ethnic or religious**; and
(d) generally poor means of transport and communication.
(Srikantan, 1973, 275).

140) In the natural (or precise) sciences, there are many similarities between the structure of atoms and the universe, but different theories are used in each case, because of the problem of "scale" involved.

relations with the sub-environment. Nevertheless, it is a common observation, that resources flow from peripheral (resource) regions, in underdeveloped countries, to centre(s) of economic and cultural expansion (usually the capital city) in these countries; in addition, these resources often flow to areas outside the boundaries of the individual states. Returns on the flows are typically retained by, and spent in and/or on, the centre in the country. It is thus a net loss to the producing region and a net gain to the centre (thus the operation is exploitation, since the centre obtains benefits and gains, for no or little cost). The region concerned can do nothing, or very little, to stop (or regulate) this flow, or bring under its control, the returns accruing from this exportation. This is due to the nature of power structure and relations in the underdeveloped countries, which tend to be highly centralised; the seat of power (the center) tends very often in these countries to be fearful and suspecious of any demands for the delegation of power to the constituent regions. This fear is mostly a result of uncertainty and of the influence of narrow nationalist outlooks and of vested interests at the centre and jealousy for newly obtained power since most underdeveloped countries have been colonies or mandates.

The flow of resources and lack of power, on the part of the region(s) concerned, create inequalities in the country, in the economic, social, political, cultural and other fields. These inequalities tend initially to increase, but later on they may be stabilised. Because of increasing needs at the centre, for more and a wider range of raw materials (primary products) resulting from both higher incomes and enlarged population (migration) and market, the centre is compelled to invest in the resource region(s), in order to increase the production and exportation of these primary products which it needs, or can export. However, since these investments are made to meet the centre's needs, (which largely tend to ignore local needs and conditions) and because they are concerned mainly with primary production, they remain in the nature of enclaves, having little spread effects on the rest of the region's economy.

When the Region came under the rule of the Ottomans, it was a devastated area, experiencing economic and social dislocations caused by the military campaigns aimed at controlling it. These military campaigns undermined the area's economy and disrupted its normal functioning. Agriculture was reduced and manufacture and trade came to virtual stagnation. Cultural activity was likewise disrupted and brought to a standstill. Thus, the effects of war on the Region's economy and society were tremendously disruptive and, moreover, the destruction and depopulation they caused were long lasting.

On the question of the effects of war on the economy and community of the Region, lies one of the weaknesses of Myrdal's Theory of Underdevelopment. He does not take up this question directly and explicitly. This is particularly important, because of his insistence that in studying underdevelopment, the distinction between economic and non-economic variables is unnecessary and creates confusion. The effects of wars are a more general feature in the (west) Asiatic countries and is not confined to the Region.

Having brought the Region under their effective control, the Ottomans began to squeeze it, in order to extract from it whatever it could; some writers tend to believe that the central government's main concern in these areas, was to extract as much tax revenues as it could. Besides taxes, the centre resorted to extortion, confiscation, and looting to effect the flow of the Region's resources to the centre. These flows have not only created inequalities, within the various areas of the Empire, but also caused great damages to the Region's economy. This has led to the deprivation of the Region of its savings and the discouragement of the wealthy to invest; the safest action for them to take was hoarding.

The Region was also deprived of the benefits of the scientific and technological ad-

vances made in the developed countries, partly because of its geographical position and isolation, but largely because educational facilities were available, (albeit on a limited scale) only in the capital Istanbul and few other important cities of the empire. Geographic isolation (lack of contact) and lack of educational facilities are the two most important factors in the under-underdevelopment of education in the Region. Science and technology are one of the two pillars of development. Scientific discoveries and technological inventions and innovations and their diffusion, require (and presuppose) the existence of at least an "educational infrastructure". The lack of such an "infrastructure" in the Region, meant that it could not take advantage of advances made in them elsewhere; and this lack, and lack of, (or very weak) contacts, with the developed countries, meant that their diffusion was impeded. Weak diffusion (or weak spread effects in the cultural and educational fields) of science and technology, resulting from a weak "educational infrastructure", is still one of the main impediments to the Region's development. Even though Myrdal hints at the importance of education and scientific research for, and in, the development process, he fails to give it the prominance it deserves. As was stated earlier, the incorporation of science and technology and advances in them, into the fabrics of society in general, and labour force and means of production in particular, constitutes the very essence of the development process and of progress of human civilisation.

Since all human action, and decisions to take action, is made within the limitations experienced by or imposed on man, it is of utmost importance to take into consideration the mental framework, inclination, prejudices, biases, preconceptions, superstitions, scapegoating, stigmatisation, suspicion, fear and uncertainty of the poeple, whether individuals or groups, making and carrying out these decisions. Mankind's history is rich in evidence of tragedies caused by misconceptions, prejudice and scapegoating. These facts, have played their role in the relationship between the Region and the centre, in both the Ottoman Era and the Republican period, only more obviously during the latter period, as mentioned above. Rivkin and Robinson have also observed, that the predisposition of leaders at the centre played a decisive role in the development of certain areas of Turkey, such as Ankara. Nevertheless, Myrdal tends to give these factors a very minor position in his theory.[141])

Having reviewed the historical evidence and pointed out some important factors at play, which Myrdal tends to either ignore, or only allude to, it may prove useful to mention some of the directions of development, which the evidence and general trends mentioned above, point to. On the political level, there are three possible developments: first: the continuation of present conditions and trends, secondly: a change at the centre, or in its attitude towards delegating some power to the Region, on regional matters (autonomy), and thirdly: the termination of existing relationships between the Region and the centre. The first of these developments is the most convenient for the centre, as it facilitates the flow of the Region's resources and fulfills the self-image and fancy of the centre (that Turkey is a uni-national state). But it is doubtful that it could continue for long, since awareness among the Region's population is increasing, and because the great inequalities between the Region and the rest of the country are difficult to conceal, or justify for long. The third of these developments seems improbable for the time being, and in the near future, unless unforeseeable developments take place; without a military force

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141) This point can be considered analogous to Richardson's "locational preferences", which are non-economic factors. Richardson is very emphatic on the importance of these preferences, and stresses that, "I would argue that it is impossible to understand the dispersion of regional growth rates, and beyond that the pressure for a regional development policy strategy, without taking locational preferences into account... Thus, the theory of regional growth must contain a location preference function." (Richardson, 1973, 197)

backing this move and a strong country committed to it, it is difficult to see how it could materialise. Both of these conditions cannot be met now. The second of these developments is the more practical and feasible for both sides. It fulfills the wishes of the Region's population, their desire to have a measure of control or a say in regional matters and, at the same time, it constitutes no threat to the continuation of the flow of the Region's resources. However, such a development presupposes a change at the centre, or its policy towards the Region. Even though such a change may seen remote, action taken by Turkey concerning the Turkish community in Cyprus may in the long run induce such a change.

On the economic level, the flow of the Region's resources will continue and most probably increase in volume and in range. Inequalities between the Region and the rest of the country will at least remain as they are for a long time to come (if not actually tend to increase), because of the continuation and increase in the flow of the Region's resources. The backwash effects emanating from the centre(s) of expansion in the country, will continue unchecked, whereas the spread effects will increase, but will remain weak. These predictions are based on the fact that the centre is reluctent or unable to adopt measures, which will lead to the control of the backwash effects and the strengthening of the spread effects, which otherwise would continue favouring the center(s) of expansion. Such measures include, among other things, control over the flow of the Region's resources, expansion of its "educational infrastructure", the location of manufacturing industries in the Region, and the provision of health and urban services and amenities. The increase in spread effects, will remain mostly the result of the expansion of the market, and industrial base at the centre(s) of expansion, in the country, and their need for the primary products available at the Region.

In the final analysis, the Region's development will depend on both the expansion of its educational services and on its industrialisation. Since they are planned, implemented and financed by the centre, the Region's development will entirely depend (as it does now) on the centre. This development is closely interlocked with prevaling political conditions at the centre and in the Region.

The solution of the Region's problems lies with the centre. Unless the centre changes its economic and social policy and political attitude towards the Region in the direction of regional decision-making powers on regional issues, through both economic and non-economic policy measures, aiming at its development and at less centralisation at the centre, i.e. of autonomy for the Region, the Region's problems will remain unresolved and most probably may become even more acute.

The development of the Region will require changes in the economic and regional policies of the centre. These changes include a shift from the regional policy of concentration, at the "national" level, to dispersion at that level, accompanied by concentration on the regional level. This is both feasible and desirable. It is feasible because the country is divided into a relatively small number of regions and investment funds available can be spread among these regions, without compromising regional and investment rationality or efficiency. It is also desirable, because it tends to reduce inequalities in the levels of development and living each region attains, which will, in turn, avoid many of the tensions and dislocations associated with such inequalities.

Any serious attempt at developing the Region's economy and community, would require at present, a conserted effort in a single, major urban center of potential growth. Such effort will have to be concentrated at such a centre, in order to both gain the advantages of a "growth centre" and/or the agglomeration economies resulting from such concentration. This concentrated effort would also lead to the enlargement of the population and the expansion of the economy of the center. This in turn would require and lead to,

the improvement and expansion of the urban services and amenities, at that centre. Agglomeration and technical linkage economies and improved urban services would reinforce each other and enhance the attractiveness of the center, in comparison with other centres in the country. Two of the Region's largest towns could be suitable candidates for such a centre, namely, Diyarbakir and Elazig. However, the former seems to be more attractive, for selection as a centre, because of its larger population size, its rapid increase of population (between 1960 and 1970), and its central geographic site within the Region. Such a centre could, and would, exercise a generative function in the Region's development.

	Population size	
Year	Elazig	Diyarbakir
1960	60,000	80,000
1965	79,000	103,000
1970	108,000	139,000

Dispersion on the "national" level can be based on a number of criteria. Among these criteria can be the ratio of each region's population to the total population of the country. This ratio can be adjusted (upwards or downwards) by a factor related to the natural resources available in each region and by the level of development it has actually attained. This factor may be the share of each region's resources in the foreign currency earnings from primary products. The level of development attained may be based on the level of economic activities and services (which is currently used in Turkey) in each region. The former factor will affect the ratio positively, whereas the latter negatively.[142]) The figures arrived at in this manner ought to be considered as broad guidelines. The distribution of investment funds among various activities and services will also depend on each region's needs and potentials.

Region	Population ratios	Share in foreign earnings	Level of economic activities and services	Index	Share in investment funds (%)
R_1	15	10	20	62.5	9.0
R_2	10	20	5	300.0	41.0
R_3	30	5	10	175.0	24.0
R_4	25	50	50	75.0	10.0
R_5	20	15	15	116.7	16.0
Total	100	100	100		100.0

$$R_1 = \frac{15 + 10}{2} \Big/ \frac{20}{100} = 62.5$$

$$R_2 = \frac{10 + 20}{2} \Big/ \frac{5}{100} = 300$$

142) Example: Two regions are considered here just to make the point clear: R_1 and R_2. The population of R_1 constitutes 15 % of the total in the country and of R_2 10 %. The former's share in foreign currency earnings from raw material exportation is 10 % and the latter's 20 %. R_1 is assumed to have achieved the level equivalent to 20 % of the country's economic activities and services and R_2, 5 %. These shares in investment funds allocated for development can be converted into percentages by adding them up and taking the total as 100. "An index of socio-economic development" of the various regions of the country has been prepared by the State Planning Office in Turkey (Cf. Fisek, 1968, 578). This index varies between (135) in West Region to (66) in East Region (meaning the Region and a number of neighbouring provinces). The other Regions, namely South, Central and North, had 102, 97 and 93 respectively. These indices can be used as an index for economic activities and services. Share in foreign currency earnings can be obtained from relevant Turkish foreign trade statistics publications. This suggestion is only a pointer towards a possible solution.

Equal stress is being laid on the political variables and factors involved, in the development of the Region, because development at the centre, and under-underdevelopment in the Region, have not come into being, because one of these two parties "happens to be strong and the other weak; one rich, the other poor; one full of initiative, the other apathetic. Such differences may always arise, and may or may not be exploited as resource power. But in structural power these differences arise from the way the structure, more particularly the division of labour in the economic cycle itself, is set up. *For this reason one cannot fight against exploitation simply by redistributing resources.* The fight against exploitation, is a fight for the change of the total structure, and particularly of those economic cycles that induce exploitation. This can take two forms: restructuring them so that costs and benefits are more equally distributed, or simply cutting them", as Galtung contends. (Galtung, 1973, 40).

It is obvious that the analysis made, and conclusions arrived at, in this study, were mainly macro rather than micro. This is due to fundamentally basic policies, practices and attitudes, which are in a sense macro-policies, that are involved. The Region's under-underdevelopment and its development are (caused and) maintained by, and the problems involved can be solved through, changes in the basic policies and practices of the State and governments of Turkey, rather than by "technical" measures only. Even the hands, of the agency at the centre, responsible for planning the development of various regions in the country, are tied by these basic policies or practices. Supposing that the agency wants to expand the educational system in the Region, in order to achieve some of its pronounced aims of "social justice" and the "development of backward regions", it will face the stumbling block of language, which greatly limits the expansion of education in the Region, and which the agency can do nothing about, since it is a fundamental policy of Turkish governments, that instruction is conducted in Turkish only.

It must be clear that the importance of micro measures and "technical" solutions, is by no means underestimated when discussing and analysing the Region's problems. The point being emphasised and underlined, is that these micro measures and "technical" solutions, will remain mostly very limited, in their effects and capability to solve the Region's problems, unless the basic policies and practices of the State and governments of Turkey, toward the Region, are changed.

A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF THE KURDS IN THE REGION

The history of the Kurds is a subject that has not been sufficiently investigated and studied. Available studies are mostly unsystematic. This is due mainly to prevailing political and socio-economic conditions, in the area in general, which have been placing great pressure on the Kurds who attempt to study their own history, and other aspects of life in the field.

However, it can be stated that the history of the Kurds, dates back to many centuries B.C., even though the Kurds might not have been known by this name. According to the *Encyclopedia Americana*, the history of the Kurds "dates back to the Gutu of ancient Assyria, an empire in which they appear to have had an independent political position; they were merged with the Medes after the fall of Nineveh." *(The Encyclopedia Americana).*

A Summarian inscription from the second millennium B.C., refers to a land with the name "Kardaka". *(Islam Ansiklopedisi*, 1955, 1089—91, quoted in Arfa, 1966, 3).

The Assyrian king Tiglath Pileser appears to have been engaged in war with a tribe named "Kur-ti-e". (Ibid.)[143])

The Greek historian Xenophon, makes reference in his work, to a mountain people called "Kurdukai". They seem to have harrassed the Greek Army's march in the area. (Ibid.)[144])

The origin of the Kurdish people, is believed by one school of opinion, to be the amalgamation of the Median tribes of the western areas of present day Iran, with the aborigines of the area now known as Kurdistan.[145]) However, a number of other schools of opinion exist.

The one opinion referred to above, seems to have gained ground and acceptance, among Kurdish historians in particular, and the Kurds in general.[146])

The Arab historians and geographers Balahuri, Tabari, and Ibn al-Athir, refer in their works, to the tribes that later came to be known as the Kurds; these tribes have, according to them, been living chiefly in the same areas, to the east of the river Buhtan, south of Lake Van and the northern banks of the Tigris. (Ibid.)

Although the geographic area known as Kurdistan, meaning the country of the Kurds, fell under Iranian rule in 550 B.C., the Kurds seem to have never ceased to lead an independent life, in their inaccessible mountainous country. Just before the Arab conquest of Kurdistan, i.e., in the seventh century A.D., when the area was still under the Sassanian (Iranian) rule, the people settling in the area corresponding to present day Kurdistan, were already known as the "Kurds". (Ghassemlou, 1965, 35).

Kurdistan was invaded by the Arab Muslims and had been under direct Muslim-Arab rule, during the period extending from the 7th to the 11th century A.D.

The areas of eastern Asia Minor, inhabited by Kurds, came under Seljuk-Turks-of-Rum rule, during the second half of the 11th century. The Seljuk rule of the area lasted from 1077 to 1300 A.D. Although the Kurds recognized the suzerainty of the Seljuks, they appear to have enjoyed actual independence, as Arfa contends. (Arfa, 1966, 12).[147])

In 1259, two Mongol armies under the command of the notorious Hulago (or Hulagu), marched through Kurdistan, as far as

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143) Tiglath-Pileser I, 1113—1116 B.C. (Sagga, 1962, Chronological Table V).

144) Xenophon, 434?—?355 B.C. **Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary**, 1965, 1090).

145) This theory has been suggested by V. Minorsky; cf. M. A. Zaki, 1961, 38—46.

146) M. A. Zaki, 1961, 57—80.

147) It should be made clear that all these changes, in the powers ruling over the Kurdish area, were accompanied by armed conflicts.

the eastern side of Lake Van. The Mongol hordes occupied Nussaybin and the whole area of Cizre in the province of Mardin in the Region. The Kurds, under the leadership of Amir al-Kamil Muhammad, put up their resistance at Meyanfarekin near Diyarbakir. The majority of the population of the town, as well as the Amir, were massacred by the invading Mongol troops. (Arfa, 1966, 11–12).

The Region then passed from the rule of one Mongol group to another of the warring Mongolian factions or tribes. During the second half of the 14th century, when the Mongol Ilkhan rule was brought to an end in 1349, Kurdistan came under the rule of the Jalayr Mongol chieftains.

However, already before the rule of the Ilkhan Mongols of the area came to an end, the Mamluks of Egypt, who were then ruling the province of Malatya and other parts of Kurdistan, had attempted to extend their power over the petty Kurdish principalities and rulers, who were themselves dominated, sometimes by the Jalayrs and sometimes by the Kara-Kuyunlu and Ak-Kuyunlu Turkomans. This rivalry, among these invaders, for control over the Region and other parts of Kurdistan, came to an end when the Ottomans conquered Malatya and other Mamluk possessions in the eastern parts of Asia Minor, at the end of the 15th century. (Arfa, 1966, 12–13).

It is evident from the above-mentioned short reference to the most outstanding military (and political) events in the Region, Kurdistan and the Middle East, that the area in general had been since the Seljuk conquests of 1055 and 1071, under the sway of Turanian rule, whether they be Turks, Turkomans or Turkicized Mongolians, who enforced their rule with the help of Turkish warriors, the majority of the population of the area being Kurds, Armenians, Iranians or Arabs. (Arfa, 1966, 13). It is also evident that the Kurds enjoyed, most of the time, de facto autonomy in the inaccessible mountainous areas they inhabited, though they sometimes recognised the suzerainty of their overlords.

The end of the 14th century witnessed a new conquest. The new conquerors were once again Turanians coming from the east. They were led by Tamerlane. Tamerlane and his hordes occupied Mosul, northern today's Iraq, in 1394. From Mosul, his army marched on Diyarbakir and Mardin, devastating the country and bringing death and misery to the population. Tamerlane conquered central Asia Minor in 1402, defeating the troops of the Ottoman Sultan Bayazid I, and reestablishing the "independence" of seven of the nine Turkish principalities, that had previously been annexed to the Ottoman realm by Bayazid I. These principalities once again enjoyed "independence" for some time.

The conquest of infamous Tamerlane, brought havoc to the whole area of the Middle East and massacre to its populace. However, according to Arfa, the major part of Kurdistan seems to have suffered relatively less extensively than the rest of the Middle East occupied by Tamerlane's troops. This is attributed by Arfa, to two factors. The first is that during that period the majority of the Kurds were nomadic, living more in high valleys than in towns. The other is that since the Kurds did not enjoy political independence, they did not have a standing army; the Kurds fought Tamerlane's hordes "when they chose to fight, a guerrilla warfare, disappearing in the inaccessible heights and deep gorges and using tracks known to themselves", suggests Arfa. (Arfa, 1966, 13).

The Turanian invasions of the Region and Kurdistan, as well as other parts of the Middle East, dealt a real blow to the area and its population; the havoc was so extensive that its consequences have been irrepairable. Ghassemlou expresses this fact in the following words: "Three big invasions strongly impaired the standing of the population in Kurdistan and in the whole area of the Near East; the Seljuk Turks who entered in 1051, the Mongols in 1231 and Tamerlane in 1402,

who in succession occupied and ravaged the countries and were the cause of immense, and for a long time irremediable, economic and social difficulties." (Ghassemlou, 1965, 36).

However, during the second half of the 15th century, the 16th century and the first half of the 17th century, the Ottomans and the Safawis of Iran were involved in fierce rivalry and campaigns, for control over the Region (and other areas of Kurdistan), through which the trade routes of one of the important trade items (silk), were then passing.

When the Ottoman Sultan Bayazid II (1481–1512) was mainly occupied with Europe, the Safawis destroyed the Ak-Kuyunlu dynasty in and near the Region. But, Bayazid II's son, Yavus Sultan Selim (Selim the Grim) I (1512–1520) showed great interest in the eastern frontiers of his realm and decided to stretch these frontiers in the east as he did in the south and west.

Selim I and his armies marched eastwards and on their way they destroyed the numerous Kurdish contingents of local Kurdish princes and principalities. Selim I's armies then came close to the Iranian army and defeated it at the Caldiran (or Chaldiran) plain southwest of Maku in 1514.

The Safawis under Shah Tahmasp I (1524–1576) and after him Shah Abbas I reoccupied, for a time, parts of the area lost to the Ottomans as far as Diyarbakir. However, the Ottoman Sultan Murad IV (1623–1640) waged a campaign, aimed at the reconquering of the areas lost to the Safawis. During the course of the campaign, between the two Middle Eastern strong powers, the area became once again part of the Ottoman realm. The outcome of the struggle between the Sultans and Shahs, which had been decided on the battlefield, was formally acknowledged in the Treaty of Erzurum, signed by the two parties in 1639, which established the frontiers between the Ottomans and Safawis, which frontiers have, by and large, remained as they appear at present. (Arfa, 1966, 16). The Battle of Caldiran and the Treaty of Erzurum have set a fatal tradition of Kurdish division, as Eagleton suggests. (Eagleton, 1963, 4).

It is thus clear that the Region and Kurdistan in general, have been almost continuously either in the path of invaders, the object of invasions, or the battlefield of military campaigns between warring powers, to achieve objectives in which the Region or the Kurds had no stake. These facts may explain not only the retardation of the Region's (and Kurdistan's) development, but also the conspicuous lack of statehood (these events and the nature of the terrain, which imposes great constraints on communication among the scattered and relatively small village and tribal communities, had nipped the rudiments of early Kurdish national awareness (at least, as expressed in the Sharafnameh and Men u Zin) when they were still in their buds, and thus interrupted the normal evolutionary processes that might have produced an entirely variant outcome.)

According to the Sharafnameh, a major work on the life and history of the Kurdish people and Kurdistan up to the end of the 16th century, written in 1596 by a Kurd, Sharef al-Din of Bitlis, the area inhabited by Kurds was ruled by a number of Kurdish principalities. At the end of the 16th century, more than 20 principalities existed in the Region, and more than 30 in the whole area of Kurdistan. *(Islam Ansiklopedisi,* 1955, 1102; quoted in Arfa, 1966, 17).

Nevertheless, as a result of Ottoman annexation of the Region and centralization policy, which was gaining in strength, these principalities were destroyed on by one.[148]) But, to control and subdue the Kurdish tribes of the Region, the Ottoman sultans tended to appoint tribal chiefs as governors in the Region's provinces. This attempt, on the part of the Ottoman sultans, to control the Kurds

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148) The failure of these pricipalities to put up a united resistance front, was due not only to lack of communication among them, but also to the Ottoman policy of "divide and rule", and internal rivalries.

through their own local leaders, was not always successful, and the control the central government exercised over the Region and its population, was seldom more than precarious.

The Ottoman empire had, since the beginning of the 17th century, been losing in strength and was on the decline, decay spreading through its economy, bureaucracy and army. This led to the revival of local self-assertion in the Region. However, this revival was quickly quelled. The 18th century was a period of steady and steep decline of the empire, weakening the position of the Ottoman government and army. This weakness encouraged the renewal of the old rivalry with the Iranians, who had not lost sight of their ancient interest in the Region and had not forgotten their previous setbacks. The rulers of Iran, availing themselves of the weakness of the Ottomans and exploiting the discontent among local Kurdish chiefs with Ottoman rule, attacked the area.

At the beginning of the 19th century, hostilities between the Ottomans and the Iranians, continued sporadically, for control over the Region. In 1821, the Iranian army conquered the Region and marched as deep as Bitlis and Van. However the campaign proved inconclusive, and in 1823, a peace treaty was concluded between the two parties in Erzurum, because the outcome on the battlefields was not decisive. With minor adjustments, the 1639 frontiers between the Ottoman empire and Iran which cut through the area inhabited by Kurds, were restored.

It is noteworthy, and unfortunate for them, that the Kurds have, on many an accasion, been beguiled into finding themselves ending up as pawns in the power game for supremacy in the area instead of they, themselves using the rivalry between the powers at war to advance their own objectives. This observation may be attributed to a number of factors, foremost among them being the nature of the terrain of Kurdistan, which constitutes a formidable barrier to communications among the scattered communities (i.e., geographical fragmentation); the strategic position of Kurdistan and it being land-locked and thus isolated from the outside world; the tribal (and, to some extent at an early period, nomadic) structure of the society, not per se, but more because of the relatively small size of the tribes (i.e., social and political fragmentation), and the non-emergence of a large, powerful tribe, that could impose its authority and unite the other lesser tribes; the rivalry among the Kurds on the basis of religious sectarianism (Shiis versus Sunnis), which was exploited by the rival powers in the area (the Ottomans being Sunnis and the Safawis, Shiis); and the non-emergence of a leader who could rally and unite them behind a common cause (political or religious). However, the most decisive single factor frustrating Kurdish attempts to achieve statehood, and fulfill their aspirations, is that their homeland is land-locked and the surrounding states have their own Kurdish minorities. Within this area, the Kurds find themselves in a situation of "strangulation", when neighbouring states agree to supress their national movement, which they always have done, except for short periods of time for tactical purposes. The Kurds have repeately been in such a situation, and there is no reason to assume that they would not have a similar experience in the future (unless they act in unison, rather than in isolation from each other, and unless they rid themselves of their political and social and geographical fragmentation). Therefore, even if the Kurds seek the support of any of the neighbouring states, they (the Kurds), in the final analysis would end up finding themselves exchanging one overlord for another, or being sold out, or abandonned by the power supporting (or more correctly pretending to support) them, when this power would be able to strike a deal with the Kurds' adversaries; and thus the Kurds end up being just pawns. For the Kurdish people to achieve their aspirations, two conditions must obtain: first, the Kurds in general, rather than each community in its respective part of Kurdistan, must rely on themselves, their own local resources, and

their concerted efforts; and secondly, a State or government (that has no Kurdish community of its own) support their case and be committed to it, until they achieve their aspirations. So far the Kurds have not been able or fortunate to find such a state for various reasons — other peoples or movements have been more fortunate than the Kurds (Bangla Desh — India, Eritrea — many Arab states, and Cypriot Turks — Turkey, for example). The first condition is necessary but, in the circumstances of the Kurds, not sufficient, unless a drastic upheaval in the area's — Middle East — conditions takes place that leads to the change of the map of the area, as happened after World War One. Another factor at play here is that the states keeping the Kurds in bonds, are supported in their efforts, to prevent them from breaking these bonds, by the great or super powers of one colouring or another. As Jenkins puts it, "Given the way the new states have been created, there are likely to be secession movements like Biafra, the Kurds, Jamaica, Nagaland and Bahr-el-Ghazal in the Sudan. Since none of these new states has [had] a large army, the reaction to these secessionist attempts depends almost entirely on the rich states and their willingness to supply arms. This in turn depends on the economic and strategic interests of the rich states." (Jenkins, 1971, 52). The Kurds in Iraq and Biafra are two recent examples; the Iraqi and Nigerian governments were first supplied with arms by Britain, their colonial creator, and later by the Soviet Union, in their drive to suppress and crush the Kurdish and Biafran movements respecitively.

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As Eagleton expresses it, "By the beginning of the nineteenth century the "wild Koord" entered the tales told by missionaries, archeologists, and those curious travellers from Europe who wanted to investigate, often on behalf of their governments, the inner reaches of a disintegrating Ottoman empire . . . This remarkable and romantic era of western penetration began . . ." (Eagleton, 1963, 4).

The Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II (1808–1839) pursued a policy of centralization more extreme than his predecessors, aimed at tighter control over remote provinces, in order to tighten the "tax screw" on them. As a result of this policy, the power and authority of local chiefs and princes were diminished, and the discontent among the populace mounted. What Kurdish petty states or principalities survived the previous liquidation, were suppressed by the new policy. The economic situation was very hard and taxes harsh. The combination of these two factors and the desire on the part of Kurdish leaders to assert Kurdish autonomy (and independence) led to the outbreak of the 1853 and 1880 revolts.

The former, led by Yazdansher, broke out in the Hakkari (and Botan) province of the Region. It spread rapidly all over the Region and covered an area extending from Lake Van to Baghdad, far afield from the Region. The forces of the uprising numbered an estimated 100,000 men in 1855. (P. I. Averianov, Tiphlis, 1900, 148–149; quoted in Ghassemlou, 1965, 40).

The latter revolt was led by Obeydollah, who was striving to establish an autonomous (or independent) Kurdish state. The revolt spread over the whole area, stretching from Lake Van in the Region, to Lake Urmia in Iranian Kurdistan. When advised to massacre the Christian population of the area under the revolt's control, Obeydollah declared that "the Turks need us only as a counterbalance to the Christians, and when there are no Christians, they will turn the reprisals on ourselves". (Nikitine, 1956, 189; quoted in Ghassemlou, 1965, 40). Subsequent events during the Ottoman era, the Young Turks' regime and Republican Turkey, have shown that Obeydollah's suspicions concerning Turkish intentions towards the Kurds, were fully justified and his foresight correct, as shown by the elimination of the Armenian Christians from Turkey and then the turning of their

prejudice and chauvinism on the Kurdish people in Turkey.

However, these were not the only revolts and uprisings that broke out in the Region and other parts of Kurdistan during the course of the 19th century. In Lutsky's jargon, "An endless wave of uprisings of the Kurdish feudal lords swept the north [of present day Iraq]". (Lutsky, 1969, 141).

This period of Kurdish history marks the inception of national consciousness, in the modern European sense of the term, among the Kurdish people and the beginning of attempts on the part of some Kurdish leaders to throw off the yoke of foreign rule and to achieve autonomy or independence and liberation and the right to self-determination. Prior to this period the concept of nationalism had not appeared in the Region (and the Middle East in general) because contacts with Europe were still weak. The dominant form of consciousness had been religious — Moslims versus non-Moslims, rather than Kurds versus non-Kurds, and tribal.

This period was also a critical era in the Kurdish history and future. It was during this time that the European powers' interests and future intentions in the Middle East and towards the Kurdish (and other) national questions were beginning to shape. In a joint statement, forwarded to the Ottoman government, by the governments of Russia, Britain, France and other European countries on September 7, 1880 (in reply to a previous statement by the Ottoman government, on the situation of Armenians living in the eastern areas of the empire, where they constituted an estimated 17 % of the total population) these European governments demanded from the Ottoman government that "Neither should the Kurdish nomadic elements, living in the mountains and coming to the valleys, settled by Christians only to cause anarchy, be included in the statistical reports that fix the majority population in each locality". (Fray, 1933, 161; quoted in Ghassemlou, 1965, 42). It is, indeed, strange to suggest the exclusion of the Kurdish population, from population censuses pertaining to the areas concerned, just because they were nomadic. It implies the absurd proposition that the way of life of a community, determines its inclusion or exclusion from population census statistics.[149])

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In his attempt to bring the Kurdish population and tribes under his control, the Ottoman Sultan Abd al-Hamid II (1876–1909) organized irregular cavalry units made up mostly of Kurds in 1891. The commanding officers of these units were tribal chiefs who

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149) Of course, the real issue was something else. The ambitious, imperial European powers were envisaging their future policy towards and sharing of the Ottoman Empire's territories. It seems that they did not see in the Kurds (see quotation from Eagleton above) a potential ally or co-operator, or the Kurds were so influenced by religion that their leaders refused to cooperate with the non-Moslim ("infidel") European powers. Therefore, looking at it in retrospect it may be said that this lack of cooperation — or colaboration — subsequently seemed to be their biggest mistake, under the so far most opportune circumstances. This is so because a distant colonial power is, however hard the struggle may be, much easier to get rid of, than a contiguous one — the overthrow of the former is generally hailed as "national liberation", whereas the overthrow of the latter is generally, unless successful, denounced as "separatism".

This basic attitude of the European powers towards the Kurds, and the Kurdish national question, has basically remained unchanged to day. For these powers, the Kurdish question has been marginal even to their policies in the Middle East. As a matter of fact, these powers have been the reason for the further division of the Ottoman controlled areas of Kurdistan into three parts — among Turkey, Syria and Iraq. As a result, the Kurds became more fragmented, numerically reduced in each of these states, politically remote and marginal, and economically separated from each other. These factors have made the Kurdish question even more complex and difficult to solve than ever. Moreover, the Kurdish question in each of these countries has become "untouchable" "internal affairs" of the states involved. These states — some of them set up by the colonialists (Kelidar, 1975, and Jenkins, 1971, 29) — have excelled the colonialists in their policies towards, and oppression of, the Kurds.

had received military ranks. (Arfa, 1966, 24). However, these cavalries were not trusted even by those who had created them. This fact can be discerned from Article 28 of the 1895 Act establishing these units, which reads, "carrying of weapons and wearing uniforms by hussars of the Hamidias [i.e., the irregular units] outside training time is forbidden. Outside this time, hussars of the Hamidias shall be summoned before regular courts." (Fray, 1933, 171; quoted in Ghassemlou, 1965, 41). This setup was one of the methods, used by the Ottoman rulers, to effectively control the Kurds, by controlling their leaders by various setups.

Some Kurds seized upon the circumstances arising from the Young Turks' seizure of power in Istanbul, and the removal of Sultan Abd al-Hamid in 1908, and began to expand their efforts aimed at the creation of an independent or autonomous Kurdish state. Periodicals were published, and cultural and political associations were established at home and abroad, with the objective of formulating and spreading Kurdish political demands and aspirations. However, the policy of the Young Turks, towards national minorities in the empire, proved more myopic, chauvinistic and repressive than that of their predecessors, the Ottoman Sultans, whom the Young Turks held responsible for the empire's backwardness and disintegration. The Young Turks pursued a policy of forcibly Turkifying (or Turkicizing) and exterminating the national minorities in the empire, including the Kurds. In addition, and seizing upon the conditions arising from the retreat of Ottoman troops, in the face of Russian troop advances, in the eastern stretches of the empire, the Young Turks' government forcibly displaced and deported more than an estimated 700,000 Kurds from their places of domicile; many of them, however, did not outlive the ordeal of their forcible deportation, to the central and western areas of Turkey. (Nikitine, 1956, 196; quoted in Ghassemlou, 1965, 44).

During the course of World War I, a secret agreement was concluded and signed between Britain, France and Russia on April 26, 1916, according to Fisher (Fisher, 1968, 370), or in May of the same year, according to Ghassemlou (Ghassemlou, 1965, 43); according to this agreement, approximately the present villayats (i.e., provinces or governorates) of Mardin, Urfa and Adiyaman were to be seized by France (in addition to other territories in the Middle East) and the rest of the Region by Russia (besides other territories). This agreement later came to be known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, after the foreign ministers of the U.K. and France, respectively. However, the Agreement was made public and denounced by the new Soviet regime in Russia.

In 1920, the Sèvres Agreement was concluded between the governments of the U.K., France, Greece, Italy, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium, Japan, Hidjaz, and Armenia, on the one hand, and the Turkish government, on th other. A Kurdish representative attended the Sèvres Conference. According to the Agreement, the victorious Allies recognized Kurdish demands for political independence, as can be clearly seen in Section III, Articles 62, 63 and 64 of the Agreement.

However, as always is the case, agreements or no agreements, political decisions and games are determined, and played, on the basis of the relative power, the parties engaged in the political game, can muster and wield. The seizure of power in Turkey by Mustafa Kemal — himself one of the Young Turks and a military man — and the abolition of the Sultanate in 1922, altered the power equation in the area in favour of the Turkish regime, (which disapproved of the agreement) and thus rendered the Sèvres Agreement a scrap of paper. The Western Allies were in no mood to enforce it, because of World War I and its aftermath worries and because the new regime in Turkey found a strong supporter in the new Soviet government.

The Sèvres Agreement was replaced, after prolonged negotiations (during the course of which the Turkish delegation used all its

ingenuity and deceit and double-talk capabilities, to suppress any direct reference in the new agreement to the Kurds or other national minorities in Turkey, and their rights in explicit and concrete terms) with a new agreement at the Lausanne Conference on July 24, 1923. According to the new Agreement, the territory, which was at the time de facto occupied, by Turkish troops, was recognized as forming part of the new state of Turkey. The Kurdish question was never mentioned in the text, the Agreement merely stating in a vague fashion that cultural and religious rights of minorities in Turkey will be respected by the Turkish government (and by calling the Kurds "mountain Turks", Turkish governments seem to have convinced themselves that the Kurds are not, or do not belong to the category of, a minority!) (Vanly, 1971, 23–26).

Shortly after seizing power, the Kemalists were in breach of all the pledges and promises they had made to the Kurds, during Turkey's "War for Independence", in return for the Kurds' support and active participation in that war, on the side of the Kemalists. As Ghassemlou points out, the declaration forming part of the so-called "National Pact" of 1920, greatly emphasized the rights of national minorities in the country, (Ghassemlou, 1965, 50) in order to win the Kurds' support for, and active participation in, the war efforts. The Kurds' basic mistake (repeated several times in their modern history) was their acceptance of the (mostly oral) vague and general promises made by the Kemalists at face value, rather than insisting on concrete (and written) commitments. This has been done by the Kurdish leaders in good faith – it seems – in order not to appear to be too demanding and intransigent in a time of "national" crisis, and because these leaders – faithful to their traditional warriors code seem to have genuinely believed in these vague, general (and oral) promises and pledges. (It might have also been done in order that they may be able to demand more later than sooner; however, the basic fault with this tactics is that the Kurds would always be weaker, vis-à-vis, a triumphant and well-established government, than with one bidding for or newly coming to power).

The more consolidated the Kemalist regime became, the fiercer became its attack on, and denial of, the national, political and human rights of the Kurdish people in Turkey.

The Turkish government introduced, or actually re-introduced, the old, medieval Ottoman policy of Turkification, a policy which aimed at the destruction of the national entity and identity of the Kurdish people (ethnocide). The "National Pact" referred to above, proclaimed independence and liberty for all areas inhabited by a Turkish majority, and entrusted the fate of the remaining parts of the Ottoman empire to a vote. (Jäschke, 1933, 101–116; quoted in Brockelmann, 1960, 440). However, no such vote has ever taken place, to determine the fate of the Region, nor has the Turkish majority in the Region's population been ascertained; all that has happened was de facto military occupation, resulting in several subsequent resistance movements against this occupation.

National oppression, political absolutism, economic harshness (such as a great rise in prices and the disappearance of many basic commodities from the market) and broken pledges and promises, were among the factors that contributed to the break out of the 1925 revolt by the Kurdish people in Turkey, which spread all over the Region. (Mudhir, al-Ta'akhi, June 25, 1972). The aims of the revolt were the restoration of the national, cultural, human and political rights of the Kurdish people in Turkey, the establishment of autonomy and the improvement of conditions in the Kurdish area in Turkey. The revolt is often mis-presented and dismissed as a rebellion by reactionary religious and tribal leaders, to restore the Sultanate or Caliphate in Turkey. This is usually done by over-emphasizing the Kurdish leaders' demands for the restoration of the Caliphate – which was then a popular de-

mand — and playing down or ignoring the main demands of the rebellion, namely, the political and national rights of the Kurds in the country. This mis-presentation is actually a repetition of Turkish propaganda and ignorance of the Kurdish side's points of view. The leaders of the revolt did actually seize upon the discontent, arising among the populace, from the abolition of the Caliphate, but their objectives were clearly to obtain autonomy for the Kurdish area and restore the Kurdish people's lost rights. This fact was admitted, albeit obliquely, even by the authorities in Turkey. This can clearly be seen, inter alia, in some of the statements made by the chairman of the military court, which tried and passed the death sentences on 53 of the leaders of the revolt at the close of the trial. He declared during the trial, on June 28, 1925, that "Some of you have made the administrative misusage of government authority, others the defence of the Caliphate, a pretext for the revolt, but all of you were at one, in the matter of creating independent Kurdistan". (Rambout, 1947, 27; quoted in Ghassemlou, 1965, 51).[150])

In contrast to the (mis) presentation of the 1925 revolt as a mere reactionary, religious, rather than national, movement, Nehru saw the events in their proper context and perspectives and with open-mindedness. He saw the revolt as a genuine national movement and an expression or manifestation against oppression and for freedom. He further saw the hypocracy of the Turkish regime's policy towards the Kurds, who were demanding the same rights the peoples of Turkey had fought for. National sentiments and aspirations seem to have been considered by the regime in Turkey — as well as, later, in the other states having Kurdish populations — as it exclusive privilege and prerogative which the Kurds have no right of thinking of having. Nehru expressed this as follows, "So the Turks who had only recently been fighting for their own freedom, crushed the Kurds, who sought theirs. It is strange how a defensive nationalism develops into an aggressive one, and a fight for freedom becomes one for dominion over others. In 1929 there was another revolt by the Kurds, and again it was crushed, for the time being at least. But how can one crush for ever a people who insist on freedom and are prepared to pay the price for it." (Nehru, 1935, 1108; quoted in Ghassemlou, 1965, 51).

The large punitive expeditionary forces dispatched to the Region were used against the Kurdish population at large and reflected the severity with which the Turkish government dealt with the events. A total of 206 villages were destroyed, 8,758 houses burnt,

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150) Reading Puntila and Jutikkala, one becomes impressed by the many parallels and similarities, between the position of Finland vis-à-vis her neighbours and the aspirations and demands of the people of Finland, and that of Kurdistan with her neighbours, and the national aspirations of the Kurdish people. The most salient similarities between the two cases are briefly:

(a) Being situated between two (strong) powers.
(b) Being sparsely populated and rich in natural resources, they "had become a coveted prize of aggressive foreign powers."
(c) The weakness of their political organization has been due to the sparseness of their settlements.
(d) The division of the Finns and Kurds into two "groups", with each siding with one of the powers in case of conflicts — the eastern Finns with Novgorod (or Russia) and the western Finns with Sweden; the eastern Kurds with the Safawis and the western and northern Kurds with the Ottomans).
(e) The division of the people being decided on the battlefield (the battle of Neva of 1240 — for the Finns — and of Caldiran of 1514 — for the Kurds) and later legitimized by treaties (the peace treaty of 1323 in the former and the Treaty of Erzurum of 1639 in the latter). "The battle of the Neva proved to be a turning point, for it... sealed the division of the Finnish people." (Jutikkala, 1962, 27); the Battle of Caldiran and the Treaty of Erzurum have "set a fatal tradition of Kurdish division." (Eagleton, 1963, 4).
(f) An interesting aspect of the position of Finland before independence is the often repeated charge of separatism levelled against the people of Finland every time they tried to affirm their being Finns and not something else and reaffirm their autonomy. The same charge is directed against the Kurds whenever they try to assert their being Kurds and not Arabs, Turks or Persians, or demand autonomy.

and 15,200 people killed. (Rambout, 1947, 28; quoted in Ghassemlou, 1965, 52). Such was the atmosphere created by the government and its idea-propagating apparatuses, that the "*Vakit*" newspaper could write with impunity in May, 1925, that "there is no Kurdish problem [in Turkey] where a Turkish bayonet appears". (*Vakit*, May 7, 1925; quoted in Ghassemlou, 1965, 52). Although this statement is obviously pompous and was at the time probably meant to boost morales among the rank and file, it does reflect the vanity of the regime and its militaristic approach to the Kurdish question. This approach has not, as a matter of fact, been exclusively Turkish; it had been followed earlier — by the Ottoman Sultans and the British occupation forces in Iraqi Kurdistan — and later as well — in Iraq and Iran. This militaristic approach to the Kurdish question is the common denominator among the countries of the Middle East having Kurdish populations, notwithstanding (false) pretentions to the contrary.

S. Ustüngel, a Turk and an author, who eye-witnessed parts of the measures adopted by the Turkish government and her troops in dealing with the Kurdish population, describes vividly how the government was trying to solve the Kurdish question in the country; he relates that "We observed villagers returning from police and gendarme stations unshattered, though many of them were covered with wounds. As to violence towards people, the Kemalists, have surpassed even that of the bloody sultans; they excel in cruelty practised on the national minorities which they Turkify by force. They have expelled the Lazas from their districts and kill Kurds on a mass scale, just as they did in the case of the Armenians. They have murdered already one hundred thousand Kurds, set fire and ravaged thousands of Kurdish villages. The villages that have been razed to the ground, were declared "prohibited territory", yet these "prohibitions" cannot help the Ankara government trying to conceal the traces of their bloody policy. Ibrahim Tallig was the first general inspector and governor in Kurdistan [in Turkey]. His punitive expeditions ravaged the whole area . . . Gendarme were leading Kurds out of the prison, shot them and then returned. Afterwards they sold the silk belts of the shot Kurdish boys in the prison." (Quoted in Ghassemlou, 1965, 51). Such were the methods of dealing with the villagers and boys, i.e., the civilian, non-combatant population of the Kurdish area; as for those who participated in the revolt, the severity and cruelty were even more exemplary and, one might expect, would have been envied and highly admired by Hulago and Tamerlane were they alive. However, it ought not to be misunderstood that the use of cruel and harsh methods in dealing with the Kurdish population at large during times of unrest is confined to the Turkish regimes and army; similar methods have bee used against the Kurds in Iraq — by the British occupation troops, by the Royal Air Force after World War II, and by the Iraqi armed forces on several occasions — and against the Kurds in Iran. It seems that the fundamental objective of these methods is to frighten the Kurds into resignation and implant the sense of hopelessness among them and to deter any contemplation that they could change their status quo — i.e., the objestive is to achieve a "once for all" solution.

In 1930, another revolt broke out in the Region. The birth place of the revolt was the Ararat area in the province of Agri, and spread over vast areas. It was led by Ihsan Nuri, himself an ex-officer in the Turkish army who took part in the "War for Independence" under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. The Turkish government was in close cooperation with neighbouring governments in containing and finally suppressing the revolt. The methods used in putting down the revolt were as cruel as the previous one, only more modern. Arfa expresses this fact in his military terminology when stating that "If the plane could do little harm to the entrenched and well-concealed Kurdish sharpshooter, they severly strafed the encampments, inflicting heavy casualties on women and

children and on the flocks." (Arfa, 1966, 41). "Preliminary estimates" put the number of villages and houses destroyed during the course of the revolt at 165 villages and 6,816 houses. (Ghassemlou, 1965, 54).

It is noteworthy that Kurdish armed struggles, are often claimed by their adversaries as being incited by some foreign power(s), whether close or distant. Although it is in the nature of the events that other powers take an interest in what happens in the area and may try to exploit these happenings, to advance their own interests, all Kurdish armed struggles have been the expression of genuine and intrinsic grievances and aspirations. The notion, that is sometimes put forward, that the Kurds are only pawns or a disruptive element in the process of nation building, in the area is both vulgar and pretentious. The states which claim to be nation building, are themselves, either the creation of the colonialists, or imposition by virtue of might not right, or legitimacy. What is created by the colonialists to serve their own vested interests, or is imposed by might alone, is not necessarily in the best interests of all the peoples involved. Some of these states are, strictly speaking, themselves, breakaway states, separated from the Ottoman Empire by the English and French colonialists. Others closely cooperated with these colonialists in suppressing Kurdish revolts — Iraq used the Royal Air Force of Britain and Turkey sought and obtained French cooperation, in suppressing the Kurdish revolt, by using Syrian soil — then under France — to outflank Kurdish forces and attack them from the rear. The Sadabad Pact, formed with the blessing of Great Britain and her participation, among these states is another event in point. It seems only appropriate to quote Jenkins; he observes that, "The large majority of poor states [underdeveloped countries] were created arbitrarily in London or Paris, Brussels or Washington. As a consequence, many of them are not nations in the European sense, but administrative areas held together by an army." (Jenkins, 1971, 30).

During the 1930's, the Turkish government intensified its policy of forciby Turkifying the Kurds. In May, 1932, a law was passed by which thousands of Kurds were deported from their places of domicile to areas in the western and central, i.e., the Turkish inhabited, areas, of the country, where they were to constitute no more than 5 % of the population of those areas. In addition, and according to the same law, "those speaking a mother tongue other than Turkish were forbidden to rebuild villages and districts, and restore craftsmen, clerk, or other groupings. According to the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers, the Minister of Interior will have the right to dissolve these groups, including those existing till nowadays." (Rambout, 1947, 33; quoted in Ghassemlou, 1965, 58).

Hand in hand with the military punitive expeditions, the Turkish government employed various methods to distort and mispresent the case of the Kurdish people in the country and abroad, and to justify and legitimize its policies in dealing with the problem. The government's spokesmen abroad, were trying their best to defend the government's harsh actions against the Kurdish population at large. Sekban for example, suggests that "Sincerely, why be afraid of becoming assimilated; the position of the weak, assimilated by the powerful, has always proved better. It is enough if force is not used." (Sekban, 1933; quoted in Ghassemlou, 1965, 58). It is only surprising that Sekban does not consider the use of punitive expeditionary forces against civilians and the destruction of villages and the burning of houses as use of force; besides, he seems to understand no other language but the language of "powerful" and "weak". Rachid, another apologist of the Turkish regime, goes even further and claims a stance for the Turkish and Ottoman governments which diametrically contravene known evidence, observations and data. He alleges that "History has given proof that, as to Turkey, from the very beginning, per-

manently and unchangeably, the respect for the rights of the minorities has never been violated nor disputed." (Rachid, 1935, 4, 15 and 17; quoted in Ghassemlou, 1965, 59).

In June, 1937, yet another revolt by the Kurdish people broke out in the Region, in the province of Dersim, as one consequence of which even the name of the province was subsequently changed to Tunceli.

It seems that all her military might and cruel methods and control over the idea-propagating apparatuses did not suffice; the President of Turkey requested from the Turkish National Assembly in 1936 that "It is essential to give the government absolute and extensive authority" to deal with the Kurdish people and their national case and "in order to remove and eradicate this deterrent ulcer and to enable immediate decisions to be taken". (N. Dersimi, *Kurdistan tarihinde*, 258; quoted in Ghassemlou, 1965, 59). Thus the (effective) demands by Kurds for their national, political and human rights are considered by the Ankara regime as an "ulcer" needing eradication, as do the other regimes in the area.

A letter dated November 20, 1937, presented by some of the inhabitants of Dersim (later Tunceli) to the League of Nations, casts some light on the nature and causes of the "deterrent ulcer", the President of Turkey was referring to. The letter states, inter alia, that the Turkish government "closes Kurdish schools, prohibits the usage of the Kurdish language, removes the words Kurds and Kurdistan from scientific works, uses barbarous methods when forcing the Kurds, including women and girls, to work on military projects in Anatolia, deports the Kurds in groups of ten people into Turkish districts where they are supposed to form a mere 5 % of the population . . ." (Ibid.)

The leader of the 1937 uprising was sentenced to death and executed for "robbery"!

With all the military punitive expeditions and the idea-propagating techniques, the government of Turkey did not feel secure enough in the Region and has been apprehensive as to what the future may bring as a result of its harsh, uncompromising policy towards the Kurdish population. This apprehension was — and still is — shared by neighbouring states having Kurdish populations, such as Iran and Iraq (and Syria). This common apprehension of the Kurdish cause has led the above-mentioned parties to, inter alia, conclude, under the auspices of Britain, an agreement to create the Saadabad Pact on June 8, 1937. Article 7 of the Pact reads that "Each of the high signatories, vows itself to make provision in its respective sphere, against the forming or functioning of armed gangs, societies or organizations that aim at overthrowing the present institutions, responsible for guaranteeing order or security of any section of the opposite party's borderline". (Gavan, 1958, 35; quoted in Ghassemlou, 1965, 62).

The World War II period as well as the post-war period has not brought about any significant changes in the policy of the Turkish governments towards the Region and its Kurdish population. The very existence of the Kurds as a nation or nationality has been denied; even their physical existence has been disputed and questioned by the advocates of Turkish nationalism and of Turkey fancied as being a nation-state, having one and only (Turkish) nationality. These ideas were expressed by the Turkish daily *"Son Posta"* on April 11, 1946, when it stated that "In Turkey no Kurdish minority ever existed either nomadic or settled, with national consciousness or without it". (Quoted in Ghassemlou, 1965, 62). This tenet, expressed by the *"Son Posta"*, seems to be the gospel of official Turkish policy towards the Kurds. As Arfa acknowledges, "The [Kurdish] people lost the right to call themselves Kurds, being discouraged from using their language even on non-official occasions." (Arfa, 1966, 45). Besides, many restrictions have been imposed on the Kurdish population; even the wearing of Kurdish national costume by men became a punishable offence.

The civilian government of Turkey was overthrown by the armed forces on May 27, 1960, and a military one was formed to replace it. However, this change of government did not bring about any fundamental alterations in Turkey's policy, vis-à-vis, the Kurdish people, except for some relative relaxation, for a short period of time, on cultural activities. Nonetheless, in 1961, the government re-imposed its strict policy once again; 8 "exiled" Kurds were arrested on charges of being "reactionaries, making communist propaganda and seeking an independent Kurdistan". (Kinnane, 1964, 32). It is indeed difficult to understand how and why reactionary elements make communist propaganda. In April, 1961, the President of the Republic of Turkey, General Guersel, declared that "no nation exists with a personality of its own, calling itself Kurdish, and that the Kurds were not only compatriots, but also racial brothers of the Turks". (Ibid). (Actually, Kurdish belongs to the Iranian branch of the Indo-European languages, whereas Turkish is a subfamily of the Altaic languages.) In response, demonstrations broke out in Mardin, Deykir, Diyarbakir, Siverek, Bitlis and Van, in the Region, on May 8, 1961, in which the demonstrators are reported to have been carrying signs reading, "We are not Turks, we are Kurds... The Turkish government must recognize our national rights". *(Kurdish Facts;* quoted in Kinnane, 1964, 33). The same source reports that 315 people were killed and 754 wounded during the demonstrations.

Within the context of the second half of the 20th century these events may seem to have a touch of unreality and tragicomedy, but, however, such are the realities of the situation in the country and the Middle East in general. To assert or just declare one's ethnic identity, dictated by virtue of birth, several lives have to be lost! Besides, in the eyes of the authorities a Kurd is neither a Kurd nor a Turk — or Arab or Persian in the other countries. He is not a Kurd because he is called or considered a "mountain Turk" in Turkey, an "Arab and Moslim" in Iraq and Syria and an "Iranian" in Iran; neither is he a Turk, Arab or Iranian, since he cannot belong into these nationalities by virtue of birth, but also because he is not really accepted into these nationalities because of their being exclusive and because there is in them very little, or no, room for those who are not Arabs, Turks or Persians, and because he is always suspect.


Since 1961, the situation of the Kurdish people in Turkey and of the Region has not changed. However, two important developments deserve mentioning. The first was the recognition of the existence of the Kurdish people in Turkey, by a then legal, political party (for the first time in the history of Republican Turkey), namely, the "Labour Party of Turkey" or "Turkish Labour Party". In its Fourth Congress held on October 29–31, 1970, the Party recognized that "the Kurdish people exist in the east of Turkey". It admitted that from the start the various governments of Turkey have pursued "a policy of oppression, of terror and assimilation, which often took the form of bloody operations and persecutions". The Party acknowledged that the "reasons for the backwardness of the region inhabited by the Kurdish people, in comparison to the other regions, are the social and economic policy carried out" by these governments, which "took into consideration the fact that this region is inhabited by the Kurdish people", and the working of the law of unequal development of capitalism. (Vanly, 1971, 59).

However, the recognition by the Party of the simple fact that Kurds in Turkey are Kurds was (one of the) main reason(s) for the Turkish government to prosecute and declare the Party illegal on July 20, 1971. The day of its judgment soon followed. On August 19, 1971, the Party's leadership was "brought before the Third Military Court of Ankara MLH [Martial Law Headquarters] on charges of "following separatist policies"! *(File on Turkey,* 1972, 166).

The second development is the March 12, 1971, "events" or the disguised military take-

over of power in Turkey. Ostensibly, one of the reasons generating the "events" was the development of "Kürtcülük", or Kurdish movement, in the eastern provinces of Turkey. (Vanly, 1971, 62). Thus, the Turkish generals have, on the one hand, denied the very physical existence of a Kurdish nation and people in the country, but, on the other hand, have not hesitated to or refrained from talking about a "Kurdish movement" when such a reference to the Kurds served their own purposes.[151])

The above historical outline is, admittedly, sketchy and far from being systematic; there are many gaps in it that need to be bridged, and many allusions which require further clarification. These shortcomings are due both to the large grounds to be covered in the limited space available and to the lack of systematic and thorough researcth and studies of Kurdish history — and other aspects of life.



Map 10: Area having a majority (or predominantly) Kurdish population (Kurdistan)

151) It would be interesting and revealing to study the Turkish government attitude and policy, towards the Turkish community in Cyprus and the island as a whole, and compare them system of government, and even independence. with its attitudes and policy towards the Kurds in Turkey; its invasion of the island has achieved what it has been denouncing the Kurds for trying to achieve, namely, autonomy and a federal

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Errata:

page 43, Map 1: Makkari = Hakkari
page 69, map: Map 4; petrolium = petroleum
page 73, map: Map 5; petrolium = petroleum; Manufaturing = Manufacturing
page 88, map: Map 8; Kanya = Konya; migrants to Malatya: 3.6 %
page 89, map: Map 9; migrants to: Diyarbakir: 25.4 %, Elazig: 15.5 %, Siirt: 15.2 %, Urfa: 8.2 %, and Van: 6.5 %

Errata

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110	2	—		two lines immediately under Table 20 should be transferred to the very	top of the same column
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115	2	f.n.	14	language).	language.
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139	1	f.n. 149	12	colaboration	collaboration
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144	2	1	1	1930's	1930s
147	1	f.n. 151	5	this line should be shifted to the bottom of column 2 of the same f.n.	
148	2	Gavan,...		Kurdisan	Kurdistan
148	2	Hämäläinen,...		Nationalitets Kampen	Naionalitetskampen