Untold Histories of the Middle East

Recovering voices from the 19th and 20th centuries

Edited by
Amy Singer,
Christoph K. Neumann and
Selçuk Akşin Somel



SOAS/Routledge Studies on the Middle East

Untold Histories of the Middle East

Much traditional historiography consciously and unconsciously glosses over certain discourses, narratives, and practices. This book examines silences or omissions in Middle Eastern history at the turn of the twenty-first century, to give a fuller account of the society, culture and politics of the period.

With a particular focus on the Ottoman Empire, Turkey, Egypt, Iran and Palestine, established scholars from within the region consider how and why such silences occur, as well as the timing and motivation for breaking them. Introducing unexpected, sometimes counter-intuitive, issues in history, the chapters examine:

- women and children survivors of the Armenian massacres in 1915
- Greek-Orthodox subjects who supported the Ottoman Empire and the formation of the Turkish republic
- the conflicts among Palestinians during the revolt of 1936–39
- pre-marital sex in modern Egypt
- Arab authors writing about the Balkans
- the economic, not national or racial, origins of anti-Armenian violence
- the European women who married Muslim Egyptians

Drawing on a wide range of sources and methodologies such as interviews, newly discovered archives, fictional accounts and memoirs, each chapter analyses a story and its suppression, considering how their absences have affected our previous understandings of the history of the Middle East.

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Recovering voices from the 19th and 20th centuries

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‘There is not one but many silences, and they are an integral part of the strategies that underlie and permeate discourses.’

Michel Foucault, *History of Sexuality, Vol. I* (1990), p. 27

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Introduction

Re-sounding silent voices

Selçuk Akşin Somel, Christoph K. Neumann and Amy Singer

All history writing chooses to give voice to certain people, ideas, facts, events and places, while consciously or unconsciously silencing others. This is unavoidable, since the historian's craft is predicated on investigation and selection of what to record and report, as a preliminary step toward analysis and explanation. It is all about retrieving absences and silences. In this respect, Middle East history is not different from other histories. They have all glossed over specific discourses, narratives, and practices. While scholarly investigation generally concentrates on topics previously unexplored – that, after all, is the point of research – research projects are often offshoots of well-rehearsed subjects or attempts to apply existing methodologies to new materials. Leaps into the great unknown are rarer, the motivations for them less obvious. This volume aims to present several such leaps, and to reflect as well on the dynamics which have created silence around the topic of each chapter.

Terms such as silence or silencing have a wide range of usage, from interpersonal and inter-family relations to the more public level of societies, states and regimes. At the public level, silencing is generally associated with political and cultural repression and censorship in authoritarian regimes, targeting opposition views. Or, it points to communal control, especially of those violating communal norms. In this general context, silencing is visible and implies regulatory control over dissenting individuals or social groups. Despite repressive measures, the civil population may preserve its own non-official versions of truth in its collective consciousness and memories.[1]

However, silenced political ideas may become so buried among the population that the official versions of truth become immune to political or intellectual challenges. These versions are reinforced through public education. Sources supporting alternative truths may have been physically destroyed. Even more, an important part of the population may feel that it is more comfortable accepting the official versions of truth than the alternatives. Social taboos can effectively prevent the remembering of certain historical facts. In fact, silencing becomes fully effective if realized with the tacit agreement of public opinion.[2] Or, issues to be silenced might be integrated into a more acceptable discourse. Ultimately, the most efficient form of silencing is the one where the issue and even the process of silencing itself are effectively

silenced.[3] Thus, with the passing of time the official truth may become the only historical reality.

The above-mentioned arguments are relevant for discussing the silencing of certain types of historical writing. Despite the fact that silencing is associated mainly with power relations, silences in historiography may not all result from intentional silencing. For example, some relevant historical questions cannot be asked, due to lack of sources or the dictates of intellectual fashion. There is also the basic problem, that we cannot reconstruct the past *wie es eigentlich gewesen*. The documents that reach us, even in the most well preserved condition, ordered in accessible collections, are far from being able to represent the past in a complete way. Historians face the problem of selective preservation of archival documents, whether the selection is intentional or not. This selection again may be closely related to power relations within the society or community in question.

Documents (either written or material) present another problem, since they are not politically neutral, but are themselves recorded through structures of power. This condition itself is an important aspect of silencing weaker or more passive groups and individuals in any power relation.

A further issue concerns the course of history. Looking from the present day to the past, we may be able to reconstruct a series of plausible causalities and deterministic developments. Indeed, the construction of plausible narratives about the past is very much what one calls 'writing history'. However, those historical actors on whom we build up causal relations, have at times themselves faced different and equally valid possibilities of action. The silencing of historical agents has depended greatly on the socio-political success of their choices: those choices leading to dead ends were discredited, their authors silenced.

Thus, history and silencing really cannot be separated from one another. If there were a lack of silence in the absolute sense, there would perhaps be no history at all. The challenge is to create academic and cultural conditions which allow for a pluralism of voices. To the extent that a universally valid reconstruction of the past is impracticable, a multiplicity of narratives is required in order to reach what used to be called 'historical truth' by historians who regarded their work with more confidence and optimism than appears possible today.

From the earliest periods of written history, there have been various acts of silencing alternative voices of history. For example, Enlightenment thinkers and philosophers promoted the notion of universal reason. This universalism, which on the one hand promoted critical thinking and scientific rationalization, on the other hand excluded any institution or society which failed to conform to the standards of universal reason. The French philosophers, with the political purpose of attacking the then-prevalent social and political institutions in France, including the church, condemned the medieval past as the 'dark ages.' In their eyes, past European history as well as all historical and contemporary non-European societies, were discredited as being outside

the realms of enlightened West Europe and not conforming to the measure of universal reason.[4] This view continued to prevail after the end of the Enlightenment: according to Hegel, with the exception of China, none of the non-European cultures had the quality of being historical.[5] Other exceptions existed only for those cultures that were somehow integrated into the Western tradition, such as ancient Egyptian, ancient Jewish, and later, North American history. It should also be remembered that the Atlantic-based trade relations of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries created a world economy, with Western Europe at its centre. This reinforced the cultural eurocentrism which affected intellectual trends in most world societies. This eurocentrism remained undisputed and succeeded in silencing the histories of most of the world's societies until the second half of the twentieth century.[6]

Romanticism was the earliest movement in Europe that succeeded in breaking the Enlightenment silencing of past voices. From the final decades of the eighteenth century, Romanticism began to express itself in architectural and artistic forms inspired by human emotions and individual experiences with nature as well as by the ancient and medieval past. Previously despised social customs and folk art were elevated as witnesses of a primordial, essential human truth.[7] In this intellectual atmosphere of the early- to mid-nineteenth century, history as a scientific and academic discipline was formulated for the first time. It was Leopold von Ranke who underlined the necessity of using primary sources to research the past. The main aim of historical research was to understand the past 'as it actually was' (*wie es eigentlich gewesen*), meaning also that each historical moment had to be considered in its own, incommensurable, right.[8] Thus when academic historiography came into being it implied a rupture of the silence imposed by the Enlightenment upon the past and in particular on the 'dark ages' of Europe – a break, however, that was rarely realized by practising historians.

Not surprisingly, von Ranke's formulation of scientific history itself worked to silence certain kinds of past voices. Von Ranke was a political conservative and an ardent supporter of the Prussian monarchy who detested liberal and socialist movements in the German states. In harmony with this political conviction, his view of history remained mainly state-centred.[9] Von Ranke put major emphasis on objectivity in historical narration and one of his measures of objectivity was the use of archival sources for establishing historical data.[10] In his time, however, archives belonged either to the state or to the church. Therefore, though Ranke's position was, without any doubt, a departure from the post-Enlightenment Western master narrative, his emphasis on archival documents reinforced an already existing bias in favour of political, military and diplomatic subjects as the only legitimate subjects of historical research. Because overall literacy was largely confined to the aristocracy, the clergy, and the urban upper strata, the existing written documentation prior to the late nineteenth century was primarily a record of the ruling elite, leaving the remaining society devoid of its own historical voice.

This hegemony of state-centred historiography effectively silenced the past

voices of the peasantry and urban lower classes in the nineteenth century. The industrial revolution in Western Europe and the emergence of an industrial working class encouraged the development of socialist ideologies. Among them, Marxism stressed the essential role of class struggle between the owners of the means of production (slave-owners, land-holding nobility, owners of capitalist ventures) and labourers (slaves, peasants, workers) as the primary dynamic of historical developments. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels not only wrote political and theoretical works, but also undertook historical studies to confirm their political claims.[11] These studies were noteworthy in breaking the historiographical silence of the popular masses and showing that the lower classes actually played crucial roles in historical developments. Marxism, in fact, played a pioneering role in the emergence of two new kinds of historiographies, i.e. social history and economic history.[12]

While a historiography of the working classes was emerging in Europe, another struggle took place in the United States to challenge the established form of history. Even while slavery remained in force, there emerged a group of African-American intellectuals who developed an alternative historiography, voicing the past and the culture of the African-American people.[13] This phenomenon was a precursor to the historiography that emerged in postcolonial Asian and African countries in the later twentieth century.

World War I and World War II, together with international and social developments closely related to these wars, effectively destroyed multiethnic empires and shattered cultural Eurocentrism at the global level. World War I led to the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman empires, as well as to the profound transformation of Germany and Russia. The October Revolution and the emergence of the USSR signified a powerful reaction to the then predominantly European world order. Numerous anti-colonial movements in Asia of the 1920s and 1930s took their inspiration from the Bolshevik regime in Russia. The dissolution of Austria-Hungary created national states in Central and Eastern Europe, which made space for voices to emerge from the past. As for the Ottoman Empire, the long-term process of its disintegration spurred the creation of national states in the Balkans, followed by the Turkish nation state in Anatolia. For the Arabic-speaking parts of the empire, however, World War I did not mean a national settlement, but rather a colonial partition between British and French spheres of influence. While all of these developments permitted the emergence of some new national historical voices, the violent nature of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, combined with colonial interference, led to the silencing of other voices from the past.[14]

The disintegration of the British and French colonial empires and the foundation of new independent states in Asia and Africa following World War II meant that the great majority of the world's sovereign countries were non-European and non-white. This situation weakened the Eurocentrism of academic historiography and spurred the writing of alternative world histories. The anti-colonial thinker Frantz Fanon discussed for the first time the

cultural impact of colonial rule over non-European populations in terms of the alienation of the latter from their own cultures to the extent that they adopted the mentality and culture of the dominant power.[15] Edward Said's *Orientalism* stressed that British and French studies of Oriental cultures engineered a discourse of Western civilizational superiority over the supposedly primitive and fanatical Arab-Islamic world. He offered theoretical tools for the criticism of the Eurocentric cultural hegemony over the non-Western world.[16] This criticism subsequently developed into an academic field, namely postcolonial studies.

Postcolonial studies set out to explore the cultural characteristics of colonized populations and discussed their ordeals in terms of the cultural impact of the metropole nations over the local societies. This approach also became an indispensable theoretical tool-maker for established disciplines such as history, sociology and literary criticism along with burgeoning research fields like gender and minority studies.[17] As a consequence, the effort of former colonized populations to retrieve their silenced histories created new ways to reevaluate European and North American histories and to amplify voices from the European and American past.

At least two common points can be discerned with respect to the emergence of the national historiographies of the Eastern Mediterranean basin and the Middle East. First, the West maintained economic, cultural and political dominance over the region beginning from the late eighteenth century. The British and French colonial presence lasted effectively until 1956 when the Suez Crisis discredited these powers and legitimized secular Arab nationalism among the populations of most Arab countries and populations. As a result of the nationalist upsurge, the European intellectual influence and the socio-cultural manifestations of this influence had to be silenced in the historiography of the time.

Second, with the exception of Iran and Morocco, all of the regional historiographies in the Middle East faced the challenge of dealing with the Ottoman imperial past, either directly or indirectly. Since these historiographies were largely organized to legitimize the process of nation building, they did not readily include the Ottoman heritage as part of the respective national histories. The past voices which did not conform to the imagined form of the national community were effectively silenced. Separate historical traditions emerged, alienated from the recent past of most Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern societies and creating new silences.

It is ironic that the new and qualitatively impressive historiography of the Middle East often comprises research originating in the academic environment of North American and Western European universities.[18] This phenomenon appears rooted in the superior funding offered by these Western institutions as well as in established discursive practices that facilitate innovative – and thus, to some extent, unorthodox – research. At the same time, prevailing power structures of academic knowledge and prestige privilege those who do research and publish in certain places, languages and

scholarly traditions over those in a more peripherical position. In other words, university rankings, citation indices and mechanisms of gratification privilege the research conducted in leading American and other English-language universities, in two ways. First these research environments offer (on average) substantially better material conditions and more secure academic freedom. Second, the prestige of the English-speaking research orbit is a powerful magnet: whoever remains outside risks marginalization and obscurity. The result is an international research agenda that more often reflects the interests of the centre than the potential diversity of multiple nodes in a network of varieties.

In this context, one may note that while eight of the twelve contributors to this volume hold doctoral degrees from Western universities, many are affiliated with universities in two countries of the Middle East, namely Israel and Turkey. The end of the Cold War had an important effect on these two countries, bringing critical internal questions to the fore. If somewhat reluctantly, Israel has had to face the Palestinian question, while Turkey is in a comparable position vis-à-vis the Kurdish problem. For a long time, these issues were officially ignored, although the civil societies in both countries regularly faced them. Similarly, the foundation stories of both nation states are connected to catastrophes: the annihilation of the Anatolian Armenians (*medz yeghern*, 'great catastrophe') and the expulsion of the Palestinians (*al-nakba*, 'disaster'). In both cases, the issue of re-sounding silenced voices from the past has become adoped as an ethical responsibility by some Israeli and Turkish intellectuals.

Ethical convictions are an important factor for many historians who try to make suppressed voices heard. (They may even be the motive for working on a certain historical issue.) However, since history has not developed a unified methodology and an agreed notion of truth, ethical considerations appear as external impositions to the academic framework of the historian. At the same time, the notion that there is history-writing without any contemporary social context is clearly a fiction. Such contexts produce political responsibility, which in its turn has an ethical aspect. Yet the impact of ethical principles on the work of historians is context-bound and not transcendental, and thus impossible to delineate in a definitive manner. Individual historians have specific ethical sensitivities (as distinct from principles), a reality that is reflected in the contributions to this volume.

Recent historiographical trends and untold histories of the Middle East

The development of postcolonial studies signalled the beginning of a new era in global historiography. This new era, which took its full shape in the final decade of the twentieth century, is characterized in general by a critical attitude toward the notion of modernization, political and cultural Eurocentrism, the concept of linear time, the belief in objective truth and historical determinism,

together with a rise of interest in the history of particularities. There is a strong tendency to use models in which social agents are intertwined in a complex set of networks determined by categories related to identity and power, as well as to apply approaches such as deconstruction and discourse analysis. As a consequence, mapping individual historical subjects in a social matrix involves less the use of terms of representativeness, as in previous times, and more that of 'situativeness'.[19] Groups or individuals are no longer understood as acting in the interest of a fixed historical force (such as a class, *raison d'état*, or an ethnic group) but rather appreciated in the ambiguous and unstable totality of all the aspects of life that combine to make up the historical situation in question.

The chapters in the present volume reflect the recent historiographical developments discussed above. Despite the fact that colonial, modernist, nationalist as well as patriarchal pressures, dominant discourses and mental frameworks lead to the silencing of past voices, it is at the same time also equally true that historical generalizations, structuralist approaches and representative arguments constitute an additional methodological reinforcement for silencing those voices from the past which do not conform to such theoretical frameworks. However, it is perhaps not a vain hope that other recent historiographical developments – the post-structuralist trend, the abandonment of the representative approach, the application of discourse analysis and deconstruction approaches as well as the opening of new research vistas with a growing variation of new historical subjects – will provide some methodological impediment against the silencing of past voices. In fact, the chapters in the present volume demonstrate the need to apply a 'methodological pluralism' (à la Feyerabend), i.e. the application of a variety of social scientific, literary critical and cultural studies methodologies together, to overcome silencings in history.[20]

The present volume seeks out voices that were ignored, muted, or distorted, directly or indirectly, as a by-product of the creation of Middle Eastern modernity. The focal questions for the Istanbul workshop from which these papers evolved[21] were: what kinds of silences and absences exist in Middle Eastern historiography? Where can historians find them and to what extent can they recover them? How and why were they created, historically and historiographically? Were these topics consciously suppressed or unconsciously forgotten? What has been the effect of these silences and absences on the modern historiography of the Middle East? And finally, why are the silences identified here being broken now, by whom, and for what purpose?

This framework does not attempt to retrace the shifts in historical research of the late twentieth century – for example, to find silences and absences within the lower strata of societies and cultures. Without underestimating the importance of recovering subaltern voices, popular themes, and the histories of dissenters and the oppressed, absences and silences can also be found elsewhere in society, culture and politics. For instance, diplomatic history and biography have been rather out of fashion among scholars (though they

retain real popular appeal, to judge from the shelves of our bookshops), whereas intellectual history is enjoying something of a renaissance.

In an analytical overview of the chapters, five main factors can be identified in the silencing of historical voices in the Middle East. These factors are: colonialist discourse, modernization theory, nationalist discourse, the cultural frame of patriarchy, and individual and family ('private') reasons.

Silencing due to colonialist discourse

In the chapter 'Looking Behind Hajji Baba of Isfahan', Naghmeh Sohrabi deconstructs the early nineteenth-century British orientalist discourse of the novel *The Adventure of Hajji Baba of Ispahan in England* (1828). The novel depicts the Persian ambassador Mirza Abul-Hasan Khan as a rascal who spent most of his time in London womanizing. Since the author, James Morier, had actually been a private secretary of the British envoy to Tehran and then accompanied the Persian ambassador on his travels to Britain, his novel was perceived in Europe as factual. His portrait of Persians 'as rascals, cowards, puerile villains, and downright fools' and his description of their culture as 'scandalously dishonest and decadent, and their society as violent', contributed to diminishing the political weight of the Qajar state at a time when Persia was threatened by Russian expansionism and needed British political support. This novel, republished in England at least eight times throughout the nineteenth century and therefore widely read, represented a discourse of British colonialism that helped legitimize British involvement in southern Iran in the final quarter of the century. Meanwhile, Mirza Abul-Hasan Khan's own travelogue, the *Hayratnamah* ('Book of Wonders'), observed British society from within an alternative Persian discourse. Yet, it was effectively silenced, both by colonial as well as by modernist Iranian historiography. Sohrabi reads Morier and Mirza Abul-Hasan Khan together, and demonstrates effectively how a British racist and colonial discourse discredited and silenced a Persian statesman and an alternate narrative of the politics of the time.

Liat Kozma, in her chapter 'The Silence of the Pregnant Bride: Non-Marital Sex in Middle Eastern Societies', applies postcolonial and feminist approaches in analysing the evidence of her micro-historical research. She discusses how orientalist discourse served as a means to portray Middle Eastern women as passive and helpless subjects of violent Islamic traditions. Her analysis explores how Western travellers depicted Islamic sexuality in terms of 'women being mere sexual objects or men's property, locked in the harem for the pleasure of their husbands/enslavers.' If premarital sex and pregnancy were discovered by the family or neighbours, the result was 'honour killing' of the girl. Such depictions emphasized to the European public the civilizational superiority of the West and thus provided moral justification for colonial domination over the region. Kozma, on the other hand, insists on the essentializing nature of this representation of violence. She demonstrates

the ways in which it is ahistorical and to a considerable extent counterfactual. Reading judicial records from Egypt from the period of judicial modernization after 1855, she documents premarital relationships as far from exceptional, and, with regard to cases of pregnancies, explores the communal mechanisms that existed to resolve the problem without resorting to traditional authorities. The pregnant bride has remained historically silent because orientalist researchers 'often confused law with practice and legal sanctions with everyday coping with sexual transgression.'

Silencing as part of the modernization discourse

Modernization theory has roots in the ideas of the Enlightenment as well as in the sociological approach of Émile Durkheim. Since World War II, it has envisaged an evolutionary course for underdeveloped countries toward democratically administered market economies of liberal Western style. For the purposes of this volume, crucial components of the modernization process include the development of a nation-state, the organization of a legal-rational bureaucracy together with a regular army, the secularization of society and the emergence of the individualized consumer. In other words, nation-states replace multi-ethnic empires, a modern civil service replaces traditional authority based on custom, and secular schools and courts replace the clergy as a source of culture, education and legal authority.[22] The modernization discourse, supported by the actual economic and political hegemony of the West over the non-Western world, has been so pervasive that for a long time it delegitimized any opposite or alternative discourse.

In the Middle East, the *tanzimat* reforms of the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire constituted an antecedent to the modernization process. During the *tanzimat* era, measures were taken to rationalize the state apparatus and establish a centralized authority within the empire. The idea of loyalty to the state and the sultan, and soon also to the new notion of an 'Ottoman nation', were promoted over traditional loyalties to communities or tribes.[23] However, the discursive hegemony of this modernization process could not eradicate older loyalties, informal networks, autonomous personalities and groups.

In her chapter 'The Ottoman Empire's Absent Nineteenth Century: Autonomous Subjects', Christine Philliou combines a micro-historical approach with discourse analysis to discuss the political activities of Stefanaki Bey, a high-level Ottoman Greek official of ethnic Bulgarian origins. Philliou shows that, despite the centralizing and regulative *tanzimat* reforms, autonomous social networks existed which contradicted the binary oppositions posited between formal and informal sovereignty, or between centralization and decentralization. According to Philliou, these networks help explain the 'split narratives of Ottoman history and the divide between imperial rule and national independence.' Modernization theory considers traditions or informal social structures as inefficient, corrupt or irrational formations. As such, they constitute obstacles to political, social and economic development.

Thus, the modernization discourse effectively created a paradigmatic blindness to autonomous social networks, and in effect silenced a crucial aspect of Ottoman political life in the nineteenth century.

Looking at the Palestinian revolt of 1936–39, Mustafa Kabha focuses on the role of the popular Islamic courts during the Palestinian uprising. These courts, founded outside the aegis of the mandate-sponsored local courts, constituted an attempt at self-administration by a different class of Palestinians, challenging existing autochthonous social hierarchies as well as British hegemony. The courts were established by Palestinians who were not of the predominant classes; they were informal and autonomous, bearing rural, non-urban, non-bourgeois, mainly traditionalist traits. Some of their judges were retired Ottoman judges who had experience in interpreting the Ottoman civil code (the *Mecelle*). The attempt to establish an alternative civil order based on these informal courts was suppressed by the British, partly because of the deterioration and the corruption of the revolt. As might be expected, the colonialist discourse silenced the phenomenon of the courts, but they were also left out of Palestinian historiography. The subaltern court system deeply divided Palestinian society, and together with the non-bourgeois, non-urban, traditionalist and Islamist character of the courts, was not a convenient historical truth for the modernist upper-class secular establishment of the Palestinian diaspora.

In the chapter 'Silent Voices within the Elites: The Social Biography of a Modern Shaykh', Yoav Alon undertakes a biographical study of a tribal shaykh who played a significant role in the early history of Transjordan and the Kingdom of Jordan. Despite the fact that Mithqal al-Fayiz was a prominent personality, there is no academic historical research on him. From the viewpoint of modernists and nationalists, tribes are traditional social institutions and not necessarily attractive as historical research subjects, since they tend to be autonomous and not to comply with central authority, do not necessarily recognize international borders, and do not shy away from collaborating with enemies of the central authority.

Nationalist historiographical silencing

The territorial expanse of the Ottoman Empire included different nationalist trajectories. Within its borders, it was the Greeks – together with the Serbs – who were the first recipients of the European Enlightenment ideas and those of the French Revolution. Their successful Greek war of independence against the Sublime Port resulted in the foundation of the Kingdom of Greece in 1830. However, this kingdom was confined to the Peloponnesus and to Attica, whereas the majority of ethnic Greeks remained inside the borders of the Empire. This situation encouraged the Greek kingdom to pursue the long-term irridentist policy known as *I Megali Idea* (the 'Great Idea'), of incorporating Greek-inhabited parts of the Ottoman Empire into Greece. A crucial component of this policy imagined all Greek Orthodox, irrespective

of ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences, as united by shared nationalist ideals.[24] The *Megali Idea* lost its vigour abruptly when the Greek Army was defeated in Anatolia in 1922 by forces of the Ankara government led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Atatürk). After the peace treaty of Lausanne (1923), the consolidation of national borders, and the compulsory population exchange of Greeks and Turks after 1922, political memories in Greece and Turkey were reshaped at the elite level where their respective historiographies projected back normative pasts in harmony with the new nation-states.

Philliou's chapter, through its investigation of Stefanaki Bey, calls into question the Greek nationalist discourse that presents Ottoman Greeks as being politically subjected and oppressed. Stefanaki Bey was a high-level Ottoman state official who took part in numerous critical political decisions. He supported the Sublime Porte even during the Greek liberation war and before and after that war served the sultans Selim III (r.1789–1807), Mahmud II (1808–39), and Abdülmecid (1839–61). This pro-Ottoman stance on the part of a member of the Ottoman Greek political class appears counter-intuitive and does not fit into the normative pattern of a determined nationalist non-Muslim intelligentsia in the disintegrating Ottoman Empire. Philliou questions the prevalent attitudes of Greek, Turkish, and Western historiographies toward the socio-political roles of non-Muslims within the Ottoman Empire. In contrast to the national narratives which claim that Christians in the Ottoman realm were kept passive, she shows that non-Muslims were not always either docile subjects or rebels, but sometimes played an active political role within and in support of the Ottoman political system. Her thesis challenges the Greek national historiographical position that the Greeks and the Orthodox Church suffered under Ottoman captivity, as well as the Ottoman and Turkish positions, which held that the Muslim Turks were the unquestioned masters of the empire.[25]

Similar to Philliou, Vangelis Kechriotis discusses a controversial politician of the late Ottoman period in his chapter 'On the margins of national historiography: The Greek *İttihatçi* Emmanouil Emmanouilidis: Opportunist or Ottoman Patriot?'. Emmanouilidis was an Ottoman-Greek lawyer from İzmir elected to the Ottoman parliament from the list of the Young Turks. He was active as an Ottoman patriot, opposing the nationalist attitudes and actions of other Greek deputies until the Balkan Wars. Emmanouilidis remained in the Ottoman parliament until the end of World War I. The present study shatters the generally accepted notion in Greek historiography that the Ottoman Greek community was nationally unified vis-à-vis the Sublime Porte. In Emmanouilidis, we again encounter an individual who fits into neither the national historiographical discourse of Greece nor that of Turkey, and has therefore remained in historiographical silence.

The Armenian community was another non-Muslim population group affected by the modernization and nationalist movements that accompanied the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Scattered throughout Anatolia

and its adjacent regions, Armenians were unable to found an independent state as did the Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians. Following the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–78, Armenian nationalist circles formed secret revolutionary parties known as the *Dashnaksutyun* and the *Hinchak*, and engaged in armed struggle against the autocratic regime of Abdülhamid II (r.1876–1909). The Hamidian regime, in turn, instigated massacres against Armenians in various Anatolian towns as well as in Istanbul.

In 1908 the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP, *İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti*), succeeded in forcing Abdülhamid to restore the constitution of 1876 and reinstate the parliamentary regime. Although Muslims and non-Muslims had high hopes for the constitutional future of the empire, the failed counterrevolution of 31 March 1909, the massacre of Armenians in Cilicia in the same year, and increasingly harsh measures of the central government weakened their expectations. Finally, the Balkan Wars (1912–13), the loss of the remaining south-eastern European territories, and the effective curtailment of the constitutional regime by a military dictatorship of the CUP shattered hopes for a participatory and pluralistic future of the empire. Such a regime might have served the interests of the different ethnic groups into which the religious communities constituting Ottoman society had by then been transformed.

After 1913, the increasing ethnic Turkish nationalism of the CUP as well as separatism among Armenian nationalists led to the stiffening of their respective positions. With the Ottoman entry into World War I, the Armenian committees considered the Russian military campaign in the Caucasus as the opportunity for a separatist revolt in East Anatolia. The CUP responded with the wholesale deportation of the Armenian civilian population from Anatolia to Syria and the Mesopotamian desert. This was accompanied by indiscriminate massacres of Armenians and plundering of their property, resulting in the annihilation of the majority of the Anatolian Armenian population in 1915.[26] During the deportation, local Turkish and Kurdish families rescued or abducted a considerable number of Armenian women and children who became their adopted children, wives, or slaves. Despite the conversion of these women and children to Islam and their adoption of new Turkish or Kurdish identities, children and grandchildren of these surviving Armenians have often learned of their ancestry. The survival of Armenian women and children, and the presence of their descendants in the present population of Turkey, have been silenced in both Turkish and Armenian nationalist historiographies.

In 'Unraveling Layers of Silencing: Converted Armenian Survivors of 1915', Ayşe Gül Altınay and Yektan Türkyılmaz undertake a feminist critique of these nationalist historiographies, addressing the subject of the Armenian women and children who survived the massacres. Turkish nationalist historiography has usually denied that there was an Armenian genocide, and has frequently downplayed even the massacres. If the issue of the surviving women and orphaned children was touched upon, it was characterized as reflecting

the 'merciful' and 'humanitarian' dimension of the Turkish people, who allowed women to marry and orphaned children to find protective shelter and become part of local Muslim families. According to the authors, this approach ignores the traumatic experiences of Armenian women in voluntarily or involuntarily becoming a part of Muslim families, adopting a new name, a new religion, a new identity, and a life-long terror of revealing their original ethnic identity. In the view of Altınay and Türkyılmaz, the trivialization of the fate of the female survivors of the genocide reinforces the denialist attitude of the Turkish state, and thus contributes to the historiographical silencing of the surviving Armenian women and children. On the other hand, the Armenian nationalist historiography considers surviving Armenian women and children as 'dead', since genocide is defined as the total annihilation of a nation as such. If not exiled in the diaspora, an ideal Armenian woman is essentialized as a martyr for the sake of the nation. The absolute category of 'genocide', then, has prevented Armenian historiography from remembering and accepting the fates of the surviving converted women and children in Turkey.

Meltem Toksöz also takes up Turkish and Armenian nationalist historiographies, in her 'Multiplicity or Polarity: A Discursive Analysis of post-1908 Violence in an Ottoman Region'. Toksöz presents an historiographical situation in which two adversary and indeed politically militant historiographies use their respective sources without contextualizing or comparing them. In consequence, each deliberately silences historical voices that would undermine the preferred narrative. The massacre of the Armenians in Cilicia studied by Toksöz appears to have been closely connected with regional social and economic dynamics, which were autonomous of the imperial centre. The process of centralization and the building of a national Ottoman economy accelerated after 1908, destroying local power balances and resulting in bloodshed. Toksöz employs a micro-history approach to overcome the deterministic historiographical assumptions related to nation-state building.

Modern Turkey emerged as a result of the Ottoman capitulation at the end of World War I, nationalist Turkish reaction to the Treaty of Sèvres (August 1920), and the Greco-Turkish war in Anatolia, also known as the Turkish War of Independence (1919–1922). The Ottoman capitulation in October 1918 also put an end to the military dictatorship of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) under Enver, Talat and Cemal Pashas. Similar to the treaties imposed on Germany, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, the Allies imposed very harsh peace conditions on the Sublime Porte, amounting to nothing less than the complete dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Anatolia was to be divided among Armenians, Greeks, and Kurds, and subjected to the establishment of British, French and Italian zones of influence. From 1919 onwards, a Turkish national resistance movement emerged in Anatolia, coordinated by Mustafa Kemal Pasha. When Britain supported Greek irredentism in Anatolia with the aim of breaking down Turkish resistance and

imposing the conditions of Sèvres, a full-fledged war broke out between Greece and the forces of the Turkish resistance.

Turkish forces were initially disorganized and weak; the irregular troops of Çerkes Edhem constituted the main military resistance to the Greeks. Meanwhile, Çerkes Edhem and a group of representatives in the Turkish National Assembly in Ankara also formed a political force which challenged the authority of Mustafa Kemal's leadership. The decision of the Ankara government to establish a regular army against the Greeks also aimed at ending its dependency on the forces of Çerkes Edhem. In the ensuing military showdown in late 1920, Çerkes Edhem was forced to flee to the Greek side.

Turkish nationalist historiography has attributed the success of the Turkish War of Independence solely to the military and political genius of Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Atatürk).[27] The new republic, having severed its bonds with the past, and experienced the radical cultural revolution of the 1920s and '30s, nurtured new generations in Turkey who were inculcated with an official version of the historical developments between 1914 and 1924. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk has become a symbol of national unity, enjoying deep respect from the greater part of the population. This personality cult, however, has led to the silencing of crucial topics as well as personalities or groups related to the history of modern Turkey.

Bülent Bilmez deconstructs mainstream Turkish historiography in his chapter 'Nationalist Discourse of Heroism and Treason: The Construction of an "Official" Image of Çerkes Edhem (1886–1948) in Turkish Historiography, and Recent Challenges'. As a controversial figure of the Turkish War of Independence, Çerkes Edhem has been actively denied a place in Turkish historiography commensurate with his activities. He has been labelled a traitor due to his eventual defection to the Greek side, while his major contribution during the initial stages of the war as well as his proximity to Mustafa Kemal Pasha have been minimized if not denied. In addition, Edhem's Circassian ethnicity has prompted Turkish national historiography to ignore entirely or to deny the roles of other Circassians in the war of independence. According to Bilmez, a historiographical silence has been maintained concerning the real nature of the relationship between Çerkes Edhem and Mustafa Kemal Pasha, as well as the possibility of a genuine political rivalry between the two for the leadership of the Anatolian government. This silence was the result of the historiographical construction of Atatürk as the undisputed leader of Anatolian resistance. Mustafa Kemal's *Nutuk* ('Speech'), the text of a six-day-long speech at the Turkish National Assembly delivered in 1927, became a 'dominant monologic narrative', silencing alternative voices from the past.

The Arabic-speaking provinces constituted the most important non-Turkish Muslim portion of the Ottoman Empire. On the eve of World War I, these provinces included the area of present-day Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, the Hijaz-portion of Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.

Egypt was nominally a part of the Ottoman Empire until it was annexed by Britain in 1914. Although the first successful modern separatist initiative among the Arab provinces took place in early nineteenth century Egypt, Arab nationalism as a modern ideology emerged only in the late nineteenth century among intellectual circles in Beirut and Damascus. However, the idea of full independence was marginal, and the greater part of Arab nationalists demanded decentralization or autonomy within the Ottoman imperial framework.[28] Despite confrontations of Arab intellectuals with the CUP and the outbreak of the Arab Revolt in 1916, the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in late 1918 was unexpected in the Arab regions of the empire. The Middle Eastern borders were drawn according to the colonial interests of the victorious World War allies. The eventual foundation of nation-states in the late 1940s imposed new nationalist discourses, where former political and cultural formations and memories, some of them originating from the Ottoman period, were effectively silenced. As in Turkey, a significant characteristic of numerous Middle Eastern nation states has been the promotion of a personality cult. Such cults impose major restrictions on regional historiographies, and work as another factor in silencing alternative voices and narratives of the past.

Eyal Ginio addresses Arab perceptions of the Balkans in the twentieth century in his chapter 'Between the Balkan Wars (1912–13) and the "Third Balkan War" of the 1990s: The Memory of the Balkans in Arabic Writings'. He adopts this novel perspective in order to examine how the attitudes of Egyptian-Arab writers were related to the Arab perception of the recent Ottoman past. To deconstruct the roots of the general, long-standing Arab disinterest in the Balkans, Ginio turns to the early twentieth century, when the empire stretched westwards toward the Adriatic Sea. Ottoman Arab imagining of Ottoman territorial, cultural and communal boundaries was rather different from that of the Ottoman Turkish ruling elite, for whom the Balkans were an essential part of the empire. The debacle of the Balkan Wars, in which all Balkan possessions were lost and Bulgarian troops came close to the imperial capital, had a traumatic effect also on the Ottoman Arabs. In the eyes of some Arab authors, it was proof of the weakness and corruption of the Ottoman Turkish ruling elite, who had turned too much toward Europe and were influenced by Jewish Zionist circles. Instead, these authors recommended that Turks should return to their Muslim and Asiatic origins and become a major Asiatic power. When World War I was over and new mandate borders were drawn, Arab nationalists blamed the Ottoman Empire for their own backwardness. Since the Balkans symbolized the core region of the Ottoman Empire, the Arab educated public ceased to consider the Balkans as a part of a common heritage and removed them from a common historical narrative.

Implicit tensions between the principles of nationalism in the Arab provinces and tribalism were also important in the historiographical silence

concerning Mithqal al-Fayiz, the Jordanian tribal shaykh studied by Alon (discussed above). Despite the fact that many Arab countries preserve some features of tribal life, historical research about tribal history in these countries has been limited to the leading chiefs and confederacies. According to Alon, major tribal confederations used to migrate through regions (Saudi Arabia, Transjordan, Iraq, Syria) which became divided, demarcated by borders artificially drawn by the mandatory powers in 1918–22. Thereafter, tribal leaders needed to maintain good relations with the various authorities of all these countries. Alon points to the difficulty of fostering a sense of national identity where literacy and an urban way of life were not part of the tribal social reality. In his words: 'the loyalty to the kin group, the tribe and confederacy, and values of honour, generosity (*karam*), bravery, egalitarianism and personal and group autonomy are no less of an ideology than nationalism'. Yet the nationalist historiography in Arab nation-states tended to remain silent about tribal history and tribal shaykhs.

The nationalist discourse also created silences around issues like the mixed marriages of Muslim men and non-Muslim women discussed by Hanan Kholoussy. Her chapter 'Interfaith Unions and Non-Muslim Wives in the Early Twentieth-Century Alexandria Islamic Courts' undertakes a feminist critique to deconstruct the texts of a group of marriage contracts issued in Alexandria, Egypt, between 1925 and 1936. These contracts were formulated for marriages between Muslim men and non-Muslim women during the years when Egyptian nationalists struggled against British colonial hegemony in the country. While the British discouraged European women from marrying Muslim males, Egyptian authorities were equally worried about the prospect of mixed marriages with a domestic domination of non-Muslim European women over Muslim men, where the Arab national identity of the household would be weakened. Egyptian authorities also feared that the offspring would not be raised in a proper Muslim and Egyptian manner. As Kholoussy shows, Islamic courts issued marriage certificates in English and French which, in blatant opposition to the canonical rules of the *shari'a*, gave Muslim husbands near-absolute authority on issues such as polygamy, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. National historiography ignored and effectively silenced this completely unknown chapter in Egyptian history.[29]

Silencing due to patriarchal discourse

Establishing and perpetuating gender hegemony, patriarchy and gender stereotyping is another goal in historical silencing. This discourse ignores the historical voices of groups, themes or incidents which do not conform to the established social system promoted by certain status groups and social classes, and where male-dominated family units constitute the basic element of the social order. Past voices silenced by the circumstances of patriarchal discourse included those of women as well as socially deprived groups like slaves, homosexuals, orphans, prostitutes, children and youth.[30] Patriarchal

discourse, as discussed in the chapters of the present volume, becomes intertwined with nationalism and the two may be difficult to untangle. A Middle Eastern specificity of patriarchal discourse is the notion of honour. Since most Middle Eastern societies are patrilineal, 'men of the family, clan or tribe seek control of reproductive power'. Women, who are attributed with honour, are basically the means for producing offspring.[31] Therefore, women are to be protected from the danger of being dishonoured or 'polluted.' Nationalism tends to combine national-cultural purity with male control over women's bodies and children as essential to preserving the purity of the nation. This attitude is in close harmony with the patriarchal notions of preserving family honour and the honour of women. As Joane Nagel states:

> nationalist scripts are written primarily by men, for men, and about men. In these national dramas, women are relegated to mainly supporting roles – as mothers of the nation, as vessels for reproducing the nation, as agents for inculcating national culture into new members, and as national housekeepers responsible for maintaining home and hearth for the nation's men who are out and about on important official business – fighting wars, defending homelands, representing the nation abroad, manning the apparatus of the state.[32]

The feminist critique in Altınay and Türkyılmaz's chapter on female and children survivors of the Armenian genocide deconstructs the close relationship between patriarchal thinking and nationalism. The notion of patrilineality allowed Turkish and Kurdish Muslims to adopt Armenian women, convert them to Islam, and assimilate them into Muslim society. The same notion, similarly dominant among the Armenians, put the Armenian nationalists in a difficult position, since the surviving Armenian women were corrupted and polluted by their enemy, and their children bore the seeds of their murderers. As a consequence, Armenian historiography considered surviving Armenian females as non-existent, while Turkish historiography was equally happy to ignore the existence of these surviving women and children.[33]

The close relationship between patriarchal discourse and nationalist thinking is also important in Kholoussy's chapter. At a time when Egyptians were struggling against British colonialism, any colonial Western influence was considered to be detrimental to the preservation of the Egyptian nation. In this context, non-Muslim but especially European women married to Muslim men appeared as a potential threat to Egyptian society. Their marriage certificates aimed at weakening foreign female cultural influence in the family, rendering the women passive vessels of reproduction, and assuring the educational hegemony of the father. Some of the European women, according to Kholoussy, preferred to adopt their husband's religion in order to cope better with an interracial and interfaith marriage. Thus, patriarchal-nationalistic legal constraints impelled women to give up their original religious identities,

demonstrating how patriarchal values were used as a means of resistance to colonial Western culture and values.

The silencing of pregnant brides, according to Kozma, is closely related to the patriarchal circumstances in which Islamic court records were drawn up. Traditional Islamic courts seldom recorded cases of illegitimate sexual relations or cases of premarital pregnancy. This silence has been interpreted by Western researchers either as an indirect proof of absolute religious control over the community, or as possible evidence for the application of 'honour killing' as a kind of communal 'solution'. However, Kozma shows that men and women could manage to escape close supervision and did ignore social and legal norms. When issues of premarital sex and illegitimate pregnancy occurred and were discovered, women or families within the community could act to protect the couple in question. A frequent solution was the marriage of the couple. As Kozma underlines, the family and the community, in order to protect their reputations, had an interest in keeping silent about such settlements. Because it was the contractual aspects of marriage that were of interest, the Islamic court and other authorities did not necessarily learn about other details. Patriarchal norms coerced families to remain silent in order to protect their members and to preserve their 'honour', and in doing so also masked historical instances of resistance.

Silencing due to fears for individual or family safety

A rather peculiar circumstance of silencing is the decision of historical persons and their descendants to practise a kind of self-silencing or internal censorship. As discussed above, the circumstances of the nation state or national historiography, as well as patriarchal discourse, may exert cultural, psychological or even physical constraints. In their chapter Altınay and Türkyılmaz point to the fact that despite the existence of hundreds of thousands of descendants of converted Armenian women and children of 1915, only very recently have a few of them spoken about their family histories. Even when such revelations of family origins and identity are expressed publicly, it is mostly done in the form of fictionalized accounts in which the real names are hidden. This silence, which has lasted almost a century, demonstrates the effectiveness of the taboo surrounding the massacres of 1915, as well as the prevalent difficulties in Turkey of revealing oneself to be of Armenian descent. Under such circumstances literary narratives may become crucial as sources for a fuller understanding of historical issues.

Kechriotis points to the case of Emmanouilidis, who, while relating his past political activities in the Ottoman Empire in a book published in Greece, failed to account for his deeds and actions between the years 1908 and 1912. Inconvenient incidents such as his clashes with Hellenist circles in Izmir or his devotion to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire had to be suppressed in the new circumstances of living in a nation-state where Greek national

historiography had established its hegemony. In such cases of silencing, which is also detectable due to omissions, or from historical and logical inconsistencies in a first-person narrative, scholars must seek out historical sources that are independent of national historiography.

About the workshop

The chapters in the present volume were originally presented for discussion at the workshop entitled 'Absent Spheres, Silent Voices: Recovering Untold Histories', organized in Istanbul by the Department of Middle Eastern and African History of Tel Aviv University, the Department of History of İstanbul Bilgi University, and the History Programme of Sabancı University between 27 and 31 May 2007. This workshop was the third in an ongoing project to re-examine the writing of Middle East history at the turn of the twenty-first century. The first workshop (1999) explored new approaches, theories and methods in the study of the Ottoman and Arab societies and cultures. The second workshop (2002) examined twentieth-century historians and historiographies of the modern Middle East. These workshops resulted in three publications: *Histories of the Modern Middle East: New Directions* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publications, 2002); the special issue of *Mediterranean Historical Review* (19/1 [June 2004]) entitled 'New Historiographies of the Ottoman Mediterranean World'; and *Middle East Historiographies: Narrating the Twentieth Century* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006). Four of the papers from the 2007 workshop were published as 'Under the Political Spell: Middle Eastern Intellectual Histories', a special issue of the journal *Comparative Studies in South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, with an Introduction by Israel Gershoni and Amy Singer.[34]

Scholars invited to the workshop as discussants commented on pre-circulated texts, so that extensive discussion of each paper was possible, among the authors, discussants and audience. The discussants included Iris Agmon, Edhem Eldem, Y. Hakan Erdem, Israel Gershoni, Fatma Müge Göçek, Christoph K. Neumann, S. Akşin Somel, Ehud Toledano, Eve Troutt-Powell, Amy Singer, Mete Tunçay, Jenny B. White, Mahmud Yazbak, and Dror Ze'evi. We would like to thank our co-organizers, Y. Hakan Erdem and Israel Gershoni, our assistants, Natalie Alyon, Gali Genossar, Elif Şimşek and Serhan Afacan, the Institute for Advanced Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, İstanbul Bilgi University and Sabancı University, and the staff of Minerva Han, the Karaköy campus of Sabancı University, for their respective contributions. Without their support, this project would not have been realized. Hakan Erdem has been a key force in the conceptualization and realization of each Istanbul workshop, and we recognize his invaluable intellectual and practical engagement with this project.

We would like to extend our thanks Ben Fortna and Ulrike Freitag, editors of the SOAS/Routledge Studies on the Middle East series for their academic input, as well as to the anonymous reviewers of the manuscript. It has been a

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Notes

1 Concerning the issue of political repression, see: M. Richards, *A time of silence: civil war and the culture of repression in Franco's Spain*, Cambridge: CUP, 1998, and S. L. Waugh and P. D. Diehl, (eds), *Christendom and its discontents: exclusion, persecution, and rebellion, 1000–1500*, Cambridge: CUP, 1996.
2 For this, see T. Akçam, *From empire to republic: Turkish nationalism and the Armenian genocide*, London: Zed Books, 2004.
3 L. J. Thiesmeyer (ed.), *Discourse and silencing: Representation and the language of displacement*, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2003, pp. xi–xiii.
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5 See G. W. F. Hegel, *The philosophy of history*, transl. John Sibree, New York: Dover Publications, 1956 [first 1899], pp. 99, 101, 112, 161–2, 182, 219–22.
6 See P. Gran, *Beyond Eurocentrism: a new view of modern world history*, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996; E. Shohat and R. Stam, *Unthinking Eurocentrism: multiculturalism and the media*, London: Routledge, 1994; V. Lambropoulos, *The rise of eurocentrism: anatomy of interpretation*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993; J. Goody, *The theft of history*, Cambridge: CUP, 2006; J. M. Blaut, *The colonizer's model of the world: geographical diffusionism and Eurocentric history*, New York: Guilford Press, 1993.
7 H. E. Barnes, *A History of historical writing*. 2nd rev. edn, New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1963, pp. 178–206; R. G. Collingwood, *The idea of history*, pp. 86–93. See also A. Bowie, *From romanticism to critical theory: the philosophy of German literary theory*, London: Routledge, 2002; J. Christensen, *Romanticism at the end of history*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000.
8 H. E. Barnes, *A History of historical writing*, p. 246; R. G. Collingwood, *The idea of history*, p. 130; F. Gilbert, *History: politics or culture? Reflections on Ranke and Burckhardt*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990, pp. 35–6.
9 H. E. Barnes, *A History of historical writing*, pp. 210, 246; F. Gilbert, *History: politics or culture?* pp. 5–6; G. G. Iggers, *The German conception of history: the national tradition of historical thought from Herder to the present*, Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1983, pp. 70–89; H. Liebersohn, 'German historical writing from Ranke to Weber: The primacy of politics', in L. Kramer and S. Maza (eds.), *A companion to western historical thought*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002, pp. 167–9.
10 F. Gilbert, *History: politics or culture?* p. 18.
11 See K. Marx, *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoleon*, London: Electric Book Co., 2001; idem, *The Civil War in France*, London: Electric Book Co., 2001; idem, *The class struggles in France*, London: Electric Book Co., 2001; F. Engels, *The condition of the working class in England*, London: Electric Book Co., 2001; idem, *The peasant war in Germany*, transl. by M. J. Olgin, New York: International Publishers, 1926.
12 W. L. Adamson, 'Marxism and historical thought', in L. Kramer and S. Maza, *A companion to western historical thought*, pp. 205–21.
13 J. Ernest, *Liberation historiography: African American writers and the challenge of history, 1794–1861*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004.
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33 For a recent article about the problem of integrating female survivors into Armenian society, see V. Tachjian, 'Gender, nationalism, exclusion: The reintegration process of female survivors of the Armenian genocide', in *Nations and Nationalism* vol. 15, no. 1, 2009, pp. 60–80.

34 Vol. 38, no. 3, 2008. The articles there include: B. Anderson, 'Voices of protest: Arab nationalism and the Palestinian revolution at the American University of Beirut'; O. Bashkin, ' "Out of place": Home and empire in the works of Mahmud Ahmad al-Sayyid and Dhu Nun Ayyub'; G. Nordbruch, ' "Bread, freedom, independence": Opposition to Nazi Germany in Lebanon and Syria and the struggle for a just order'; and C. Schumann, 'The "failure" of radical nationalism and the "silence" of liberal thought in the Arab World.'

Part I

Missing women

1 Unravelling layers of gendered silencing

Converted Armenian survivors of the 1915 catastrophe

Ayşe Gül Altınay and Yektan Türkyılmaz

An unknown number of young Ottoman Armenians (including babies and small children) survived the death marches and massacres of 1915 as adopted daughters and sons of Muslim families. Fewer others became wives and, in exceptional cases, husbands. There were also occasional cases of whole families surviving by converting to Islam.[1] While some of these survivors (particularly young men) were reunited with their families or relatives in later years,[2] or were taken into orphanages by missionaries and relief workers, many others lived the rest of their lives as 'Muslims', taking on Turkish, Kurdish, or Arabic names. In recent years, the stories of these survivors have become publicly visible through memoirs, novels and historical works in Turkey. This new visibility has raised questions about the absence of this particular group of survivors in Armenian, Turkish, Kurdish, as well as international scholarly and popular histories of 1915.[3] Simply put, the stories of these survivors have been silenced by all historiographies, either in the form of total erasure or of serious trivialization.[4]

This chapter explores the development of this silence in Turkish nationalist historiography and discusses the implications of the recent 'unsilencing' for 'the Armenian question' and for the existing narratives of identity and belonging in contemporary Turkey. In what follows, we first present an overview of Turkish nationalist historiography on 1915 and its silence with respect to this particular group of survivors, and then discuss the nature of the debate on 1915 surrounding its ninetieth anniversary. The second part of the chapter provides a detailed reading of two pioneering works: a popular memoir (*Anneannem* by Fethiye Çetin) and an academic study (*Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi (1915–1923)* by İbrahim Ethem Atnur) which have broken this silence in different ways. In the concluding section, we analyse the radical intervention that the stories of Islamized Armenian survivors pose for Turkish nationalist historiography and self-understanding.

From silence to defence: the 'Turkish case' against genocide allegations

'A page of human history that is best forgotten'

In her analysis of the Ottoman and Turkish historiography of 1915, Müge Göçek identifies three historical periods marked by distinct narratives: the Ottoman investigative narrative (1910s), the republican defensive narrative (1953 onwards), and the postnationalist critical narrative (1990s onwards).[5] Written around the time of the events of 1915, works that Göçek classifies as the Ottoman investigative narrative are based on a recognition of the Armenian massacres. According to Göçek, 'the central tension in the Ottoman investigative narrative regarding the Armenian deaths and massacres in 1915 is over the attribution of responsibility for the crimes',[6] rather than their existence. Recent studies on the various texts of this period – from the memoirs of Cemal Pasha and Halide Edib to Ottoman newspapers and magazines published between 1915 and 1920, to Ottoman archival records – suggest that one can also find a wide range of narratives on the differential fates of the Armenian women and children during the deportations.[7] These narratives point to the survival of significant numbers of women and children through Islamization and adoption into Muslim families (whether for protection, free labour or sexual abuse).

Anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot, in his study on the silencing of the Haiti Revolution, identifies four moments when silences enter the process of historical production: 'the moment of fact creation (the making of *sources*); the moment of fact assembly (the making of *archives*); the moment of fact retrieval (the making of *narratives*); and the moment of retrospective significance (the making of *history* in the final instance).'[8] Using Trouillot's terminology, it is possible to argue that in the making of sources, archives and early narratives of 1915, neither the Armenian massacres of 1915 nor the survival of women and children through Islamization are silenced in the form of total erasure (although they are at times trivialized). Silence as erasure comes in the moment of 'retrospective significance', that is the making of *history*.

After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, both the Armenian massacres and the fate of the Islamized women and children become part of the nationalist silence cast over the dark pages of recent history. Hülya Adak argues that, starting with Mustafa Kemal's *Nutuk* (the Speech), Republican memoirs, in an almost uniform fashion, fall into a deep silence about 1915 and its aftermath.[9] Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's biographer Şevket Süreyya Aydemir defined it in 1965 as 'a page of human history that is best forgotten', and summarized the prevalent attitude of the time:

> I believe that the Turkish-Armenian struggle and settlement is a page of human history that is best forgotten. Which side has the primary

> or real responsibility? Who? Again, I believe that it is better to refrain from searching for answers to these questions and forget this story forever.[10]

Only three decades afterwards were the first books published about 1915. According to Göçek, the two studies on Ottoman Armenians that came out in the early 1950s[11] mark a significant transition from the Ottoman investigative narrative to the republican defensive narrative. In the latter narrative, that developed after the 1950s, the size of the Armenian population before the war and the numbers of casualties during the war are minimized, wartime Muslim losses are emphasized, massacring of Armenians is denied, and the main responsibility for the *tehcir* (translated as 'relocation' or 'deportation', depending on the author)[12] is placed on the Armenians themselves and the Great Powers, with the Ottoman state/Muslims/Turks being represented as 'victims' rather than perpetrators.

Starting with the 1970s, the republican defensive narrative gained impetus, as well as a new layer of defensiveness, as a response to the lethal attacks against Turkish diplomats in Europe and North America by the Armenian armed group ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia).[13] In 1976, Esat Uras's 1950 book was reprinted by Belge Yayınları, becoming an important 'source' for subsequent works. A revised edition in 1987 included a lengthy introduction and was translated into English the following year.[14]

In the words of Göçek:

> The nationalist cloak over [the republican defensive] narrative creates shortcomings: the use of archival material is highly selective, and nationalist scholars almost unanimously overlook other source material that contradicts the narrative, such as the investigation records of the Ottoman military tribunals and contemporaneous accounts in Ottoman newspapers documenting the deaths and massacres of 1915.[15]

One of the deep silences of the republican defensive narrative, until recently, has been the silence over the converted Armenian survivors. Not only does their existence remain unmentioned in canonical works, but in the 'number-crunching' regarding the total Armenian population and casualties, which is central to this narrative, this particular group of survivors is treated as a nonentity.

The main source for number-crunching has been Kamuran Gürün's 1983 book entitled *Ermeni Dosyası* (translated into English as *The Armenian File* in 1985).[16] In this book, Kamuran Gürün uses three different 'methods' for calculating the number of Armenians who died during the *tehcir*, concluding that 'at most' 300,000 died of all causes, including illness and climate conditions.[17] The first 'method of computation' involves adding the 400,000 to 420,000 Armenians who emigrated to Russia during World War I (a figure

based on the League of Nations Emigrants' Committee reports) to the 625,000 Armenians living within the Ottoman borders in 1921 (a figure based on a report by the Istanbul Armenian Patriarch). The sum of 1,045,000 reached is then subtracted from the Armenian population in 1914, which Gürün says was 'approximately 1,300,000.' This computation leads him to conclude that 'the total number of Armenians who died during the war cannot be more than 300,000.'[18]

As a second 'method of computation', Gürün refers to the figure of 500,000 cited by the *Blue Book*[19] for the number of Armenian 'emigrants' in Zor, Aleppo and Damascus as of 5 April 1916.[20] Subtracting this number from the 702,900 who were deported (according to the records of the Ottoman Ministry of the Interior) and also accounting for those who were sent to regions other than Zor, Aleppo and Damascus, he concludes that 'the number of those who died from all causes was well below 100,000.'[21]

As a third method, Gürün combines census figures. Adding the number of Armenian emigrants to France, the USA, Greece, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Arab countries, and Russia (using different sources for each), he reaches the total number of 825,000. He continues his calculation as follows: 'If we count those who went to other European countries, the missing and the forgotten as 50,000, we reach the figure of 875,000. With the population of 123,000 [Armenians] in Turkey [according to the 1927 census], we obtain 998,000. When we subtract this number from the Armenian population in Turkey in 1914 of 1,300,000, we obtain 302,000.'[22]

Kamuran Gürün's conclusion is unequivocal: 'Every computation indicates that the number of casualties (we use this term because this is a society at war) of the Armenians of Turkey, for all reasons, did not exceed 300,000.'[23] He also provides a lengthy discussion of how most of these deaths were due to epidemics, climatic factors, hardship suffered during the 'journey', as well as attacks by 'culprits', and not 'massacred on the orders of the Government.'[24] In subsequent years, he repeated his conclusions in other publications.[25] His computations and conclusions have been cited widely in Turkish nationalist historiography, making 300,000 the 'official figure' of total Armenian deaths during World War I.[26] In the lengthy introduction to the expanded edition of Esat Uras's book in 1987, Gürün's 'computations' are quoted at length and his conclusions are reiterated.[27]

Gürün's book uses several 'telegrams' sent from the Ministry of Interior to various provinces to make the claim that 'the Government particularly emphasized the protection of life and property, and continually gave instructions for necessary measures to be taken.'[28] One of the telegrams refers to Armenians converting to Islam 'to be able to stay in their areas of residence' and orders local officials to transfer such people 'despite their conversion.'[29] On the other hand, two of the telegrams convey government orders for Armenian orphans to be adopted by Muslim families: A message was sent on 22 June 1915: 'Among the Armenian families, the girls up to age 20, and boys up to age 10 who are orphaned will not be sent to the south, but will be

adopted by families.'[30] This message was sent by the Ministry of the Interior to the province of Elaziz on 10 July 1915:

> It is ordered that children are to be adopted in accordance with Muslim traditions by prominent people residing in towns and villages where Armenians are not present. If there are a great many children, they may also be adopted by less wealthy, but honourable and honest families, who will be paid 30 kurush per month per child. It is required that a list be made of the families which have adopted these children and that a copy of this list be sent to the centre.[31]

These telegrams about orphans to be adopted are not discussed by Gürün and are merely listed as 'evidence' for his general claim about the 'protection of life and property' by the Ottoman government. Nevertheless, these references make it clear that Gürün is aware of the conversion and adoption of Armenian children. In fact, he seems to generalize from these specific telegrams and present such conversions and adoptions as a measures for 'the protection of life.' Yet, how does he account for this 'life' when it comes to his 'computations'? There is no specific mention of this category of survivors in his computations. Since his various computations are largely based on the number of 'remaining Armenians' in Turkey and around the world, the only category where the converted survivors would fit seems to be among the 'dead'.[32] In other words, Armenian converts and adoptees are not regarded by Gürün (or by others in the Turkish nationalist historiography who have used Gürün as their main source) as 'survivors' of the *tehcir*.

In recent years, the references to converted Armenian adoptees have become more extensive in Turkish nationalist historiography. For instance, a recent publication of the Turkish Historical Society cites a 1921 report of the Armenian Patriarchate that refers to '63,000 orphans who still remain in Muslim homes and Arab tribes',[33] as well as a US document that mentions '95,000 Islamized Armenians'.[34] Other references to the women and children survivors are more indirect: 'Orphan children and widowed women were not subject to *tehcir*. They were taken under custody in orphanages and villages and were given financial aid.'[35] Written by the President of the Turkish Historical Society, this narrative simultaneously distorts the historical record[36] and provides no account of the predicament of those 'taken under custody'.

In short, Armenian converts and adoptees are either erased from the historical record altogether, or they are mentioned as examples of Ottoman government efforts to 'protect life'. In the 'computations' regarding the Armenian population after the *tehcir*, the only category reserved for them (indirectly) is among the 'dead'.[37]

Moving beyond the 'war of theses'

2005 was an important year for Armenians globally. The 90th anniversary of the Armenian genocide was commemorated by a variety of events in Armenia and elsewhere. In Turkey, the year 2005 was marked by intense debate and confrontation regarding the fate of the Ottoman Armenians in 1915. Most particularly, for the first time since the 1920s, there *was* a public debate about what had happened in 1915 and how the subject should be approached.

The public debate was shaped by two different frameworks. The first framework, which we will discuss in the next section, was formulated around a question of curiosity, namely 'what happened in 1915?', while the second framework borrowed from the republican defensive narrative to assume a 'war' of pre-defined positions. This was a 'war of theses', where there were two clear sides/theses: the Turkish thesis and the Armenian thesis. While this war was being fought on television, in radio programmes, and in the newspapers, the arguments of 'the other side' (i.e. diaspora Armenians) were often paraphrased (and often misrepresented) by the local participants in the debate.

In this war, the 'nation' was fetishized, with such militarized concepts as 'pride', 'heroism', 'unity', and 'treason' gaining extra weight. The climax of this fetishization was the parliamentary speech of the Minister of Justice, Cemil Çiçek on 24 May 2005, declaring that the organizers and would-be-participants of the first critical academic conference on 1915 were 'traitors': 'This is stabbing the nation in the back. . . . We should close the era of spreading propaganda against this nation, of treason by those who carry the identity cards of this nation.'[38]

The central point of the war of theses was the term 'genocide', or, as it is often phrased in Turkey, 'the alleged genocide' (*sözde soykırım*). The spokespersons of the Turkish state, such as the president of the Turkish Historical Society, Yusuf Halaçoğlu, agreed that what happened in 1915 was a 'tragedy',[39] but argued that it was impossible to call it 'genocide'. Even terms such as 'ethnic cleansing' were vehemently opposed by Halaçoğlu and others.[40] Borrowing from earlier historians and diplomats, such as Gürün, Halaçoğlu claimed that the proper term was *tehcir* (translated as 'relocation', not 'deportation'). Halaçoğlu considered *tehcir* to be along the same lines as the 'necessary war measures' that the US had undertaken when it 'relocated' its Japanese population during World War II.[41] Furthermore, he argued that not all Armenians were subjected to *tehcir*. Halaçoğlu cited Catholic and Protestant Armenians, along with Istanbul Armenians as being in the group of Armenians not subjected to *tehcir*. In the case of Catholic and Protestant Armenians, he claimed that it was only when they participated in the 'rebellion' that they were sent away. He also claimed that widowed women and orphan children were left behind, children being put in orphanages and some of the women being taken in by 'wealthy families' or married to Muslims.[42]

The 'war of theses' was not the only available framework within which 1915 was debated in 2005, although it was the predominant one. An increasing number of academics, intellectuals, and journalists used the occasion of the ninetieth anniversary to ask a series of questions (What happened in 1915? Who was responsible? Where should we stand in relation to these atrocities?) and to challenge the above arguments that made up the 'Turkish thesis.'

Until the last months of 2004 and early 2005, there had only been individual attempts at challenging the official discourse that the *tehcir* (deportation) of Armenians to the Syrian desert in 1915 was a necessary war measure. In the 1990s, the two books published by historian Taner Akçam and the Turkish translation of Vahakn N. Dadrian's and Yves Ternon's books provided alternative historical material to understand what had taken place, but these publications were hardly discussed in the media or in public.[43] The first large-scale public debate took place after the ground-breaking interview of journalist Neşe Düzel with historian Halil Berktay in the daily *Radikal* on 9 October 2000; much of it was in the form of 'attacks' on Berktay.

In November 2004, four years after his interview in *Radikal*, Halil Berktay was approached this time by a mainstream weekly news magazine, *Nokta*. Based on a long interview with Berktay, *Nokta* published a special supplement entitled: 'The Armenian Tragedy: What happened in 1915? What remains from the past?'[44] In the 32-page *Nokta* special supplement, Berktay provided a narrative of 1915 which fundamentally challenged the official line and suggested focusing on the 'human side' of this tragedy, with a view of the past as a 'foreign country'. As the introductory remarks by the magazine suggested, Berktay's interview was following a heated debate on the minority question in Turkey, which had begun with the report of the Prime Minister's Office's Advisory Council on Human Rights (ACHR), prepared by Professors Baskın Oran and Ibrahim Kaboğlu. This report suggested a new formulation of national identity, one based on 'constitutional citizenship'. It replaced the term 'Turk' with the term '*Türkiyeli*' (of/from Turkey), articulating a difference between ethnic sub-identities (*alt kimlik*) such as Turkish, Kurdish, Jewish or Armenian, and the supra-identity (*üst kimlik*) of being a citizen of Turkey.[45] Berktay's interview in *Nokta* appeared in the midst of the heated debate on the ACHR report. Four weeks after the publication of the interview, an anonymous editorial in *Nokta* announced the departure of the editor Mustafa Sönmez and apologized to the readers for Berktay's interview, which had 'displayed the one-sided view of Diaspora Armenians.' The note of apology assured the readers that *Nokta* certainly stood for 'the indivisible unity of the Turkish Republic with its state and nation.'[46]

The supplement in *Nokta* and the editorial apology that followed it were characteristic of the intense debate and confrontation between those who were engaged in a 'war of theses' and those who sought to inquire about and discuss publicly what had happened before, during, and after 1915. Newspapers and magazines ran interviews with critical scholars in this field, such as Taner Akçam, Halil Berktay, and Stefanos Yerasimos, among others.[47]

The weekly *Express* issued a 130-page supplement titled *Büyük Felaket* ('The Great Catastrophe'), which included the narratives of Armenian survivors alongside interviews with historians, and asked that this 'great pain' be recognized.[48] Famous writers such as Orhan Pamuk and Elif Şafak talked about historical responsibility and the need to share pain.[49] Perhaps most notably, the first critical academic conference on 1915 was organized by a prominent group of scholars from a number of different universities in Turkey and abroad.

Although its full title was 'Ottoman Armenians during the Demise of the Empire: Responsible Scholarship and Issues of Democracy', the conference was referred to in the mainstream media as the Genocide Conference. Much to everyone's surprise, it hosted more than 60 speakers and chairpersons, representing nine universities in Turkey and seven universities in Europe and North America. Among the speakers were prominent writers and journalists, as well as former diplomats and politicians. Although this high-profile conference was initially scheduled to begin on 25 May 2005, Boğaziçi University (the host institution) decided to postpone it after the above-mentioned speech of the Minister of Justice Cemil Çiçek (blaming the participants for 'stabbing the Turkish nation in the back'). This speech and the decision to postpone the conference resulted in a national crisis in the days and weeks that followed. Some claimed that the conference should not take place because it was one-sided in its approach, and hence unscientific.[50] However, many others treated this issue as a case of academic freedom and supported the right to hold a conference (often making it clear that they themselves did not view the events of 1915 as genocide). The Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Speaker of the Parliament made statements suggesting that the conference should take place. Finally, the conference did take place on 24 and 25 September 2005, at İstanbul Bilgi University.[51]

The 'discovery' of Islamized Armenians

Who is my grandmother?

'Tales of Tragedy and Escape' was the title of a key panel at the conference. It hosted, among others, a lawyer and a surgeon who had recently completed their first books. Based on the stories of their grandmothers, both Armenian survivors of the catastrophe of 1915 who had converted to Islam and passed as Muslims for the rest of their lives, Fethiye Çetin and Irfan Palalı were challenging the cold calculation of numbers with individual human stories of suffering and survival.

Although the earliest example of this body of literature was Serdar Can's 1991 *Nenemin Masalları* ('My Grandmother's Tales'),[52] it was not until 2004 that the issue of Islamized Armenians became a matter of public debate. Between 2004 and 2008, nine books of memoir and fiction directly addressed this issue. Fethiye Çetin's *Anneannem* ('My Grandmother') was the first

memoir in this wave and has been the most popular in and outside of Turkey. By 2009, *Anneannem* had already been translated into Western Armenian, Eastern Armenian, English, French, Italian, German, and Greek, and author Fethiye Çetin had been invited to give talks in more than 20 cities in Europe and the Middle East (including Armenia). In this section, we first provide a close reading of *Anneannem*, focusing on its plot, narrative strategy, and reception, and then contextualize it within this growing literature.

Anneannem moves between three different storylines. First is the narrative of Heranush/Seher, as related by her granddaughter, about Armenian life in a small Ottoman village before 1915, the death march of 1915, and Heranush's journey to become Seher, initially as the adopted daughter of an Ottoman corporal (whom she remembers with great respect and love), and then as the wife of a man from Maden (a small town near Elazığ in Eastern Turkey), with whom she had five children. The second storyline is that of the author recounting her grandmother's life and relations with different members of the family. Because Fethiye Çetin lost her father at an early age, she and her family lived with their maternal grandparents for many years. From Çetin's account, we learn that the grandmother was a strong woman who established a loving family. 'There were times when money was scarce in our home,' writes Çetin, 'but we never missed two things. One was love, and the other was food.'[53] Çetin depicts her grandmother as a clean, hard-working, and generous woman who had good relations with almost everyone she knew. The third storyline is Fethiye Çetin's own struggle with the story of her grandmother, her unsuccessful efforts to establish a relationship with her grandmother's Armenian family in the USA while Heranush/Seher was alive, her protest at the funeral regarding the names by which her grandmother and her grandmother's parents were called, and finally, her trip to New Jersey to visit the graves of her grandmother's parents and to meet the American members of the Gadarian family.

Grandmother Heranush/Seher was born in the small Armenian village of Habab (Palu) in southeastern Anatolia at the turn of the century. At age 10, during the death march of 1915, she was separated from the rest of her family and adopted by an Ottoman corporal in Çermik, against the wishes of her mother Esquhe. Her brother Horen was adopted by another Muslim family. Heranush remembered her grandmother intervening and asking Esquhe to give Heranush and Horen away:

> My daughter, the children are dying one by one. No-one will survive this march. If you give them away, their lives will be saved, if not, they will die. We will all die. Let them go, so that at least they can live.[54]

Indeed, Esquhe would be the only surviving member of her extended family by the end of the long, dreadful march to Aleppo.

Heranush herself had seen men being taken away and listened to stories of their massacre by the river told by the few survivors. She had witnessed the

kidnapping of her youngest aunt Siranush and, most dramatically, had watched two of her cousins being drowned in the river by their own grandmother (Heranush's paternal grandmother) who then threw herself into the river and died. Heranush/Seher spent most of her 95-year-long life in the town of Maden, where this incident took place in 1915, watching that river flow day and night. Each time she told this story to her granddaughter (and she told it several times), a long silence would follow.[55]

Before getting married and moving to Maden, Heranush lived in the neighboring town, Çermik, with her new parents, Corporal Hüseyin and his wife Esma. 'God bless him ("*Allah gani gani rahmet eylesin, toprağı bol olsun*"), Hüseyin was a good man',[56] remembered Heranush/Seher, adding that he treated her very well, as if she were his own daughter. She told Fethiye that Hüseyin was known to be a 'soft-hearted man' because he had refused to participate in the killing of Armenian women and children in 1915. Fethiye Çetin was not persuaded: 'But grandmother, didn't his soft heart ache even a bit when he was cutting off the heads of the [Armenian] men to throw into the well?' In her response, Heranush/Seher was evasive: 'I don't know.'[57] From this response and others, Fethiye Çetin concluded that her grandmother did not want to question her stepfather Hüseyin, whom she liked very much.[58] The rest of her stories about Corporal Hüseyin had to do with him being very happy to be called 'father', being proud of his daughter, and treating her well.

Heranush/Seher married the nephew of her stepmother, Fikri, who had lost both of his parents before he was 15. In the meantime, Heranush's brother Horen (renamed Ahmet) lived in a nearby village, and the two siblings started meeting regularly after Horen/Ahmet discovered his sister's whereabouts. They had learned that their mother had survived and managed to reach Aleppo, but they had little information about the rest of the family. One big surprise was their kidnapped aunt Siranush finding Heranush in Çermik: 'As I was sweeping the front of our house one day, a woman stopped at the entrance and I looked up. She collapsed right there and started crying. This was my little Aunt Siranush, in the colorful clothes of local Kurdish women.'[59] She had married a Kurdish man in Siverek (Urfa) and was 'doing well'. Heranush and Siranush met often after Heranush got married and settled in Maden, but fell out after Heranush refused to marry her daughter to Siranush's son, saying 'I won't let my children marry their kin.'[60] Fethiye Çetin vaguely remembered the visits of this woman, who was never introduced to them as a great aunt.

After Heranush/Seher had her second child (Fethiye's mother), Horen/Ahmet brought a surprise letter from their father, who had been trying to locate them for years. Finally, he was able to reach them and send some money to help them join the Gadarian family in Syria. Although Heranush/Seher's husband Fikri agreed to this move initially, his family persuaded him not to move. Horen ended up joining his family in Aleppo and finally relocating to the USA with them, while Heranush stayed behind.

Years later, another contact was established between Heranush and Horen. This time Horen sent money and an invitation to Heranush to visit the family in the USA, but because Heranush did not have an ID or a passport,[61] she sent her son instead. After staying in the USA for a few months, her son came back saying that he had lost all the contact information with the Gadarian family. Heranush/Seher had once again lost touch with her brother. Years later, another contact was established by Fethiye's friend Ayşe, which did not get far, either. By the time Ayşe was able to reach Horen's daughter in New York, Horen was on his deathbed, yet he had learned that his sister was looking for him. After he died, his children were not interested in contacting their aunt Heranush, and she died without having seen anyone from her Armenian family in the USA. Nevertheless, when she learned, through Ayşe and Fethiye, that Horen had named one of his daughters Heranush, her eyes lit up and she said: 'So, they have not forgotten me.'[62]

Fethiye Çetin shares her own responses to her grandmother's story throughout the book. In the first chapter, which depicts her grandmother's funeral, we read about her bursting out when her grandmother's parents are named as Hüseyin and Esma: 'But this is not right! . . . Her mother's name is not Esma; it is Esquhe. Her father is not Hüseyin; he is Ovannes!'[63] Later during the funeral, she spoke out once again when she said, 'May she forgive you, us, all of us!'[64] Throughout their years of intense sharing, Fethiye Çetin goes through shock, disappointment, anger, and shame, sometimes finding it hard to sleep at night.[65] The kinds of stories she hears from her grandmother go against everything that she knows about history. When she confronts her mother and aunts about these stories, she realizes that her grandmother has spared her children the most 'inhuman details' of what she had gone through and witnessed.[66] It is only with Fethiye that she has shared her most painful memories.

When Heranush/Seher dies, Fethiye Çetin writes an obituary for the Armenian-Turkish newspaper *Agos*, where she narrates the story of Heranush and expresses this wish: 'With this obituary, we hope to reach my grandmother's (our) relatives, whom we could not reach while she was alive, and share [our] pain.' The obituary ends with Grandmother Heranush's words, 'May those days be over, never to be repeated again.'[67] The obituary finds its way to an Armenian-French newspaper, where a family friend of the Gadarians reads it and informs the family of Heranush's death. Soon, Heranush's sister Margaret, born in the USA after the reunion of Esquhe and Ovannes, and her children start communicating with Fethiye, exchange photographs and family stories across the Atlantic. One important document Fethiye Çetin receives from Margaret is a letter written in Armenian by Heranush to her father Ovannes. In this letter, having recently learned how to read and write, the little Heranush lets her father know that everyone in their family is fine, and that she regularly goes to school and works very hard.[68] Margaret finds this letter in her father Ovannes's wallet after his death. After these emotional exchanges, Margaret's children invited Fethiye to the USA, as a present for Margaret's eightieth birthday.

The book ends with photographs of both parts of the family, as well as of the reunion itself. The last photograph, which is also the cover of the book, portrays the graves of Ovannes and Esquhe Gadarian with the pink roses brought to them by Fethiye Çetin. 'As I put the roses by their joint grave', writes Çetin, 'I asked them, my grandmother, all of them for forgiveness in my name and in the name of all those who had caused this incredible suffering.'[69]

Çetin's story inspires others to 'ask for forgiveness' as well. In 2006, Tuba Akyol, a columnist in the Sunday supplement of the popular daily *Milliyet*, dedicated a whole page to a review of *Anneannem* and of Elif Şafak's bestselling novel *Baba ve Piç* (Father and Bastard) and entitled her essay 'I apologize.' Extending an apology for what had happened to Armenians in 1915, Akyol observed that 'stories can do what large numbers or convoluted concepts cannot do . . . Concepts are cold, stories can touch you inside.'[70]

Like *Anneannem, Baba ve Piç*,[71] published in 2006, is also based on a story of survival, with an American Armenian family and a Turkish Muslim family discovering a common (great) grandmother, Shushan. Orphaned during 1915, Shushan becomes Shermin after marrying a Muslim man, and Shushan again after emigrating to the USA with her brother (leaving her husband and son behind). In Şafak's novel, the great granddaughters of Shushan/Shermin meet in Istanbul to explore the multiple layers of conflict that simultaneously separate and connect them in uncanny ways.[72]

Anneannem and *Baba ve Piç* have been the most popular examples of a growing body of literature on 1915: memoirs and fiction depicting, on the one hand, the tragedies of the Armenian survivors of the death march and, on the other, the processes of discovery experienced by their children and grandchildren. Since the publication of *Anneannem* in 2004, eight other books of memoir and fiction (including Şafak's *Baba ve Piç*) have directly addressed this issue.

'M.K.' Adlı Çocuğun Tehcir Anıları: 1915 ve Sonrası ('The Tehcir Memories of a Child called "M.K." '), prepared for publication by the prominent political scientist Baskın Oran, is based on the recollections of a young boy who survived the massacres of 1915 by living with and working for Muslim households in southeastern Turkey.[73] After moving from one locality to another for almost ten years, M.K. manages to emigrate to Australia where, before his death, he tapes the chronicle of his experiences in those years. Most strikingly, he chooses not to use his real name, but only his initials.

Other examples of this literature bring the two genres of writing, memoir and fiction, together. Irfan Palalı, a surgeon from Urfa, in his 2005 book *Tehcir Çocukları* ('The Children of Tehcir') presents the story of his converted Armenian grandmother and other women like her in the form of a novel, changing names and places to maintain anonymity for members of his family.[74] A similar combination of memoir and fiction is adopted by Kemal Yalçın, a Kurdish Alevi writer based in Germany, in his 2005 book *Sarı Gelin, Sari Gyalin*[75] and by Filiz Özdem in her 2007 book *Korku Benim Sahibim*.[76]

In contrast, Yusuf Bağı's 2007 *Ermeni Kızı Ağçik* ('The Armenian Girl Ahcik') is presented directly as a 'true story' of Fatma/Meryem, the author's grandmother.[77] Two other books, Kemal Yalçın's 2006 non-fiction book *Seninle Güler Yüreğim*[78] ('My Heart Rejoices with You') and Gülçiçek Günel Tekin's 2008 *Kara Kefen*[79] ('Black Shroud'), move beyond family stories and present biographical accounts of various 'hidden' or 'Islamized' Armenians interviewed by the authors.

One common characteristic of these works is that almost all of the stories are about women who have survived the catastrophe by marrying into Muslim families or by being adopted as children at young ages. The exceptions include M.K.'s story, which is told directly by an Armenian man who survived the catastrophe as a child/young man and spent the rest of his life in Australia; the grandfather depicted in Özdem's *Korku Benim Sahibim*; and the stories of two 'hidden' Armenians, interviewed by Kemal Yalçın in *Seninle Güler Yüreğim*, who have both maternal and paternal Armenian lineage in their families.

These nine works of memoir and fiction published in the course of a few years have been followed by a historical volume on the same topic, written by a historian based in Erzurum. Although the author situates his work in the context of mainstream Turkish nationalist historiography, his pioneering study of converted women and children survivors of 1915 also opens up new channels of curiosity and exploration. The next section provides a detailed analysis of this study.

Researching 'Armenian women and children'

İbrahim Ethem Atnur's 300-page study, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi (1915–1923)* ('The issue of Armenian women and children in Turkey, 1915–1923'), is the first academic work to focus primarily on the issue of Islamized Armenians. Before discussing his analysis of women and children, let us first summarize Atnur's position regarding the events of 1915. In line with mainstream nationalist historiography, Atnur regards *tehcir* as a legitimate measure[80] in response to the rebellious acts of the Ottoman Empire's Armenian subjects:

> The aim of the Ottoman government in issuing the relocation and resettlement law was to change the location of those persons who were harmful to the state and were in cooperation with the enemy. Rather than a measure to punish its own citizens in the context of the ruler and ruled relationship, this was intended to save the state from the calamity and destruction that it was facing. For this reason, all the rights of those relocated were given priority.[81]

Throughout the book, Atnur recognizes the great suffering of Armenian women and children, who 'despite their innocence, constituted the main body of victims.'[82] Yet, he blames the Armenian nationalists,[83] the Western powers who aided their aim of establishing 'Great Armenia', and the American

Protestant missionaries for their suffering.[84] Citing a large number of Ottoman orders and telegrams sent to local officials, Atnur seeks to demonstrate the Ottoman government's 'resolve to administer and implement the relocations in humane fashion',[85] although he repeatedly notes the practical difficulties of realizing this aim in wartime conditions.[86] Atnur recognizes the occasional acts of 'sexual violation' targeting young girls and women, but emphasizes the 'immediate interventions' of the Interior Ministry when such incidents occur.[87]

According to Atnur, it was not only the government that acted in a humane fashion, but also local Muslim families, who saved and protected children, young girls, and women from hunger, illness and death.[88] While advancing this point, he refers to German sources that document the dissent of local Turks from the relocation of Armenian children and women.[89] What is interesting is that such references are presented together with a defensive narrative that legitimizes the deportation of the very group of people that he defines as 'innocent victims.'

Regarding the actual fate of Armenian women and children on the road to Syria, Atnur provides detailed analyses of the various policies of the central government. In the case of children who were left without parents, the Ottoman government had two methods: 1) placing these children in orphanages, and 2) giving them up for adoption by Muslim families.[90] Some of the orphanages that Atnur discusses were dedicated to Armenian children alone, while others were Muslim orphanages where Armenian children were given Turkish names and converted to Islam. A similar practice is observed in the cases of adoption by Muslim families: 'the general preference was for the children to be distributed to Muslim villages.'[91]

Similarly, the general policy for widowed women and young girls is presented as one of marriage to Muslim men. Atnur documents a number of orders regarding the marriage of young girls and women to Muslim men issued by government officials in Istanbul. 'Some of these women converted to Islam, sometimes by force, and gave birth to Muslim children.'[92] In Atnur's view, the aim of the Ottoman government in playing a role in such marriages was merely 'providing protection'.[93] These marriages were the result of three processes: the state's effort to protect, the attention that 'certain *sahipsiz* [literally, without an owner, unclaimed], beautiful, wealthy and educated women attracted in times of war', and the choice of Armenian women to marry Muslim men in order to escape relocation.[94] A second category of women Atnur mentions (but simultaneously trivializes in terms of numbers) are those who were not taken as wives:

> During the *tehcir*, although small in number, there were also some women without any family members [*kimsesiz*] who were taken into Muslim homes for protection. In some cases, these women had to work in these households, and in others, they were sexually violated, as has been the cause of occasional complaint.[95]

Atnur's narrative of the predicament of Armenian women and children during the deportations appears to have been crafted as a response to the ways in which their stories are presented in Armenian and Euro-American sources:

> Since children and women were the chief protagonists of wartime and post-war propaganda in the west, their treatment in Armenian and western publications embody great exaggerations. There are allegations that all women and girls were abducted to become wives, second wives or servants, that all such women were Islamized, that Turkish civilian and military authorities put women in their harems or that they sold them for high prices, that women and girls were distributed to the Kurds, and so on. According to such allegations, the Ottomans have conducted a thorough genocide, eliminating all women, girls, and children through certain means. This means that the Armenian race, in regard to women and children has come to an end.[96]

To the contrary, claims Atnur, the information he provides in this work should shed light on the 'existence of Armenian women and children'.[97]

A central concern for Atnur is the question of whether acts of conversion (by women and children alike) constitute an effort to assimilate. His answer is a cautious 'no'.

> Although it is true that raising orphan children in Muslim families according to 'Islamic customs' means converting these children to Islam, as in all other issues, one sees different implementations by the administration, resulting in a contradiction. A government that had as its aim the Islamization of all orphan Armenian children would not have given these children to missionaries or to Armenian-controlled orphanages, as in the case of Şam [Damascus].[98]

Atnur's discussion of the orphanages and orphans embodies other cautionary remarks as well. For instance, after documenting the various orders issued to the provinces by the Interior Ministry regarding the procedures of placing Armenian children in orphanages, Atnur raises the question of local response:

> It was not possible to find official records of the kinds of information and numbers regarding orphans demanded by the Interior Ministry. The local authorities [*vilayet ve mutasarrıflıklar*] must have conveyed this information requested from them to the Ministry. However, it appears that the relevant records in the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives have not been classified yet.[99]

This statement is significant for two reasons. First, instead of resolving the matter based on the existing documents, it incites curiosity regarding the local

responses to government orders and decrees, indirectly marking their absence from the mainstream Turkish historiography of 1915. Second, the statement draws attention to the non-transparent nature of the official archives, with important documents remaining uncatalogued and hence, unavailable to researchers.

Large sections of Atnur's book are dedicated to post-war efforts by the Armenian Church, missionaries, foreign consuls, and particularly the Near East Relief to 'gather' Armenian girls, women, and children from orphanages and Muslim homes. In Atnur's analysis, the post-war predicament of Armenian women and children appears quite different. In the case of children, he discusses the government's strict orders to give Armenian children to their families, relatives, the Armenian community or the missionaries, and the diligent (even aggressive) efforts of the Armenians and missionaries to retrieve the children.[100] He concludes that the Near East Relief had taken 'a great majority' of the Armenian orphans out of the country by the end of 1922.[101]

In Atnur's account, the women who had been married to Muslim men 'mostly' stayed with their husbands, instead of reclaiming Armenian lives. The possible reasons he provides for this 'choice' are as follows: 'because they loved their husbands, because they had children, because they feared the break-up of their families, and because of their anxieties about how they would be received by their own communities.'[102] He leaves the 'forcefully married' out of this discussion, claiming that they had already left these marriages during the Armistice. Atnur also acknowledges the possibility that 'under the conditions of the time' some women may not have been able to leave their husbands despite wanting to do so.[103]

What became of these women who stayed behind with their Muslim husbands? What about the children who remained with their adopted families? Atnur leaves these questions virtually unexamined. His historical account ends with Armenian orphans leaving the country with Near East Relief and other missionaries in 1922 and 1923, together with large portions of the remaining Armenian population. Nowhere in the book can one find references to the growing number of memoirs and fictional accounts depicting the lives of the survivors who remained in Muslim families, except for a footnote where he politically distances himself from the authors of these works:

> Recently in Turkey, certain books have come out regarding those people who were Islamized in the past. The stories of the protagonists in these books may be true. However, when one scrutinizes these events historically, it is observed that some of these works are engaged in propaganda between the lines, that their appeal to people's feelings finds exaggerated expressions, and that they give the impression that it was only minority children who experienced such events.[104]

In short, while still remaining within the overall framework of nationalist historiography, Atnur's book marks an important turning point in the Turkish

nationalist historiography of 1915, both in terms of its attempt to discuss this history by putting converted women and children (in his terms, the 'innocent victims' of *tehcir*) at the centre of the analysis and in terms of the critical questions he raises regarding the previous literature and the state of the archives.

A year after the publication of Atnur's book, Erhan Başyurt, a journalist from the Islamist weekly *Aksiyon*, picked up from where Atnur ended his analysis and asked a set of very critical questions regarding the converted Armenian survivors who continued to lead Muslim lives after the founding of the new republic in 1923. The title of Başyurt's book, *Ermeni Evlatlıklar: Saklı Kalmış Hayatlar* ('Armenian Adoptees: Hidden Lives') reveals his focus.[105] Although Başyurt shares much of Atnur's analysis of the events of 1915 as well as his political stance, he takes the newly emerging memoirs seriously and openly discusses the silencing of the existence of Armenian adoptees in academic works and popular images:

> Some sources claim the number [of Armenian adoptees] to be 300,000, other sources 63,000, and yet others claim that they do not exist. Despite the fact that the Armenian issue has been discussed for so many years, it is striking that no research has been done on the Ottoman population records on this issue. Not only have the Armenian adoptees not written their stories, they have not been the subject of any serious study. It can be argued that until recently, this issue has remained a 'taboo'.[106]

Başyurt himself had decided to break this 'taboo' and write on Armenian adoptees after listening to the presentations by Fethiye Çetin and İrfan Palalı at the 'Ottoman Armenians during the Demise of the Empire' conference: 'I had heard a lot about the adoptees and those Armenians saved during the *tehcir*, but it was the first time that I was meeting people who openly acknowledged that their grandmothers were Armenian.'[107] Çetin and Palalı are also the first people whom Başyurt cites in his acknowledgments, thanking them for 'courageously putting this issue in writing.'[108]

According to Başyurt, one needs to differentiate between two different groups of Armenians who stayed behind as 'Muslims': the adoptees and the Crypto-Armenians. The former group includes children and women who were 'saved' by Muslim families and have continued their lives among them. Başyurt estimates their numbers to be between 40,000 and 60,000.[109] The latter category points to those families (and in some cases villages or neighbourhoods), totalling approximately 100,000 people,[110] who converted to Islam to escape the deportations, but continued their hidden lives as Armenians, marrying among themselves and, in some cases, converting back to Christianity. Although Başyurt makes his own position regarding religious conversion clear when he defines conversion to Islam as 'being honoured by Islam' (*Islam ile şereflendirilmek*), he also warns against the dangers of treating all Armenian converts (*mühtedi*) as Crypto-Armenians. 'Certainly, there are many people among the Armenian converts who have fully adopted the

Muslim faith in their lives . . . For this reason, Armenian adoptees and converts should not be approached with prejudice.'[111] Yet, by dedicating a whole chapter to the activities of Crypto-Armenians in 'terrorist organizations' (with examples from their participation in the Kurdish armed group PKK, the Armenian ASALA and the Maoist militant group TİKKO[112]), Başyurt himself contributes to the general anxiety about the 'real allegiance' of converted Armenians.

Başyurt adopts an unorthodox approach to the question of whether the events of 1915 should be considered as 'genocide' or not. On the one hand, he clearly argues against the use of 'genocide' and dedicates a chapter entitled 'There are Tragedies, but not Genocide' to an interview with Hikmet Özdemir, a political scientist working for the Turkish Historical Society. On the other hand, he uses the case of the Armenian adoptees and converts to argue that these events constituted a great tragedy, one that has been underestimated and understudied:

> Adopting the numbers or the approaches of either the Armenian or the Turkish historians does not make it possible to disregard the tragedy of those displaced people. Similarly, the fact that *tehcir* was based on legitimate reasons does not mean that Armenians did not suffer.[113]

According to Başyurt, the case of Armenian adoptees and converts simultaneously challenges the Armenian thesis regarding genocide and the mainstream Turkish approach that undermines the tragedy of 1915:

> Adoptees and Crypto-Armenians reveal that the number of Armenians lost during *tehcir* was not as high as it is believed to be and that a significant number of Armenians were protected by Muslims . . . If the intent was indeed to eliminate all Armenians, as it is claimed to be, it would not have been possible to talk about so many people who were saved. Moreover, it appears to be state policy to marry the widows, protect the orphans and to give them to families as adoptees . . . Rather than showing that *tehcir* constituted 'genocide', the Armenian adoptees perhaps show that it did not. But, Armenian adoptees also point to the fact that the tragedy was much greater than it is believed to have been.[114]

In other words, it is possible to argue that Başyurt, despite the nationalist underpinnings of his study, contributes to the efforts in Turkey to move beyond the 'war of theses' and open up new channels of curiosity, exploration, and empathy. He brings together official Turkish sources and arguments with the recently emerging critical works of memory to draw attention to the 'human side' of 1915 and its aftermath.[115] His proposals for a 'solution' to this issue are three-fold: 1) the Turkish state and society need to 'free themselves of their fear of minorities' and take measures to deal with the discrimination and marginalization of Armenians (which lead them to hide

their identities; 2) the population records should be made transparent and available so that people may inquire into the past; and 3) scientific research should be conducted about Armenian adoptees as 'a social wound inherited from *Tehcir*', revealing the real figures of Armenian adoptees and converts by the use of archival documents. Başyurt concludes his study with the claim that 'such an enlightenment will add new dimensions to the debate on the *Tehcir*.'[116]

In sum, ranging from individualized stories presented in the form of memoirs and novels to academic research projects to journalistic studies, we now witness an outbreak of interest in contemporary Turkey regarding the predicament of Ottoman Armenians who survived the deportations and the massacres of 1915 and 1916 by converting to Islam. One of the questions that needs to be addressed is 'why now?' and another is 'why not *until* now?' The concluding section below offers some tentative answers to these crucial questions.

Nationalist anxieties and unravelling layers of gendered silencing

Let us first go back to one of the questions posed at the beginning of this chapter: why is it that the vast body of the literature on the deportations and massacres of Armenians in 1915 has been so silent about converted Armenian survivors? Our reading of the existing literature suggests three possible reasons for this silence: 1) the patriarchal conceptualization of gender relations; 2) the political hegemony of 'genocide recognition' vs. 'genocide denial'; and 3) the prevalence of ethnicist/racist understandings of the nation.

According to Cynthia Enloe 'nationalism has typically sprung from masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation, and masculinized hope'.[117] Not taking women's experiences seriously, the scholarship on the Armenian catastrophe of 1915 typically treats women as undifferentiated victims, as opposed to historical actors. Women (as well as children) are defined through the 'men' who 'own' them. In both Turkish and Armenian, the term that is most frequently used for women without a man to claim them is '*sahipsiz*/*anter*/*ander*' (literally 'without an owner'). Not surprisingly, women are often discussed in the same sentence as 'property' and are often defined as 'our women' or 'their women', underscoring the construction of women as commodity (under patriarchal ownership). This perspective appears to be shared across national divides. To give an example from Atnur:

> Another group that was placed under state protection in certain regions and exempted from *tehcir* was the group of *sahipsiz* women and orphaned children who would be the worst victims of the war and of conditions on the road.[118]

In this framework, 'women and children' often fall into the same category,

resonating with Enloe's critique of militarized discourses of national honour that place 'womenandchildren' (as one entity) under the custody of men.[119] In a patriarchal worldview, 'womenandchildren' are passive beings in need of male protection and guidance, without which they become '*sahipsiz/anter*'.

Moreover, when national identity is constructed around patrilineage, the background of women as mothers or wives loses its significance. Başyurt's remark about the absence of 'Armenian grandfather' stories in recent writings in Turkey may serve as one reminder of such an approach. Hence, the prevalence of a patriarchal conceptualization of gender relations seems to have played an important role in the silence over the existence and fate of converted Armenians – comprised mostly of women and children.[120]

Yet, a much stronger reason for the Turkish silence is likely to be a general policy of silencing 1915 altogether. As Göçek argues, what marks the Turkish nationalist narrative is its 'defensiveness', meaning that all production of knowledge on 1915 becomes fixated on negating Armenian claims of genocide. As we have seen above, one of the main characteristics of the Turkish nationalist historiography of 1915 is its claim that the Ottoman government could not be held responsible for the deaths of Armenians (who mostly died of epidemics, climatic conditions, or the attacks of bandits on the road). Similarly, works like Atnur's reveal an anxiety that the issue of converted Armenians contributes to claims that *tehcir* was a genocidal act, since Article 2 of the United Nations Convention of Genocide refers in paragraph (e) to the forcible transfer of children from the group to another group as a genocidal act. Atnur builds his main argument around the claim that the Ottoman state was not practising a systematic policy of assimilation. Instead, he tries to show that the Ottoman government was taking painstaking measures to prevent such assimilation. According to Atnur, 'it is unthinkable that the Ottoman Government was engaged in a general assimilation by marrying *sahipsiz* girls and women.'[121] Similarly, as noted above, he argues the implausibility of the claims that orphans were assimilated into Muslim families: 'A government that had as its aim the Islamization of all orphan Armenian children would not have given these children to missionaries or to Armenian-controlled orphanages, as in the case of Şam [Damascus].'[122] Atnur's 'defence' against the thesis of 'assimilation' is clearly addressing the UN definition of such policies as part of genocide.

This 'defensive' approach of the Turkish historiography has played itself out against the background of the hegemonic nationalist narrative that constructs the Turkish nation as a primordial, homogeneous entity defined through Turkishness and Sunni Islam.[123] In this framework, any mention of 'other' identities is regarded as a 'divisive threat'.[124] Until recently, the discussion of any 'difference' from the Turkish-Sunni-Muslim norm had been silenced in varying degrees, with 'non-Muslim difference' being the source of state-sponsored discrimination. In this context, voicing Armenian heritage or affinity would have been considered risky. Therefore, it is possible to argue that ethnicist (and at times racist) state nationalism is one of the major

sources of the silence on Armenian converts in Turkish historiography. Not surprisingly, it is with the advance of what Göçek calls the 'postnationalist critical narrative' regarding 1915 that the silence about Armenian grandparents is being broken.

Under the weight of the patriarchal and nationalist approaches defined in the dichotomy of 'genocide recognition' vs. 'genocide denial', the stories of the converted women and children survivors of the massacres of 1915 remained buried in deep silence for almost 90 years. Etyen Mahçupyan, the current editor of *Agos*, the Turkish-Armenian bilingual weekly published in Istanbul, estimates the number of converted survivors of 1915 as being 200,000.[125] Akçam proposes the same number, although with caution: 'The number of women and children given to Turkish and Kurdish families or kidnapped is impossible to estimate. Some sources put this number at 200,000, but, like all the other figures, this is no more than conjecture.'[126] If the figure of 200,000 is accurate, it would imply that several million Muslims in Turkey today are in some way affiliated (as children, grandchildren, nieces, nephews, etc.) with converted Armenian survivors. Yet, sheer numbers are not enough to disturb deep nationalist silences. What are the dynamics behind the recent upsurge in the popular and academic literature on these survivors?

One can argue that Turkey has been going through a major transformation in the past decade. From militarism to homophobia, violence against women to rights of religious and ethnic minorities, a number of 'taboo' issues have become dynamic sites of academic and political debate.[127] More specifically, the advance of what Göçek calls 'post-nationalist critical narratives' in regard to the Armenian deportations and massacres has significantly enlarged and enriched the debate on 1915.[128] The growing feminist critique of patriarchal structures and mindsets, and its significant contribution to 'taking women's lives seriously', as well as the growing interest in questions of 'identity' in general, have also contributed to opening a space for exploring the fate of converted Armenian women and children.[129] The positive effects of reforms connected to the EU accession process in allowing expanded scope for freedom of conscience and expression, and the temporal distance between the survivors and those who are voicing their experiences (mostly grandchildren) are additional factors behind this recent upsurge of interest.[130]

Yet, this increasing interest in the stories of converted survivors is also marked by growing 'anxieties' over the nature of 'national identity'. These anxieties are evident in the works discussed in this chapter. For instance, Başyurt, while emphasizing the 'human aspect' of the issue, simultaneously dedicates a significant portion of his book to an analysis of 'hidden Armenians' in 'terrorist organizations' such as PKK and TİKKO. Irfan Palalı published his book in the form of a 'novel', changing people's names in order to address the familial anxieties over the public unsilencing of his grandmother's story.

The recently publicized stories of converted Armenian survivors have

provided significant challenges to the 'war of theses' that shapes the national and international debate on 1915. In particular, the memoirs and literary works published so far challenge the fetishization of 'archival documents' in the ongoing polarized debate and introduce new sources (oral history, family stories, etc.).[131] They also create a new space for empathy and reconciliation through a redefinition of the 'other' and her experiences. Yet, there is also the danger that this process of un-silencing may be marred by growing nationalist anxieties. In 2007, Hrant Dink, a prominent Armenian journalist and intellectual who has been regarded by many as the main agent of 'cultural translation' and 'reconciliation' between Armenians and Turks, was murdered by a 17-year-old nationalist youth from Trabzon, in collaboration with a host of accomplices. His assassination caused a major setback to the process of opening new spaces for empathizing with past and present pain.

The stories of Armenian converts who have spent their lives in Muslim families or Muslim towns open up the Pandora's box of national identity and prompt new and difficult questions: Who belongs to the nation? Who is an 'Armenian' and who is a 'Turk'? Whose lineage matters? Who is considered a 'survivor'? Whether the recent 'coming out'[132] of this particular group of survivors will create new possibilities for mourning and reconciliation, or further ignite growing nationalist anxieties, continues to be a critical question facing Turkey today.

Notes

1 A recent study with the 'grandchildren' of survivors points to significant diversity in the patterns of survival by Islamized Armenians: Fethiye Çetin and Ayşe Gül Altınay, *Torunlar*, Istanbul: Metis, 2009.
2 See D. E. Miller and L. T. Miller, *Survivors: An Oral History of the Armenian Genocide* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Richard Hovannisian, 'Altruism in the Armenian Genocide of 1915', in *Embracing One Another*, eds Samuel and Pearl Oliner, New York: New York University Press, 1992.
3 For an important contribution to the history of Armenian conversion into Islam before 1915, see S. Deringil, ' "The Armenian Question is Finally Closed": Mass Conversions of Armenians in Anatolia during the Hamidian Massacres of 1895–1897', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 2009, vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 344–71.
4 For a discussion of silencing through 'total erasure' and 'trivialization', see M.-R. Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1995.
5 F. M. Göçek, 'Reading Genocide: Turkish Historiography on the Armenian Deportations and Massacres of 1915' in *Middle East Historiographies: Narrating the Twentieth Century*, eds I. Gershoni, A. Singer, and Y. H. Erdem, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006, pp. 101–27.
6 Göçek, 'Reading Genocide', p. 111.
7 See H. Adak, ' "Ötekileştiremediğimiz *Kendimizin* Keşfi": Yirminci Yüzyıl Otobiyografik Anlatıları ve Ermeni Tehciri' *Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, 2007, no. 5, Spring, pp. 231–53; Y. Selim Karakışla, 'Savaş Yetimleri ve Kimsesiz Çocuklar: "Ermeni" mi, "Türk" mü?' *Toplumsal Tarih*, 1999, vol. 12, no. 69, pp. 46–55; F. Özbay, 'Milli Mücadele Döneminde Öksüz ve Yetimler: 1911–1922 Yıllarında

Anadolu'nun Kimsesiz Kız Çocukları', in E. Gürsoy-Naskali and A. Koç, eds, *Savaş Çocukları, Öksüzler ve Yetimler*, Istanbul: Kırmızı, 2003, pp. 105–15; T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler (1915–1920)*, Publication no. 14, Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1914; İ. E. Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi (1915–1923)*, Ankara: Babil, 2005.

8 Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*, p. 26.

9 Adak, 'Ötekileştiremediğimiz *Kendimizin* Keşfi.'

10 Ş. S. Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, Istanbul: Remzi Aydemir, 2003 [1965], 121, quoted by Adak, 'Ötekileştiremediğimiz *Kendimizin* Keşfi', p. 248, our translation.

11 These works are the following: E. Uras, *Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi*, Ankara: Yeni Matbaa, 1950; and Y. G. Çark, *Türk Devleti Hizmetinde Ermeniler (1453–1953)*, Istanbul: Yeni Matbaa, 1953. For a discussion of these works and the silence before them, see Göçek, 'Reading Genocide'.

12 Since the 1950s, the 'terminology' used to define the events of 1915 has been a contested field not only between Armenian scholars and scholars from Turkey, but among the scholars from Turkey themselves. Esat Uras's book in 1950 uses the terms '*sürgün*/*sürgün edilenler*' ('deportation/deported' or 'exile/exiled') both in chapter headings and in the main text. One of the leading figures of the nationalist defensive narrative, Bilâl Şimşir similarly uses 'deportation' to name the measures taken by the Ottoman state (see B. N. Şimşir, 'The Deportees of Malta and the Armenian Question' in *Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (1912–1926)*, Istanbul: Bogaziçi University Publications, 1984, p. 40). Yet other authors contest the use of 'deportation' as a translation for *tehcir* and make passionate arguments for 'relocation' or 'emigration' as the correct terminology (see K. Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1983; K. Gürün, *The Armenian File: The Myth of Innocence Exposed*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985; Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *Facts on the Relocation of Armenians*, Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Printing House, 2002). The anxieties over terminology also manifest themselves in the form of mistranslations, as in the case of the English translation of the revised and expanded edition of Esat Uras's book. 'Sürgün' (deportation or exile) is translated as 'relocation' throughout the book (E. Uras, *The Armenians in History and the Armenian Question* [English translation of the revised and expanded second edition], translated by S. Artemel, Introduction by C. Kürşat, Istanbul: Documentary Publications, 1988). The clues for this mistranslation are to be found in Cengiz Kürşat's 200-page introduction to this revised edition. Referring to Kamuran Gürün's work, Kürşat 'corrects' his use of 'göç ettirme' (translated as 'moving of population' rather than 'emigration' or 'forced migration') and suggests that 'resettlement' is the correct terminology to be used for the measures taken by the Ottoman state (C. Kürşat, 'Introduction: The "Armenian Question" from the Lausanne Conference until the Present Day' in Esat Uras, *The Armenians in History and the Armenian Question*, p. 129).

13 According to the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 34 Turkish diplomatic staff and their family members were killed by ASALA terror acts between 1973 and 1994. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ermeniler-tarafindan-sehit-edilen-diplomatlarimiz-ve-kamu-gorevlileri-ile-yakinlarinin-listesi.tr.mfa> (accessed Nov 16, 2009).

14 E. Uras, *Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi*, Istanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1976; E. Uras, *Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi (Yeniden gözden geçirilmiş ve genişletilmiş ikinci baskı)*, Istanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1987; E. Uras, *The Armenians in History and the Armenian Question*.

15 Göçek, 'Reading Genocide', p. 120.

16 Kamuran Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1983; Kamuran Gürün, *The Armenian File: The Myth of Innocence Exposed*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985.

17 Gürün, *The Armenian File*, pp. 214–19.
18 Gürün, *The Armenian File*, p. 217.
19 See J. Bryce and A. Toynbee, *The Treatment of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915–1916. Documents Presented to Viscount Grey of Falloden by Viscount Bryce*, ed. A. Sarafian, Princeton, NJ: Gomidas Institute, 2000 [1916].
20 Gürün, *The Armenian File*, p. 217.
21 Gürün, *The Armenian File*, p. 218.
22 Gürün, *The Armenian File*, pp. 218–19.
23 Gürün, *The Armenian File*, p. 219.
24 Gürün, *The Armenian File*, pp. 214 and 219.
25 See K. Gürün, 'Under the Light of Evidence: The Armenian Question and "Relocation" ' in *Armenian Allegations: An Assessment*, Istanbul: Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies (OBIV), 2001, pp. 3–17.
26 The website of the Foreign Ministry of Turkey cites Kamuran Gürün's book (*Ermeni Dosyası*) on the top of the list of 'sources' on the 'Armenian allegations regarding 1915.' See <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/1915-olaylarina-iliskin-ermeni_iddialari.tr.mfa> (accessed 16 November 2009).
27 C. Kürşat, 'Introduction', pp. 132–5.
28 Gürün, *The Armenian File*, p. 212.
29 Gürün, *The Armenian File*, p. 212.
30 Gürün, *The Armenian File*, p. 211.
31 Gürün, *The Armenian File*, p. 212.
32 One other possibility (and only very indirectly) would be among the ambiguous category of 'the missing and the forgotten' which he uses only in the 'third computation'. Gürün, *The Armenian File*, p. 218.
33 H. Özdemir, K. Çiçek, Ö. Turan, R. Çalık and Y. Halaçoğlu, *Ermeniler: Sürgün ve Göç* Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2004, pp. 122–3.
34 H. Özdemir, *et al.*, *Ermeniler*, p. 155.
35 Y. Halaçoğlu, *Ermeni Tehciri*, İstanbul: Babıali Kültür Yayıncılığı, 2004, p. 83.
36 Such distortions are enabled by a selective use of the archives. Gürün, Halaçoğlu and others use one or two telegrams to selected provinces that ask the local authorities not to send the orphans away or to marry the widowed women to Muslim men to generalize about the overall implementation of the deportations. A frequently used document to 'prove' the exemption of orphans from the deportations is the telegram numbered BOA. DH. ŞFR, nr. 54/163, which was sent to Mamuretülaziz on June 26, 1915 asking the authorities to keep the orphans in the province 'for the time being' (*şimdilik*). Many historians conclude from this telegram that the orphans were not sent on the deportation roads. For instance, M. Demirel, in a 1996 publication of the Chief of Staff, suggests that '*sahipsiz* [destitute] Armenian children were not subjected to migration' (M. Demirel, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Erzurum ve Çevresinde Ermeni Hareketleri (1914–1918)*, T.C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, Genelkurmay Askerî Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Yayınları, Ankara: Genelkurmay Basım Evi, 1996, p. 58).
37 Armenian historiography is not within the scope of this article, but we would like to emphasize the need to review the Armenian historiography of 1915 in the same light. Many Armenian historians of genocide also refer to the converted Armenian women and children as representing the 'eradicated nation.' For instance, according to P. Balakian, '. . . tens of thousands of women were abducted into harems or Muslim families, and tens of thousands of children were taken into families and converted to Islam, and in this manner of forced conversion another segment of the Armenian population was eradicated.' (P. Balakian, *The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America's Response*, New York: Harper Collins, 2003, p. 180).
38 '[B]u, Türk Milletini arkadan hançerlemektir. . . . [B]u milletin nüfus cüzdanını

taşıyanların bu milletin aleyhine propaganda yapma, ihanet etme dönemini artık kapatmamız lazım.' Available online. 'Birinci Oturum', 24 May 2005. <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem22/yil3/ham/b10101h.htm> (accessed 10 August 2009).

39 Kaplan, *1915'te Ne Oldu?*, p. 94.
40 Kaplan, *1915'te Ne Oldu?*, p. 91.
41 Kaplan, *1915'te Ne Oldu?*, pp. 91–2. An important component of this argument has been the claim that in this war, which included intercommunal warfare, as many (or more) Muslims died. The main source that is used to advance this claim is: J. McCarthy, *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821–1922*, Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1995.
42 Kaplan, *1915'te Ne Oldu?*, p. 91.
43 T. Akçam, *Türk Ulusal Kimliği ve Ermeni Sorunu*, Istanbul: Iletişim Yayınları, 1992; T. Akçam, *Insan Hakları ve Ermeni Sorunu: Ittihat ve Terakki'den Kurtuluş Savaşına*, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1999; V. N. Dadrian, *Ulusal ve Uluslararası Hukuk Sorunu Olarak Jenosid*, Istanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1995; Y. Ternon, *Ermeni Tabusu*. Istanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1993.
44 H. Berktay, '1915'te Ne Oldu? Geçmişten Bugüne Ne Kaldı? Ermeni Trajedisi', *Derin Nokta*, Complementary Supplement of *Nokta*, no.1116, 22–28 November 2004.
45 'Minorities Comment on Report on Minorities', *bianet*, 5 November 2004. Available at <http://www.bianet.org/2004/12/01_eng/news47344.htm> (accessed 11 August 2009).
46 'Nokta'dan' *Nokta*, no.1120, 19–25 December 2004.
47 One of the most important series of interviews were conducted by journalist Sefa Kaplan in the most popular daily newspaper, *Hürriyet*, which were later compiled into a book with the title *What happened in 1915?* with a large question mark dominating the cover: Sefa Kaplan, *1915'te Ne Oldu?*, Istanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 2005.
48 *Büyük Felaket: 1915 Katliamı ve Ermeni Sorunu*, Re Yayıncılık, Istanbul, April 2005.
49 Orhan Pamuk was later taken to court for 'publicly denigrating Turkish identity' for his claim that 'Thirty thousand Kurds and a million Armenians were killed in these lands and almost nobody but me dares to talk about it.' The case was closed on 22 January 2006. For Pamuk's own account of this trial see O. Pamuk, 'On Trial', *The New Yorker*, December 19, 2005.
50 The main allegation here was that the conference did not include any speaker who would convey the 'Turkish thesis' to the audience.
51 The venue had to be changed due to a local court order issued against Boğaziçi University, based on a complaint from a group of lawyers.
52 S. Can, *Nenemin Masalları*, Istanbul: Umut Yayımcılık, 1991 (second edition, 1993).
53 F. Çetin, *Anneannem*, Istanbul: Metis, 2004, p. 17. For the English translation, see Fethiye Çetin, *My Grandmother*, trans. M. Freely, London: Verso, 2008.
54 Çetin, *Anneannem*, p. 47.
55 Çetin, *Anneannem*, p. 54.
56 Çetin, *Anneannem*, p. 56.
57 Çetin, *Anneannem*, p. 56.
58 Çetin, *Anneannem*, p. 57.
59 Çetin, *Anneannem*, p. 59.
60 Çetin, *Anneannem*, p. 60.
61 When Fethiye Çetin asks her grandmother: 'You did not need anyone to get an ID and a passport issued to your name. If you wanted to do it, you could have done it yourself, grandma. Why didn't you do it?', her grandmother's response is 'I don't

know.' Fethiye Çetin continues her query in the book: 'Why did this woman, who had overcome unthinkable challenges throughout her life and had struggled against the obstacles faced by her children and loved ones, feel so disempowered when it came to her real identity? Why could she not stand up for her family, her identity, and her own wishes?' See Çetin, *Anneannem*, p. 62.

62 Çetin, *Anneannem*, p. 69.
63 Çetin, *Anneannem*, p. 8.
64 Çetin, *Anneannem*, p. 42.
65 Çetin, *Anneannem*, pp. 52–5.
66 Çetin, *Anneannem*, p. 63.
67 Çetin, *Anneannem*, p. 77.
68 Çetin, *Anneannem*, p. 81.
69 Çetin, *Anneannem*, p. 115.
70 T. Akyol, 'Özür Dilerim' ('I Apologize'), *Milliyet Pazar*, 19 March 2006.
71 Published in English as E. Shafak, *The Bastard of Istanbul*, London and New York: Viking Penguin, 2007. The Turkish translation has sold more than 120,000 copies, making it the best selling book in Turkey in 2006.
72 In 2006, Elif Şafak and her publisher Semih Sökmen were taken to court for 'denigrating Turkishness', under the infamous Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, and acquitted during the first trial.
73 B. Oran, ed., *'M.K.' Adlı Çocuğun Tehcir Anıları: 1915 ve Sonrası*, Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005.
74 I. Palalı, *Tehcir Çocukları: Nenem bir Ermeni'ymiş . . .*, Istanbul: Su Yayınevi, 2005.
75 K. Yalçın, *Sarı Gelin – Sari Gyalin*, Istanbul: Birzamanlar Yayıncılık, 2005. The name of the book plays with the Turkish and Armenian versions of a folk story and song popular in Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Turkish name translates as 'yellow bride' whereas the Armenian is 'the bride from the mountains.'
76 F. Özdem, *Korku Benim Sahibim*, Istanbul: Yapı Kredi, 2007.
77 Y. Bağı, *Ermeni Kızı Ağçik*, Istanbul: Peri, 2007. 'Ağçik/ahcik' means young girl in Armenian.
78 K. Yalçın, *Seninle Güler Yüreğim*, Istanbul: Birzamanlar Yayıncılık, 2006. This book was originally published in 2000 by Doğan Kitapçılık, but the publisher does not distribute it (finally eliminating the published copies). The book becomes available in Germany after 2001, but not available in Turkey until the second edition published by Birzamanlar Yayıncılık in 2006.
79 G. G. Tekin, *Kara Kefen: Müslümanlaştırılmış Ermeni Kadınların Dramı*, Istanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2008.
80 He goes further to define Talat Pasha's use of initiative as 'heroic', Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, p. 23.
81 Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, p. 25. All translations from this book are ours.
82 'Çocuk ve kadınlar ise hiç günahları olmadığı halde mağdur olan asıl kitleyi oluşturmaktaydı', Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, p. 293.
83 Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, p. 293.
84 Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, p. 78.
85 Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, p. 27.
86 For instance, Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, pp. 27 and 70.
87 Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, p. 70.
88 Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, pp. 51, 72 and 151.
89 Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, p. 51.
90 Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, pp. 52–3.
91 Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, p. 66.

92 Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, p. 72.
93 Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, p. 74.
94 Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, p. 74.
95 Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, p. 189.
96 Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, pp. 75–6.
97 Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, p. 76.
98 Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, p. 67.
99 Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, p. 67.
100 Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, p. 151. Atnur also provides ample examples of the 'mistakes' that occurred in this process of retrieval, including stories of Muslim children being mistaken for Armenian, as well as stories of Armenian children being torn from their new families against their will.
101 Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, p. 284.
102 Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, p. 186.
103 Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, p. 186.
104 Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, p. 68.
105 E. Başyurt, *Ermeni Evlatlıklar: Saklı Kalmış Hayatlar*, Istanbul: Karakutu, 2006.
106 Başyurt, *Ermeni Evlatlıklar*, p. 10.
107 Başyurt, *Ermeni Evlatlıklar*, p. 10.
108 Başyurt, *Ermeni Evlatlıklar*, p. 127.
109 Başyurt, *Ermeni Evlatlıklar*, p. 121.
110 Başyurt, *Ermeni Evlatlıklar*, pp. 59 and 122.
111 Başyurt, *Ermeni Evlatlıklar*, p. 62.
112 PKK stands for *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan* (The Workers Party of Kurdistan) and TİKKO stands for *Türkiye İşçi Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu* (The Worker and Peasant Liberation Army of Turkey).
113 Başyurt, *Ermeni Evlatlıklar*, pp. 18–19.
114 Başyurt, *Ermeni Evlatlıklar*, pp. 122–3.
115 This is how Başyurt depicts the focus of the 'Ottoman Armenians at the Demise of Empire' conference as well: 'In this two day conference, the priority was given to the human side and tragedies of the Armenian *tehcir*', Başyurt, *Ermeni Evlatlıklar*, p. 9.
116 Başyurt, *Ermeni Evlatlıklar*, p. 126.
117 C. Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*, London: University of California, 1989, p. 44.
118 Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, p. 29.
119 C. Enloe, ' "Womenandchildren": Making Feminist Sense of the Persian Gulf Crisis', Village Voice, 25 September 1990.
120 In the Armenian historiography, too, it is only recently that critical analysis of women's experiences of the Catastrophe are being addressed. See E. Sanasarian, 'Gender Distinction in the Genocidal Process: A Preliminary Study of the Armenian Case', *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, 1989, 4(4): 449–61; Miller & Miller, *Survivor*; R. W. Smith, 'Women and Genocide: Notes on an Unwritten History', *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, 1994, vol. 8 no. 3: pp. 315–34; A. Sarafian 'The Absorption of Armenian Women and Children into Muslim Households as a Structural Component of the Armenian Genocide' in *God's Name: Genocide and Religion in the Twentieth Century*, eds. O. Bartov and P. Mack, New York: Berghahn Books, 2001, pp. 209–21; K. Derderian, 'Common Fate, Different Experience: Gender-Specific Aspects of the Armenian Genocide, 1915–1917' *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, 2005, vol. 19 no. 1: pp. 1–25; V. Tachjian, 'Gender, Nationalism, Exclusion: the Reintegration Process of Female Survivors of the Armenian Genocide', *Nations and Nationalism*, 2009, vol. 15 no. 1: pp. 60–80. It is interesting to note that the main source for the growing Armenian scholarship on Islamized (or 'crypto/hidden') Armenians is

the book *My Grandmother* by F. Çetin (along with other examples of this literature in Turkey). See R. Peroomian, *And Those Who Continued Living in Turkey after 1915: The Metamorphosis of the Post-Genocide Armenian Identity as Reflected in Artistic Literature*, Yerevan: Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute, 2008; R. Melkonian, 'The Images of the Islamized Armenian Women in Modern Turkish Literature', Conference paper, Hrant Dink Memorial Workshop, organized by Sabancı University, the International Hrant Dink Foundation and Anadolu Kültür, Istanbul 2009.

121 Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, p. 74.

122 Atnur, *Türkiye'de Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselesi*, p. 67.

123 See A. Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve 'Türkleştirme' Politikaları*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000; D. Güven, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Azınlık Politikaları ve Stratejileri Bağlamında 6–7 Eylül Olayları*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006; B. Oran, *Türkiye'de Azınlıklar: Kavramlar, Lozan, İç Mevzuat, İçtihat, Uygulama*, Istanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2004; M. Yeğen, 'Yurttaşlık ve Türklük', *Toplum ve Bilim*, 2002, vol. 93: pp. 200–17; A. Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları (1919–1938)*, Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001.

124 See B. Oran, *Türkiye'de Azınlıklar*.

125 S. Kaplan, *1915'te Ne Oldu?*, pp. 107–8.

126 T. Akçam, *A Shameful Act*, p. 183.

127 See Ş. Tekeli, ed., *Kadın Bakış Açısından 1980'ler Türkiyesi*, Istanbul: Iletişim Yayınları, 1990; T. Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmî Kaynakları*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, vol. 1 and 2 1991, vol. 3 1992; K. Kirişçi and G. M. Winrow, *Kürt Sorunu: Kökeni ve Gelişimi*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1997; N. Mater, *Mehmedin Kitabı: Güneydoğu'da Savaşmış Askerler Anlatıyor*, Istanbul: Metis, 1999; A. G. Altınay, ed., *Vatan-Millet-Kadınlar*, Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000; T. Bora, ed., *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Cilt IV: Milliyetçilik*. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001; Ayşe Gül Altınay, *The Myth of the Military-Nation: Militarism, Gender and Education in Turkey*, New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2004; A. İnsel and A. Bayramoğlu, eds, *Bir Zümre, Bir Parti: Türkiye'de Ordu*, Istanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 2004; L. Neyzi, *'Ben Kimim?' Türkiye'de Sözlü Tarih, Kimlik ve Öznellik*, Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004; *Ne Yanlış Ne de Yalnızız! – Bir Alan Araştırması: Eşcinsel ve Biseksüellerin Sorunları*, Istanbul: Lambdaistanbul Eşcinsel Sivil Toplum Girişimi, 2006; *LGBTT Bireylerin İnsan Hakları Raporu*. Kaos GL. Ankara: Ayrıntı Basımevi, 2007; Özgür H. Çınar and C. Üsterci, *Çarklardaki Kum: Vicdani Red – Düşünsel Kaynaklar ve Deneyimler*, Istanbul: Iletişim Yayınları, 2008; N. Mutluer, ed., *Cinsiyet Halleri*, Istanbul: Varlık, 2008; Y. Arat, 'Contestation and collaboration: women's struggles for empowerment in Turkey' in *The Cambridge History of Turkey, vol. 4, Turkey in the Modern World*, ed. Reşat Kasaba, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 388–418.

128 Başyurt suggests that his book was conceptualized at the Ottoman Armenians conference.

129 It is quite telling that the most radical works in this growing field have been written by woman writers (Fethiye Çetin and Elif Şafak).

130 See Başyurt, *Ermeni Evlatlıklar*, p. 11.

131 For a critical discussion of the debate around the 'archives', see S. Deringil, 'Geç Dönem Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Ermeni Sorununu Çalışmak ya da "Belgenin Gırtlağını Sıkmak" ' in *Simgeden Millete: II. Abdülhamid'den Mustafa Kemal'e Devlet ve Millet*, Istanbul: İletişim, 2007, pp. 219–48. This has significant implications for the 'Armenian genocide literature' as well. Marc Nichanian has published extensively on the 'archivization of memory' in this literature. (See M. Nichanian, *The Historiographic Perversion*, trans. Gil Anidjar, New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.) In the invigorating exchange over the concept

of 'genocide' between Marc Nichanian and David Kazanjian, Nichanian problematizes the obligation that the framework of 'genocide' places on the victim to 'appeal to the archive to prove that what was conceived as not having taken place did indeed take place' (D. Kazanjian and M. Nichanian, 'Between Genocide and Catastrophe' in *Loss: The Politics of Mourning*, eds. David L. Eng and David Kazanjian, Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003, p. 133). 'We need to enter into the endless game of proving it, to detach ourselves from ourselves in order to come forward as proofs, as so many living proofs of our own death.' (ibid, p. 133). It is for this reason, among others, that Nichanian and Kazanjian use the concept of 'Catastrophe' rather than 'genocide' in their discussion of 1915. Following up on Nichanian's formulation of 'living proofs of our own death', one can argue that within the Armenian genocide literature, converted Armenians constitute an even more radical example of such 'proof", whereby even their mere 'existence' as 'living' has not been recognized until recently.

132 We would like to thank Halide Velioğlu for this formulation.

2 Interfaith unions and non-Muslim wives in early twentieth-century Alexandrian Islamic courts[1]

Hanan Kholoussy

In late 1927 two Christian women, one Egyptian and the other British, entered into Islamic marriages with Egyptian Muslim men within three months of one another at the Alexandria Islamic court.[2] While the two women faced similar treatment in the court, their marriages had very different consequences for them outside the courtroom. By marrying Shafiq Ghurbal, Sarah Gertrude Humberstone chose to ignore the warnings of the consul of her country, renouncing her British citizenship and relinquishing the protection of the consular courts[3] in order to enter into an interracial, interfaith marriage. Such marriages were bitterly opposed by many of her British and Egyptian contemporaries, at a time of intense anti-colonial nationalist struggle between the pseudo-independent Egyptian nation and the British colonial power.[4] Lydia Tawfiq Matta, on the other hand, incurred no legal risks by entering into an interfaith union with Ibrahim Rifʿat, despite the fact that she was Catholic and he was Muslim. In fact, her Islamic marriage provided her with more rights than a Catholic marriage would have, including the explicit right to divorce that she made sure to stipulate in her contract, as we shall see below. The *shariʿa* court, however, viewed both women as equally potent threats and, as a result, made sure to clarify to these non-Muslim women that they were entering into a strictly Islamic institution that carried a variety of rights and responsibilities, in order to avoid future disputes.

In contrast to historical scholarship on the Middle East that has silenced such interfaith couples, this chapter aims to understand the treatment of interfaith unions, especially non-Muslim wives, in the Egyptian *shariʿa* courts. Although some scholars have investigated non-Muslims' use of the Islamic courts in earlier time periods or other parts of the Middle East, none has thoroughly examined interfaith marriages between Muslim men and non-Muslim women.[5] Specifically, this chapter explores the rights of non-Muslim wives married to Muslim men in the *shariʿa* courts of Alexandria, Egypt and the ways in which the courts treated these women when compared with their Muslim counterparts and their Muslim husbands. It engages in a close reading of 120 interfaith marriage contracts between Egyptian Muslim men and Egyptian and foreign non-Muslim women filed in the Alexandria *shariʿa* courts from 1925 until 1936, when Egypt achieved semi-formal independence.[6] As

will be demonstrated, vast discrepancies existed between these contracts and the standard Muslim marriage contracts, revealing the need felt by the Egyptian Ministry of Justice officials[7] to assert their own understanding of the Islamic identity of an interfaith union in a formally printed interfaith marriage contract prototype, including the rights of a Muslim husband, the lack of rights of a non-Muslim wife, and the Islamic identity of their future offspring. This article analyses why the government drafters were compelled to standardize interfaith contracts and to emphasize selectively a Muslim husband's rights over his non-Muslim wife. It argues that the Egyptian government not only sought to ensure that interfaith unions would remain strictly Islamic marriages, but also to ensure that no doubt would arise regarding the legal rights of Egyptian Muslim husbands vis-à-vis their non-Muslim wives, in order to avoid future courtroom battles.

In order to situate the social assumptions embedded in these interfaith contracts within their larger political, legal, and religious contexts, the discussion here first examines the historical background of colonial Egypt, its *shari'a* legal system, and the sociolegal rights of non-Muslim European women during the British occupation. It then reviews briefly a standard Muslim marriage contract in order to provide a point of comparison with the interfaith conjugal contract. In order to better comprehend these interfaith contracts, they are situated in the sociolegal arena of the *shari'a* courts and the city of Alexandria. The five conditions of an Islamic marriage that are spelled out in the interfaith contracts are analysed, and the rights and duties of non-Muslim wives compared with those of their Muslim counterparts and their Muslim husbands. The discussion concludes with an attempt to gauge why these contracts were standardized and what purpose they served.

Historical and legal background

Although Britain occupied Egypt in 1882 and established a new colonial regime, Egypt nominally remained a province of the Ottoman Empire as one of its autonomous regions. (Philliou's chapter in this volume focuses on two other such regions.) At the onset of World War I in 1914, however, the British placed Egypt under a temporary protectorate, ending all political ties with the Ottoman Empire. After World War I, when Britain failed to remove this protectorate status immediately, Egyptian nationalists initiated a three-year struggle for independence, beginning with the 1919 revolution. In 1922, the British conferred nominal independence on Egypt, and in 1936 they established it as a sovereign nation. Under these agreements, Egyptians assumed responsibility for their internal affairs, while the British retained some authority in foreign affairs and continued to maintain a military presence around the Suez Canal. This awkward arrangement persisted until 1956, when Egypt achieved full independence.

Unlike in colonial India, British officials did not attempt to reform the Islamic legal system in Egypt, despite their frequent criticisms of the *shari'a*

courts.[8] On its own accord, the Egyptian government increased the formalization of the *shari'a* courts and limited their jurisdiction to issues of religious endowments and personal status in 1880 and 1897.[9] The 1897 code reorganized the courts into a clear hierarchy of lower-level and appellate courts, which lasted until 1955 when they were abolished and their jurisdiction was transferred to the post-colonial state's civil courts.[10] The personal status laws that guided the *shari'a* courts were defined in the Hanafi Personal Status Code that the Egyptian government commissioned Muhammad Pasha Qadri to collate and publish in 1875.[11] Although this code was never officially promulgated, and thus was not binding on the Egyptian courts, it served as the unofficial law of the state and became a manual for judges and lawyers of the dominant Hanafi doctrine, the official legal school of the Ottoman Empire. The code was amended with Law No. 25 of 1920 and Law No. 25 of 1929, which we discuss below.[12]

Both Egyptian civil and *shari'a* laws permitted Egyptian Muslim men to marry both foreign and Egyptian non-Muslim women, provided that they were 'people of the Book' (*ahl al-kitab*), meaning Jewish or Christian women who adhered to a monotheistic religion that had a revealed book.[13] Muslim women, on the other hand, were prohibited from marrying non-Muslim men, since children acquired the lineage and religious identity of the father.[14] By institutionalizing such laws, Egyptian legislators ensured that Muslim women would not marry non-Muslims, at least not under the legal auspices of the state. Consequently, scholars of the Egyptian *shari'a* courts do not find such unions in the historical record, and this chapter, which addresses the silence of interfaith unions between Muslim men and non-Muslim women, is unable to un-silence their counterparts.

In Egypt, as in other colonies, European women were placed under heightened surveillance by the officials of their countries, for fear that they would transgress colonial boundaries and marry foreign colonized men.[15] Growing metropolitan anxieties over racial superiority, national fitness, and imperial competition caused European colonial communities to tighten prohibitions against interracial marriage. The task of maintaining imperial prestige fell upon European women, whose role as guardians of morality had assumed national importance.[16] Although British officials did not ban marriage between British women and Egyptian men, the consulate in Cairo issued to British women a 'solemn and detailed warning about the risks they would incur' if they married Egyptian Muslim men.[17] One such memorandum, drafted in 1911, cautioned them that a Muslim husband would have the right to marry up to four wives, easy access to divorce, and that any children would be raised as Muslims.[18] In 1915, the Egyptian Mixed Court of Appeal[19] ruled that a woman lost her original nationality and acquired her husband's nationality upon marriage, even if that meant colonial subject status.[20] The Egyptian civil code also clearly stipulated that divorce was subject to the legislation of the country to which the husband belonged.[21] Like the marginalized subjects in Kozma's study in this volume, European wives of Egyptian

men residing in colonial Egypt also lived on the margins of both their own national communities and their new colonial communities.

The standard marriage contract

In Islamic law, marriage is a contractual relationship legalizing intercourse and procreation. A woman and a man are united by their agreement to a marriage in which the names and lineages of the bride and groom are given, an amount of *mahr* (dower) is stated, and two male witnesses are named.[22] For a marriage contract to be considered legal, it must include the *mahr* that the groom pays to his bride in advanced (*muqaddam*) and delayed (*mu'akhar*) forms, and the names of the bride, the bridegroom, their proxies, and the witnesses.[23] Islamic law does not require any evidence of the union in writing, although it does recommend it to be in written form.[24] Marriage contracts were not required to be registered in Egypt until 1931,[25] but many couples chose to do so because the 1897 law required written marriage contracts in order to hear certain marriage, divorce, and inheritance claims.[26] As Tucker explains, 'To register your marriage in court was to place marriage and its consequent rights and obligations squarely under the jurisdiction of the Islamic court, in anticipation of the court's playing a role in any later disputes.'[27]

Since an Islamic marriage is a contract, both parties can stipulate certain conditions.[28] In his survey of marriage contracts in Ottoman Egypt, Abdal-Rehim found many that specified conditions safeguarding the wife's interests, such as the prevention of her husband's extended absence from the home; her right to an automatic divorce should her husband take another wife; and her husband's pledge to provide a specific clothing allowance.[29] Most marriage contracts in early twentieth-century Egypt, however, often included just the bare necessities.[30] By this time, marital agreements recorded in court were no longer individually handwritten but rather came in the form of printed contracts with the details of the parties filled in by the Islamic *qadi* (judge) or *ma'dhun* (notary).[31]

The court and city arena

Before analysing the interfaith contracts, we must first situate them in the sociolegal arena of the Alexandria First Instance *Shari'a* Court, where all of the interfaith couples in our survey had their unions registered in the marriage register aptly entitled 'Marriage Contracts between Muslim Men and Women of the Book'. Not all of the couples actually came to this main court, however. More than half went to one of the lower courts located in the Alexandrian districts of al-Labban, al-Manshiyya, or Karmuz,[32] which then forwarded a copy of the couple's nuptials to the Alexandria *Shari'a* Court where it was entered into the bound master ledger of contracts. While a *qadi* generally witnessed and registered the nuptials, he often authorized a scribe to record the marriage.[33]

Arabic was the official language of the *shari'a* court, yet these interfaith contracts were very pointedly tri-lingual: typed in Arabic on the front, they included complete English and French translations on the back. The scribe or judge filled in the required information – such as the date and names of the witnesses, as well as the name, lineage, birthplace, address, age, religion, nationality and profession of both the bride and groom – by hand in Arabic. If the couple later divorced, the scribe would return to the registry and write in the margin of their contract the date and type of divorce, and the amount of deferred dower the bride received or forfeited.[34] This practice of returning to the contract to note whether the couple divorced was not unique to interfaith contracts. Marriage registrars were instructed to do so beginning in 1880.[35]

While the register's title suggests that it contains only interfaith marriages between Muslim men and non-Muslim women, nearly a fifth of the 120 contracts drawn up between 1925 and 1936 recorded marriages among non-Muslims (either between two Christians, two Jews, or a Christian and a Jew). While the various Egyptian Christian and Jewish sects each had their own independent religious tribunals where they usually recorded their marriages and other issues of personal status,[36] the fact that a non-Muslim couple would choose to register their marriage in an Islamic court is not surprising. Like non-Muslim minorities in other Islamic territories, Christian and Jewish Egyptian couples often utilized the system to seek rights such as dowers, alimony, divorce, and polygamy that their own religious courts did not afford them.[37]

Non-Muslim women who chose to marry Muslim men were forced to marry in the Islamic courts, since their own religious courts would not adjudicate their marriages and any resulting conflicts unless the husband accepted the wife's religion.[38] The remaining contracts were thus recorded between Egyptian Muslim men and non-Muslim women: 42.5 per cent of the contracts were logged between an Egyptian Muslim husband and an Egyptian non-Muslim wife and 37.5 per cent with a foreign non-Muslim (usually European Christian) woman.

Neither the interfaith marriages between Egyptians nor those between Egyptian men and foreign women should be surprising, given that these couples came together in Alexandria, Egypt's most cosmopolitan city. By the onset of the British occupation in 1882, Alexandria had become the fourth most important port in the Mediterranean and, as a result, home to nearly half of Egypt's foreign residents,[39] a minority that numbered 225,600 in 1927, constituting 1.6 per cent of the country's total population.[40] Alexandria was known for its conglomeration of large foreign communities of Greeks, Italians, and Maltese who lived side by side with local Egyptians.[41]

The interfaith contracts

Aside from the differences noted above, these interfaith contracts most significantly departed from a conventional marriage contract between two

Egyptian Muslims in that they explicitly stipulated the five conditions of an Islamic marriage. The rights and duties of a Muslim man and his non-Muslim wife with regard to polygamy, divorce, dower and maintenance, child custody, and inheritance were very selectively displayed in these contracts.

Polygamy

The first clause in these contracts states:

> (1) The husband may validly, unless there be any legal impediment to his so doing, have 2, 3, or 4 wives at one and the same time, notwithstanding the opposition of the one with whom he is already united in marriage.[42]

It is evident that the contract drafters wanted to emphasize to the non-Muslim wife that polygamy was legal for Muslim men in Egypt. They also blatantly did not inform the non-Muslim bride of the principle of equal treatment that was required of the polygamous man. Rather, they used the vague term 'legal impediment'. As Baron points out, the notion that a Muslim man could take up to four wives, provided that he treated them equally, was a provision that was morally, but not legally, binding.[43]

Nor was the non-Muslim bride granted the right to indicate that she could receive an automatic divorce if her husband took a second wife, although Hanafi law allowed a wife to add conditions to her contract specifying that she could receive an automatic divorce should her husband commit certain acts, like taking a second wife.[44] As noted above, Abdal-Rehim located numerous marriage contracts in nineteenth-century Egypt that stipulated the wife's right to a divorce should her husband take another wife.[45] This raises the question as to why polygamy was clearly explicated and portrayed in these contracts discussed here as the husband's unconditional right, 'notwithstanding the opposition' of his wife. It seems that the drafters of these contracts either believed that a non-Muslim wife did not have rights similar to those of her Muslim counterpart, or did not want to make her aware of such rights.

It is interesting that the drafters would choose to list the permissibility of polygamy as the first feature in these contracts, given that polygamy was an exceedingly uncommon practice in British-occupied Egypt. All of the interfaith contracts surveyed indicated that the husband was single upon entering his marriage, and none mentioned that he later took another wife. This comes as no surprise given that polygamy was not widely practised, since the scarce resources of the masses did not allow for the maintenance of a second wife.[46] Censuses reveal that the already low rate of polygamy was on the decline: whereas 4.8 per cent were polygamous in 1927, only 3.4 per cent were by 1937.[47]

Divorce

The second stipulation in these contracts reads:

> (2) He may divorce his wife whenever he pleases, with or without her consent. He may also refuse to allow her to leave his house without her permission. He also has the right to compel her to live in his house and she may be forcibly compelled to obey him according to the Chari [*shari'a*].

This clause addresses two separate issues concerning the husband's rights and the wife's duties in marriage: *talaq*, the husband's right of unilateral repudiation, and *bait al-ta'a*, the husband's domicile in which his wife must reside and obey him and to which she must return, in case of unlawful desertion. While all of the possible meanings of what constituted a wife's 'obedience' were not specified, her duty to live with her husband in the marital domicile and her obligation to obtain his permission to leave this home were elaborated upon among Hanafi jurists.[48]

Legal discourse, however, recognized a certain level of vagueness in the rule that a wife must reside in her husband's home, 'an ambiguity that arose from the idea that a woman should not be asked to make a move that entailed undue hardship'.[49] It could be argued that in the case of European women who were asked by their Egyptian husbands to reside with them in Egypt, these women faced difficult 'hardship' living in a foreign country, thousands of miles away from their native countries. When a 'distant place' was involved, one jurist even argued that 'the husband was absolutely forbidden from insisting that his wife move.'[50]

This particular argument, and the ambiguities regarding the husband's right to demand that his wife reside with him, were not noted in the interfaith contracts. It seems that the drafters felt the need to foreground their interpretation of a non-Muslim wife's obedience to her Egyptian Muslim husband in order to inform her that she would not be able to argue later that she faced 'hardship' living in a 'distant place'. It must be noted, however, that Hanafi jurists who elaborated on this issue defined a wife's hometown as the place where she was married.[51] In such a case it could be argued that because the foreign wives discussed here were married in Alexandria, then the port city would be considered their 'hometown'.

The drafters of these contracts also did not question the unilateral and unrestricted male right of divorce, which is clearly defined in Islamic law.[52] Because Hanafi law considered the husband's irrevocable pronouncement of divorce to be one of immense gravity, if the husband were to use the formula of repudiation in jest, drunkenness, or even under compulsion, it was still considered to be valid and effective.[53] Yet a husband's pronouncement of divorce could also be rescinded, which provided an opportunity for him to reconsider his decision. In this instance, the husband could make a first, and even second, pronouncement of divorce during the wife's period of *tuhr* (the period during which she was not menstruating): the divorce was revocable because he could take her back by words or action (resumed sexual intercourse) during her waiting period (*'idda*). When Husain Muhammad Karib, for example, divorced his Swiss Catholic wife, Martha Oesch, a revocable first

divorce on 6 October 1929, he was permitted to take her back at any time until he uttered two other oaths of divorce.[54] If he did not take her back verbally or sexually during his three consecutive pronouncements of divorce during three successive periods of *tuhr*, then the third pronouncement served as a final and irrevocable dissolution of the marriage. Considering that their contract makes no note of an irrevocable dissolution, we can assume that Husain revoked his divorce oath, but we cannot know whether it occurred against Martha's will. The resulting circumstances of a revocable and irrevocable divorce were spelled out in the contract's fifth clause:

> (5) If the husband pronounces against his wife a revocable divorce, he may take her back at any time before the expiration of her 'Iddat' even without her consent, if, however, the divorce is 'bain' (irrevocable) the wife cannot be taken back except by her own consent, with a new dower and in virtue of a new contract. But if the wife be repudiated by 3 sentences of divorce, the husband can only take her back after her remarriage duly consummated and the dissolution of this last remarriage by divorce or the death of the husband.

This passage also referred to the divorced wife's obligation to observe her three-month waiting period (noted in the English translation above as 'Iddat') before she could remarry. The rationale of the *'idda* was two-fold: first, to ensure that if the wife were pregnant no questions would arise regarding the child's paternity and right to inherit and, second, to allow a period of time during which reconciliation could occur.[55]

Interfaith contracts dated after 1929, however, make no reference to the changes in Egyptian law regarding the husband's right of divorce. Law No. 25 of 1929 departed from Hanafi jurisprudence to draw on the other more liberal Maliki and Shafi'i schools of law in an attempt to curtail slightly a man's unilateral right to divorce.[56] Four articles of Law No. 25 of 1929 legalized the following conditions under which a husband's repudiation of divorce would be invalid: (1) an oath uttered by a man who was drunk or under duress; (2) an oath used to force a woman or another party into a particular action; (3) regardless of the number of oaths uttered, only one oath was allowed at any one time; and (4) a divorce oath could not be implicit, but must be explicitly stated.[57] These conditions, however, were not reflected in the interfaith contracts, as evidenced by the provision that the Egyptian husband could divorce his wife 'whenever he pleases'. Despite the Muslim husband's facile access to divorce, few interfaith unions in our survey ended in this form of male-initiated repudiation.[58]

It is interesting to observe that the more common form of divorce among these interfaith couples was the revocable *mubara'a* divorce (7.3 per cent versus 5.2 per cent), which occurred by mutual consent of the spouses and could be initiated by either the husband or the wife.[59] While the content of the interfaith contracts did not explicate this type of divorce, notes in the

margins indicate that seven couples ended their marriages in this manner.[60] Unfortunately, the scribe did not note who initiated the divorce, except in two cases when the non-Muslim wife – one an Egyptian Christian and the other a Hungarian Catholic – agreed to surrender the remainder of her dower in exchange for a divorce.[61] While this might suggest that the other five divorces were male-initiated, we cannot be sure as the scribe may just have neglected to note that the wife forfeited her dower.

What is even more noteworthy is not only that at least two interfaith unions were dissolved at the non-Muslim wife's initiative, but also that the body of these contracts made no reference to a wife's right to divorce even when it elaborated the husband's prerogative to divorce in not one but two places. Although a wife's ability to divorce was quite limited in Islamic law, especially in the Hanafi school, a wife could obtain a divorce if her husband consented and she agreed to forfeit the remaining balance of her dower; if her husband were impotent and unable to consummate the marriage; and if her husband were missing for an extended period of time.[62] While the interfaith contracts made no reference to female rights to divorce, both the Egyptian Christian Eugenie Behamdouni and the Hungarian Catholic Margaret Diossy were at least aware that they were entitled to divorce their Muslim husbands in exchange for their dowers.[63] How did these two non-Muslim wives know of this right, which was not noted in their marital contracts? It seems more remarkable that Margaret, who was born and raised in Budapest, knew of this right than her Egyptian counterpart, who surely had some awareness of the marriage and divorce rights in the prevailing religion of her country.

Like Eugenie, Lydia Tawfiq Matta was versed in the marital rights that Islam granted wives. As mentioned in the introduction, Lydia asserted the unconditional right to divorce herself from her husband in their marriage contract.[64] This kind of divorce must have the express consent of the husband because he must grant his wife this right, known as *yad al-ʿisma*.[65] Lydia's contract is the only one among the 120 contracts examined that stipulated *yad al-ʿisma*, indicating that it was not a common request of non-Muslim wives. While her Catholic faith would never have conceded her this right, her Egyptian background seemed to have provided her with some familiarity of *sharīʿa* that her foreign counterparts may not have had.

Nor did the interfaith contracts refer to the additional divorce rights Egyptian Muslim women acquired after 1920. Calls to grant women greater access to divorce culminated in new legislation. Law No. 25 of 1920 and Law No. 25 of 1929 expanded women's grounds for a judicial divorce: (1) the husband's contraction of a chronic or contagious disease; (2) his failure to provide maintenance; (3) his desertion; or (4) his maltreatment.[66] While the drafters of interfaith contracts did not publicize any of these female rights to divorce, they were careful to insist that the related obligations of dower and support to a non-Muslim wife be fully observed if her husband divorced her, as we shall now see.

Dower and maintenance

The next clause in these contracts delved into great detail regarding the dower (*mahr*) and maintenance (*nafaqa*) in case of *talaq*:

> (3) If the divorce be pronounced before the consummation of the marriage, and when the amount of the dower has been specified, the wife will only be entitled to half of this amount; if, however, the divorce be pronounced after the consummation of the marriage she will be entitled to the whole amount. The wife, who has already received any part of the dower, will be entitled to claim the remainder. When the dower has not been specified, and the divorce takes place before the consummation of the marriage, the wife will only be entitled to claim from the husband a dress [*kiswa*] as determined by the Chari; if, however, the divorce takes place after the consummation of the marriage, she will be entitled to the customary dower, the amount of which shall be fixed by the Cadi or by agreement between the parties. The wife is also entitled to the cost of her maintenance during her 'Iddat' (period of probation) if the divorce takes place after the consummation of the marriage; but she is not entitled to it when the divorce takes place before. The amount to be paid in respect of such maintenance will be fixed by the Cadi or by agreement between the parties.

This part of the contract reflected how the dower was intended to discourage the husband from exercising his right to divorce without serious contemplation, since upon dissolution of the marriage, he was required to immediately pay the dower in full.[67] These contracts also specified the wife's right to maintenance. Maintenance was one of the major marital obligations imposed upon a Muslim husband. He was required to provide food, clothing, and lodging regardless of his wife's financial means, unless she refused him conjugal rights or was disobedient throughout their marriage and for the duration of her *ʿidda* if they divorced.[68]

While one may wonder whether non-Muslim women, who were not accustomed to such financial rights in their own connubial culture, demanded high dowers and spousal support, our survey of interfaith contracts reveals that the average dower that Muslim husbands offered their non-Muslim brides (40.5 Egyptian pounds, between 1925 and 1936) was double the average dower that Egyptian Muslim brides received in the Egyptian province of Qalyub (20 Egyptian pounds between 1916 and 1938).[69] A few European wives received rather profligate dowers. For example, Luizette Miguetz, who just arrived in Egypt from her native Paris to marry Ali Bek Ismaʿil, received a dower of 200 Egyptian pounds.[70] Her fellow countrywomen, Horteuse Gayetti, was given 120 Egyptian pounds upon marriage,[71] while Sapho Rosso, Irine Facchinelli, and Caroline Firgallo – all Italian Catholics – each received a dower in the amount of 100 Egyptian pounds.[72] None, however, rivalled

Sarah Gertrude Humberstone, the British wife who opened this chapter.[73] She received an astounding 400 Egyptian pounds, a dower value that drew utter shock and stinging criticism from Egyptians nearly a decade later when Huda Shaʿrawi, the founding leader of the Egyptian Feminist Union and daughter of the largest landowner in Egypt at the time, married her niece to a suitor for the same amount.[74] These interfaith contracts indicate that the amount of dower reflected the Egyptian Muslim husband's status rather than that of his non-Muslim bride, even though Islamic law decreed that the dower should be determined by the social position of the bride's family and other criteria such as her age, beauty, fortune, and virtue, as was the custom among Egyptian Muslim couples.[75]

While the Egyptian Muslim husband's status was easy to determine from his honorary titles (if any) and his profession noted in the interfaith contract, his foreign wife's status was not as evident. Scholars have suggested that European women who would concede to marrying indigenous, colonized men in various colonies usually came from lower socioeconomic backgrounds.[76] Although the class background of the European wives in these conjugal contracts who hailed from Britain, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, France, Greece, Hungary, Austria, Russia, Denmark, Romania, and the Netherlands is not discernable, it is likely that the majority of single European women residing on their own in colonial Egypt came from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. The British occupation brought along with it a few thousand single, working-class European women who came to work as governesses in wealthy households or teachers in the foreign-language private girls' schools.[77] While the interfaith contract provided a space for the non-Muslim wife to list her profession, all of the European women listed themselves as unemployed, except for Angela Bride, an Austrian midwife who assumed Egyptian citizenship.[78] It is possible that these women stopped working upon their marriages, particularly to wealthy men, but it is interesting to note that the rest of the women who did state their professions – one Jewish schoolteacher and three Christian seamstresses – were all Egyptian subjects.[79]

Furthermore, more than a third of the interfaith marriages that transpired between Egyptian men and European women were with Greek or Italian women, and not women from colonial empires. It is not surprising that so many of these women were Greek or Italian, given their large communities in Alexandria since the early nineteenth century.[80] Indeed, almost half of the Greek and Italian women were born and raised in Alexandria, not Europe.[81] These women, in particular, were likely to have been of the working class, given the social composition of their communities in Alexandria and the very frequent interactions of these communities with the Egyptian Muslim majority.[82]

Child custody

The interfaith contracts also went to great lengths to clarify Hanafi custodial rights:

> (4) The children born of the union of a woman with a Mohamedan husband, follow the religion of the latter. In case of divorce, the woman shall have charge of her infant children during the period of suckling and the cost shall be borne by the father; she shall be entitled also to have the custody of her children upon such terms as to the amount to be paid her in respect of their maintenance, as shall be fixed by the Cadi or agreed upon by the parties. The period during which the wife is entitled to have the custody of her children is 7 years for the boys and 9 years for the girls, unless the Cadi otherwise orders, on the ground of some impediment.

Although these contracts did not explain what 'some impediment' could entail, a divorced wife usually lost custody rights of her children if she was of 'questionable morality' or if she remarried.[83] By being blatantly vague in a very detailed document, it would appear that the drafters were intentionally leaving 'some impediment' open to the interpretation of a Muslim male judge should a custody battle arise in the future. In spite of the more liberal legal reforms passed in Egypt during the 1920s, legislators continued to follow the strict Hanafi custodial rules that dictated that upon divorce the children should return to their father at age seven for boys and nine for girls. Yet Article 7 of Law No. 25 of 1929 decreed that when the judge deemed it in the child's best interest, the court would extend maternal custody of children to nine years for boys and eleven years for girls, following the minority Hanafi view.[84] Interfaith contracts dated after 1929, however, did not reflect this possible extension of a mother's custody.

Since children acquired the religious identity of their father and he was legally responsible for their religious education, it appears that the interfaith contract drafters were not concerned with a non-Muslim mother's religious influences on her children during their early years. Islamic law divided the guardianship of a child into two main categories: (1) the guardianship of upbringing (*tarbiya*) and (2) the guardianship of education or the spiritual guardianship.[85] The biological mother oversaw the first stage of *tarbiya*, known as dependence (*hadana*). However, the woman who cared for the child during the period of dependency, that is, until the son reached age seven and the daughter reached age nine, must be of sound mind, trustworthy, and capable of looking after the child.[86] Because a child's religious socialization did not begin until the child reached the age of religious understanding (the end of *hadana*), a divorced or widowed non-Muslim mother was entitled to oversee her child's *hadana* like her Muslim counterparts.[87] Her religious identity was not an issue unless she tried to indoctrinate the child in her own faith or took her children to live with non-Muslims.[88]

Inheritance

It is in the final aspect of the interfaith contracts where the most obvious legal difference between an interfaith Islamic marriage and a standard Islamic marriage was made clear:

> (6) Difference of religion is one of the legal impediments to succession, and the surviving husband or wife therefore cannot inherit from the deceased who is not of his or her religion.

If both parties were Muslim, then the husband received one-half of his wife's estate if she had no other legal heirs and one-fourth if she had living children or paternal grandchildren. The Muslim wife inherited one-eighth of her husband's estate if there were children or paternal grandchildren, and one-fourth if there were no children. The wife's share was a collective one so if there were multiple wives then they equally shared the one-eighth or one-fourth portion.[89] There were only two impediments to inheritance upon which all schools of law agreed: (1) homicide and (2) difference in religion.[90] If the deceased had been killed by a legal heir, then that heir was deprived of his/her inheritance. Similarly, a Muslim could not inherit from a non-Muslim, and vice versa, even if they were united in marriage. Each of them, however, could leave a bequest to the other.[91] The interfaith marriage contracts, however, made no note of this option. Naturally, if a non-Muslim wife had converted to Islam at any point during her marriage, then she would be entitled to her deceased Muslim husband's estate. Our survey of interfaith contracts reveals that two wives – who happened to be German sisters – had recently converted to Islam, a situation which leads us to wonder why their marriages were recorded in the interfaith nuptial registries.[92]

Perhaps their husbands, the judges, or the scribes wanted to ensure that these recent converts would have no misunderstandings about their rights and obligations in an Islamic marriage, even now as Muslims. The only legal advantage their conversion afforded them was an automatic entitlement to a portion of their husbands' estate upon their death. In addition to added legal and financial protection, perhaps, like the Armenian women in Altınay and Türkyılmaz's chapter in this volume, these German sisters also found social advantages to converting to the religion of their husbands and new community. In all other respects but inheritance, as this chapter has shown, non-Muslim and Muslim wives were supposed to share identical rights in Islamic marriage and divorce, even when the interfaith contracts chose not to underscore this fact.

Conclusions

While the interfaith contracts surveyed included slightly more Egyptian-Egyptian interfaith unions than Egyptian-foreign ones, they appear to have

been intended for marriages between Egyptian men and foreign, particularly European, women. The fact that these contracts were formulated in two Western languages as well as Arabic makes it clear that the drafters did not want the foreign non-Muslim wife to misunderstand any of the aspects of an Islamic marriage. More than anything else, the official standardization of these contracts discloses the importance attached by the drafters to asserting systematically their interpretation of the Islamic identity of an interfaith marriage, including the rights of the Muslim husband, the lack of rights of a non-Muslim wife, and the Islamic identity of their offspring.

Furthermore, the extraordinary emphasis on certain aspects of Muslim marriage that characterizes the interfaith contracts and the fact that a marriage contract between two Muslims did not contain all the features that its interfaith counterpart did, all point to the biased portrayal of the conjugal rights and duties of an Egyptian Muslim husband and a non-Muslim wife. Interestingly, the male drafters of these contracts left out many options and rights available to a wife in an Islamic union. Perhaps it was assumed that a non-Muslim woman (especially a foreigner) was not as familiar with Islamic marital rights and duties as her Muslim counterpart. When these interfaith contracts are situated in their wider social, political, and religious milieus and compared to the standard Islamic marriage contract, it nonetheless becomes clear that the drafters sought to emphasize selectively their own patriarchal understanding of a Muslim husband's rights over his non-Muslim wife. While we may never know why, it appears that the drafters believed that interfaith unions, and perhaps those with European women in particular, raised certain fears about the legal rights of Egyptian Muslim husbands vis-à-vis their non-Muslim and foreign wives during a period of intense anticolonial nationalist struggle. As a result, they sought to minimize potential conflicts. Because only the contracts have been uncovered thus far, and not any related court cases (if there were any), we cannot know whether the drafters succeeded in their goals.

Notes

1 I would like to thank the publisher's anonymous readers and the Third Istanbul Workshop organizers and participants for their suggestions.

2 *Mahkamat al-Iskandariya al-Shar'iyya: ʿUqud Zawaj al-Muslimin b-il-Kitabiyyat* (hereafter UZMK), Cairo: Dar al-Watha'iq al-Qawmiyya (hereafter DWQ), register no. 4715, contract no. 16 (01/09/1927) and 20 (08/12/1927), respectively.

3 Each Western government that was protected by the concessions granted by the Capitulations maintained consular courts that adjudicated cases involving its respective citizens residing in Egypt, who could not be tried in the Egyptian courts. See J. Brinton, *The Mixed Courts of Egypt*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, pp. 163–7.

4 For an analysis of these debates in the press, see H. Kholoussy, 'Stolen husbands, foreign wives: mixed marriage, identity formation, and gender in colonial Egypt, 1909–1923', *Hawwa: Journal of Women in the Middle East and the Islamic World* 1, no. 2, 2003, pp. 206–40.

5 M. Afifi, 'Reflections on the personal laws of Egyptian Copts', in A. Sonbol (ed.) *Women, the Family, and Divorce Laws in Islamic History*, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996, pp. 202–15; A. Cohen and E. Simon-Pikali, *Jews in the Moslem Religious Court: Society, Economy and Communal Organization in the Sixteenth Century*, Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1993; S. Faroqhi, *Men of Modest Substance: House Owners and House Property in Seventeenth-Century Ankara and Kayseri*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987; R. Jennings, 'Zimmis (non-Muslims) in early 17th century Ottoman judicial records', in R. Jennings (ed.) *Studies on Ottoman Social History in the 16th and 17th Century*, Istanbul: Iris Press, 1999, pp. 347–412; N. al-Qattan, 'Dhimmis in the Muslim court', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 31, 1999, 429–44; A. Shmuelevitz, *The Jews of the Ottoman Empire in the Late Fifteenth and the Sixteenth Centuries*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984.

6 This registry consists of 30 separate ledgers, each one containing 20 typed marriage contracts, between 1925 and 1955. I surveyed the first six ledgers, which contained a total of 120 contracts. I ended at 1936, because the format of the contract changed and because that is the year in which Egypt achieved more formal independence.

7 The contracts contain the official stamp of the Ministry of Justice, which oversaw all matters regarding the Islamic courts.

8 N. Brown, *The Rule of Law in the Arab World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 38.

9 See J. Anderson, 'Law reform in Egypt', in P. Holt (ed.) *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt*, London: Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 222 and R. Shaham, *Family and the Courts in Modern Egypt*, Brill: Leiden, 1997, pp. 10–12.

10 Ibid. Although technically part of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt did not follow the *shari'a* reforms in other Ottoman provinces. For an extensive study of the sociolegal reforms in Ottoman Palestine, see I. Agmon, *Family and Court*, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006.

11 See M. Qadri, *Kitab al-Ahkam al-Shar'iyya fi al-Ahwal al-Shakhsiyya 'ala Madhhab al-Imam Abi Hanifa al-Nu'man*, Cairo: Ministry of Justice, 1875.

12 For a detailed analysis of these laws, see H. Kholoussy, 'The nationalization of marriage in monarchical Egypt', in A. Goldschmidt Jr. et al (eds) *Re-Envisioning Egypt, 1919–1952*, Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2005, pp. 317–50.

13 J. Esposito, *Women in Muslim Family Law*, 2nd edn, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2001, p. 19. For a discussion of the distinction made in Islamic law between revealed religions and other religions, see M. Khadduri and H. Liebesny, *Law in the Middle East*, Washington, DC: The Middle East Institute, 1955, p. 136.

14 M. Yamani, 'Cross-cultural marriage within Islam', in R. Breger and R. Hill (eds) *Cross-Cultural Marriage*, Oxford: Berg, 1998, p. 154.

15 See A. Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire*, Durham: Duke University Press, 1995, and idem, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.

16 Stoler, *Race*, p. 35.

17 D. Hopwood, *Tales of Empire*, London: I.B. Tauris, 1989, pp. 70–1 quoting Sir Thomas Rapp.

18 As cited in B. Dunne, 'Sexuality and the "civilizing process" in Egypt', PhD diss., Georgetown University, 1996, pp. 148–9.

19 The Mixed Courts (1845–1937) adjudicated all suits between Egyptians and non-Muslim foreigners, except personal status issues, which were left to the religious courts.

20 'Mixed Court Ruling', *Egyptian Gazette*, 15 December 1915, p. 5.

21 N. Safran, 'The abolition of the shar'i courts in Egypt', *The Muslim World* 48, 1958, p. 23.

22 J. Tucker, *In the House of the Law*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, p. 38.
23 A. Sonbol, 'Adults and minors in Ottoman *shari'a* courts and modern law', in Sonbol, *Women*, p. 240.
24 Esposito, *Women*, pp. 15–16.
25 Ibid., p. 50; J. Anderson, 'Recent developments in shari'a law III', *The Muslim World* 41, 1951, 113.
26 Esposito, *Women*, pp. 51–2.
27 Tucker, *In the House*, p. 72.
28 Z. Mir-Hosseini, *Marriage on Trial*, London: I.B. Tauris, 1991, p. 32.
29 A. Abdal-Rehim, 'The family and gender laws in Egypt during the Ottoman period', in Sonbol, *Women*, pp. 98–110.
30 See, for example, *Mahkamat Qalyub al-Shar'iyya: 'Uqud Zawaj* (hereafter MQS), Cairo: DWQ, register nos. 4737–155499 (09/1916–11/1938).
31 The *ma'dhun* merely held the authority to record marriages and divorces, which he was required to report to his local *shar'i* court each month, while the *qadi* also held the power to adjudicate disputes. See Sections 159–78 in *La'ihat al-Mahakim al-Shar'iyya*, Cairo: al-Matba'a al-Miriyya, 1880, pp. 26–9.
32 See, for example, UZMK 4716, 14 (27/11/1929); 4716, 16 (12/01/1930); 4716, 17 (27/01/1930), respectively.
33 See, for example, UZMK 4715, 11 (27/12/1936).
34 See, for example, UZMK 4715, 3 (29/03/1926).
35 Section 170 in *La'ihat*, p. 28.
36 Brinton, *The Mixed Courts*, p. 162.
37 For an overview on the scholarship of non-Muslims' contractions of Islamic marriages, see al-Qattan, 'Dhimmis', pp. 433–5.
38 Brinton, *The Mixed Courts*, p. 162.
39 Ministry of Finance, *Population Census of Egypt, 1927*, Cairo: Government Press, 1931, p. 180, p. 214.
40 Ibid.
41 M. Ruiz, 'Intimate disputes, illicit violence', PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2004, pp. 122–4.
42 All sections quoted from the interfaith contract are taken directly from its English translation.
43 B. Baron, 'The making and breaking of marital bonds in modern Egypt', in N. Keddie and B. Baron (eds) *Women in Middle Eastern History*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991, p. 283.
44 Tucker, *In the House*, p. 38.
45 A. Abdal-Rehim, 'The family', in Sonbol, *Women*, pp. 98–110.
46 K. Cuno, 'Joint family households and rural notables in 19th-century Egypt', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 27, 1995, p. 499, fn. 9.
47 See, respectively, Ministry of Finance, *Population Census of Egypt, 1927*, p. 71; idem, *Population Census of Egypt, 1937*, Cairo: Government Press, 1942, p. 117.
48 Tucker, *In the House*, pp. 63–4.
49 Ibid., p. 64.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Esposito, *Women*, pp. 29–30.
53 Ibid., p. 29.
54 UZMK 4715, 3 (29/03/1926).
55 Esposito, *Women*, p. 34.
56 J. Anderson, 'Recent developments in shari'a law V', *Muslim World* 41, 1951, pp. 278–88; Baron, 'The Making', in N. Keddie and B. Baron, *Women*, p. 285; Esposito, *Women*, p. 51.

57 'Marsum bi-Qanun Raqam 25 li-Sanat 1929' in *Majmuʿat al-Qawanin wa-l-Marasim wa-l-Awamir al-Malakiyya li-l-Thalathat al-ʿAshur al-Awla min Sanat 1929*, Cairo: Matbaʿat al-Amiriyya, 1930, p. 203.
58 Five interfaith marriages were dissolved by the Muslim husband's repudiation. See UZMK 4715, 3 (29/03/1926); 4717, 2 (5/06/1930); 4717, (17/10/1931); 4718, 3 (17/03/1932); 4720, 19 (16/02/1936).
59 S. Milad, *Watha'iq al-khulʿ*, Alexandria: Matbaʿat Iskandariya, 1996, pp. 17–18.
60 Seven interfaith unions ended in *mubara'a* divorces. See UZMK 4716, 11 (27/04/1929); 4716, 20 (24/04/1930); 4717, 13 (8/06/1931); 4717, 15 (13/07/1931); 4718, 4 (19/03/1932); 4718, 16 (14/02/1933); 4720, 3 (4/10/1934).
61 UZMK 4716, 11 (27/04/1929); 4718, 16 (14/02/1933).
62 Esposito, *Women*, pp. 33–4.
63 UZMK 4716, 11 (27/04/1929); 4718, 16 (14/02/1933).
64 UZMK 4715, 20 (08/12/1927).
65 Khadduri and Liebesny, *Law*, p. 147.
66 Anderson, 'Recent developments in shariʿa law V', 278–88; Baron, 'The Making', p. 285; Esposito, *Women*, p. 51.
67 Tucker, *In the House*, p. 180.
68 Esposito, *Women*, p. 25.
69 MQS 4737–155499 (09/1916–11/1938).
70 UZMK 4716, 8 (21/01/1929).
71 UZMK 4716, 3 (27/11/1929).
72 UZMK 4718, 6 (22/05/1932); 4720, 2 (01/08/1934); 4720, 15 (01/07/1935), respectively.
73 UZMK 4715, 3 (29/03/1926).
74 A. Saʿd, 'Mas'alat al-muhur', *Al-Usbuʿ* 2, no. 87, 31 October 1935, 1.
75 Esposito, *Women*, p. 24.
76 See, for example, C. Brown, 'Literary images of intercultural relationships between Westerners and Middle Easterners', in W. Johnson and D. Warren (eds) *Inside the Mixed Marriage*, Lanham: University Press of America, 1994, p. 102. Egyptian press writers also pointed to the inferior class position of European women who married Egyptian men during the British occupation. For examples, see Kholoussy, 'Stolen husbands', pp. 231–5.
77 M. Badran, trans., *Harem Years*, New York: Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 1987, p. 13.
78 UZMK 4720, 1 (19/07/1934).
79 UZMK 4717, 13 (8/06/1931); 4716, 16 (12/01/1930); 4719, 15 (18/03/1934); 4720, 4 (7/10/1934), respectively.
80 M. Sulaiman, *Al-Aganib fi Misr*, Cairo: Ein For Human and Social Studies, 1996, pp. 55–137.
81 UZMK 4715, 8 (6/09/1926); 4716, 1 (6/02/1928); 4717, 15 (13/07/1931); 4718, 1 (26/12/1931); 4718, 14 (05/111932); 4720, 2 (01/08/1934); 4720, 15 (01/07/1935).
82 Ruiz, 'Intimate Disputes', pp. 123–4.
83 Sonbol, 'Adults', pp. 252–6.
84 Esposito, *Women*, p. 54.
85 Khadduri and Liebesny, *Law*, p. 154.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Esposito, *Women*, pp. 39–40.
90 Khadduri and Liebesny, *Law*, p. 165.
91 Ibid., p. 166.
92 UZMK 4719, 10 (09/09/1933); 4720, 20 (19/02/1936).

3 The silence of the pregnant bride

Non-marital sex in Middle Eastern societies

Liat Kozma

In October 2003, 18-year-old 'Nagwa' married her boyfriend. Six months later, she gave birth to a full-term baby girl. Her mother-in-law dismissed the odd timing as a 'miscalculation of the conception date'. Such cases of premarital pregnancy and its peaceful resolution would rarely reach official records. A century and a half earlier, in mid-nineteenth-century Egypt, instances of premarital sex could reach official records, sometimes even in cases that did not end badly for the parties involved. Couples quickly got married before the birth; at times, pregnant women turned to the *shari'a* court to force reluctant partners to marry them, and couples to force reluctant parents to give their blessing. Some cases ended in legal or social sanctions, but others did not. The purpose of this chapter is to trace scholarly silence on premarital sex in Middle Eastern societies and then ask how Egyptian archival sources can help the historian shatter this silence and present new questions about family, community, adolescent girls and the modern state.

Historians of Middle Eastern societies have argued that we know little about such sexual and social transgressions because these have been silenced both in everyday life and in historical sources. Orientalist scholarship, moreover, has often confused law with practice and legal sanctions with everyday coping with sexual transgression. Islamic law is indeed intolerant of sex between a man and a woman who is neither his wife nor his slave, viewing illicit sex as a crime against God, punishable by lashes or death. Customary law, moreover, condemns women deflowered before marriage to 'honour killing'. Scholars, therefore, are normally silent about peacefully resolved social and sexual indiscretions. 'Fallen' women whose families reintegrated rather than ostracizing them were thus erased from both public memory and scholarship.

This issue is, of course, highly political. Western and indigenous discourses on sexuality, as well as their gaps and silences, serve to justify both patriarchal control of women and power relations between the Middle East and the West. It is still difficult to declare oneself a feminist, to denounce female genital mutilation or honour killing, or to advocate for gay rights in the Middle East without being de-legitimized as an apologist for the West.[1] Without ignoring sexual oppression in historical Middle Eastern societies, however, I argue rather that by focusing on clitoridectomy or honour killing,

we lose sight of diverse familial and communal dynamics affecting young women's lives in historical (and contemporary) societies. To understand mechanisms of power surrounding the control of women's bodies in Middle Eastern societies, it is therefore vital to trace those instances in which silence prevails in both primary and scholarly sources. Such an exercise may serve as a reminder that our work is highly implicated in interwoven power mechanisms.

My aim in the first part of this chapter is to offer a sketchy genealogy of scholarly representations of illicit sexuality in Islamic societies. I start with two men: ethnologist Raphael Patai and sexologist Magnus Hirschfeld. The former authored one of the most well-known texts on Arabs and the Middle East, while the latter's writing on the Middle East is almost unknown. I then explore how Arab feminists have tried to challenge dominant representations of feminine sexuality in their societies, focusing on the early writings of Egyptian gynaecologist Nawal al-Saʿdawi. Finally, drawing on my own research on nineteenth-century Egypt, I demonstrate how a careful reading of archival sources unearths social practices hitherto overlooked by historians. Like Hanan Kholousy (in this volume), I believe that historians of women and gender have a duty to expose gaps between representation and practice in historical societies in the Middle East.

In the land of the Bible: Raphael Patai

Raphael Patai's 1973 *The Arab Mind* remains one of the most widely read texts on Arabs and Islam. Although his work has largely been discredited by scholars, his popularity refuses to fade away: his chapter on sex is still often cited to explain Arab socio-political behaviour.[2] Discussing it is worthwhile not only because of its continuing popularity, but also because it represents and summarizes some of major themes in Orientalist popular literature and research.

Since the eighteenth century, travellers to the Ottoman Empire were fascinated by Islamic sexual norms, most notably the veil and the harem. These epitomized women's oppression in Islam, and were invoked to justify colonial domination. The veil and the harem left Muslim women out of the reach of Western gaze and desire – an obstacle to colonial visual control. Unveiling thus became a powerful theme in colonial fantasy, a trope of penetration into Oriental mysteries. Women travellers, in a sense, offered the Western reader a peek into the harem, using their privileged access to female spaces to complement the colonial gaze and extend it to spaces unavailable to men.[3]

Travellers' description of Islamic sexuality focused on men's unlimited access to women's bodies and on women's oppression. In such representations, Muslim men were violent, licentious and sexually perverse. Women were mere sexual objects, or men's property, locked in the harem for the pleasure of their husband/enslaver. They could not choose their mate nor meet their fiancé before marriage. Any transgression of segregation norms could be fatal, as men who suspected a female relative of non-marital sex

were likely to murder her. Since the nineteenth century, moreover, travellers and colonial officials saw these practices also as an endemic vice of a morally depraved society and polity, reaffirming the moral superiority of the West and rationalizing colonial rule.[4]

Common to many of these descriptions was what anthropologist Johannes Fabian termed 'the denial of covalence', namely, the denial of the fact that both the observer and the observed inhabit the same chronological time.[5] Local inhabitants supposedly preserved ancient costumes that had long disappeared in other parts of the world. This imagined past could be biblical times, Pharaonic antiquity or the days of Prophet Muhammad. Orientalists and travellers constructed an imagined Arab or Islamic type, with a fixed mindset, essentially different from the 'Western' one, and unchanging across space and time.[6] Thus, the consistency that Patai and others would later discover in these travel accounts and early ethnologies did not derive from purely empirical evidence. The manners and customs of modern Muslims seemed so stagnant and unchanging partly because travellers and ethnographers often used earlier texts as reference, which sometimes predicted and sometimes explained what they had seen in the Orient. Travellers came to the region having read earlier travellers, the Bible, or English or French translations of *Arabian Nights*, their accounts often reflecting these readings no less than their actual observations.[7]

Patai's popular works on the Middle East followed and summarized this tradition. In the introduction to his 1959 *Sex and Family in the Bible and in the Middle East*, he likens his work to that of an archaeologist. As much as archaeologists dig Palestine and Egypt for evidence of biblical times, he claims, ethnographers and anthropologists may study present-day sexual norms in the region to trace ancient customs and mores. Things have changed, no doubt, over the past 3,500 years, he admits, but sexual mores in the region are relatively preserved, and changes slow to arrive.[8]

Loyal to this assumption, Patai juxtaposes evidence from diverse places and times and conflates them into a single unchanging unity of Arab sexuality. He combines Hilma Granqvist's research on rural Palestine, Alois Musil's ethnography of Arabia's Rwala Bedouins, Edward William Lane's description of nineteenth-century Cairo and biblical narratives into a coherent, unchanging essence. He cites Jacob's love for Rachel, alongside Musil's translation of Rwala love poems, to support his claim that premarital love had indeed existed in biblical times.[9] Similarly, he finds murder as punishment for rape both in the biblical story of Jacob's daughter Dinah and in present-day Arabia.[10] Such historical parallels are interesting. Continuity, no less than change, deserves an explanation, but Patai ignored historical specificities and assumed consistency rather than trying to explain it. He was therefore virtually blind to historically specific power relations.

Fifteen years later, similar themes could be found in Patai's famous *The Arab Mind*, which tries to explain Arab resentment of the West. Ignoring historical processes yet again, the only possible explanation he could come up

with was couched in collective psychological terms. The main assumption underlying the entire project is the notion of an 'Arab mind' as an empirical entity essentially different from its Western counterpart. Like *Sex and the Family*, this book relies on anecdotes and conflated space and time. An entire chapter is dedicated to sexuality, mainly to women's sexual oppression: honour killing, veiling and female circumcision. Arab notions of honour, he argues, privilege family honour over the lives of individual family members. Repression of sexuality in Arab society, moreover, turns sex into a primary mental preoccupation in the Arab world. Muslim men grow up believing that if it were not for the restrictions on interactions between the sexes and the capital punishment awaiting sexual offenders, they would not be able to control themselves and would have sex with the first woman they laid eyes on.[11]

Central to Patai's argument is the essential difference between Western and Arab men. Unlike a rational Western man who would merely divorce an unfaithful wife, for example, the Arab man would kill his female relatives for sexual indiscretions.[12] Unlike male circumcision (practised in the West) – which is virtually harmless and serves the ritual purpose of increasing a man's virility, female circumcision is meant to moderate women's sexual desire in the interest of preventing both pre- and extra-marital sex.[13]

Violence against women is far from unique to the Middle East. The emphasis on women's oppression silences other aspects of female social and sexual lives. The silence of the pregnant bride makes Arab social mores seem particularly cruel and Western gender relations particularly egalitarian and devoid of patriarchal power relations.

Patai's writings represent but one trend in Orientalist writing on Islamic sexuality. Other Western travellers viewed Ottoman sexual practices as representing a different, rather than a less moral, outlook, while still others used them to criticize what they saw in their own societies.[14] One such traveller was Magnus Hirschfeld, who turned his travel account into social critique.

Comparative sexology as social critique: Magnus Hirschfeld

> To speak in whispers of sex, especially in an unscientific manner, is a great mistake. Only through pure truth can we have true purity.[15]

Sixty-two year-old Jewish-German sexologist Magnus Hirschfeld arrived in Egypt at the end of a world tour begun in October 1930. Starting in New York, he had travelled to San Francisco, Tokyo, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Manila, and India, finally reaching the Middle East in late 1931. Arriving in Greece in March 1932, he learned that it was no longer safe for him to return to Germany, and was forced into exile in Switzerland. In May 1933 the Nazi government dismantled his institute and burned his library and archives. He then left for Paris, where he died two years later at the age of 67.[16]

The stated aim of his 1935 book *Men and Women: The World Journey of a*

Sexologist was to expose the arbitrariness of sexual norms at home, in view of the sexual habits of other societies. As a sexual reform activist, Hirschfeld strove to abolish the criminalization of homosexuality, and supported free access to birth control and abortion, as well as single women's rights to sexual activity and motherhood. His personal agenda, moreover, was anti-colonialist and anti-racist, believing that only a society guided by scientific principles could be progressive and just.[17]

Sexual tendencies, he argues in his book, are identical across cultures. Sexual differences between countries are culturally determined – it is culture, rather than physiology or human nature, that determines which sexual habits and practices will be considered legitimate or deviant. Hirschfeld dedicates some fifty pages (out of about five hundred) to his three-month visit to Egypt. He records meetings and conversations with Egyptian doctors and government officials (whom he tried to convince that, from a scientific point of view, homosexuals should be allowed to follow their instincts and have sex with men rather than women), and with representatives of the nascent Egyptian feminist movement. He also lectured in the American University of Cairo (AUC) as a guest of the Egyptian Medical Association.[18]

In some respects, Hirschfeld adopted the prevalent Orientalist discourse. He could not help thinking of the biblical Exodus when he crossed the Sinai by train. He identified the facial features of Tutankhamen and Nefertiti in the faces of Egyptian men and women he met. He also claimed that marriage partners had been chosen by relatives and prohibited from meeting each other before marriage 'since time immemorial'.[19]

Alongside these Orientalist tropes, however, Hirschfeld notes signs of change. The veil and the harem were gradually being discarded, and most women wore transparent veils – a 'graceful compromise'. Restrictions on women's mobility in public spaces were attenuated, and he could see them in theatres, parties, public gatherings, and even attending his own lectures on sexuality at the AUC. More women insisted on choosing their own husbands, rejected sexual double standards and demanded monogamy. He was impressed by representatives of the Egyptian feminist movement, who strove for what he described as complete equality – 'The high intellectual level of these Egyptian feminists is another proof that mental capacity depends neither upon sex nor race' – and saw clearly what most of his contemporaries tended to ignore: the indigenous struggle of Middle Eastern women against multiple forms of oppression.[20]

Some sexual phenomena, he observes, are not that different from those found in other parts of the world. Port Said's bad reputation, he claims, is unjustified, as it resembles other port cities in the world, 'from Hamburg, Amsterdam and Marseille to Hong Kong, Yokohama and San Francisco', namely 'sex-starved packs of turbulent young seamen, as well as the tourists and passengers lusting for adventure, precipitat[ing] themselves upon the girls who are waiting for them and who keep posted on the exact hours of the ships' arrival and departure.'[21] Similarly, he rejects the racist assumption that

'the Negros hold the record for every kind of vice', and notes that the hashish smokers and drunkards he met in Egypt were all white, and that in Cairo's and Alexandria's brothels he saw only blacks selling their bodies to whites.[22] Similarly, he views belly-dancing much more positively than most travellers. He finds it charming, and admits that the outsider cannot help being carried away. In spite of the sexual tension involved, he adds, the celebration 'ended with much decorum and great hilarity'.[23]

Like other foreign travellers, he condemns female circumcision as 'senseless, heartless cruelty.' Its purpose, he observes, is to mitigate the intensity of women's sexual pleasure, 'because the Oriental desires no subjective, active participation on the part of the woman in the sexual act.'[24] At the same time, he was interested to learn that some Egyptian doctors objected to the practice as much as he did, and told him that it does not originate in the Qur'an, but rather in pre-Islamic traditions. He also learned from them that uncircumcised women had less chances of getting married, and acknowledged that abolishing the practice would be difficult.[25] Unlike most of his contemporaries, however, he uses the example of female circumcision to discuss male circumcision, increasingly practised in the West since the late nineteenth century, supposedly for hygienic purposes. As an 'objective student of sex', he argues, male circumcision is superfluous and devoid of any hygienic benefits, as 'Nature creates no organs for the purpose of their being cut off.'[26]

The uniqueness of Hirschfeld's narrative lies in his awareness of power relations that dictate social norms and practices: colonialism, gender inequality and heteronormativity. He supported anti-colonial movements wherever he came across them, and even met Gandhi in India and Mustafa Nahhas in Egypt. Colonial occupation and anti-colonial struggle are intimately related to sexual questions, he emphasizes:

> The feeling of freedom which is determined biologically and deeply anchored in the souls of mankind, extends first to personal individuality, then directly to sex and the sexual influence on a person as embodied in the family, and thirdly, to the families bound closely together through marriage, language, the home and many common living conditions.[27]

One can find at least one striking irony in Hirschfeld's visit to Egypt. During his first lecture at the AUC, Dr Khalil, Secretary General of the Egyptian Medical Association, presented him to the large audience. Egyptian traditions, principles, ways of life and points of view were different from European ones, said Khalil. Dr Hirschfeld, he said, would present the enlightened European opinion of the problem of sex. The listeners might then see for themselves which principles could be applied to Egypt.[28] Eighteenth months after Khalil eulogized Hirschfeld as a representative of European enlightenment, Hirschfeld's Institute and library were destroyed, his books burned to ashes, and his research notes were used against his subjects, some of whom were later sent to concentration camps.[29]

Unlike Patai, Hirschfeld acknowledged the historicity of sexuality. To him, sexual norms were culture-specific, affected by social, political and economic relations. After Patai and Hirschfeld, the representation of feminine sexuality finally moved from Western men to Arab women, when feminist activists started writing about female sexuality in the later decades of the twentieth century.

Nawal al-Saʿdawi: feminists talk of sex

In the 1970s, feminist politics introduced new voices to the English-language discussion of female sexuality. Moroccan sociologist Fatima Mernissi and Egyptian gynaecologist Nawal al-Saʿdawi started writing in French, English and Arabic about their own experiences of harem life, virginity norms, sexual violence and female circumcision, supported by clinical observations and empirical research. In their early writings, both employed feminist theory, Marxism, feminist critique of psychoanalysis and a feminist reading of Islamic sources to criticize gender-based power relations in their respective countries. Both analysed women's sexual oppression within a network of power relations and against several systems of power and knowledge.

Both Mernissi and Saʿdawi became famous in the US and Western Europe for reasons somewhat different than those that brought them fame in their native countries. Both were believed to represent the voice of hitherto silenced Arab women. They supposedly lifted the veil from the faces (and private parts) of Muslim women, unwittingly confirming Western stereotypes about women's oppression in Islamic societies. A selective reading of their works made them fit nicely into Western conceptions of female sexuality in Islam. American reviewers read their books as testifying to the progress American women had made as opposed to their Arab counterparts. These reviews, moreover, tended to de-contextualize these feminists and present them as isolated voices, rather than operating within broad-based political and feminist struggles – such as a critique of post-Nasserite Egypt or a feminist critique of the Moroccan personal status code.[30]

I wish to focus here on al-Saʿdawi's early books in Arabic. In these works from the early 1970s, informed by her clinical experience and feminist convictions, she addressed women's sexual oppression in a society that did not talk openly about sex. She cited cases from her medical experience, alongside quantitative and qualitative studies. Her purpose was for men and women to know more about female anatomy and sexual pleasure, in order to empower her female patients and her readers. Women told her of sexual abuse in childhood, of incest, of rape and of marital rape. She talked to them about masturbation and about sexual pleasure in childhood. She wanted her book to inform women about their bodies and to refute erroneous assumptions that most of them still held.[31]

Saʿdawi views women's ignorance of their own bodies as an outcome of patriarchal power relations. Patriarchal society perceives women as no more

than reproductive tools, and cares more for male monopoly over womb and offspring than about women's familiarity with their own bodies. Women's sexual pleasure, moreover, threatens patriarchal control and is therefore undermined. Seclusion, gender segregation, limitation of women's mobility, veiling and genital mutilation are supposedly designed to 'protect' men from female sexuality. Patriarchy maims women in order to control their reproduction and powerful sexuality.[32]

Saʿdawi also does not shy away from discussing three taboo topics: the clitoris, the hymen and sexual abuse. In silencing the existence and importance of the clitoris, she argues, men control women's sexuality even without actual clitoridectomy. Unaware of their own anatomy, women are ignorant of their capacity to experience sexual pleasure, and by extension unable to oppose genital mutilation. As for the hymen, she challenges the popular assumption that an intact hymen constitutes proof of chastity. The cultural meaning ascribed to the hymen does not fully correspond with female anatomy. One out of four girls will not bleed on her wedding night because of the structure of her hymen, and thus might be treated as a non-virgin merely due to societal ignorance.[33]

Saʿdawi's early works do not attack Islam or Arab culture, but rather highlight the manifestations of patriarchy she encounters in her daily practice. She attacks the double standard which condemns women involved in premarital sex, but not their partners. She also discusses female sexuality within a wider set of power relations: household division of labour, the double burden of working women and the conflict between their education and expectations from life, and social expectations of them.

This discussion, however, is still devoid of historical depth. To understand women's oppression in the present, al-Saʿdawi and others go back to seventh-century Arabia, but ignore fourteen hundred years of history. Moreover, this representation of women's oppression leaves little room for feminine agency and resistance. It is thus left for the historian to trace other voices and other options in Islamic and Arab history.

When historians talk about sex

Early Orientalist works on sexuality did not differ much from Patai's books or travellers' accounts. They assumed that since the *Qur'an* and the *hadith* banned premarital sex, such incidents rarely occurred, and when they did and were detected, carried capital punishment. An edited volume published in 1979 under the title *Society and the Sexes in Medieval Islam* is a good example. In one of the book's articles, James A. Bellamy argues that the *hadith* literature is 'the prime factor in producing the sense of pudency in Muslims', not only at the time of the Prophet, but also to this very day. 'Anyone who knows Muslims and Islam must be aware that this respect [for sexual mores] continues virtually unabated in Islamic countries today.'[34] In another contribution, J.C. Bürgel quotes instances of illicit love and lust in

medieval Arabic literature. His conclusion, however, is that his findings have nothing to do with lived experience: 'Eroticism, love, and marriage in Islam were decisively modeled after the pattern delineated in the Koran and the Sunna.' Literature, however, 'holds positions long since lost in real life; literature dares to dream what is beyond the range of the individual and the laws of society.'[35]

From the early 1980s, historians of *shari'a* courts began studying discrepancies between law and practice. Abraham Marcus's study of eighteenth-century Aleppo was among the first to find evidence of everyday sexual regulation and transgressions, and to explore questions of sexuality within their lived social context. According to Marcus, sexual relations outside of marriage are indeed unlawful, and violations, especially by women, are so damaging to personal and familial honour that society has set up physical and social barriers to prevent them. Violations, however, are not uncommon. Islamic or customary law cannot govern all aspects of social relations. In spite of severe social and sometimes penal sanctions, Aleppo's *shari'a* court records are replete with illicit affairs and illegitimate offspring.[36]

Most historians, however, found very little evidence of such transgressions. Dror Ze'evi found seventeenth-century Jerusalem *shari'a* court records virtually silent about sexual matters. *Shari'a* courts rarely provide insight into how society views non-marital sex, he argues. Families tended to resolve cases of illicit sex in the form of honour killing, he claims, but conspired with the authorities to conceal these murders. Frequent reports of women and girls falling victim to all sorts of accidents, he claims, may actually imply high rates of honour killing.[37]

The archives of precolonial Egypt enable the historian to explore a broad range of social practices and behaviours related to premarital sex in one historical society. In my own research, I found about a hundred cases related to premarital sex, about one fourth of which involving premarital pregnancy. This richness of sources is related to Egypt's evolving centralized legal system. During the decades preceding the British occupation of 1882, a strong state began asserting its presence in the daily lives of Egyptian men and women. Police stations were established in Egypt's regional centres and urban neighbourhoods, and forensic experts, both men and women, examined victims of violence for evidence. A new legal institution, the Councils of Adjudication, handled cases according to an Egyptian version of the 1855 Sultanic Penal Code. New procedures paralleled, rather than replaced, the *shari'a* courts, which continued to adjudicate criminal cases according to the *shari'a*.[38]

The cases recorded in Egypt's archives enable the historian to ask a series of questions that have hitherto been the monopoly of anthropologists or social activists. One can find evidence of rape, and ask who the rape victims were, who the rapists were, and how the legal system and social networks treated rape. One can also find evidence of consensual premarital sex and ask how such affairs could take place in an allegedly gender-segregated society,

and how families and communities chose to treat them. Were girls actually murdered for sexual transgressions? What were the alternative solutions?

Sexuality and the imposition of sexual norms in a given society, I argue here, must be understood within the context of social relations and social power. The ritual nuptial defloration, honour killing and social handling of premarital sex are not in any way predetermined, but rather stem from historically specific social dynamics.[39] As in any other human society, in Egypt familial handling of social and sexual transgression varies greatly. The historian's goal is to trace the range of options and opportunities culturally available to men and women in a given historical society, including honour killing, criminal investigation and private resolution. The pregnant bride, who is virtually invisible in historical research, should be and can be incorporated into our discussion of licit and illicit sex in Islamic societies.

Consider the following example. On March 1877, Hasna's brother brought her to the police station after she had run off with a man named Saʿd. Although Hasna hardly left home, Saʿd kept trying to attract her attention from the street, looking up at her window and entertaining her until late hours of the night, until he managed to convince her to leave the house. In her testimony, Hasna told the police that she had befriended Saʿd, her next-door neighbour, for a couple of years. One day, she visited his house to get some dough from his mother. She found him alone, and he deflowered her with her consent and promised to marry her. Both were convicted for premarital defloration and sentenced to six months' imprisonment. Hasna's brother appealed her conviction. He claimed that she should be seen as a victim, rather than an active participant. She was a minor, he claimed, who lacked the mental capacity and reason of an adult woman, and was easily lured by marriage promises. The Supreme Council ratified Hasna's conviction, but did consider her brother's appeal and reduced her sentence to three months.[40]

Theoretically, this is a case of *zina*, illicit sexual intercourse between a man and a woman who is neither his wife nor his slave. It is considered a crime against God (a *hadd* crime) punishable by death when one of the partners is married, or by lashes if both are not.[41] In practice, however, jurists and judges seldom treated extra- and premarital sex as *zina*. The *shariʿa*'s strict rules of evidence require four witnesses to the act itself, or confession in four separate court sessions. False accusation of *zina*, moreover, was considered defamation (*qadhf*), also a crime against God – a measure meant to deter people from making further false accusations. In addition, the *hadd* punishment was not applied in cases of doubt. This principle could be applied when testimonies conflicted, or when the crime was committed under duress, or when a man mistakenly believed his partner to be legitimate (for example, if she impersonated his wife, or if he wrongfully assumed that he was the legal owner of a his wife's slave).[42]

When *hadd* could not be applied, the defendant was liable to *taʿzir*, a lighter form of punishment, which was within the *qadi*'s discretionary power. In precolonial Egypt, these cases were handled by the Councils of Adjudication.

According to the 1855 Sultanic Code, honour-related offences that could not be proved in the *shari'a* court carried a penalty of six months' imprisonment. Premarital sex could also be adjudicated as an 'abduction of a girl', which carried a similar prison term. In addition, women who lost their virginity before marriage were entitled to monetary compensation for bodily injury, which equalled their proper bride-money (*mahr al-mithl*). Such compensation was obligatory if a woman lost her virginity as a result of an accident, but not in cases of consensual sex.[43] The main function of the *shari'a* court procedure was often to restore social order and help the girl and her family regain their status and reputation. Monetary compensation could help the victim, whose marital prospects were significantly reduced, to survive economically.[44]

When considered in the context of social relations, Hasna's case raises several questions. First, it implies that despite strict societal and legal norms prohibiting premarital sex and amorous interactions between single men and women, gender segregation was far from water-tight. Men and women did manage to evade family and community surveillance, and did find opportunities to meet each other. In this case, Sa'd was courting Hasna from the street. In another case, a girl whose father worked as a doorman in an Alexandrian inn eloped to Cairo with one of its Greek residents.[45] In another case, a girl agreed to have sex with the neighbourhood barber after he had promised to marry her.[46]

At the same time, members of the community constantly monitored women's presence and mobility in public space. Neighbours were more than willing to report suspicious interactions between non-related men and women. In Hasna's case, the neighbours testified to the police to previous interaction between her and her lover. In another case, neighbours contacted the police when they suspected that a man's new servant actually served as his illegal concubine.[47] In yet another case, a prostitute was accused of enticing her neighbours' young daughter to have sexual intercourse with a certain man. Neighbours then told the police that they occasionally noticed the girl speaking to her neighbour on the roof when her parents were away.[48] Finally, Hasna enjoyed the protection of her family, who did not want to see her punished. In a similar case, the girl's father reasoned that social sanctions following premarital defloration, such as reduced marital prospects, were severe enough, and that imprisonment would unnecessarily aggravate her condition.[49]

Thus, cases of premarital sex from precolonial Egypt challenge the assumption that strict legal and social norms banning premarital sex necessarily meant violent social sanctions against the women involved. Honour killing was a real threat, constantly present in many women's life choices. It existed, however, within a repertoire of social practices and possible courses of action. Below is a tentative outline of this repertoire.

Most premarital defloration cases that reached the authorities in this period were what we would now call rape, but state officials recorded them as 'defloration by force.' Premarital defloration itself was an offence against

honour, for which both parties could be held liable. The element of coercion was relevant only in determining the girl's responsibility. If she could prove that she had not consented, she was acquitted. These cases were usually initiated either by the girls themselves or by their guardians, who wished to see the assailant punished. Rape victims risked conviction for (their own) defloration, and as in other legal systems, which have tended to mistrust women's testimonies of sexual assualt, they had to prove that they had not consented. When the assailant denied that sexual intercourse had taken place, the woman found herself unable to explain how she had lost her virginity, and was convicted while her rapist walked free. The girls' decision to turn to the police following an assault was affected by the assumed outcome of the legal procedure, as was their testimony at the police station. As I demonstrate elsewhere, women often told the police that they were drugged or violently raped, in order to convince the police that they had not consented. When they failed to convince lower legal instances, they sometimes chose to appeal.[50]

Another possible course of action was marriage. Rape could reduce a woman's marital prospects, and marriage to the rapist could minimize the damage to her family's reputation. In some cases, one of the parties did not accept this solution, as they believed they could avoid legal and social sanctions without it. In one case, for example, a blind girl accused her Qur'an teacher of raping and impregnating her. Having failed to prove her allegations, her father asked the teacher to marry her, but he refused and managed to evade responsibility for the girl and her pregnancy.[51] In another case, a man admitted to rape accusations in a *shari'a* court, and expressed his wish to marry the girl. In spite of the damage to her reputation, however, the girl refused. Her bet proved successful, at least in the legal arena. His confession in the *shari'a* court was used against him in the council and he alone was convicted.[52] In many other cases, however, marriage did ensue, with or without punishment of the parties involved.

Marriage was often the socially acceptable solution to premarital consensual sex, and often a solution that the parties themselves had desired. As in other societies, many couples resorted to clandestine sex because their parents refused to see them married. Premarital sex could force reluctant parents to change their minds.[53] One may ask why such cases reached the authorities in the first place. Presumably, none of the parties involved would have any interest in involving the state. Most cases of consenting couples reached the authorities through a parent or a sibling who called in the police to retrieve a runaway girl.[54] Women themselves sometimes initiated police involvement when their partners failed to fulfil a marriage promise. Some cases indeed ended in marriage.[55] In one such case, a couple from a village near Asyut eloped to a nearby village after the girl's parents vetoed their marriage. The young woman turned to the authorities a month later, as she was unhappy with the marriage. Asyut's Council sentenced her to one month in jail, and her husband to six. Intent on minimizing the damage, her father now agreed to the marriage, which was properly conducted with his blessing.[56]

Although marriage could be the desirable solution for couples and their parents, in precolonial Egypt this solution did not satisfy the authorities. Couples could get married and be punished at the same time. In one such case, Wahba ʿAmir and pregnant Fatima confessed to premarital defloration in Alexandria's *shariʿa* court. The court sentenced them to 75 lashes each (the *shariʿa* punishment for *zina* when both partners are single) and then proceeded to conduct their marriage ceremony.[57] In a similar case, Saʿid Mansur accused ʿAbd al-Malik of deflowering his daughter, who was now eight months pregnant. ʿAbd al-Malik confessed and suggested that since they were of the same religion, and both single, they could marry, which they did. In spite of their marriage and repeated appeals, however, they were also sentenced to a few months' imprisonment.[58]

Whether consensual or not, pregnancy and birth complicated matters for unmarried couples, particularly for women, and made premarital sex harder to conceal. Since midwives were obliged to inform the authorities of births, moreover, single women sometimes resorted to unassisted labour. In one such case, a divorcee named Kashta gave birth in her stepfather's home. In an attempt to conceal the birth, she did not call for a midwife, and handed her newborn baby over to a neighbour. She managed to keep the child hidden for three months before her stepfather informed the authorities about what he believed to be his neighbour's illegitimate child.[59] This case exemplifies, first, a woman's (initially successful) attempt to avoid family and community surveillance. It also exemplifies the kind of solidarity that women might offer each other in concealing illegitimate births. Finally, it demonstrates how illegitimate children could hardly escape community surveillance. Here, ironically, the stepfather was more vigilant when it came to his neighbour than when it came to his own home. Some women were much less fortunate, as unassisted labour often ended in maternal and foetal death;[60] others resorted to infanticide.[61] Abortion, especially during the first four months of pregnancy, was not illegal, and is therefore invisible in our records. It is safe to assume, however, that this was yet another solution to illicit pregnancy.[62]

Premarital sex is invisible to the historian when a couple and the family manage to resolve a case without involving the authorities, and sometimes even without involving the community. The repertoire of behaviours and practices outlined here implies that like 'Nagwa', whose story opened this article, most of these cases never reached court. The story of illicit sex in historical societies is sorely lacking without reference to this diversity.

Conclusion

What is it that silences the pregnant bride? Why has she been so invisible to most historians? First, scholars ignored her because they focused on prescriptive legal texts and disregarded court records and other archival sources. Second, the family and the community had a clear interest in rendering her invisible. Effective control of young women's sexuality was possible only

when social networks publicized the punishment, while keeping implicit settlements silent. The family whose reputation had been compromised also sought to keep the matter silent. Third, when couples chose to get married, this fact did not have to reach the authorities. Families did not involve the authorities in cases that could be resolved within the family or the community. Before the nineteenth century, the state had no interest in those aspects of human life governed by customary law, or those that could be settled peacefully between families. Finally, the archives of precolonial Egypt documented cases that *shari'a* courts rarely did. The Khedival state was interested in those aspects of community and family life, and brought men and women to justice for violations that would not have reached courts in the past.

The importance of shattering this silence is both scholarly and political. For scholars, this serves as yet another important reminder not to settle for the letter of the law but rather to explore the diversity of human behaviours and norms. More importantly, perhaps, it invites us to challenge the assumption that women's sexuality in Islamic societies was violently oppressed. This assumption leaves no room for community tolerance and for women's creativity and resistance. Recognizing the existence of such options in historical societies promotes the struggle for more space for resistance in the twenty-first century Middle East.

Notes

1 See L. Nader, 'Orientalism, Occidentalism and the Control of Women', *Cultural Dynamics*, 1989, vol. 11, pp. 323–35.
2 For one discussion of the book's contemporary readings, following the the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, see N. B. De Atkine, 'The Arab Mind Revisited', *Middle East Quarterly*, 2004, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 47–55.
3 D. Spurr, *The Rhetoric of Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing and Imperial Administration*, Durham: Duke University Press, 1993, pp. 170–83; M. Yeğenoğlu, *Colonial Fantasies: Toward a Feminist Reading of Orientalism*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 39–99.
4 Z. Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 70; D. Ze'evi, *Producing Desire: Changing Sexual Discourse in the Ottoman Middle East, 1500–1900*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006, pp. 155–6; D. Ze'evi, 'Women in 17th-century Jerusalem: Western and Indigenous Perspectives', *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 1995, vol. 27, pp. 159–60; L. Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation: The Family Politics of Modernizing, Colonizing and Liberating Egypt (1805/1923)*, Berkeley: California University Press, 2005, pp. 90–9.
5 J. Fabian, *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1983, pp. 31–42.
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Part II

Marginal lives

4 Silent voices within the elites

The social biography of a modern shaykh[1]

Yoav Alon

Arab tribal shaykhs have played a central role in the Arab Middle East for centuries. In fact, a major part of the population throughout the region recognized the leadership of such men until recent decades. The position of shaykh was a highly-prized office, one that carried influence and power. From the latter part of the nineteenth century, with the initiation of Ottoman centralizing reforms in the periphery, and especially after World War I with the emergence of the modern nation states in the Fertile Crescent and Arabia, this office underwent dramatic changes. It adjusted to the changing circumstances, but remained of central importance in the newly independent states, and sometimes even survives in modified forms into the present day.

Surprisingly, the important office of shaykh has mostly escaped academic attention. Although tribal shaykhs are mentioned in many histories and ethnographies of the Middle East, no study has yet attempted to investigate their political, social and cultural significance. The result is that even though we are familiar with some historical shaykhly figures, mainly from an anthropological perspective, we are far from understanding the office of the tribal shaykh at large. This scholarly silence is all the more remarkable, since recent years have seen a growing academic interest in tribal societies in the Middle East and the role they play in modern states.

This article attempts to demonstrate both the feasibility of studying tribal shaykhs and the benefits of doing so by offering a preliminary sketch of the social biography of a particular shaykh. Mithqal al-Fayiz, who began his life as a leader during the late Ottoman period, rose to prominence within the Bani Sakhr tribal confederacy at the time of the establishment of the Emirate of Transjordan in 1921, and served as the paramount shaykh of the confederacy until his death in 1967. The article will show that Mithqal played a significant role in the development of modern Jordan. He had a great impact on the course of events that led to the creation of the Emirate and to its consolidation as a new polity, especially in the first decade after its establishment. At the same time, however, the process of state-formation transformed his role from that of a leader of an independent community into a mediator between his tribes and the central government.

Retrieving the voice of Mithqal, however, is a Herculean task. The shaykh

was illiterate and therefore left no recorded material in the form of a diary or memoirs. He certainly was not an intellectual, and his public statements, though available, are sparse and short. Moreover, and despite his fame, not a single study about him has been carried out in Jordan. Nevertheless, his actions and choices speak volumes about his attitude, ideology and motivation. The current study, then, follows Mithqal's behaviour, actions and reactions to the changing realities around him, in order to understand his role and worldview. This methodology makes it possible to overcome the scholarly silence, and draw Mithqal into the written history of the Middle East.

Before discussing Mithqal, the chapter will show that despite the steadily growing body of literature dealing with state-tribe relations, shaykhs as historical topics for inquiry have been largely absent from the literature, unlike tribal leaders in Iran and Afghanistan who did receive fuller scholarly treatment.[2] It will then attempt to examine this absence in the literature. This initial discussion highlights the objective methodological difficulties of studying the shaykhs, but also shows that certain biases among scholars account in part for this lacuna. This is true not only as far as western historians are concerned; in Jordan itself, shaykhly figures such as Mithqal have not been the subject of historical study, and this absence warrants explanation.

The absent place of shaykhs in the literature on state and tribe

Until recent decades, most of the Middle East's population lived in rural areas and could be characterized as tribal in terms of political organization, social patterns of behaviour, cultural values, ideology and economy. Even today, most Arab societies retain many features of tribal life, which modern conditions and emerging centralized states have been unable to erode. Still, tribal societies have received only limited attention from scholars, in particular from historians of the region. Historians tended to leave the study of such societies to anthropologists. They, in turn, offered detailed studies, but placed disproportionate emphasis on nomads.[3]

Recent years have seen a change as more historians and social scientists have begun to explore the history of the relations between state and tribe.[4] Thanks to this development, our understanding of tribal societies in the modern Middle East has been greatly enhanced. Not only can we now benefit from excellent historical case studies, but also the methodological and theoretical developments in the field are most impressive. A new body of scholarship challenges common assumptions, suggests new definitions for the notions of 'state' and 'tribe', and introduces sharper tools to analyse tribal societies in modern states.[5] By transcending the supposed dichotomy between state and tribe, it shows that tribes react in different ways to the creation of a centralized state, and experience different degrees of autonomy and subordination. In some cases, tribes have acquired a stake in the survival of the state. State authorities, for their part, may attempt to destroy tribes, change their traditional way of life, or dismiss their values as anachronistic. However, more

often than not, governments co-operate with tribes, share power with them, co-opt their leaders and incorporate tribal values into the state's ethos. Generally speaking, the new literature emphasizes the dynamic rather than static nature of both state and tribe and their abilities to accommodate each other in response to changing historical circumstances.

The recent literature has also paved the way to a better understanding of the tribal shaykhs, offering a conceptual framework for studying the political and cultural environment within which the shaykhs operated. These new studies expose the internal political structure of tribal society and the external relationships between tribes and states. The studies also describe some basic characteristics of the shaykhs' roles and the qualities expected of them, as well as offering accounts of the sources for and nature of shaykhly authority. As such, this scholarship created the foundation for the study of shaykhs.

For example, the concept of chieftaincy developed by Khoury and Kostiner, Tapper and others focuses on the leadership system of the big tribal confederacies and on the political process both in Arabia and in Iran. Following Barth and others, their approach is less interested in kinship considerations, which preoccupied the first generations of anthropologists. Instead, it emphasizes the crucial role of the confederacy's leader in maintaining the unity and common action of the confederacy as a political entity. This is indeed a daunting challenge because of the environment in which the leader operates. The chieftaincy is composed of various elements, each of which enjoys a considerable degree of political manoeuvrability, as well as cultural and economic autonomy. The leader's task is made all the more difficult due to the normative absence of institutionalized power in tribal society. As far as Arab shaykhs are concerned, at least theoretically, they enjoy no more than a status of *primus inter pares* in a society that holds egalitarianism as one of its cultural fundamentals. Moreover, the shaykhdom is never secure, and a shaykh constantly needs to maintain the support of his followers against challenges from other able and ambitious men of his tribe.

It is the precarious leadership position that requires the shaykh to attract the sponsorship of some higher authority, by creating for himself and his people what Caton terms an image of 'indomitableness before potential allies and enemies'.[6] Indeed, relations with a state can guarantee the provision of resources, which in turn helps the leader to maintain his position; the ability to distribute favours constitutes an important factor in his standing among his followers. This might explain the shaykh's motivation to co-operate with central governments and colonial powers as the historical evidence abundantly demonstrates.[7] The link to state authority helps the shaykh to fend off attempts by potential rivals to replace him. As Lancaster shows, once shaykhs in Arabia began dealing with state officials, in the wake of the consolidation of Ottoman rule in the late nineteenth century – precisely the period when this study begins – it became more difficult to take over the shaykhdom.[8] For their part, central governments created and upheld tribal elites in order to help them rule indirectly difficult populations beyond their reach.

Despite what seems like an impressive accumulation of general knowledge, our understanding of tribal societies in general and their leaders in particular is far from satisfactory. This situation stems from our tendency to assume that we can draw generalizations and make theoretical assumptions about certain frameworks of tribal life. Anthropologists highlight some features common to most tribal societies, from which they feel comfortable extrapolating from one society to another under different historical conditions. For instance, there is some agreement among scholars that tribal society possesses 'cultural substance', or what Tapper calls a 'state of mind', namely a pattern of social organization, a typical way of behaviour and a value system.[9] Similarly, Eickelman invokes the notion of 'family resemblance' to note certain common features across the board.[10] As far as Arab shaykhs are concerned, the shortage of concrete examples and detailed biographies makes the attempt to test the intuitive assumptions problematic.

Several factors account for the relative absence of histories of the shaykhs. Until recently, most tribal leaders could not read or write, and their societies were illiterate. Thus, finding sources suitable for studying shaykhs poses a serious challenge. Many of the available sources were written by government officials, representatives of foreign empires, Western travel writers or Arab intellectuals – all of whom were external observers to their subject matter, and can be fairly suspected of being prejudiced or of having flawed perceptions. Such sources, therefore, are problematic for the social historian who seeks documents which originate from within the society under study.

The objective problem of sources aside, there are other factors that account for the gap in historical research, factors deriving from the attitude of historians of the Middle East. First, many historians see tribal, and especially nomadic societies, as being the realm of anthropologists. Discussing the historical study of nomadism, Lindner has already asserted that 'Historians dislike nomads'.[11] This statement can be adopted to refer to tribes in general, nomadic and settled alike. Second, many historians, utilizing conventional tools of historical inquiry, namely written texts, have reservations about the methodology of oral history, which offers a means to overcome partially the scarcity of reliable sources alluded to above. Finally, shaykhs were seen, and rightly so, as part of the elite, who enjoyed close ties with central governments. Moreover, many a shaykh willingly collaborated with colonial regimes. In a highly politicized field such as Middle Eastern studies, which in recent years has focused on the lower strata of society, the study of elite collaborators – like the tribal shaykh – became unfashionable.

Further research on tribal societies and on the shaykhs, however, is possible and also necessary in order to bring them into focus as part of Middle Eastern historiography. This would allow for a more comprehensive appreciation of many aspects of their history, and their roles within the larger society as well. It is in these contexts that the present study aspires to make its contribution.

Historical writing in Jordan and the absent shaykhs

If we speak of silence in the historiography of tribal shaykhs, perhaps the emphatic term 'silencing' is more accurate, as far as the literature in Jordan is concerned. Mithqal al-Fayiz and his peers played a crucial role in the history of Jordan. Moreover, their families still constitute a prominent element of the Jordanian political elite centred on the Hashemite family. This prominent position owes much to the ancestors of these families, who led their tribes during the formative years of the mandate period, a role duly acknowledged with great pride by the families. Nevertheless, these shaykhs, Mithqal included, are marginalized in local histories. Although a large volume of literature on tribes and the bedouin has appeared in Jordan since the 1980s, there are no studies dedicated to specific shaykhs.[12] It is true that many of them do make an appearance in Arabic books about the development of Jordan as a political entity in the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the role of the shaykhs is always overshadowed by other actors – namely the Hashemites or their British partners.[13] Short biographies of shaykhs appear only on the pages dedicated to history and national heritage in the Jordanian daily newspapers. First and foremost among them is the official *al-Ra'y*, considered to be the mouthpiece of the tribal or Transjordanian (as opposed to the Palestinian) element of the kingdom.[14]

This silencing was the result of more than one factor. First, the history of tribal leaders potentially goes against the grain of traditional history writing in Jordan. The latter was established in the late 1950s, with the publication of Munib Madi and Sulayman Musa's *Tarikh al-Urdunn fil-Qarn al-'Ishrin*.[15] This work, and the many others by the late Musa that followed, emphasized the role of the Hashemites and conformed to the founding myth of Jordan, which dates back to the 1916 Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire. According to this narrative, the state of Jordan is the outcome of the revolt; it was a tribal coalition initiated and led by the Hashemite family. This establishes the Hashemites' legitimacy to rule over Jordan and its tribes. The narrative emphasizes both state-building and nation-building, with both processes presided over by the Hashemite kings and intended to cement divergent tribal, regional, religious or ethnic communities into one unified nation under Hashemite rule. Tribal history, in contrast, might undermine this hegemonic semi-official narrative, since it emphasizes, by definition, division (along kinship and tribal lines) rather than uniformity. Moreover, much of the shaykhs' fame was earned before the establishment of Jordan or during its first years. At the time, however, tribes and their leaders were often in opposition to the emerging state and even to the founder, Emir (later King) Abdullah. They were at pains to retain their privileged position vis-à-vis a colonial regime that encroached upon their personal autonomy and that of their communities. They often opposed government policies, evaded government orders and at times took up arms, the most prominent case being the 1923 Balqa' revolt.[16] The semi-official histories tend to present these conflicts

briefly and interpret them as no more than the growing pains of the new polity, merely delaying the processes of state-building, and the imposition of the central government's rule over society. An alternative interpretation might weaken the well-established convention about the historical alliance between the Jordanian tribes and the Hashemite family.

Another difficulty in writing about specific leading tribal figures is that Jordan is a segmented society (divided into tribal confederacies, tribes, and lineages), where the current political prominence of certain tribes and families derives to a large extent from their history. Therefore, any writing of history is especially sensitive, and needs to be handled cautiously lest it affect a family's good name and reputation. Stressing the historical role of a specific tribal leader automatically invokes the envy of the family or tribe of his historic rivals, who are at present also his family's competitors for Hashemite favours. Thus, self-censorship is often exercised to prevent such potentially divisive situations. The paucity of tribal histories (in contrast to the very common genealogies and works of a folkloristic nature) is an indication of the difficulty in writing about shaykhs. One example is the futile attempt of the historian of the ʿAdwan tribe to compose his tribe's history and publish it in book format, as analysed by Andrew Shryock.[17] The controversy that accompanied each publication on tribal affairs by Dr Ahmad ʿUwaydi al-ʿAbbadi – the main protagonist of Shryock's book – further corroborates this interpretation.

The social biography of Mithqal al-Fayiz

Unlike a political biography, social biography seems to be the best method to examine a certain profession, office or status which is shared by many societies and has a long history. It enables us to learn about a general or universal phenomenon from the case study of an individual. Eickelman's social biography of a Moroccan *ʿalim*, modelled in turn on Clifford Geertz, Karl Mannheim and others, serves as an inspiration for this kind of study. A social biography is the interpretation of:

> . . . a single naturally coherent social phenomenon . . . a specific manifestation of a more comprehensive pattern which has a very large, in some cases virtually infinite, number of such embodiments and manifestations, the one at hand simply being regarded as particularly telling in the fullness, the clarity, and the elegance with which it exhibits the general pattern.[18]

Mithqal al Fayiz's life seems to fulfil these requirements for a social biography and presents a remarkable opportunity to portray a clear and vivid picture of a tribal shaykh in modern times. Mithqal was an important and colourful historical figure whose clout, and wheeling and dealing, extended far beyond the borders of Transjordan. Conveniently, his long life (he died at the age of ninety in 1967) spanned a crucial period of change in Middle Eastern history.

The decisive factor in enabling the writing of Mithqal's social biography has been the availability of sources: there exists abundant written material about him. Mithqal – like his father before him – was an attraction for travellers, who produced lively and detailed accounts in English, German and Hebrew. Since he played a crucial political role and often posed a challenge to the Transjordanian government and colonial authorities, Mithqal drew the attention of state officials, both Jordanian and British, whose records can be found in various state and private archives in the United Kingdom, Jordan and Israel. Due to his close contact with the Zionist movement in the 1930s and 1940s, the Central Zionist Archives contain dozens of reports concerning Mithqal, as well as a wealth of correspondence with him. Because of his involvement in regional politics, his actions and statements were covered by the press in Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Palestine. Oral accounts supplement this material.

Mithqal al-Fayiz was born in the late 1870s into the shaykhly family of the Fayiz tribe who, for generations, held the leadership of the powerful Bani Sakhr confederation. As such, young Mithqal had the prospect of becoming future leader. Although evidence of his childhood is not available, it can be assumed that he was groomed to become a shaykh, along with some of his many brothers and cousins. Mithqal came of age during the era of Ottoman reforms in the Syrian periphery. During the latter third of the nineteenth century the Ottoman government incorporated the southern parts of the Syrian *vilayet* under its direct rule. It initiated a series of modernizing reforms which resulted in a change in the relationship between the strong nomadic confederacies of the steppe and the state.[19] A decade before Mithqal's birth, the Bani Sakhr, like many other nomadic tribes, lost control over parts of the country in which the Ottomans imposed their own system of law and order. Thus, the *dira* (tribal territory) of the Bani Sakhr in the western parts of the Balqaʾ and ʿAjlun regions (what would become central and northern Transjordan) was severely encroached upon. At the same time, however, the vast eastern regions were still beyond Ottoman reach, well into the Syrian desert up to Wadi Sirhan, which came under Saudi sovereignty in 1925.

It was Mithqal's father, shaykh Sattam al-Fayiz, who led the Bani Sakhr during this delicate time of momentous change, and succeeded in striking an alliance with the Ottoman state. In doing so, he ensured the prosperity and extensive autonomy of his tribes, while putting them gradually on the path of modernity. One of the aspects of the latter was the decision of the Bani Sakhr shaykhs to benefit from the 1858 Ottoman land law. They registered large tracts of tribal land under their names in the newly established *tapu* office, and cultivated it with labour from Palestine and Egypt. As early as 1895 Mithqal owned land he received from his father. He continued to accumulate vast territories, becoming the largest landowner in Transjordan in 1922. Land was gradually becoming the main source of income for many shaykhs in the region.[20]

Mithqal began his public life during World War I. As a gifted warrior who led raids against other tribes, the war served him as a convenient launching pad

to increase his fame and reputation among the Bani Sakhr tribes, headed at the time by his older brother, Fawwaz.[21] Mithqal supported the Ottomans against the approaching armies of the British and the Hashemite-led Arab Revolt. In 1917, upon the death of Fawwaz, Mithqal made his first bid to become the paramount shaykh (*shaykh mashayikh*) of the Bani Sakhr, but lost to his nephew, the son of the deceased leader. It was then, and apparently as compensation, that the highest Ottoman official in Syria, Cemal Pasha, awarded him the title of *pasha*, thus making him the only person in Transjordan to hold this prestigious rank. The granting of the *pasha* title proved beneficial to the Ottomans. Mithqal remained loyal, and brought about a temporary split within the tribe when the British and Hashemite armies advanced into the country and obtained the new paramount shaykh's support.[22]

Mithqal's main significance and impact, however, needs to be seen in the context of the establishment of the Emirate of Transjordan. He played an important role in the formative years of modern Jordan. When Abdullah arrived in Transjordan in November 1920, Mithqal al-Fayiz was one of the principal power brokers in the country. He commanded the support of a 30,000-strong tribal confederacy with an estimated military force of around 3,000 men. Further, he presided over a much larger coalition of additional tribes and communities, overshadowing the Bani Sakhr's official shaykh. His influence in Amman, soon to become the capital, derived to a large extent from the alliance he struck with the wealthy and influential Khayr family of merchants, originally from Damascus.[23] This alliance was cemented by Mithqal's marriage to ʿAdul, the daughter of Saʿid Khayr, the mayor of the town. The previous two years, between the collapse of Ottoman rule in Syria and the establishment of the British–Hashemite partnership in Transjordan, allowed Mithqal to retrieve his political status and extend his 'reputation range', a term coined by Lancaster to delineate the informal status of a tribal leader.[24] His allegiance to the Ottomans was not held against him, as he cultivated good relations with Faysal bin Husayn during the latter's short reign over Syria.[25] Moreover, the collapse of the Faysali state, and the futile early British attempts to control the country with a handful of political officers in the second half of 1920, allowed him to consolidate his leadership in the Balqa' region. As such, Mithqal played an important part in the future development of Transjordan. His strong resistance to Britain's attempts to extend its influence, and his support of Abdullah contributed to the British decision in March 1921 to recognize Abdullah's rule in the area – at least temporarily.[26]

Mithqal quickly became Abdullah's most important and powerful ally, and helped the Emir to consolidate his base of support. By that time, the Emirate of Transjordan was gradually emerging as a separate political unit. While contributing to Abdullah's state-building effort, Mithqal – the official paramount shaykh since the death of his nephew in April 1921 – was also at pains to maintain his personal autonomy and that of his tribal confederacy, perhaps the most important duty of a tribal shaykh.[27] In an era of colonial rule, the emergence of new political units and demarcation of international

borders, government centralization, and rapid economic change which badly affected the bedouin economy, this was a challenging task that greatly preoccupied him.

Mithqal's efforts to preserve the autonomy of his confederation as well as his leadership were easier during the first decade after the establishment of the Emirate. The weak government was not a match for the nomadic confederacies and its rule was limited to the settled zone west of the Hijazi railway. The back-seat position taken by Britain in administrating the country until 1924 allowed Abdullah a free hand in handling tribal affairs. Many tribes and their leaders enjoyed this policy. Mithqal's close relations with Abdullah entailed privileges to him personally, as well as to the Bani Sakhr tribesmen. For instance, Abdullah awarded him a large plot of land which made Mithqal the owner of 70,000 dunums (approx. 70 km^2), and the largest landowner in the country. He also reduced the tax assessments on Mithqal and his confederacy, and even exempted them altogether. By the 1920s, Mithqal was one of the richest and most influential people in the country.[28] This was partly in return for the military support of the Bani Sakhr, which he would extend to the Emir while the Arab Legion was still weak and could not deal unaided with external threats.[29]

This period saw the first changes in the traditional role of a shaykh. By the mid-to-late 1920s Mithqal ceased to lead raids. He also spent more time in the capital Amman, where he owned a house, rather than in his desert castle or camping with his tribespeople.[30] The growing gap between the paramount shaykh and his immediate family and the rest of the confederacy would become much more noticeable a decade later. In Amman, Mithqal could host government officials, army officers, urban notables and other tribal shaykhs who had business in the capital, thus cementing his relations with the nascent state elite and increasing his influence within the government.

The move to Amman was also necessitated by Mithqal's election to the Legislative Council in 1929–31 and again in 1934–37. His rare and brief interventions in the Council's discussions reveal his fierce objection to the government's attempts to limit tribal autonomy. Mithqal's opposition in the Council to the ratification of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1928 earned him the reputation of a national leader even outside Transjordan. The Jaffa-based *Filastin* daily newspaper reported that Mithqal snubbed all of Abdullah's attempts to persuade him to support the treaty, going so far as to threaten Abdullah: 'should you fight me I will ride my camel and migrate to the desert'.[31] Reportedly, Mithqal proudly left Abdullah's palace on foot rather than riding in the Emir's car, which had brought him there in the first place. In the Council's meeting he denounced both the treaty and the Emir's alleged attempts to buy off members of the opposition.[32] Two years later, the same *Filastin* featured Mithqal's visit to Palestine on its front page, printed his picture and described him as 'the great Arab leader' and 'one of the heroes of Arabism' (*batal al-ʿuruba*).[33] In no time, however, Mithqal amended his relations with Abdullah, on whose support he was increasingly reliant.

Indeed, Mithqal seems to have been aware of the changing circumstances, and prepared his family to deal with them. Observing the post-war changes and the new requirements of modern life, he provided his sons with a modern education. He sent one of them to the Quaker school in Lebanon. The son who would succeed him, ʿAkif, was sent to acquire a general education and agricultural training. In later years Mithqal employed an *Azhar* graduate to tutor his children.[34] Mithqal himself was illiterate but employed a scribe who was responsible for his many communications, which Mithqal stamped with his own seal. By the late 1930s the seal was no longer used, as Mithqal had learned to sign his own name.

From the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, the alliance with Abdullah was no longer sufficient to preserve the shaykh's autonomy. Economic crisis resulting both from successive years of drought and the worldwide Great Depression particularly hurt the nomads. The expansion of the Wahhabi movement from Arabia, and increased British and government involvement in nomadic affairs, weakened the tribes both in absolute terms and in relation to the government. By 1933 the nomadic tribes were plunged into poverty and famine. Many people died from hunger and disease. The tribes and their shaykhs were in desperate need of help from the government. At this time, however, the alliance with Abdullah was less beneficial to Mithqal, since the Emir had lost much of his authority over tribal affairs to Captain John Glubb and the Arab Legion's Desert Patrol, established in 1930.[35]

In addition, by the mid-1930s the state apparatus expanded, so the government consolidated its power and could intervene in society more effectively. As the political, military and economic dominance of the state grew, tribal society was relegated to a position of dependence on the government. Moreover, tribes, and more particularly the tribal confederacies, lost much of their *raison d'être* as many of their functions were gradually assumed by state agencies. Security, livelihood, conflict resolution and even health and education now became available without recourse to the tribal framework. These developments put growing strain on Mithqal and other shaykhs, including Haditha al-Khuraysha, Sultan and Majid al-ʿAdwan, Kulayb al-Shurayda, Rufayfan al-Majali and Hamad bin Jazi.[36]

Nevertheless, Mithqal's attempt to maintain his privileged status met with remarkable success. One of his strategies to preserve his independence of action, or at least to postpone its decline, was to cultivate close relations with the Saudi court, and with the Jewish Agency in Palestine. The former ties increased his leverage with Abdullah, who was displeased with his protégé's liaison with his arch rival Ibn Saud. The Saudi connection was also a potential safe haven in case of a falling-out with the local authorities. The nearly fifteen years of intermittent relations with the Jewish Agency (1930–44) were meant to relieve him of his economic predicament and, mainly, to avoid his economic and political subordination to the government and the British. Mithqal advocated enthusiastically and publicly the idea of Jewish colonization of Transjordan. To that effect he negotiated the sale or lease of his land,

which lay fallow in years of bad rains. He also organized and led a group of landowning shaykhs and notables who lobbied the government – albeit unsuccessfully – to allow them to lease or sell land to the Jews. Yet when the negotiations with the Jews came to a standstill, Mithqal was quick to give his support to the *mufti*, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, and to the Palestinian Arab Revolt.[37] More than anything, these external alliances and constant manoeuvrings helped him to delay and mitigate – but not to stop – the growing dependency of his tribes on the government, the British and even Abdullah.

A few years before the mandate's termination, the nature of relations between the government and its tribes changed dramatically. Even Mithqal was no longer immune from government intervention. In 1943 the central government obtained his absolute acquiescence. Unrest in the Bani Sakhr region was a pretext for punitive military measures. An Arab Legion brigade stormed one of the Bani Sakhr villages, made arrests, and collected taxes worth £12,000, £2,500 of which were Mithqal's personal debt. He paid an additional £2,000 owed to the treasury over twelve years. Concurrent with this event, Abdullah sent the Legion to retake a certain territory that Mithqal had taken over unlawfully.[38] The central government could finally confront Mithqal and limit his autonomy, a measure which only a few years earlier would have been unthinkable.

By 1946, when Transjordan gained its independence from Britain, Mithqal's role had changed dramatically. Twenty-five years after the initiation of the state-building process, Mithqal remained a wealthy and influential figure, but like his fellow shaykhs had lost much of his independence. His interests had become enmeshed with those of Abdullah and the regime at large, and he had become dependent on the goodwill of the central government. His legitimacy had changed; his moral authority among his kin and confederacy had lost much of its essence, and had been replaced by a new role as a go-between for the central government and his community. Still he continued to perform tasks which were expected of a tribal shaykh of his stature, such as mediating, judging, distributing lavish hospitality and charity-giving.[39]

Mithqal was nearly seventy years old and gradually retreating from public life, allowing his son ʿAkif to fulfil many of his tasks. Nonetheless, he remained the paramount shaykh of the Bani Sakhr until his death in 1967. By that time, tribes played a different role in modern Jordan, which was fighting to maintain its integrity and very existence. Indeed, Mithqal played an important role in this battle through his son. More significantly, his impact survived him, as both his son and grandson played important roles in Jordanian public life. ʿAkif al-Fayiz's star shone in 1957 when he helped the young and inexperienced King Hussein to thwart what remained the most serious *coup d'état* attempt of his reign. Afterward, he served in many ministerial and other high public positions.[40] ʿAkif's son and Mithqal's grandson, Faysal al-Fayiz, represents the third generation of the family's leaders to serve the Hashemites. In 2003 King Abdullah II appointed him as prime minister, a position he kept for a year and a half.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to overcome the scholarly silence in the study of tribal societies and the study of shaykhs in particular. It has concentrated on the life of a prominent Jordanian shaykh, Mithqal al-Fayiz. It sketched his social biography, concentrating on his role during the time of the Emirate of Transjordan under British colonial rule (1920–46). Despite its methodological limitations, this study shows the feasibility of writing the history of shaykh Mithqal al-Fayiz. It also highlights his significant historical role, overlooked thus far by historians of Jordan, local and foreigner alike.

The study chose the process of state-building in Transjordan under the British mandate as the most relevant context in which to examine Mithqal and understand his daily conduct and strategic choices. By doing so, it highlights the significant role Mithqal played in Jordanian history. For instance, his resistance to the first British attempts to rule territories east of the Jordan River, coupled with his early support of Emir Abdullah, facilitated the establishment of the Emirate of Transjordan and helped determine its unique features: a British–Hashemite partnership with a special and privileged role for the tribes, the nomadic ones in particular. Additionally, Mithqal's support for Abdullah and his regime in the 1920s helped Abdullah to consolidate his power. The Emir could thus turn what was only a temporary agreement between him and the British government into a dynastic regime which survived till the present day. Finally, Mithqal's constant manoeuvrings during the 1930s and 1940s, even as the central government consolidated its power vis-à-vis the tribes, ensured the special position of his tribes within the emerging political entity. These manoeuvrings were also very effective in preserving his status as a prominent member of the state elite, as well as paving the way for his descendants to continue enjoying this privileged status.

The portrayal of the life of Mithqal al-Fayiz illustrates the centrality of the office of tribal shaykh in Transjordan, its role in the creation of the modern state, the dramatic transformation it underwent during modern times, as well as its lasting legacy. This line of inquiry contributes to our understanding of the consolidation of the Hashemite regime and state, the emergence of a tribal elite and the creation of a wider social basis for the kingdom. In particular, it reveals the origins of the Jordanian political system, which is based on historic alliances between the Hashemites and several prominent tribal families or households, consequently helping safeguard the stability of the kingdom for the last ninety years.

Notes

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5 A nationalist discourse of heroism and treason

The construction of an 'official' image of Çerkes Ethem (1886–1948) in Turkish historiography, and recent challenges

Bülent Bilmez

Introduction

The place of mythologized heroic figures in national(ist) historiographies and their role in the discursive construction of nations are widely studied issues. However, the role of anti-heroes is equally important and illuminating, particularly when the subject figures in the formative period of a nation state, such as the so-called 'Turkish war of independence' (1919–23), in which Kemalist nationalists were involved in the formation of the modern republic of Turkey. The subject of this essay, the place of the Circassian military leader Çerkes Ethem (1886–1948) in this war, constitutes a model case study in support of this assertion. Çerkes Ethem is widely considered one of the most prominent 'traitors' in Turkish national historiography of the twentieth century, while simultaneously earning praise for his acts on behalf of the nationalist movement's centre in Ankara during the first two difficult years of the war. As a result of his armed struggle and often violent suppression of opposition forces in Western and Central Anatolia, it is generally accepted that between 1919 and 1920, Ethem played a vital role in the emergence of armed resistance to the Greek invasion of Western Turkey. He was particularly instrumental in consolidating the supremacy of the Ankara-based Kemalist cadres in the resistance. By the autumn of 1920, however, Ethem's irregular forces (the Ethemists) were in conflict with the regular military forces supporting the Ankara government (Kemalists); this struggle ended at the beginning of 1921 with the Kemalists' victory and their absolute control over the 'national independence movement'. That Ethem subsequently sought refuge with the Greek forces has been the main reason for the accusation of treason levied against him in Turkish historiography.

This chapter discusses the different approaches in Turkey to the so-called 'Çerkes Ethem Incident' (*Çerkes Ethem Olayı*) and the resulting variety of images of Ethem himself, by depicting some controversial issues in the

historiography. Instead of describing extensively the life of Çerkes Ethem or his activities during the Turkish war of independence, this chapter aims to illuminate his place in the Turkish historiography.

Historical background: deeds of a hero and sins of a traitor

Ethem's life and especially his activities in the war provide the context of this story. He was the youngest of five children in a Circassian family which moved to the Ottoman Empire in the 'Great Migration' of the Circassians during the second half of the nineteenth century, and settled in Bandırma in north-western Anatolia. This migration resulted from the Russian intrusion into the North Caucasus, inhabited mainly by Circassian people.[1] Ethem was born and raised in the small village of Emreköy. According to the testimony in his own disputed 'memoirs', Ethem had been keen on military education since childhood and he left home to attend a military school in Istanbul when he was 19 years old.[2] After graduating with top marks, he fought in the Balkan Wars and World War I, in which he proved his special capabilities in militia fighting and was highly esteemed by his commanders. Wounded just before the end of the war, he returned to his village as a low-ranking and unknown officer. Ethem's elder brothers Reşid[3] and Tevfik[4] had been members of the secret Special Organization (*Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*) established within the War Office by Enver Pasha after the Balkan Wars and used to suppress subversion and possible collaboration with the external enemy. The *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* was an irregular fighting unit, used during World War I for special military operations in the Caucasus, Egypt, and Mesopotamia.[5] During World War I, Ethem was also active (together with brothers Reşat and Tevfik Beys) in this organization under the direction of Eşref Bey (Kuşçubaşı), who was captured by the British in Yemen in early 1917 and was a prisoner of war until 1920.[6] During World War I Ethem served for a time under the command of the governor of Diyarbakır, Dr Reşit Bey, who was known for his active participation in the Armenian massacres in 1915 and who committed suicide in 1919 while standing trial in Istanbul.[7] In November 1915 Ethem also took part in the suppression of a Nestorian rebellion in Midyat and Cizre in south eastern Anatolia,[8] as well as in the operations of the organization in Iran under the Ottoman officer Rauf Bey (Orbay) (1881–1964), who also claimed to be of Circassian origin.[9]

The invasion of western Anatolia by Greek armies after the occupation of Izmir (Smyrna) from May 1919 on, supported by the victorious Allied Powers (particularly Britain) occurred simultaneously with the first attempts to organize by local resistance groups. It was also at this point that Ethem and his brothers were approached by Rauf Bey, who had signed the Armistice of Mudros as the Minister of the Ottoman Navy on 30 October 1918 and who would later resign from his position to join the Kemalist movement. After a meeting with Rauf Bey in May 1919, Çerkes Ethem started to organize one of the first resistance militia groups in the northern Aegean and southern

Marmara region.[10] The details of that meeting, during which Ethem and his brothers were supposedly commissioned by Rauf Bey to initiate resistance to the Greek invasion, and the initial steps taken by Ethem to assemble a militia group, using munitions and other facilities provided by Eşref Kuşçubaşı's family in the neighbouring village, have been a matter of dispute in Turkish historiography.[11] It is well known, however, that from the onset and during the first two years, Ethem played a crucial role in the resistance movements to the Greek invasion of western Turkey, movements later incorporated into the forces of the Turkish war of independence.

Controversial issues and key questions in the Turkish historiography

The scope of this chapter does not allow for a detailed discussion of Ethem's activities during the first years of the Turkish war of independence (1919–20). It suffices to state that there has been a consensus in Turkish and international historiography on the vital role of Ethem's 'mobile forces' (*Kuvva-i Seyyare*) in halting the advance of Greek forces and, especially, in putting down the traditionalist, pro-Istanbul, local 'oppositional movements'[12] in Anatolia against the Ankara government in 1919 and 1920. Ethem was undisputedly seen as a hero and named the 'saviour of the nation' (*münci-i millet*) by the politicians and press in those years in Ankara. Even after being declared a traitor (*vatan haini*) by the Kemalists, when he broke with the Ankara government at the end of 1920 and took refuge with the Greeks after the persecution of his military forces by the Kemalist army, Ethem's heroic deeds have nonetheless been acknowledged by the Kemalists, albeit generally in a diluted version. Hence, the various images of Ethem were constructed by different circles in Turkey and are based on diverse narratives and/or interpretations of his acts after November 1920, especially after his taking refuge with the Greeks on 28 January 1921.

With respect to the historiographic dimension, there are still several disputed factual issues in these different narratives. The background to the initiation of Ethem's struggle and the formation of his first troops is debated, as are the extent and exact nature of his role in the suppression of the (previously-mentioned) rebellions against the Ankara government and in halting the Greek invasion. His place in and relations with the then-growing leftist, pro-Bolshevik movements in Anatolia are also in dispute. The same may be said of the military activities of his forces against the Greek army in Demirci in the summer of 1920 and in Gediz in the autumn of 1920.[13] Further, Ethem's activities abroad after taking refugee with the Greek forces on 28 January 1921, and especially in Turkey after the founding of the republic, have always been unclear and a matter for much speculation. Another disputed issue, to be discussed below, is the transfer of Ethem's remains from Jordan, where he died, to Turkey. The uncertain and puzzling story of the different versions of Ethem's 'memoirs', published from 1955 on, is another

aspect that has never been studied systematically, although even scholars who refer to them have suspected their accuracy.[14] Finally, there is also the matter of his nickname, *Çerkes* (Circassian), which is seen as a pejorative epithet by Ethem himself and other Circassians, since it was used after his so-called treason and thereby was seen as an insult to Circassians.

A full discussion of each of the above-mentioned issues cannot be fully explored in this short chapter. Instead, yet another disputed issue, one that plays a determining role in the formation of the different Ethem narratives, will be examined here: the growing divergence between the Ethemist and Kemalist forces from November 1920 to the end of January 1921, and the reasons for their conflict. Indeed this chapter concentrates on the diverse approaches to this issue in various Turkish sources about Ethem and about the Turkish war of independence in general.[15] The attitude of different authors is usually reflected in their choice of terms – 'rebellion', 'riot', 'disqualification', 'elimination', or 'resistance'; the same events and sources yield a variety of interpretations.

In discussing the divergence and subsequent clash between the Ethemists and the Kemalists, authors have posited a variety of incompatible and contradictory explanations, often within the same text or in texts by the same author. These explanations will be listed here without any in-depth elaboration. The first account overstates the importance of personal conflict and competition for leadership between Ethem and Mustafa Kemal, and sees this conflict as the result of Ethem's inability to adjust to his sudden rise to power and prominence, claiming that his new status had gone to his head. According to another explanation, Ethem's (allegedly) leftist policies against the Kemalists and/or his collaboration with the leftist opposition made Ethem's forces (and Ethem himself) a great (potential) threat to the Kemalist leadership. Alternatively, the divergence of and subsequent clash between the Ethemists and Kemalists is explained by the irreconcilable conflict between the irregular (Ethemist) forces and regular (Kemalist) army. Finally, Circassian ethno-centrism seen in some acts of Ethem and his forces is presented as another reason for this divergence and clash. As a result of these divergent explanations, various images of Ethem have always existed among different circles in Turkey.

Ethem's controversial images: different ideological approaches

The diverse interpretations discussed above have created different narratives on the 'Çerkes Ethem Problem' in Turkey. This chapter claims that these different narratives, discussed below, can be classified according to their general ideological orientation.

The first narrative is the orthodox (rightist and leftist) Kemalist one, which has largely silenced others through the dominant monologic narrative and by diluting the question of the right of self-defence. This narrative emerged from a canonical text by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) (1881–1938) himself, the *Nutuk*

(Speech). This six-day speech was delivered on 15–20 October 1927 in Ankara to the Congress of the *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası* (CHF, Republican People's Party).[16] In the *Nutuk*, Ethem is represented as a relatively important figure in the first years of the Turkish war of independence, starting with the legendary landing of Mustafa Kemal and his friends at Samsun on the Black Sea coast on 19 May 1919. Ethem's relative importance, albeit expressed in a rather patronizing tone, derives from his leading role in the swift suppression of the oppositional movements or 'rebellions', despite his low military rank and his insistence on irregular military organization.[17] The problems caused by Ethem started, according to Mustafa Kemal, immediately after Ethem suppressed the great 'rebellion' against the Ankara government in August 1920 in the province of Yozgat.[18] After this, Ethem arrived in Ankara as the indisputably strongest military leader in the unoccupied parts of Anatolia, and was received there as a great hero and 'rescuer of the nation' by the members of the new Ankara parliament founded in April 1920 and by the elite in general.

Mustafa Kemal claimed that the main problem lay in Ethem's over-estimation of his own power and his ambitions for leadership, exploited by some politicians in Ankara.[19] According to this narrative, the conflict with Ethem's irregular forces reached a peak during the defeat at Gediz[20] and his 'rebellion' started after the division of the Western Front Forces in November 1920 under Ali Fuat Bey (Cebesoy) into a shared military leadership: forces of the Western Front under İsmet Bey (İnönü) and of the Southern Front under Refet Bey (Bele)[21]. His 'treason' was finally verified by his act of taking refuge with the enemies, i.e. the Greeks. Thus, the official narrative had a double purpose. On the one hand, it marginalized Ethem and excluded him from the collective memory by minimizing his role in the Turkish war of independence. On the other hand, Ethem's name was identified with treason wherever mentioned. Mustafa Kemal's account was reproduced in school textbooks, encyclopaedias and popular history books soon after its first publication. It should be noted that the arguments of Mustafa Kemal and the orthodox Kemalist narrative about the 'Çerkes Ethem Problem' could not be challenged in Turkey for a long time; any attempt to question the narrative remained strictly taboo. Moreover, Çerkes Ethem's own version of the story remained untold until the (partial) publication of his memoirs in the 1950s.

In other early canonical texts, however, Ethem does not play a significant role in the general story of the Turkish war of independence, and his so-called treason was treated as a trivial but clear example of treachery in the historiography. The challenge to this narrative came from right-wing Kemalists in the second half of the 1950s under the government of the newly founded *Demokrat Parti* (DP, Democratic Party). This party was founded in 1946 by one group of the Kemalist elite in opposition to the traditional Kemalist CHP led by Mustafa Kemal's successor, İsmet İnönü, who had ruled during the period of one-party dictatorship in Turkey between 1938 and 1950. Surprisingly, the official narrative (repeated in subsequent memoirs published by many protagonists of the Turkish war of independence[22] and in most

academic and popular historiography on the war), is absent from the first edition of the official 'history of the Turkish war of independence' (*Türk İstiklal Harbi*) published in 1964 by the Turkish military.[23] This first edition reflects the goal of suppressing any memory of Ethem's contribution. In the second edition of this work, published ten years later, the 'Çerkes Ethem Problem' constituted the entire last chapter of the work.[24] In the intervening decade, Ethem's treachery had been severely condemned in many works on the Turkish war of independence, both general histories and books focusing on specific dimensions of it.[25]

This concentrated effort to emphasize the image of Ethem as a traitor in the second edition of *Türk İstiklal Harbi* must be seen as a reaction to the right-wing Kemalist revisionism (see below), which had already been countered in the same year in a pamphlet by Yunus Nadi.[26] Such an orthodox Kemalist account was seen as well in a later book by Zeki Sarıhan[27] and in the recent works of Ahmet Efe.[28] The authors all announce their position in the titles of their works, which each use the word 'treason' to refer to Ethem and his forces. Yunus Nadi's work is based on his own memories and some contemporary sources and replicates Mustafa Kemal's narrative and arguments, while praising the allegedly 'first legendary victory' of the Turkish war of independence under İsmet Bey at İnönü (10–11 January, 1921) which later earned İsmet Bey his surname.[29] This effort to consolidate the place of the 'first victory' at İnönü in the general history of the Turkish war of independence can only be understood by taking into account the conjuncture within which Yunus Nadi's pamphlet was published: It was in this period of severe enmity between the CHP and the DP that the first attempts of right-wing revisionism can be observed.

Zeki Sarıhan, a leftist orthodox Kemalist schoolteacher, on the other hand, makes comprehensive use in his work, first published in 1984, of published sources on the 'Çerkes Ethem Problem' and some periodicals of the time.[30] He aims to counter the new leftist revisionist interpretation of Çerkes Ethem, which described Ethem as a 'patriot and sympathizer of socialism'.[31] The main targets of this counterattack were İ. Bilen,[32] the leftist periodical of 1980, *Savaş Yolu*, and Yalçın Küçük,[33] whose work will be discussed below. Another example of the left-Kemalist defence of the official narrative is Doğan Avcıoğlu's influential book on the history of the Turkish war of independence, in which Ethem is represented (in accordance with Mustafa Kemal's words) as a 'false Bolshevik' who was supported by some local communists in Ankara because of his military power.[34]

As can be seen in a recently published book by Sadi Borak, the opportunism and political intrigues of Mustafa Kemal against the Ethemists and leftist groups are sometimes explicitly praised in the orthodox Kemalist historiography as the virtues of a genius political leader.[35] The most recent defender of orthodox Kemalism, Ahmet Efe, is a schoolteacher like Sarıhan. He provides one of the crudest and most aggressive accounts to be discussed. Efe first published his ideas in a pamphlet in 2004, after the article on which it

is based was not accepted by any periodical.[36] Efe there condemns Ethem for organizing the Circassian Congress on 24 October 1921 in İzmir, calling it 'a concealed treachery'![37] This pamphlet portrays Ethem as a traitor from the beginning of his activities in the Turkish war of independence to the end of his life, based on previously published sources. The pamphlet distinguishes itself from the other orthodox Kemalist narratives through its aggressive discourse and its secondary focus on Ethem's activities abroad after 1921.[38] Efe's second work, consisting of more than 800 pages, is a much-expanded version of this article, in which he elaborates on each topic through a comprehensive use of almost all existing secondary sources, argues with any kind of revisionism, and discusses each point in meticulous detail.[39] The author puts himself forward as a staunch defender of Mustafa Kemal and Kemalism, and an aggressive public prosecutor, using his book as the indictment of the revisionists.

The second narrative is that of the right-wing Kemalist revisionists, which can be seen as an indirect criticism of Kemalism. The principal figure behind the right-wing Kemalist challenge is Cemal Kutay, who published two pamphlets in 1955[40] and 1956[41] with a revisionist approach based on Ethem's 'memoirs'. A third pamphlet in this series was announced on the back cover of the second one, but never appeared. Instead, in 1973, Kutay published a two-volume work including revised versions of the previously published pamphlets together with the promised continuation.[42] In these pamphlets and the book, which was reprinted several times, Kutay tries to represent the 'Çerkes Ethem Problem' as a crisis caused by the unjust treatment of the event by some high-ranking commanders around Mustafa Kemal, chiefly İsmet Bey (İnönü). While analyzing this revisionist approach, one should not forget the continuous competition between the DP and CHP in the 1950s, each claiming to represent 'the only genuine Kemalism' as the source of their legitimacy and power. This even led to the construction of a kind of cult of Mustafa Kemal in the 1950s by the (allegedly) liberal DP in the fight against the CHP and against the construction of the cult of İnönü as the 'national leader' (*Milli Şef*).

This 'right-wing Kemalist' revisionist approach was repeated in the revised version of Kutay's book. It was published with a new title in 2004, *Çerkez Ethem: Tamamlanmış Dosya* ('Çerkez Etem: Completed File'), and taken over by another author, Nurer Uğurlu. The same author also published a volume that includes a reprint of Ethem's memoirs, long quotations from the *Nutuk*, parts of Kutay's above-mentioned book and other common sources like the parliamentary records[43] and memoirs of Ethem's contemporaries also used by Kutay and others.[44]

The third narrative can be called left-Kemalist revisionism and is based on an indirect recognition of mistakes of the Kemalists and a hesitant attempt at revision. This attempt to revise the official narrative emerged from the moderate leftist circles. They supported the Kemalist cause, while also hinting that naming Ethem a traitor was an overstatement. Instead, they underlined

his deeds in support of the Ankara government in the first years of the Turkish war of independence. This approach not only retains the orthodox Kemalist framework to a certain extent but also lacks a clear class-oriented analysis. The leftist feature emerges from indirect and vague praise of irregular Ethemists as a kind of 'voice of the people'. Perhaps the earliest articulation of this position is to be found in a Master's thesis by Cemal Şener, in which Şener portrays the problem as a struggle between the central(ist) power and the decentralist forces based on the peasantry. Şener actually does not attempt to justify Ethem's activities, to prove that he is not a traitor, or to question the Kemalist narrative in general, but rather tries to justify as reasonable the disqualification of the relatively 'backward' Ethemist forces by the 'progressive' Kemalist ones, while advocating a re-evaluation of Ethem's treason at the end.[45]

The fourth narrative about Ethem is the one developed by a leftist oppositional group with a Marxist class perspective and a (timid) critique of Kemalism. Although separated here from the left Kemalists, some of the authors in this group also came under Kemalist influence. The general attitude of the leftists in Turkey was to establish distance between themselves and the Ethemist opposition to the centre, an attitude already adopted during the Turkish war of independence. This can be seen best in an interview with the leader of the Turkish Communist Party (TKP) Mustafa Suphi in January 1921: 'We definitely declare that we condemn Ethem and his accomplices and that therefore we had never had and would never have relations with such people.'[46]

This treatment of Ethemists as bandits continued until the 1980s, reflecting also the Bolsheviks' very pragmatic and opportunistic position toward the Turkish war of independence. The best known Turkish communist poet, Nazım Hikmet, consolidated and popularized this view in his work.[47] Rasih Nuri İleri, an elderly but active member of the communist movement in Turkey, also supported the Kemalist narrative by claiming that Ethem might have been pursuing an individual dictatorship with the support of his bandit forces.[48]

One of the most recent examples in this traditional line is Emel Akal's work on Kemalism and Bolshevism, initially published in 2004. She states that personal conflict, competition for leadership within the same group and the irreconcilable conflict between the irregular forces and the regular army were not the only reasons for the disagreement between the Ethemists and Kemalists. The possibility of the Ethemists becoming an alternative to Mustafa Kemal in the struggle for power should, according to Akal, be investigated as well.[49] Although the author does not make it clear what she means by 'an alternative' to Mustafa Kemal in the framework of a struggle for power, there were several leftist alternative groups and organizations in that period: *Yeşil Ordu* (Green Army), *Halk Zümresi* (Popular Front), THİF (*Türk Halk İştirakiyyun Fırkası*), TKP, etc. However, Akal suggests in conclusion that the Ethemist opposition (led not only by Ethem, but also Tevfik

Bey and especially Reşit Bey) was based on the claim for power and she maintains that Enver Paşa was the alternative leader for and under whom the Ethemists were fighting.[50]

The first leftist author attempting a clear and radical revision of the official narrative is Yalçın Küçük, who in the second volume of his *Theses on Turkey* described the elimination of Ethem's forces by the Kemalists as a result of the rivalry between the central(ist) power of the wealthy classes and a popular movement with leftist leanings. Küçük's most important contribution is the significant revision of the official narrative concerning the developments of the winter 1920–21 during the Turkish war of independence. He undertakes a radically critical reading of the previously published sources, including the official ones to discuss: the successes of the Ethemist forces in Demirci and Gediz denied in Kemalist historiography; the obscure game of the Kemalists between the Soviet Bolsheviks and the leftists in Ankara; the persecution and imprisonment of the cadres of the illegal (internal) TKP/THİF; the elimination and murder of the leaders of the (external) TKP; and the supposed victory of the regular army at İnönü under İsmet Bey (İnönü).[51]

Another example of the leftists' attempts to revise the representation of the 'Çerkes Ethem Problem' is found in the rather naïve research of Yusuf Büyükbaşaran from Bursa, who tried to apply a class-based analysis and concluded that Ethem could not be accused of being a traitor.[52] Yalçın Küçük picks up and repeats Büyükbaşaran's claim that Ethem cannot be portrayed as a traitor.[53]

The work of Yalçın Küçük was very influential among the leftists, and an article published by Ali Sarıali in 1987 can be seen as a product of this influence. Sarıali claims that, beside the acts of Ethem's forces against the wealthy classes, the fact that Ethem became a strong alternative to Mustafa Kemal played the determining role in the conflict, which ended with the elimination of Ethemists by the bourgeois leaders Mustafa Kemal and İsmet Bey (İnönü) by means of appalling provocations and intrigues. The main reason for Ethem's failure, he states, was that 'his petty-bourgeois background did not possess a character that would demand power.'[54]

Ergun Hiçyılmaz's book, a very weak example of the leftist works based on previously published documents, is also revisionist, in the sense that the 'Çerkes Ethem Problem' is represented as a problem between the accommodating and conformist Kemalist forces and the more revolutionary Ethemist ones.[55] Hiçyılmaz's work lacks not only academic criteria but also those of a class-oriented approach to the question. Ethem's demise is portrayed rather as the unjust treatment of a popular hero incurred by his non-conformist behavior and the personal rivalry between himself and the Kemalist elite. Similarly, Hüseyin Aykol's book is a poor compilation of only a few well-known secondary sources relying chiefly on Ethem's memoirs. He challenges the official image of Ethem as a traitor without any convincing or original arguments. Moreover, this author's leftist background seems not to have

added any class-oriented or social colour to his historiographically weak narrative.[56]

Emrah Cilasun's recent book is the only leftist investigation that both represents a socially and politically leftist approach and also contributes to the historiography through the use of some new sources.[57] Cilasun rejects the discourses of both heroism and treachery, something rarely observed in other critical approaches in Turkey.[58]

Ethem confiscated the properties and capital of the wealthy local elites, thus flouting the traditional local power structures based on conventional class relations. This move apparently prompted complaints to the Ankara government but played an important role in the evaluation of some leftists.[59] Ethem's much-disputed involvement in the leftist movements (especially *Yeşil Ordu*) and his relations with the Bolsheviks occupy a central place in such accounts, because the Kemalists were clearly fearful of any collaboration of these leftist groups with such a powerful military force. According to many authors, it was this fear that was instrumental in Mustafa Kemal's decision to liquidate the *Yeşil Ordu*, which at the beginning also included the Kemalists, and to persecute those of its members who continued their activities secretly.[60]

The fifth Ethem narrative is based on the ethnocentrism of some Circassian intellectuals who call into question the use of Ethem's nickname/epithet *Çerkes*, i.e. Circassian. Two groups can be distinguished among these Circassian authors. The first group, the Kemalist Circassian intellectuals, accept the official image of Ethem (albeit with some reservations about overstatement), but are also concerned about the impact of this image on the general perception of Circassians in Turkey and especially on their role in the Turkish war of independence. Vasfi Güsar articulates a clearly Kemalist position in his discussion of a Circassian Ottoman officer, Met Çunaka İzzet [Paşa], claiming that İzzet Paşa attempted in vain to restrain 'the ignorant' Ethem, who resisted the incorporation of the guerrilla groups into the regular army.[61] In the same vein, a short excerpt from a well-known study on the Turkish war of independence by Sabahattin Selek,[62] in which Ethem is accused of being spoiled by his sudden 'fame, prominence and influence', is reproduced in a book compiled by the Circassian author İzzet Aydemir.[63] At the beginning of the chapter on Ethem in this book, Ethem is described starkly as 'the destroyer/murderer of his own nation' in the words of H. İzzettin Dinamo, author of a multi-volume semi-literary work on the Turkish war of independence.[64] Aydemir emphasizes in this chapter that Ethem had always maintained reciprocally respectful relations with Mustafa Kemal, and that he had always been disliked by his compatriot Circassians. He concludes, however, that Ethem should not be accused of treason by the (Turkish) nation which he served, and that his sins should not be attributed to all other Circassians, whom Ethem slaughtered.[65] A similar approach by the same author had been put forward a year earlier in an interview for the Turkish press, in which he stated that the conflict between Ethem and Mustafa Kemal

could easily have been avoided if both sides had not behaved wrongly. In this interview, Aydemir called for the demolition of taboos in Turkey in order to make a free discussion that would make clear the real situation.[66]

Another Circassian author, Muhittin Ünal, devoted a section of his book on the Circassians in the Turkish war of independence to Ethem. In it, the 'Çerkes Ethem Problem' is narrated in a rather unpartisan manner through quotations from secondary sources.[67] Presenting a comprehensive and multi-faceted account of Ethem's story, Ünal comes to the conclusion that Ethem was not '. . . as sinful as believed. He did not fight against Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his friends for power [leadership] either.'[68] According to Ünal, Ethem was the victim of a sinister plan of his elder brothers and some deputies plotting against Mustafa Kemal in the Ankara parliament. After recognizing his mistake at the last moment, he had intended to surrender. However, he was not given this opportunity by the regular army commanders and was thus forced to take refuge with the Greek side. Ultimately, the author concludes that the accusation of treachery levelled at Ethem was overly severe and unjust. Ünal adopts an ethnocentric Circassian discourse throughout his book and implies that the principal actors behind this dramatic problem were Ethem's brothers and some influential men around Mustafa Kemal (i.e. İsmet, Refet, etc.), Kılıç Ali Bey being the most important.[69] Taking a similar approach, another Circassian author, Sefer Berzeg, also challenges the accusation of treason, but without discussing the role of Mustafa Kemal in this story.[70]

The second group of Circassian authors are the oppositional (revisionist) intellectuals, who challenge the official image more directly and explicitly by remaining cognisant of the fact that '[t]he word treachery contains important messages for Circassians in Istanbul and Turkey.'[71] To begin with one of the most recent examples, the young author Yeldan Barış Kalkan Çurmıtı criticizes the 'official historiography' and represents the 'Çerkes Ethem Problem' as a deliberate plan by Mustafa Kemal to eliminate Ethem, whom Mustafa Kemal regarded as an alternative leader.[72] A similar attitude can be found in an article by Kirami Toğuzata, who not only challenges the canonical narrative of the *Nutuk* (Mustafa Kemal), but also criticizes the right-wing revisionist description of Ethem as someone who lived a rather politically inactive and isolated life after leaving Turkey. According to the author, this image was initially drawn by Cemal Kutay, 'although there are many documents about Ethem's activities abroad.' According to Toğuzata, Ethem's letter to Celal Bayar in 1938 asking for amnesty for the Kurdish rebels and autonomy for the Kurds was just one of the indicators of his continuing interest in the internal political affairs in Turkey. Consequently, the author rejects both the images of 'a traitor' and of 'a person regretting his previous deeds', which would fill future generations with shame and impose conformism on them, whereas the image of a resisting Ethem would infuse them likewise with the spirit of resistance and rebellion.[73] The ongoing campaign among Circassians for the transfer of Ethem's remains to Turkey and his rehabilitation, which enjoys

the support of some revisionist intellectuals, can be understood only in the framework of such movements against the mainstream discourse.

Finally, in order to give a more comprehensive picture, revisionist approaches to Ethem also include those of some authors in Turkey with Islamic orientations. They defend Ethem against the 'main enemy': Kemalism and Mustafa Kemal himself, although it is well known that Ethem was no more religious or Islamist than Mustafa Kemal. Rather, this attitude appears to be based on the implicit understanding that 'any assault on Kemalism is good!' An example of this approach can be found in Bozgeyik's book, the main work in this category.[74] The subtitle of Bozgeyik's book, 'a traitor or a hero?' articulates his radical challenge to the image of Ethem in 'the official historiography'. Relying primarily on long quotations from secondary sources, most of which were mentioned earlier in this chapter, the author offers an alternative account of the entire Ethem story and criticizes those authors whose versions are, presumably, wrong because they tried to adhere to the account in Mustafa Kemal's *Nutuk*.[75] Bozgeyik concludes that calling Ethem 'traitor' was only a political move that suited Mustafa Kemal's policies, and that Ethem was actually 'one of the pioneer personalities starting the national movement before Mustafa Kemal had come to Anatolia and has done nothing to deserve this accusation . . . The "Çerkes Ethem Incident" was entirely a product of Mustafa Kemal's plan and programme.'[76] The most radical anti-Kemalist statement can be found in the last sentences of the book:

> We believe that a 'history court' will be summoned in the near future and all personalities of our recent past will be tried in the light of documents and accurate information. Only then will it be seen that many people now declared as heroes were [actually] traitors and many of those declared as traitors were the real heroes. . . . Also in the case of the 'Çerkes Ethem Incident' the actual ones will be revealed. We believe this.[77]

Other Islamist authors expressed similar ideas, among them İsmail Çolak.[78] However, a popular book by a liberal Islamist and Turkish nationalist author, Mustafa Budak, represents Mustafa Kemal as the person trying to reach an agreement, thus adopting a rather more pro-Kemalist approach than the one of the abovementioned Islamists.[79] The revisionist tendency in Budak's approach is visible in the conclusion, where he states that the question of Ethem's treason is still unanswered.[80]

Conclusion: official narrative, silences and challenges

A general review of the interpretations and revisions of the conflict between the Ethemists and Kemalists, and of Ethem's different images in Turkish historiography, demonstrates the complexity of his representation in Turkey. There is a certain correspondence between the negative or positive representation of Çerkes Ethem's image and the ideological stance of the authors

with respect to Kemalism. Thus, one chief insight gained from the mapping and analysis of these representations is the predominance of a general ideological-political positioning over a specific historiographic discussion.

Given the silence surrounding the 'Çerkes-Ethem-Problem' in Turkish academic writing, it might be inferred that most works on this issue are of a non-academic character. Among those works discussed in this essay, Cemal Şener's book is the only published work that originated in a graduate thesis, his MA dissertation in the Faculty of Political Sciences at Ankara University. Two additional, unpublished, MA theses on Ethem repeat the common popular historiography and reproduce official ideology,[81] as do a PhD thesis on the 'Green Army'[82] and a paper delivered at a symposium in 1998 in Sakarya and published a year later.[83]

In some cases, such as Emrah Cilasun's book,[84] popular historiographic works comply more with academic standards than some academic ones. However, it is still striking to note the disinterest among prominent professional historians of Turkey regarding this thorny issue. A remarkable characteristic of the current (mostly popular) historiography in this context is the lack of new sources: almost all works make use of the same sources, although they may differ in their perception and representation of the same *problematique*, based on selective and ideological readings of these materials. It is also worth mentioning here the meticulous (albeit ideologically problematic and very aggressive) works of Ahmet Efe because he also makes use of almost all related secondary sources.

With regard to breaking the silence within the dominant narrative, on the other hand, neither the first attempt by Cemal Kutay, who relied on Ethem's memoirs in the 1950s (and the independent publication of the memoirs in 1962), nor a second attempt by the leftist authors Yusuf Büyükbaşaran and especially Yalçın Küçük in the 1990s, offering a direct challenge to the dominant Kemalist ideology, has succeeded in any far-reaching re-evaluation of the official narrative, either in the non-professional or academic historiography. A recent reaction from Circassian circles in the form of an ongoing Internet campaign for the transfer of Çerkes Ethem's remains to Turkey and a rehabilitation of his reputation may, however, draw the attention of more scholars to this topic.[85] The increase in interest among serious academic historians may shed some light on factual questions through the critical study of familiar and hitherto unexploited primary sources. Research, especially in the underutilized Greek and Russian archives, may yield new insights. The publications by a relatively new foundation in Istanbul[86] and two recent books by Mehmet Perinçek and Akbulut and Tunçay[87] demonstrate the potential of the Russian sources. New documents from the Greek archives, used by Cilasun, prove the importance of the Greek archives.[88] Another source of new and alternative information on the matter is the hitherto unpublished memoirs of other contemporaries of Ethem or uncensored versions of the already published ones, including that of Ethem himself.

The increase in serious academic works would also encourage scholars to

question Ethem's supposed 'treason' and especially Mustafa Kemal's decisive role in delegitimizing Ethem and his forces. Until now, the most radical responses to the dominant narrative have focused more narrowly on the Circassian character of Ethem and the negative impact of his image as a traitor on the Circassian community of the Turkish Republic. Mainstream historiography has tended to downplay and dilute Mustafa Kemal's role in this process. Nevertheless, the discourse today is shifting: the earlier tendency to underline the role of İsmet Bey and Refet Bey in delegitimizing Ethem and his forces, which can be observed in most of the previous revisionist attempts, has declined.

In this context, we can conclude that the most evident silence in Turkish historiography on Ethem has been in reluctance to question openly the rivalry over leadership between Ethem and Mustafa Kemal himself. This rivalry must be discussed in the framework of the contemporary discussions about Mustafa Kemal's tendency to dictatorship and his intolerance of any possible alternative political leader in the new Turkey as it was being constructed during the Turkish war of independence. It is interesting to remember in this context that Mustafa Kemal and Ethem accused each other of having clandestine long-term plans for personal dictatorship.[89] Very telling in this framework as well is the criticism of Mustafa Kemal for building a dictatorial political system voiced by some intellectuals together with political and military leaders of Mustafa Kemal. By focusing on the role of İsmet Bey and Refet Bey in the Çerkes Ethem Problem, the Turkish (especially right-wing) historiography usually tried to avoid this rather thorny question. The representation of the matter as the mismanagement of an 'internal' crisis and the rather unfair treatment of a (previous) national hero can be observed in its most complete form in the right-wing Kemalist revisionist historiography exemplified by Cemal Kutay. However, it is also discernible in the left-wing Kemalist historiography[90] and in some works articulating a Circassian point of view.[91]

This general hesitancy to question Mustafa Kemal's personal role in this conflict might also be the reason for the academic silence. Free discussion of any issue regarding Mustafa Kemal has never been possible in Turkey, because of legal restrictions, on the one hand, and political and cultural pressure, on the other.

Finally, it bears repeating that the result of the disinterest of critical and professional historians concerning the subject of Ethem is that almost all the works discussed in this chapter have repeatedly used the same published sources without making any substantial additional contribution to the foundation of the historical narrative.

Notes

1 S. Berzeg, *Turkiye Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda Çerkes Göçmenleri (II)*, Istanbul: Nart Yayincilik, 1990, pp. 13–37; E. Cilasun, *Bâki İlk Selam: Çerkes Ethem*, İstanbul: Versus Yayıncılık, 2006, pp. 20–1.

2 Ç. Ethem, *Çerkes Ethem'in (Ele Geçen) Hatıraları*, Istanbul: Dünya Yayınları, 1962, p. 11. For one of several 'modernized' re-publications of his memoirs in later years see Ç. Ethem, *Anılarım*, Istanbul: Berfin Yayınları, 1998.
3 P. H. Stoddard, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa: Osmanlı Devleti ve Araplar, 1911–1918: Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Üzerine Bir Ön Çalışma*, Istanbul: Arba Yayınları, 2003, pp. 54, 88, 157, and 163.
4 Ibid., p. 166.
5 For the activities of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* before and during World War I, see: P. H. Stoddard, *The Ottoman government and the Arabs, 1911 to 1918: a Preliminary Study of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, and A. Cemil, *I. Dünya Savaşı'nda Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*, Istanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1997.
6 C. Kutay, *Çerkez Ethem: Tamamlanmış Dosya*, Istanbul: Özgür Yayınları, 2004, pp. 65–9; Berzeg, *Turkiye Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda Çerkes Göçmenleri*, p. 38; I. Aydemir, *Muhaceretteki Çerkes Aydınları*, Ankara: Sanat Kitabevi, 1991, pp. 151–64; Cilasun, *Bâki İlk Selam: Çerkes Ethem*, pp. 25–7.
7 For a later edition of Ünal's book, see: M. Ünal, *Kurtuluş Savaşında Çerkeslerin Rolü*, İstanbul: Kafkas Derneği Genel Merkez, 1996, p. 169; Berzeg, *Turkiye Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda Çerkes Göçmenleri*, p. 38.
8 S. Sarısaman, 'Ömer Naci Bey Müfrezesi', *Atatürk Yolu* 4, November, 1995, p. 504.
9 Z. Sarıhan, *Çerkez Ethem'in Ihaneti*, Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1986, p. 13; R. Orbay, *Siyasi Hatıralarım: Cehennem Değirmeni*, Istanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1993, p. 78; Kutay, *Çerkez Ethem: Tamamlanmış Dosya*, 65. Almost all scholars indicate his Circassian origin, but Sefer Berzeg, a non-professional though serious Circassian historian, rejected this in a personal conversation on 4 April 2007 (at *Şamil Vakfı*, İstanbul) and claimed that Rauf Bey's Circassian origin is wrongly repeated in almost every work.
10 Orbay, *Çerkez Ethem: Tamamlanmış Dosya*, p. 79; K. Turan (ed.), *Hacim Muhittin Çarıklı, Balıkesir ve Alaşehir Kongreleri ve Hacim Muhittin Çarıklı'nın Kuvayi Milliye Hatıraları (1919–1921)*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1967, p. 43; Kutay, *Çerkez Ethem: Tamamlanmış Dosya*, pp. 37–45 and 58–60.
11 Kutay, *Çerkez Ethem: Tamamlanmış Dosya*, p. 356; Efe, *Çerkez Ethem*, Istanbul: Bengi Yayınları, 2007, pp. 61–7; Cilasun, *Bâki İlk Selam: Çerkes Ethem*, pp. 34–47.
12 Although the term commonly used in Turkey for these anti-Ankara-government violent movements in Düzce, Yozgat (both brutally crushed by Ethem) and Konya in the first years of the Turkish war of independence is 'uprising/rebellion' (*ayaklanma/isyan*), this very usage in the official historiography is anachronistic because, at the time of these 'uprisings', Ankara had not yet become the centre of power in the (remaining) Ottoman Empire. Rather, Ankara was only one centre of the rebellious powers who were led by some high-ranking officers and remnants of the *Ittihat ve Terakki* (Union and Progress) elite (intellectuals, politicians, middle-class professionals, local tradesmen, etc.), mainly against the Greeks and Armenians. This new (and oppositional) centre itself was 'rebelling' against the Istanbul government, which was trying to implement the new settlements (e.g. Treaty of Sèvres, 1920) imposed by the Allies after World War I.
13 The success of the nationalist forces under Ethem in stopping the Greek advance forces around Demirci and Simav in July–August 1920 is usually marginalized in the dominant historiography. See Ethem, *Hatıraları*, pp. 91–100 and Utkan Kocatürk, *Atatürk ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi Kronolojisi*, Ankara: TTK, 2000, p. 189. Ethem also led the nationalist attack against the Greeks in Gediz in the last week of October 1920, which was represented in later years as a failure by Mustafa Kemal in his *Nutuk* and as a victory by Ethem in his memoirs. See: Atatürk, *Söylev*, pp. 366–8 and Ethem, *Hatıraları*, pp. 110–21. On the Gediz campaign in general, see: Efe, *Çerkez Ethem*, p. 114–15 and sources given there. For the

silencing of the success of Ethem's forces, especially by the dominant historiography, see: Y. Küçük, *Türkiye Üzerine Tezler, 1908–1978*, Istanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1984, pp. 625–63.

14 See, for example, Efe, *Çerkez Ethem*, pp. xxv–xxvi and Sarıhan, *Çerkez Ethem'in İhaneti*, p. 23 n. 2.
15 For a discussion of books published on this question in Turkey after the year 2000, see: B. Bilmez ' "Yeniden" Tartışılan Çerkes Ethem (1886–1948)', *Mesele*, 3, March, 2007.
16 E. J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, London: I. B. Tauris, 1993, p. 175.
17 M. K. Atatürk, *Söylev (Nutuk)*, Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu, 1981, pp. 329, 332 and 347–9.
18 Atatürk, pp. 347–9.
19 Atatürk, pp. 348 and 377–406.
20 Atatürk, pp. 366–8.
21 Atatürk, pp. 371–2.
22 See, for example, İ. E. Akıncı, *Demirci Akıncıları*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1978; R. Apak, *Yetmişlik Bir Subayın Hatıraları*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988; R. Apak, *İstiklal Savaşında Garp Cephesi Nasıl Kuruldu*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1990; M. Ünal (ed.) *Miralay Bekir Sami Günsav'ın Kurtuluş Savaşı Anıları*, İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2002. The first edition of the latter was published in 1994.
23 *Türk İstiklal Harbi, Cilt VI*, Ankara: Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı, 1964. (Hereinafter: TIH, 1964.)
24 *Türk İstiklal Harbi, Cilt VI: İstiklal Harbinde Ayaklanmalar, 1919–1921*, Ankara: Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı, 1974. (Hereinafter: TIH, 1974.)
25 See, for example: K. Esengin, *Milli Mücadele'de Hıyanet Yarışı*, Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1969, pp. 225–52.
26 Y. N. Abalıoğlu, *Çerkes Ethem Kuvvetlerinin İhaneti*, İstanbul: Sel Yayınları (Atatürk Kütüphanesi), 1955.
27 Sarıhan.
28 A. Efe, *Gizli Kalmış Bir İhanet: Çerkez Kongresi ve Çerkez Ethem*, İstanbul, 2004; A. Efe, *Çerkez Ethem*, İstanbul: Simurg Yayınları, 2006; A. Efe, *Çerkez Ethem*, İstanbul: Bengi Yayınları, 2007.
29 Abalıoğlu, pp. 110–28.
30 Sarıhan.
31 Sarıhan, p. 7.
32 I. Bilen, *Çetin Savaş*, Istanbul: Er-tu Matbaası, 1978.
33 Sarıhan, pp. 24–5.
34 D. Avcıoğlu, *Milli Kurtuluş Tarihi, İkinci Kitap: Sovyet Devrimi Karşısında Türk Devrimi*, İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1995, pp. 555–601. The first edition was published in 1974, and the second in 1975.
35 S. Borak, *Yeşil Ordu ve Çerkes Ethem Olayı*, İstanbul: Kırmızı Beyaz, 2004. This book seems to be a reprint of a previously published text(s), but there is no information in this edition about the original publication.
36 A. Efe, *Gizli Kalmış Bir İhanet: Çerkez Kongresi ve Çerkez Ethem*, p. 8.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., pp. 71–85.
39 Efe, *Çerkez Ethem*, 2007.
40 C. Kutay, *Çerkes Etem Hadisesi -Kendi Hatıralariyle-*, Istanbul: Tarih Kütüphanesi, 1955.
41 C. Kutay, Çerkes *Ethem Hadisesi 2 – İsmet İnönü Çerkes Ethem Çekişmesi*, Istanbul: Ercan Matbaası, 1956.
42 C. Kutay, *Çerkes Ethem Dosyası* (2 Vols.), Istanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1973. There were also later editions of this work, the fourth and improved edition of

which was published in 1990 as a one-volume book with a new preface: C. Kutay, *Çerkes Ethem Dosyası*, Istanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1990.

43 TBMMZC (1920–38) *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Zabıt Cerideleri, 1920–1938*, Ankara and TBMMGCZ (1980) *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Gizli Celse Zabıtları, Cilt: I–IV*, Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1980.

44 N. Uğurlu, *Çerkez Şahanı Ethem*, Istanbul: Orgun Yayınevi, 2006.

45 C. Şener, *Çerkes Ethem Olayı*, Istanbul: Etik Yayınları, 2001. The first edition was published in 1984.

46 M. Tunçay, *Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar*, Istanbul: BDS. Yayınları, 1967, p. 346.

47 N. Hikmet, *Kuvayi Milliye*, Istanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1974, p. 42: 'Ve 29 Aralık Kütahya: /4 top /ve 1800 atlı bir ihanet /yani Çerkes Ethem, /bir gece vakti /kilim ve halı yüklü katırları, /koyun ve sığır sürülerini önüne katıp /düşmana geçti. / Yürekleri karanlık, /kemerleri ve kamçıları gümüşlüydü, /atları ve kendileri semizdiler.'

48 R. N. İleri, *Atatürk ve Komünizm*, Istanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1994, p. 198. The first edition was published in 1970.

49 E. Akal, *Milli Mücadelenin Başlangıcında Mustafa Kemal, İttihat Terakki ve Bolşevizm*, Istanbul: TÜSTAV, 2006, pp. 327 and 330.

50 Ibid., 330–4.

51 Küçük, *Türkiye Üzerine Tezler*, pp. 614–713.

52 Büyükbaşaran, Y. *Tarihin Gölgesinde Çerkes Ethem*, Bursa, Kuban Yayınları, 1996. The first edition was published in 1993.

53 Y. Küçük, *Türkiye Üzerine Tezler, Cilt V*, İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1992, pp. 427–564.

54 A. Sarıali, 'Çerkezler ve Çerkez Ethem', in Y. Güven (ed.) *Basında Çerkesler I*, Istanbul: Savsırıko, 1994, pp. 16–21.

55 Hiçyılmaz, E. *Gizli Belgelerle Çerkes Ethem*, İstanbul: Varlık Yayınları, 1993, p. 19.

56 H. Aykol, *Çerkes Ethem'in Gerçek Yaşam Öyküsü – Ali Bey'in Dramı*, Istanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2001.

57 Cilasun.

58 For Gün Zileli's statements in this vein in the preface of this book, see: Cilasun, pp. 1–12.

59 See for example: Sarıeli, reprinted in Güven pp. 19–20.

60 See for example: A. Altınbaş, 'Milli Mücadele'de Yeşil Ordu Cemiyeti ve Siyasi Kökenleri', MA Thesis, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi Ana Bilim Dalı, Istanbul University, 1995, p. 97; E. Akbulut and M, Tunçay, *Türkiye Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası (1920–1923)*, Istanbul: Sosyal Tarih Yayınları, 2007, pp. 13–14.

61 V. Güsar, 'Met Çunatuka İzzet', in: İ. Aydemir, (ed.), *Muhaceretteki Çerkes Aydınları*, Ankara: Nart Yayıncılık, 1991, pp. 7–13.

62 S. Selek, *Anadolu İhtilali* (2 Vols), Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1976.

63 İ. Aydemir (ed.), *Muhaceretteki Çerkes Aydınları*, Ankara: Nart Yayıncılık, 1991, p. 77.

64 H. İ. Dinamo, *Kutsal İsyan* (7 Vols.), İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1990; Aydemir, p. 95.

65 Aydemir, 99–100.

66 *Güneş Gazetesi*, 24 August 1990, p. 9.

67 M. Ünal, *Kurtuluş Savaşında Çerkeslerin Rolü*, İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1996, pp. 195–275.

68 Ibid., p. 270.

69 Ibid., pp. 270–5.

70 Berzeg, pp. 37–40.

71 J. M. Çorlu, *İstanbul Çerkesleri*, İstanbul: Nart Yayıncılık, 1994, p. 12.

72 Y. B. K. Çurmıtı, *Çerkes Halkı v e Sorunları*, İstanbul: Gün Yayınları, pp. 243–60.
73 K. Toğuzata, 'Hain Ethem! Ölü Ethem'den iyidir', *JİNEPS*, 5, February, 2007, p. 5.
74 B. Bozgeyik, *Çerkez Ethem: Hain mi? Kahraman mı?*, Istanbul: Timas Yayınları, 1995.
75 Ibid., pp. 117–24 and *passim*.
76 Ibid., pp. 226–7.
77 Ibid., p. 228.
78 M. İ. Çolak, 'Çerkez Ethem Olayının İçyüzü', <http://www.yenidunyadergisi.com/index.php?sf=arsiv_oku&id1=1429&id2=14>, 2002; M. İ. Çolak, 'Tipik Bir Hâinlik Paranoyası; Çerkez Ethem Muammâsı, *'Anadolu Gençlik Dergisi*, 25 February, 2002, pp. 48–52.
79 M. Budak, *Milli Mücadelede İç Ayaklanmalar*, İstanbul: Yeni Safak, 1995, pp. 84–5.
80 Ibid., p. 86.
81 K. Turan, 'Çerkez Ethem', MA Thesis, Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü, Istanbul University, 1995; B. Özbey, 'Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Çerkez Ethem Olayı', MA Thesis, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ankara University, 1999; Turan, 1995, and Özbey, 1999.
82 Altıntaş, 1995.
83 G. Çağlar, 'Milli Mücadele'de Çerkez Ethem'in Kuzey-Batı Anadolu'daki Faaliyetleri', in M. Alpargu, and E. Şahin (eds) *I. Sakarya ve Çevresi Tarih ve Kültür Sempozyumu* Sakarya, Sakarya University Press, 1999.
84 Cilasun.
85 For more information on the campaign and the supporting statements of some Circassian and non-Circassian intellectuals see http://www.uzunyayla.com/imzakampanyasi2.asp. For the news on this campaign in the Turkish press see İ. Hekimoğlu, 'Çerkes Ethem'e "iade-i itibar"!' *BirGün*, November 18, 2006, Istanbul, 2006; E. Toprak, 'Çerkez Ethem için "iade-i itibar" kampanyası', <http://www.aleviweb.com/forum/showthread.php?t=7695>. For an earlier attempt by Reşit Bey's daughter, Güner Kuban, to launch a campaign for the transfer of Çerkes Ethem's remains to Turkey and rehabilitation of his reputation in 1989 see: N. Bozkurt, (1989) 'Yeğeni Güner Kuban Kolları Sıvadı: Çerkez Ethem'i Aklama Girişimi', *Tempo*, 32, August 1989, pp. 5–12, reprinted in Y. Güven, ed., *Basında Çerkesler I*, Istanbul: Savsırıko, 1994, pp. 76–9.
86 www.tustav.org.
87 M. Perinçek, *Atatürk'ün Sovyetler'le Görüşmeleri: Sovyet Arşiv Belgeleriyle*, Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2005; Akbulut and Tunçay.
88 Cilasun, pp. 173–203.
89 Efe, *Çerkez Ethem*, pp. 214, 223.
90 For example, Cemal, 2001.
91 M. Ünal, *Kurtuluş Savaşında Çerkeslerin Rolü*, Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1996.

6 On the margins of national historiography

The Greek *İttihatçı* Emmanouil Emmanouilidis – opportunist or Ottoman patriot?

Vangelis Kechriotis

Accounts regarding the political choices of the Ottoman Greeks during the Second Constitutional Period (1908–18) have been heavily marked by the traumatic experience of the First World War, and the Greek-Turkish War of 1919–22 in particular. The prevalent view, put forth by prominent figures of the time like the Young Turk Celal Bayar, has been that the community was divided into two groups, those described as the *Yunancılar* ('Greekists'), who advocated the incorporation of the 'unredeemed' Greek populations and territories into the Hellenic state, and those referred to as the *Bizansçılar* ('Byzantists'), who supported the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, albeit with the explicit purpose of taking over its institutions from inside and transforming it into a Christian Empire.[1] Both strategies, it has been argued, were related one way or another to the 'Great Idea', the Greek irredentist vision that was already being articulated in the 1840s.[2] Ever since its emergence, this distinction has been reproduced in all relevant accounts in Ottoman historiography. It has also been largely reflected in Greek historiography. There, in contrast to what has prevailed in the Ottoman historiography, the involvement of the Ottoman Greeks in the politics of the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti*; hereafter CUP) during a turbulent period has been characterized as patriotic activity aimed only at protecting Greek interests. What has escaped both sides' attention, however, is the fact that a number of Greeks, inspired by Ottoman patriotism and a sincere commitment to the necessity of cooperation with the Turkish-Muslim element in order to protect the integrity of the Empire, identified politically with the CUP in ways that do not fit the categorizations mentioned above.

This chapter aims to situate a Greek Orthodox parliamentary deputy, Emmanouil Emmanouilidis, within this conceptual framework and research agenda. Emmanouilidis, even before 1908, was at odds with the supporters of a Hellenic ideology among the members of his community in Izmir. Upon the outbreak of the constitutional revolution, he published articles supporting the CUP and urging his coreligionists to serve the common cause. Eventually, in 1911, he was elected deputy in an interim parliamentary election, thanks

to CUP support. In the Parliament, he played an active role in arguing for contested bills against the criticism of the opposition, in which other Greek Orthodox deputies played a prominent role. My aims are to discuss Emmanouilidis' early political writings in a period when he addressed his own community and to compare them with his later activities as well as with the publication *The Last Years of the Ottoman Empire*, an account of the period which he wrote in 1924 as an attempt to present his own version of the events, and to renounce accusations directed against him.[3]

Turkish nationalism and the non-Muslims in the CUP

Over the last two decades, the academic debate on the Young Turks and the proto-Kemalist character of the CUP ideology has been closely related to the debate regarding the emergence of Turkish nationalism. In his pioneering study, Erik Jan Zürcher argues that, as far as the distinction between the opposition groups abroad and the ones in the empire is concerned, the groups that contributed significantly were those inside the empire, groups which were not concerned with theoretical debates, a concern dear to the émigrés. Neither did they bother to consolidate a coherent ideology. However, the fact that they did not derive from all the sections of the Ottoman populations but were instead dominated by young officers, the overwhelming majority of whom were Turkish-Muslim, determined the political orientation of the movement. There were practically no non-Muslim officers among them, and even the Albanians or Arabs who participated in the revolution later on opted for Albanian and Arab independence. Only ethnic groups that had no claim over specific lands, such as the Circassians, remained loyal to the empire. Thus, this Turkish majority saw in the movement not only the means for the defence of the empire but also for the promotion of Turkish-Muslim nationalist aspirations. In other words, Turkish nationalist ideology was at the core of the Young Turk political project from the beginning. The reason why they claimed to be working for the preservation of the Ottoman state, Zürcher claims, was because there was no alternative: this was the only Turkish state in existence. The other option would be – as soon happened – to start abandoning territories which were claimed by the non-Muslim communities living there. Being nationalists, though, the Young Turks opted for the 'maximal' solution.

As for their official discourse, the Young Turks adopted the ideal of the statesmen of the *Tanzimat*, the concept of 'Union of the elements' (*İttihad-ı Anasır*), while actually aiming at the 'Ottomanization of the minorities'.[4] The issue at stake here, I would argue, is whether the Young Turks utilized this concept in a conscious effort to deceive the non-Muslim communities, or, to the contrary, actually aspired to achieve their cooperation. Zürcher seems to argue the latter. As for the implementation of their authority, he claims that the influence of the CUP remained indirect as, in many regions, it was compelled to rely on local notables who agreed to be nominated candidates on the Unionist ticket without necessarily sharing Unionist views. Thus,

Zürcher also shares the view that party discipline in the Parliament was weak and Unionist dominance rather precarious.[5] Yet, recently, Zürcher seems to have revised somewhat one of his basic arguments with respect to Turkish proto-nationalism in the period preceding the Young Turk Revolution. He now argues about the central role of religious sentiments among the Muslims, introducing the term 'Muslim nationalism' to describe the rise of patriotic sentiments and the voluntary involvement in warfare, and criticizes Kemalist state ideology precisely for having imposed a pattern of unanimity which eliminated any other version of collective loyalty and for having retrospectively denounced the expression of religious sentiments in politics.[6]

Zürcher's other claim regarding the minimal role that the groups of Young Turks abroad played in the movement has also been challenged. Şükrü Hanioğlu, in his monumental analysis of the political ideology and the organizational efforts of these groups, maintains that in the period 1902–08 their ideas underwent a huge transformation, and while their faith in 'science' survived as an underlying tenet, the more they were involved in political activism and propaganda, the more they abandoned their vision for a society organized upon scientific doctrines. As for the relationship between the Young Turks and national ideology, Hanioğlu emphasizes the fact that for the period until 1907, the content of CUP propaganda was predominantly based on Turkish nationalism. Therefore, it was successful among minority Turkish populations in the Balkans and also among young Turkish officers who 'had learned to admire the nationalist movements against which they were fighting'.[7] Yusuf Akçura, the prominent and influential ideologue of this first period, described the predicament of the movement as follows: 'it is impossible to create a nation by uniting and bending various elements of the Empire because of the development of the idea of the nation and because of the great degree of enmity among the various nations and especially between the two religions.'[8] Hanioğlu claims that these ideas were widespread in the Unionist publications of this period, where the term 'Turk' had replaced the term 'Ottoman'. But, similar to the way that the Young Turks abandoned their sociological theories, Hanioğlu asserts, they also suppressed their Turkish ideology out of 'political opportunism'. Thus Turkism, like Ottomanism or Pan-Islamism, constituted only a means to the success of their supreme political goal which was the integrity of the empire. This 'fluid' propaganda of the CUP, accommodating diverse political views, allowed the Unionists to reach an understanding with various non-Muslim groups.[9]

As pointed out above, Zürcher, while describing the Unionist circles in Salonica, underlined the fact that the CUP did not wish to attract non-Muslim members. Hanioğlu, who describes the Unionist circles abroad, on the contrary, suggests that the Unionists used a conciliatory discourse in order to attract as many allies as possible. He assumes, however, that this was only a temporary manoeuvre, and that sooner or later, they would reveal their real agenda. This view, we would argue, does not take into account the capacity of the relevant discourse, even if it was opportunistic in character, to reshape

the ideological expectations of its recipients. Moreover, the accusation of ideological inconsistency does not consider the eventuality of diversity and conflict among several views, but relies solely on the assumption of a well-organized conspiracy. Thus Hanioğlu argues that contrary to the common belief among scholars, the Young Turks had adhered to Turkism long before the Balkan wars of 1912–13. He maintains, though, that, even if in theory they considered all elements equal, in practice they considered the Turkish element as dominant in the Ottoman Empire.[10]

Under these circumstances, why should the CUP have been attractive to non-Turks as well? The last decades have witnessed the appearance of a number of works investigating the role of the non-Turkish communities and narrating the events from their point of view. Hasan Kayalı,[11] who studied the development of Arab nationalism in this crucial period, has demonstrated the extent to which local notables played a key role in the support of political prospects that might better serve their interests. Janet Klein, on the other hand,[12] has demonstrated the split between the Kurdish leaders in the Kurdish populated areas in Anatolia who had vested interests in the old regime, and those in Istanbul who supported the new regime. What is important in these studies is that loyalties in the old era as well as socio-political cleavages in the new era have been utilized as an analytical tool allowing us to comprehend better the new alliances. In other words, it was not so much ideology as power relations and local social networks that produced new alliances.

What about the non-Muslims? Did they share the vision of the reform and survival of the Ottoman Empire, despite the strongly Muslim-Turkish character of the movement? Kemal Karpat[13] in his seminal article on the Vlach *İttihatçı* Batzaria, one of the founding members of the CUP, has pointed to exactly the same considerations and predicaments. Recently, Reymond Kevorkian[14] and Rober Koptaş,[15] in their studies on the Armenian parliamentary deputy Krikor Zohrap, have argued that despite the fact that Zohrap would fiercely criticize many CUP policies, he wholeheartedly endorsed the need for the regeneration and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Finally, Benjamin-Trygona Harany, in his study of the Süryânî intellectuals and publicists of the period, Naum Faik and Aşur Yusuf, has described the strong impact that the constitutional regime had on that community, at least before the collapse of the precarious balance in 1915.[16] Recently, therefore, a historiographical discourse has appeared that focuses on the loyalty of the non-Muslims to the Ottomanist ideal, instead of the treacherous character of their revolutionary movements. Certainly, it was already common knowledge that the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (*Dashnaksutiun*), in particular, joined forces with the CUP both before and after 1908.[17] What is new here is the notion that prominent members of the community beyond the *Dashnaksutiun* not only endorsed the Ottomanist ideal but also played a prominent role in everyday politics only a few years before their extermination by their erstwhile Turkish comrades.

In Greek historiography, a silence still prevails around figures who played an equally central role throughout these turbulent years. Members of the Greek Orthodox community who described the events of 1908 and their aftermath were personally involved in the political developments and controversy. Certainly, their attitudes and political choices were not unanimous. However, this is not always mirrored in contemporary accounts. There is no doubt, in their view, that many things went wrong. In this sense, these texts have an apologetic character and at the same time contribute to a preliminary investigation with historiographical claims but mainly with didactic purposes and lacking academic sensitivity. The accusations in these texts are partly addressed to the opponents of mainstream political attitudes within the Greek Orthodox community. However, the main target is the CUP. Accordingly, almost everybody in the community was convinced that all non-Muslim communities were victims of a vicious game, of a fraud: The Young Turks had in mind, from the very beginning, to eliminate all other communities in the empire, but in order to avoid immediate resistance, they used 'Ottomanism' as an intermediate stage in their longer-term plan.[18]

In 1980, we come across, for the first time, a remarkable number of Greek publications concerning the Young Turk era and, broadly speaking, Greek–Turkish relations. In a seminal article, Alexis Alexandris demonstrates how the involvement of Hellenic consular authorities in the preparation for the 1908 elections had a negative effect on the relationship between the Ottoman Greeks and the CUP. At the same time, the author criticizes the arrogant attitude of certain Greek Orthodox deputies in the Ottoman Parliament. Despite the intercommunal tension, he points out, in 1912 the CUP wanted to negotiate with the Greek Orthodox political leadership; however, the offer was rejected. Even more importantly, Alexandris describes the Unionists as 'politically immature' for wishing to safeguard the cooperation of communities which until then were politically subject to Muslim authorities. When, however, the CUP faced massive opposition in the Parliament, especially after 1912, they became all the more authoritarian.[19] Alexandris' article is significant because for the first time in modern Greek historiography, the scenario of the predetermined annihilation of the non-Muslim ethnicities is abandoned.

Emmanouil Emmanouilidis and the controversy within the Smyrniot community

In the introduction to *The Last Years of the Ottoman Empire*, the author, Emmanouil Emmanouilidis, informs his readers that the manuscript was already completed in August 1920. It was published, however, only in 1924. One can assume that at a moment when the Treaty of Sèvres of July 1920 marked the fulfilment of the 'Great Idea' as promoted by the Greek prime minister Eleftherios Venizelos, Emmanouilidis aimed at presenting his own account of events. The author draws a picture of an Ottoman Empire which:

> [had safeguarded] through religious privileges provided to the Christians and capitulations to the foreigners, tolerable living conditions for the non-Muslims. New Turkey is by law and in essence a xenophobic and intolerant state which was deprived of its non-Turkish Muslim subjects due to the general war, while it uprooted its Christian races and made life unbearable for foreigners. The doctrine 'Turkey for the Turks' is now applied relentlessly and in its most narrow sense by a nationalist government which has its seat in an Asiatic capital and is functioning under a regime of its own perception.[20]

Interestingly, Emmanouilidis starts his narrative from 1912. It is from that moment on, he claims, that Turkish politics started pursuing explicitly the transformation of the Old Empire into a homogeneous state, at any cost. He also describes the Mudros armistice of 1918, which marked the de facto demise of the Ottoman Empire, as the happiest moment in the history of the two nations, 'a moment which marked the revival of the Byzantine Empire and the catastrophe of Turkey [*sic*]'.[21]

This reference compels the reader to situate the author amongst the *Bizanscılar*. Actually, despite the fact that such a discourse was still dominant even a few years after the final collapse of the 'Great Idea', what happened with the Mudros armistice was the triumph of the nation-state model, represented here by both Greece and the new Turkey, a model which was to prevail over any imperial imagination. Furthermore, the very fact that Emmanouilidis chose not to include the period 1908–12 appears suspicious. It is as if he wished to conceal his own personal contribution to the developments in the empire following the Young Turk revolution. Ironically, his choice of narrative would develop into an historiographical approach to which I as well as other authors of the present volume, such as Eyal Ginio, would subscribe.[22] This approach maintains that even if all the political and social ingredients were already present before 1912, the Balkan Wars still marked the beginning of an essentially new era. Emmanouilidis seems implicitly to legitimize his involvement in politics on the grounds that conditions were different prior to the Balkan Wars.

When I first came across this text, I actually knew nothing about Emmanouilidis. During the research for my dissertation, however, fragments started appearing which revealed a large part of the puzzle. We have no information about the date of birth of this competent lawyer and politician, but we do know that he was born in Kayseri and died in Athens in 1943. After the defeat of the Greek army in 1922 and the subsequent expulsion of the Greek Orthodox population from Asia Minor, he became a member of the Greek Liberal Party headed by Eleftherios Venizelos, as well as a leading figure of the Asia Minor Political Centre. He served as a governor of Greek Western Macedonia and was minister of social care in the 1928–31 cabinet of Venizelos.[23]

Emmanouilidis played a role in the local politics of his hometown of Izmir,

centre of the province of Aydın, well before 1908. Izmir during those years was tormented by a mounting controversy between two administrative bodies which competed with one another for hegemony over the Greek Orthodox population. According to the Organic Regulation of 1888, both the Central Committee, which mainly expressed the interests of the Hellenic subjects, and the Council of Elders, which primarily represented the interests of the Ottoman subjects among the Greek Orthodox, were recognized as the two 'leading authorities' of the community, being always under the spiritual leadership of the local Orthodox metropolitan. Emmanouilidis appears for the first time as the editor of the short-lived journal *Aktis* ('Coast'), published in Izmir in the aftermath of the Greco-Ottoman War of 1897. The humiliation of the Hellenic state in that war would temporarily have an impact both on relations between the two states and on the living conditions of the Greek Orthodox population in the Ottoman Empire. In the midst of the turmoil, a new Patriarch was elected in Istanbul under the name of Constantine V. The new Patriarch initially belonged to the circle of Joachim III, the most influential among the Patriarchs of the last Ottoman century and a staunch defender of the autonomy of Ottoman Greek institutions *vis-à-vis* the Hellenic state. Constantine V was renowned for his loyalty to the Ottoman authorities.[24] Therefore, he was welcomed by the pro-Ottoman faction within the Smyrniot community. In the journal *Aktis*, we read that:

> the electoral council and the clergy saw in the Metropolitan of Efessos and *locum tenens* the only man who can restore the demeaned prestige of the patriarchal throne. There is no doubt that the virtuous, educated and law-abiding arch-hierarch of our Church will perform brilliantly in his noble duty. [His tasks are going to be] the punctual maintenance of the National Regulations [or 'General Regulations' (*Nizamname*) of 1862], the elevation of the financially tormented and spiritually weak lower clergy, the reshuffling of the ecclesiastical hierarchy . . .[25]

A few years later, Constantine V, under pressure from the Hellenic authorities, would be forced to abdicate. He was replaced in 1901 by his mentor, Joachim III. This would have an impact on the balance between the two administrative bodies in Izmir: in 1902, after a series of minor controversies concerning the community foundations, a major conflict broke out regarding the election of the community administration. It was a clear attempt on the part of the Council of Elders to claim and implement an authority beyond that stipulated by the Organic Regulation of 1888. Based upon the distinction between Ottoman Greeks and the rest of the Orthodox community, the Council of Elders claimed hegemony over both administrative and religious affairs. This claim accorded perfectly with the laws of the Ottoman state and the 1862 'General Regulations' of the Patriarchate, and received the whole-hearted support of both. The Ottoman political context after the Greco-Ottoman War of 1897 and the restrictions imposed by the Ottoman authorities on

expressions of nationality encouraged such claims. A key role in this conflict was played by two figures who would lead the camp of the pro-Ottomanists: namely Sokratis Solomonidis, the foremost figure on the Council of Elders and the editor of the most well-known Greek Smyrniot newspaper, *Amalthia*, as well as the lawyer Emmanouil Emmanouilidis.[26]

During the crisis, which would last until almost 1908, the authorities in Istanbul – both the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and the Ottoman government – became increasingly involved. Yet neither body managed to impose its decisions upon the Smyrniot community, which seems to have been beyond any control. In June 1904, a patriarchal letter to the local Orthodox Metropolitan Vassilios held the prominent *Elders* Sokratis Solomonidis and Emmanouil Emmanouilidis responsible for the deadlock. As a result, the Patriarch requested that they be removed from the Council of Elders. However, it was suggested that this should be accomplished within the community, lest the general atmosphere deteriorate even further.[27] This attitude seems to represent a clear shift; until that time, the Patriarchate had supported the policy of the Council of Elders *vis-à-vis* the Hellenic subjects. This shift was probably related to the return of Joachim III to the patriarchal throne after seventeen years of self-isolation at Mount Athos. Joachim was now determined to restore the prestige of the Patriarchate by cooperating with the Hellenic authorities. Eventually, the Patriarchate issued instructions urging the amendment of certain articles in the community's Organic Regulation and the cooperation between the Council of Elders and the Central Committee. Only then, it was put forth, would peace return to the community.[28]

The controversy evolved around the control of the community foundations, such as hospitals, orphanages, schools, etc. The details of the community conflict were presented by the Athenian journalist Stelios Tsalouchos.[29] In Tsalouchos' reporting, Sokratis Solomonidis is accused of having 'personal interests' (*idiotelia*) while Emmanouilidis, who is scornfully described as Manol Pasha (the Turkish version of his name indicates his subservience to the Turks), is accused of pursuing factionalism (*kommatismos*). The two were said to have taken advantage of the 'contributions of widows and the pennies offered by the common people',[30] thus totally discrediting the principles of participation in charitable activity. As a result, Tsalouchos concludes, 'the chain of personal interests and self-profit, a system of lethal exchange between certain people, prevents any honest citizen from participation'.[31] Emmanouilidis and Solomonidis are accused of being the 'Ephialtes',[32] i.e. traitors to Hellenism in Izmir.

After 1908, Emmanouilidis was involved in political bargaining with the new party in power, the CUP. He was eventually even elected a parliamentary deputy on the CUP-ticket. His faction, the pro-Ottomanist one, was very much favoured by the new circumstances, which offered them the possibility of dominating the community. The challenges of the new regime, however, did not allow for internal conflicts and the two community bodies would

eventually, through the 1910 Organic Regulation, achieve a 'compromise', both political and social, which would enable them to sustain their status.[33]

A new era of political participation

The bond between Solomonidis and Emmanouilidis was not only a political one; it was also a bond related to common geographical origins. Both of them were from Cappadocia. We know that there was a wave of migration that led many among the Turkish-speaking Greek Orthodox Karamanli people of Cappadocia to Istanbul, Izmir and Mersin. The two alleged 'traitors' of the community belonged to an influential network of Karamanlides that tried to dominate the community administration. Emmanouilidis was also the nephew of Aristidis Pasha Georgantzoglou, a native of Kayseri in Cappadocia who would be elected a parliamentary deputy before being appointed as a member of the Upper House (*Meclis-i Âyân*) and eventually becoming a cabinet minister. Another candidate from Cappadocia who was elected to the Parliament, Pavlos Carolidis, was a history professor at the University of Athens.

When Aristidis Pasha Georgantzoglou quit his position as a parliamentary deputy at the beginning of 1911 to take his seat in the *Meclis-i Âyân*,[34] the issue of his replacement instigated a fierce debate among the Greek Smyrniots. The Unionists suggested that there should be no election and that the position should instead be automatically taken over by another Greek Orthodox. Indicative of the tension are the comments of the translator (dragoman) of the Hellenic Consulate in Izmir who, by way of supporting the candidacy of the lawyer Aristovoulos, exclaimed: 'Smyrna has no Hellenic representatives in the Parliament. Aristidis Pasha was a traitor, Carolidis is a traitor. The great patriot Aristovoulos is going to be elected to confront those traitors.'[35] The CUP officials nominated a different candidate, namely Emmanouilidis, who eventually prevailed in the elections, receiving a great majority of both Muslim and Greek votes. As Carolidis commented, these votes originated to a large extent from those regions where there were no Hellenic consulates. Soon after his election, Emmanouilidis was elected second vice president of the Parliament, an office that his uncle had also occupied.[36]

In the Parliament, Emmanouilidis devoted considerable efforts to support the political positions of the CUP. During the debate on the amendment of article 35 of the constitution,[37] it was Emmanouilidis who defended the CUP against the criticism launched by Georgios Boussios.[38] According to article 35, the Sultan had the right to dissolve the Parliament and call for elections in the event of a continuous disagreement between the cabinet and the Parliament, as long as the senate gave its consent. The CUP wished to abolish the senatorial veto, thus giving it a free hand to proceed to elections whenever it deemed appropriate.[39] Emmanouilidis' support of the CUP interests in the Parliament would be rewarded with his re-election in the 1912 elections, whereas Boussios, the leading figure of the 'Constitutional League', the alter ego of the 'Society of Constantinople', would fail.

On October 1912, following the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, Emmanouilidis delivered a speech 'defending Turkey's territorial integrity as well as the rights of its citizens' at a meeting held in Sultanahmet Square and attended not only by the Jewish deputy Nesim Masliah from Izmir, but also by Turkist figures such as Talaat and Yusuf Akçura.[40] As a supporter of the CUP, Emmanouilidis had already attracted the fury of Athenian newspapers, which launched a fierce polemic, calling him 'Ephialtes' once again. However, this attack from the Athenian press did not affect the larger part of the Greek Orthodox community of Izmir, where Emmanouilidis was already well known as a lawyer and a patriot.[41] A similar discourse on treason in contemporary historical literature also appears in the chapters in this volume by Bülent Bilmez and Mustafa Kabha. In these two cases, as in the present chapter, the authors have attempted to ask larger questions about the particular circumstances of agency, and look beyond the more familiar narratives which were constructed to legitimize traumatic experiences or defeats.

After the conclusion of the parliamentary period and the proclamation of new elections, the Unionists were willing to cooperate with the Greek Orthodox community. The five individuals who remained under the spell of the CUP were Nalis (Monastir), Emmanouilidis (Izmir), Mihailidis (Izmit), Kofidis (Trabzon), and Savopoulos (Balıkesir); the 'Constitutional League', which coordinated the political activities of the Greek Orthodox community, would work to prevent their election. Despite its claims of neutrality, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate gave instructions to the local ecclesiastical authorities to support the 'League' and, in certain cases, even urged their congregations to persecute those compatriots who were Unionist candidates, even going so far as to threaten them with excommunication. Similarly, Boussios advised the Greek Smyrniots to vote for the Turkish candidates of the opposition, and not the Greek ones of the CUP. Carolidis denounced this atmosphere of intimidation fuelled by certain journalists in the Pera district, which had a large Greek Orthodox population, claiming they created an atmosphere 'similar to the one of the Hamidian regime'.[42]

Among the CUP circles, the debate on the candidates in the province of Aydın was a vivid one. The only Muslim candidate nominated by the CUP was Mehmed Seyyid Bey, whose election was considered to be certain. In mid-March, the party branch in Izmir announced the candidacies of Nikolaos Tsourouktsoglou, editor of the newspaper *La Reforme*, as well as Mihail Tsakiroglou and Yovanovits, both of whom were medical doctors. By late March, however, it seemed that the three strongest candidates for the Greek seats were D. Dimitriadis, X. Anastassiadis and Emmanouil Emmanouilidis.[43]

Upon the launching of the electoral campaign in Izmir, *Amalthia* criticized its Istanbul colleagues for not explaining the proposals that the CUP had delivered to the 'League', even though they were more advantageous than the ones put forth by the Liberal opposition. The newspaper also asserted that the decisions of the 'League' should not bind the whole of the Greek

Orthodox population. The 'League' should represent only its members and should not exert any influence on the 'national consciousness of the race'. Furthermore, it was argued that if there was a need for the whole nation to commit itself to an agreement with some party, then only the Ecumenical Patriarchate should handle the matter. According to the newspaper, the Patriarch Joachim III had suggested to the two administrative bodies of the Patriarchate, the Holy Synod and the National Mixed Council, to accept the proposals of the CUP in order to safeguard the interests of the nation.[44]

Amalthia would gradually sharpen its criticism against the 'League', which was supported by the Hellenic authorities. The Izmir deputy Carolidis, who in the meantime had severed his ties with the 'League', informs us that the Hellenic Ambassador in Istanbul, Ioannis Gryparis, had forced the Izmir Orthodox Metropolitan Chrysostomos to impose a boycott against *Amalthia*, so that nobody would buy it. However, the Metropolitan did not abide by the order. On the other hand, the boycott was implemented not only against *Amalthia*, but also against *Imerisia*, a newspaper published by Nikolaos Tsourouktsoglou, who was one of the initial CUP candidates for the elections. Groups of agitators patrolled the market and prevented anyone from buying these newspapers. Moreover, they discouraged any firm from publishing advertisements in the newspapers, on the premise that nobody was buying them.[45] Ironic as it may seem, the Greek Orthodox now applied practices among themselves similar to the ones the Muslim boycotters had already been implementing for a few years. It is indicative of its political stance that against all accusations, *Amalthia* replied that it was against the authoritarian tendencies both of the CUP and those within the community.[46]

The Smyrniot Greeks are reported to have been so disappointed by the electoral campaign that only a tenth actually went to the polls. The people thus expressed 'their discontent with those who wished to deceive them'.[47] As to the accusations about the low quality of the candidates, the circles of the 'League' stressed that the most able members of the community had not even agreed that their names be included on the list.[48] The results of the first round elections reflected this political atmosphere. Out of the 181 electors, 141 Muslims and only 40 non-Muslims were elected. From these, 155 belonged to the CUP and 26 to the opposition.[49] This was the moment when the names of Carolidis and Emmanouilidis were announced as candidates on the ballot of the CUP.[50] When the second round of the elections began, it was clear that the CUP would gain the overwhelming majority. In the presence of all the religious leaders of Izmir and the electoral committee, 125 out of the 128 local electors voted for the deputies. One hundred and eight of them voted for the CUP list, consisting of Mehmed Seyyid, Musa Kâzım, Carolidis, Emmanouilidis, Vahan Bartestanian and Narli Masliah, while only seventeen voted for the opposition.[51]

Emmanouilidis and Carolidis were eventually elected, but the new parliament would be a short-lived one. Despite the disaster of the Balkans Wars,

Emmanouilidis was one of the few Christian deputies during World War I in the by then marginalized Ottoman Parliament. As is clear from the parliamentary minutes, Emmanouilidis stood up to protest against the anti-Christian persecutions but by the middle of the Great War, it was rather late for someone stigmatized as a traitor to claim any popularity among the Hellenic Greeks. On the other hand, he was able to retain his popularity in Istanbul. Joachim III had passed away in 1912. He was replaced by Germanos V, himself a Karamanlı native of Cappadocia, who kept a low profile during those difficult years, only to be accused as a traitor after the end of the war and the collapse of the Empire.

Between the ethnic elements and the Ottoman nation

As already mentioned, Emmanouilidis avoided the period before 1912 in his book published after the conclusion of the dramatic chain of events leading to the expulsion of Greeks from Anatolia. The involvement of a particular group from Izmir, where the newspaper *Amalthia* and its editor Solomonidis played a crucial role in public affairs during the period, could be explained as an opportunistic attempt to strike an alliance with the most powerful political partner. However, these individuals also seem to have shared a vision about the integrity of an Ottoman Empire, which, through its political and economic emancipation, could provide a viable alternative to all kinds of nationalism, including the Greek one.

In an article published in Greek in *Imerisia* ('Daily') during the fall of 1908 and reproduced afterwards in Ottoman Turkish in *İttihad*, the official organ of the Izmir branch of the CUP, Emmanouilidis articulated his ideas on current issues. The article, entitled 'İ'tidâl-ı Dem' ('Cold-bloodedness'), discussed the Bulgarian proclamation of sovereignty, and the attitude that the enraged Ottomans should adopt. The author pointed out that:

> as we share their noble anger, the patriotic manifestations have a special influence on our heart. However, what we will publicly express today is not our feelings, because this is a personal matter. We are going to express our ideas about how to deal with the news that keeps coming. War is a word, a word that unfortunately can express more than anything else in a moment of anger. We say unfortunately because war is a decision that is going to have an impact not only on us but also on future generations. It can change the course of history, it can put a government in danger.[52]

Emmanoulidis expressed his views as an Ottoman patriot, discussing not the military potential of the Ottomans to overwhelm the Bulgarians, but the probability that this might prove to be part of a larger project. What is more, even if there was no doubt that the Bulgarians would lose the war,

the Ottoman nation, he claimed, should prepare itself properly for this eventuality. In his words,

> Over the last years, after they achieved their goal at no personal sacrifice but simply with the support of the Russian forces . . . [the Bulgarians] have been preparing themselves for this war. The whole nation has worked towards this aim and they have put together an army of 250–350,000 men, which is the most they could possibly do.[53]

However, the author claims that the huge Bulgarian debt of twenty-four million francs, which had to be serviced every year, evoked great concern in European circles, which highlighted the fact that:

> every day that passes by in peace for Bulgaria weakens its military potential, and . . . it is clear that they will not be able to preserve their current military strength. On the other hand, the military power of the Ottoman state is a source of admiration even among the Great Powers. It possesses an army of 700,000 trained men. Apart from that, the army is famous for its heroism. The officers have received German training. And yet, it has not reached the point of perfection that its Bulgarian counterpart has reached. If the Ottoman state does what has to be done, it will possess a determined army that will instill terror in its enemies.[54]

The key issue in the article, however, concerns the conscription of non-Muslims into the Ottoman army. Emmanouilidis argued that if the military training of non-Muslims stipulated by the new constitution were to be considered seriously, it meant a change in the empire's priorities. If this issue were resolved, the state would not need to transfer troops from Anatolia and Syria to the Balkans, and it would be in a position to dominate all the Balkan territories. The author, however, warned that:

> Even if we consider the causes we have described from a military point of view, in case we wage a war against Bulgaria, there is another issue of immense importance we should pay attention to. It has not yet been three months since the proclamation of the constitution. As the Parliament has not yet been summoned and no law has yet been issued to reassert and support the constitution, the administration has not been purged of those civil servants who are willing to safeguard the continuity of [the old regime]. Could there be a greater threat to the new administration that has been established in the Ottoman lands? Let us not forget that we lost our first constitution due to the war with Russia. Now, if we are going to wage a new war, we should not lose sight of the fact that those supporters of the authoritarian regime [which preceded the Constitutional Revolution] who work to restore the previous condition will find an opportunity. The constitution is more important than the war against

> Bulgaria. The boundaries of the Ottoman state once extended as far as Vienna. After a series of hardships, the authoritarian regime and the administration that was born out of it squeezed this glorious state into its current borders.[55]

The future deputy, after this attack on the old regime, highlighted the character of a legitimate Ottoman government. In his view, it should represent patriotism, justice and equality [among the members] of the 'blessed Ottoman nation that represents the unity of all elements'. He repeatedly pointed out that his call for cautious action was not directed at the military balance, but rather to the political aspect of the issue:

> the idea of a war between the Ottoman nation and the Bulgarians has become widespread. In order for our army to teach them a lesson and to preserve Istanbul through the occupation of the Balkans according to the Treaty of Berlin, there is no sacrifice that would not be necessary for the Ottoman nation and in particular for the *Rum* [Greek Orthodox] element.[56]

This is only an example of the attitudes of those Ottoman Greeks who not only saw a new era of hope emerging in 1908, but claimed an active role in it. The distinction between an Ottoman nation (*millet*) and its different elements (*unsur*), the devotion to the Ottoman government and the Ottoman state, and the eagerness to have non-Muslims drafted into the Ottoman army are some of the critical aspects of this Ottomanist discourse. Emmanouilidis's words gain additional importance if one considers the Greek hostility against the Bulgarians during the thirty years prior to 1908, due to the Macedonian Question, as well as the possibility that Greeks could take advantage of the conjuncture to push the empire into a war from which Greece could profit. I argue that his stance cannot be described as opportunistic; on the contrary, it represents the attitude of an Ottoman patriot.

However, Emmanouilidis was not a rare specimen. As pointed out earlier, a whole political elite, originating from Cappadocia, had before 1908 openly clashed with the Hellenic elites in Izmir. In the new era, it would rejoice at the prospect of the regeneration of the empire. Upon the proclamation of the constitution, the first articles in Ottoman Greek newspapers captured all the enthusiasm of the moment. Among them, *Amalthia* expressed the commitment of the Greek nation (*Ellinikon Ethnos*) 'to the sentiments of love and solidarity towards the other races . . ., but at the same time to its autonomous privileged status which was so openly recognized by the restored constitution'.[57] It seems that the unleashing of new possibilities had already alarmed the leaders of the community, since it was considered necessary to set the limits of negotiation immediately. The terms 'solidarity' and 'autonomy' refer to a common Ottoman destiny, although in these circumstances, 'autonomy' should be read to include the idea of 'freedom' as well. Within this

framework, these two concepts do not appear to contradict each other; they are actually complementary to each other, as revealed by the following appeal of *Amalthia*:

> Orthodox people of Smyrna, you will show disrespect to the holy traditions you inherited if you do not pray to God for the souls of your compatriots, the heroic children of this common fatherland, who . . . lost their lives for us to obtain these bright days of freedom. These martyrs are your real brothers even if they belong to a different race. They are your brothers, since your ideal was always freedom and it was for this ideal that they fell and were tortured.[58]

The 'martyrs', the 'real brothers' do not necessarily belong to the same 'race' (*fyli*), but they definitely belong to the same 'fatherland' (*patrida*), which can embrace all the diverse races. What is more important, however, is that the honour owed to them does not derive from duty to the 'fatherland'. It is considered a sign of respect to 'the holy traditions' of the 'race'. Thus, whereas political solidarity among all martyrs of freedom who share the same fatherland is consolidated, this solidarity does not bear any past, any tradition, and thus cannot entail any loyalty by itself. In other words, it always remains conditioned by ethnic solidarity. On the contrary, the concept of 'freedom' (*hürriyet*), which as part of the Ottoman vocabulary of the time, normally should be read as 'political freedom', could be easily fertilized within an ethnic frame of reference and so transformed into 'national freedom'.

Concluding remarks: reflecting the interests of a bureaucracy

In the post-1908 era, figures such as Solomonidis and Emmanouilidis played a very active role in public affairs. Through their personalities, their political alliances stretching beyond the community, and their ability to take advantage of the new political circumstances, they managed successfully to impose their own views on the political representation of the community in the Ottoman Parliament. In the pre-1908 period, such a representation was non-existent, and thus what mattered was control of community affairs. In the Second Constitutional Period, however, due to the exigencies of the parliamentary system, the community could no longer afford to be a 'closed' system and had to open itself to the outside world, thereby jeopardizing its autonomy and coherence. It is within this framework that we should assess the contribution to Ottoman politics of figures such as Emmanouilidis. Having already accumulated experience during intra-communal conflicts prior to 1908, he took the opportunity to play a key role in much broader developments in Ottoman society at a time when his political affiliations were largely the result of his previous choices. Despite his post-World War I attempt to legitimize his pre-1912 political activities within the context

of Hellenic irredentist ideology, his earlier trajectory would remain in the shadows, buried under the ruins of the empire.

Notes

1 Celal Bayar, *Bende Yazdım*, Istanbul, 1967, vol. 5, p. 1589.
2 On the Great Idea, or *I Meghali Idea*, see Elli Skopetea, *Το 'Πρότυπο Βασίλειο' και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα; Όψεις τού εθνικού προβλήματος στην Ελλάδα* (1830–1880) ('The "Model Kingdom" and the Great Idea; Aspects of the national question in Greece (1830–1880)', Athens: Politropo, 1988 and Paschalis M. Kitromilides, 'Greek Irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus', *Middle Eastern Studies* vol. 26, no 1, Jan., 1990, pp. 3–17.
3 Emmanouil Emmanouilidis, *Τα τελεύταία Έτη της Οθωμανικής Αύτοκρατορίας* ('The Last Years of the Ottoman Empire'), Athens, 1924.
4 Erik Jan Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor, The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement*, Leiden: Brill, 1984, pp. 21–3.
5 Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: a Modern History*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2004, p. 99.
6 Erik Jan Zürcher, 'Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists, Identity politics 1908–1938', in Kemal H. Karpat (ed.) *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey*, Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2000, pp. 150–79. For a survey of the debate see Vangelis Kechriotis, 'Turkish nationalism or Muslim allegiance? The debate in late Ottoman Studies and the preconditions of Kemalist ideology' in Jasna Dragovic-Soso, Nevenka Martin, Wendy Bracewell (eds), *History of the present, Workshop on the South-East European History, Belgrade 22–23 November 2001*, London: Centre for SEES, University College, 2002, pp. 51–4.
7 Sükrü Hanioğlu, *Preparation for Revolution. The Young Turks, 1902–1908*, New York: OUP, 2001, p. 295. Hanioğlu touches here only once on the significant role played by Balkan nationalisms in the formation of Young Turk ideology, not as the motivation which prompted a similar reaction but as a repository of themes and narratives which would contribute to the formation of Turkish nationalist ideology.
8 Akçuraoğlu Yusuf, *Türk Yılı 1928*, Istanbul, 1928, p. 401, quoted in Hanioğlu, *Preparation*, p. 294. For Akçura see also François Georgeon, *Aux Origins du nationalisme Turk: Yusuf Akçura (1876–1935)*, Paris: ADPF, 1980.
9 Hanioğlu, *Preparation*, p. 296.
10 Ibid., p. 299.
11 Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918*, Berkeley-LA: University of California Press, 1997.
12 Janet Klein, 'Power in the periphery: The Hamidiye cavalry and the struggle over Ottoman Kurdistan, 1890–1914', unpublished PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 2002.
13 Kemal Karpat, 'The Memoirs of N. Batzaria: TheYoung Turks and Nationalism', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 6, no. 3, 1975, pp. 276–99.
14 Raymond Kévorkian, 'The CUP and the Armenians: Krikor Zohrap,' paper presented at the conference *Turkey 1908–14: Biographical Approaches* at the University of Zürich, 13–15 November 2008.
15 Rober Koptaş, 'Armenian Political Thinking in the Second Constitutional Period: The Case of Krikor Zohrab', unpublished MA dissertation, Atatürk Institute, Bogaziçi University, 2005.
16 Trigona-Harany, Benjamin. The Ottoman Süryânî, from 1908 to 1914. Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2009.
17 Arsen Avagyan and Gaisz F Minassian, *Ermeniler ve İttihat ve Terakki: işbirliğinden çatışmaya* ('Armenians and the [Commitee of] Union and Progress: from

cooperation to conflict'), çeviren (translated by) Ludmilla Denisenko, Mutlucan Şahan. Istanbul: Aras yayınları, 2005.

18 Vangelis Kechriotis, 'From Trauma to Reflection: Greek Historiography and the Young Turks' "Bizarre" Revolution' in Christina Koulouri (ed.), *Clio in the Balkans*, Thessaloniki: CDRSEE, 2002, pp. 91–108.

19 Alexis Alexandris, 'Οι Έλληνες στην υπηρεσία της Οθωμανικής Αυτοκρατορίας' ('The Greeks in the service of the Ottoman Empire'), *Deltion tis Istorikis kai Ethnologikis Eterias*, vol. 2, 1980, pp. 365–404, esp. 392–5.

20 Emmanouil Emmanouilidis, *The Last Years . . .*, 'Πρόλογος' (Introduction), ε'.

21 ibid., στ΄.

22 Eyal Ginio, 'Between the Balkan Wars (1912–13) and the "Third Balkan War" of the 90s: The Elusive Memory of the Balkans in Arabic Writings'.

23 Eva Ahladi, 'Ο Σμυρναϊκός Τύπος στις αρχές του 20ου αιώνα: Η απωτύπωση της κοινωνικής διαμάχης ('The Smyrniot Press in the turn of the 20th c.: the imprint left by the social conflict' in Loukia Doulia (ed.), *Ο Ελληνικός Τύπος 1784 έως σήμερα: ιστορικές και θεωρητικές προσεγγίσεις* ('The Greek Press, 1784 to this day: historical and theoretical approaches'), Athens: Institute of Neo-Hellenic Research/National Research Foundation, pp. 463–9.

24 When, in May 1901, Constantine V was eventually forced by the National Mixed Council (the lay-dominated council of the Patriarchate) to resign in favour of Joachim III, he applied to the Ministry of Justice and Religions, protesting against this decision and asking for the latter's intervention in order to maintain his position. See Paraskevas Konortas, *Οθωμανικές Θεωρήσεις για το Οικούμενικό Πατριαρχείο* (Ottoman perceptions of the Ecumenical Patriarchate), Athens: Alexandria Press, 1997, pp. 354–5.

25 Emmanouil Emmanouilidis, 'Κωνστανίνος Ε΄' (Constantine V), *Aktis*, 5 (1 May 1897), p. 82.

26 Vangelis Kechriotis, 'A non-Muslim Ottoman Community: Between Autonomy and Patriotism; The Greeks of Izmir at the End of the Empire', unpublished PhD dissertation, Leiden, 2005).

27 P.A. Codex A'77, 5 June 1904, p. 90.

28 P.A. Codex A'77, 21 June 1904, p. 92.

29 Stelios Tsalouchos, *Η εν Σμύρνη κοινοτική κακοδαιμονία, τεύχος Α', εφημεριδογράφοι και κοινοτικοί άρχοντες από εικοσιπενταετίας μέχρι σήμερον, Έλεγχος ιδία της πολιτείαςτων απηνών και αμειλίκτων διωκτών των εν Σμύρνη Ελλήνων, Σωκράτούς Σολομωνίδού και τινός Μανώλογλού των τα στήθη της δύστύχούς των Σμύρναίων ορθοδόξού κοινότητος πιεζόντων απαισίων Εφιαλτών* ('The community disorder in İzmir: Journalists and community notables over the last twenty-five years, a scrutiny especially of the behavior of the ruthless persecutors of the Hellenes of Smyrna, Sokratis Solomonidis and someone called Manologlu, the "Efialtes" who suppress the breath of the miserable Orthodox community of Smyrna'), Athens, 1906 and Stelios Tsalouchos, *Ιστορία της ορθοδόξού κοινότητος Σμύρνης* ('History of the Orthodox community of Smyrna'), Athens, 1908.

30 Ibid., 66.

31 Ibid., 64.

32 They are attributed the title of *Judas* or *Ephialtes* – the notorious figure who helped the Persians to defeat Leonidas' troops in the battle of Thermopylae in 480 BC.

33 Kechriotis, 'A non-Muslim Ottoman Community'.

34 During his career as parliamentary deputy, Georgantzogou served as a vice-president of the Parliament and also as a minister. In one the first sessions of the Parliament, in the elections for the position of second vice president (the president being Ahmet Rıza and the first vice president being Talaat), Yorgantzoglou

received 122 votes against 129 for Necip Draga, an Albanian deputy from Drama and member of the Üsküb branch of the CUP, and 109 for Ruhi al-Khalidi, an Arab deputy from Jerusalem. Despite the fact that he came second in the ballot, he was preferred by the Sultan. See I/I/5, December 13, 1324/December 26, 1908, Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi, 1, 52–4, cited in Aykut Kansu, *Politics in Post-revolutionary Turkey: 1908–1913*, Leiden: Brill, 2000, p. 30. After the suppression of the 31 March coup (13 April 1909), the Unionists imposed on the new Sultan, Mehmed V Reşad, a cabinet led by Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, in which Yorgantzoglou was offered the portfolio of Minister of Agriculture, Mines and Forestry. However, under monarchist pressure, the mandate for a cabinet was given to Tevfik Pasha. In this cabinet, the same ministry was offered to the monarchist Dimitraki Mavrokordato. See ibid., p. 130. When Tevfik Pasha handed in his resignation, Yorgantzoglou eventually took over the ministry in the new cabinet set up on 5 May, replacing Mavrokordato. Ibid., p. 132.

35 Pavlos Carolidis, *Λόγοι και Υπομνήματα* ('Speeches and Memoranda'), Athens, 1913, p. 232.

36 I/IV/2, 3 October, 1327/16 October, 1911, Meclis-I Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi, 1, p. 15.

37 I/IV/ 34, 27 December, 1327/ 9 January, 1912, Meclis-I Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi, 2, pp. 396–417.

38 Known in Turkish historiography as 'Boşo Efendi', he participated in the 'Macedonian struggle' during the autocracy of Abdülhamid II. After the restoration of the constitution in 1908, he was released from prison and was elected as a deputy in the Ottoman Parliament. From the very beginning, he played a prominent role there in the negotiations among the non-Turkish deputies of the Parliament. At the same time, he published a series of newspapers, which were banned one after the other. Eventually, when the CUP returned to power with the *Bab-i Âli* coup of January 1913, Boussios was expelled to Greece; see Thanos Veremis, 'The Hellenic Kingdom and the Ottoman Greeks: The Experiment of the "Society of Constantinople" ' in D. Gondicas and C. Issawi, *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism*, Princeton UP, Princeton, 1999, pp. 181–91 and Vangelis Kechriotis, 'Greek Orthodox, Ottoman-Greeks or just Greeks? Theories of Coexistence in the Aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution', στα *Études Balkaniques*, 2005, vol.1, pp. 51–72.

39 See Aykut Kansu, *Politics*, p. 296.

40 See *Tanin*, 'Dünkü Büyük Nümayişler: Harb! Harb! Sultan Ahmed' de – Harbiye Nezaretinde – Türbe-i Fatih' de', 22 September 1328/ 5 October 1912.

41 Pavlos Carolidis takes the opportunity at this point in his account to reprimand those who use the accusation of 'traitor', something of which he himself had been a victim. See Carolidis, *Speeches*, pp. 233–4.

42 Carolidis, *Speeches*, pp. 342–5.

43 'Les elections a Smyrne', in *The Levant Herald and Eastern Express*, March 19, 1912 quoted in Aykut Kansu, *Politics*, p. 366. The information provided by Aykut Kansu does not explain this shift. It is worth mentioning that conflicts similar to the one emerging in the Greek Orthodox community appeared in the Armenian and the Jewish ones. Stephen Spartali, the Armenian candidate, ceded his place to Vahad Bardizbanian, member of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, and the final candidates for the one Armenian seat were Diran Achnan, Vahad Bardizbanian and S. Davidian. For the Jewish seat, the community was divided. Those who supported the CUP were for Nesim Masliah, whereas the majority supported the candidacy of Selim Mizrahi. Ibid.

44 *Amalthia*, 'Εκλογαί' ('Elections'), 6 January 1912.

45 Carolidis, *Speeches*, pp. 361–2.

46 'The Greek people of the Empire is not a race of fellows who will fall from

one slavery into another' *Amalthia*, 'Ζητούσιν και ευθύνες' ('They even hold us responsible'), 30 March 1908.

47 *Amalthia*, 'Παράδοξοιεκλογαί' ('Weird election') 11 March 1912. *Amalthia*, 'Εκλογαί', ('Elections'), 11 March 1912.

48 *Amalthia*, 'Της αστοχίας ταποτελέσματα' ('The results of missing the target'), 16 March 1912.

49 *Amalthia*, 'Εκλογαί' ('Elections'), 11 March 1912.

50 *Amalthia*, 'Υποψήφιοι βουλευταί' ('Deputy candidates'), 16 March 1912.

51 In Ödemiş (Odemisio), Tire (Thira), Menemen (Menemeni), Nymfeo, Sivrihisar, all electors voted for the CUP. See *Amalthia*, 'Αι βουλευτικαί εκλογαί' ('The parliamentary elections'), 17 March 1912. In the overwhelmingly Greek-populated Urla (Vryoulla) and Çeşme (Krini), however, the votes were split and some voted for Carolidis, Emmanouilidis, Mehmed Seyyid Bey and Kâzim Efendi while others for Anastasiadis and Kavafakis. On the whole, however, 140 votes went to the CUP and only 23 to the opposition. See *Amalthia*, 'Εκλογαί βουλευτών' ('Deputy elections'), 18 March 1912.

52 İttihad, 30 September, 1908, 'İʿtidâl-ı Dem' (Cold-bloodedness).

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

57 *Amalthia*, 'Η μεγάλη εθνική διαδήλωσις-Το φρόνημα της κοινότητος' ('The great national demonstration – The morale of the community'), 19 July 1908.

58 Ibid.

7 The Ottoman Empire's absent nineteenth century

Autonomous subjects

Christine Philliou

Introduction

The Ottoman Empire was in many ways a victim of its own political longevity. One reflection of this is an underlying paradox in the meta-narrative of Ottoman history: despite over six centuries of dynastic and political continuity, we tell two distinct stories of Ottoman sovereignty. On the one hand, Ottoman historians have, over the past generation, revealed fascinating aspects of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, going far beyond the Decline paradigm of the past to explore both the tectonic shifts and the microchanges in sovereignty. When sketching out the context for studies on these middle centuries our points of departure go back to the murky fourteenth-century foundations of the Ottoman state, and tend to revolve around the era of Süleyman (1520–66) in the mid-sixteenth century.

And yet, when we get to the nineteenth century, our point of departure shifts to the present. Suddenly we look *back*, from the Turkish nation-state, from the modern Middle East or Balkans, from the vantage point of modern colonial and post-colonial projects. While we would like to be free of the mid-twentieth century modernization paradigm, it is often difficult to expunge our deep assumptions about teleological change and normative economic and political development, to see other trajectories that may have existed.

This retrospective impulse somehow makes more sense for the second half of the nineteenth century, when leaders of the Ottoman state formally proclaimed a project to modernize, even westernize, and guarantee formal equality to citizens. Indeed, increasing numbers of people in the Ottoman state and Ottoman society began to measure themselves against their counterparts in the 'West' and look to European paradigms for education, economy and sovereignty. The yardstick of modernity had begun to be used by historical actors in the Ottoman Empire as well as their 'Western' counterparts.

The two disjointed narratives we tell of Ottoman history leave the first half of the nineteenth century a dead space.[1] Some historians who have addressed this period, such as Stanford Shaw, decided to live with (or ignore) the paradox, exemplified in the title of his book on the reign of Sultan Selim III

(1789–1807), *Between Old and New*.[2] Others, such as Khaled Fahmy and Ussama Makdisi, have found more sophisticated and productive ways around the paradox by focusing on a different, regional dimension of sovereignty, or a different trajectory from the imperial one.[3] But the imperial paradox persists, so that for the most part, the first half of the nineteenth century remains a lacuna between the two disjointed interpretive frameworks of Ottoman sovereignty – the classical/post-classical framework and the retrospective teleology of modernization.

The present chapter uses this paradox to try to unravel both the 'old' and the 'new' stories of sovereignty from the perspective of Orthodox Christians who served the Ottoman sultanate. I argue this disjointedness derives in part from a preoccupation with formal categories and institutions of sovereignty – by which I mean the distribution of political authority enacted through the practices of governance. For the pre-nineteenth century period, historians like Leslie Peirce have recently studied the relationships between formal and informal or de facto authority, both in the imperial centre and in the provinces. However, for the period beginning from the mid-nineteenth century the big questions still tend to start with or critique the formal modernization project – whether in the form of the imperial Tanzimat reforms, the British or French colonial project, or national projects in the Balkans and Middle East, and scholars assess the effects of those formal changes on a population or an institution.[4] There is, of course, great validity in critiquing the formal modernization project of the Ottoman state, but other lines of inquiry remain to be pursued. One such line follows the perspective and role of Istanbul-based Orthodox Christian statesmen in Ottoman governance, beginning from the early nineteenth century.

To access the early nineteenth century as a locus of change in itself and not just the time of 'proto-reforms' or the 'eve of nationalism', I use social networks as an operative category. Source materials come both from the Ottoman archives in Istanbul and from an Ottoman archive I discovered in Greece, as well as Greek-language archives in the Orthodox Patriarchate and a personal archive transplanted from Istanbul to Athens. These sources make it possible to bring to life the teeming networks that constituted Ottoman sovereignty at the turn of the nineteenth century.

For some of the same reasons that the paradox of Ottoman historiography exists, the network approach is a fruitful methodology with which to reconsider the turn of the nineteenth century.[5] This was certainly a time for which a focus on formal institutions reveals little about what was actually going on, nor about how people were using the institutions in question. Indeed, in institutional terms the first half of the nineteenth century can only be seen as an unmitigated failure, as demonstrated by Sultan Selim III's 'failed' *nizam-ı cedid* reforms and the 'reactionary' Janissary-*ulema* coalition. However, by abandoning normative assumptions, we can better appreciate a new vantage point in this period – that of the Ottoman actors themselves. Ultimately, this approach may also be useful for re-examining earlier and

later periods as well. Networks, I argue, are one promising method for recovering this period and start to build a new discursive frame.

Networks have long been employed by historians to discern subterranean social and political processes. Historians of diverse times and places such as the early modern Mediterranean, more recently the Indian Ocean, and modern Germany, for instance, have used networks to bring out new connectivities and dimensions of historical change.[6] In Ottoman history, Norman Itzkowitz long ago suggested a way toward networks with his work on prosopography and his well-known article, 'Eighteenth-century Ottoman realities'. In his book on Mustafa Ali, Cornell Fleischer masterfully demonstrated how *intisab* (connections), worked to bring *re'aya* (subjects) into the fold of the *askeri* (ruling class) in the later sixteenth century.[7]

These Ottoman examples are limited to a Muslim arena, however. Certainly many of the people about whom Fleischer and Itzkowitz wrote were converts, or sons of converts from Christianity, and yet the populations that remained Christian were outside the scope of their analysis. The point here is not a criticism, but rather an illustration of the settled nature of confessional categories in the modern historiography of the Ottoman Empire. The story of Christian subjects is conventionally seen as a separate one from the 'mainstream' story of Ottoman sovereignty.[8] Christians ostensibly had their 'own' millets – corporatist structures wherein they enjoyed spiritual and some legal autonomy. For the turn of the nineteenth century, however, the present work demonstrates that non-Muslims as well as Muslims were participating in dense, overlapping social networks, and were using the same operational logic to augment their wealth and their share in sovereignty. It was precisely the diverse activities and associations of actors crossing the formal confessional and political boundaries that in effect constituted sovereignty.

The case presented here – one person, one document, and one concept – demonstrates how we might employ networks to gain new insight on sovereignty. 'Autonomy' is the concept highlighted in particular. Like networks, the concept of autonomy leads to a new vantage point. While networks decenter the binary opposition posed between formal and informal sovereignty, autonomy decenters the conventional oppositions between centralization and decentralization that are posed with respect to imperial authority and the ayan, or provincial elites, in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. The conventional ayan narrative concludes with the 'failed' federalism of the *sened-i ittifak*, or 'deed of alliance', in 1808. With this pact, regional ayan agreed to be loyal to the sultanate and provide troops when needed, in exchange for protection and representation in an imperial advisory council. The agreement was never put into practice, however, and so remained a dead letter. Alternatively, the idea of autonomy allows us to follow Ottoman transitions through the first half of the nineteenth century and reconnect the split narratives of Ottoman history and the divide between imperial rule and national independence.[9]

Autonomy

Autonomy is personal as well as political. 'Political autonomy' as a trope in nineteenth-century Ottoman governance can be juxtaposed with the question of 'personal autonomy' as seen through the lens of one Ottoman subject's life and career. This specific juxtaposition is possible through a close examination of an Ottoman policy memo that directly discusses political autonomy, and through its form, indirectly evokes the question of personal autonomy.

A word about the way autonomy is conventionally understood with regard to the Ottoman nineteenth century: the term 'autonomy' was regularly bandied about by diplomats and statesmen in multi-state negotiations in the nineteenth century, and yet has fallen by the wayside in twentieth and twenty-first century historiography.[10] Looking out from the negotiating tables in Istanbul and Europe, Balkan states such as Serbia, Bulgaria, and Romania achieved a variant of autonomy by mid-century before reaching full-fledged independent status in the wake of the Congress of Berlin in 1878, and islands such as Samos and Crete were autonomous for longer (80 years) or shorter (14 years) periods before becoming part of the Greek Kingdom as a result of the Balkan Wars in 1912–13. The Greek Kingdom itself had only become independent in the early 1830s after discussions among Great Power states of whether to make it autonomous but still under Ottoman sovereignty. Egypt also achieved a kind of autonomy in the form of the khedivate under Mehmet Ali's descendants, which led into the tangled encounters between Ottoman, British, and French Empires and an emergent Egyptian nation. Kurdistan, in contrast, seems to have lost its autonomy through the course of the nineteenth century, prompting Martin van Bruinessen to explain thus the failure to achieve independent Kurdish nationhood in the twentieth century.[11] Mount Lebanon was given a form of autonomy in response to the 1860 sectarian violence there, and this is often seen as the seedling of the modern state of Lebanon.[12]

Autonomy, as these examples demonstrate, was often seen by Great Power diplomats and by twentieth-century scholars as a waystation on the normative road to independence from Ottoman rule. In retrospect, it was a road that often led to the nation-state (sometimes through the detour of French or British Mandate, in the case of much of the current 'Middle East'), so historians do not usually devote much time to the concept. Quite understandably, we tend to glide over the way things may have looked at fixed points, and indeed for prolonged periods in the nineteenth century, in order to see how they got to where they are now.

The idea that deserves further consideration and discussion is that of political autonomy. If we explore the way it was understood by a variety of historical agents in the early and mid-nineteenth century, this concept can illuminate a different dimension of the nineteenth century, perhaps even an alternative to the teleological narratives formed out of modernization theory and twentieth-century nationalism. The discussion now turns to explore the understanding of political autonomy by one historical agent: Stefanaki Bey.

Personal autonomy

Enter the question of 'personal autonomy'. While political autonomy is a concept with the potential to unsettle the framework of the Eastern Question and its component processes, personal autonomy is first a lens through which to view political autonomy (for it allows us to recapture individual vantage points), and second, a means to unsettle another set of categories we have in place regarding the Ottoman nineteenth century: namely, the categories of confessional belonging and political participation. We know on the one hand that the Ottoman Empire was officially Sunni Muslim and this was in certain times and places a crucial element of the ruling dynasty's, and the larger state's identity. At the same time, the empire contained subject populations that were Christian and Jewish as well as both Sunni and Shi'a Muslim. Most commonly, the accommodation of these characteristics side by side has been reconciled by describing a phantom 'millet system', wherein non-Muslims were 'resident outsiders' to the Ottoman political system, enjoying a corporatist spiritual and often administrative 'autonomy' within the confines of Shari'a law. However, if non-Muslim subjects theoretically operated in the 'autonomous' spaces of their separate millets, it is not clear what this autonomy meant in practice, or whether the millets even existed as 'institutions' in the modern sense in any period before the nineteenth century. Despite this basic lacuna, the millet paradigm is still used as a self-evident starting point for portraying the lives and activities of non-Muslims.

Twenty-five years ago, Benjamin Braude wrote an article challenging the static paradigm of the millet system and suggested that millets were a creation of the nineteenth century read backward in time, although neither he nor scholars since him have come forward to offer analytical alternatives to nor qualitative examples in support of this paradigm.[13] My work explores another aspect of the millet question, that of the phantom autonomous millets waiting to become nations, networks, which of course were made up of autonomous individual subjects. The individual case below demonstrates the method and the results of this research.

The autonomous subject

Our autonomous subject is Stephanos Vogorides, a.k.a. Stefanaki Bey. Born as the Ottoman subject Staiko Sonkov in Kotel, part of today's Bulgaria, his many incarnations and names reflect the complexities of Ottoman sovereignty during his life, from the 1770s until 1859.[14] Stefanaki Bey was born (as Staiko) to a small-time livestock merchant father, part of a Bulgarian-speaking family, sometime in the early 1770s. He likely would have remained rural and Bulgarian-identified were it not for the local political and financial feuds that drove his family north out of Kotel, and were it not for the Phanariot networks that pulled them into the 'twin principalities' of Moldavia and Wallachia in the 1780s.

Who were the Phanariots? The answer here offers a further revision to conventional historiography: they were an Orthodox Christian, Greek-identified caste, clique, elite, or network, that had come to take up diverse operations of Ottoman governance by the late eighteenth century. They are conventionally understood to have been a small number of intermarrying families who enjoyed a quasi-aristocratic status and served in four top Ottoman positions reserved for them: Grand Dragoman at the Ottoman Court, Dragoman of the Imperial Fleet, and the two Voyvodas (like Stefanaki Bey, enjoying several titles in different languages: Princes/Hospodars/Hegemones/Beys) of the 'semi-autonomous' provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, borderland provinces crucial not only for military-strategic reasons but for the meat and grain provisions they supplied to the imperial capital of Istanbul.[15]

The Phanariots were not a tiny caste, a slice of 'Byzance après Byzance', divorced from Ottoman governance on the one hand and the subject populations on the other.[16] Instead, in the period of their highest ascendancy at the turn of the nineteenth century, their associates lived and travelled in all corners of the Ottoman Empire and far beyond, into Russia and central and western Europe. They were deeply involved in Ottoman governance through a tremendous range of 'political' activities, from guild politics to tax-farming, provincial administration, high court politics, Ottoman foreign relations, Church politics of course and military operations (as secretaries and translators predominantly). In order to grasp their vantage point and influence, however, it is worth letting go of the 'millet system' framework that still determines our understanding of the role of confessional identity in Ottoman governance. Phanariots and their throngs of associates, while certainly involved in Church affairs and although indeed named Phanariots because of their residence in the Phanar quarter of Istanbul, where the Orthodox Patriarchate is located, included individuals well beyond the confines of the *Millet-i Rum* in their daily activities and political affiliations.

Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire could belong to a variety of linguistic groups – Albanian, Serbian, Romanian, Arabic, Armenian, Bulgarian and Turkish, in addition to Greek. And yet, in order to gain admission to Phanariot networks, individuals such as Stefanaki Bey had to Hellenize – i.e. become acculturated into 'things Greek'. This is where something gets lost in historiographic translation. Today, 'Greek' is associated with Greek nationality. In the period under discussion the overlap between Orthodox Christian and 'Greek' was far more complex. On the one hand, the category of 'Rum' – derived from 'Roman' i.e. Byzantine, included a panoply of linguistic groups. On the other hand, there was the so-called high Greek language (usually called not 'Greek' by its speakers, but 'Holy Letters', because of its affiliation with the Orthodox Church and the Christian Bible), and this is the language into which Christians of other linguistic groups were being acculturated. The process is somewhat analogous to that in which Muslim Ottoman subjects who were Arabic, Albanian, or Kurdish-speaking learned Ottoman Turkish and came to identify with the Ottoman dynasty in

order to enter the ranks of state functionaries. (The Koprülü and Ghikas families are fascinating examples of this parallel phenomenon.)

Stefanaki and many others achieved hellenization through a name change (Staiko Sonkov became Stephanos Vogorides) and often through attending a Greek Princely Academy, established by Phanariot princes. Stefanaki attended such an academy in Bucharest, the capital of Wallachia, in the 1780s and 1790s, where he learned Greek and made social connections with others like him, who would be useful later in his career. To summarize briefly: he then moved to Istanbul and entered the service of Phanariot families and Ottoman military officials, learning the trade of a dragoman (translator/negotiator) just in time to travel to Egypt with the Ottoman fleet to hold off Napoleon's invasion in 1799. Stefanaki and the retinue to which he belonged were then expelled from Egypt bythe young Mehmet Ali Pasha. Returning to Istanbul, he re-entered the service of the Ottoman military and the Phanariots.

For the next sixty years Stefanaki, in his words, 'traversed the dangerous waves' of Ottoman, international, and Istanbul politics, and managed to survive, personally and politically, through the Greek insurrections and Ottoman retributions, four sultans and countless grand viziers, the unmaking and remaking of the Ottoman military, a handful of wars with Russia, the shifting alliances at the Ottoman court, and of course the institutional reforms of the Tanzimat in 1839 and 1856. He was a weekly visitor to Sultan Mahmud and, subsequently, Sultan Abdülmecit, a behind-the-scenes operator at the emerging Ottoman Foreign Ministry in the 1830s and 1840s, a patron for his own network of protégés in foreign and domestic posts, and a confidante of Sir Stratford Canning, the British Ambassador in Istanbul. In addition to all this, he was the first Prince of the autonomous polity of Samos, to which he paid only one visit, choosing to rule from his power base in Istanbul.

The drama of Stefanaki Bey's life and career took place entirely in the first half of the nineteenth century, the lost prequel to the well-studied Tanzimat era. This is only one clue that the grand narratives of decline, modernization, and the Eastern Question have been masking evidence for an alternative analytical framework.

In the course of his impressively long career, Stefanaki wrote and submitted countless memos to the grand viziers on questions of policy, and his personal correspondence records many more informal conversations (often in whispers, it seems) with the sultan and scores of Ottoman high statesmen. He was involved in just about every matter of policy and kept abreast of developments throughout the empire through his network of protégés, informants, and associates, which makes him a wonderful guide through the first half of the nineteenth century. One particular document, which he composed in Ottoman Turkish for the sultan and his advisers in the 1850s regarding the question of political autonomy for the 'twin domains' of Moldavia and Wallachia, offers a sample of the rich findings from this correspondence.

The autonomous document

This document, an undated policy brief, written in the 1850s by Stefanaki Bey, in Ottoman Turkish, and the story of its provenence are both part of the present story. The document went undiscovered, along with 800 other Ottoman documents, in a library in Greece, until the year 2000 when, while working on another portion of this archive for my dissertation, I noticed a catalogue entry of 'old Turkish documents' and asked to see them. They were the Ottoman Turkish portion of the Musurus Archive, Kostaki Musurus being the Ottoman Ambassador to London for much of the Victorian period.[17] Musurus, in addition to representing the Ottoman sultanate in London, was also the son-in-law (*damat*) of Stefanaki Bey. Again, the fact that no one had explored this cache of fascinating documents reminds us that there are whole realities that have fallen between the cracks of our current analytical categories for the Ottoman nineteenth century. This Ottoman archive, together with the massive Ottoman state archives in Istanbul and the Greek-language correspondence between Stefanaki Bey in Istanbul and Kostaki Musurus during his residence in London, reveal a richly layered view of Ottoman political and social realities in the first half of the nineteenth century. The document under discussion here belongs to the Athens Ottoman archive.

Stefanaki Bey seems to have written this document to submit to Sultan Abdülmecit in the 1850s to advise on Ottoman policy toward Moldavia and Wallachia, the former Phanariot strongholds that had, in 1830, passed into the hands of 'indigenous' Romanian boyars, or land-owning elites. The boyars had, in the wake of 1848, demanded a constitution and formal autonomy; by 1856, the Treaty of Paris discussions were underway to grant them constitutions and national assemblies under Great Power protection and nominal Ottoman rule.

Stefanaki Bey prefaces his policy brief regarding the question of Moldavian and Wallachian autonomy with this anecdote:

> Evahir-i devr-i Saltanet-i Selimiye'de Rusya üzerine müretteb-i ordu-yu Hümayun'da asaleten kethüda bulunan Mustafa Refik efendi'nin Ordu-yu hümayun tercümanı olan çakerlerine bu maslahatın bahsında 'Ben yirmi beş seneden beri devlet-i aliye'ye hidmet ederim. Elbet devlet-i aliye'ye benim dahi bir hissem var ve re'y itasına istihkakim derkardir' demiş idi.

That is:

> At the end of the sultanate of Selim [c. 1806], Mustafa Refik efendi, acting as kethüda for the troops of the Imperial Army against Russia, had said to your servant [Stefanaki], the Dragoman of the Imperial Army, regarding this matter, 'I have served the Sublime State for twenty-five years. Surely it is evident that I have a share in the Sublime State and deserve to give my opinion.'

Stefanaki uses this reasoning to justify the comments he is about to submit. (The following quote paraphrases one of his introductory statements, a sentence that continues for 24 lines.)

> I am sure it will not be seen as surprising, and am consoled that it will be pardoned, then, if I, who have with zeal rendered my services for fifty-five years to the Sublime State, not stand idly by in the discussions but confront the political matters [*devlet-i aliye'nin mevvad-i mülkiyesi*] of the Sublime State directly, and have the audacity to put forth my humble, miserable observations and research in writing to '*hakkaniyet ve fetaneti ve insaf ve başireti mutehakkik ül-subut olan Fehametlü Devletlu efendim*' [you]. I express my gratitude and goodwill toward my patron [*velini'metim*], the Sublime State. I have subsisted on benefaction and arduously served our homeland [*vatan*] according to the requirements of '*vatan ve diyanet ve insaniyet*' – homeland, piety, and humanity.
>
> I have served in times of war and peace, such as when I kept Eflak and Boğdan [Wallachia and Moldavia] under the strong protection of the Sublime State in the disastrous time of the Rum interregnum, working against those who were conspiring, overtly and covertly [*zahire ve hafiye*] in Rumeli against the Sublime State. And again in the time of the Russian conquest of Edirne when the deceased Pertev Pasha felt so much pain and anxiety about giving Russia a 10 million (akçe) indemnity that he was ready to give up Eflak and Boğdan and move the boundary with Russia up to the Danube River and those in the Council [Şura] of the Sublime Porte were running about (not knowing what to do). I made the counter-proposal that allowed us to keep these territories under the protection of the Sublime State.

Stefanaki's preface brings up a number of fascinating points. First, he ties his own qualifications and justification for writing the memo to Mustafa Refik efendi, a major military figure in the generation of the Nizam-ı Cedid under Sultan Selim III. This legitimates his approach not just by claiming the same justification of years of service to the Sublime State, but also his personal connection with Mustafa Refik efendi earns him political capital in the world of networks of governance. Yet the comparison is a 'safe' way to do this, since the people he refers to are all dead and so not liable to endanger him by associating him with any 'live' faction. Not only does Stefanaki have years of service under his belt, but he has associations with impressive individuals from what seems to have been a formative, almost epic age – of Selim III and the Nizam-ı Cedid.

Second, note that Stefanaki, in justifying the submission of his memo, is careful not to use exactly the same language as Mustafa Refik, who had said he 'had a share in the state' and 'deserved' to give his opinion ('*Elbet devlet-i aliye'ye benim dahi bir hissem var ve re'y itasına istihkakim derkardir*'). Even with double the years of service claimed by Mustafa Refik, Stefanaki, perhaps

because he was a Christian, was not bold enough to claim a share in the state, or to deserve anything, let alone having an opinion. Rather, he was simply putting the results of his research and observations in writing, as a way of expressing his gratitude for the benefaction of the Sublime State, which has been his generous patron.

Certainly some of this language can be attributed to the elaborate formalities involved in addressing high statesmen in Ottoman political culture, but the particulars of these formalities are not incidental. Stefanaki does situate himself in the Ottoman power structure, albeit with the self-effacing linguistic conventions necessary to any formal political exchange with the Sultan. He is hardly claiming personal autonomy here: he is assuming a particular and familiar persona, that of a humble servant, recipient of the goodwill and benefaction of the Sublime State. In other contexts he assumed other approaches: When conveying information to Sir Stratford Canning, the British Ambassador in Istanbul, he promoted himself as the close confidant of Sultan Abdülmecid, and when in secret conversations with the French envoy Baron Boislecomte, sent to arbitrate between Mehmet Ali and Sultan Mahmud, Stefanaki emphasized his associations with Mehmet Ali back in the Napoleonic day, and claimed to have had a hand in Mehmet Ali's rise to power.

Stefanaki was conscious of what we would call his autonomy, writing to his son-in-law Kostaki Musurus in London at one point, to explain how one has to 'adjust one's language' (*rythmizeis ten glossa sou*) depending on one's interlocutor – Russians, British or Ottomans. If he was only a humble servant offering his miserable comments in Ottoman Turkish discourse, he was far from humble – and quite autonomous – when we observe him in three dimensions.

Political autonomy through the eyes of Stefanaki Bey

The preface, however, was merely an introduction to Stefanaki Bey's more substantive comments about *political* autonomy, specifically regarding the Twin Domains (*Memleketeyn*) of Moldavia and Wallachia, Boğdan and Eflak. In the subsequent three and a half pages (159 lines), Stefanaki does several things. We will digress briefly from autonomy to follow his amazing discussion.

First, he reviews the historical and political relationship between the Ottoman state and the boyars of Eflak and Boğdan (who are depicted as an autonomous/separable entity) since the reigns of Sultans Fatih Mehmed II (1451–81) and Bayezid II (1481–1512). His *leitmotif* here is that the indigenous boyars and beys had always shown a tendency to separate from the 'hükümet', or authority/sovereignty/government, of the Sublime State, at times siding against it by allying with Hungarians, Poles, Austrians and Russians, until the Sublime State had surpassed all other states and was victorious everywhere, even as far as Hungary. Only then did the boyars and beys

of these provinces shamelessly ask for permission to maintain the laws (*kavanin-i memleketlerinin ibka*) and protection (*muhafıza*) of the state. This arrangement began in earnest in 1581 (*sene-yi İseviyesinde*) with the Saxon Voyvoda Yanko. Stefanaki then touches on some of the other important voyvodas of these '*emaret*', or principalities, as he calls them. He continues through the early eighteenth-century shift away from 'indigenous' voyvodas (the last being Brankovan of Wallachia,who was executed for treason in Istanbul, and Cantemir in Moldavia, who fled to Russia). They were replaced by '*dersa'adet'te Rum milleti hademesinden voyvodalığa intihab ve tayyin buyurmuş olduğu*', that is, servants or personnel of the Greek Orthodox millet in Istanbul who were appointed to the position of voyvoda from the 1710s until the outbreak of the Greek insurrections in 1821.

According to Stefanaki, in his time, as in earlier times, the boyars of Eflak and Boğdan were always willing to take part in the intrigues originating in Austria and Russia to incite sedition and revolution amongst the *re'aya* of Rumeli. When Ipsilanti (the instigator of the Greek insurrections) crossed the Pruth River (from Russia into Moldavia) with only three men and with the collaboration of the Russian consuls (*Ipsilanti yalniz üç adamler ile geçmiş iken Rusya konsoloslarının ifsadı ile*), all the boyars allied with Ipsilanti in his seditious plan, so disloyal and treacherous were they. (This is, incidentally, the much mythologized – in Greek national history – start of the Greek War of Independence.)

This chequered history of Eflak and Boğdan is all the preliminary leading up to the discussions that have been 'sticking to tongues' (*vird-i ziban*) for several years about 'autonomia': '*şurut-u atikaları ve istiklal-ı idare-i dahiliye man'asinde olan otonomiya*'. The 'old conditions' (*şart*), probably referring to the Règlement Organique from 1834 and *autonomia*, meaning independence of internal administration, are being misconstrued, he claims, and used as fodder for sedition by the Belgian and French (liberal) newspapers, in collusion with Ottoman followers of Europe. Here Stefanaki seems to be arguing that the 'old' customary agreements amounted to a kind of autonomy and are being intentionally blurred together with a new, formal 'autonomy' by European liberals and their adherents.

Stefanaki comes out quite clearly against this new autonomy for Eflak and Boğdan, partly out of his resentment of the indigenous boyars. In his case against the Romanian boyars, Stefanaki discusses recent specific examples of their betrayal, likening them to other seditious acts in recent memory. Among these, he names Ipsilanti himself, who fled to Russia; Karaca Bey, another Phanariot Prince, who fled to Italy; and adds to the list the examples 'from Islam' (*Islamdan*) of Battal, Tayyar, and Ramiz Pashas as well as the Silistre *mütesellimi* Yılıkoğlu and Rusçuk *mütesellimi* Köse Ahmed Efendi, all of whom (as his reader would presumably know) fled to Russia in the course of the Nizam-ı Cedid events of 1806–08. He does not omit the Janissaries, citing their repeated acts of sedition against the Imperial Sultanate: '*ve bu sürette gerek İslam ve gerek hademe-i nasara tabe'alarının sebep-i firarlari artık*

tevarih-i muhtelifede yeniçerilerinin tagallubatından ve hükumet-i saltanat-i seniyye müdirlerinin vahşet engiz idare ve ihafat ve tevhimatından neş'et etmiş olduğu kabil-i inkar olamaz.' ('It cannot be denied that the terrible sedition originated from the baseless administrators of the imperial government and from the usurping of power by the janissaries in several instances and the defection of both Muslims and Christians.') The reader is meant to conclude that the sedition of the boyars should not be rewarded with privileges of autonomy and special treatment, but they should be treated like others who have betrayed the state.

After a few more jibes at Austria, Russia, and the boyars, Stefanaki goes on to counter the arguments that have been made against having Ottoman troops in the fortresses of the autonomous provinces (Moldavia and Wallachia). These arguments seem to have claimed that the presence of Ottoman troops would be harmful and contrary to the will of the people of the province. Stefanaki argues that the new, post-Janissary Ottoman troops in the fortress of Belgrade have not harmed (*halel götürmedi*) the 'Serb millet' since the granting of autonomy to Serbia (in 1830), and if they have, he reasons, then what should the people of Corfu and the Septinsular Republic say about the British involvement in their local administration and laws? (The British had annexed these formerly Venetian Ionian Islands to their empire in the wake of Napoleon's retreat. Stefanaki is in effect putting British and Ottoman troops on the same footing, since both constituted foreign forces present in an autonomous region.)

Stefanaki goes on to question further the specific conditions of autonomy, asking, for example, whether the tax and customs burden for Moldavia and Wallachia should be based on the ratio of population to tax burden, as smaller cases such as the island of Samos. He questions whether the voyvodas should be chosen from the local population or not – other sources suggest his ulterior motive was to have his son Nicholas installed as voyvoda – and he also argues against the institution of local militias in Moldavia and Wallachia, warning that these provinces are becoming friendlier and friendlier with Russia with each passing day and that it is just a matter of time before they make a military alliance against the Ottomans.

Stefanaki was using a complex calculus to advise for and against different components of autonomy in Moldavia and Wallachia. On the one hand, their track record of loyalty to the Sultan was not good. Rather than see this in the nationalist light that, for instance, portrayed Romanians as having always fought bravely against the terrible Ottoman yoke, and therefore deserving of independence, Stefanaki sees it as a reason to pull them closer to the central administration and not grant them concessions of an undeserved autonomy. Sometimes he seems to imply that the customary conditions (*şurut-u atikaları*) should be maintained, and at other times that these boyars do constitute an autonomous entity and that their relationship to the Ottoman state must be open to negotiation.

While Stefanaki began his composition with an anecdote about Mustafa

Refik efendi, he caps it off with a telling anecdote and quote from Napoleon:

> *Büyük Bonaparta Mısır'dan avdeti akibinde Paris'te bulus[?] konsolosluğu tahsili günü Fransalulardan edepsiz olanları arifaten hasır ve tahdide ihtilal memleketin ref'iyle islah-ı hal-ı memlekete mübaşirette Fransa ministerolerinden biri, 'ya konstitusyonumuz ne olacaktir?' yollu sual eylediğinde 'Fransaluların kendi elleriyle tekvin-i fitret-i ihtilal ile ayakları altında aldıkları ve itibar etmedikleri Konstitusyona idasından istihkakları kalmadı' deyu müşarün-ileyh Bonaparta cevabı boyarların kuş nahoşlarına ismağ olunsa nabica değildir.*
>
> The Great Bonaparte, upon returning from Egypt, was meeting with his consuls on their payday. One of his French ministers informed him of some rude Frenchmen who were threatening to rebel and upset the order of the realm, and then asked: 'Hey, what is going to become of our Constitution?' Bonaparte answered: 'French people no longer deserve to be given a Constitution, as they themselves have created upheaval and revolution and in so doing have failed to consider and have trampled the Constitution.'

Just as the French people forfeited their right to have a constitution, so, too, according to Stefanaki, has the disloyal behaviour of the Romanian boyars shown them to be unworthy of autonomy.

Conclusion

Rather than portray autonomy as a waystation on the linear road to national independence, Stefanaki's memorandum reveals a far more complex phenomenon, indeed a whole field of discourse. Autonomy, often implicit, begins to look more like a vast space of negotiations between local or regional entities and the central state. These entities are at once geographic – the territories themselves – and social – the boyars, in this case. Furthermore, there is a new kind of autonomy 'sticking to people's tongues', and this seems to be connected, yet separate from the old and very intricate questions of customary autonomy (*şurut-u atikaları*). This new kind of autonomy is different not because it is seen as leading to independence, but because it is associated with the Great Power states of Russia, France, and Austria, as well as Belgium as a spearhead of liberalism (Stefanaki does not mention Britain much, because he was often a partisan of Britain). Autonomy, therefore, becomes a potential wedge these countries can use to remove territory from the sovereignty of the Ottoman state. The principle of popular will or self-determination based on any kind of national ideology is absent from his thinking and his arguments, even in the 1850s. And yet, there is also a nascent concept of ethnic-political groups in his argument when, for example, he refers to the Serbian millet, the Rum millet, and the people of Rumeli.

Stefanaki framed the question of autonomy within the intricate relationships between the Sultanate and the localities that constituted its domains. Just as in his individual career, mutual obligation was an important criterion in assessing relationships – political or personal. In fact, a broader parallel exists here between the Ottoman personal and the political: in both cases, autonomy does not represent a clear-cut relationship, or a provisional compromise between dependence and independence. Instead, it represents a much wider spectrum of relationships that must be continually renegotiated. In the political realm, there are overlapping entities of the territory of Moldavia and Wallachia, the boyars, the 'ahali' or people, the officials of the Sublime State, and the Great Powers conspiring against the Sublime State. In the personal realm, there is Stefanaki Bey asserting his own autonomy and trying to fulfil the requirements of '*vatan ve diyanet ve insaniyet*' – homeland, piety, and humanity – which are both overlapping and in conflict.

Notes

1 This is not to say there are no book-length studies that touch on the first half of the nineteenth century: M. Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change*, Oxford: OUP, 1996; B. Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants, Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700–1900*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995; and more recently V. Aksan, *Ottoman Wars, 1700–1870: An Empire Besieged*, Harlow: Longman/Pearson, 2007, have all addressed aspects of this period.
2 S. Shaw, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire Under Sultan Selim III, 1789–1807*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971.
3 K. Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmet Ali, His Army, and the Making of Modern Egypt*, Cambridge: CUP, 1997; U. Makdisi, *Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Lebanon*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.
4 L. Peirce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire*, Oxford, 1993; *Morality Tales: Law and Gender in the Ottoman Court at Aintab*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.
5 My approach draws broadly on 'social network theory' developed in the social sciences over the past fifteen to twenty years, but does not apply any particular network theory, nor do I seek to quantify social network behaviour and associations in Ottoman society. Rather, I suggest that the logic of social networks may offer a productive alternative to the institutional logic that has predominated in Ottoman studies. I argue that the network logic fits the modus operandi of the historical actors under discussion. In this way, the lexicon of 'connectivities' used by S. Subrahmanyam, *Merchant Networks in the Early Modern World*, Aldershot: Variorum, 1996; *Explorations in Connected History: From the Tagus to the Ganges*, Oxford: OUP, 2005 is also helpful and another possible alternative.
6 See, for instance, S. Subrahmanyam, *Merchant Networks in the Early Modern World*, Variorum, 1996; *Explorations in Connected History: From the Tagus to the Ganges*, Oxford: OUP, 2005.
7 C. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Ali, 1541–1600*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

8 The situation is different regarding the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. See, for instance, the work of B. Masters, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism*, Cambridge: CUP, 2001; B. Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine*; U. Makdisi, *The Culture of Secatarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Ottoman Mt. Lebanon*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999; and E. D. Akarli, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861–1920*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, who touch on connections and conflicts among confessional groups in the Arab provinces. These works mostly offer provincial vantage points, rather than perspectives from Istanbul.

9 B. Doumani, in his *Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants, Peasants in Jabal Nablus*, successfully employs the concept of autonomy for a similar period, although in reference to a particular province and toward a different end. The layers of autonomy he explores in Chapter 1, 'The meanings of autonomy' include 'rule by native sons, most of whom had descended from the same families for generations; a common sense of identity, which ranked loyalty to Jabal Nablus far above that to the Ottoman Empire; and mutual defense against external and internal threats, whether against the French army or the rulers of Acre' (p. 52). While Doumani's observations are very much connected to some of the meanings of autonomy explored here, the vantage point for the present study is Istanbul, and I juxtapose the many layers of Ottoman autonomy with a new form of autonomy emanating from multi-state negotiations in the nineteenth century. The vantage point of Jabal Nablus studied by Doumani would be comparable to the vantage point of Moldavians and Wallachians in the case study under discussion here. However, the perspective presented here is that of an Istanbul-based statesman with a stake in Moldavian/Wallachian politics – as if in Doumani's case there had been a statesman in Istanbul writing about the prospect and terms of formal autonomy for Jabal Nablus.

10 The 'Eastern Question' is usually the frame used to encompass the three central processes of the nineteenth century: nation-state formation, imperial modernization, and the European colonial project(s) in the emergent Middle East, particularly Egypt. In this familiar Eastern Question frame, the Ottoman Empire is the passive recipient, often reduced to merely a venue, for European Great Power states to work out their rivalries and promulgate their visions of change through institutional reform. The assumptions behind this framework – that the only motor for change can be the west and therefore westernization, and that liberation from Ottoman rule was brought to subject peoples in stages by European Great Powers are clearly articulated, for example, in M. S. Anderson's classic study, *The Eastern Question, 1774–1923: A study in international relations*, London: Macmillan/St Martin's, 1966.

11 M. Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh, and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan*, London: Zed Books, 1992.

12 See U. Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Mt. Lebanon*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.

13 B. Braude, 'Foundation myths of the millet system', in B. Lewis and B. Braude, eds., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society*, vol. 1: The Central Lands, New York, 1982, pp. 69–89.

14 For more biographical information on Stefanaki Bey, see: Christine Philliou, *Biography of an Empire*, Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming 2010.

15 See S. Runciman, *Great Church in Captivity: Study of the Patriarchate of Constantinople from the Eve of the Turkish Conquest to the Greek War of Independence*, Cambridge: CUP, 1968. See also *Symposium L'Epoque Phanariote*, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki, Greece, 1974.

16 N. Iorga, *Byzance après Byzance: Continuation de l'Histoire de la vie Byzantine*, Bucharest, 1971.

17 Musurus Papers, Gennadius Library, Athens, Greece. The document that is the focus of this discussion was part of the uncatalogued Ottoman Turkish portion of the Musurus Papers. According to the preliminary catalogue I made for the archive, this document can be found under Dossier 2 File II Document 18.

8 Looking behind *Hajji Baba of Ispahan*

The case of Mirza Abul Hasan Khan Ilchi Shirazi

Naghmeh Sohrabi

In the Asian and African Studies Reading Room of the British Library, next to a portrait of the second Qajar monarch, Fath Ali Shah (r. 1797–1834), hangs another portrait of a bearded Persian: that of Mirza Abul Hasan Khan Ilchi (hereafter referred to as Ilchi), Envoy Extraordinaire from the court of Fath Ali Shah to that of King George III (r. 1760–1820) in the years 1809–10. The painting shows the ambassador dressed in full Qajar garb: a gold brocade tunic, vest, turban, and green slippers. He is standing in front of a window with a view of the English sky and trees in the distance. By all accounts, he was a sight to behold.

There exists another portrait of a bearded Persian 'ambassador'. It sits opposite the title page of James Justinian Morier's novel, *The Adventures of Hajji Baba of Ispahan in England*.[1] The etching includes, from left to right, a short English woman and two English men in black, in the middle there is a young Persian man gesturing towards the Englishmen on his right, and to his left a tall plump man with a beard down to his chest wearing a tall white turban and a white robe in profile, with two other bearded Persians standing behind him. Underneath, it reads:

> 'By my beard!' cried the ambassador, 'this is worse than all!' then addressing himself to Feridoon, he said, 'What is this I hear? Who told you to go through the city making promises?' 'What promises? What marriage?' said the astonished Feridoon.[2]

In the etching, the Persian ambassador is confronted in London by the father of an English girl who claims that the ambassador's barber, Feridoon, had promised to marry his daughter, leading to the ambassador's cries of astonishment.

The ambassador in the *Adventures of Hajji Baba* is none other than the Envoy Extraordinaire of the first painting, whom Morier had accompanied on his journey from Iran to England in 1809. Yet in this second drawing none of the statesmanlike qualities of the first painting exist. The ambassador, while still dominating the middle of the frame, is no longer facing the viewer, and is part of a larger comedy of manners – Persian manners to be

exact – that lies at the heart of Morier's fictional account. Additionally, the second painting places Mirza Abul Hasan Khan among the scheming English lower class and his own naïve companions, stripping him of the regal and solitary air of the first portrait.

Sources contemporary to Ilchi, both in Persian and English, are brimming with references to him, as he was undoubtedly an important figure for the history of the Qajar era (1794–1925). He was an early traveller to Europe (first in 1809 and again in 1818), a statesman with acute instincts for self-preservation who survived the wrath of two different monarchs as well as benefiting from their munificence. Additionally, he has left behind two accounts of travel, one in his own hand of his journey to England in 1809, entitled *Hayratnamah* or the *Book of Wonder*, and one written by a scribe, Muhammad Hadi ʿAlavi Shirazi entitled *Dalil al-sufara* (*Guide for Ambassadors*) of his three year residence in Russia.[3] Yet despite his significance, Mirza Abul Hasan Khan has at best been ignored and more often than not derided by later historians. As such, his place in nineteenth-century Iranian and British historiography serves as a fascinating case study for a different kind of historiographic silencing, one not borne out of a lacuna as much as a cacophony of sounds surrounding his figure. Unlike other more obvious cases of 'absent voices' in Middle East historiography, both Ilchi himself and those contemporary to him have left behind a plethora of sources about him and his time. Yet he is absent, sidelined, or maligned in later works of histories.

This chapter examines the nature of Ilchi's silencing in the historiography of the Qajar period. It questions the implications for the history and historiography of early Qajar Iran of conflating the figure of Mirza Abul Hasan Khan Ilchi, an influential politician in the first half of the nineteenth century, with the fictional Mirza Firouz, a caricature of Persian cunning and foolishness. To this end, I first provide a sketch of the historical figure of Mirza Abul Hasan Khan gleaned from nineteenth-century chronicles and secondary sources, both Persian and English. I then discuss the significance of Morier's *Hajji Baba of Ispahan* series and the role played by Ilchi's literary alter ego, Mirza Firouz, in masking our understanding of his historical self. Peeling away these silencing layers allows us to re-evaluate Ilchi as a significant historical figure of his own time and to focus on his own account of travels to England, *Hayratnamah*, as a reflection of how the early Qajar court saw itself and its role on the international scene.

A biographical sketch of Mirza Abul Hasan Khan

Mirza Abul Hasan Khan Ilchi was born in 1776 in Shiraz. His father, Mirza Muhammad ʿAli Khan Isfahani, was a scribe to Nadir Shah (1688–1747), and narrowly escaped death when Nadir Shah himself was assassinated on the same night his sentence of execution was to have been carried out. Ilchi's uncle and father-in-law was Haji Ibrahim Shirazi (Iʿtimad al-Dawlah), a

grand vizier (Sadr ʿAzam) to both Aga Muhammad Khan Qajar (1742–97), the founder of the Qajar dynasty and to Aqa Muhammad Khan's nephew and successor, Fath ʿAli Shah. In 1801, when, according to the chronicles, Haji Ibrahim began to pose a threat to Fath ʿAli Shah, he was blinded and killed on the orders of the king, and the family was disgraced.[4] As a result, Mirza Abul Hasan, who was then governor of the southern province of Shushtar, fled Iran and travelled first to Mecca (where he made the pilgrimage) and from there to India where he remained for two and a half years before being forgiven by the king and allowed to return to Iran.[5]

In the first decade of the nineteenth century, Fath ʿAli Shah had already sent two ambassadorial missions to India to discuss the possibility of an alliance with the British against the Russians, with whom the Qajars had clashed in frontier disputes in the Caucasus. After a decade of musical-chairs treaties between the Persians, the Ottomans, the French and the British, by 1809 the Qajars and the British turned to each other in order to protect their respective interests in the region. The British were motivated by fears of Napoleonic expansion in India, while the Qajars, weary of continuous conflict with the Russians, were fearful that the French were not going to support them, despite the guarantees in the Treaty of Finkenstein (1807). All of this led to the creation and signing of the 'Preliminary Treaty of Friendship and Alliance' between the Qajar and British governments in 1809.[6]

Ilchi was chosen to travel to England to finalize the treaty, though the exact reason why he was chosen is not known. Not surprisingly, various authors give different reasons for Ilchi's appointment as the Persian envoy. Sir Hartford Jones, who was at the time the British ambassador to Persia, writes in his memoirs:

> The Persian appointment became a matter of intrigue at the Persian court, and, like all other things there, would have become matter of pecuniary speculation, if I had not interfered, and put an end to it, by insisting that Meerza Abdul Hassan [*sic*], who had joined me at Khona Khowra, and who from a residence at Calcutta and in India, was in some measure acquainted with our manners and customs, should be nominated to accompany Mr. Morier.[7]

On the other hand, some twentieth century sources claim that he received this appointment as a result of his connections with high-ranking courtiers[8] or quoting British sources, they claim that he got the job because no one wanted to go to the court of an 'infidel'.[9]

Regardless of how the appointment came to be, in May of 1809, Mirza Abul Hasan Khan set off for England along with James Morier, who had first arrived in Persia in 1808 as the private secretary of Sir Hartford Jones, the Crown's envoy to Persia. The mission set off by land to England, travelling westward from Tehran, through Anatolia to Istanbul before embarking on

a boat in Smyrna. On November 25, 1809 Ilchi and his retinue landed in Plymouth and proceeded to London, where they spent seven months before returning to Iran by sea in July 1810. During his time in London, where he shared a house with Morier,[10] Ilchi became the talk of high society, his every movement and words reported in newspapers and private letters as far away as the United States.[11] During the mission, the East India Company began to pay him an annual salary, which continued until his death and is seen by later historians as a sign of his treachery.[12] He apparently became a Freemason at this time.[13]

On his return to Iran, Mirza Abul Hasan Khan was in the company of not only Morier, but also the new British ambassador to Persia, Sir Gore Ouseley, his wife and daughter, and his brother (and private secretary), William Ouseley. The trip back to Persia took nearly nine months as the ship ended up in Rio de Janeiro and eventually continued on to India, finally arriving at the port city of Bushihr on 1 March, 1811.[14] According to William Ouseley, during the trip his brother:

> discovered and frustrated, at this place [Cazereen], a plot devised for the assassination of Abul Hassan Khan, the Persian ambassador to England. Jealousy of his supposed wealth and influence was the cause – having returned in Sir Gore's suite from this country.[15]

Morier, who stayed in Persia until 1816, wrote two accounts of these travels: *A Journey through Persia, Armenia, and Asia Minor, to Constantinople, in the years 1808–1809*, published in 1812, and *A Second Journey through Persia, Armenia, and Asia Minor, to Constantinople, between the years 1810–1816*, published in 1818. Other than a short stint in Mexico, he held no other diplomatic position and instead turned to writing 'Oriental' themed novels.

Ilchi, on the other hand, remained active in the court of Fath Ali Shah and is the Persian signatory on the (in)famous Gulistan Treaty of 1813 that ceded parts of the Qajar empire to Russia on the tail end of the first Perso-Russian wars of 1804–12. He subsequently was sent to Russia to finalize the treaty, and resided there for three years but was unable to get the Russian court to budge from its position and cede some of the territory back to Iran. He was then sent on another public European diplomatic journey in 1818–20 with, among others, the task of purchasing weapons in Austria. He was also asked by Abbas Mirza, the heir to the crown, to accompany back the Persian students that had been sent to England in 1815.[16]

It is clear that his appointment in 1824 as Minister of Foreign States, the second such appointment ever in the Qajar state, was due to his familiarity with various foreign states.[17] Specifically, in the nineteenth century chronicle *Nasikh al-tavarikh* the news of his appointment is preceded by descriptions of his efforts to negotiate a settlement with the Russians in the presence of Abbas Mirza.[18] He was one of a handful of courtiers who were against the second round of Perso-Russian wars (1826–7) that ended in the 1828

Turkmanchay Treaty,[19] which subsequent historians have seen as a symbol of the failure of the Qajar state to protect Iran's interests.[20] In 1834, he was one of several courtiers who 'sowed the seed of dissent' in the war of succession that broke out after Fath Ali Shah's death, and delayed the move of his appointed successor, Muhammad Shah (r. 1834–48), to the capital.[21]

> At this time Mirza Abul Hasan Khan the minister of foreign states [*vazir-e duval-e kharijah*] who was in fear of Mirza Abul Qasem Qaim Maqam, and as a result shunned the reign of Shahanshah-i Ghazi [title for Muhammad Shah] said that 'answering foreign states is my responsibility [*bar zimmat-i man ast*]' and brought forth a book that [said] 'among the foreign states and the nobles of Europe it is customary that the will of a deceased king in determining a successor depends on the assent of the populace, if the people are not pleased with the rule of the heir apparent [vali'ahd], it is possible to change it'. This book [*nigashtah*] gave strength to many people and some of the princes and noblemen who were in Tehran . . .[22]

Ilchi's support for one of the challengers to the throne, 'Ali Mirza Zill al-Sultan,[23] who was roundly defeated after 40 days, forced him to seek sanctuary at a shrine for fear of reprisal by Qa'im Maqam, the new king's prime minister.[24] But shortly after coming to power, Qa'im Maqam was replaced by Haji Mirza Aqasi, the king's former teacher. Aqasi promptly forgave Mirza Abul Hasan Khan and he returned to the court where he once again became the Minister of Foreign States. According to the *London Medical Gazette* of 1846, he, along with several other British and Persian dignitaries, died in the cholera epidemic of that year.[25]

Mirza Firouz and Mirza Abul Hasan Khan

In the same year that Ilchi was appointed minister, Morier anonymously published *The Adventures of Hajji Baba in Ispahan*. This fictionalized memoir of Hajji Baba, the son of a barber from Isfahan, became an instant hit in England and was immediately translated into German, French, and later into Russian.[26]

Hajji Baba begins with an 'Introductory Epistle' to Revd Dr Fundgruben.[27] Written by a 'Peregrine Persic', it describes Persic's long-time stay in Persia (similar to Morier's) and how he came across a certain Hajji Baba, a sickly mirza (or scribe), whom Persic cured and for which in return he received a copy of Hajji Baba's memoirs. Persic, the authoritative voice of Persia, then translates the memoir (the result of which is the book at hand) and also, based on his own experience, ascertains that 'most of the incidents are grounded upon fact'. The result is a book that from one perspective 'lampoons Persians as rascals, cowards, puerile villains, and downright fools, depicting their culture as scandalously dishonest and decadent, and their

society as violent' and became the example *par excellence* of 'Orientalist' depictions of Persians.[28]

Near the end of the novel, Hajji Baba, now in Istanbul, seeks out the 'ambassador' in order for him to redress his grievances. As he arrives at the house of the ambassador in Istanbul, he inquires about his character and relays the information to his readers thus:

> The ambassador, by name Mirza Firouz, was by birth a Shirazi, of respectable though not of high parentage, excepting in the instance of his mother, who was sister to a former grand vizier of great power, who, in fact, had been the means of placing the Shah upon his throne. The mirza married his cousin, a daughter of the said vizier; and this led to his being employed in the government, though he had previously undergone many vicissitudes, which had caused him to travel into various countries. This circumstance, however, was one of the reasons of his being selected by the Shah to transact his business at foreign courts.[29]

Morier's descriptions leave no doubt as to who his model for Mirza Firouz was. From his place of birth to his marriage, and his 'travels to various countries', Mirza Firouz is drawn directly from Morier's experience with Mirza Abul Hasan Khan. At the end of the book, Hajji Baba is chosen to accompany the ambassador to England and enters his 'native place as Mirza Hajji Baba, the Shah's deputy'.[30] This ending sets the stage for the next book when 'Persic' directly addresses the readers, stating:

> Give me encouragement and I will tell you more. You shall be informed how Hajji Baba accompanied a great ambassador to England, of their adventures by sea and land, of all he saw and all he remarked, and of what happened to him on his return to Persia.[31]

Four years later, in 1828, *The Adventures of Hajji Baba of Ispahan in England* was published. Like the earlier book, nowhere is Morier's name mentioned, yet unlike the earlier version the preface to the second novel is signed by 'the Author' and not Persic. Here, in another letter, this time addressed to 'the gentle reader', Morier/the author, reminds us that at the end of *Hajji Baba*, he had asked for encouragement to continue the tale. This he receives in the form of 'a letter from Persia. It came from one high in office, and with whom I had lived in habits of intimacy during my residence in that country, and its perusal threw me at once into the very heart of my Asiatic recollections'.[32]

The letter is written in *pinglish* [Persian/English], with broken phrases such as 'King very angry, sir. I swear him you never write lies; but he say yes – write.'[33] The author of this letter directly addresses his link to Mirza Firouz: 'You call me Mirza Firouz, I know very well and say I talk great deal nonsense. When I talk nonsense?'[34] Morier then reproduces a letter he wrote back to the Persian, written in similarly broken English, and making fun of

both the style and the content of the letter itself.[35] Yet as a way of distancing himself perhaps, Morier also implores the readers not to draw a direct line from 'Mr. Such-a-one' to characters from the story as 'the letter above cited of my Persian friend shows how easily an individual will take a character to himself, which, although it may fit in some parts, yet does not on the whole.'[36]

Much like every other aspect of this story, the authorship of this letter has been under dispute. While for the most part it was taken for granted that the author of the letter at the beginning of *Hajji Baba in England* was Mirza Abul Hasan Khan, in 1985 Sir Denis Wright using a letter addressed to John McNeill from James Fraser concluded that the author was indeed not Ilchi but rather it was written by McNeill. Yet in the course of his research on the Moriers, McKenzie Johnston found in a private library three letters that may have proven that Ilchi was at least partly the author of the letter to Morier. The first and second letters, dated 1825 and 1826 respectively, from Henry Willock to David Morier (James' brother) claim that news of the *Hajji Baba* books had reached the Persian court and that 'Abul Hasan is outrageous [*sic*] at his picture under the name of Mirza Firouz'. The third letter claims to be a 'copy of the Mirza's letter' and is similar to the letter published by Morier except it contains a first paragraph (that Morier claimed he had deleted since it was obviously not written by a Persian) and a last paragraph, both of which are a far cry from *pinglish*. The existence of these three documents point to Ilchi's authorship of the original letter.[37]

Regardless of the authenticity of the letter, the spectacle and interest created by Mirza Abul Hasan Khan during both his visits to England led to the immediate identification of Mirza Firouz with Ilchi in reviews of the novels. For example in a review that appeared in 1829 Sir Walter Scott states:

> The ambassador – whose liberal mode of thinking, and shrewdness of perception of character, though mingled of course with national prejudice and a good deal of national roguery, are not to be disguised – is, we conclude, the same Mirza whose wit and talents excited a strong sensation in the fashionable world about eighteen or twenty years ago.[38]

It seems though that with the passage of time, the envoy of the fashionable world's imagination blended with the barber of Morier's, so that less than two decades later, the German missionary and scholar Joseph Wolff would write: 'Before quitting Teheraun, I called on Mirza Abul Hassan Khan, the Haje Baba of Morier, and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to the Court of Persia. Haje though looking older, is cheerfulness itself.'[39] Thus, by 1845, the identification of the real Ilchi with various fictional counterparts was complete.

The consequence of this identification, as argued by Nezam-Mafi was that the *Hajji Baba* books came to be seen not as popular and amusing works of fiction, but rather as 'historical documents'[40] and authoritative sources for understanding 'Persia' among the British. He notes:

> the travels of Mirza Hassan might have remained only a curious episode in history had it not been for Morier's fiction. In the struggle to appropriate Abul Hassan, no contemporary of the Persian envoy dealt the death's blow to his legend in quite the same way as his companion, Morier.[41]

The power of Morier's fictional accounts, he argues, comes from Morier's position as the companion to Ilchi during their travels, the length of his stay in Persia and his rank within the British mission, the use of Persian in the Hajji Baba books (both in translation and also in transliteration), and also the intersection of his fiction with his more 'factual' travel accounts that at times narrate similar events.[42]

There are indications that the Qajar court was aware of Morier's fictional works in the 1830s. Sir Henry Willock, for example, reported that 'in 1830 Prince Abbas Mirza was trying to find a European to translate it [*The Adventures of Hajji Baba in England*] into Persian'.[43] But it was not until the 1880s that Mirza Habib Isfahani, a dissident writer in exile in Istanbul, translated *Hajji Baba in Isfahan* into Persian,[44] which was eventually published in 1906, in the midst of the Constitutional Revolution. The timing of the publication alongside its translator's political leanings worked to 'legitimize what was to become its [*Hajji Baba in Ispahan*] inclusion into the discourses of anti-colonialism and reform that were part of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906–1911'.[45] The novel's portrait of a decadent state and decaying nation fit perfectly into parts of the Constitutionalist rhetoric that adopted and promoted such an image in order to justify its claims for reform.

The interlinking of *Hajji Baba* in Persian with the rhetoric of the Constitutional Revolution fits into the larger historiographical forces that have been instrumental in the silencing of the historical figure of Mirza Abul Hasan Khan. Taking the constitutionalists at their word that the Constitutional Revolution marked the beginning of Iranian 'awakening' and 'enlightenment', historians have portrayed the nineteenth century as a period of perpetual struggle – and the failure of this struggle: for reform/modernity until the Constitutional Revolution and the creation of a constitutional monarchy in Iran.[46] The modernist and nationalist discourse that embraced Morier's image of the bumbling Persian as a critique of Iranian society in turn helped shape a post-Constitutionalist historiography of the Qajar period that in its portrayal of the nineteenth century as a backdrop to the 'inevitable' Constitutional Revolution, saw little or no value in the real figure of Mirza Abul Hasan Khan – a man of the court whose signature on the Gulistan and Turkmanchay treaties only confirms his status as a traitor to the nation, and whose own observations of England were until quite recently labelled as historically insignificant.

If we take Michel Trouillot's famous four moments of historical silencing – sources, archives, narrative, and retrospective significance[47] – it becomes clear that the historiographical particularities of Qajar Iran was a significant

reason why Ilchi's *Hayratnamah* languished in the archives until 1986, only to be published in a highly censored fashion.[48] The archival silencing of *Hayratnamah* was not due to ignorance of the manuscript itself, which by all accounts was known to various scholars. Mahmud Mahmud, for example, the author of an eight-volume history of British–Iranian relations in the nineteenth century, writes in a footnote:

> Mirza Abul Hasan Khan Shirazi in this book has described his travels specially his travels to London. Even though it is a thick and detailed book, I have read it carefully in the hopes that I find in it something that would have historical documentation [*sanadiyat*] but I must say frankly that from the beginning to the end one did not see in that book anything that is worth mentioning.[49]

One interpretation of this omission may be that as a political historian, Mahmud may indeed not have found much that was useful in *Hayratnamah*, which as we will see shortly is mostly a record of official banquets and ceremonies, and rarely reveals details of the negotiations that took place between him and British officials. The dominance of a particular kind of political history in Iranian historiography is certainly a significant factor in explaining *Hayratnamah*'s cold reception by contemporary historians. Yet it falls short of explaining why Mahmud, in a rather bizarre move, uses James Morier's accounts as a source with 'documentary' value, stating Morier's 'sarcasm' as its only drawback.[50]

When *Hayratnamah* was finally published in 1986, the editor Hasan Mursilvand not only deleted sections he deemed 'inappropriate' (pages of descriptions of various parties and dalliances with women) but also had a running commentary throughout the text on Ilchi's perceived treason calling him in his introduction, once again, an agent of the English. His censoring of passages that deal with wine and women created the impression that the omitted sections were far more fascinating than the benign descriptions that manuscript copies reveal them to be.[51] Yet while the prominent historian Abbas Amanat points to the treatment of *Hayratnamah* by its editor, Hasan Mursilvand, as an instance of 'disturbing examples of bigotry' that 'are not rare in the confusion of the present day book market' in Iran,[52] this particular type of 'bigotry' was made possible by the historiographical context outlined above. By not describing precisely what the nature of Ilchi's decadence was, Mursilvand was able to transform *Hayratnamah* from a Qajar courtier's descriptions of London's high life to that of a pleasure seeker's torrid writings, similar to Morier's descriptions of Mirza Firouz in England.[53]

Yet if we start from the premise that *Hayratnamah* as a text produced in the early Qajar period, by a figure significant to his own times, can provide insight into the world it came from, then what new interpretive possibilities present themselves to the historian? To answer that, we need to turn to a well-known episode, reported in *Hayratnamah*, in Morier's account of Mirza

Abul Hasan Khan's trip to England, and the fictional *Hajji Baba in England*: Mirza Abul Hasan Khan's trip from Plymouth to London.

In the appendix to his *Second Journey through Persia*, Morier gives an account of Ilchi's behaviour in the carriage as they travelled from Bath towards London. Ilchi, Morier writes, 'grew very anxious as we proceeded, and seemed to be looking for an Istakball [*sic*], or a deputation headed by some man of distinction, which, after the manner of his own country, he expected would be sent to meet him.'[54] He then goes on to say that all their attempts to assure Ilchi that things were done differently in England were in vain and that this only 'seemed to grieve him the more'. The interesting part of Morier's account comes here:

> and although to a foreigner the interest of the road greatly increased as [we] approached the city, yet he requested to have both the glasses of the carriage drawn up, for he said that he did not understand the nature of such an entry, which appeared to him more like smuggling a bale of goods into town, than the reception of a public envoy.[55]

Morier's obvious displeasure at Ilchi's behaviour is such that he uses this scene almost verbatim in *Hajji Baba in England*, though this time the scene is narrated by the 'Persian' Hajji Baba. Here, Morier sets up the scene by describing the great care Mirza Firouz and his companions took of their appearance as they anticipated the great reception they would receive as they approached London: They wear their nicest clothes and even take 'care to curl the *zulfs* behind our ears'.[56] Hajji Baba continues by explaining to the reader 'in what a different manner Persians approach a city, on occasions of ceremony, to what appeared to be usual here. It was the custom amongst us, we assured them [the English] to move very slow'.[57] On the contrary though 'the infidels who were driving our carriage galloped their horses more like cavalry making a charge against an enemy, than like men conducting the representative of the shadow of Allah upon earth'.[58] As the carriages approach London:

> the ambassador began to look about him for the grand deputation. We perceived no troops, nor any horsemen running to and fro with anxious looks . . . 'And this is the custom of your country', exclaimed Mirza Firouz, 'to smuggle an ambassador into the seat of your government, as if he were a bale of prohibited goods?'[59]

Morier's account of the approach to London is used to present certain characteristics and failings of Mirza Abul Hasan Khan. The paragraphs following the ones quoted above make clear that despite the elaborate lodgings provided for Ilchi in London, he could not get over his disappointment over his entrance to the city. Additionally, he is a man for whom a 'grand deputation' is far more important than seeing 'the interest of the road',

something every foreigner would and apparently should appreciate. In *Hajji Baba in England*, Morier expands on this portrayal by transferring both the descriptions and also Morier's own interpretation of the scenes to that of Hajji Baba himself. Significantly, while the expression 'like a bale of goods' is Morier's description of what Mirza Abul Hasan Khan was thinking, in the fictionalized account, it is the envoy, Mirza Firouz, himself who utters these words. Additionally, the juxtaposition of the speed of the carriage (which is referred to in both texts) with the 'out of place' desire of the Persians to approach London slowly works to mark the Persians as unwilling to let go of their pointless and traditional rituals (the *istikbal*) for what is obviously modern and thus superior (the speed of the carriage, and the sights of the grand imperial capital). It is these characterizations of Ilchi and the Persians that have seeped into both the history and the historiography of the period.

But the inclusion of Ilchi's own narrative of the same scene opens up another interpretive possibility. Throughout his travelogue, *Hayratnamah*, Ilchi describes in sometimes boring detail all instances when the British government created any kind of ceremony around his public appearances. For example, upon leaving the boat after four days of quarantine in Plymouth, Ilchi writes that:

> ships fired their cannons; and the soldiers and civilians lined up on all sides, ceremonially putting their hands to their brows – their customary way of showing respect . . . At the moment of our arrival on shore, the soldiers lowered their flags, and I asked Mr. Morier for the reason. He explained that when members of the Royal Family visit the port the flags are lowered as a sign of respect; and the like honour was due to the high rank of the Envoy of the Padishah of Iran.[60]

Ilchi's attention to spectacle is not limited to his encounters in Europe: Even as they travel by land through Anatolia, Ilchi's royal retinue served as a reminder of the power of the Qajar monarch, distributing tributes to various tribal chiefs in Anatolia and criticizing the state of the Ottoman Empire both implicitly and explicitly. Ilchi's 1809 trip and the treaty he was sent to finalize mark a turn in Qajar foreign affairs whereby Iran – before the back-to-back defeats at the hands of the Russians – was confident in its value as a 'buffer state' in the Great Game. As a result, the Qajar crown saw itself as a powerful negotiating partner and Ilchi's insistence on pomp and circumstance that later historians have read as his frivolity was precisely one way to demonstrate that confidence.

Within this context, Morier's amusing 'bale of goods' story takes on a different significance. In *Hayratnamah*, Ilchi sets up the exact scene by describing how they left Bath in a carriage that moved 'with the speed of lightning towards London'.[61] His description of the 'scenic route' includes his delight at the countryside and the sight of a river (presumably the Thames) 'greater even than the Shatt al-Arab'.[62] He then writes that as they approached

London, the skies darkened with such rain that as a result 'no one was able to move from his place'. Who this no one is becomes clearer after Ilchi describes the glorious lodgings provided for him in London. 'Even though I was grieved by the lack of *istikbal* [*sic*] on the part of the people of the city due to heavy rain', he writes, the beauty of the table set for him was such that 'the pain and the sadness left my heart completely and the night passed in happiness'.[63]

Morier, like many after him, judged Ilchi's actions based on what he (and we) assume a foreigner in Europe must do – a 'dictatorship of spectacle' if you will, as if one must, if not from England, gaze at its glories and be in wonder of it. But for Ilchi, a foreign diplomat from Fath ʿAli Shah's court, the spectacle meant nothing if he himself was not observed, for his assessment of his ability to project his own power, and by extension the power of the throne, came precisely from the ability to create and to be a spectacle among the English. Ilchi sought out and enjoyed the prospect of being the 'stocking gaze of multitudes' because it was precisely through his being a spectacle that the power of his mission could be played out.[64]

It is crucial to emphasize the interconnectivity of 'ceremony and politics'[65] in the Qajar court. The pomp and circumstance that Ilchi sought out and put on display himself were not merely ceremonial rituals, and symbols of monarchy stripped of political meaning. They were, in and of themselves, a form of practising politics, both domestically and abroad. This is demonstrated in one slight difference in Ilchi and Morier's tales of the approach to London. In Morier's accounts, the envoy's emphasis on a grand *istiqbal*, juxtaposed against the 'speed of the carriage' and the 'interest of the road' work to highlight the 'backwardness' of the Persians. The reason he gives Ilchi for the absence of such a deputation again works to draw another sharp distinction between him and the English: things were done differently there. Ilchi in contrast, both mentions the speed of the carriage and the splendours of the route to London, but more importantly, he explains the lack of a 'proper' reception not in terms of cultural difference but in terms of rain, a natural phenomenon that could not be prevented. The substitution of a 'natural' as opposed to 'cultural' explanation for his arrival in London points to how intricately linked the rituals of power were to power itself for Ilchi, such that only something as uncontrollable as the weather could prevent it.

If, as has been argued, the spectacle of Europe provided a background to Ilchi's own narrative about the ways in which he became a spectacle in it, then *Hayratnamah* is not so much a record of Europe, as it has erroneously been seen, as much as a narrative record of the splendour of the Qajar court reaching as far as European shores, written for courtly consumption.[66] This allows for an understanding of *Hayratnamah* that is similar to what Layla Diba has argued persuasively regarding early Qajar paintings – particularly those of Fath ʿAli Shah – namely that they 'played an integral role in the nineteenth-century exercise of power, both at home and abroad'.[67] Additionally, she notes 'ceremonious veneration of the ruler extended to

events, and attributes, even distantly associated with the shah'.[68] In this context, *Hayratnamah* can be read as a narrative exercise of power, much in line with Saba's *Shahanshahnamah*,[69] which set in verse the glory of Fath ʿAli Shah and his overreaching power. As such, even the title of the text 'Book of Wonder' takes on multiple meanings, not only signifying a sense of wonder at the 'many strange and innumerable new things seen and recorded'[70] in it but a reference to Ilchi himself as the representative of Fath ʿAli Shah whose presence in Europe caused great 'wonder' among the Europeans. This meaning of *Hayratnamah* was not lost on its English audience: in 1819, on the occasion of Ilchi's second trip to England, one observer noted that 'he has written an extensive narrative of his travels in India, Turkey, Russia, and England, to which the King of Persia has given the pompous title *Hairat-nameh* (book of wonder)'.[71] The title can be deemed pompous only if it is understood to refer to 'wonder' towards the Qajar representative and the monarchy itself, and not, as has been assumed by later scholars, to mean wonder at Europe.

To return to the painting that began it all, at first glance, Sir William Beechy's painting of the Envoy merely shows Ilchi the exotic Persian, against an English landscape. In *Hayratnamah* though, Ilchi gives us clues to his pose in the picture. He writes:

> [William Beechy, the painter] prepared the canvas and drew a portrait of me on the day I met the king, and also the portrait of the king. In a pleasant way, he drew the way the letter was presented to the king and the way the king of London took the letter from me . . .[72]

And if you look carefully, it is there – a small detail in the painting – resting firmly under the envoy's right hand: the letter from the Qajar monarch to the English king and the *raison d'être* for his adventures in England.

Notes

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1 J. J. Morier, *The Adventures of Hajji Baba of Ispahan in England: Revised, Corrected, and Illustrated with Notes, and an Appendix by the Author*, London: Bentley, 1850.
2 The first edition of *Hajji Baba in England*, published in 1828 does not carry any etchings or visual representations from the book. Additionally, unlike the 1850 edition, it does not have an appendix in which Morier reproduces parts of his travelogues to Persia. See: J. Morier, *The Adventures of Hajji Baba of Ispahan in England*, London: John Murray, 1828.
3 M. M. Hadi ʿAlavi Shirazi, *Dalil al-sufara'*, Muhammad Gulbun ed., Tehran: Dunya-yi kitab, 1984.
4 The Persian chronicle *Iksir al-tavarikh* claims that Haji Ibrahim Khan began to

say 'baseless and inappropriate words' regarding Fath ʿAli Shah's actions and as a result was killed: ʿAliquli Mirza Iʿtizad al-Saltanah, *Iksir al-tavarikh: Tarikh-i Qajariyah az aghaz ta 1259 H.Q.*, Jamshid Kian'far ed., Tehran: Visman, 1370/1991–2, p. 56.

5 These details are repeated in various sources including J. Morier's *A Journey through Persia, Armenia, and Asia Minor to Constantinople, in the years 1808 and 1809*, London: Longman, Hurst, et al, 1812, pp. 220–3, and various Persian chronicles.

6 There is a vast literature on this subject. For a small sample, see S. G. Razi, *Qajariyyah, Ingilistan va qarardadha-yi isti'mari*, Tehran: Markaz-i asnad-i inqilab-i Islami, 1380/2001; R.K. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran, a Developing Nation in World Affairs 1500–1914*, Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1966; I. Amini, *Napoléon et la Perse: les relations franco-persanes sous le Premier Empire, dans le contexte des rivalités entre la France, l'Angleterre et la Russie*, Paris: Fondation Napoléon: Diffusion Picard, 1995. For an examination of the Qajar attempts at positioning Iran as a buffer state see E. Ingram, 'An Aspiring Buffer State: Anglo-Persian Relations in the Third Coalition, 1804–1807', *The Historical Journal*, vol. xvi, no. 3, 1977, 509–33 and *Britain's Persia Connection 1798–1828: Prelude to the Great Game in Asia*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

7 H. J. Brydges, *An Account of the Transactions of His Majesty's Mission to the Court of Persia, in the Years 1807–11: to which is Appended, a Brief History of the Wahauby*, London: J. Bohn, 1834, p. 228.

8 M. Bamdad, *Tarikh-i rijal-i Iran*, n.p.:n.p., 1347/1968–9, p. 35.

9 James Braillie Fraser quoted in I. Ra'in, *Mirza Abu al-Hasan Khan Ilchi*, Tehran: Sazman-i intisharat-i javidan, 1357/1978–9, p. 24.

10 H. McKenzie Johnston, *Ottoman and Persian Odysseys: James Morier, Creator of Hajji Baba of Ispahan, and his Brothers*, London: British Academic Press, 1998, p. 129.

11 In addition to London newspapers which carried reports of Ilchi's every move, newspapers on the US eastern seaboard replicated this fascination with the Persian envoy, albeit with some delay. For example, page 3 of *The New York Spectator* of 25 August, 1810 quoted 'London papers' of June 29 that 'His excellency Mirza Abdul [*sic*] Hassan, the Persian Ambassador . . . will embark in a few days on board the Lion man of war, at Portsmouth, on his return to Persia'.

12 Bamdad, *Tarikh*, p. 36.

13 A. G. Mackey, *The History of Freemasonry*, New York: The Masonic Co., 1898, 1984.

14 J. Morier, *A Second Journey Through Persia, Armenia, and Asia Minor to Constantinople between the Years 1810 and 1816*, London: Longman, Hurst *et al*, 1818, p. 37.

15 'Sir William Ouseley's Travels to the East', *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, April, 1819, p. 531. I have not been able to verify this claim in any Persian sources.

16 Ilchi has left no account of his second trip to Europe. While the British National Archives are full of letters and reports, to my knowledge there are scant secondary sources that examine this particular trip. One exception is M. M. Eskandari-Qajar, 'The Story of the "Fair Circassian" and Mirza Abol Hassan Khan Shirazi "Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary" of Fath Ali Shah Qajar to the Court of St. James', *Qajar Studies*, 8, 2007, pp. 60–77, which in addition to providing a biographical sketch of Ilchi, reproduces little known contemporary accounts of Ilchi in 1819–20 along with images of him, Morier, Sir Gore Ouseley, and the 'fair Circassian' from private collections.

17 Riza Quli Khan Hidayat, *Rawzat al-safa-yi Nasiri*, Jamshid Kian'far ed., Tehran: Asatir, 1380/2001–2, p. 7821.

18 M. M. Taqi Sipihr [Lisan al-Mulk], *Nasikh al-tavarikh: dawrah-'i kamil-i tarikh-i*

Qajariyyah, Jahangir Qa'im Maqami ed., Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1337/1958, vol. 2, p. 357.

19 Ibid., p. 366. According to *Nasikh al-tavarikh*, the second Perso-Russian wars were instigated by various religious figures who declared in a *fatwa* that 'anyone who avoids a jihad with the Russians has disobeyed God and obeyed Satan'. Accordingly, upon hearing Ilchi and others' objection, they 'sent stern letters and said to them you have weakened in your beliefs and in your religion or else how would you disapprove jihad against the infidels?' Ibid., pp. 365–6.

20 Both treaties stand in contemporary Iranian historiography as watershed moments where the shock of the loss of land, the heavy monetary burden they brought on, and the capitulations the treaties carried became an impetus to modernize Iran, militarily and educationally. For a discussion of these treaties through the writings of a contemporary politician, see A. Amanat, ' "Russian Intrusion into the Guarded Domain": Reflections of a Qajar Statesman on European Expansion', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 1993, vol. 113, no. 1, pp. 35–56; For a more detailed discussion of these boundary disputes see F. Khashani-Sabet, *Frontier Fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804–1946*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 15–47.

21 ʿItizad al-Saltanah, *Iksir al-tavarikh*, pp. 419–20.

22 Sipihr, *Nasikh al-tavrikh*, vol. 2, p. 601.

23 A. Amanat, *Pivot of the Universe: Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar and the Iranian Monarchy 1831–1896*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, p. 33.

24 While it follows that Ilchi would have been scared of reprisals from Qa'im Maqam for picking the wrong side, Sipihr's paragraph quoted seems to imply that Ilchi chose to side with Zill al-Sultan precisely because of his problems with Qa'im Maqam. One can speculate that the root of the disagreement lay in the conflicting positions taken by the two statesmen over the renewal of hostilities with the Russians at the start of the second Perso-Russian wars. For an examination of Qa'im Maqam's changing position vis-à-vis Russia see Amanat, 'Russian Intrusion into the Guarded Domain'.

25 *London Medical Gazette or Journal of Practical Medicine*, London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, New series vol. 3,1846, p. 598.

26 *Hajji Baba* was translated into Russian by Osip Senkovskii in the early 1830s. For more information on the impact of the novels in Russia and specifically on the 'Oriental' writings of Pushkin, see R. Polonsky, 'Hajji Baba in St. Petersburg: James Morier, Osip Senkovskii, and Pushkin's literary diplomacy between East and West', *Journal of European Studies*, vol. 35, no. 3, 2005, pp. 253–70.

27 George Krotkoff notes that 'to a person trained in the Austrian Orientalist tradition, however, the name *Fundgruben* immediately evokes the "father" of Austrian Orientalism and founder of one of the earliest Orientalist periodicals, *Die Fundgruben des Orients* or *Les Mines de l'Orient*. He was Joseph von Hammer, later Freiherr von Hammer-Purgstall (1774–1856)'. Undoubtedly, Morier was aware of the fact that Hammer-Purgstall was Ilchi's interpreter in the Viennese court during the latter's second visit to Europe and translated the two poems written by Fath ʿAli Shah on the banners he gave Ilchi as a present: 'Ode des perischen Hofdichters Feth Ali Chan', *Fundgruben des Orients*, Baron Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, ed., Vienna: A. Schmid, 1818, pp. 216–17.

28 A. Amanat, 'Hajjibaba of Ispahan', s.v. *Encyclopedia Iranica*.

29 J. Morier, *The Adventures of Hajji Baba of Ispahan: Revised, Corrected, and Illustrated with Notes by the Author*, London: R. Bentley, 1851, p. 424.

30 Ibid., p. 462.

31 Ibid.

32 Morier, *Hajji Baba in London*, vi.

33 Ibid., vii.

34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., ix–x.
36 Ibid., xi.
37 H. B. McKenzie Johnston, 'Hajji Baba and Mirza Abul Hasan Khan – A Conundrum', *Iran: Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies*, vol. 33, 1995, pp. 93–96.
38 Sir W. Scott, 'Hajji Baba in England', *The Quarterly Review*, London: John Murray, January and April 1829, p. 91.
39 J. Wolff, *Narrative of a Mission to Bokhara, in the years 1843–1845: To Ascertain the Fate of Colonel Stoddart and Captain Conolly*, London: Pub., for the author, by J. W. Parker, 1845, p. 219.
40 M. Taqi Nezam-Mafi, *Persian Recreations: Theatricality in Anglo-Persian Diplomatic History, 1599–1828*, M.A. thesis, Boston University, 1989, p. 225. His chapter on James Morier and Abul Hasan Khan (idem., pp. 180–231) does a careful job of tracking the conflation of Mirza Firouz/Hajji Baba with the figure of the Persian Ilchi in British imagination.
41 Ibid., p. 207.
42 Ibid.
43 From a letter dated 30/1/1830 from Willock to David Morier, quoted in McKenzie Johnston, *Ottoman and Persian Odysseys*, pp. 216–17.
44 For more information see the introduction by M. A. Jamalzadeh to the 1996 Persian edition: *Haji Baba-ye Isfahani*, Mirza Habib Isfahani trans., Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1996.
45 K. Rastegar, 'The Unintended Gift: *The Adventures of Hajji Baba Ispahani* as a Transactional Text Between English and Persian Literatures', *Middle Eastern Literatures*, 2007, vol. 10, no. 3, p. 253; See also A. Amanat, 'Hajji Baba of Ispahan', s.v. *Encyclopedia Iranica*. Both authors link the timing of the Persian publication to the Constitutional Revolution's adoption of 'orientalist' images of Iran as part of its modernist discourse.
46 For a more extensive discussion of the historiographic effects of the Constitutional Revolution on the Qajar period see N. Sohrabi, 'The Tyranny of the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 on the Historiography of Nineteenth Century Iran', unpublished article.
47 M. Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1995, p. 26.
48 M. A. Ilchi, *Hayratnamah: Safarnamah-'i Mirza Abu al-Hasan Khan Ilchi bih Landan*, Hasan Mursilvand ed., Tehran: Mu'assisah-'i khadamat-i farhangi-i rasa, 1364/1986; M. M. Cloake translated *Hayratnamah* into English in 1988 but her translation is incomplete, focusing only on Ilchi's stay in London. See: M. A. Ilchi, *A Persian at the Court of King George, 1809–1810: The Journal of Mirza Abul Hasan Khan*, M. M. Cloake ed., London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1988.
49 M. Mahmud, *Tarikh-i ravabit-i siyasi*, Tehran: Iqbal, 1328/1949, vol. 1, p. 90.
50 Ibid., p. 91. The dismissal of Ilchi's own narrative in favour of Morier's was common. The only biography of Ilchi, written by the highly unreliable Isma'il Ra'in, freely uses Morier's fictional accounts as a biographical source especially in a chapter devoted to Ilchi's 'lovemaking'. See: I. Ra'in, *Mirza Abu al-Hasan Khan Ilchi*.
51 M. A. Khan Ilchi, *Hayratnamah*, London, British Library, ADD 23, p. 546.
52 A. Amanat, 'The study of history in post-revolutionary Iran: Nostalgia, Illusion, or Historical Awareness?' *Iranian Studies*, 1989, vol. 22, no. 4, p. 14.
53 For example, Mirza Firouz exclaims on the day that he finally goes to the English court: 'Oh such women . . . I was in love with them all; they were all unveiled; I saw much flesh whiter than snow; eyes that killed; and teeth which smiled delight'. Morier, *Hajji Baba in England*, p. 142.

54 Morier, *A Second Journey through Persia*, p. 402.
55 Ibid.
56 Morier, *Hajji Baba in England*, p. 84.
57 Ibid., p. 85.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., p. 86.
60 Cloake, *A Persian at the Court of King George*, p. 27; Mursilvand, *Hayratnamah*, p. 122.
61 Cloake, *A Persian at the Court of King*, p. 35; Mursilvand, *Hayratnamah*, p. 128.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 M. Tavakoli-Targhi, *Refashioning Iran: Orientalism, Occidentalism, and Historiography*, New York: Palgrave, 2001, p. 41. Tavakoli-Targhi has a slightly different take on *Hayratnamah*: 'Whereas in Europe Mirza Abu al-Hasan was taken as evidence of exotic Persia, back in Iran his eyewitness report became evidence of self-experience in Europe. The exotic Persian of London became the narrator of the tales of the exotic *Farang*', p. 43.
65 W. M. Kuhn, 'Ceremony and Politics: The British Monarchy, 1871–1872', *The Journal of British Studies*, 1987, vol. 26, no.2, p. 135.
66 I develop this theme in much greater detail and over the nineteenth century in my manuscript *Signs Taken for Wonder: Nineteenth Century Persian Travel Literature to Europe* (under review).
67 L. S. Diba, 'Images of Power and the Power of Images: Intention and Response in Early Qajar Paintings (1785–1834)', in L. S. Diba and M. Ekhtiar (eds.), *Royal Persian Paintings: The Qajar Epoch 1785–1925*, London: I. B. Tauris, 1998, p. 31.
68 Ibid., p. 30.
69 F. Ali Khan Saba-yi Kashani, *Kitab-i mustatab-i Shahanshahnamah*, M. Malik al-Kuttab ed. Bombay, 1867.
70 Mursilvand, *Hayratnamah*, p. 48.
71 'Sketches of Society: Memoir of the Persian Ambassador', *The London Literary Gazette and Journal of Belles Lettres, Arts, Sciences, etc.*, May 8, 1819, p. 299.
72 Mursilvand, *Hayratnamah*, p. 182.

Part III

Memories of conflicts

9 Between the Balkan Wars (1912–13) and the 'Third Balkan War' of the 1990s

The memory of the Balkans in Arabic writings

Eyal Ginio

In 1996 Muhamed Mufaku al-Arnaut, doubtless the current leading authority on Balkan Islam in the Arab world, published a book on the cultural history of Islam in the Balkans. The book was intended to acquaint the Arab reader with the rich Muslim heritage of the Balkan Peninsula and with the region's historical connections with the Arab and the Muslim worlds and civilizations.[1] In the introduction to the book, al-Arnaut's publisher, the Tunisian scholar ʿAbd al-Jalīl al-Tamīmī, lamented the ignorance prevailing in the Arab world towards the Balkans and its Muslim populations. He compared the dearth of interest in the Balkans in Arab academic circles with the vital academic activity on this region seen in the West over the last five decades, but al-Tamīmī was at a loss to explain this indifference of the Arabs. Nevertheless, he did note that interest was reviving in the Arab world with regards to the Balkans, due to the wars that ravaged the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.[2]

While al-Tamīmī was probably exaggerating his appreciation for European scholarship on Balkan Islam prior to the 1990s – the West has also waited for the troubles in the Balkans, to 'rediscover' the Muslim populations there – his assessment of the Arab world's lack of interest in the area is accurate. In the introduction to another of his books, on Muslim Belgrade, al-Arnaut declared himself puzzled at the gap existing between the magnificent Ottoman past of the city – 'the abode of jihad' for the Muslims and the gates leading to the East for the Christians, an urban centre that boasted more than two hundred mosques during the Ottoman period, a city that could rival Damascus in its Muslim infrastructure – on the one hand, and the apathy that Arab scholars showed towards the Islamic heritage of the city, on the other. Furthermore, he claims, while during the 1950s and 1960s hundreds of articles and studies and dozens of books were published in Arabic about communist Yugoslavia, one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement, the same enthusiastic authors remained totally indifferent to Belgrade's Islamic past and ignored its significance as an exemplary Muslim city situated on European soil.[3]

The 'forgetting' of the Balkan Muslims was not limited to the Arab world. In Turkey, for example, the previous 'silence' towards the Balkans was explained by the claim of Kemalism to concentrate on Anatolia as the exclusive homeland of the Turks. European academic negligence of the Balkan Muslims was accounted for by the omnipresence of the nation-state as the standard case study in investigating the Balkans. However, no similar discussion was offered to explain the Arab silence towards the Balkans during the long period stretching from the Balkan Wars (1912–13) to the outburst of hostilities in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.

This article aims to examine this gap by studying contemporary Arab writing on the Balkans. My intention is to locate the seeds of oblivion and estrangement from the Balkans in contemporary Arab writings on the Balkan Wars. These conflicts, I will argue, are the main junction in the Arab perceptions of this region and its relevance to the Arabs' own relations with the Ottoman state and its future, perceptions drawn by leading publicists. I will then explain the silence that prevails in Arabic historiography with regard to the Balkans until the 1990s. After all, as Marc Augé reminds us, 'Remembering or forgetting is doing gardener's work, selecting, pruning. Memories are like plants: there are those that need to be quickly eliminated in order to help the others burgeon, transform, flower.'[4] Following Augé's metaphor, would it be true, then, to claim that the Balkans and their memory were perceived in Arab contemporary debates as doomed to oblivion in order that the Ottoman state could survive, with a new and more Muslim and Asian character? Could we argue that contemporary Arabs and Turks had differing perceptions of the Ottoman territorial, cultural and communal boundaries and the place allocated to the Balkans within these boundaries?

Before turning to the perceptions of the Balkans in Arab writings through the twentieth century, a brief introduction to the rediscovery of the Balkans in European and Turkish writings is needed. This will highlight the imagining of the Balkans not merely as a geographic unit, but also as a discursive perception that shaped European and Turkish attitudes towards the region and its inhabitants.

The wars in Yugoslavia and the 'rediscovery' of the Balkans in Europe and Turkey

After a long period of silence stretching back to the end of the Balkan Wars (1912–13) and the subsequent victory of the nation-states and their historiographies in the West, the topic of Islam in the Balkans was 'rediscovered' by the West only during the wars that accompanied the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and then discussed and published in a host of books, conferences, articles, travelogues and other academic and popular publications. The Western bafflement at the images of violence, cruelty and frenzied killing – associated perhaps more readily with areas distant in mind and space in the Middle East or Africa – taking place this time among Europeans in well-known European

summer destinations, had to be explained. The various publications were designed to provide some of the answers and to make sense of the Balkans' ostensible distinctive violence. Robert Kaplan, for example, in his bestseller on the Balkans described its history by presenting ominous meetings with various 'ghosts' from the past which supposedly impinge on current perceptions and attitudes in the area. His aim was to expose the distinct historical processes that led the Balkans along a totally different path than the peaceful one adopted by Europe following World War II.[5]

While the matter was first raised by Bakić-Hayden and Hayden[6] and others, it was mainly *Imaging the Balkans*, published by Maria Todorova in 1997, that shifted the emphasis in the Western academic world from studying the history of the Balkans to exploring the Western writings on the region. In her book, Todorova coins the term *Balkanism*, representing a cultural construction that prevailed from the seventeenth century until the present day in Western writing about the region; it was later adopted also by leading Balkan writers. *Balkanism* constructed the Balkans as 'the other' within; a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive image of the 'European' and the 'West' has been shaped. Towards the end of the twentieth century it provided the West with a convenient substitute for the emotional discharge that orientalism had provided, while exempting the West from embarrassing charges of racism, colonialism, Eurocentrism and Islamophobia.[7] Following Todorova, the image of the Balkans as unfolded in various Western cultural products – prose, travelogues, films, etc – was explored by many scholars.[8]

In Turkey a similar interest in the Balkans resurfaced during the 1990s, but for different reasons. As noted, the previous silence there towards the Balkans (and other former Ottoman territories) was explained by the claim of Kemalism to concentrate on Anatolia as the exclusive homeland of the Turks. However, this silence was replaced during the late 1980s with a new interest reflected in sundry publications – travelogues, academic studies, conferences and various types of popular publications. The appearance of these publications indicates the growing interest of the Turkish public in the Ottoman heritage of the Balkans, its relevance to Turkey's policy towards the area and to Turkey's own identity. Following the end of the Cold War and the subsequent decline in Turkey's strategic military importance to the West, the Balkans and Central Asia were perceived as alternative venues to demonstrate Turkey's geopolitical significance. Numerous publications delved into the myriad cultural aspects of Muslim culture shaped in the Balkans under the Ottoman aegis. Branded often as neo-Ottomanism, this new awareness regarding the Ottoman past perceives the Balkans as being part of the Ottoman hinterland that presents a shared cultural legacy and a potential for sustaining political and cultural networks of solidarity.[9]

The wars accompanying the disintegration of Yugoslavia, especially those involving Muslim populations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, instigated likewise wide interest in the Arab world concerning the 'forgotten' Muslims of the Balkans. The Muslims' plight on the various fronts turned out to be

one of the main issues discussed in the various media channels during much of the 1990s. Dozens of popular publications appeared in the Arab world with the aim of acquainting the Arab audience with the Balkans, its Muslim history and with the plight of the Muslim populations inhabiting the region. Some of these publications, as mentioned above, expressed astonishment at the silence that had until now been found in the Arab publishing world towards the Balkan Muslims. To understand this silence, I will argue, one must go back to the late Ottoman period.

The encounter with the Balkans: the Balkan Wars (1912–13)

The long Ottoman period placed the Balkans and the Arab world under the same rule. It also enabled merchants, pilgrims, soldiers, but also fugitives, criminals, adventurers, and others, to move between these two regions. However, it was mostly the late Ottoman period that offered numerous meeting points to Muslim elites arriving from the Balkans and the Middle East. It was chiefly the capital Istanbul and its various cultural and political institutions that could bring together politicians, students, journalists and others originating from the two regions. Pan-Islamic sentiments and an affinity with the Young Turks equally made Istanbul a convenient place of refuge for some young Egyptians, as well as North African Arabs who lived outside of the Ottoman boundaries, yet regarded Istanbul as the centre of their allegiance and cultural affiliation.[10]

Another much more extensive meeting must have taken place during the obligatory military service, in effect since 1909, and against the backdrop of increasing ethnic tensions in the Ottoman Balkans. While the allocation of recruits to the different Ottoman military units was based to a large extent on territorial origin, the Ottoman military authorities, nevertheless, endeavoured to station some units far from their soldiers' places of origin. Prior to the Balkan Wars, some units originating in the Arab provinces were singled out to serve in the Balkans. One such group, containing about 1,300 new recruits, came from Jabal al-Durūz (nowadays in southern Syria). Among the soldiers was the young Sultan al-Atrash, later to become one of the leaders of the Syrian revolt (1925). His testimony about his military service in Macedonia offers a view of the Ottoman Balkans as he perceived them later in his life.[11] Jaʿfar Pasha al-ʿAskarī (1885–1936), who would later serve twice as the prime minister of independent Iraq, fought as an Ottoman officer on the battlefields of Eastern Thrace during the Balkan Wars. In his memoirs he explained the Ottoman defeat by referring to the politicization of the officers' corps, the poor infrastructure and the wretched training of the rank and file soldiers.[12]

In addition to military service, another encounter between Balkan Muslims and Arabs living in the Ottoman realms occurred following the settlement of refugees from the Balkans in the Arab provinces. At least from the Ottoman–Russian war of 1876–78 and the corresponding battles in the Balkans, Arab publicists wrote about the political events occurring in the Balkans.[13] The

plight of the Muslim refugees from the Balkans was one important feature of these conflicts. While most of the refugees settled in Anatolia,[14] some were relocated by the Ottoman authorities to sensitive areas in the Arab provinces. One example is the village of Kaysariya, which was constructed in 1878 amidst the local Crusaders' and Roman ruins of Caesarea, to accommodate Bosnian refugees.[15] The issue of *hijra* from the Balkans, now under Christian sway, to the abode of Islam was raised and discussed by Arab scholars. Upon receiving a request from Bosnia for a religious opinion, the Syrian/Egyptian scholar Rashīd Ridā (1865–1935) issued a *fatwā* in July 1909, published in *al-Manār*, in which he discussed the question of whether Muslims in Bosnia should perform a *hijra* due to its transfer from Muslim to non-Muslim domination.[16]

The interest in the Balkans burgeoned with the outbreak of the Balkan Wars in October 1912. The rapid development of the Arab press and the proliferation of charitable organizations disseminated the war's horrors and provided potential contributors with the administrative networks through which they could channel their beneficent response. The Egyptian Red Crescent ship, *Al-Bahr al-Ahmar*, was transformed into a floating field hospital. Taking advantage of Egypt's neutral status, the vessel evacuated refugees and wounded soldiers to Anatolia.[17] The war inflamed popular responses in different corners of the Arab provinces and in Egypt (as well as other Muslim territories). Reports of popular mobilization to assist the Ottoman war effort abounded. Some of them were anecdotal. The Başbakanlık Archives in Istanbul, for example, contain correspondence relating to an initiative by a certain ʿAlī al-Ghānī Efendi, the secretary of the quarantine at Sidon, who approached the Committee for Assisting the Ottoman Navy with a proposal to construct a submarine (*bir tahtelbahir sefine*) that would assist it in performing its duties.[18] The Egyptian authorities and local authorities in the Arab provinces showed their concern and support for the Ottoman cause also by staging various ceremonies that became spectacles of Ottoman patriotism. Special place was given to the lavish visits organized for the victorious battleship *Hamidiye*, and its captain, Rauf Bey [Orbay]. During the course of the war, the *Hamidiye* moored in many Eastern Mediterranean ports. These stopovers – ostensibly made only for bunkering with coal – were exploited for propaganda aimed at Ottoman and Egyptian audiences. The local press followed the battleship's cruise and described in detail the encounter between the crew and the local population. Thus, for example, the Egyptian journal *al-Muqattam* reported the enthusiasm of the crowds when the battleship arrived in the harbour of Haifa.[19] A few days later the journal published a poem written by a local poet, Salīm Ilyās, lionizing the battleship and its feats.[20] At some ports the leaders of local communities offered presents as a token of gratitude to the captain of the *Hamidiye*. These presents were carefully chosen to represent the distinctive artistic heritage of the place in question. The Ottoman naval museum in Beşiktaş, established in 1897, includes an exhibition room dedicated to Rauf Bey. One of the major items of memorabilia

on display there is a chair made of wood and mother of pearl inlay presented to the renowned captain by a delegation from Damascus.

Yet, it should be noted that even if a general mobilization was declared, the enlistment of Arab soldiers to the fighting units was limited by the Ottomans' inability to transport them from the Arab provinces to the Balkan battlefields. This was due both to the lack of effective transport infrastructure in Anatolia and to the Greek navy's ability to impose its control over the Aegean Sea. Therefore, audiences in the Arab provinces (and, of course, in Egypt) remained distant observers. The Arab press carefully covered the events, recounted the atrocities happening in the Balkans and encouraged readers to assist the Muslim war victims by subscriptions. For the Egyptian elite, headed by the khedival family, the war presented an opportunity to demonstrate its benevolence and commitment to assist Muslims in need. Egypt, essentially outside Ottoman control for almost a century, was nevertheless eager to express its attachment to the Ottoman cause. It should be remembered that loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan/Caliph was one of the few possible avenues of resistance to the British domination. Therefore, the orientation towards the Ottoman Empire flourished in Egypt between 1882 and 1914.[21] This was especially evident in times of crisis.

Most of the news items that appeared in the Egyptian press were culled from the British press. However, as the war continued, some newspapers dispatched their own correspondents to cover events taking place at the front and to report on the civilians' plight in Istanbul. Some newspapers retained permanent reporters. The Balkan Wars remained the main story for most of the time. The Egyptian press was the main source of news for Arabs living in the Ottoman lands. Being outside the Ottoman state's effective boundaries, the Egyptian press developed relatively unimpeded, without the stringent restrictions of Ottoman censorship.[22]

It is clear from the Egyptian press's standpoint during the Balkan Wars that the Egyptians felt deeply bound to the Ottoman state, and even more so to the Ottoman Caliph. They accused the Balkan coalition of waging a religious war. Thus, for example, Yūsuf Al-Bustānī, the Egyptian commentator writing for *al-Jarīda*, argued that instilling resentment against the Ottoman state in the hearts of Christian Balkan people had become a holy religious command (*fardan muqaddasan*), a hatred that babies absorbed with their mother's milk.[23] The Egyptian journal *Al-Manār* called the Balkan wars *al-Harb al-Balqānīya al-Salībīya* ('the Crusaders' War of the Balkans'), adding that its aim was to expel the Muslims from Europe, thus echoing one of the main Ottoman allegations against their Balkan foes.[24] Indeed, it is clear that the strong memories of the Crusades continued to influence the shaping of political identities, alignments and antagonisms in contemporary Arab writings. Another article further claimed that:

> it is clear that all of Europe is currently fighting the Ottomans; four of the small states and one of the European powers [Italy] are fighting it

> with weapons, while the other European powers fight [the Ottomans] with their politics and authority.[25]

As the war continued, news relating horrible accounts of Bulgarian atrocities appeared regularly in the Arab press. These accounts were intended to alarm and provoke the public. Some of the tragedies taking place in the distant Balkans reached Egyptian soil as well with the Muslim war refugees from the Macedonian city of Kavala. They arrived in Alexandria at the express invitation of the khedive himself, since Kavala was the native city of the khedival family, attracting special attention in Egypt.[26]

The press coverage of the war was additionally important because it offered Arab audiences an opportunity to learn about the Balkans – and here we can use the term 'discovery'. The periodical *Al-Hilāl* offered its readers an introduction to the Balkans. In November 1912 it dedicated the front pages to a short historical survey of the region, its history, population and major urban centres. Probably using secondary Western sources, the newspaper attempted to make some sense of the ongoing conflict. Particular attention was given to assessing the military capacity of the Balkan states – 'the total number of Montenegrins does not exceed the number of those residing in Alexandria', it was noted; the paper added, however, that 'they are very powerful'.[27] In its next edition, in December 1912, *al-Hilāl* aptly referred to the Ottomans' past victories in the Balkans during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.[28] *Al-Muktataf* placed a group portrait of the four Balkan kings on its front page before proceeding to introduce the Balkans to its readers. Pertinent to our discussion is the periodical's remark about the ignorance reigning among the Arabs with regard to the Balkans:

> We know more about the history of India and China than we know about the history of the Serbs and the Bulgarians; We are more familiar with the description of London and Paris than we are acquainted with Üsküp [Skopje] and Salonica.

However, the commentary continued, the current war prompted the Arab readers to seek information about the Balkans – to acquaint themselves with its landscape, history and current conditions.[29]

The Balkan Wars placed that region and its Muslim populations in the spotlight of the Egyptian media. Names and toponyms that just a short while earlier had been totally unknown could now be found regularly on the front pages of the leading newspapers. And yet, when Egyptian commentators turned to assess the wars' ramifications on the future of the Ottoman Empire, the Balkans were quickly put aside. This phenomenon stands in contrast to the prevailing representation of the Balkans in contemporary Turkish formal and popular writings, in which the Balkans evolved to become a kind of Ottoman counterpart of the lost French territories of Alsace and Lorraine.

The loss of the Balkans and the 'return' of the Ottomans to Asia

A disastrous calamity (*nakbah fātikah*) was one of the recurring labels given to the Ottoman defeat in the Arab press. The Egyptian press was not indifferent to the ongoing debate in the Ottoman press regarding the military rout. The scale of defeat was openly discussed and analysed,[30] yet it was portrayed in the Arab press as someone else's failure. The culprits were clearly the Turks, or more precisely the Young Turks' Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) regime. Such blunt accusations, of course, could appear only in the Egyptian press, well away from Ottoman censorship.[31] Protesting voices were also raised, though more clandestinely, in the Arab provinces still under Ottoman control. A formal French report from Damascus analysed the effects of the surrender of Edirne on Arab public opinion. Though reflecting the French vested interests in the area,[32] the report conveys the astonishment of the locals in the face of the swift and decisive Ottoman rout. The report maintained that 'the taking by force of the Turkish ancient capital in Europe left an enormous impact on the Muslims of this country.' It went on: 'Even the entrance of the Bulgarian troops to Constantinople could not deliver a more profound blow on them. The Christians, for their part, were all rejoicing at the Turkish debacle.' Facing the fall of Edirne, the report observed, everyone (in Syria) declared that 'the Turks are doomed; The Arabs cannot forgive the Ottomans for having ruined the prestige of Islam and for dragging them to the bottom of an abyss.'[33]

In the Turkish-speaking provinces of the Ottoman state, especially in the capital Istanbul, the Balkan Wars and the immense territorial losses that resulted together generated a body of literature characterized by much grief and lamentation over the suffering of the nation. The Ottoman debacle during the First Balkan War provoked the appearance of various publications that provide insights into the contemporary debate about the defeat's causes, the ensuing internal crises, and possible new directions for achieving transformation, regeneration – and revenge. Indeed, an important part of the plan to revive the Ottoman nation was intertwined with calls for revenge and for the future liberation of the Balkans. This Ottoman 'culture of defeat' – to use Wolfgang Schivelbusch's term[34] – surfaced as early as the beginning of November 1912.

One finds a similar debate on the Ottoman defeat in the writings of Egyptian authors. Equally traumatized by the Ottoman fiasco, they suggested similar remedies, among them the revitalization of Islam as the major spirit of the Ottoman army.[35] The main contrast between the Turkish-language writings and their Egyptian counterparts is the latter's emphasis on the decentralization of the Arab provinces as a way to safeguard the Ottoman sultanate, and on the disappearance of the Balkans from the scheme of revival. The Islamist *al-Manār* was the most unambiguous about the importance of Islam as a major ingredient of revival. The journal reproached the CUP leaders for imitating France and for assuming that Islam would lead the

Ottomans nowhere. Thus, for example, CUP leaders had suspended the obligation to pray in the army, rendering it optional. The adoption of what the author described as Ottoman patriotism and Turkish nationalism brought about the military rout. He scorned the Ottomans for exchanging religious devotion and the Islamic link, the basis for Ottoman victories in the past, in favour of Ottoman patriotism and Turkish nationalism.[36]

However, even *al-Manār*, which took the most critical stance against the CUP regime, did not contest the Ottoman dynasty's right to lead the Muslim community. The writer insisted on a large array of crucial reforms and political reorganization that must be implemented; otherwise, he argued, all the efforts of the world's Muslims to assist the Ottomans would be to no avail. In his vision, the Ottoman state should turn its back on Europe and return to its position as a Muslim and Asiatic power. He challenged the Ottoman state to take precise and groundbreaking steps, to break what he labelled as the European and Jewish-Zionist chains, and absorb Islam and the Caliphate fully. According to him, the Ottomans must depart from Byzantine, corrupt Istanbul, found a new capital in the heart of Asia, and establish there a new government based on decentralization, a government that would be able to unite the Arabs and the Turks into one powerful nation.[37] The idea of relocating the Ottoman capital to a more secure place that would strengthen the links between Turks and Arabs indeed appeared occasionally in the Turkish and Arab press, until the assassination of the Grand Vizier Mahmud Şevket Pasha in June 1913 and the passing of a prohibition of further public debate on the subject.[38]

The Egyptian *Al-Muqtataf* published in June 1913 a summary of essays by Western experts on the ways open to the Ottomans to save their empire, and on the potential that awaited the Ottomans in Asia. Quoting the German Marshal Colmar von der Goltz,[39] the article stated that 'it is currently incumbent [on the Turks] to reconcile with the Arab component, to come to agreement with it and to refrain from considering their sultanate as a European state but to regard it merely as an Asian state.' A brilliant future awaited the Ottomans in Asia if they could forsake their European ambitions, it said.[40]

In July 1913, *Al-Jarīda* convened a symposium featuring several leading Egyptian publishers and intellectuals who were asked to express their thoughts on the future of the Ottoman sultanate and the means to revive it (*inhād al-saltanah*) following the defeat.[41] Among those participating in the symposium were Fathī Bāshā Zaghlūl and Fāris Efendi Nimr (the owners of the *Al-Muqtataf* and *Al-Muqattam* newspapers), the poet Ismāʿīl Sabrī Bāshā, the historian Jurjī Bey Zaydān (the owner of *Al-Hilāl*), Ahmad Lutfī Bey al-Sayyid (then the owner of *Al-Jarīda*), Farah Efendi Antūn (the owner of *Majalat al-Jāmiʿa*), the publicist Muhammad Masʿūd, Muhammad Rashīd Rida (the owner of *Al-Manār*), Dāūd Efendi Barakāt (the editor-in-chief of *Al-Ahrām*) and others. The speakers suggested various solutions and scenarios. Most of them referred to the importance of decentralization and granting more powers to the provinces (some went so far as to use the term

'administrative self-governing'), full equality for the Arabs vis-à-vis the Turks, propagating the Arabic language among all Muslims, justice for all and the importance of education as crucial devices to ensure the future of the Ottoman Empire. Unlike their Turkish colleagues, Arab publicists envisioned the Balkan Wars mainly through the prism of Ottoman-Arab current and future relations. The Balkans and the Muslim populations there were utterly absent from their vision for the future.

The forgetting of the Balkan Muslims: the years of silence

The loss of the Balkans brought about their disappearance from the attention of the Arab elites. In 1921 Husayn Labīb published in Cairo his book on the 'Eastern Question'. Examining the events that took place during the Balkan Wars, Labīb adopted the nationalist discourse to describe the conflict. For him, the Balkan Wars were a national confrontation in which the Turkish oppressors had endeavoured to keep their dominance on the area against the will of the local peoples, who in fact wanted to free themselves from the yoke of the Turks.[42] The discourse prevailing hitherto, which described the Balkan alliance as a modern Crusading aggression, gave way to a totally different narrative that extolled the Balkan struggle as reflecting patriotic sentiments that had enabled the Balkan states to liberate themselves from Turkish tyranny.

At this stage, events in the Balkans were viewed in the Arab world in terms of nationalism and the nation-state. Few scholars continued to write in Arabic on the Balkan Muslims henceforth. The Egyptian interest in the Macedonian city of Kavala, the birthplace of the dynasty's founder, was an exceptional case during the royalist period. The khedives had already demonstrated their interest in Kavala by directing much of their charity towards this port city in the past. Chief among their donations had been the *imaret* complex built by Muhammad ʿAlī (Mehmed Ali) in his native city. In addition to the public kitchen, the complex included two mosques, two religious schools (*medrese*) and a children's school (*mektep*).[43] It was sustained by a significant pious endowment, based on revenues collected from the nearby island of Thasos. Crowning the hillside of Panagia, the city's old district, the *imaret* became one of the main buildings controlling the city's landscape, providing it with its distinct Muslim character. Welcoming refugees from Kavala during the Balkan Wars was presented as another bond connecting the khedival family with its city of origin. The assistance offered by Khedive ʿAbbas Hilmi (r. 1892–1914), a grandson of Mehmed Ali, to alleviate the suffering of the inhabitants of Kavala during the Balkan Wars was likewise praised by local non-Muslims. One book, written by Refael Yosef Florentine, a local Jew, described the khedive as a true *sivdadíno* [citizen] of Kavala who had saved his fellow townsmen from starvation without distinction of class or religion.[44] Following the city's conquest by Bulgarian forces in November 1912, some voices in the Egyptian press raised the question of annexing Kavala and the

island of Thasos to Egypt. Since only as recently as 1902 had the incumbent Ottoman sultan been able to oust agents of the Egyptian khedive from Thasos, such a scheme was not totally inconceivable.[45]

While the wish to secure the city by restoring Egyptian sovereignty over it came to nothing, the significance of Kavala did not disappear altogether following its conquest by Bulgaria (which later lost it to Greece during the Second Balkan War). If we bear in mind that the interest was chiefly cultivated by the reigning royal family of Egypt, the city's significance should not surprise us. The interest in Kavala was reflected in various charitable activities, in the construction of royal monuments and in the publishing of history essays that began with Mehmed Ali's experiences in his natal town and fondly presented the city as a major *lieu de mémoire* commemorating the roots of the royal family in the legendary land of Alexander of Macedon and the Ptolemaic dynasty. These historical references suited the agenda of Mediterranean identity in Egyptian royalist historiography that prevailed in the 1920s and 1930s. An illustrative example is Mehmed Ali's biography written by Ilyās al-Ayyūbī (1874–1927), a Palestinian who served as the head of the translation section in the Egyptian Senate House, and a protégé of King Fūʾād (r. 1917–36). The opening pages of the book were dedicated to Kavala, its historical significance since Classical times and its role in moulding the skills and abilities of the young Mehmed Ali.[46] Indeed, this type of narrative characterized the royalist school of history as developed mostly under King Fūʾād's tutelage and his wish to cultivate historical scholarship in Egypt sympathetic to the monarchy and its devotion to the modernization of Egypt.[47] More anecdotal was the naming of one of the royal yachts after the city of Kavala.

Under King Fūʾād, the house where Mehmed Ali was born was made into a small museum; in 1934 the Greek authorities built a statue of Mehmed Ali riding his horse. The statue, though depicting the founder of the dynasty as a chubby person, at least in the eyes of one of his descendants,[48] is situated on a small square adjacent to the house of Mehmed Ali. The statue was designed to create a commemorative itinerary that takes in the main points linking the Egyptian monarchy to Kavala. King Fūʾād was supposed to attend the ceremony inaugurating the statue but could not, due to illness. It was only in 1949 that another descendant of Mehmed Ali, Prince ʿUmar Ibrāhīm, officially dedicated the statue.[49] The Greek authorities maintained these buildings as a testimony to the Greek–Egyptian relationship. The *imaret* likewise held a modest exhibition dedicated to the connection between Kavala and Egypt. In January 2005 the *imaret* complex was reopened as a luxury hotel, faithfully restored and elegantly furnished to suggest an Oriental ambiance.[50]

In commemorating the Balkans, Kavala was an exceptional case, representing merely the concern of the Egyptian royal family to cherish its place of origin. Against the backdrop of general indifference in the Arab world, it was mostly the task of Bosnian scholars who arrived in Egypt to keep alive the memory of the Balkans among Arab readers. Muhammad al-Khāndjī al-Busnāwī, better known by his Bosnian name Mehmed Handžić (1906–44),

was a rare example indeed, writing in Arabic on the Muslims living in Bosnia-Herzegovina. His *Al-Jawhar al-Asnā fī Tarājim Ulamāʾ wa Shuʿarāʾ Būsna*, published in Cairo in 1349 (1930/31), is a unique example of a commemorative book, written in the tradition of biographical dictionaries; it was explicitly intended by its author to maintain an awareness of the Muslim heritage in Bosnia.[51]

Handžić's decision to settle temporarily in Cairo reflects the evolving importance of the Egyptian capital in preserving the bonds between the Arab world and the Balkans in the interwar period. Norris describes in his book on the Balkan Muslims the vital cultural arena developed by Albanian and Bosnian scholars in Cairo. During the first half of the twentieth century Cairo became one of the main centres for publishing Albanian literature, poetry, newspapers and plays.[52] Handžić, who studied at al-Azhar University, was therefore a member of a small yet influential group of Muslim émigrés from the Balkans who were active in Egypt. His work had two aims: to bolster Muslim identity among the Muslims of Bosnia and to acquaint the Muslim world with the Muslim presence in Bosnia – according to him, the last Muslim stronghold on European soil – in order to save Bosnian Muslims from oblivion.

The book *Al-Jawhar al-Asnā*, written in Arabic, was compiled with the second aim in mind. The book begins with a short introduction concerning the historical Muslim presence elsewhere in Europe, already consigned to oblivion: Andalusia and Sicily are presented to the reader as examples of territories where Islam flourished for hundreds of years, before being conquered by the infidels and lost to Islam. 'With the passing of time all of these lands mentioned above became devoid of Islam and Muslims; their heritage there was obliterated and their institutes were wiped out.'[53] A similar destiny awaits the Balkans, he laments. To describe the full extent of Muslim presence in the Balkans, Handžić refers to the seventeenth-century Ottoman traveller Evliya Çelebi. He compares Çelebi's description of Muslim Hungary, boasting a network of mosques, religious schools and Sufi lodges, with the contemporary situation in Hungary where no Muslims or mosques remained. In Belgrade, only one mosque frequented by some Muslim merchants was left from the dozens of mosques, religious colleges and schools for Muslim boys, all of them visited by Evliya Çelebi. Handžić himself witnessed the scale of destruction in Salonica, where mosques were razed or transformed into churches. At the sight of this obliteration, Handžić recalls the demise of Islam in Andalusia.

But physical destruction was not the only menace awaiting the Muslims of the Balkans; another danger stemmed from their relegation to oblivion in Muslim hearts. He claims that:

> We were able to find that the Muslims in Egypt do not possess any knowledge relating to the Muslims' conditions in this land [Bosnia], as if God never created them. This ignorance is not limited to the uneducated

> groups; even educated persons are totally devoid of information about their brethren inhabiting this land [Bosnia].[54]

Oblivion was the danger to which Handžić's book sought to provide some remedy. As part of his effort, Handžić relates the Muslim heritage of Bosnia and its deep attachment to Islam that was able to endure the vicissitudes of time. Only World War I and the subsequent establishment of Yugoslavia as a nation-state keen on developing a unified identity among its citizens could undermine this heritage. The implementation of a centralized educational system caused a deep turbulence among Muslims as among others. For Handžić, the character of the non-believer teacher serving in the state schools and imposing his false messages upon his innocent pupils ranked highest among the threats to the souls of Muslim children, and therefore to the survival of Islam in Royalist Yugoslavia. However, Bosnia was still different from other former Muslim lands in Europe, he claimed. Its Muslim population was still able to sustain a network of Muslim education and charity institutions, and to express a Muslim identity that was distinct from that of their non-believer neighbours in appearance, mentality and language.

To understand Handžić's sense of urgency and looming danger, we should briefly refer to the pressure exerted on the Muslims in interwar Yugoslavia to assimilate themselves with one of the surrounding national identities. During the parliamentary phase of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croatians and Slovenes, known from 1929 as Yugoslavia, the Muslims were not recognized by the state as a national group (like the Serbs and the Croatians), but merely as a religious community. Therefore, the Muslims were under constant pressure from the opposing Serbian and Croatian nationalist movements to identify themselves as either Serbs or Croats. The royal dictatorship, enforced in 1929 by King Alexander I (r. 1921–34) adopted a different approach: it was eager to impose the unitary concept of Yugoslavism (a common identity and political unity based on the shared South Slav origins) on the rival national groups by emphasizing their shared Slavic heritage. Internal administrative boundaries, based on historical divisions and ethnicity, were intentionally replaced with new administrative districts that cut across historical and ethnic lines. One of the outcomes of this decision was that Bosnia-Herzegovina, like other national territories, was erased from the national map.[55] Against this backdrop it is clear why Handžić was striving to underscore the differences existing between the Muslims of Bosnia and their Serbian and Croatian neighbours and close linguistic relatives.

Following World War II the significance of the Balkan Muslims in the eyes of the Arab public declined further still. Under the influence of nationalist-secular historiography and against the background of the good relations existing between Tito's Yugoslavia and the Arab world, much of the modest attention given to the Balkans in Arab publications was now devoted to Tito and his federative Yugoslavia, which presented a distinctive path towards socialism.[56] It seems that the few publications written in Arabic during this

period were mostly by non-Arabs. Sarajevo, now the official capital of the Bosnia-Herzegovina federative state in Communist Yugoslavia, became the centre for intellectual activity aimed at bridging between Yugoslavia and the Arab world. The Institute for Oriental Studies in Sarajevo (Orijentalni Institut U Sarajevu), established in 1950, was the main academic institute designated to study the Muslim heritage of the area and to promote the study of the Muslim world in general.[57] Among its publications in Arabic one can find a Serbo-Croatian–Arabic dictionary (1973) by Teufic Muftic, the second translation of the Koran into Bosnian (1975) prepared by Besim Korkut, and the publication of all the Arabic documents found in the archives of Dubrovnik, indicating the wide commercial and maritime connections between this Adriatic former city-state and the Arab world.[58] The Turkish Historical Society, for its part, published translations of scholarly studies relating to the Islamic presence in the Balkans. This was done especially to spur Arab awareness of the plight of Muslims in Communist Bulgaria in times of crisis between Turkey and Bulgaria.[59]

From the second half of the 1980s a new wave of publications appeared in the Arab world with regard to the Balkans and their considerable Muslim population. The wars in the former Yugoslav republics, and the new perceptions about the Ottoman heritage as seen in the Arab world, contributed to new interest and interpretations of the region's Islamic heritage.[60] For a short period the Balkans again benefited from the interest of the Arab media.

Conclusions

In 1980, the Egyptian historian ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Muhammad al-Shinnāwī published his book on the Ottoman Empire. The book, one of the first to revise openly the nationalist historiography hitherto prevailing in the Arab world with regard to the Ottoman Empire, summarizes the main Ottoman contributions to the Arab and Muslim worlds. Among those contributions, al-Shinnāwī mentions the expansion of the abode of Islam by incorporating the Balkans.[61] Indeed, the conquest of the Balkans is presented in his book as a major 'project' initiated and executed by the Turks. The assumed bond between the Ottoman Turks and the Balkans in Arab writing may explain the fact that the Arab perceptions of the Balkans are clearly linked to their attitudes towards the Ottoman past in general.

The development of national historiographies in the Arab world is intertwined with the demise of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I and the adoption of the nationalist narratives in the former Arab provinces, now under European mandate. This phenomenon could explain the reshaping of Arab perceptions of their own Ottoman past during the interwar period. In the nationalist narrative the Ottomans were regarded as foreign Turks who conquered most of the Arab world and subsequently caused its cultural, political and economic decline. The late Ottoman period was regarded as a time of constant failure and tyranny, which led inevitably to the rise of the

modern Arab nation-states.[62] In this discourse the Arabs' Ottoman heritage was clearly undermined and marginalized.[63] Parting with the Ottoman past meant also the severing of the historical links between the Arab world and the Balkans.

The indifference and silence of the Arab world with regard to the Balkans in general and the Balkan Muslims in particular is not sufficiently explained by pointing to the changed political circumstances that evolved after World War I. As demonstrated in this chapter, the estrangement from the Balkans was apparent in Arab writings already by the end of the Balkan Wars. In other words, the forgetting of the Balkans in Arab writings occurred within an Ottoman context. The Balkan Wars indeed brought the Balkans in general and the Balkan Muslims in particular, into focus for contemporary Arabs. This wide-ranging encounter prompted much sympathy and popular mobilization of assistance for the Muslim war victims. At the same time, however, the territorial losses in the Balkans were perceived not only as a military catastrophe, but also as a point of departure leading the Ottoman state toward a better future, in which it would develop its true character as a Muslim and non-European entity. The Balkans, therefore, were regarded almost as a rival territory, competing with the Arab provinces for the attention and limited resources of the Ottoman centre. For many Arab publicists, notwithstanding the scale of defeat and the damage caused to Muslim populations, the loss of the Balkans would thus mean fresh opportunities for the Arab provinces in the framework of the 'new' Ottoman Empire. It was hoped that within this framework the Arabs could take their appropriate place. The modest administrative reforms implemented in the Arab provinces in April 1913 – mainly in the realm of linguistic rights – and the new conciliatory policy of the CUP towards the Arabs were seen by many Ottoman Arabs as confirming this aspiration.[64]

Notes

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2 Ibid., pp. 6–7.
3 M. Mūfākū [al-Arnaut], *Tarikh Bilghrād al-Islāmīya*, Kuwait: Maktabat Dār al-ʿUrūba, 1987, pp. 5–7. He later published an expanded version of this book under the title *al-Islām fī Yūghuslāfiyā min Bilghirād ilā Sarāyīvū*, Amman: Dār al-Bashīr, 1993.
4 M. Augé, *Oblivion*, trans. by M. de Jager, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004, p. 17.
5 R. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History*, London: St Martin's Press, 1993.
6 M. Bakić-Hayden, 'Nestling Orientalisms: the Case of Former Yugoslavia,' *Slavic Review*, 1995, vol. 54, pp. 917–32.
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10 K. J. Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*, Cambridge: CUP, 2004, p. 73.

11 F. ʿAzzām (ed.), *al-Mudhakkirat al-Kāmila lil-Zaʿīm Sultān Bāshā al-Atrash* [Israel], 1998, pp. 85–6.

12 J. ʿAskarī, *A Soldier's Story: From Ottoman Rule to Independent Iraq*, trans. M. Tariq al-Askari, London: Arabian Publishing, 2003, pp. 38–48.

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10 The courts of the Palestinian Arab revolt, 1936–39

Mustafa Kabha

The 1936–39 Palestinian Arab revolt was undoubtedly a major juncture in modern Palestinian history. Yet in Palestinian historiography and, arguably, in the collective memory of Palestinians, it has hardly been remembered as such. Though often mentioned, it was completely overshadowed by the memory of the 1947–48 *Nakba* ('Catastrophe'). While the latter remains the focus of great attention, the developments of 1936–39, often treated in the most general terms, are still comparatively marginalized, arguably even silenced. Two explanations can be offered, one nationalist and one social.

First, it seems more natural to dwell on the *Nakba*, due to the magnitude of the disaster and the fact that much of the blame can be attributed to external factors: the Zionists, the Arab states, the British and other actors. Dealing with 1936–39 requires much more soul-searching. The revolt was a spontaneous, authentic Palestinian Arab uprising which led also to serious internal tensions, splits, and fraternal strife. It resulted in a self-inflicted wound that weakened Palestinian ability to cope with future challenges.

Second, the leadership of the revolt was soon captured by the lower classes and by representatives of the rural sectors. This chapter is devoted to reconstructing one aspect of this popular dynamism. The fact that such topics have mostly been neglected by Palestinian historians can be also attributed to their focusing on the roles of the upper and middle classes, and by their tendency to ignore voices from below.

The Palestinian Arab revolt of 1936–39 was not initiated by any formal leadership. It resulted from a complex social, political and cultural dynamic, which produced a spontaneous outburst. The power of the rebellion shook up previous leaderships and formed new ones. Palestinian Arab society had no 'state-in-progress' and no system of civil institutions that could step in and replace the British Mandate government. In the ensuing tempest, the population and its shaken leaders were compelled to construct governing systems providing services and order, in the midst of the fighting. This chapter examines the court system that developed from the spontaneous capabilities of the leadership and the populace under these conditions. The history of the Courts of the Revolt reflects contemporary Palestinian

circumstances in general and provides an additional angle for illustrating both Palestinian Arab sources of power and their inadequacy.

The revolt and the law: spontaneous origins

Two weeks after the beginning of the General Strike, declared by the Palestinian 'national committees' in April 1936, opposition to the British Mandate authorities increased under the guidance of these committees. They called for civil disobedience in all fields of life, and for the severing of all contact with Mandate institutions.[1] The policy of non-cooperation was implemented almost fully in the first few months. One of the banned institutions was the Mandatory Court; as a result, an alternative court system was needed. Muhammad ʿIzzat Darwaza of the al-Istiqlal Party and secretary of the 'Central Committee of the Jihad', which operated throughout the revolt from Damascus, noted in his memoirs:

> New arrivals from Palestine related from knowledgeable sources that the work of the government courts had been reduced by approximately 25 per cent. Many plaintiffs and complainants are appealing to the commanders of the revolt and asking them to judge and rule on their matter. The commanders usually agree to this demand and issue a verdict reasonably rapidly.

The Palestinian public indeed began appealing to 'committees of mediation and arbitration' established in the Palestinian Arab cities in coordination with the popular committees leading the strike. At the same time, it was clear that a formal solution was necessary to prevent legal matters from falling into unauthorized hands.[2]

A manifesto printed by Fawzi al-Qawiqji, the commander of the volunteer forces from Arab countries who entered Palestine in late August 1936, announced the establishment of the Court of the Revolt. This court received its authority from the supreme leader of the Arab revolt in Palestine, i.e. Qawiqji himself. The manifesto defined the role of the court: 'to perform judging roles among the Arab population of Palestine, to pass judgment and impose proper punishment, in order to introduce security and order and promote justice throughout Palestine. At the same time it will put an end to corruption, treachery and spying'. Aside from the supreme commander, other judges appointed were Muhammad al-Ashmar, commander of the Syrian detachment, Fakhri ʿAbd al-Hadi, commander of the Palestinian detachment (subsequently leader of the 'peace bands' mentioned below), ʿAbd al-Rahim al-Haj Muhammad, a Palestinian from the village of Dinabe near Tul Karm (subsequently general leader of the forces of the revolt), and the Syrian Munir al-Rayyis, general inspector of the forces of the rebellion.[3]

A short discussion of the first case brought before this court illustrates its characteristics. The subject of this first trial was the theft of a gun from one

of the rebels. The claim was filed on September 5, 1936, approximately two weeks after Qawiqji arrived in Palestine. It was documented in the *Bulletin of the Front*, published by the headquarters of the revolt:

> The Court of the Revolt in Southern Syria [Palestine] heard the version of the accused, Deeb al-Kayid, and his friend Hamid, and the testimony of Yusuf Ahmad Taqatiq. After hearing the prosecution, the court found that the aforementioned accused, Deeb al-Kayid, stole a gun from one of the Mujahidin, named Fulayh, but was caught red-handed. Therefore the court decided unanimously to comply with the request of the general prosecution, and sentenced him to one hundred lashes in public. In addition, the court ordered that the house of the accused shall be demolished, after evacuating all its inhabitants. The sentence was given in the presence of the accused, having received the approval of the Supreme Command.[4]

The accused appealed against the severity of the sentence before a smaller bench and received a reduced sentence of lashes, while the house demolition was cancelled. According to eye witnesses, the trial was held at Qawiqji's headquarters on Mt al-Muntar (south-west of the village of Balʿa, in the Tul Karm district). The thief received his punishment in the central square of the village of Balʿa, before many onlookers from the village and from other adjacent villages.[5]

Thus the first ruling of this court included two sentencing patterns, both traditional and modern. Punishing by lashes is common in Muslim law, the *Shariʿa*; punishing by house demolition, a collective and non-individual punishment, was introduced and widely used by the British, and one of the reasons for its cancellation at the appeal hearing was the attempt to avoid any resemblance to British legal practice. It seems that the judges of the revolt understood that house demolition was an extreme step that risked arousing the fury of the people, who were supposedly the supportive home front of the planned guerrilla war. Sentencing an accused to receive lashes was compatible with the declaration that the court's authority would derive from Islamic law.

The records indicate that Palestinians indeed preferred the Court of the Revolt to the Mandatory Court. ʿIzzat Darwaza relates:

> Some of those arriving from Palestine told us a number of interesting stories about the attitude of citizens to the government courts and the Courts of the Revolt. For example, the story of a man who came to Musa al-Nimr, a judge at the Magistrates' Court in Jaffa, and asked for the papers that he had filed. When the judge asked for his reason, he answered that he wished to file the claim at the Court of the Revolt. The judge had no recourse but to return his papers. In another case, attorney Nasri Nasri, representing a plaintiff in the Central Court, was seen arguing with his client in court. When the judge, Muhammad al-Baradiʿi, asked him what was the matter, the attorney answered that the plaintiff

> would like to postpone the hearing and to postpone judgment. The judge said that this was impossible and that his only recourse is to cancel the charges. The plaintiff answered that he has no objection, and when judge al-Baradiʿi demanded an explanation he said that he intends to press charges at the Court of the Revolt. The judge was amazed at the answer, but he complied with the plaintiff's request and removed the case from the court's agenda.[6]

It must be stated that in this initial phase of the revolt the court did not deal with issues of treachery, spying or actions against Palestinian national interests. These were still times of unqualified enthusiasm, and no such cases were recorded at this stage.

The peak of the revolt and institutionalization of the courts

In the summer of 1937, after publication of the Peel Commission recommendations, a new phase began in the history of the revolt. Qawiqji had returned to Iraq some time earlier (as early as October 1936) together with the joint Arab forces. The revolt was now led by local bands, organized throughout Palestine, and they served as the regional basis for courts created in the same format as Qawiqji's court. Now that the custom of avoiding the Mandatory Courts had become established, the authority of the Courts of the Revolt expanded, and they were required to intervene in all areas of life in Palestinian Arab society. In an interview, Bashir Ibrahim described the basis for the establishment of district courts:

> At first, local committees existed in almost every city and village. They engaged in mediation, citizens' problems were brought before them and they attempted to solve them. The problems concerned land, inheritance and other family affairs. The most serious problems – murders stemming from blood feuds, violations of family honour or betrayal of the national ideal – were brought before the commander of the local band of the revolt or before the regional commander. In certain cases, commanders of local bands would hold drumhead trials in the field. Anyone who objected to the verdict, or who was involved in a case, could appeal to the High Court of Appeal, which operated beside the headquarters of Commander ʿAbd al-Rahim [al-Haj Muhammad]. Most of the district courts were founded after Qawiqji's departure. The regional commanders appointed judges from among suitably educated and prestigious dignitaries. In my case, I was appointed by the regional commander in our area, ʿAbdallah al-Asʿad, who received confirmation of the appointment from the general commander, ʿAbd al-Rahim al-Haj Muhammad.[7]

The general commander, ʿAbd al-Rahim al-Haj Muhammad, commanded the 'Large Triangle' area – Jenin, Nablus, Tul Karm. He was the first regional

commander to establish a court of law, and in the summer of 1937 this court became the National Supreme Court for all areas of the revolt. ʿAbd al-Rahim appointed former Ottoman judge ʿAbd al-Qader al-Yusuf al-ʿAbd al-Hadi (from the village of ʿArrabeh near Jenin) to head the court. The legal team also consisted of ʿAbd al-Fattah Samara (from the village Dinabe near Tul Karm and a relative of the appointing commander) and Diya ʿAbdu (from Nablus). ʿAbd al-Rahim stated in the letter of appointment: 'The court was founded in response to the many cases brought before the Command of the Revolt. It will act in the interests of the public good in accordance with the Holy Book of Allah [the Qur'an] and the Sunna of Prophet Muhammad, and according to the rulings of the righteous first generation of Muslims.'[8]

Alongside this court, a High Court of Appeal was also founded, usually comprising the Supreme Commander of the Revolt, two regional commanders and four district judges. This court convened infrequently, usually at one of the two main headquarters of ʿAbd al-Rahim al-Haj Muhammad, in Balʿa or Kufr al-Labad. The fee for filing a claim was set at 50–500 Palestinian mils for a regular case, and 250–1,000 mils for an appeal.

The Supreme Court's letter of appointment set a statute of limitation of ten years on criminal matters, but there was no statute of limitation in cases of treachery and acting contrary to the national interest. This letter thus provided the courts with the authority to deal with the sale of land to Jews and with collaboration with Jewish elements or with the Mandate government, even if this act had been committed in the distant past. This enabled the courts to reopen old 'cases', even if the culprits had meanwhile 'repented' and now supported the forces of the revolt, or if their sons or brothers were among the fighting forces. The reopening of these old 'cases' provides an indication of the inability of leaders of the revolt to rise above the past and to avoid the tendency to 'settle old accounts'. By reopening them and imposing death sentences, the leaders sowed the seeds of the civil war into which the revolt deteriorated in its last phase. Relatives of those punished who sought to take revenge, sometimes even leaders of the small fighting bands, deserted from the forces of the revolt to the 'Peace Bands' (*Fasa'il al-Salam*) inspired by the British. The 'Peace Bands' consisted of people disillusioned with the revolt and many who felt undermined by the rural sector's domination of the revolt. Their struggle diminished the momentum of the Palestinian Arab rebellion and contributed to its repression by the British.

At the beginning, and as the armed revolt escalated and internal solidarity increased, these courts enjoyed public trust. At the same time, the commanders of the revolt were not above enforcing their judgment on litigants and punishing any who approached Mandatory Courts. Darwaza relates:

> One of the rebels owed money to a Tul Karm merchant. The merchant filed a claim at a [government] court, which issued a foreclosure decree on the rebel's assets. The merchant went to execute the decree, accompanied by a policeman. This became known to ʿAref ʿAbd al-Razeq, commander

> of the revolt in the Taybe-Tul Karm area, and he convened a band of rebels. They lay in wait for Muhammad ʿAbd al-Halim [the merchant] and the executing policeman, and arrested them. ʿAbd al-Razeq interrogated ʿAbd al-Halim, reprimanded him, forced him to sign and confirm full receipt of the sum, and fined him 50 Liras. ʿAbd al-Halim had no choice but to obey and sign the receipt.[9]

Such acts of coercion, in addition to the British authorities' disregard of the events and the absence of any reaction, were also grounds for citizens' appeals to the Courts of the Revolt. In many cases these courts proved their efficiency, particularly during the height of the revolt, when large parts of the country were ruled by the rebels. Darwaza concludes:

> Each rebel headquarters became a regional government centre. People come and go from these centres with no fear or discomfort. [Government] officials are aware of this, but they are powerless to prevent it, and they don't even try: The spirit of revolt has swept through the land and it rules. So and so has a problem requiring solution and another has a complaint, a person is owed money by another and wishes to be paid immediately, etc . . . Everybody comes to the commander of the revolt or to the government of the revolt in order to receive their due. The leaders of the revolt listen, comply with the demands and solve the problems. They send messengers to the litigants, convey notices or injunctions to be executed, a personal habeas corpus to the headquarters of the revolt or an injunction to perform a certain deed, and so forth.[10]

Another anecdote from the memoirs of Darwaza illustrates the efficiency of the legal system of the revolt compared to the impotence of the Mandatory system: One woman, a British citizen, appealed to the Magistrates' Court in Haifa asking it to hasten treatment of her complaint about the theft of jewellery from her apartment. The judge answered that it would take a long time, and mockingly said that she could appeal to the courts of Abu Durra (commander of the revolt in the area), and he would see to it that her jewellery was returned. The woman took the suggestion seriously, taking a taxi to the headquarters mentioned, in the village of ʿEin al-Sahla in Wadi ʿAra, and gave Abu Durra the names of the suspects. A week later the woman was called to his headquarters, where she received her jewellery.[11]

A British judge, cited in ʿEzra Danin's book, described the Courts of the Revolt:

> At first such courts were established in the region of Commander ʿAbd al-Rahim al-Haj Muhammad, then the other headquarters followed suit and courts of law were established in the regions of ʿAref ʿAbd al-Razeq [the southern Triangle and the Coast from Netanya to Jaffa] and Yusuf Abu Durra [the area of Haifa, the Carmel, Wadi ʿAra and the Jezreʿel

> Valley] and Sheikh Hasan Salame [the area of Ramle and Latrun] and the area of al-Mashayikh in the northern district [Upper Galilee]. All these erected courts were similar to the first, however their scale of activity did not reach that of the courts of Commander ʿAbd al-Rahim. With the exception of ʿAbd al-Rahim's district, judges followed their political orientation. They were often inclined to rob and steal, particularly if the accused belonged to the opposition.[12]

This tendency towards separate and arbitrary decisions gradually grew in the popular legal network as well, parallel to the diminishing ability of the Palestinian Arab leadership to supervise the various areas of the revolt.

In the absence of justice – deterioration of the revolt

Some of the leaders of the armed bands demonstrated independence in everything related to conducting trials, sentencing, and executing sentences. Senior leaders of the revolt decided to issue instructions to the leaders of the bands, calling them to order and demanding that they avoid decisions related to the execution of sentences pending approval of the Supreme Command. General Commander ʿAbd al-Rahim al-Haj Muhammad sent a letter in the summer of 1938 to the leaders of the armed bands, listing his instructions:

> Article 4. Band leaders do not have the authority to sentence a man to death, whatever the incriminating evidence. Only the Supreme Command has the authority to issue such a sentence.
>
> Article 5. In order to preserve the purity of the revolt and its public image, band leaders are forbidden to impose fines, in any circumstances. They may arrest the guilty and hand them over to the Supreme Command for judgment, although it is clear to everyone that traitors and plotters will not be sentenced to fines.[13]

The Command of the Revolt distinguished between criminal hearings and hearings concerning treachery or acting contrary to national interests. The instructions of the Command stated which punishments could not be given to traitors, but not which punishment was appropriate. The ambiguity probably stemmed from two factors: this was a way of saying that the obvious punishment for the offence of treachery was death. In addition, it left band leaders the recourse of killing those accused of treachery whom representatives of the Supreme Command were unable to bring to the High Court of the Revolt. This ambiguity left room for anarchy in the activities of the Court of the Revolt and for an increase in local initiatives, seemingly performed on its behalf.

At first the instructions of the Supreme Command were defied in places far from the Large Triangle, an area which was almost completely controlled by the rebels. Later on, such acts of defiance became prevalent in places

traditionally controlled by families identified with the Nashashibi camp; the 'opposition' to the leadership was headed by the Husseini camp. For example, the city of Ramallah and its vicinity were under the influence of the 'Nashashibis' and the opposition protected and legitimized those who defied the instructions of the Supreme Command. In September 1938, the Supreme Command published a manifesto describing the actions of a new band, the ʿIz al-Din al-Qassam Band, sent to Ramallah in order to deal with incidents in which instructions given by the Court of the Revolt had been violated and to apply pressure on the opposition. The dispatching of the band was described in the manifesto as:

> the first stage in a grand plan of the General Headquarters. Its main goal is to establish the work of the national committees and the committees of mediation and reconciliation, which will enable each innocent citizen to enjoy his rights and prevent hostility and aggression. It will also put an end to the activities of the corrupt, the schemers and those who steal citizens' property due to wrongful interests.

The manifesto further related that the band was welcomed with cries of joy by the multitudes who took to the streets in its honour, after they had attacked a number of government targets in the city, severed telephone lines, attacked a police station and attacked the building of the local Magistrates' Court.[14]

However, this activity of the ʿIz al-Din al-Qassam Band did not end the anarchy in the legal system, rather it destroyed its remaining ability to enforce order. The anarchy gradually increased when the general commander, ʿAbd al-Rahim al-Haj Muhammad, was injured in battle near the village of Nazla al-Sharqiyya (Tul Karm region) and taken to a Damascus hospital. The sources indicate a growing atmosphere of debilitation, quoting accounts of the Supreme Command's inability to enforce its will on the band leaders.

ʿAref ʿAbd al-Razeq, who tried to fill ʿAbd al-Rahim's place, did not succeed. In November 1938 he published a manifesto stating that:

> band leaders are not authorized to impose fines or to confiscate property of their own accord. They must receive the approval of the Supreme Command. Anyone [of the band leaders] who acts on his own accord, will be responsible to the High Court of the Revolt . . . Any band leader who has knowledge or proof of treachery, must bring these to the Supreme Command, supported by solid proof. The command will decide which measures to take.[15]

Manifestos distributed by other senior commanders stressed time and again that the role of the band leaders was strictly military and that they had no authority to deal with civil matters. These recurrent notices attest to disobedience toward the Supreme Command and, in fact, the beginning of the

revolt's disintegration. The violations, which grew more frequent and were ostensibly performed on behalf of the leadership, marred the image of the revolt among the very public which it sought to represent.

Some of the violations were performed in the vicinity of supreme commanders: ʿAref ʿAbd al-Razeq treated the case of a senior band leader under his command who issued verdicts without receiving ʿAref's approval. He was brought to the Court of the Revolt, demoted, and fined 100 liras.[16] In another incident, one of the bodyguards of General Commander ʿAbd al-Rahim was brought before the Court of the Revolt due to improper behaviour. He was convicted, removed from duty, and fined 10 liras.[17]

A drama that severely affected the image of the courts and the remaining unity of the revolt began at the initiative of the followers of Sheikh Yusuf Abu Durra. They tried thirty-eight *mukhtar*s and prominent public figures *in absentia* on charges of selling land, land speculation, and cooperation with Jewish institutions and with the British government. The 'court' sentenced the mukhtars to death, and Abu Durra sent groups of assassins to carry out the executions. The operation was conducted on the night of January 4–5, 1939, and it concluded with the execution of five people, four mukhtars and one prominent rural leader. Six other mukhtars were wounded; the rest apparently received prior warning and spent the night elsewhere. The British later sentenced Abu Durra to death for this act. The event emerged as a traumatic memory and resulted in a split between the general public and the leadership of the revolt, a process manifested, among other things, in a mass return to the governmental legal system.[18]

A British judge attested to the deterioration of the court system toward the end of the revolt:

> In late 1938, particularly after Commander ʿAbd al-Rahim al-Haj Muhammad left for Syria, and after Supreme Judge ʿAbd al-Qader al-Yusuf left as well, band leaders began trying cases and deciding disputes, and legal anarchy reigned. Band commanders discriminated in favour of those who seemed more important. In most cases the considerations dictating their sentences were familial or a result of bribery. Many began fleeing these courts to Syria and Lebanon or asking the leader of the rival band for sanctuary. When the legal system of the revolt disappeared, the public reverted to the government courts.[19]

The courts – profile of the leadership

As stated, after the High Court of the Revolt was established, the regional commanders initiated district courts, which encompassed most of the country: the Galilee, Haifa and the coast, Jaffa and Ramle, the northern valleys, the Shomron and the Jerusalem region, Hebron, Gaza and Beersheba. The judges and officers of this system were selected by the Supreme Command of the Revolt and approved by the Central Committee for the Jihad, located in

Damascus. Some of the renowned figures who served as judges or members of the Courts of the Revolt were:[20]

1. ʿAbd al-Qader al-Yusuf al-ʿAbd al-Hadi (ʿArrabeh, District of Jenin) – Supreme Judge;
2. Diya ʿAbdu (Nablus) – member of the Supreme Court;
3. ʿAbd al-Fattah Samara (Dinabe, District of Tul Karm) – member of the Supreme Court;
4. ʿAbd al-Hamid Ibrahim (Kufr al-Dik, District of Nablus) – district court and sometimes Supreme Court judge;
5. Bashir Ibrahim (Zayta, District of Tul Karm) – district court judge;
6. Sheikh Salih Taha (Saffuriya, District of Nazareth) – district court judge;
7. Salim Ibtali (Qalqilya) – district court judge;
8. Sheikh Hammed al-Khatib (Kawkab Abu al-Hayja, Upper Galilee) – district court judge;
9. Fayyad Hasan Tamish Mahajna (Lajjun, District of Jenin) – district court judge, active in the area of Balad al-Ruha and Wadi ʿAra;
10. Sheikh ʿAli al-Saʿadi (al-Mansi, District of Jenin) – district court judge, active in the area of Marj ʿIbn ʿAmar (Jezreʿel Valley) and al-Ruha;
11. Ahmad Abu Hantash (Qaqun, District of Tul Karm) – district court judge, active in the area of Wadi al-Hawarath;
12. Ahmad al-Mazraʿawi (al-Mazraʿah, District of Ramallah) – member of the district court;
13. ʿAref Ibrahim (Kufr Raʿi, District of Jenin – member of the district court;
14. Muhammad Diab (Silat al-Thahr, District of Jenin) – member of the district court;
15. Shakib al-Kutab (Nablus) – member of the district court;
16. Muhammad al-Ghuzlan al-Saffuri (Saffuriya, District of Nazareth) – member of the district court;
17. Khalil Abu Laban (Ramle) – member of the district courts in the areas of Ramle and Jaffa;
18. Al-Haj Mansur Halawa (Jaffa) – member of the district court in Jaffa;
19. Muhammad Ahmad al-Masʿoud (Um al-Shuf, District of Haifa) – member of the district court;
20. Sheikh Tawfiq al-Salih (ʿIllar, District of Tul Karm) – member of the district court, operating in the northern area of the Tul Karm District (al-Shaʿrawiyya);
21. Musa al-Batal (Tirat al-Karmel, District of Haifa) – secretary of the district court;
22. ʿAbd al-Halim al-Jinsafuti (Jınsafut, District of Ramallah) – operating in a district court in the Jaffa area.

The profiles of these officials may indicate the criteria that led to their appointment. Four were clerics carrying the title of shaykh, acting imams who were also known for their integrity and incorruptibility. They enjoyed

public prestige and were influential in their communities. Testimonies collected from their acquaintances and relatives indicate that they engaged in mediation and social arbitration prior to the revolt, and in some cases continued doing so after it ended. Six others were known as clerics who served as imams when necessary, as well as mediating. Three others were members of the religious bands established by Sheikh ʿIz al-Din al-Qassam in the first half of the thirties. This fact ensured their public trust and they were known as 'Qassamiyoun'. Two others were rebel-fighters who were appointed judges due to their knowledge and proficiency in the Shariʿa or on the finer points of Ottoman law (the laws of the *Mijalla*). The others were appointed mainly due to their affinity with the band commanders operating in their area.

Of the twenty-two officials mentioned, only five hailed from the cities (two from Jaffa, two from Nablus and one from Ramle) while the remainder were from rural areas. The small number of city dwellers indicates the degree to which the revolt was dominated by rural elements, as well as the lack of trust accorded the bourgeoisie, intellectuals and the urban elite by leaders of the fighting bands. These three classes led the general strike (April–October 1936) but did not succeed in directing the revolt after the initial phase of passive struggle.

Prosecution procedures and the process of trial

The Courts of the Revolt operated clandestinely and were constantly evading the British authorities. Those who wished to use their services had to contact a local commander, who would see to it that the matter was brought before the District Judge or the General Command and the Supreme Court. Their response would arrive through mediators. If the request for trial was approved, the litigants would be brought to the place of trial and returned blindfolded. Darwaza related:

> There are many accounts that mention kidnapping. What happens is that people appeal to the leaders of the revolt with their affairs and problems. The leaders send messengers to the defendants asking them to come to the headquarters of the revolt. Some consent easily and accompany the messengers readily, and others demonstrate hesitation or objection. In such cases the messengers would take them to the headquarters forcibly and the commander would examine the cases and the complaints brought and decide how to treat them. Then he would order that the people who were brought by force be released. Sometimes the commander received reports of people who spoke evil of the revolt. In such cases the commander would order that they be brought forcibly. He would examine the reports, question the accused, and most often make do with a warning . . . People were usually not executed until decisive proof was presented. For the most part the abductions ended well and those abducted would return home safe and sound.[21]

The Courts of the Revolt had no modern code of laws or written criteria to guide the judges, who based their decisions on the Shari'a and on social conventions. When deliberating on matters of conflict between families, clans and social groups, the judges referred to local customs and traditions. They often used their discretion when encountering new circumstances and contexts. Sentences were not consistent, even in identical cases. Criminal cases were less complex, as they were based on customary laws and traditions. However cases of treachery and acting contrary to national interests were different. What was considered treachery? Who determined the nature of the act and its severity? Decisions on these fateful issues had no precedents, and the judges found them to be an almost impossible challenge. However as long as the rebels had the power to enforce the sentences reached by their courts, and as long as their acts were perceived by the general public as legitimate, the verdicts were received with understanding and sometimes humility. When the power of the rebels diminished, and when traditional conventions of justice and honour were increasingly abused, the courts lost their public legitimacy.

Means of punishment

This law enforcement system made use of a number of types of punishment, and their execution was obviously affected by the virtually underground character of the entire process.[22]

1. **Incarceration:** in the absence of appropriate facilities and due to the need to operate clandestinely, incarceration was applied only in rare cases. The authorities of the revolt usually imprisoned people for purposes of interrogation or to ensure their appearance in court. Abandoned houses, empty pits and wells and caves in remote hills served as prison facilities. Four main wells were used by the rebels: near the village of Zayta in the district of Tul Karm; 'Ein al-Sahlah in the district of Jenin; and Kawkab Abu al-Hayja and Tarshiha, both in the Upper Galilee. Aside from these, occasional use was made of dozens of local wells. The accused were imprisoned in the wells for a maximum of a few months, and guards or relatives lowered down their meagre supplies by rope. Jailors were often forced to flee the place of arrest upon the approach of British forces, and in such cases the detainees remained at the bottom of the well, with no bread or water, for a number of days.[23]
2. **Lashes and hard labour:** punishment by lashes was applied mainly in cases of moral transgression, theft or domestic violence. The punishment was usually carried out in public, and the number of lashes varied from ten to one hundred. Another physical punishment was chaining the feet in iron chains and leaving the punished man barefoot for a certain period. Hard labour was imposed in a manner that served the struggle: building stone barriers to disrupt British forces or removing British barriers, carrying equipment and supplies to rebels by mountainous routes, and so on.[24]

3. **Fines:** fines were imposed in cases of theft, destruction of property and evading assistance to the forces of the revolt. The fines varied from a few grush to 100 Palestinian liras. If the accused could not pay in cash, he was required to pay in goods, usually agricultural produce or foodstuffs used to feed the fighters.
4. **Exile:** this punishment was imposed mainly in cases of feuds between families and clans related to family honour or blood feuds. An attempt was usually made to banish the violator of social conventions. The purpose of this separation was to calm everybody down and to enable the committees of reconciliation and mediation, operating on behalf of the revolt, to reach a 'sulha' thereby facilitating the return of the exile. Banishment in such cases could last between six months and two years.
5. **Death sentence:** when reconstructed, the patterns of capital punishment reflect an interesting development of the revolt and its transformations, particularly with respect to the level of solidarity among the Palestinian Arab population. At the height of the revolt, when the court system reached its full power and influence, almost no death sentences were recorded. In this period only the Supreme Court of the Revolt had the authority to sentence a person to death, and it usually rejected such recommendations made by the district courts.[25] When the momentum of the revolt diminished, the legal system lost much of its power, as well as its efficiency and influence. It gradually became more difficult to conduct regular legal proceedings. Litigants had difficulty finding the leaders or their mediators – some left the country, while others were killed in battles with the British or were arrested. Under the ensuing conditions most trials were held hastily and carried out by inferiors. Most of the convictions and sentences were imposed on the accused *in absentia*, and the sentencing was usually strict and the degree of severity did not always correspond to the seriousness of the offence.

During this period, junior judges sentenced many people to death, mainly those accused of treachery and of collaborating with the British and with the Jewish establishment. Bands of assassins were responsible for executing the sentences, and they did so in the homes of the accused or by ambush. In many cases, the accused had no idea that they had been judged and sentenced to death.[26] This anarchy soon undermined the national foundations of the revolt. The relatives of those sentenced to death and their families stood up to the forces of the revolt and established, with British encouragement, the 'Peace Bands'. From here the road to civil war was short indeed, and it erupted in full strength in the last months of 1938 and the first half of 1939. This civil war weakened Palestinian Arab society for years to come, took a toll that lasted generations, and formed a traumatic collective memory of the entire revolt.

Thus the story of the courts of the Palestinian Arab revolt during 1936–39 serves as a window onto the history of Palestinian solidarity throughout this

period. As long as national coherence prevailed, the spontaneous legal system operated efficiently and provided a proper, fair and popular alternative to the Mandatory system. At the height of the armed revolt (from the summer of 1937 until the autumn of 1938) the people's identification with the revolt and its goals matched their willingness to accept the legitimacy of its courts. When cracks began to appear in the wall of solidarity and the revolt deteriorated into civil war, the internal balance of the spontaneous system of justice was destroyed as well and itself became a contributing cause of decline. Deep rifts were formed in the delicate structure of Palestinian Arab society, making it easier for the British to re-establish their hegemony over the Palestinians.

Appendix 1: Bashir Ibrahim, profile of a judge at the time of the revolt [27]

Bashir Ibrahim was born in the village of Zayta in 1910. After completing his primary education he worked in agriculture. He was an autodidact, who read Islamic books of law and learned the Ottoman 'Mijalla' laws and was greatly influenced by his brother Iskandar, who was an investigator at the Zichron Yaʿaqov Mandatory police station. In an interview, Bashir Ibrahim described his varied positions in the court system of the revolt:

> I began as an investigator, then at age 27 I was appointed Justice of the Peace, dealing with petty legal and criminal issues. Then I was promoted and I became a District Judge in the region extending from Caesarea in the north to Tul Karm in the south and from Hadera in the west to Kufr Raʿi in the east. In this position I coordinated between the bands of the revolt and the public, finding solutions to conflicts and incidents that broke out between the bands of the revolt and the civil populace. In addition to this role, I also handled information systems and publicity and I phrased the manifestos distributed by the Supreme Command of the Revolt.

The area under Ibrahim's responsibility was extensive, and he would move from place to place at night, accompanied by armed bodyguards, carrying his authorization to work as a judge, awarded by the General Commander of the Revolt. While on assignment, he was caught by the British at the Gan Shmu'el railway station. He was imprisoned at the Mazraʿah Prison (near Acre) where he remained until the conclusion of the revolt. He attests that he continued engaging in legal affairs and arbitration while in prison, and helped settle conflicts that broke out between the prisoners. Bashir Ibrahim continued engaging in mediation and arbitration after the revolt, was a regular member of the 'Reconciliation Committee' (*Lajnat al-Sulh*) of the Tul Karm area under Jordanian (1948–67) and, later, Israeli rule (1967–87), and even engaged in arbitration during the First Intifada (1987–91).[28]

Appendix 2: Selected legal issues

A. Trial of the Jewish engineer Yehoshuwa Dafna: [29]

Headquarters of the General Command of the Arab revolt in Palestine, 26 of Jamada II, year 1357 of the Hijra [23 August 1938]

In the name of merciful and compassionate God: Announcement to the magnificent Arab nation

On the road from Haifa to Jaffa, the Mujahidin of the al-Zalazil band stopped the Jewish engineer Yehoshuwa Dafna. He was brought before the district court on 18 August 1938 and sentenced to death, but he was allowed to appeal to the High Court of Appeal. The accused took advantage of this opportunity and his case was transferred to the Supreme Court of the Revolt. The court heard his appeal and the many witnesses and decided as follows: Considering that many trustworthy Arab witnesses have testified in favour of the accused, and considering that the man has not admitted to affiliation with the Zionist idea which we hate and loathe,

1. and considering the fact that a death sentence would be catastrophic for his family and young children
2. and based on the court's belief in the famous Arab concept 'al-ʿafw ʿind al-maqdira' [granting clemency from a position of power]
3. and based on the fact that the court sees the accused as a prisoner-of-war who should not be harmed

In light of all the above, the court decides as follows:

1. To release this prisoner and not to accept the sum (1000 Palestinian liras) which he offered as a ransom in return for his release, in order to prove that the revolt has lofty goals and it rises above base materialism.
2. To grant the accused 5 Palestinian Liras and Arab clothes from the coffers of the revolt and to return him peacefully to the place from whence he was taken.
3. To charge a committee of the revolt with advertising the details of the verdict, so that it will be known in public that the Arabs perform lofty deeds in all they do.

Signed,

ʿAbd al-Rahim al-Haj Muhammad

General Commander of the revolt and President of the High Court of Appeals

B. Criminal Case against A.S. of the village Jat and M.S. of the village ʿIllar

Judge Bashir Ibrahim related in an interview:

These two people came at night to the village of Sarkas and took jewellery, eight Palestinian liras, and a model no. 5 Mauser pistol from two women. The villagers appealed to me for help. I contacted Commander ʿAbdallah al-Asʿad and he asked me to go there and investigate. On the way we passed through the home of A.S. in the village Jat. We searched his house and we found the stolen items. In his investigation he gave us the names of the women who had been robbed. Since he was under the command of the General Commander, he refused to appear before the Court of the Revolt. I sent a message to the band commanders in the area, Ahmad Abu Zaytun, ʿAbdallah al-Asʿad and ʿAbd al-Rahman Zaydan, and they sent me some armed rebels. I sent the rebels to arrest him and I commanded them to warn him that if he would not accompany them in five minutes they would begin shooting everyone present. When the women heard the threat they said that if he would not obey they would come in his place. When he heard this, he agreed to come. The trial was held under guard of the Um al-Fahm band, commanded by Yusuf al-Hamdan. I was the prosecutor and the judges were three band commanders from the area. I prepared the case for the prosecution in advance and I recited it for the court. After a lengthy discussion, the court decided as follows:

> A.S. was convicted. He will receive 50 lashes, he must walk with the rebels for one month barefoot and in iron chains, his weapons will be confiscated, he will be exiled for two years. If he is seen in the area during this time he will be under no legal protection.[30]

Notes

1 On this, see: A. Zuʿaitir, *Al-Haraka al-Wataniyya al-Filastiniyya. Muʾassasat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya*, Beirut, 1980, pp. 61–75; see also: T. Swedenburg, *Memories of Revolt: The 1936–1939 Rebellion and the Palestinian National Past*, Minneapolis: Unversity of Minnesota Press, 1995.
2 M. I. Darwaza, 'Muzakkarat Muhammad ʿIzzat Darwaza', *Dar al-Gharb al-Islami*, Beirut, 1993, vol. 3, p. 644.
3 M. Khadr al-ʿAli, 'Taht Rayat al-Qawiqji', *Matbaʾat Babil*, Damascus, 1938, pp. 32–3.
4 Nashrat al-Jabha, September 1936.
5 Interview with Bashir al-Ibrahim, Regional Judge for the revolt in the Tul Karm area, July 18, 1999.
6 M. I. Darwaza, 'Muzakkarat Muhammad ʿIzzat Darwaza', p. 644.
7 Bashir Ibrahim, Interview, July 18, 1999.
8 This Letter of Appointment of the Court is located in the Archives of the British Colonial Office, file no. C.O. 733-2983.
9 This story is related by M. I. Darwaza, 'Muzakkarat Muhammad ʿ Izzat Darwaza', vol. 3, pp. 644–5.
10 Ibid., p. 645.
11 Ibid., p. 755.
12 This testimony of the British judge appears in E. Danin's book, *Teʾudot Udmuyot*

Miginzey Haknufiyot Ha'arviyot Bim'ora'ot 1936–1939. Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1981, pp. 27–9.

13 These instructions appear in a document kept in the archives of the British Colonial Office, file no.: C.O. 733-2983.
14 This manifest appears in: A. Zu'aitir, *Watha'iq al-Haraka al-Wataniyya al-Filastiniyya, 1918–1939*, Beirut, 1979, p. 502.
15 Ibid., pp. 518–19.
16 Interview with Bashir Ibrahim, July 18, 1999.
17 Ibid.
18 Interview with Hani Hasan Fayyad, son of the judge representing Abu Durra's headquarters, Fayyad Hasan Tamish Mahajna, originally from the village of Lajjun and later a refugee in Um al-Fahm. The interview took place in his home in Um al-Fahm on February 11, 2001.
19 E. Danin, *Te'udot Udmuyot Miginzey*, pp. 28–9.
20 Information on activists of the Courts of the Revolt appears in: Y. Porat, *Mimehumot Limrida: Hatnu'ah Hale'umit Ha'arvit Hafalestinit, 1929–1939*. Tel Aviv: Am Oved Publishers Ltd, 1978. In addition: M. I. Darwaza, *Mazkarat*, Volume 3; A. Zu'aitir, *Watha'iq*, E. Danin, *Te'udot*, passim.
21 M. I. Darwaza, 'Muzakkarat Muhammad ʿIzzat Darwaza', vol. 3, p. 655.
22 About some of the methods of punishment see: M. I. Darwaza, Ibid, vol. 3, p. 655.
23 About this see: M. Kabha and N. Sirhan, *Bashir Ibrahim, al-Qadi al Tha'ir fi Thawrat 1936–1939*, Ramallah, 2000, pp. 26–8.
24 Interview with Sadeq Jarrar, commander of one of the rebel bands that guarded the facilities of the Court of the Revolt in the Jenin area. The interview was held in his home, in the village of al-Bard (area of Jenin) on May 10 1999.
25 Interview with Mahmoud Ismaʿil Barimi (Abu Fathi), commander of a regional band and member of a Court of the Revolt in the Tul Karm area. The interview was held in his home, in the village of al-Labd, on March 30 1999.
26 Interview with Bashir Ibrahim, 18 July, 1999.
27 The biography summary appears in: Kabha and Sirhan, *Bashir Ibrahim*, p. 21.
28 Ibid.
29 The document appears in: M. Kabha, N. Sirhan, *ʿAbd al-Rahim al-Haj Muhammad, al-Qa'id al-ʿAm Lithawrat 1936–1939*. Ramallah, 2000, pp. 165–6.
30 The verdict appears in: Kabha and Sirhan, *Bashir Ibrahim*, pp. 25–6.

11 Multiplicity or polarity

A discursive analysis of post-1908 violence in an Ottoman region

Meltem Toksöz

It is now common historical or even popular knowledge that the so-called 'Armenian Question' was one of the most challenging problems of the late Ottoman Empire; it still is for the Turkish republic. The international dimension pushing the Turkish authorities toward an acknowledgement of responsibility for the 1915 massacres adds to the challenge, rendering all the more difficult any scholarly discussion between the two opposing discourses of complete responsibility and denial. In other words, the history of Ottoman Armenians is abundantly written about through two discourses, neither of which leaves space for any other analysis. The problem is not one of silence but of noise that obscures any possibility of differentiation. That is to say, these binary discourses do not admit any other kind of research into the complex Ottoman Armenian history, despite multi-dimensional contemporary sources. Whatever history we have on Ottoman Armenians is thus veiled if not locked into violence, completely silencing other scholarship on a whole host of issues, including moments of crisis and violence before 1915.

My primary aim in this chapter is to carve a space in Ottoman Armenian history outside the two binary positions of absence and presence of genocide. Indeed, selecting a chapter of that history before 1915 is part of this attempt. Another part, equally important, lay in selecting a provincial geography with a prominent and historically strong Armenian populace that was not affected by the other violence of the nineteenth century.

A brief period, 13 days, of violence in 1909, occurred in southeast Ottoman Anatolia, previously Cilicia, encompassing the medieval geography of Lesser Armenia. Most of the literature on the violence in and around Adana in 1909, which resulted in the death of thousands of Armenians in this large and largely multi-ethnic/confessional/linguistic region, has been written within two principal discourses. Scholars, writers, and intellectuals on either side have settled on the two distinct terms of massacre/*katliam* and *iğtişaş*/incident when referring to the violence. The result is that this 1909 violence is referred to without contextualizing the history of the region, whose Armenian history is perhaps one of the least studied. However, the two frameworks are actually not that readily demarcated when one researches the many narratives produced in contemporary accounts, archives, papers, books etc.

Contemporary positions were actually much more diversified and unclear than the two frameworks suggest.

The massacres began just one day after the Ottoman counter-revolution of 1909, and thus easily allowed both contemporary and current scholarship to identify the Adana violence as either an extension of the Islamic opposition to the 1908 Young Turk revolution, or as part of a secretive Committee of Union and Progress rehearsal for 1915. I believe neither connection is clear. What happened in Çukurova was not simply an extension of *ancien régime* support, nor did the province have such organized links with the CUP. Both relations assume a strong network of ties between the province and the imperial centre which could not have developed outside the context of regional dynamics.

Hence, I argue here that the 1909 violence must be analysed in its own right, and in a regional light. The nineteenth-century development of this very dynamic region was an almost autonomous process culminating from a web of relations between global, imperial central, provincial and local forces.[1]

In this chapter I begin to analyse the local multiplicity of forces, mostly for the first five months, between April and August 1909. I am not as much interested in unravelling a silence per se, but rather in exploring the creation of polarized discourses that serve principally the nationalist history of either side. Instead of what actually took place, I will look into the narratives of events in order to reconstruct the making of oppositional discourses, not researching the claims. For determining one claim over the other will not help us distance ourselves from nationalist history, much as any admission on the part of the Turkish republic of the genocide will not turn the silence/absence into sound history. I believe that only such a discursive analysis into the making of binary histories in a particular region can rescue us from our nationalist world and provide new tools beyond imperial/national paradigms. Indeed, regional historical analysis can be the first step in explaining the making of the nation-state in a more historical light, rather than as an 'inevitable unfolding'.

The case of Ottoman Çukurova/Cilicia is particularly fertile for such an endeavour. By 1908, this was a land of shared hegemony between foreign capitalists, bourgeoning indigenous classes, and the state. The new social and economic stratification resulted in a major but single clash between Muslims and Armenians in 1909. But a year later, the regional recovery was remarkable and nothing pointed toward similar disruption in the region's history until the war.

The long history of the region can be traced back to medieval times, when Cilicia was the seat of an Armenian kingdom. However, it did not have an official toponym during the Ottoman Empire. At the beginning of the nineteenth century most of Cilicia was nothing but a marshland, where settled Armenian and Turcoman nomadic populations cohabited with ease. Indeed, much of its land mass, surrounded by mountain ranges in the north and east and by the sea in the south, showed no signs of being an integrated

social or political space until the second half of the nineteenth century. Moreover, Cilicia represented an indeterminate area between two major culture zones of the Arab world and Anatolia. The tribal background of the region posed an important obstacle to any settlement effort. First and foremost, Cilicia needed a settled population that would engage in commercial cotton cultivation.[2] The 1860s brought yet another dimension to Cilicia, which eventually affected profoundly the human geography of the region: the Muslim immigrants who settled there following the Crimean War required constant protection from tribal intervention. The second wave of migration after 1862–63, this time of Circassians from the Caucusus, pointed to a more conscious effort for efficient settlement, which culminated in the attempt to sedentarize a larger portion of the nomadic populace, namely the Forced Settlement (*Fırka-ı Islahiye*) in 1865.[3] However, sedentarization was no easy task and entailed a long process. As the region began to take shape, settlement increased and different ethnic communities such as Arab Christians and Greeks added to the indigenous Turcoman and Armenian population.

By the end of the nineteenth century the region became a separate Ottoman province, the province of Adana, and a major region of cotton production and export, capable of holding its own in the Eastern Mediterranean competition of integrating into an increasingly global world. The shaping of this regional landscape was both artifact and agent of a multitude of negotiations between the imperial centre, the urban municipal and provincial governments, and global forces in the post-Tanzimat era. The 1867 establishment of provincial administration in Cilicia (Adana Vilayeti) provided the governor with the power to control tax-collection. New institutions, such as district and township committees, created at sub-provincial levels presented the local powers with new political mechanisms. These committees in the towns consisted of tax officials, kadı, police chief, and Muslim and non-Muslim members of the local community. Through this provincial administrative restructuring, the reforms instituted local empowerment mechanisms, which were among the reasons behind the rise of local authority, and the setting behind social conflicts.[4] Regional resources and regional development held these conflicts at bay as long as the region could preserve its relative autonomy vis-à-vis the Empire. Hence, the peak of the autonomous strength of the region fell in the era between the late 1870s and the 1890s when the indigenous population used every opportunity to make use of the growing interest of both the central state and foreign capital, at different levels and capacities. The 1886 opening of the railway between the provincial centre, Adana and the port city of Mersin, greatly helped the accumulation of local revenue and power.[5]

Consequently, by 1908, Ottoman Çukurova was a land of tremendous growth and wealth shared by all the burgeoning indigenous classes, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. This new social and economic stratification caused clashes between Muslims and Armenians only when the region lost its relative autonomy in economic development as of 1908, to be tied to the development

of a national economy, disrupting the regional distribution of power. It was such autonomy that had enabled the very mixed ethnic population of the region to cohabit peacefully and even welcome immigrants, Arab Christians in the early nineteenth and Greeks in the late nineteenth century. Largely thanks to the dominance of the port city Mersin, a very cosmopolitan urban space created from scratch, layers of world commercial-political-cultural trends in the region interacted easily with Ottoman imperial, regional and local powers. These encounters allowed for the creation of a new kind of space in Çukurova where multiple communities established conditions for their material relations, and attached themselves to the region and not to the Ottoman Empire or global forces alone. Social conflict, when it occurred, was a local affair reaching from the local to the global level, operating both as source and agent of the region's socioeconomic autonomy.

When Çukurova's particular provincial autonomy was threatened by the 1908 constitution, the heavy Armenian presence turned into a peculiarity in the regional centre of Adana. The response was a bloody massacre in 1909, which preceded the 1915 genocide in Anatolia. This violent episode dealt a serious blow to the region's development, and although it could not yet reverse the process entirely, it did initiate a profound change in the region, which by that time had become integrated to the periphery of the global economy and relatively autonomous from the Ottoman Empire.

The violence

The violence erupted simultaneously with the 1909 Ottoman counter-revolution against the 1908 constitution, coinciding to the hour with the so-called incident of 31 March. Not only the grave consequences of the violence but also the simultaneity with the political events at the centre prompted rationalizations and contemporary discourses that cannot be easily ascribed to the revolutionary or counter-revolutionary ideologies of the day. Put differently, the contemporary discursive analysis of the violence in Çukurova almost immediately pointed toward an ethno-religious demarcation between the two increasingly divided groups of Ottoman citizenry. After five months of legal investigations and proceedings, the contextualization of the massacres began to reflect this demarcation, positioning Armenians and Turks at opposite poles, and this remains largely unchanged a century later.

The Ottoman Çukurova that Armenians and Muslims had shared in peace for centuries turned into a place of social collision between Armenians and Turks at a moment of state paralysis in the age of revolution. At the end of the five months, the state was able to step in and attempted to turn back the tide to an Ottoman regional existence. This did not mean erasing the history of the 13 days from official documentation; to the contrary, it helped reiterate the violence within opposite discourses.

These discourses are not readily observable when one first investigates the great loss of life and property that accompanied the violence of April 1909.

By August 1909, the Ottoman government identified the 13 days of violence as 'bedlam' (*iğtişaş*), while local representatives called it an 'incident' (*vaka*), Armenian sources 'disaster', and missionary and other foreign language sources 'massacre'. All reached the same conclusion: that many Armenians were dead. However, this shared conclusion did not come easily or even smoothly. The government, for instance, reached its conclusion after an arduous and complex process that radically changed its formulation of the violence. From April to August all administrative cadres, from the governor to district officers including military personnel, were replaced, different martial authorities investigated all details, and various supervisory commissions became involved.

These changes alone may suffice to point to the post-1908 instability and indecisiveness of the political powers both in Istanbul and Çukurova. The April 1909 days of the counter-revolution in Çukurova demonstrate important aspects of the 1908 revolution in the Ottoman Empire. Political life both within and without the state was by no means settled; instead, disagreement and confusion filled the air. The extent of the confusion is reflected in the relations of between the province and Istanbul, which were clarified only long after the violence. The Istanbul government needed five months even to decide on a course of action. Only in August, after administrative restructuring and legal proceedings, did the government admit responsibility for the violence and compensated the losses of the Armenians affected. The complexity of the process cannot be explained simply by what was happening within the revolutionary cabinet in Istanbul, or among the oppositional groups. We cannot assume that the southeastern Anatolian province of Çukurova experienced the revolution and its aftermath in the same way as did the cadres in Istanbul. On the contrary, the province had its own historical complexities that moulded the local version of the April 1909 (March 31) crisis into something that was neither a directive of the CUP nor an extension of central politics in Istanbul. It is this regional rendering that presents what had been/is perceived as part of Ottoman Armenian history in a far more complicated light. In the next section, I examine this regional framework, from the general in Çukurovan history to the space-time particulars of the violence.

Çukurova at the turn of the twentieth century

Commercial agriculture based on cotton growing and exports yielded real fruits for Çukurova as of the 1890s, which was an era of unprecedented economic growth for the region.[6] It is this accumulation of wealth that allowed a growing Armenian community to play a role both through agricultural investments and commercial activity and that paved the way for the 1909 violence. Comprising approximately 12 to 15 per cent of the total provincial population, the Armenians concentrated their investments mostly in and around Adana, at Kozan and Haçin.[7] It is interesting to note that in

places where Armenians were not such a large proportion of the population, they managed to escape violence. The port town of Mersin, with a relatively small Armenian population, is a good example, as law and order were not disrupted at all in this most cosmopolitan site in the region.

It is also important to point out the minimal impact of the 1909 violence on the Çukurovan economy. In a short time – within a year – regional export volume had recovered to the high levels achieved during 1900–05. In other words, the 1909 violence did not disrupt the long-term trend in the region's economic growth.

April 1909 is nonetheless a significant time for Çukurova. Mid-March to mid-April of every year used to be the time for ploughing, a crucial period for cotton cultivation in the region. It required an intensive concentration of labour to accomplish the job in a short time. Çukurova, lacking sufficient sources of labour, depended on an annual labour migration, mostly from eastern and northern regions stretching as far as Kayseri. By the mid-nineteenth century, this seasonal labour migration had become part of life in the region, profoundly affecting the local composition of the population, even if only temporarily. Later in the nineteenth century this migrant group consisted mostly of Kurds, but included other groups as well.[8] Even today, the highway connecting Çukurova to the east is filled with tents where migrants from Urfa stay during the season. The ploughing season also coincided with the region's barley harvest, again handled by migrant agricultural and more skilled workers from the east, consisting this time mostly of Armenians but also of Kurds from Harput, Diyarbakır, Muş, and Erzurum.[9] These labour migrations had, since the mid-nineteenth century, been both a problem and a necessity for regional livelihoods and the economy in general. The problem was one of security, as this crowd, housed in tents along the major routes and in huts scattered through fields and villages, comprised non-natives to the region. This 'security hazard' seems to have intensified in the last decade of the nineteenth century with the extension of cotton cultivation to the north of region, around Ceyhan. Repeated measures undertaken by the central government are documented in the Ottoman archives. Gendarme activity in this season was more intense, as fighting among labourers created a common but irregular threat.[10]

Besides being the annual season for ploughing and harvesting, April is especially important for the Armenian populace because Easter coincides with the end of ploughing.[11] Celebration of Easter meant a break in most Armenian commercial activity, easily visible due to the closing of many shops. Easter also meant a holiday break in missionary schools and the return of many students to their home villages. In 1909, Easter began on Monday, April 12, two days before the eruption of violence. The following day, Tuesday, was itself significant as it was the weekly market day of Adana, bringing many traders from nearby settlements.

April 1909 was important for a third reason. The 14th of the month, the day on which the violence began, was also the first day of the annual

convention of all the missionaries in Eastern Anatolia. The 1909 convention was a jubilee meeting and was held in Adana. The presence of so many missionaries explains the abundance of eye-witness accounts, notably those of missionaries from Maraş and Antep. The main topic of the convention was to be the situation of orphans in the eastern provinces. Needless to say, the missionaries could not hold their meeting, although they had already arrived in the location.[12]

The multiplicity of narratives concerning the actual events starts with what or rather who fuelled the violence. One narrative, which was mostly Turkish, assigned blame to the Armenians, marking the starting point as the murder of two Turks. The other, mostly Armenian but pro-Armenian as well, claims the violence began with the murder of two Armenians. However, the accounts refer to two different time periods – one beginning the night of the 12th, the other beginning the night of the 25th.[13] In addition, a variety of narratives exist which differ in their level of emotion and outrage concerning who was behind the murders. Culprits identified in these narratives range from a widespread arming of Armenians against Muslims, to particular individuals such as a bishop named Musheg who had been heading a propaganda drive for the re-establishment of the Cilician Armenian Kingdom of the medieval era.[14] Contrasting with this narrative is the claim that one Bağdadizade Abdülkadir provoked Turks against Armenians in the initial murders.[15] Both narratives insist that the murders and the ensuing violence were premeditated. For instance, on Tuesday 13th, according to one group of narratives, all Muslim-owned shops in Adana had been marked with white chalk so as to exclude them from being targeted, and on the first day of the violence, all Muslims, including state officials, were told to wear *sarık* (turbans) instead of fes. These actions pointed to the planning and intent on the part of the Muslims.[16]

The opposing discourse generated narratives that locate the start of tensions as Friday 9 April (27 March).[17] They identify the first wave of violence in Adana as lasting three days, from 14 to 16 April, elsewhere from 15 to 17 April. In these narratives, the city is victimized for three days in the first wave and one and a half days in the second, whereas the violence elsewhere in the region lasted from 14 to 27 April. These narratives also commonly indicate that in each location there was a different provocation.[18] All these variations in the larger shared narrative indicate further that one political position did not clearly create one single discourse.

The narratives also vary as to the deeper causes for the violence, beyond the murders that initiated it. Most frequently cited are the *ancien régime* and Hamidian counter-revolutionary religious forces. An ineffective local government and incapable local administrators are added to this list as of August 1909, but not earlier. Some narratives further complicate the picture by pointing to both the local gendarme commanders and the soldiers sent from Rumeli after the dethronement of Abdülhamid II, as among the chief responsible parties. This kind of narrative stems from another, which puts the

entire blame on the counter-revolution of 31 March and the failure of the 1908 revolution. Here, two different discourses implicate the military and the CUP. The first claims that the April 1909 violence was a direct result of the government's failure – a position which does not necessarily support the *ancien régime* of Abdülhamid II. The second maintains that the CUP organized the violence as part of the suppression of the counter-revolution. Although they mention local authorities, these narratives emphasize more strongly the role of the centre in causing the violence, and not the dynamics of the provincial society.

Returning to the night of Tuesday, 13 April, another common point of the narratives is a meeting between Armenian clerical leaders and the Governor Cevad Bey, the reasons still pointing to opposite discourses. In one version, the Armenian clerics ask for the governor's help in dispersing the Muslim crowd; in the other, they inform him of the impending violence as a kind of threat.[19] In both discourses the governor is said to have guaranteed peace. Either because of his efforts, or because it was believed that he would be incapable of doing anything, the next morning the military commander (*ferik*) and an Armenian bishop went to the market accompanied by a force of 50 soldiers. It is this group that heard the first shots fired and moved toward the source of the shots, according to one discourse; according to the other, it was these very soldiers who shot at the unarmed Armenians who had gathered to confront the armed Muslim crowd. According to the Turkish discourse, the Armenians – admittedly armed only with sticks in this first instance – dispersed, but damaged Muslim property in the process. According to other narratives, while soldiers shot Armenians, the Muslim crowd pillaged the Armenian-owned shops. All narratives insist on shots being fired, but then differ in their descriptions of the nature of the other weapons: knives, swords, and sticks. No narrative clarifies how or at what point the bishop's involvement ceased before the ensuing gunfire.

At this point, one narrative stands out because, by August 1909, all parties point to it as the most reliable: the eye-witness account of the British vice-consul Doughty-Wylie, who was there in Adana. Actually, Doughty-Wylie, stationed in Mersin, relates his own efforts and not the events. What we have from him in essence is a very careful account of how everyone, including the local authorities, tried to stop the bloodshed. Without placing his narrative into any discourse, it ends up serving both.[20] For instance, his very sympathetic tone toward the Muslims who helped the Armenians has been used as proof of no wrong-doing on the part of the Muslims. Again he very carefully put some blame on the inefficiency of the military by stating that 'the number of soldiers was not enough', or, as used by the opposite discourse, by stating that '200 [soldiers] would suffice'.[21]

Doughty-Wylie met with the governor and the *ferik* on 16 April, accompanied by the Apostolic Bishop and the Catholic Bishop Terzian. Again, both discourses narrate the meeting: one portrays the governor asking the Armenians to disarm, the other the Armenians pleading with the governor to

have the Muslims disarmed. No resolution is narrated, but that night the first wave of violence subsided, for which neither discourse offers an explanation.[22]

The developments between April 9 and 16 are recounted in the greatest detail in foreign sources. The events between April 24 and 26, identified as the second massacre, are tied to the article of İhsan Fikri published by a newspaper known as a CUP publication.[23] All narratives of this second period also relate that European warships had anchored by Mersin on 21 April.[24] Another article, from 22 April published in *İtidal* and signed by İsmail Sefa, accused the Armenians of calling for foreign help, and entered into both discourses as proof of CUP involvement. One discourse carries the involvement further by linking the article to the news of the arrival of soldiers from Beirut and Damascus when Mahmut Şevket Pasha entered Istanbul to affirm the revolution. Soldiers did arrive in Adana on 24 April, but from Rumeli. In one discourse, they march to the Abkaryan School, followed by a Muslim crowd and local soldiers, beginning the second wave of violence in this place sheltering refugees.[25] The opposing discourse claims that the Rumelian soldiers stopped the local soldiers and crowd in the course of this march, despite the attack on them by armed Armenians.[26] All narratives point to this Sunday as the culmination of the violence.[27]

May–August 1909: legal process

At the end of April, Governor Cevad Bey and Ferik Mustafa Remzi Pasha were released from duty. Babanzade Zihni Pasha became the new governor, while all gendarme, police and military forces were combined into the *Müretteb Birlikler* (united forces) headed by Colonel Boşnak (Bosnian) Mehmed Ali Bey.[28] The new governor announced the results of his investigation, finding a total of 1900 Muslim and 1500 non-Muslim casualties.[29] This investigation, however did not end the matter. Within a month, two separate legal councils (*Divan-ı Harp*) acting as tribunals had been established, one in Adana, the other in Cebel-i Bereket. Each *Divan-ı Harp* set up multiple investigation committees. Two additional committees arrived from Istanbul, one headed by Faik Bey of the *Şura-yı Devlet* and the other by Artin Mosmorciyan Efendi of the Criminal Courts. The work of the two was combined through the supervision of Esad Bey, the then-governor (*mutasarrıf*) of Mersin.[30] Another delegation from the Parliament (*Meclis-i Mebusan*), headed by the Kastamonu representative Yusuf Kemal and including Tekirdağ representatives Hagop Babikian, Arif Bey and Musdikian Efendi, began a separate investigation.[31]

The two courts-martial remained busy with the case of the governor of Cebel-i Bereket, Mehmed Asaf, as most casualties were from his district. After a long and arduous process, he was acquitted but not allowed to leave Adana, awaiting orders from the grand vizier Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha. Mehmed Asaf accused the Armenians and all those came out against him for being Armenian supporters.[32]

Having concluded the investigation of Mehmed Asaf, the legal councils did not initiate any other investigations but instead awaited the report of the parliamentary delegation. This hiatus in investigations is notable as an indication of how the government handled the whole affair. The legal process was put on hold while members of parliament conducted their own investigation, during which a declaration of absolute loyalty to the state and the constitution was secured from the representatives of all the Christian communities.[33] In this, the government clearly paved the way for a discourse charging the unconstitutional disruption to the regime of the CUP revolution as the responsible party and was careful to secure the support of the parliament. Yet, the anticipated parliamentary delegation report never emerged, and delegate Babikian was mysteriously found dead in his hotel room. Rumours of disagreement between Yusuf Kemal and Babikian over the report further clouded this mysterious death.[34] Never admitted by Yusuf Kemal himself, these rumours became the foundation of the discourse against the CUP which has in turn been used as evidence of the insincerity of the state in handling the affair. Babikian's interview in the newspaper *Tasvir-i Efkar*, published just before his death, clearly absolved Armenians of any wrongdoing.[35] At this point the state was unable to bring the affair to an end but began to act more fastidiously and even allowed an investigative delegation from the Patriarchate in Istanbul to proceed to the region.[36] Triggered by Babikian's death, many indigenous and foreign press articles appeared, supporting completely the innocence of the Armenians. This discourse differs radically from that of the later Turkish popular and scholarly discourse. However, this same discourse in the press shares much with the Armenian nationalist discourse prevalent then and today, and prompted an investigation into the decisions of the Divan-ı Harp. Consequently, the Adana Divan-ı Harp resigned, the acquittal of Mehmed Asaf was overturned by the grand vizier (itself a very curious act on the part of the government, completely undermining state legal authority) and Cemal Pasha was appointed as the new governor.[37]

The appointment of Cemal Pasha as governor clearly indicated a great change in the way the government handled the violence, pointing to a crossroads. The extremely limited number of archival documents available from the period April–August 1909, contrasting with intense documentation of the violence of August 1909–August 1910, shows this rather unequivocally: at the beginning, the limited mention of the violence was accompanied by discussions referring to it as an ordinary police matter. However, as of August 1909 the term 'iğtişaş' surfaced, and every detail of the violence was considered within this framework. Although when used by Ottoman authorities the term gave no signs of such a contrary discourse, the usage of the term today is a pivotal part of the Turkish nationalist discourse.

The standpoint of the Ottoman authorities in August was very clear from the first action of the new governor, Cemal Pasha, who publicly admitted the terrible outcome of the violence.[38] Indeed he wrote this in a declaration so

that it could be announced in various parts of the city. Fundamentally, Cemal made two points: first, that the provincial government was completely at fault and that the loss of life on the part of the Armenians was 'a black page' in Ottoman history.[39] By means of his personal declaration, the government adopted this discourse admitting inefficiency and even supported it with a promise to compensate any and all damage to Armenians. Cemal Pasha also denied in his memoirs that only a few Muslims were actually punished, insisting on how he himself ordered the hanging of forty-seven Muslims as opposed to one Armenian.[40] In the end, Cemal Pasha concluded this new discourse by counting 17,000 Armenian casualties, and 1850 Muslims.[41] This number is remarkably close to the 17,844 declared by the Patriarchate.[42] The Istanbul Patriarchate later reached a higher figure of 21,361.[43] Various councils rounded up the number of Armenian deaths to around 20,000, while the Ottoman Bank calculated the damage at around five million liras.[44] The number given by Cemal Pasha has never been repeated in any Turkish narrative of the republican period, despite extensive references to the same passage from his memoirs. The memoirs are used as source material to support an entirely opposite discourse, in which Cemal's making credit available to rebuild all damaged commercial property, and his establishing a construction commission for new residences, all indicate the benevolence of Ottomans and by extension the certain innocence of Muslims.[45] However, no Turkish source on 1909 that I know of mentions the new residential quarter named Çarçabuk as constructed specifically for Armenians.[46]

The turn in the state's handling of the violence has, however, another twist, which shows the complexity beyond multiple narratives and alternating discourses. In August, the state sent in another Divan-ı Harp that ultimately decided that no further legal investigation regarding the former governors and military commanders was required.[47] Instead, the council began to deliberate on criminal acts ranging from rape and larceny to armed assault, pillage, and murder. One complaint stands out because the court refused to consider it: the forced conversion of Armenian girls, followed by forced marriage.[48] Other criminals, including persons involved in the death of two Armenians on 14 April,[49] were punished with imprisonment, without any discussion of the role these murders played in starting the wave of violence.[50] Instigators like Bağdadizade Abdülkadir were exiled, again without any direct connection being drawn between their crimes and the ensuing violence.[51] In the end, the accused in all narratives and both discourses are punished, albeit not entirely equally.

One moment when the multiplicity of narratives and opposing discourses clearly collided is in the documentation from the following year regarding those not punished but instead rewarded for their acts in defence of the Armenians during the violence.[52] For instance, Major (Binbaşı) Mehmed Bey, who had been exiled, was reappointed to the high post of commanding the Aleppo Gendarme as a result of the efforts by the Istanbul Patriarchate because he had actually protected the Armenians of Kozan.[53] Similarly a

müderris, Mustafa Efendi, was awarded the *Mecidi Nişan* for having protected Armenians in Cebel-i Bereket and Kozan.[54] For the government, the concluding action of the whole affair was the provision of funds for the reconstruction of Armenian dwellings in Tarsus.[55]

Conclusion

There is no doubt that the first decade of the twentieth century dealt a serious blow to the region's development and its relative autonomy. Clearly, when this autonomy was first threatened by the 1908 constitution, the heavy Armenian presence became a peculiarity that the regional centre, Adana, attempted to deal with through a bloody massacre in 1909, which preceded the 1915 genocide in Anatolia. Although the 1915 events did not entirely disrupt the process of capitalist development in the region, they nevertheless changed the regional landscape, from the periphery of the global economy, in relative autonomy from the Ottoman Empire, en route to a metamorphosis within Turkey's national economy.

In the republican era, the region was radically redefined in both economic and social terms. In the nineteenth century, local autonomy resulted from the unfettered working of the market in a newly forming region, although the economy of the nation-state was politically dominant. The region rose to prominence as a periphery of the nineteenth-century global economy, then lost its status with the collapse of the world economy in the interwar period and the ethnic homogenization imposed by the new Turkish nation-state in the 1920s.

The multiplicity of writings produced before the 1920s and their ensuing proliferation in two opposing discourses shows this redefinition of the region as it lost its global status to become a nationally-bound one. Thus to my mind, both the Armenian and Turkish national discourses and historiographies on the 1909 Adana massacres, if not on the whole matter of the 'Armenian Question', suffer not from silence but from absence of multiplicities that the national imaginary does not allow either spatially or temporally. Any regional history prior to the 1915 genocide is a dimension lost in the face of imperial times, spaces and imaginings. The scholarly silence regarding this historiographic phenomenon is itself an enormous loss, as it is this silence that turns into absence today.

Notes

1 Undoubtedly, the 1909 violence pointed to the disruption of this process which had so far held social conflict at bay. The process was back on track within a year and the region returned to business as usual. It was disrupted again in the mid-war years, to be realigned under French occupation until 1921. Total loss of this autonomy came with the making of the Turkish national economy.

2 For the tribal background of Cilicia see A. G. Gould, 'Pasha and Brigands: Ottoman Provincial Reform and its Impact on the Nomadic Tribes of Southern

Anatolia, 1840–1885', PhD Dissertation. Los Angeles: University of California, 1973. For the subsequent changes in the incredibly mixed human geography of the area see M. Toksöz, 'The Çukurova: From Nomadic Life to Commercial Agriculture, 1800–1908', PhD Dissertation, Binghamton: SUNY Binghamton University, 2001. Chapter 2.

3 C. Pasha, *Tezâkir*, edited by Yusuf Halaçoğlu, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1991.

4 M. Toksöz, 'Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century: Some Thoughts on Provincial Reform' (in Greek, trans. Elektra Kostopoulou) in *To Istorika – Elefterotypia*, no. 286, 19 May 2005.

5 M. Toksöz, 'Ottoman Mersin: the Making of an Eastern Mediterranean Port-town', *New Perspectives on Turkey*, Fall 2004, pp. 71–91.

6 Toksöz, 'The Çukurova', Chapter 8.

7 Yearly demographic data of post-1890 Çukurova fluctuates sharply in very complicated ways. The figure given here is an approximation out of various data supplied by: K. Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830–1914. Demographic and Social Characteristics*, Madison, Wisconsin: Wisconsin University Press, 1985; V. Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie, Géographie Administrative, Statistique Descriptive et Raisonnée de Chaque Province de l'Asie-Mineure, II*, Paris: E. Leroux, 1892; M. Krikorian, *Armenians in the Service of the Ottoman Empire 1860–1908*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977; and J. McCarthy, *Population History of the Middle East and the Balkans*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2002.

8 For the history of seasonal migration into Çukurova see M. Soysal, *Die Siedlungs- und Landschaftsentwicklung der Çukurova, Mit besonderer Berucksichtigung der Yüreğir-Ebene*, Erlangen: Frankische Geographische Gesellschaft, 1976.

9 M. Toksöz, 'The Çukurova'; K. Çallıyan, *Adana Vakası ve Mesulleri*, Reforme Hınçak Cemiyeti, Dersaadet 5 Teşrinisani 1325 (Istanbul, 1909).

10 M. Toksöz, 'Toplumsal Çatışma, Hukuk ve Asayiş İlişkisi Üzerine', in N. Levy et al. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Fransa Tarih Yazımlarında Asayiş*, Istanbul: IFEA Publications (forthcoming).

11 H. Davenport (Gibbons), *The Red Rugs of Tarsus*, New York: The Century Co., 1917.

12 American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Mission (ABCFM), documents numbered 123–155, 12 May 1909, Adana Report. My thanks to Catherine Murphy, my doctoral student at Boğaziçi University Department of History. See also: H. Davenport, *The Red Rugs of Tarsus*, p. 100.

13 M. Asaf, *1909 Adana Ermeni Olayları ve Anılarım*. Yayına Hazırlayan Ismet Parmaksızoğlu, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1986; C. Pasha, *Hatıralar, Ittihat-Terakki ve Birinci Dünya Harbi*, Hazırlayan Behcet Cemal, Istanbul: Selek Yayınları, 1959; S. Sonyel, *The Turco-Armenian Adana Incidents in the light of Secret British Documents, July 1908–December 1909* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988); C. Anadol, *Tarihin Işığında Ermeni Dosyası*, Istanbul: Turan Kitabevi, 1982; H. Terziyan, *Kilikya Faciası* (Armenian), Istanbul, 2nd edn, 1912 (my thanks to Kirkor Agopyan for the translation), as printed in Terziyan, *The Nerses Tarzelian Archbishopry Report*, 1911; and (no author), *The Young Turks and the Truth about the Holocaust at Adana in Asia Minor during April 1909*, London: (no publisher), 1911; H. Davenport (Gibbons), *The Red Rugs*.

14 For a crystal clear version of this interpretation see M. Asaf, *1909 Adana Ermeni Olayları ve Anılarım*; C. Pasha repeats the same allegation, *Tezâkir*, pp. 333–81. Foreign sources from the decade after the massacres also mention the Armenian idea for re-establishing the Cilician Kingdom. For instance, W. J. Childs. *Across Asia Minor on Foot*, London: Blackwood, 1917. pp. 347–53.

15 See: K. Çallıyan, *Adana Vakası ve Mesulleri*.

16 See A. Adossides, *Armeniens et Jeunes-Turcs, Les Massacres de Cilicie*, Paris:

Stock Edition, 1910; H. Terziyan, *Kilikya Faciası*; and K. Çallıyan, *Adana Vakası ve Mesulleri*.

17 C. Anadol, *Tarihin Işığında Ermeni Dosyası*, p. 305, and Adossides, *Arméniens et Jeunes-Turcs*, p. 26.
18 Adossides relates all incidents in minute detail, for which see: *Arméniens et Jeunes-Turcs*, pp. 61–81. Terziyan also provides detailed lists of property damage and murders in all locations, for which see: *Kilikya Faciası*, pp. 161–6, 182–9. M. Asaf, *1909 Adana Ermeni Olayları*, pp. 32–8; K. Çallıyan, *Adana Vakası ve Mesulleri*, pp. 8–11, and H. Davenport, *The Red Rugs of Tarsus*, pp. 113–17.
19 United States National Archives (USNA), Special Reports and Government Inquiries, MC 1107 Roll 39 Document 813 Report by Reverend Gibbons with the ABCFM at Tarsus, signed April 23, 1909. Recorded June 21, 1918.
20 United Kingdom, Foreign Office (FO), 424/219, From Lowther to Grey, 14, 15, 16 April 1909. Doughty-Wylie's version can be found in many different sources: C. Pasha, *Tezâkir*, p. 354, Reverend Gibbons Report, Adossides, pp. 31–48.
21 FO, 424/220, From Doughty-Wylie to Lowther (14 April 1909), 6 July 1909. A few hundreds of Assyrians and Greeks also lost their lives during the continuing violence on 15–16 April.
22 FO, 424/219, From Lowther to Grey, 17 April 1909.
23 H. Terziyan, *Kilikya Faciası*, pp. 805–10. Turkish Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives (OA), Dahiliye Nezareti, Muhaberat-ı Umumiye (DH.MUI), 23–2, 21, 16 Rebiulevvel 1328 (28 March 1910).
24 H. Davenport, *The Red Rugs of Tarsus*, p. 156, Reverend Gibbons Report, USNA.
25 Reverend Gibbons Report, USNA.
26 C. Anadol, *Tarihin Işığında Ermeni Dosyası*, p. 305, M. Asaf, *1909 Adana Ermeni Olayları*, p. 12.
27 FO, 424/220, From Doughty-Wylie to Lowther (14 April 1909), 6 July 1909.
28 M. Asaf, *1909 Adana Ermeni Olayları*, pp. 16 and 46.
29 S. Sonyel, *The Turco-Armenian Adana Incidents*, p. 42.
30 M. Asaf, *1909 Adana Ermeni Olayları*, pp. 18–24. Adossides, pp. 66–70.
31 K. Çallıyan, *Adana Vakası ve Mesulleri*, pp. 35–7.
32 M. Asaf, *1909 Adana Ermeni Olayları*, pp. 32–46.
33 FO, 424/220, From Doughty-Wylie to Lowther (14 April 1909), 6 July 1909, Adossides, p. 48.
34 Y. K. Tengirşenk, *Vatan Hizmetinde*, Istanbul, 1967, pp. 122–3.
35 As cited in Terziyan, pp. 800–5.
36 H. Terziyan, *Kilikya Faciası*, pp. 252–3.
37 OA, DH.MUI, 16–2, 41, 20 Ramazan 1327 (5 October 1909).
38 C. Pasha, *Tezâkir*, pp. 351–3.
39 *The Young Turks and the Truth*, p 192. In his own memoirs the wording is as 'Osmanlı Tarihi'nin en elim vakası' ('the most dismal affair of Ottoman history)'. C. Pasha, *Tezâkir*, p. 48.
40 C. Pasha, ibid., pp. 354–5.
41 C. Pasha, ibid., p. 354.
42 C. Anadol, *Tarihin Işığında Ermeni Dosyası*, p. 307, H. Terziyan, *Kilikya Faciası*, p. 157.
43 H. Terziyan, ibid., p. 254.
44 FO, 424/220, From Doughty-Wylie to Lowther, 19 July 1909.
45 C. Pasha, *Tezâkir*, p. 354.
46 M. Toksöz and E. Yalçın, 'Modern Adana'nın Doğuşu ve Günümüzdeki İzleri', Ç. Kafescioğlu and L. Thys-Şenocak (eds.), *Essays in Honor of Aptullah Kuran*, Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999, pp. 435–52.
47 OA, DH.MUI, 16–1, 25, 15 Ramazan 1327 (30 September 1909).
48 OA, DH.MUI, 14–2, 7, 19 Ramazan 1327 (4 October 1909).

49 OA, DH.MUI, 23–1, 18, 29 Ramazan 1327 (14 October 1909) ve 29–1, 29, 18 Şevval 1327 (2 November 1909).
50 For instance, OA, DH.MUI, 29–1, 17 and 9, 17 Şevval 1327 (1 November 1909).
51 OA, DH.MUI, 37–2, 6, 26 Zilhicce 1327 (8 January 1910).
52 Among them are the petitions of Armenians drawn to the Commission for Compensation also set by Cemal Pasha. (Eşya-yı Menhube Komisyonu) C. Pasha, *Tezâkir*, pp. 354–5 and OA, DH.MUI, 15–2, 19, 12 Ramazan 1327 (27 September 1909).
53 OA, DH.MUI, 39–2, 15, 29 Cemaziyelevvel 1328 (8 July 1910).
54 OA, DH.MUI, 43–1, 21, 12 Zilkade 1327 (25 November 1909).
55 OA, DH.MUI, 39–1, 14, 18 Zilkade 1327 (1 December 1909).

Glossary

a'yan: provincial notables.

Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909, died 1918): crowned sultan in order to issue the Constitution, he assumed absolute power after the Russian–Ottoman War of 1877/78; advocated Islamist and paternalist ideologies while modernizing to strengthen the Ottoman military as well as the fiscally bankrupt and economically under-industrialized and under-populated empire; deposed in 1909, exiled to Salonica, then died in the Beylerbeyi palace in Istanbul, 1918.

askeri: the Ottoman ruling class prior to the nineteenth century.

Bedouin: Arabic-speaking nomadic peoples of the Middle Eastern deserts, especially of Arabia, Iraq, Syria and Jordan.

boyars: land-owning elites in the Balkans.

Cilician Armenian Kingdom: a medieval polity under the Rubenid, then the Latin Lusignan dynasties between 1080 and 1375; massive Armenian presence in Cilicia after the Byzantine re-conquest of the area in the tenth century; independence secured with declining Byzantine influence, and maintained between greater powers such as Crusaders, Seljuks, Ayyubids, Mongols and Mamluks.

Circassian (from Turkish *Çerkez*): peoples in the north-west Caucasus, and their descendants dispersed after the Russian conquest of the northern Caucasus (1817–64).

Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti*): secret organization within and outside the Ottoman Empire until 1908, when it became the major force of Ottoman politics; later a political party; comprising many graduates of the modern military schools working against the absolutist rule of Abdülhamid II; after 1913 emphasized Turkish nationalism and a protectionist economic policy and dominated the political scene under the triumvirate of Enver, Talat and Gemal Pashas.

Counter-revolution of 1909: *see* Incident of the 31 March.

Crimean War (1853–56): Russia fighting against the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain, France and (after 1855) Sardinia-Piedmont over influence in the Middle East, especially Russia's claim to protection over the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire and the Danubian Principalities,

Moldavia and Wallachia; ended with allied victory and the Treaty of Paris, stalling Russian expansion for some time and spurring further reforms in the Ottoman Empire.

dragoman: Ottoman interpreter, translator, negotiator of non-Muslim origin.

Enver Pasha (1881–1922): Ottoman officer and politician; leading member of the CUP and the Young Turk Revolution of 1908; after 1913, a member of the triumvirate that dominated Ottoman government and politics, acting as Minister of War; fled the empire in 1918; died in a skirmish near Dushanbe, in today's Tajikistan.

fatwa: a formal legal opinion issued by an Islamic authority.

fes: brimless red felt hat introduced under Sultan Mahmud II (1808–39) and made compulsory for all civil and military (but not religious) dignitaries of the empire; banned in the Turkish 'hat revolution' of 1925.

Fırka-ı Islahiye: 1865 Ottoman military expedition in the Çukurova region and the Taurus mountains around Kozan in order to exert state control over the tribes in the region.

grand vezir: chief minister of the Ottoman Empire.

Halk Zümresi (Popular Front): a leftist organization formed after the dissolution of the Yeşil Ordu.

Hanafi doctrine: one of the four Sunni schools of religious law in Islam, currently predominant in Central Asia, India, Pakistan, Turkey, and the countries of the former Ottoman Empire.

hijra: the historical flight or emigration of the Prophet Muhammad in 622 from Mecca to Medina, from which is dated the Muslim era.

Hirschfeld, Magnus (1868–1935): physician and pioneer of sex research; campaigned for the rights of sexual minorities and women (including to obtain abortions).

(Hüseyin) Rauf Bey [Orbay] (1881–1964): naval officer and politician; high-ranking diplomat during World War I and minister of naval affairs; among the initiators of the Turkish War of Independence; after 1923, part of the political opposition, leaving Turkey after the assassination attempt on Mustafa Kemal in 1926; re-admitted to Turkey in 1935, member of parliament in 1939, but never gained real political influence.

Incident of March 31: the unsuccessful 1909 counter-coup to the Young Turk revolution, mounted by lower-ranking religious functionaries, students, rank and file officers and liberals.

intisab: connections.

istiqbal: reception, welcome.

Janissaries: the elite infantry of the Ottoman Empire, dissolved in 1826.

Khedival state: Egypt under the rule of the dynasty of Muhammad (or Mehmed) Ali Pasha under the title of *khedive* (Turkish: *hıdiv*).

Kılıç Ali Bey, later Ali Kılıç (1888–1971): Ottoman and Turkish officer and politician participated in the War of Independence; served as a member of parliament (1920–38) and played a prominent role in the judicial

persecution of opponents to the new regime in the revolutionary 'Courts of Independence' (*İstiklâl Mahkemeleri,* beginning 1920).

Mahmud Şevket Pasha: Ottoman officer, the leading political figure after 1909 when his military intervention saved the constitutional regime; murdered in 1913 while serving as grand-vizier.

Mecidî Nişan (or *Nişan-ı Mecidiye*): order awarded by Sultan Abdülmecid in 1851 and conferred on both Ottoman subjects and foreigners.

medz yeghern: great catastrophe.

Megali Idea: Great Idea; the Greek irredentist policy.

Mernissi, Fatima (b. 1940): Moroccan sociologist and scholar, one of the leading Islamic feminists, especially renowned for her book *Beyond the Veil* (1975).

Mijalla (Ottoman Turkish *Mecelle*): the Ottoman civil legal code in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the first attempt to codify a part of the *shari'a*-based law of an Islamic state.

millet (Turkish, from Arabic): 'religious community' or 'people', referring to different religious groups in the Ottoman Empire, including Muslims; for minorities, *millet* indicated a religious community organized under its own laws of personal status and responsible through its leaders to the central government for the payment of taxes and other obligations.

millet-i Rum: Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire.

müderris: teacher at a *medrese,* an institution of higher education of Islamic theology and law.

Mudros, Armistice of: signed between the British and Ottomans in 1918, ending hostilities between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied forces in World War I.

Mustafa an-Nahhas (1879–1965): leading Egyptian politician and member of the *Wafd*-party, repeatedly prime minister between 1928 and 1952.

Nestorian or Nasturian Christians: a separate sect since the fifth century, believing that Jesus Christ had not only two natures but two separate, co-existing essences; lived historically in the Anatolian-Iranian mountains around their patriarchate at Qudshanis (near Çölemerik/Hakkâri), persecuted during World War I and in the 1930s. Today the Assyrian Church of the East survives mainly in the diaspora, and in Iraq; a Chaldean Catholic Church counts around 2.5 million members worldwide.

Nizam-i cedid (New Order): a series of reforms under Sultan Selim III (1789–1807).

Nutuk: speech, delivered by Mustafa Kemel Atatürk in 1927.

Patai, Raphael (1910–96): ethnographer and philologist of Hungarian-Jewish descent who lived in Israel (after 1933) and in the USA (after 1952).

Phanar (also Fener): A neighbourhood in Istanbul, where many Greek-Orthodox subjects resided.

Phanariots: an Orthodox Christian, Greek-identified elite or network, involved in diverse operations of Ottoman governance by the late eighteenth century.

re'aya: Ottoman subjects.

Refet [Bele] Bey/Pasha (1881–1963): Ottoman military officer, fought with Mustafa Kemal in the Turkish War of Independence, temporarily serving as minister of the interior and national defence; after 1923, joined the political opposition, joining parliament only in 1935.

Rumeli: the Ottoman province of Rumelia ('Roman land'), comprising roughly today's Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Northern Greece.

Rwala Bedouins (also spelled Ruwallah): an Arab tribe present in the Lebanon, the Syrian desert and the northern part of the Arab peninsula; participated in the 'Arab revolt' against the Ottoman Empire during World War I.

sarık: turban or, more precisely, the cloth wound around the cap that forms the stabilizing basis of most forms of turbans.

Sened-i İttifak: document or pact of alliance, signed in 1808, between the notables and the sultan but never implemented.

Smyrniot: an inhabitant of Smyrna (today's İzmir, Turkey).

Şura-yı Devlet (Council of State): institutionalized in 1868 and repeatedly restructured, acting partly as the highest administrative court of the Ottoman Empire, partly as a legislative body.

Tanzimat (fully: *tanzimat-ı hayriye*, 'Beneficial Ordering'): the state-driven Ottoman reforms beginning with the 1839 Edict of Gülhane, intended to strengthen state structure by centralization, bureaucratization and codification of modern laws; regarded as the beginning of Ottoman modernity.

tehcir: relocation; deportation.

Turcoman (in the context of this volume): Turkophone nomads, also Iraqi Turks and the speakers of the Turkmen language in Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Iran; also, citizens of Turkmenistan.

Türk Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası: a group of left-wing nationalists, founded in late 1920 under the mentorship of Mustafa Subhi, who was murdered attempting to enter Anatolia from Soviet Russia.

Turkish Communist Party (*Türkiye Komünist Fırkası,* later *Türkiye Komünist Partisi,* TKP): initiated founded by leading exiled members of the CUP in 1919; a party on the Soviet model was convened under Mustafa Subhi's chairmanship in 1920. After uniting with the *Türk Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası* and Subhi's murder in 1921, the party was banned in 1922, after which it operated as an underground organization with a representation at the Komintern.

ulema (sing. *alim*): Muslim learned religious scholars.

vilayet (Ottoman Turkish): Ottoman province ruled by a *vali*, or governor-general.

Yeşil Ordu (Green Army): anti-imperialist organization set up in May, 1920 to gather support for the nationalists, especially in face of the 'Army of the Caliphate' operating in the interests of Sultan Mehmed VI Vahdeddin; dissolved in July 1920, after Çerkes Edhem had joined it.

Young Turks (Turkish *Jöntürkler*): coalition of reform groups, including the CUP that led the revolutionary movement against Sultan Abdülhamid II, which culminated in the establishment of a constitutional government.

Young Turk Revolution (1908): led by officers belonging to the CUP; restored the Ottoman Constitution of 1876, retaining Sultan Abdülhamid II until the Counter-revolution of 1909 (Incident of the 31 March). After the revolution, Ottoman politics were characterized by open ideological strife and increasing military domination in the face of external and internal crises.

Yunus Nadi [Abalıoğlu] (1880–1945): journalist, defender of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), eventually one of the most important journalistic voices of Kemalism; founded the newspaper *Cumhuriyet* ('Republic') in 1924 while continuously serving as a member of parliament.

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