Graham Wallas AND THE Great Society



Terence H. Qualter

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
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Propaganda and Psychological Warfare
The Election Process in Canada

GRAHAM WALLAS AND THE GREAT SOCIETY

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To Shirley

Contents

	Preface	ix
1	From Classical Scholar to Political Scientist	1
2	Fabian Socialism	25
3	Education for a New World	47
4	The New Science of Politics	77
5	The Great Society and the Good Society	103
6	The Reconstruction of Society	125
7	In Defence of Liberty	154
	Notes	173
	Bibliography	186
	Index	195

Preface

I was first attracted to Graham Wallas as a graduate student at the London School of Economics some twenty-five years ago. My interest at that time was in the nature of propaganda, and specifically its role in a democratic society. Wallas' studies of the psychology of human social behaviour, as expressed in *Human Nature in Politics, The Great Society*, and *Our Social Heritage*, were obviously of critical importance in such a study, and his reflections on the manipulation of public opinion contributed significantly to the dissertation that was eventually completed.

At that time I made a mental note that a serious book on the work of Graham Wallas was long overdue and I began to consider it as a project to be undertaken some time in the future. It was an idea, never completely abandoned, but regularly set aside in favour of other activities. Finally a sabbatical leave due in 1973/4 seemed to force the issue. Either the Wallas book would be written then, or not at all. From about 1971 I began to think about what such a book might be and to tell my colleagues that I would spend my next sabbatical writing 'the first book on Graham Wallas'. Unfortunately, it was also in 1971 that Martin J. Wiener published *Between Two Worlds: The Political Thought of Graham Wallas*. Now, if I was to do anything at all, it would be the second book on Graham Wallas.

Obviously Wiener's book changed much, and for a time it seemed unwise to proceed. I saw no point in trying simply to attack or refute Wiener's approach – even if such a criticism could have been substantiated. I had no quarrel with Wiener. His book was very much the kind of book I might have wanted to write had I started a few years earlier. Then I realised that, although I did not disagree with Wiener's interpretation of Wallas, his style was not my style. I wanted to stress different things, and to shift the emphasis. My view of the significance of certain events in Wallas' life clearly differed from Wiener's.

Like Martin Wiener, I wanted to produce a reasonably short and readable book. And because of his efforts, I was able to leave certain things unsaid, or covered in a brief reference. For the same reason, I was then able to give more attention to Wallas' secondary writings (his articles and book reviews), which are important for a full understanding of his work, but which Wiener could not possibly have covered within the limits he set himself. I could see my book becoming, not a rival to Wiener's work, but a complement to it. It seemed appropriate to proceed.

This decision became even more justifiable as the work got under way. It was not just coincidence that led to the appearance of Wiener's work just as mine was starting. It became one of my conclusions that the present condition of the world, the increasing scepticism about the virtues of unchecked industrial expansion, a growing awareness that 'more' is not necessarily the same as 'better', and a growing concern for the 'quality of life', all make Wallas' preoccupation with the turning of the Great Society into the Good Society, more than ever relevant. He speaks more to our own age than to the world of the preceding three or four decades. And even in the professional world of the political scientist, there seems to be emerging a new awareness that while empirical and quantitative studies are essential, empiricism and quantification which consciously seek to be 'value-free' may, in fact, foster values contrary to the nobler traditions of our society. There is, perhaps, a revived realisation that one of the purposes of empirical study is to provide a firmer intellectual, historical, psychological basis for the values we hold important, and that an empiricism which tries to disregard values is either futile or sterile. All this is, of course, very much the case that Wallas had tried to argue. There seems now an audience, not just for two books on Graham Wallas, but for several, and perhaps a reissue of his major original works.

As always, a great many people assist in the production of an academic book. Through a Leave Fellowship, the Canada Council provided the initial financial support that made it possible. Professor Anthony Barker, as Chairman of the Department of Political Science, provided me with office space at the University of Essex. Mr C. G. Allen, Keeper of Manuscripts at the British Library of Political Science, aided in access to the Wallas Papers. Professor H. R. G. Greaves, who was my graduate tutor, and who introduced me to Wallas' work, provided a good deal of advice and encouragement. And my colleagues at the University of Waterloo helped by

reading and commenting on bits and pieces of the manuscript in the various stages of this production. My grateful thanks to all of these.

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T.H.Q.

1 From Classical Scholar to Political Scientist

Graham Wallas was born on 31 May 1858, the fifth child and elder son in a family of nine children. His father, Gilbert Innis Wallas (1821–90), was, at the time of Graham's birth, a curate in Bishopwearmouth in Durham. But when Graham was still a small child, in 1861, the family moved to Barnstaple in Devon, where Gilbert Wallas was appointed vicar. His upbringing in a clerical household, in a rural backwater, was the most important single influence in the formation of Wallas' system of values.

Even now north Devon is one of the most beautiful, peaceful areas of England. The major threats to its rural calm and traditional ways come, not from industrial expansion, but from the hundreds of thousands of tourists who every year crowd its tiny villages and narrow roads. When Wallas was a child the area was almost totally undisturbed. It offered a quiet, traditional life, virtually unaffected by the gigantic forces of the industrial revolution. It was here that Wallas formed his vision of a way of life for which there seemed no place in the sprawling industrialised cities. When later he wrote of the alienating impact of the Great Society, it was the image of this earlier, more settled, more tranquil existence that he had in mind. North Devon was a long way from the Great Society.

Although he spent almost his whole adult life in London, Wallas still assessed the industrial revolution in terms of its impact upon the kind of life he had known as a child. As he looked at London, or Birmingham, or Manchester, it was Barnstaple that he had in the back of his mind. When he wrote an Introduction to the first cheap edition of John Ruskin's *The Two Paths* in 1907, he commended Ruskin for being the first to 'protest against the ugliness, the monotony, and the grime which accompanied the expansion of the manufacturing industry during the nineteenth century'. Ruskin, he said, 'could look right through the paper returns of leaping and bounding trade which hid from most men of that time the sight of

blackened valleys and wasted childhood'. Ruskin greatly impressed Wallas. The Introduction concluded:

> Thirty years ago Ruskin had rooms in the college where I was an undergraduate. I heard his lectures, and for a short time saw him almost every day. His mobile lips were not yet covered by a beard, and he wore always with his precise costume that intensely blue neckcloth, which he constantly renewed. His face was that of a man who had seen, and was to see again, Hell as well as Paradise, but who yet was not stern, like Dante, but of a tender and playful humour.[1]

He drew attention to one passage from Ruskin which clearly moved him deeply, for he described it, rather extravagantly, as 'one of the most splendid passages in English literature'. It is worth restating here, for it tells us as much about Wallas as about Ruskin.

> Just outside the town I came upon an old English cottage or mansion, I hardly know which to call it, set close under the hill, and beside the river, perhaps built somewhere in Charles's time, with mullioned windows and a low arched porch. . . . There, uninhabited for many and many a year, it had been left in unregarded havoc of ruin; the garden gate still swung loose to its latch; the garden blighted utterly into a field of ashes, not even a weed taking root there; the roof torn into shapeless rents; the shutters hanging about the windows in rags of rotten wood; before its gate, the stream which had gladdened it now soaking slowly by, black as ebony, and thick with curdling scum; the bank above it, trodden into unctuous, sooty slime; far in front of it, between it and the old hills, the furnaces of the city foaming forth perpetual plague of sulphurous darkness; the volumes of their storm coiling low over a waste of grassless fields, fenced from each other, not by hedges, but by slabs of square stone, like grave-stones, riveted together with iron.[2]

This is the authentic note of the emotion, the passion, that led Wallas first into Fabian socialism, and then into the search for a more scientific (i.e. more efficient, less humanly wasteful) approach to the management of modern society. Although Wallas later 'lost his faith', becoming in time a bitter opponent of clerical influence in education, he did not reject the moral principles which guided his

earlier life. From his father Wallas developed a strong moral conviction, a belief in social justice and in the dignity of the individual, which set the purpose of all his later thinking. Even after he had abandoned formal Christianity, he remained true to the values acquired in rural Devon. His father's evangelical Christianity, reflected in piety and good works, was developed into a kind of secular evangelism, manifested in a deep humanitarianism and moral fervour, and a lasting commitment to public service. As an organised institution religion was an anachronism, but many of the values it inspired were essential components of civilised living.

The loss of faith was slow and was for a long time resisted. But young Wallas acquired from his father not only faith and moral seriousness but also the habits of a disciplined, enquiring mind. In the face of the challenges of historical research upon biblical fundamentalism, the critical mind triumphed over faith. Wallas himself referred to the process:

> When I was a boy at school we learnt from each other that some people denied the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, and others, say, the ascription to St. Paul of the Pastoral Epistles. This knowledge strengthened the 'doubts' against which we were warned in the school chapel. We all fought against our doubts; those who succeeded in the fight mostly became clergymen; those who failed became agnostics.[3]

Wallas was first educated at Shrewsbury, a school deeply conservative in the social and religious values it attempted to impress upon its young pupils. As 'Roughborough' Shrewsbury appears in Samuel Butler's *The Way of All Flesh*. Butler, who had himself been at Shrewsbury, described the principal overt objective of Shrewsbury-Roughborough as the production of 'God-fearing Christians'. H. W. Nevinson, a contemporary of Wallas, confirmed Butler's account of the generally uninspiring intellectual climate of the school,[4] in an interpretation which Wallas later endorsed. He described the rules for the composition of Greek and Latin verses which he was trained to follow in order to win a scholarship. 'Why we were to do so, neither we nor our Headmaster (who had won more verse-prizes with, it seemed to me, less poetic sensibility than anyone else in the long history of Cambridge scholarship) had the least idea.'[5]

Wallas was apparently less unfortunate in his schooling than most

of his generation. Time and again there appears in his notes the phrase, 'the intellectual wantlessness' of English education in the Victorian era. His constant criticism of public school education was that it failed to stimulate thought, to arouse the desire to know and to explore. In 1906 he wrote:

> The shallowness of the intellectual and emotional life in most public schools is very largely due to the understood compromise by which the clerical headmaster abstains from pushing his religious control beyond a certain point, while the lay assistants keep silence with regard to all serious thought or feeling on the subject studied.[6]

Later in the same paper he described the typical pattern of English education as the arrangement ' . . . by which an Anglican governing body and a clerical headmaster superintend the reading of pre-Christian philosophy and scientific history by lay teachers to the children of Jews and agnostics'.[7]

But at Shrewsbury, where the atmosphere was still generally dispiriting, he himself came under the influence of one exceptional teacher, A. H. Gilkes. He was, said Wallas, 'the one master from whom any of us, I believe, received any real intellectual stimulus'.[8] Gilkes was unusual in that he encouraged his pupils to reflect on the content of the classics they were reading. In the fashion of the time, most were content merely with the meticulous, precise translation of Greek into English, without any regard to the impact of what they were reading upon the Greek world, or to its possible relevance to the world of the nineteenth century. Under Gilkes, however, Wallas began to study Aristotle, not only as Greek language, but as political theory. Subsequently the Aristotelean ideal of the State which existed for the moral development of its citizens permeated Wallas' political philosophy. Always at the back of his concern for a modern science of politics, there remained the shadow of the *polis*. The task, somehow or other, was to recreate in modern industrial society the spirit and temper of classical Athens, to found the 'good society' in which the 'good life' might be lived.

After six years at Shrewsbury Wallas went, on a classical scholarship, to Corpus Christi College, Oxford. He arrived at Oxford in 1877, and took a second-class degree in Literae Humaniores in 1881. From then until 1890 he was a classics schoolmaster. The pattern was a familiar one. The son of a rural

clergyman was educated in the classics at a traditional public school where very little other than Greek was taught. He furthered his education at an equally traditional Oxford college, where the curriculum was, in the beginning at least, little more than a continuation of the classical translation and composition of public school. In his formal education he had no contact with science, with psychology, with economics, or with modern history. Wallas later described what the study of Government had been like at Oxford in the nineteenth century.

> If any one had reflected that Government is a science like any other science, and had gone to Oxford, for instance, which believed itself to be a University given to the study of Government, and asked for advice, he would have been advised to read a very few interesting books by Aristotle or Hobbes, but would have found it very difficult to apply what he read in those books to the actual problems of how you should administer a Factory Act, how you should develop Poor Relief, or what you should do about the gold standard.[9]

Elsewhere he recalled that he had been asked to write essays on the State, which, like the lectures he listened to, 'took no heed of political facts later than Aristotle's lost collection of Greek city constitutions'.[10] That he should begin a career as a classics schoolmaster with this training was almost inevitable. His life to this point was a stereotype, almost a parody, of a particular kind of Victorian upbringing. The only unexpected thing was that he did not remain a schoolmaster.

Wallas fortunately reacted against the confining intellectual environment of Shrewsbury and Oxford. His interests gradually shifted and he began to read extensively in politics and history. It was at this stage that he became a friend of Sydney Olivier, a friendship which was to last many years, and which was later to be the instrument through which Wallas was brought into the Fabian Society. Together Olivier, Wallas, and other young undergraduates, began to discuss a world of literature beyond the narrow confines of the formal curriculum. In particular they read Charles Darwin, whose theories on the origin of species were perhaps the most exciting, revolutionary, and disturbing ideas of the age. It was not until later, in 1885, that Wallas and Olivier, in the company of Webb and Shaw, first began to read Marx.

Now, more than a hundred years later, it is difficult to appreciate the impact of Darwin on his generation. Most often when the 'Darwinian controversy' is mentioned, one is reminded of the absurdities of the Scopes trial in Tennessee in 1925. But Darwin did not only, or even most importantly, affront the prejudices of backwoods fundamentalists. He offered as well new concepts of man as animal, and man as social being. He suggested new insights into the sources of man's behaviour. And he opened up new methodologies of scientific study.

Origin of Species was published a year after Wallas' birth, and Darwin, who had also been a pupil at Shrewsbury School, became one of the most significant intellectual influences in Wallas' formative years. 'For the change made by Darwin was enormous. As Aristotle declared that Socrates brought down philosophy from the heavens to the earth, so we can say that Darwin transferred the cause of development from within to without.'[11]

Darwin's work challenged not only scientific orthodoxy. It shook the world of the moralist and of the social reformer. Above all it offered the social reformer guidance in discovering those social motives which are 'the fulcrum of social change'.

> For many centuries past the young men of each generation have been told by their elders that every proposed reform in social organization is 'against human nature'. They have generally, and rightly, ignored this warning, because no one knew what human nature was, and there were no means of distinguishing between those things in human character which the reformer could hope to change and those which he must assume to be unchangeable. Facts about human nature as apparently permanent as the belief in magic or the sentiment of monarchy have proved capable of change, while apparently superficial traits, such as the sense of the ridiculous or the need of recreation, have proved to be unexpectedly stubborn.[12]

Since the publication of *Origin of Species*,

> . . . we have in fact been able to represent the human race to our imagination, neither as a chaos of arbitrarily varying individuals, nor as a mosaic of homogenous nations, but as a biological group, every individual in which differs from every other not arbitrarily but according to an intelligible process of organic evolution.[13]

Darwinism stimulated in Wallas a life-long interest in the application of scientific method to the problems of social man. And it brought to a head the conflict between Wallas' formal Christian background and the new science.

> Science seemed to be opening up a new approach to life, sweeping away the oppressive dogmas of religion and metaphysics. The 'warfare between science and religion' was for Wallas and his generation a fact of life. The religion of his day was authoritarian, literalist, and rigid; the science was aggressively secular.[14]

In this conflict one had to choose, to decide between faith and orthodoxy on the one hand, and scepticism and rationalism on the other. Wallas chose rationalism and, with it, the methodology of science. Science offered not merely technology and invention; it provided men with a new world-outlook, deeper and more meaningful than that of orthodox Christianity.

> Men will not take up the 'intolerable disease of thought' unless their feelings are first stirred, and the strength of the idea of Science has been that it does touch men's feelings, and draws motive power for thought from the passions of reverence, of curiosity, and of limitless hope.[15]

Darwin also provided a counterbalance to another influential voice at Oxford in Wallas' day: that of T. H. Green. Wallas might easily have followed Green's idealism. Green, also the son of an evangelical Anglican minister, transferred the moral precepts of an abandoned religious belief into a secular doctrine of social reform. This was the route followed by Wallas, but Wallas was not attracted to the philosophical idealism on which Green based his system. Experimental science seemed to him to provide a more secure footing than European idealism. Wallas' practical political proposals were often very similar to those of Green, but they were founded on quite different philosophical assumptions. Wallas, who was never confident in dealing with metaphysical speculation, preferred a pragmatic approach to specific issues. He has described how he found Green unsatisfactory after he had heard him lecture at Balliol:

> The lecture was an argument for human immortality, based on the statement that since we only know of the existence of our bodies from the testimony of our conscious mind, there is no *a priori* reason for believing that the dissolution of the body affects the continued existence of the conscious mind. Green asked for questions; I, being fresh from reading Darwin, asked him whether his argument applied to the conscious mind of a dog, and Green answered that he was not interested in dogs.[16]

To Wallas this was not an adequate answer. He could no longer consider man in isolation from the rest of the world.

After he abandoned religion, and found the idealist alternative lacking any appeal, Wallas became more determinedly a rationalist. His first simple rejection of Christianity, based primarily on an intellectual inability to accept a literal Old Testament explanation of society, and a disinclination to attach any significance or validity to theological arguments, gradually hardened into a militant anti-clericalism. His enmity was directed at the Roman Catholic Church and, in particular, at High Church Anglicanism. To Wallas' mind the High Church had diverted Christianity from its role of moral leadership into an abstract mysticism. He was particularly offended by 'the morally and intellectually incredible "scheme of salvation" of orthodox Anglicanism'.[17] There also stemmed from Anglicanism the main threat to a progressive society, that of the 'dead hand' of tradition.

> And of all 'dead hands' the most dangerous is that which consists of endowments, handed from generation to generation, to provide that certain men should be chosen and supported, not to think courageously, or seek sincerely to find and teach new truth, but to teach opinions formed by others who died generations or centuries before, and can now never be argued with or convinced.[18]

The 'dead hand' increasingly directed the policy of the Anglican Church and moulded its personnel. This was a disaster, not only for the Church itself, but for the whole society, for the Anglican Church, dominated by 'anti-intellectual obscurantism', had enormous influence and control over English elementary education. At the political level he believed the influence of religion to be pernicious. Organised religion had contributed nothing con-

structive to social thought. Instead of encouraging men to look critically at the world around them, to seek solutions to the problems which constantly confronted them, and to follow the logic of any argument to wherever it led, religion appealed to the 'foreordained' will of God, or to a rigid dogma. It stultified human reason.

These, then, were the components of Wallas' philosophy of life: A rigid and rather conservative moral code and a sense of public duty derived from evangelical Christianity, but developing through rationalism into a strictly secular ethic; a model of social life, of the good society, which drew its inspiration from a combination of Aristotle's *polis*, an idealised memory of his rural childhood, and a methodology of social analysis and reform based largely on Darwin and modified by a growing interest in human psychology. Later there were other influences. Henry George and Robert Owen were important to the development of Wallas' own ideas of socialism. And Bentham was constantly held up as the model of social inventor. But the foundation remained solid, only slightly affected by the new structures built upon it.

Wallas' blending of secular evangelism, rationalism, and Greek idealism explain much of what led him into Fabian socialism. Fabianism seemed at first to offer the most convenient environment available for a man of Wallas' temperament. But while the Fabian Society provided an intellectual base, the influence was not all one way. Wallas also helped to mould that peculiar combination of attributes that made up Fabian socialism.

Wallas was brought into contact with the Fabians through Sydney Olivier, who later worked with Sidney Webb at the Colonial Office. Webb described their first meeting:

> I still vividly remember my first meeting with Graham Wallas in 1882, just over half a century ago. Wallas called at the Colonial Office to see a college chum, Sydney Olivier, who was living in Downing Street with me, both of us being at the time Resident Clerks. Olivier was not in, and Wallas waited for his return. Almost instantly, with Wallas' characteristic gift of intellectual intimacy, I found myself engaged in a game of chess, and simultaneously discussing the state of the nation. For the ensuing couple of decades our intellectual intimacy was close and continuous.[19]

This little group of Olivier, Webb, and Wallas, with George Bernard Shaw, were the inspiration and driving force which created the Fabian Society, defining its unique style. Shaw described them as 'the three Musketeers and D'Artagnan'.[20] Although the Society never again reached the peaks of brilliant imagination scaled by its founders, to this day it retains something of the special character imposed by them.

A later chapter will examine more closely Wallas' association with the Fabians. Here I wish merely to draw attention to the importance of the Fabian Society in the development of Wallas' overall pattern of thinking. Membership in the Fabian Society was a significant stage in his transition from traditional classical scholarship to modern political science and social reform. The Fabian Society was both less and more than a political movement. It was less in that it did not seek to become a political party, and it had neither a coherent programme, nor a systematic body of doctrine. It was more, in that it embodied also a state of mind, a concept of society and of 'acceptable' methods of social change. It was both a political and an ethical association. Beatrice Webb expressed its fundamental values: 'No great transformation is possible in a free democratic state like England unless *you alter the opinions of all classes of the community* – and, even if it were possible, it would not be desirable.'[21]

To the Fabians the birth of the democratic State changed the character of socialism. New concepts were needed in a situation where the working class was improving its economic position and gaining legitimate access to political power, and where the State itself was accepting responsibility for social reform. In a pre-democratic condition, socialists of necessity thought in terms of revolution, but in the democratic State revolution was not necessary since the mechanism for change existed 'and needed but to be used'.[22]

> It was easy for the Fabians to take up the attitude they did. They were not wholly in revolt against the Liberal–Radical doctrine in which they had been nurtured. Even Bernard Shaw's more flamboyant utterances have a way of exploding in a laugh and dissolving into very moderate proposals. As direct heirs of the Enlightenment in its English Utilitarian branch, the Fabians were fairly satisfied with their philosophical inheritance. They did not, as a group, need to invent a fundamentally new system,

> but were content to work within the framework of the old, for it opposed no insuperable barriers to their aims. Furthermore, the Fabians were not proposing to behave in a revolutionary or violent manner. They were constitutional, orderly and almost, if not wholly, respectable, and this sort of conduct does not seem to call (in a relatively peaceful age) for special justification. Marxism probably needs a philosophy in a way that Fabianism does not, because Marxists propose to do something that calls much more for justification. . . . While the Marxists need to appeal to moral courage reinforced by a philosophical 'world view', the Fabians could appeal simply to 'common sense' of a practical sort.[23]

Their appeal, however, even while it was pragmatic, democratic, constitutional and common sense, did demand a rethinking of the nature of society and of the purposes of social life. One did not have to be a revolutionary to be a Fabian. But one did have to move away from Liberal concepts of competitive individualism, and accept the values of a society consciously organised for the welfare of all its members. Fabianism provided the English with a constitutional and respectable road back to a belief in *social* responsibility for the well-being of both individuals and communities.

When Wallas first joined the Fabian Society he was still a classics schoolmaster, although his rationalist philosophy made his position in a clerical-dominated school system increasingly difficult. He was not prepared to do what many others had done – to pay lip service to a Church he no longer believed in. He later recalled the period of crisis:

> Forty years before . . . I sat, as a young public-school master . . . in the school chapel. A number of the elder boys were being confirmed by a bishop. I was leaving the school in a few days, having been dismissed because the headmaster was not satisfied with my explanation of my unwillingness to take the Sacrament according to the Anglican rule as he demanded. My future seemed difficult, and I was very anxious lest I should fail in the strength of purpose needed to 'make good' under the new conditions.[24]

Martin Wiener has confirmed, from conversations with Miss May Wallas, that Wallas' determined anti-clericalism was the principal reason for giving up public-school teaching.[25] We might, however,

speculate that his growing concern for political and social questions would have made him increasingly frustrated with the narrow confines of classical teaching, and that, even without the religious issue, he would not have long remained in a public-school environment. After abandoning the life of a schoolmaster, Wallas was for several years a lecturer under the London Society for University Extension. His themes now, however, were no longer the classics, and his lectures were largely on the local and central institutions of British government.

With this new interest dominant, he enthusiastically worked in close cooperation with the Webbs in the formation of the London School of Economics and Political Science. Although there are various accounts of the events leading to the establishment of the School, with certain inconsistencies in the details they provide, probably the most carefully researched and documented study is that of Sir Sydney Caine.[26] This confirms the general view that the first ideas of what such a school might be and do were discussed over a breakfast between Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Bernard Shaw, and Wallas, in August 1894. Wallas himself stated that the School was 'invented' at that time, but it seems unlikely that anything quite as structured or complete as an 'invention' came out of this first discussion.[27] This is, of course, beside the point. The matter of interest is that Wallas was one of the small group of brilliant people who put their minds together to create an institution which, in the matters it sought to investigate, and the methodologies it hoped to encourage, was far removed from the classical tradition in which Wallas had been raised.

The money for the foundation of the School came from a bequest from an eccentric Fabian, Henry H. Hutchinson. Sidney Webb had been appointed the chairman of the trustees of the Hutchinson estate. The money might have been spent in many ways, including Fabian propaganda, or support for socialist parliamentary candidates. This, however, would have been short-sighted and wasteful. Beatrice Webb has expressed the philosophy which led to the decision to use the Hutchinson money to create a new research institute:

> . . . reform will not be brought about by shouting. What is needed is *hard thinking*. And the same objection applies to sending nondescript Socialists into Parliament. The Radical members are quite sufficiently compliant in their views: what is lacking in

> them is the leaven of knowledge. So Sidney has been planning to persuade the other trustees to devote the greater part of the money to encouraging *research* and economic study. His vision is to found, slowly and quietly, a *London School of Economics and Political Science* – a centre not only of lectures on special subjects, but an association of students who would be directed and supported in doing original work.[28]

This concept of the scientific investigation of social problems fitted well with Wallas' thinking and he was, from the beginning, an enthusiastic supporter of the School and its aims. Writing in 1896 on the proposed British Library of Political Science which was to be incorporated into the School, he described it as a 'definite attempt to introduce a "*novum organum*" ' into the study of the 'difficult and shifting facts of political and social science'. By gathering those 'books which are not books', the reports and documents and pamphlets, particularly of government bodies, the new library would go a long way towards making a new science of politics possible.[29]

The question of the directorship of the London School of Economics is an interesting, and not irrelevant, sidelight in the somewhat confusing story of the School's creation. I can do no better than to quote Caine:

> We can thus identify 8 February 1895 as perhaps the most important date in the School's history, the date when the decision was taken to create it.
>
> On that day too the Hutchinson Trustees appointed the first of the School's Directors – not W. A. S. Hewins, generally counted as first, but Graham Wallas. However, at their next meeting, on 28 March, Wallas came in person to decline the offer and the Trustees appointed W. A. S. Hewins instead. There remains a little mystery whether Wallas changed his mind or whether, as he afterwards implied, he had never been intended to do more than hold the job until someone else was available. More speculatively, may one wonder whether Webb's co-trustees were as initially as happy as he was to see the key post filled by a non-Fabian in the shape of Hewins and whether there was a little stage-managing about the offer and refusal, designed to demonstrate that an effort had first been made to get a Fabian Director?[30]

Whatever the matter of the directorship, Wallas certainly joined the teaching staff at the beginning.[31] With short breaks as a visiting professor in the United States, Wallas lectured at the London School of Economics from 1895 until 1923, mainly on British and imperial institutions, and on the psychology of politics. Even after his retirement he remained closely attached to the School, continuing to see students, and to write, and deliver occasional lectures. He was still working, and left a partially completed book, when he died on 9 August 1932.

Wallas' unique powers of communication, and the personal interest he took in all he met, made him an incomparable teacher. Teaching, not simply in the sense of imprinting on blank minds his own knowledge, but in the sense of professor and student working together in the task of discovery, was one of the great passions of his life.

The love of teaching extended into a deep concern for the way all things are taught. Wallas gave a great deal of his time and energy to educational policy. He was interested both in the detailed administration of a school system, and in the philosophy which motivated that administration. His services on the London School Board, and on the Education Committees of the London County Council, were not merely formal. He devoted an enormous amount of talent to the work; so great, indeed, that we must give a separate chapter to his work in education. In all this he played an important role in the creation of London's educational system. After his death Harold Laski wrote of him:

> He was a magnificent lecturer who, at his best, was one of the most inspiring academic forces of our time. The innumerable students, both in England and America, who went to hear him were different people because they had passed through his lecture-room. And, even more remarkably, he was a very great director of research. I doubt whether anyone I have ever known had quite his faculty for making the young graduate feel the moral urgency and intellectual fascination of digging through the raw material to the principle which emerges. Always full of suggestion, endlessly patient, quick, alert, vivid, he conveyed, as few men conveyed, the sense of the delight of the chase, the immense social importance of the quarry killed.[32]

Wallas' own 'delight in the chase' was given its full expression in

the publication of his first book, the *Life of Francis Place* (1898). Biographies may tell us as much about the biographer as about the biographee. Every biography is an impression, an interpretation, of another person's life, and while the 'objective' life remains with the subject, the interpretation, or the impression, is part of the biographer. The incidents which are chosen as significant, the reports, or imaginative reconstructions, of conversations, the ascriptions of motives, or the attempts to define the subject's goals in life, are all part of the writer's experience. When a biography about a person not in a position to pay for the honour, nor so well known as to appeal to the mass market of those who seek vicarious excitement in the scandals, intrigues, and weaknesses of the famous, is written by someone after neither a quick profit, nor even a degree, we must assume some special motive. Much scholarly biography is written by those who see in their subject something of themselves. This does not mean simple adulation or wish-fulfilment. The biographer of King Arthur does not necessarily need to dream of himself sitting at the Round Table. It does mean that the biographer will have some empathy with his subject. The writer will see in his subject some reflection of what he might have been or done, or what he imagines he would like to have been or done, in similar circumstances, or he shares the values, the causes, of his subject. (In a 'black' biography – the life of a villain, an enemy – the empathy may be with the peoples, or causes, or ideals frustrated or attacked by the subject.) The life he writes is thus to some extent a reflection of his own aspirations. Such is Graham Wallas' *Life of Francis Place*. There is no doubt at all that Wallas was deeply attracted by Francis Place and by the causes he espoused.

Francis Place was born in 1771 in a private debtors' prison operated by his father. From an early life of poverty and squalor he became, at eighteen, an independent journeyman breeches-maker. In 1793 he took a prominent part in a strike of journeymen tailors, as a result of which he lost his job. Place's name was circulated among all prospective employers and he was effectively black-listed. For months he and his young wife literally starved. By indomitable will and energy Place recovered from these terrible privations and eventually, in 1801, established himself as an independent tailor.

Here begins the remarkable life of the 'radical tailor of Charing Cross'. Place was, from the very beginning, a tremendously hard worker, and a great reader. He understood that knowledge meant power, and he was tireless in his search for such power. As his

business prospered he began to collect, in the rooms behind his shop, his famous library. This was, for the most part, a vast collection of political treatises, parliamentary reports, and statistical returns. To his 'radical laboratory' came virtually every reformer and revolutionary in London. Place provided them with the facts, the arguments, and often the inspiration for their various causes. This obscure library in Charing Cross, unsuspected by most of the wealthy aristocrats who patronised Place the tailor, became the headquarters of English radicalism. Wallas quoted Place on this double aspect of his life:

> Had these persons been told that I had never read a book, that I was ignorant of everything but my business, that I sotted in a public-house, they would not have made the least objection to me. I should have been a 'fellow' beneath them, and they would have patronised me; but . . . to accumulate books and to be supposed to know something of their contents, to seek for friends, too, among literary and scientific men, was putting myself on an equality with themselves, if not, indeed, assuming a superiority; it was an abominable offence in a tailor, if not a crime which deserved punishment.[33]

The movements for the Parliamentary Reform Bill of 1832, the Chartist agitation, and the repeal of the Workmen's Combination Acts, all began here. To a very large extent they were controlled and directed from this unpretentious back room. Place sought neither office nor public recognition, but he was an active participant in every major political campaign of his day. An unfriendly reviewer called him 'the most indefatigable and unscrupulous plotter who ever escaped the gaol'.[34]

From his own experience, Place developed a lasting and genuine hatred of oppression. He was motivated by the desire to save others from the poverty, injustice, and degrading inhumanity of his own early life. Again and again he stressed that if working men were to survive, they must preserve, through every privation, their own self-respect.

> A friend and follower of Bentham and James Mill, his ideal may be called political democracy coupled with industrial liberty. . . . His industry was marvellous and his persistency extraordinary, and in popular and Parliamentary agitations he

> was an inventor and tactician of the first order. In educational schemes he was equally active; and the 'Birbeck', originally the London Mechanics' Institute, owes its existence chiefly to Place.[35]

Place kept an extensive and detailed diary, and the British Museum holds more than seventy volumes of Place's biographical material. He was an industrious collector of historical material, including reports, newspaper clippings, and pamphlets of every kind. Each day he copied and preserved all his important political correspondence and memoranda. Wallas' *Life*, therefore, is based, not on a few secondary sources, or the vague memories of old men, but on the patient sifting of an enormous amount of historical documentation, prepared in most cases within a few hours of the events they described.

Francis Place was never, of course, a Fabian, and the Fabians, had they known him, would not have found him a congenial companion. Yet in a sense he was a prototype Fabian; dedicated, hard-working, pragmatic, an enemy of all privilege and, above all, successful. His approach to politics, which rejected revolutionary heroics in favour of the patient work of administrative reforms, was essentially Fabian in character. So was his belief in the importance of careful fact-finding. Lord Durham, in a speech written for him by Place, declared that the future belonged to him who 'would take the trouble to collect facts, and had the capacity to draw correct inferences'.[36] Later, in *Human Nature in Politics*, Wallas made the point again:

> . . . an organising politician like Francis Place, could always check his own feelings about the 'rights of property', 'mischievous agitators', 'spirit of the Constitution', 'insults to the flag', and so on, by examining statistical facts as to the numerical proportion, the income, the hours of work, and the death rate from disease, of the various classes and races who inhabited the British Empire.[37]

The *Life of Francis Place* was important in three distinct ways. It first of all made public the career of a previously little known democratic organiser, and in the process it brought fresh light on the development of democratic institutions at a critical period of English history. It added new perspectives to our understanding of the political manoeuvring which culminated in the Reform Bill

and, by extrapolation from the one particular case, clearer insight into the political process in general. Secondly, it expanded new methodologies in English social history. Most subsequent histories of the nineteenth century reflect the influence of Wallas' insistence on the importance of primary documents, especially the official papers in the public archives.[38] Finally it helped Wallas arrive at his own concept of the historical course, and the moral basis, of social reform. The writing of the *Life* was a vital stage in Wallas' development as a political scientist. Many years later he recalled:

> . . . the good fortune which sent me at the beginning of my own studies for a long . . . voyage of exploration among the vast first-hand correspondence and diaries of Francies Place. . . . I came out from my years of research a different man; and I do not find it easy to separate my emotional from my intellectual changes in those years.[39]

After the *Life of Francis Place*, one should also look at Wallas' review of *The Village Labourer, 1760–1832*, by J. L. and Barbara Hammond (1911). In writing *The Village Labourer* the Hammonds used the same patient sifting of documents and public archives as Wallas had used in preparing the life of Place. The same motivations, the same deep sense of social injustice, and the same awareness of the need for original sources in social research inspired both books. It is not surprising, therefore, to find Wallas giving *The Village Labourer* the highest praise and frequently thereafter referring his students to it, as a model of social investigation. Writing in the *New Republic* in 1917, Wallas suggested that any American student coming to England should read the Hammonds' book.

> If he will do so he will not only add much to his own knowledge of history and human nature, but will save me a good deal of trouble in explaining what I believe to be the most effective method and mental attitude for social research.[40]

How deeply the book affected him, and how closely he saw in it the same forces that were revealed in Francis Place's career is shown in just one passage.

> In this history there are no blameless heroes or picturesque villains, no 'love interest', or touching death-bed speeches. The evil is done by ordinary, rather stupid and selfish, English

> statesmen and judges and squires and parsons, who had to face a difficult social and economic problem in a rather stupid and selfish age. The evil is suffered by ordinary English laborers, by the little yeomen who were being crushed down into the ranks of the laborers, and by the village artisans who sympathised with them. They were mostly inarticulate men, lifted only into moments of heroism when they tried to express, sometimes in words that Tolstoy might have written, their sense of the inherent justice of their cause and their ever-disappointed conviction that all men of good will must understand them. . . . The leaders of the villages appear in the story only for an instant. They organise a petition or a collection, address a meeting, or destroy a threshing-machine. Then come long weeks in gaol, a few hours of dumb bewilderment in the dock while Mr. Justice Alderson addresses them on the great truths of political economy, and they are sent to the gallows or Botany Bay.[41]

Throughout his life, Wallas, as researcher, professor, or political activist, was motivated by this deep sense of social injustice and awareness of the degrading impact of industrial capitalism. The Hammonds' book roused the same feelings as those which followed the reading of Ruskin.

The importance of Christian evangelism, rationalism, and Darwinism in the evolution of Wallas' thought has already been outlined. Jeremy Bentham, who had been introduced to Francis Place by James Mill, represented another facet in Wallas' complex background. Bentham's techniques of social investigation and of social reform deeply impressed Wallas, and despite his many admitted failings, Bentham was the one model whom Wallas most often tried to emulate. Wallas' approach to social research was quite overtly based on what he had learnt from Bentham. The central theme of Wallas' *Art of Thought* (1926) is derived from Bentham's understanding of the nature of invention. Bentham had defined invention as 'imagination taken under command by attention, and directed to the accomplishment of some particular object or end in view'. He added to this general definition the further proposition that 'among the objects of invention or discovery is method'.[42] Wallas' understanding of the process of invention was clearly inspired by Bentham's speculations. In a paper on 'Bentham as Political Inventor', from which these quotations are taken, Wallas wrote further:

> The first requirement of his method of using imagination for the purpose of invention is that we should be clear as to the end to be served by the invention which we seek. The end he proposed to himself in all his searches was human happiness, but those of my audience to whom such an end seems unworthy and degrading may use Bentham's method to attain any other end which they prefer, provided always that they are as clear as Bentham was what that end is, and as determined as Bentham was to reach it. The next stage in his method was the formation of a habit of allowing thought to spread as widely as possible from association to association, while constantly watching for any sign that some new idea might appear which would help towards the attainment of his end.[43]

The starting-point of the above paper is Wallas' report of a comment, made a few years previously, by the Dean of St Paul's, that you 'can no more invent a constitution or a social order than you can build a tree'.[44] Wallas thought this an absurd notion and he went to some lengths to point out the extent of political invention which already directly affected the life of the Dean. This led him into his principal topic, an account of the achievements of the 'greatest name in the history of British political invention', Jeremy Bentham. Bentham was the man who,

> in seventy years of uninterrupted toil, made inventions which have transformed our legal procedure, substituted competition for patronage in the civil service, and introduced a logical relation between our central and local government; who made scientific health adminstration possible by the creation of social statistics, and introduced a hundred minor improvements, whether in savings banks and money orders, or the ordnance survey or office architecture, or by the invention of words like 'international' and 'codification', without which modern political thinking would be more confused than it is.[45]

Throughout Wallas' later life the influence of Bentham was clear and pervasive. It was not simple adulation or uncritical acceptance. Wallas was fully aware of the inadequacies of Bentham's knowledge of human psychology and of the absurdities to which this lack of knowledge led him. Bentham was 'a born psychologist, born, unfortunately, before the discovery of modern psychology'.[46] Many of Bentham's schemes were quite impracticable. They were grossly

over-detailed, and the more the details were elaborated, the more the schemes drifted from the real world to the fanciful. His single-minded reductionism had dominated English political-economic thinking for a century and had been cited as an excuse for rejecting urgently needed social reforms which were 'contrary to human nature', or a 'violation of the laws of political economy'.

But Bentham himself was a thinker who was genuinely concerned with social reform, not simply as philosophic speculation, but as action. Bentham was not content just to prove the desirability of reform. He devoted even more energy to devising the institutional machinery for putting reforms into effect. Wallas dismissed much of Bentham's philosophic writing as narrow reductionism, and his physchology as ridiculously inadequate. But he held the highest admiration for, and sought in his own life to improve on, Bentham's concern with the effective application of reforming zeal. He was a 'very great inventor of social expedients'.[47] The elements of Benthamism which most impressed Wallas were the careful attention to administrative detail, and the desire, not only to invent, but to investigate the components of the process of invention. 'But perhaps the best help that the social reformer can acquire from him is guidance in the difficult art of being a reformer.'[48]

Wallas' life-long distrust of metaphysical abstractions both reinforced, and was reinforced by, his conviction that philosophers should also be practical men concerned with the 'real world' around them. Philosophy and politics, he felt, are most successful when they try to help each other.

> [English philosophers] have neither taken the position of Diogenes that philosophy has nothing to do with practical life, nor have they asked with Plato that our philosophers should be absolute monarchs. . . . a country is best governed when the philosophers try to understand and sympathise with the politicians . . . and when statesmen try to understand and pay their respects . . . to the abstractions of philosophy.[49]

This was the great strength of Bentham for Wallas. Bentham made many mistakes, and the inadequate basis of his psychology led to the perpetuation of many social evils. Yet Bentham always considered himself a reformer whose philosophy would be meaningless if it offered no guide to practical politics. His philosophy was the source of his political inventions.

Despite its defects, Bentham's psychology did force attention to the broader question of the psychological foundations of political behaviour. Two other English writers who also attempted a psychological analysis of representative government were Walter Bagehot and Sir Henry Maine. Bagehot's *Physics and Politics* (1872) drew heavily on Darwin's evolutionary conceptions. Bagehot saw human nature as rooted in man's biological structure and therefore it could be changed only through the slow processes of biological evolution. Human political behaviour was thus far more primitive in its foundations than civilised man usually cared to admit, and modern governments would do well to pay heed to the forces of instinct in such behaviour. These ideas, together with the not unrelated views in Sir Henry Maine's *Popular Government* (1885), were important structural elements in Wallas' own approach to human nature in politics.

From the experience of writing the *Life of Francis Place*, and from the sympathetic study of Bentham, Wallas perfected his own practical techniques of social research. A good deal of the energy of his later years was given to trying to teach the value of these techniques to his students. But it was not only the practical techniques of applied research that interested him. From Bentham's speculations, and from his own work, he became increasingly interested in developing an art of thought and a systematic science of political invention. These themes became the central concern of his later writings.

Wallas was aware that his own philosophy had no simple, single origin. It arose from the blending of many influences. And, as he himself put it in another context: 'To a philosopher the distinction between his experience and his philosophy cannot exist. His philosophy is his own interpretation of his experience.'[50]

The variety of factors which contributed to Wallas' world-view led him to see life as multi-faceted, and consequently to oppose all reductionist explanations. This was the heart of his criticisms of both Bentham and Marx. For Wallas it was the responsibility of the political thinker to accept the complexity of the environment and of human nature. This complexity was an empirical fact which could not be over-ridden by any monist or reductionist philosophy. A psychological or political theory which attempted to reduce the complexity of human behaviour to a single cause was doomed to failure. The common ground of his criticisms of Hobbes, Bentham, Comte, and Tarde was that they were all guilty of trying to impose

simple-minded, monist explanations of social effects.

Thus the argument against the 'intellectualist fallacy' of nineteenth-century liberalism was not what careless reading might assume it to be, a denial of reason. It was the argument that reason was only one of several impulses behind human behaviour. To see all human behaviour as rational calculation was an error, but no more so than to deny the possibility of any rational calculation.

With the publication, in 1908, of *Human Nature in Politics*, where the question of rationality in politics was more fully explored, the evolution of Wallas' thinking was complete. The rather pedantic classics schoolmaster, raised in a rural, clerical household, and educated at a tradition-bound public school, abandoned Christian orthodoxy at university. A growing awareness of the discoveries of the bilogical sciences, combined with a study of rationalist thinking, brought him to a secular, evangelical socialism. His concern was to find political and economic solutions to the degrading and alienating effects of industrial capitalism. A continuing curiosity, and an unwillingness to take accepted opinions at their face value, led him into a deeper exploration of the springs of human behaviour. This first manifested itself in the *Life of Francis Place* and later in a different form in *Human Nature in Politics*. In both we find an attempt to discover a more complete science of politics, of political invention and, ultimately, of thought itself. But although after *Human Nature in Politics* there were developments, expansion, refinement, and even considerable modifications, the pattern of thinking remained unchanged. The classics teacher had become the political scientist.

It is appropriate to conclude this chapter with an assessment of Wallas by a good friend, Beatrice Webb. This was written before Wallas had published anything of consequence other than his Fabian Essay, and before he had joined the teaching staff of the London School of Economics. But while it was written before he had become a public figure, famous at least in the limited world of academics, it seems to have been an accurate impression, confirmed at least in the essentials of character, by those who knew Wallas only in later life. This is what Beatrice Webb wrote, describing Wallas as a member of the Fabian Junta in 1893.

> Graham Wallas – six feet with a slouching figure – good features and a genial, open smile – utterly unselfconscious and lacking in vanity or personal ambition. Without convictions he would have lounged through life – with convictions he grinds; his natural

sluggishness of nature, transformed by his social fervour into a slow grinding at anything that turns up to do. In spite of his moral fervour, he seems incapable of directing his own life, and tends to drift into anything that other people decide. This tendency is accentuated by his benevolence and kindliness and selflessness – almost amounting to a weakness. Thus, while his intimate friends love him and impose on him, superficial strangers of poor character often actually despise him. To some men and women he appears simply as a kindly, dull fellow – an impression which is fostered by a slovenliness of dress and general worn-out look. He preaches too, a habit carried over from his life as usher and teacher of boys. To his disciples he appears a brilliant man, first-rate lecturer, a very genius for teaching, a great thinker and a conscientious writer. It remains to be seen what else he will become beyond a successful propagandist and an admirable and most popular University Extension lecturer. He has two books on hand – but, owing to his constant running off on other people's business, they stand a poor chance of being finished within a year or so. If enthusiasm, purity of motive, hard if somewhat mechanical work, will make a man a success, then Graham Wallas has a great career before him. He has plenty of intellectual ability too; what he lacks is deliberate concentration and rapid decision what to do and how to do it. A loveable man.[51]

2 Fabian Socialism

This is not the place for a detailed history of the Fabian movement. That has been adequately covered elsewhere,[1] and it is sufficient here to note briefly the circumstances of the Society's birth. In 1882 a group of individuals, under the leadership of Thomas Davidson, began to meet in London to discuss ethical problems. Davidson, whom Beer described as 'an ethical anarchist communist, basing all improvement on self-reform', established the Fellowship of the New Life, which had as its aim the reconstitution of society on 'the principle of highest morality'.[2] Some of those brought together within the Fellowship of the New Life soon wanted to go beyond personal moral improvement to consider social reform, and they began to meet with a wider circle to this end.

At a meeting on 23 November 1883, principally of members of the Fellowship, the following resolution was proposed and carried, apparently unanimously:

> The members of the Society assert that the Competitive system assures the happiness and comfort of the few at the expense of the suffering of the many and that Society must be reconstituted in such a manner as to secure the general welfare and happiness.[3]

Although approved without overt dissent, this resolution marked the splitting off of those whose concern was moving from the purely spiritual to the economic and material. The Fabian Society was born out of this split. A further meeting was held on 4 January 1884 at which a number of resolutions were introduced and carried. Two of these are important to note: (1) That the Society be called the Fabian Society. (2) That the Society shall not at present pledge its members to any more definite basis of agreement than that contained in the resolution of 23 November 1883. (This was the resolution quoted previously.)[4]

It should be recorded here that the only two Fabian Essayists present at this foundation meeting were Hubert Bland, who

remained an Executive Committee Member of the Society from its birth unitl 1911, and William Clarke. G. B. Shaw joined the Fabians in September 1884, and Sydney Olivier and Sidney Webb became members in March 1885. Graham Wallas, who was introduced to the Society through Webb and Olivier, did not become a member until April 1886, although he had for several years previously been meeting regularly with other members of the 'Hampstead Group'. He was a member of the Executive of the Society from 1888 to 1895.

Increasingly the Society became dominated by the personalities and interests of its new members and drifted further away from the Fellowship of the New Life. There was no formal breach, and no antagonism, but the two movements became concerned with different approaches, and found that they had little in common. Nevertheless, it is not insignificant that the Fabian Society was born out of an ethical movement. The Fellowship itself was finally dissolved in 1898.

Wallas' own thought had independently developed along Fabian lines. He was not 'converted' to Fabianism. He joined the Society because it was an association of people who already shared many of his views. Part of the Fabian *Credo*, a belief in the power of knowledge, was embodied in one of Wallas' earliest writings, a paper on 'Socialists and the School Board', published in 1888. Here Wallas wrote: 'It is obviously useless to try to influence public opinion on any subject without accurate knowledge of it. Socialists when they are not lecturing, sleeping, or earning their daily bread, ought to be reading Blue Books.'[5] This declaration of faith, which had also guided Francis Place, was clearly part of what attracted Wallas to both Place and the Fabians. Wallas' whole life reflected his concurrence with that most Fabian-like statement, which could have been made, in its spirit, equally well by Beatrice Webb. The *Life of Francis Place* was a reflection of the social values, and of the concept of the most efficient techniques of social reform, which drew Wallas into association with the Fabians.

The single most coherent exposition of Fabian political and economic philosophy is contained in the *Fabian Essays in Socialism*, published in 1889, and since reissued several times. The *Essays* were the joint effort of seven contributors[6] yet, although the individualism of the several essayists is not lost, the work as a whole has a high level of internal consistency.

The plans for the *Essays* were apparently made during the early

part of 1888. Among the Wallas Papers there is a collection of notes by Wallas, Webb, Olivier, and Shaw, on proposals for a set of tracts on socialism. One note, signed by Olivier, apparently documents the conception:

> Further, if the above mentioned Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John are to conspire for the issue of a double-barrelled New Testament (and I am quite prepared to contribute two of the proposed gospels) I see no reason for supposing that they would reap much advantage by recruiting a fresh stage standing army to practise their pronouncements on.[7]

Because the book was planned in advance, with a carefully arranged scheme, it achieved a unity and coherence unusual in a collection of essays by a number of highly intelligent and independent individuals. It had the added strength of the meticulous editorship of G. B. Shaw, who possessed the unusual talent of extracting a kind of intellectual unity from a group of very diverse writers without destroying their individuality. Many years later Wallas recalled:

> One of our difficulties was that the seven of us included minds of very different types, especially, perhaps, those of Mr. Sidney Webb, and Mr. Hubert Bland; and I, with my schoolmaster's outlook, was greatly struck by the fact that Shaw, when discussing the kind of revision which he should urge on the essayists, said, 'I'm not going to Webbulize Bland or Blandulate Webb.'[8]

The *Essays* were an immediate success. The whole first edition of one thousand copies was sold out within a month and the book has continued to sell to the present day. Part of its appeal lay in its apparent matter-of-fact common sense. While it proposed a major transformation of English society, it spoke in the tones of quiet reason, rejecting strident, revolutionary polemics. If there was to be a revolution, it was to be a gentle one. Edward Pease expressed a Fabian's view of the Fabian achievement:

> 'Fabian Essays' presented the case for Socialism in plain language which everybody could understand. It based Socialism, not on the speculations of a German philosopher, but on the obvious

> evolution of society as we see it around us. It accepted economic science as taught by the accredited British professors; it built up the edifice of Socialism on the foundations of our existing political and social institutions: it proved that Socialism was but the next step in the development of society, rendered inevitable by the changes which followed from the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century.[9]

The Fabians, in A. M. McBriar's terms, 'stood at the parting of the ways, at the point where the modern attitude to the State diverged from the Liberal-radical attitude of the nineteenth century'.[10] Liberal philosophy had separated the concept of the State, as coercive agent, from civil society, as a 'self-acting co-operative mechanism'. And in association with the economic doctrines of laissez-faire, liberalism assigned a minimum role to the State. In this context the Marxist and anarchist proposals that this minimum role should, or would, be eliminated altogether, were not as foreign as they might appear today. Fabianism, however, emerged as the authority of laissez-faire doctrines was in decline, and as society increasingly came to rely on the State as the instrument of social purpose. Fabianism is the gospel of State-socialism rather than anarchist-socialism.

The two most clearly identifying characteristics of Fabian socialism are that social change be democratic, and that it be gradual. Sidney Webb's contribution to the *Essays* most clearly organisation bit by bit comes'.[11] The essential precondition for advocates of social reconstruction, he said, had understood the democratic lesson and knew 'that it is through the slow and gradual turning of the popular mind to new principles that social re-organisation bit by bit comes'.[11] The essential precondition for fundamental change was a society prepared to accept such change, a preparation which was necessarily a slow and democratic process.

Despite this stress on the value of democracy, the Fabian approach to democratic theory was vague and uncertain. In a sense they took democracy very much for granted and assumed its eventual triumph. Wallas' personal views on democracy, which will be more fully developed in a later chapter, combined a pessimistic 'realist' approach to representative democracy as conceived in liberal-democratic theory, with an optimistic, almost Utopian vision of what democracy might become under more favourable circumstances. Wallas in fact tried to combine a tough-minded

'realist' analysis of democracy with an optimistic liberal ideal of a rational, responsible individual. He wanted to be both a scientific critic and a social reformer, both to analyse and to preach. In Wiener's words, he was 'trying to have his cake and eat it too'.[12] He believed that the English had adopted democratic political institutions, without becoming democrats at all 'in the American sense'. Democracy in England was leavened by the continuance of 'certain undemocratic yet not irrational habits'.[13] Wallas found these few non-democratic components to be a source of strength, not of regret.

The Fabians generally took a pragmatic approach to democracy. They had little to say about the nature of democracy, although a great deal to say about the administrative machinery necessary to make it work. As Max Beer put it: 'The Fabian Society appears to form an institute for social engineering.'[14] It is not too much of a distortion to charge that they were more interested in operating the machinery than in analysing its nature and purpose. Sidney Webb, for example, believed that his own career in the Civil Service, based almost entirely on success in competitive examinations, proved the virtues of 'government by experts'. Webb, and to a lesser extent the other Fabians, shared with J. S. Mill a decided preference for meritocracy over both aristocracy and democracy. He did not pause to consider whether this view of government required any modification of the common formulation of democratic theory.

So long as the Fabians were preoccupied with the techniques for realising the 'good society', they gave far less than adequate attention to the fundamental nature of that good society. Democracy to the Fabians appeared more as a method and process than as a social goal. In the syllabus for a lecture to the Fabian Society in 1930 on 'Ends and Means in Democracy', Wallas explained their attitude:

> The early Fabians dealt with means rather than ends. We assumed that men desired or needed certain things – roughly conceived of as more money or more leisure or more happiness – and we concentrated on the process of discovering and making known the scheme of causes and effects which would enable them to obtain those things. . . . We were trained by Webb and Shaw to take our own desire for the greatest happiness of the greatest number for granted, and no more talked about it than a soldier in a campaign talks of his patriotism.[15]

Wallas eventually found this simplistic notion inadequate and he was to spend a good deal of his later life exploring the nature of the democracy that one hoped to achieve, rather than just with the means of achieving some vaguely conceptualised notion of it. *Human Nature in Politics* was the starting-point of a critical re-examination of the easy optimism of nineteenth-century parliamentarianism. In later years, and especially after the 1914–18 war, which effectively destroyed Victorian optimism, he became even more disturbed about the gulf between the machinery of democracy and the ideals that machinery was intended to realise.

> Since the Armistice of 1918 we have watched with growing distrust the actual working of our political systems. The tactics of parliamentary majorities and parliamentary elections seem utterly inadequate to provide wise and progressive direction for the organised co-operation of great industrial societies.[16]

The appreciation of the gap between means and ends led Wallas to examine, not only the means but, even more importantly, the ends, the goals of the good society. What, he kept asking, was the purpose of political activity? This increasing concern with the nature of the end was to be one of the sources of friction which finally led to his resignation from the Fabians.

While one distinguishing feature of Fabianism was that social change had to be democratic and constitutional, perhaps even more characteristic was the further requirement that change be gradual. The revolution would be achieved, not in one bloody holocaust, but in an irresistible sequence of reforms. Wallas explained later the philosophy of gradualism:

> Instead of looking on 'capitalism' and 'exploitation' as a single fact to be destroyed by the shock-tactics of class-war and forcible revolution, we came to see the economic advantages which individual men enjoyed by inheriting or acquiring land or bonds or brains or training as matters of more and less. If a Liberal Chancellor of the Exchequer taxed land or unearned income, or an educationist worked to improve the primary or technical schools, or a hygienist invented schemes of housing, we accepted his work, not as a 'palliative', but as an actual step towards our ideal. . . . Every extension of the franchise or improvement in administrative machinery represented to us a percentage of our programme.[17]

The Fabians presented a new version of socialism. Unlike the Utopians, they had no desire to separate themselves from the life of the State by establishing autonomous communities which might convert the world to socialism by good example.[18] Nor did they, like the Marxists, see the road to socialism through the aroused class-consciousness of the proletariat. The Fabians, who were not themselves of the working classes, had little confidence in the possibilities of change dependent on working-class initiative. They did not pretend to be anything other than an intellectual elite. For most of the Fabians the concept of socialist change was the permeation of the existing State with socialist ideas and practical socialist measures, until the accumulation of gradual change produced a total transformation of the society.[19]

Both in origins and in philosophy, the whole character of Fabian socialism was clearly alien to Marxism. Apart from a general desire to substitute community ownership for the private ownership of the means of production, they had little in common. Fabianism was essentially middle-class intellectual English, non-doctrinaire, persuasive, constitutional, and reformist. As time went on, the Fabians, especially Shaw and Webb, became increasingly paternalistic and elitist. The Fabian case against Marxism, however, was more than just a by-product of national character. Wallas reported that a serious attempt had been made to understand Marx:

> . . . from the beginning of 1885 we had all four [Shaw, Webb, Olivier, and himself] belonged to a little reading circle in Hampstead for the study of *Das Kapital*. We expected to agree with Marx, but found ourselves from the beginning criticizing him.[20]

The English edition of *Das Kapital* was not published until 1886, but it appears that the Fabians were reading him in French. Edward Pease, for example, mentions that his French edition of *Das Kapital* was dated October 1883,[21] and G. B. Shaw mentions that in 1885 a friend found him in the British Museum Reading Room poring over a French edition of *Capital*.[22] According to McBriar, the Fabians at this early period knew nothing of Marx's or Engels' philosophical writings, but were familiar with the *Communist Manifesto* and certain historical writings, and expositions of 'scientific socialism'.[23] The disagreements with Marx were focused on three general themes. The first of these was economic theory, and specifically the Marxist theory of surplus value.

> Instead of taking surplus value in the lump, we divided it into the three 'rents' of land, capital, and ability, and faced the fact that, if he worked with the worst land, tools, and brains 'in cultivation', the worst-paid labourer might be producing no more wealth than he consumed. This led us to abandon 'abstract labour' as the basis of value, and to adopt Jevons's conception of value as fixed by the point where 'marginal effort' coincided with 'marginal utility'.[24]

At the same time in 1916, Wallas wrote Pease a personal comment on his *History of the Fabian Society*, which had just been published. He made the point that:

> If I had written it I should have emphasised, more than you have done in the early chapter, the character of the break with Marxism which was made at the Hampstead Group in 1884–8. It consisted (a) in our insistence on Ricardo's Law of Rent, and (b) in our preference of Jevons' value analysis to Marx's.[25]

The acceptance of Jevons' value analysis was part and parcel of the notion of gradualism. It made it possible, said Wallas, for the Fabians to treat as problems of more-or-less issues which the Marxists treated as absolute contradictions. The same attitude which, in the *Basis* of socialism, enabled the Fabians to advocate the nationalisation of 'such forms of capital as could be conveniently managed socially' rather than the nationalisation of 'all means of production and exchange', is brought out in the attitude to rent and value.

> Our 'rent' was the result of differential advantages and we were glad to help the most moderate land tax or death duty which nationalized any of it or to oppose such a thing as Leasehold Enfranchisement which made such a process in any degree more difficult.[26]

The second major point of disagreement between the Fabians and Marx centred on their rejection of the concept of economic determinism. Here, however, part of the disagreement would seem to arise from a misunderstanding of what Marx was actually saying. Even as late as 1916, for example, Wallas could make the point in reference to Marx: 'We never supposed that all political alliances and party quarrels, or all wars or sexual customs or religions were

due to the single desire to make money.'[27] And he continued to approach Marx in this simplistic manner. In *Our Social Heritage* he wrote: 'A Marxist believer in the materialist explanation of history could henceforward agree with the disciples of the classical economists in reducing all motive to the simple desire for pecuniary gain.'[28]

Wallas was not alone in this misunderstanding and the Fabians in general were most unsympathetic to Marxist historicism. Their objections extended wider than economic determinism. Although they were prepared to predict the eventual victory of socialism, they were unwilling to subscribe to any overall philosophy of history which would substantiate their confidence. Their theory of history went no further than first-level, short-term prediction, and they exhibited a marked intellectual antipathy to any wider-ranging historicism. Wallas' general criticism of Marxism was that it was an example of 'reductionism', the attempt, always futile, to reduce the complexity of human life to a single cause.

His distrust of metaphysical abstractions made him as suspicious of T. H. Green as of Karl Marx. Of the British Idealists he had written:

> But all these British interpreters of German thought were, like the German thinkers, metaphysicians, concerned to find by metaphysical methods a conception of the state which should form part of a rational solution of the problem of the universe, and should prove indeed that there was no reality in the universe except reason.[29]

Wallas believed this approach repugnant to the 'ordinary British politicician or statesman', and he obviously regarded himself as an 'ordinary Englishman', to whom 'the very phraseology of metaphysical idealism was unintelligible'. By implication the phraseology of Marxist historicism was equally unintelligible. Wallas' own approach was nominalist, although he did not maintain this position with complete consistency. He generally accepted reality as the sum of sense impressions, and was prepared to find in such reality an adequate explanation of the universe. Only later, in his psychological work, did he begin to find deficiencies in a completely nominalist approach. In considering later Wallas' own psychological theories we will be in a better position to examine his objections to the mechanistic psychology of modern Marxism. Here it is

sufficient to note that these objections reflected his general antipathy to monist explanations.

The third point of disagreement was a corollary of the second; a rejection of a 'scientifically determined' revolution. The Fabians believed in the certain triumph of socialism, but not as the product of any automatic process or scientific law. Socialism would succeed, but only because there were enough dedicated men and women of talent prepared to work extremely hard and efficiently to make it succeed. And it would succeed because of that skilled work, and not because of any scientific laws. Indeed the Fabians did not use the term 'inevitability' in any sense of logical or historical necessity. All they meant was, that given what had in fact happened in the past, the triumph of socialism seemed to be a very high probability. And there was no necessity behind what had happened in the past. There could easily have been a different sequence of events which would have resulted in different consequences. All they were really prepared to say was that the chance events of the past produced a very high likelihood that socialism would be the next development in Western European history.

The dispute with Marxism extended to the question of revolution. The Fabians were inclined to argue that if socialism could be achieved only through a bloody revolution, with all the pain and anguish that that would entail, then it might well be that socialism was not a goal worth pursuing. The ends would not justify the means. But because they believed that Marx was wrong, because they believed that education and the gradual transformation of society were surer roads to socialism, the Fabians were prepared to work to bring a socialist society into being.

The rejection of Marx made it more than ever necessary that the Fabians should make a systematic statement of their own position. This is largely the justification of the collected *Fabian Essays*. Wallas' contribution to the *Essays* was entitled 'Property Under Socialism'. Of this Pease later wrote that Wallas treated the subject of property 'with moderation rather than knowledge'.[30] In discussing property Wallas started from a definition originally used by John Austin in his *Lectures on Jurisprudence* (1869). The term 'property' could be used for ' . . . any right which gives to the entitled party such a power or liberty of using or disposing of the subject . . . as is merely limited generally by the rights of all other persons.[31] Wallas' views on property owed a good deal to Henry George, whose influence was at its highest at the time the Fabians were writing. The specific

details of George's single land tax were rejected but, nevertheless, it was through George that Wallas and the other Fabians came to lay such stress on the importance of land. The progressive socialisation of land was high in the list of Fabian priorities, and a critical element in Wallas' road to socialism. For example, the title to a set of notes for a discussion with a Mr Brooke at the Bedford Debating Society, some time in the late 1880s is: 'That as long as land and capital are subject to private monopoly, the reward of the individual worker will not increase.'[32]

Apart from land, the Fabians adopted a pragmatic, *ad hoc* approach to property. They had no doctrinaire scheme for the total elimination of all forms of private property. The *Basis* of Fabianism, published in 1887, set the policy:

> The Fabian Society consists of Socialists. It therefore aims at the reorganization of society by the emancipation of Land and Industrial Capital from individual and class ownership, and the vesting of them in the community for the general benefit. In this way only can the natural and acquired advantages of the country be equitably shared by the whole people.
>
> The Society accordingly works for the extinction of private property in Land and of the consequent individual appropriation, in the form of Rent, of the price paid for permission to use the earth, as well as for the advantages of superior soils and sites.
>
> The Society, further, works for the transfer to the community of the administration of such industrial Capital as can conveniently be managed socially. For, owing to the monopoly of the means of production in the past, industrial inventions and the transformation of surplus income into Capital have mainly enriched the proprietary class, the worker being now dependent on that class for leave to earn a living.[33]

The Fabian concept of public ownership was wider than what is now commonly understood by nationalisation. Public ownership meant more than the transfer of economic power to the *central* organs of the State, embracing also other forms of community control.

> Socialism, as understood by the Fabians, meant the organisation and conduct of the necessary industries of the country, and the appropriation of all forms of economic rent of land and capital by the nation as a whole, through the most suitable public authorities, parochial, municipal, provincial, or central.[34]

The Fabians' ideal was never an intensely centralised State, and they spoke often of the 'manifold' rather than the 'unified' nature of the socialist State.[35] In the early days of the movement at least, they were quite fairly labelled 'municipal socialists'. In the *Essays*, Wallas himself explained at some length the practical criteria for the range and scale of public ownership.[36] There were always practical limits to what could be brought under effective community control, and Wallas resisted any temptation to try to push public ownership beyond these limits. And as long as public ownership was not universal, some measure of private property would have to be accepted.[37] Full public ownership might be a more consistent scheme, but, as a Fabian, Wallas could not condone any policy which went further than public opinion would accept. In the prevailing sentiment, private property, and even private industry, would long continue to exist along with public property and public industry. '. . . families at present prefer waste and discomfort to that abundance which can only be bought by organisation and publicity.'[38] Wallas set human wishes, even when apparently irrational, as a higher priority than fully rational organisation. Wallas' pragmatic approach to public ownership is illustrated in a Memorandum he prepared for the Coal Industry Commission in 1919. There he argued that because the existing coal resources, once exhausted, could not be replaced, 'each generation of the inhabitants of Great Britain has to decide how far it will prefer the interests of its successors to its own interest'. This was a special case and therefore, he said, 'in this all-important respect I believe that nationalisation would have advantage over private ownership'.[39]

Wallas' socialism is unintelligible out of the context of his evangelical upbringing. His socialism was not derived from Marxist historical determinism, nor from carefully constructed economic theory. It was the response to the moral outrage at the effects of capitalism, which he saw not only as economically inefficient, but, much more importantly, as morally destructive. This is a thread which runs through all Wallas' work. He attacked capitalism less as a machinery for achieving certain goals than as an immoral form of social organisation whose goals corrupted society. The materialist foundations of capitalism were inimical to the Good Society. The *Polis* could not be recreated on capitalist values.

The defects of capitalism could not therefore be corrected simply through improving the material conditions of the workers. The problems went deeper than the matter of wages and hours of work.

The over-riding concern was to restore the human qualities of life destroyed by industrial capitalism. Capitalism had demoralised its people to the extent that it would be impossible to implement many desirable social reforms. Without a return to more cooperative social values many community services, if supplied by a capitalist government, would be abused, for the nature of capitalism ensured that men would take unfair advantage of whatever was provided for them.

> For more than a century the proletarians of Europe have been challenged by their masters to do as little work as they can. They have been taught by the practical economists of the Trades Unions, and they have learnt for themselves by bitter experience, that every time any one of them . . . does one stroke of work not in his bond, he is increasing the future unpaid labor not only of himself but of his fellows.[40]

This selfish, competitive spirit of capitalism was the greatest handicap to be overcome by the would-be reformer. The social problem was that capitalism divided workers from owners, and alienated the workers from both what they produced and the act of production itself. Capitalism, like Marxism, assumed the division of society into two exclusive classes of owners and workers.

> When I was in the United States in 1919 I used to notice an assumption, among the more conservative writers and thinkers, which I also noticed in England during the 1880s – that the whole social question consisted in an illegitimate claim by those members of the community who were naturally fitted only for routine manual labour to enjoy that share in the joint economic product which was due to the superior intelligence of the born inventors and organisers. The really difficult problems of the degree to which organising power might be due to the mere possession of wealth, and the possession of wealth might itself be due to inheritance or some other cause than the superior natural efficiency of the possessor were largely ignored.[41]

Time and again Wallars returned to this theme. Thus, in 1915 he declared that under liberal-capitalism, the 'individual liberty of the masters meant the slavery of the men'.[42] Much the same point had been made in the Fabian *Essays* where he wrote that 'every

circumstance of monotony, ugliness, and anxiety' had made the working day degrading and wearisome. 'All, almost without exception, now look upon the working day as a period of slavery.'[43] The remedy lay in a collectivist society, with a deep sense of community – a society in which all men could come to understand that the good of each depended upon the common good of all.

> Every progressive thinker or politician agrees that no permanent cure for this inefficiency [of modern British industry] can be brought about unless the wealth we produce is distributed with greater fairness, and unless, in the complicated subdivision of modern industry, the producers can be made to see more clearly and to feel more warmly that each man's work is a service rendered to the whole community. The first task, therefore, of our generation is to make men desire a larger measure of social equality and to realize the meaning of social service.[44]

The new world which would emerge was a dream compounded from John Ruskin, Robert Owen, and William Morris, and set uneasily in the framework of Fabian concern for the science of administration and the practical problems of governing the new utopia. While Wallas rejected Owen's concept of the model community, he remained impressed by the moral character of Owen's socialism. To Wallas, Owen was the true originator of modern socialism. Thus he wrote in 1910 that socialism began 'about a quarter to one o'clock on the afternoon of August 21, 1817, in the City of London Tavern' (where Owen gave his first lecture on socialism).[45] In 1887 and 1888 Wallas, along with other Fabians, spoke from time to time to the Hammersmith branch of Morris' Socialist League and followed keenly Morris' interpretation of the ways to socialist change. In a lecture in 1892 he expressed, in words that were reminiscent of Ruskin and Owen, his views on the goals of the good society.

> Shall the working hours of the day be looked upon as a period of discomfort, made as short as possible and only endured because they produce the material means of happiness for the consuming hours? Or shall the day be looked on as whole, and happiness be sought for in the motives and conditions of work as well as in rest and enjoyment after work?[46]

In *The Great Society* he made explicit his model, a society in which harmony and moderation prevailed, but in which the cultivation of moderation in public life did not preclude excellence as a personal ideal.

> If I try to make for myself a visual picture of the social system which I should desire for England and America, there comes before me a recollection of those Norwegian towns and villages where everyone, the shopkeepers and the artisans, the schoolmaster, the boy who drove the post-ponies, and the student daughter of the innkeeper who took round the potatoes, seemed to respect themselves, to be capable of Happiness as well as of pleasure and excitement, because they were near the Mean in the employment of all their faculties. I can imagine such people learning to exploit the electric power from their waterfalls, and the minerals in their mountains, without dividing themselves into dehumanised employers and officials, and equally dehumanised 'hands'. But I recollect also that the very salt and savour of Norwegian life depends on the fact that poets, and artists, and statesmen have worked in Norway with a devotion which was not directed by any formula of moderation. When I talk to a New Zealander about the future of his country, and about the example which she is creating of a society based on the avoidance both of destitution and superfluity, I sometimes feel that she may still have to learn that the Extreme as a personal ideal for those who are called by it, is a necessary complement of the Mean in public policy.[47]

The romantic vision of Norwegian society is clearly an amalgam of rural Devon and the Athenian *polis*. It coloured all Wallas' thinking on the purpose of social activity and was the standard by which the quality of organisational forms could be tested.

Behind the utopian vision Wallas still had enough practical realism to know that a socialist society would not solve all the problems of the world. It would not necessarily bring about complete human happiness, nor would it eliminate all human vices. Yet, even after granting some weaknesses, socialism seemed to offer huge opportunities for uplifting society, for approaching closer to his vision.

> But in the households of the five men out of six in England who live by weekly wage, Socialism would indeed be a new birth of

> happiness. The long hours of work done as in a convict prison, without interest and without hope; the dreary squalor of their homes; above all that grievous uncertainty, that constant apprehension of undeserved misfortune which is the peculiar result of capitalist production: all this would be gone; and education, refinement, leisure, the very thought of which now maddens them, would be part of their daily life. Socialism hangs above them as the crown hung in Bunyan's story above the man raking the muck heap – ready for them if they will but lift their eyes. And even to the few who seem to escape and even profit by the misery of our century, socialism offers a new and nobler life, when full sympathy with those about them, springing from full knowledge of their condition, shall be a source of happiness, and not, as now, of constant sorrow – when it shall no longer seem either folly or hypocrisy for a man to work openly for his highest ideal. To them belongs the privilege that for each one of them the revolution may begin as soon as he is ready to pay the price.[48]

This is not the vision of Marx or Lenin. There is no revolution, no cataclysmic overthrowing of an old order – but a slow dawning of a new society. Wallas did not wish to 'liquidate' the bourgeoisie, and knew it was not possible to convert them directly. He hoped, rather, to render them ineffective by progressive taxation, the nationalisation of key industries, and the community control over all aspects of economic life. Wallas' mood was not one of anger or rage. He did not hate the individual capitalists, but was, rather, saddened by the society which made them as they were. This was the set of ideals, the image of society, that broughtWallas into the Fabians. Indeed, given such a value structure, he could not really have gone anywhere else at that period in English history. In its earlier creative days, the Fabian Society was a singularly congenial environment for Wallas. Mack, for example, made the point that:

> In a way, the public figure of Graham Wallas was a creation of the Fabian Society. He had a lounging, indolent temperament. Without the constant goading of his fellow-Fabians and their mighty example of tireless disinterested labor in social science, he might never have written anything.[49]

However, in time Wallas' commitment to the Fabian Society

weakened and he found himself at odds with the adopted Fabian policy on a number of issues.[50] He was not prepared simply to fade into the background while preserving a formal association. He felt that as a founding member of the Society he was obliged to make his position clear, and finally, in January 1904, he submitted his resignation. His letter to the Society is worth recording:

> Dear Pease, – I am resigning my membership of the Fabian. For a good many years past, in fact since I left the Executive, I have, as you know, been able to give very little time to the Society. I have drafted almost nothing myself, and when I have disagreed with the form or substance of any Tract I have come forward as a very unhelpful critic of work already done.
>
> I have, for instance, disagreed with some minor points in the London Education Tract which is about to appear, and with many important points in the Tariff Tract which was passed last Friday. On that occasion it was clear that the vast majority of the Society was in agreement with the Executive and against me.
>
> If I were an independent student I might give up criticism and content myself with showing by my membership a general sympathy with the cause of social reform. But I am an active politician, and even such matters as electoral tactics or the details of administrative machinery, which are of small importance to a student, do create real difficulties for any man who has, day by day, to adopt and defend a position of his own on these very points.
>
> I have therefore determined to go. Those who, like yourself, have been fellow members of mine for the last eighteen years will understand the regret with which I do so. I should like you, even now, to think of me as an unattached friend of the Society, and to allow me to help the Local Government Information Bureau on any questions concerned with my work. Sincerely yours, – Graham Wallas.[51]

To this formal letter of resignation, Wallas penned a briefer, personal note:

> Dear Pease, Enclosed explains itself. I have nothing to add except that I really mean what I say at the end. Do you think the Executive would allow my letter to appear in the next Fabian News? Yours sincerely, Graham Wallas.[52]

While the moment of parting was as explained in Wallas' formal letter of resignation, the cause was much deeper. For some years Wallas had been drifting further and further from his Fabian colleagues. Increasingly his mind was concerned with the nature of the new society, with what we might today call the political culture of industrial democracy. He was no longer prepared to be confined by the Fabian preoccupation with the 'practical' side of reform. Their vision of man, which focused on the political and economic, and ignored the cultural and spiritual, was incomplete. To his mind the Fabians, and especially the Webbs, had become so absorbed in means that they had lost sight of ends. The warmth had gone out of their socialism. There were dangers that in their preoccupation with efficiency, the Fabians, or at least the Webbs, would make a sham of democracy. It was here that there was a fundamental conceptual gulf between Wallas and his former colleagues.

> Democracy for both Webb and Shaw was a means of procuring *consent* by the populace to the measures of an *elite*. For Wallas it had to be a means of securing at least some popular *understanding* and intelligent participation in government.[53]

Wallas' gradual conversion to the belief that all social and political problems were fundamentally psychological problems further strained the relationship. The Fabians as a group were obsessed by the mechanics of administration and refused to look far beyond the reform of existing institutions.

> While the residual Fabians have been lapsing steadily towards administrative details, towards mere freaks of manipulative contrivance, towards syndicalism and trade-union politics, he has been steadily developing the larger idea that the supreme human need is the organization of a general understanding and a collective will; that given these things, traditions and institutions can be fused and reconstructed with ease, and that without them there is no tradition and no arrangement, however admirable, that will not be turned to evil by the untutored littleness, the blind disputes and private dishonesties of mankind.[54]

Wallas' interests had begun to broaden. He looked on socialism as a *Weltanschauung*, a world-view by the guidance of which all political and economic problems would be solved.[55] And from this

perspective he began to concern himself with an ever-widening range of interests. Fabian 'gas and water' socialism became too narrow a frame of reference, although in spirit Wallas remained true to the philosophy of life that had first drawn him into the Society. His breach was more with the Webbs than with Fabian socialism. He quarrelled with the institution and its directors. He had no quarrel with the peculiar brand of social reform and the vision of society which inspired the birth of Fabianism.

After he resigned from the Fabian Society, Wallas turned for a short while to Syndicalism and Guild socialism. 'World War I, however, killed his enthusiasm not only for Syndicalism but for doctrinal approaches to social problems of any kind whatever.'[56] Guild socialism had seemed at first attractive because it offered the image of a new society. It seemed to open up an alternative to the apparent inadequacies of the existing political system, an alternative more rational and more attuned to the 'real' interests of working people. But it was a false alternative, an unattainable utopia. It was based on the unfounded assumption that the fabric of a guild structure would, of itself, lead to a change in human nature; that within the guilds people would become less selfish, more public-spirited. The facts of political life quickly exposed the realities behind the Guild socialist dream.

> [The intelligent young British working man] for a few days before and at the opening of the General Strike in 1926 had perhaps an intellectual and emotional vision of a new Guild Socialist society. But the rasping voice of a communist fanatic from the back seats at a Trade Union meeting seems [undecipherable] a mocking parody of that vision.[57]

The great problem of Guild socialism, as of Syndicalism, was that it exaggerated the extent to which men could be divided into functional groups. It assumed an exclusiveness of interest among the working members of a profession which ignored the legitimate role of other members of society. It was not only teachers, for example, who had an interest in education, and it would be a disaster for society if teachers were given exclusive control over education.

Many of the Guild socialists had argued that the organisation of the electorate along vocational lines would eliminate the difficulties and dangers of electioneering in a mass electorate. Wallas was unconvinced of this and believed that there would be just as much

non-rational electioneering in, say, the National Union of Teachers as in any territorial constituency with an equal number of voters.[58] Guild socialism also imposed problems on the ultimate basis of political power. 'A definite clash, for instance, between the Army and the Trade Unions . . . without the possibility of Parliamentary intervention, seems to be about the worst imaginable event that the future could contain.'[59] Wallas rejected Guild socialism because he believed in parliamentary democracy. Those who assume too easily that *Human Nature in Politics* was a cynical attack on democracy, or that Wallas was one of those turn-of-the-century critics who denied the possibility of democracy, would do well to read what he wrote in 1915 on the subject of Guild socialism:

> On ultimate questions, even within the restricted sphere of education, I would rather that national policy were represented by the mind and feeling of the average candidate for Parliament or for the L.C.C. than by that of the average candidate for the N.U.T. Executive. And I can never forget the monopolist spirit, the hereditary exclusiveness, the intellectual rigidity, which destroyed the guild socialism of the medieval cities, and may some day destroy the great surviving guild of the lawyers.[60]

Much the same point was made again in 1921, when Wallas was reviewing R. H. Tawney's *The Acquisitive Society*. There he wrote:

> Mr. Tawney also seems to me to exaggerate the degree to which the grant of self-government will of itself increase the 'public spirit' of the producer. As I read his eloquent chapter on the 'Liberty of Industry' I substituted in my own mind 'The Inns of Court' and 'The British Medical Association' for his general term 'professions': and in every paragraph I found myself doubting and hesitating. . . . professional independence may, in its own way and place, help the growth of public spirit. But I am convinced that it is not the main element in that growth, and that the intolerant Syndicalists who come to the front at every crisis in industry, or the Church, or Medicine, are no more on the true path of progress than are the intolerant nationalists of Warsaw or Fiume.[61]

The difficulties, the contradictions, of Guild socialism and of Syndicalism become more apparent when, in *The Great Society*, and

Our Social Heritage, Wallas began to consider various forms of social organisation. As he analysed the function and role of existing vocational organisations his opinion hardened that their effect was detrimental to the social good. Vocational organisations, the corner-stone of Syndicalism, became, not liberating forces, but instruments of reaction, of the perpetuation of vested interests. We shall therefore return to Wallas' criticism of Syndicalism in later chapters on social organisation.

Wallas' understanding of the socialist reconstruction of society was a concomitant of his concern for developing a coherent educational policy. If the new society was to be brought about, not through revolution, but through democratic public acceptance, and if education was to be the means by which the new democratic society would be brought into being, educational reform was the necessary precondition for social transformation. In the *Essays* he wrote:

> If we wish to wean the children from the selfish isolation of the English family, from the worse than savage habits produced by four generations of capitalism, from that longing for excitement, and incapacity for reasonable enjoyment, which are the natural results of work-days spent in English factories, and English Sundays spent in English streets, then we must give freely and generously to our schools.[62]

How Wallas integrated his life philosophy with his practical concerns for educational policy and educational administration will be the central theme of the next chapter. As we delve deeper into the development of Wallas' political philosophy his socialism becomes fuzzier. Increasingly we are brought to the conclusion that Wallas, despite a deep commitment to humanitarian ideals, to the common good, to public service, to the dignity and worth of all men, was not a socialist at all, but an evangelical liberal who gave the individual not only rights, but a heavy burden of social obligations. As we explore his ideas we will see, with increasing clarity, how his collectivism merges into a machinery for the better realisation of the good of individuals in an urban-industrial setting. It is most significant that he makes a point of rejecting the concept of an organic society in favour of the more individualistic concept of organisation. His vision is not Marx's 'from each according to his

ability, to each according to his need', but a revitalised *polis* in which each recognises his own obligation to the greater social good, and in the voluntary performance of that obligation achieves his own moral self-perfection.

3 Education for A New World

The public-school education of the English middle classes in the late nineteenth century was seldom designed to stimulate the intellect. There had developed a tradition that 'all conscious and systematic effort in the use of the mind' was 'bad form'. 'The spontaneous brilliance of a clever athlete in doing a short composition is tolerated. To aim at more is to be a "smug".'[1] Wallas was sufficiently perceptive to be aware of the deficiencies of his formal schooling, and from this, and from his own experiences as a schoolmaster, he developed a life-long concern for the nature and character of education. His first public lecture in 1886, and the closing chapters of his last completed book, in 1926, both dealt with education. Within the Fabian Society this was his speciality, and he was far more sanguine than most of his socialist colleagues about the power of education as a means of social betterment. 'As Webb never ceased to be a bureaucrat at heart, so Wallas never ceased being a teacher in his outlook.'[2]

From 1894 to 1904 he was a member of the London School Board, and from 1897 to 1904, chairman of its School Management Committee. During part of the same period, from 1898 to 1904, he was a member of the Technical Education Board for London. When the School Boards were abolished in 1904, and their activities taken over by the municipal and county councils, Wallas was elected as a Progressive to the London County Council – on which he served until 1907. The Progressives were in opposition to the Moderates – a Conservative-clerical party inspired principally by the desire to protect the interests of Church schools and to keep the costs of education as low as possible. This was followed by a period from 1908 to 1910 during which he was a non-elected member of the Education Committee of the London County Council. In all this activity he followed a family example of involvement in educational administration, for his father, Gilbert Wallas, had been appointed chairman of the School Board in Barnstaple when it was founded in 1871.

His interests were not confined to the education of the young and he was, from 1908 to 1928, an active and often critical member of the Senate of the University of London. It was not a concern simply with education for its own sake. In one of his earliest writings,[3] where Wallas established his position as a humanitarian, he also proclaimed his belief that it was through education, and only through education, that a new and better society could be brought about. This was the link between Wallas, the Fabian socialist, and Wallas, the educationist. Education provided the machinery through which socialists could create a new world without revolution.

Education meant, of course, much more than schooling in the three Rs. It involved the development of the whole personality. In *Our Social Heritage* he described how, in the course of a discussion with some American graduate students in England, he had proposed as a definition of education: '. . . a process by which human beings so acquire the knowledge and habits which constitute civilization as to be fitted to live well, both individually and in co-operation.'[4] More than thirty years earlier, in the *Fabian Essays*, the same vision of the fullness of the educational experience was suggested in terms which remind us again of the dominant role of Greek idealism in Wallas' thinking. Education could make the modern society, like the Athenian *polis*, a moral community. Its task was as much an ethical as an intellectual process.

> If this generation were wise it would spend on education not only more than any other generation has ever spent before, but more than any generation would ever need to spend again. It would fill the school buildings with the means not only of comfort, but even of the higher luxury; it would serve the associated meals on tables spread with flowers, in halls surrounded with beautiful pictures, or even . . . filled with the sound of music; it would seriously propose to itself the ideal of Ibsen, that every child should be brought up as a nobleman. Unfortunately, this generation is not wise.[5]

The new society desired by Wallas and his colleagues needed careful nurturing in an environment more congenial than that open to the majority of urban children. One of the principal obstacles to a higher quality English education was the increasing urbanisation of the population, which affected people psychologically as well as

materially. 'The town child lives in an artificial environment; that is to say, he never sees or hears anything all day long . . . which has not been given its form and colour and sound by the act of man.'[6]

Large-scale urbanisation was a social fact which produced profound changes in man's life-style; changes which simply could not be ignored or glossed over. If society was to survive the impact of urbanisation, it needed to think through the consequences, a great many of which were unintended, and largely beyond control. But this was not true of all of them. Such aspects of life as the width of streets, the provision of parks and open spaces, the effectiveness of the police in keeping the streets safe, and so on, were all controllable, and were all part of the artificial environment which would affect the child as he grew up.

> When the town park-keeper now trains a boy to admire flowers without picking them, or the medical officer of health puts up a notice warning him not to eat unripe fruit, or the policeman prevents him . . . from smoking 'substitutes professing to take the place of tobacco,' they are in the most literal and exact sense taking part in his education.[7]

It was up to those with direct authority over education in the schools, and those responsible for other facets of the environment, to be aware of the powers of good and evil at their disposal; to determine what sort of society they wished to have now, and what sort of society they wished to prepare for in the future. All involved were faced with:

> . . . the intolerable difficulty of deciding whether they are preparing the town child for a life like that which he sees around him or for something better; and whether, in allocating the disputed half-hours of the curriculum, it is more important that the son of a London labourer should be fitted to conceive and help to bring about a nobler London, or to earn higher wages at his father's trade, when higher wages may mean, as things are now, the only possibility for him of a civilized life.[8]

This was the core problem. Beyond simple enthusiasm for the cause of more and better education for the many, there were deeper issues. What were the goals of education? And what was meant by 'better' education? Wallas gave far more attention to these fundamental

questions than did his Fabian colleagues. He was deeply involved, not only with the form and content of education, but also with its broader social goals.

The Fabians in general possessed an uncritical faith in the power of education, the 'gradual turning of the popular mind to new principles', to rectify the injustics of existing society. It was more or less assumed that once people were properly educated they would work together for the common good. Taking this for granted, they passed on to other topics failing generally to ask themselves what they really meant by 'properly educated', or who would do the educating. But Wallas argued that the Fabian road to socialism through learning could lead nowhere until the educational system itself could be made more democratic. He therefore wished to see control over education removed from the monopoly of the governing and established classes and placed in the hands of the public. It was, in his view, undesirable that decisions affecting the educational opportunities of all classes in the society should be taken by only one class.[9] Like Bentham, he believed that only the whole society would act for the general good. Particular classes would always confuse the general good with their own particular class interest. This was a particularly critical problem in an age when one class was beginning to reach out for new cultural and educational advantages previously denied it.

The English educational system was then, as it to a large extent still is, closely linked with the class system. The hierarchy of English schools, at both primary and secondary levels, is far more complex than in any other advanced country. And because this complex arrangement is maintained within the framework of a relatively rigid class structure, the wealthier classes have always been able to gain easier access to the 'best' or more favoured schools, and have used such schools to preserve the privileges of the well-to-do.

> As long as the manners and traditions of various classes in England differ, even approximately, as much as they do at present, the well-to-do classes will insist on sending their children to schools in which the tone is set by their own traditions. They will stand just now the inclusion of a certain per-centage of scholarship children, coming from exceptionally careful homes, and exceptionally quick at assimilating a new tradition. But, if that per-centage is very materially increased, well-to-do or 'cultivated' parents will withdraw their children.[10]

The social conditions of the working classes, the crowded homes, the absence of an intellectually stimulating environment, which did not naturally include books, and the pressure of a peer-group, most of whom were content to be manual workers, further disadvantaged the intellectually bright working-class child. Recognition of the relevance of the school system to the class structure of English society in part explains Wallas' involvement in educational politics. He wanted to see more socialists voting at School Board elections, running as candidates for School Boards, or becoming school managers or school teachers. Until this was done the schools would remain a force of reaction, indoctrinating each new generation in the discredited values of the past. As members of School Boards, socialists were to avoid overt socialist propaganda, which would be self-defeating, but they should work with teachers, giving them every encouragement, and showing sympathy with their problems. The same philosophy which lay behind the founding of the London School of Economics, that the unbiased teaching of history and the social sciences would lead to the wide-spread acceptance of socialist views, is apparent in Wallas' approach to socialists and School Boards. This was an area of public service for which socialists were particularly well qualified, by inclination, and by talent. Their potential influence was enormous.

In a lecture in 1886, to an assembly of sympathetic socialists, Wallas tied his views on the control of education in with his Fabian philosophy of gradualism. The Fabian belief in the efficacy of gradualism justified the stress on arriving at socialism through education, rather than violent upheaval. It would be slow but it would be sure.

> However little we get done of what we desire, if we only secure a few more months schooling for the children of the poor, slightly better school-books, or slightly more intelligent teachers, that little will, of itself be worth a hundred times all, and more than all, the trouble that we shall have taken. If we only excite bitter opposition and contempt – if it really turns out that without a thorough change of the whole social system of England we can move no single step forward – that too will have been a valuable lesson for us to have learnt for ourselves, and to have taught to others. We might possibly have preferred to make our Socialistic institutions all at once, but as a matter of fact they are being developed now, one by one, and it is by the working of those

institutions in which at this moment Socialist ideas are expressed that the Socialist ideas will themselves be judged.[11]

But education could never fulfil its great role, nor could socialists gain much influence, as long as it was controlled by churchmen. To Wallas, clerical domination was responsible for almost every defect, every failing, of English education. 'The price we have had to pay in the past for the long series of religious squabbles from 1832 to 1870, is too frightful to contemplate.'[12] The price included such things as insufficient and unscientific education, inadequate supply of qualified teachers, and the existence of voluntary and fee-paying schools. England's 'extraordinary backwardness in developing any kind of national education' was the result of religious prejudice and, perhaps even more importantly, 'class prejudices taking the name of religion'.[13]

This was the link between Wallas' political philosophy and his bitter anti-clericalism. He understood only too well the relationship between religious control of education and the perpetuation of the class structure of the society. The established Church, as one of the country's greatest landlords, and with a near monopoly over primary education, had many interests in common with the landowning aristocracy.[14] The established Church was a powerful and overt ally of the Conservative Party, and a determined defender of the existing social order. It made no sense to attack the injustices of society without attacking the Church which supported them. Wallas was far more extreme in his anti-clericalism than his fellow Fabians. While most were unsympathetic to formal Christian dogma, partly from rationalist arguments, and partly from personal temperament, the Society as such did not greatly concern itself with sectarian issues. Wallas was virtually alone in the vehemence of his anti-Church stand.[15] It was an attitude which led to some friction with other Fabians, especially Sidney Webb, who was inclined to brush the religious issue aside as of minor importance. Beatrice Webb, in defending Sidney's approach, accused Wallas of seeing 'the priest behind the policy' on every question.[16]

The nature of Wallas' anti-clericalism needs some qualification. Although he had become an agnostic, he was most certainly not hostile to the ethical precepts of Christianity. His anger was directed primarily at the political and and social power of the Anglican Church. More directly in the field of education he was distressed by the sectarian rivalry and interdenominational disputes, which

seemed to be the inevitable outcome of Church control. He was anti-Church, rather than anti-Christian. He savagely attacked the 'anti-intellectual obscurantism' of the Anglican Church, which had such a deadening influence on English education.[17] Like James Mill before him, Wallas wanted an entirely secular education system.

The question of the precise form, the curriculum, of religious teaching in the schools, and the training of teachers to teach religion, occupied a great deal of Wallas' time and energy before the First World War. He lectured widely and wrote numerous letters to the press on the theme, but as it is now virtually a dead issue, there would seem to be very little to be gained by recalling all the details here. The central argument is clear: Wallas was opposed to all forms of sectarian religious instruction. Religion taught as history, or philosophy, as one of the major influences in the development of society, or as a comparative study, was a legitimate concern of educators. What Wallas objected to was the attempt by the established Church, or any other Church for that matter, to use the schools as a medium for the indoctrination of the young in any one form of sectarian orthodoxy. The attempt to impose religious conformity, to prescribe only one set of values, seemed to be the very antithesis of education. Through time his attitude hardened rather than softened. In a brief article in 1927 he opposed the compulsory teaching of religion – meaning orthodox established Church dogma – in schools as 'the teaching at everybody's expense what nobody believes'.[18]

At the turn of the century, in addition to sectarianism, one of the major issues in English education was the nature of the controlling bodies. The Government Bills of 1896 and 1900 had assigned primary and secondary schools to different authorities, with School Boards in charge of compulsory primary education and the local authorities directly responsible for non-compulsory secondary education.[19] Secondary education was not conceived, as it was generally in North America, as a normal extension of the primary system, but as a separate system altogether, one open to only a small segment of young people. Wallas opposed this division as economically and administratively inefficient. But this was not his main point. Of much greater consequence was the fact that the separation of primary and secondary authorities was both educationally and socially harmful.

> The two great hindrances to the public control of education are religious feeling and class feeling; and just as the opposition between Board and 'Voluntary' schools, produced by the Act of 1870, has tended to crystallise and increase religious feeling, so the proposed separation of authorities would crystallise and increase class feeling. The School Boards would become partisans of working-class schools, the municipal authorities (outside their technical functions) of middle-class schools, and, since the municipal authorities are the stronger, working-class schools would go to the wall.[20]

The conflict between the two authorities most clearly manifested itself in arguments about the curriculum, especially as it related to the most suitable curriculum for working-class primary schools. It was acknowledged that 'more than half of the English governing class has always been opposed to the teaching of anything beyond the three R's to the children of the working classes'.[21] The same class of people had, in an earlier period, opposed even that much education for the children of the 'lower orders'. In debate in the House of Commons in 1807, for example, a Mr Davies Giddy had declared:

> However specious in theory the project might be of giving education to the labouring classes of the poor, it would be prejudicial to their morals and happiness; it would teach them to despise their lot in life, instead of making them good servants in agriculture and other laborious employments. Instead of teaching them subordination, it would render them fractious and refractory, as was evident in the manufacturing counties; it would enable them to read seditious pamphlets, vicious books, and publications against Christianity; it would render them insolent to their superiors; and in a few years the legislature would find it necessary to direct the strong arm of the power towards them.[22]

A century later, when Wallas was writing, there were still many Tories who would agree with the spirit of Mr Giddy's remarks. There were still a great many among the upper classes who felt strongly that the whole purpose of working-class education was to equip working-class children to enter the labour force as early as possible, with sufficient training to make them efficient and

productive members of that labour force. Here Wallas quoted Sir Charles Adderley:

> Any attempt to keep the children of the labouring classes under intellectual culture after the very earliest age at which they could earn their living, would be as arbitrary and improper as it would be to keep the boys at Eton and Harrow at spade labour.[23]

The debate about the kind of education to be given to working-class children was not a simple black-and-white confrontation between the forces of reaction and obscurantism on the one hand, and the pure-minded, progressive socialists on the other. Many public-spirited members of the middle classes also advocated a greater level of technical training in working-class schools. This, it was argued, would equip the young people to become something better than mere labourers, and this, surely, was a desirable end. It was a view held even by many Fabians. Webb, for example, had protested Wallas' position. It was not, wrote Webb, the function of the elementary schools to prepare working-class children for higher education, but for 'the counting house, the factory, or the kitchen'. The elementary schools had the responsibility of

> . . . educating the *mass* of ordinary average children for the ordinary average life. Let us make both this life, and the preparation for it, as good and as elevating as we can – but do not let us mix up, to their common detriment, the other function, that of preparing the exceptionally clever boy or girl for exceptional work.[24]

Although Wallas would later modify his position on intellectually gifted children, in the period before 1914 he regarded Webb's approach as indicating, not a lack of good will, but a misunderstanding of the true interests of the working classes.

> But the workmen themselves . . . steadily oppose any such plan. They feel that the only hope for the working classes lies in their future *intellectual* education, and they have learnt that however much public technical training would increase the 'national' income it would lower skilled wages without necessarily raising the wages of those who are now unskilled. Their way of looking at the question is very difficult for an ordinary middle-class

> politician to understand. To him the need of technical education, 'if we are to compete with foreigners,' is perfectly obvious, the need that the working classes should be taught to think is not obvious at all.[25]

Wallas' opposition to mere technical training, or skill development, for the working classes was based on a deep conviction that it was not enough to provide the working classes with an education fitting them to be more skilled at their jobs if it did not also open up the chance to seek new types of job. Without the extension of opportunity, working-class education would do no more than perpetuate, and strengthen, a class system which he wished to eradicate. As he noted in 1886: 'A better education would increase the amount of wealth that the workers would produce: it would not necessarily increase the amount that they would receive.'[26]

Education went further than job training. Its goal was to equip the young, and all the young, to live decent and productive lives, to 'realise their potentials' as full human beings. In short, the debate was between those who wanted a more technically qualified working class, and those who wanted to give individual children the chance to rise beyond working-class limitations.

The issue is not yet closed in British politics. The controversies of the 1960s and 1970s about secondary modern, comprehensive, and grammar schools, are still essentially a debate about whether different classes of children shall receive different types of education, appropriate to their class and prospects in life, or whether attempts should be made to break down class barriers by directing all children through a uniform school system. Uniformity in the system does not mean, of course, that all children will be taught the same things in the same way. It means no more than that all schools will be of a similar kind, catering to all classes of children, and providing such variety in curriculum as teacher and pupil interests, and resources, allow.

Wallas' position on this issue gradually shifted. He remained unalterably opposed to the concept of working-class schools preparing working-class children for working-class jobs, and in today's terminology he might be regarded as a supporter of comprehensive schooling. Yet he also became increasingly aware of the difficulties of the super-normal child and in both *Our Social Heritage* and *The Art of Thought* he defended the proposition that unless the society was prepared to make special provisions for its

exceptional children, both the children and the society would suffer. In *Our Social Heritage* he quoted an American, a Professor Dallas Sharp, who had proclaimed the 'democratic conception' of education.

> The true end of American Education is the knowledge and practice of democracy – whatever other personal ends our education may serve. . . . We must all go together to school, with a common language, a common course of study, a common purpose, faith, and enthusiasm for democracy.[27]

While Wallas had an 'intense sympathy' for those American teachers like Sharp who wished to use the education system to prevent the growth of hereditary social stratification, he rejected Sharp's proposal as paying too little attention to the complexities of democracy. Sharp, and other 'democrats', were prepared to make special provision for the mentally deficient, but sought to treat all others by a common standard of 'normal'. But Wallas came to believe that society ignored those of exceptional intellectual and artistic talent at its peril. In *The Art of Thought*, in particular, he gave a great deal of attention to the special problems of the gifted child, and the difficulties of identifying and encouraging superior ability in the conditions of mass education. In the first place the environment of the industrial city inhibited the emergence, the self-discovery of genius:

> If Plato were born today in America or England or Germany, he . . . would be a member of a community whose educational policy was guided by at least a half-hearted desire that every citizen should have the opportunity of developing all his powers: but he would also be a unit in that type of social organization which has resulted from the development of mechanical industry, and which I have called the Great Society. Unless he belonged to the tiny section of his nation whose members own sufficient accumulated wealth to be 'independent', he would probably live in one of the meanly uniform houses of a city street, and be the child of parents with few traditions of culture. Nothing in his daily surroundings would stimulate in him the passion for truth and beauty which the Athenian temples and porticos, and the eager talkers and traders and poets and orators, and the valleys and hills and coast of Attica stimulated in the earlier Plato. It would

> be only occasionally, as the result of preliminary arrangement, and perhaps at moments that did not suit his mood, that he would see the fields in spring time, or be taken to an intellectually or aesthetically stimulating cinema or picture-gallery, or hear a few words on the wireless from an interesting man. He might never, throughout his boyhood, be able to spend three consecutive hours away from the noisy living-room and the noisier street, with a boy of his own age and tastes.[28]

And in the second place, the large classes, and rigidly structured timetables, would mean that few teachers would have the time or opportunity to recognise and nourish superior ability even when it presented itself.[29]

Some of Wallas' changing attitudes to education, which in turn reflect his overall unwillingness to accept simple solutions to complex problems, are seen in his attitudes to compulsory education, and in particular to the raising of the school-leaving age. As a matter of general principle, he naturally approved of the highest possible level of education for as many people as possible, and he admitted the necessity for some measure of compulsory education. In the years between 1889 and 1894 he had been a school manager in London, in which capacity he worked on the prosecution of working-class parents who failed to send their children to school. More than thirty years later he recalled:

> I was carrying out a policy laid down both by Parliament and by the elected School Board, and I myself believed that almost any hardship was better than that a child should grow up without education. But I am now surprised when I remember how severe was the system which I helped to administer.[30]

By the 1920s he was prepared to accept that education was simply 'a means of attaining human excellence', and that compulsion was 'only a very crude means of attaining education'.[31] Compulsory education was no universal panacea. It was, perhaps, a necessity, but a regrettable necessity, and one that could be modified in special cases. The issue was given an added dimension by the movement which was beginning to gather strength in the 1920s to raise the school-leaving age to sixteen. Again Wallas extended cautious approval. It was essential, he argued, that before taking

such a large step, those responsible for it should realise the complexities of the problem they were tackling.

> It is no light matter for any state to assume the responsibility of compelling by police power the attendance of the whole population at school past the age when Milton was already a poet, Nelson a naval officer, Napoleon a lieutenant of artillery, Alexander Hamilton a political writer, Bentham an Oxford graduate, Sir Philip Sidney a formed scholar, Mrs. Siddons, Sarah Bernhardt and Ellen Terry professional actresses, and Mozart and Beethoven famous musicians. It is clear, for one thing, that if we are to pass a law extending educational compulsion even to sixteen, we should consider our existing machinery for compulsion.[32]

Wallas' philosophy of education, as reflected in these specific situations, was not something independent of, or extraneous to, his total life philosophy. He approached education from the standpoint of a social reformer who saw education as a means to the creation of a new set of social values. He did not mean by this that the educational system was to be a propagandistic device for replacing the old social dogmas by the new. As he saw it, education was a genuine, unprejudiced search after truth. Its task was to liberate the mind from the shibboleths and the superstitions of the past. It should challenge every apparently self-evident assumption and be receptive, but not uncritically so, to the challenge of new ideas. The educational philosophy itself was derived from a broader philosophy of life. Wallas' understanding of human behaviour and human psychology, compounded from his readings of Darwin and other evolutionary scientists, his rationalism, and his knowledge of contemporary psychological theories, joined with his conception of the purpose of human activity, were closely reflected in his conceptions of the nature of the educational experience.

The most important statement of Wallas' educational theories was contained in an Address to a Conference of the Froebel Society, in 1901.[33] Friedrich Froebel (1782–1852) was a German educationist, greatly influenced by Rousseau, and founder of the Kindergarten system of instruction. Froebel's basic proposition was that the child was an organism, and that it was the function of education to develop that organism. The educator's task was not to interfere or prescribe, but to oversee and protect. This is not the

place for a major treatise on Froebel, and perhaps the shortest route to an understanding of his ideas is through the term 'Kindergarten' itself. Kindergarten did not mean, as it might now be popularly understood to mean, a garden where children played. For Froebel, the children themselves were the plants in the garden, and the teacher was the gardener. The teacher's job was to help the 'plants' develop most effectively along lines laid down by nature, and not by the gardener himself. In the decades around the turn of the century, Froebel's educational theories were enjoying considerable vogue among the upper middle classes, largely in reaction to the rigid, rote-learning of an earlier generation.

Wallas' address in 1901 attacked the whole basis of Froebelian education. The criticism was based on the development of biological theories. In the early nineteenth century biological orthodoxy concluded that the formation and development, both of individuals and of species, came from within. 'They thought that each individual, since it developed from within, required only freedom and nourishment to attain perfection according to the law of its species.'[34] Froebel had translated this biological framework into a theory of education. The individual child possessed an inner nature which, in the most favourable environment, would unfold into the fully developed human being. A single quotation from Froebel's most famous work, *The Education of Man* (1826), contains the essence of his ideas:

> We give time and space to young plants and young animals, knowing that they then beautifully unfold and grow well in conformity with the laws which act on each individual; we let them rest, and strive to avoid powerfully interfering influences upon them, knowing that these influences disturb their pure unfolding and healthy development. But the young human being is to man a piece of wax, a lump of clay, from which he can mould what he will. Men, who wander through your fields, gardens and groves, why do you not open your minds to receive what Nature, in dumb speech, teaches you?[35]

Froebel and his followers thus conceived the whole world as the expression of the inner will, the inner law of each thing. It was a conception of enormous popular appeal, and tremendous persuasive power. But, said Wallas, Froebel had died in 1852, seven years before Darwin had published his *Origin of Species*, and so

revolutionised the whole science of biology. Darwin had transferred the cause of development from within to without. In doing this he had undermined the whole metaphysical basis of Froebel's theories.

> Darwin demonstrated that, while it is true that there is a tendency in each living thing towards variation, yet the variation is in itself indifferent; and that the formative cause which *selects* variations and produces those permanent changes which we call the development of species must be looked for in the environment of the individual, and not in any inner tendency.[36]

Reliance on pre-Darwinian philosophy, with its emphasis on development from within, led to an underestimation of the influence of 'traditional knowledge which is handed down, so to speak, from outside the child' as part of his environment, and overestimates the importance of internal instincts. This was not merely a pedagogical question. Fundamental philosophical problems were involved. It was not, therefore, enough simply to 'follow nature' and hope for the best. The Darwinian reconstruction of the moral sciences demanded recognition that 'the deliberate care and contrivance of the parent must form a large part of the environment of the child'.[37] The educator could not just stand aside and let the child's 'inner self' develop. His task was so to influence the environment to bring out, and make permanent, the 'best' tendencies in the child, and to discover how far he could go in creating tendencies which might not otherwise have appeared at all. The 'selecting principle' in education would be directed, not just at present tendencies, but at the tendencies best directed to the child's whole future life. Education dealt not only with the child, but with the whole man.

Froebel's innovations, said Wallas, had been a healthy reaction to the overly rigid, unimaginative schooling of an earlier period–a schooling which denied any possibility of spontaneous development in the child. But, as so often happens, Froebel's disciples had forgotten (or never understood) the intellectual foundations of the system. They carried the reaction much too far, ignoring almost everything but spontaneous development. Froebelian education had become too soft, it provided too little preparation for a harsh reality.

> Indeed, many . . . would deny that there is any difference whatever between interest and attention, and if . . . the brightest child . . . cannot pass a simple examination, are apt to ascribe this fact to the faults of the 'examination system'. Unfortunately the life which the civilized man must lead, unless he has a large independent income, is much more like an examination than a class . . . human knowledge is increased, not by the ecstatic following of one's own most vivid impulses, but by concentration on a succession of difficult and uncertain inferences relating to some uninteresting subdivision even of the most interesting subject.[38]

The Froebelian view, in turn, led to a disregard, even contempt, for direct instruction and the habit of attention. Both of these were exceedingly dangerous tendencies, especially to those whose circumstances would lead them to be brain-workers in adult life:

> . . . particularly and assuredly is it dangerous for those children of poor parents who have to fight their way, in spite of difficulties, up into the intellectual life, because those children can only do so through *books*.[39]

I have given a great deal of attention to this paper on education because I consider it one of the most important statements for an understanding of Wallas' mind. He was speaking specifically on the question of elementary education, but he was expressing a wider philosophy of life. The exacting principle behind all his ideas was a total commitment to the importance of knowledge; knowledge not only of 'facts' but of ways of thinking about facts. Knowledge did not arise spontaneously, nor did it come easily. Knowledge was acquired only through sustained hard work. Such work could easily be futile, wasted effort unless one first learnt how to think, to select, and to organise. Much of his later work revolved around the questions of effective thinking, of controlled imagination, of the systematic development of thought to produce much-needed social and political invention.

In virtually all his major writings Wallas had been concerned with the problems of thought – both organised thought as a social necessity, and individual thought as a phychological phenomenon. In *The Great Society*, for example, he asked himself whether 'there is an art by which efficiency of Thought can be improved'.[40] He

responded to this obviously rhetorical question in a chapter which both described the characteristics of such an art, and pleaded for more people to devote more time to it. Finally, in his last complete book, *The Art of Thought*, he sought to bring these threads together to develop a new cloth. The past failures of thought were obvious. The scientists and engineers had 'by technical methods whose subtlety would have been inconceivable to our grandfathers', contrived plans for the destruction of London and Paris. But the statesmen who met to prevent these plans from being put into operation found it no easier to cooperate than did the leaders of two Stone Age tribes.[41] This same contrast was the theme of one of his last lectures:

> [In 1914–18] the statesmen and social scientists and moral and religious teachers of Europe had assigned to them as their main duty the preservation of peace, and they failed utterly; the directors and inventors of the physical sciences had assigned to them as their main duty the killing of as many of the national enemies as possible, and they succeeded magnificently.[42]

All this was, Wallas admitted, a commonplace. Many people had said as much before him, and since his time many more have continued to deplore the failure of the social sciences to keep pace with technology or with the theoretical advances in the physical and natural sciences. But Wallas focused on the connection between man's failure to develop his capacity for social organisation and the survival of his primitive tribal dispositions in an alien modern environment. Man, as animal, had not changed rapidly enough to control his new powers. Most of the social problems of the twentieth century thus arose from 'the failure of human thought to contrive an adaptation of human society to its new environment'.[43] Thought was therefore more urgently needed than ever before in human society. As he had concluded in *The Great Society*: 'if no means could be discovered of increasing the efficacy of Thought, then the outlook for the Great Society would be dark indeed.'[44]

By thought he meant, first of all, that kind of specialised thought in biology, physics, sociology, and politics which would help us to understand our past, and therefore our present predicament. But in addition to this, and more importantly, he meant those processes of thought itself which might be applied to any form of specialised knowledge. There was a desperate need for research into thought, for greatly improved thought, to ' . . . help to diminish the dangers

which threaten our civilization'.[45] It was a point he had made even more emphatically a few years previously in a lecture in which he had tested some of the ideas for *The Art of Thought*.

> In [the present situation] . . . I believe that future historians will say that we do well to be appalled by the prospect immediately before us – we should probably all agree that mankind requires creative thought, new thought, new applications of new knowledge, if we are to prevent immediate and further disasters.[46]

It was the practice of the art of thought that concerned him, rather than theoretical science, although the object was to use the resources of the theory to improve the practice of the art. In distinguishing here between what he called the empirical arts of thought and the scientific, he drew an analogy between the art of cooking as performed by the experienced chef and the science of food selection and preparation as defined by the chemical sciences. If the object was to prepare the best possible dinner there was no doubt that the 'art' as understood by the chefs was far ahead of the 'science' of the chemists. Yet, with proper understanding and modesty, the science of the chemists might yet make a significant contribution to the art of the chef. In similar terms one might consider the state of thought. There have long been specific rules for thought, which include the rules of grammar, and the techniques of logic or statistical method. But in addition there has also long been 'an unformulated "mystery" of thought',[47] which can be explained by no science and which is independently discovered, lost, and rediscovered by successive creative thinkers. His chapter on thought in *The Great Society* had suggested the importance of the difference between thought as formal logic and grammar, and thought as a creative exercise for the production of new ideas. In *The Art of Thought* he tried to bring these two concepts together, to create a 'scientific art' of thought. His whole argument was that an actual art of thought did exist, and could be discovered and taught. He believed:

> . . . that the practice of that art is one of the most important activities of human society, that training in that art should be part of the education of the future thinker, and that in this, as in other cases, a complete separation between teaching and doing will be fatal to the art itself.[48]

If there was an art of thought, it certainly belonged in the field of psychology. For Wallas this posed difficulties. As he wrote to Elie Halevy: 'I shall be enormously glad when the Thought book is finished. I am not really a trained psychologist and am continually finding new doubts and new points of view.'[49] Yet without previous background or specialist training he read as widely as he could in psychology and had little hesitation in formulating his own psychological theories or in criticising the efforts of professional psychologists. In fact, said Wallas, much of current psychological theory dealing with thought was useless, or worse than useless, to the would-be thinker. Psychology was deeply influenced by research in nerve-physiology and tended to express its conclusions in 'clumsy mechanical metaphors'.

When Wallas was writing in the 1920s the common position was to conceive instinct as force, and intelligence as a machine driven by that force. But Wallas had always distrusted mechanistic explanations of behaviour, and found them particularly dangerous when applied to the relationship between instinct and thought. 'I find no trace of a completely emotionless brain driven by a completely irrational autonomic system.'[50] There was a certain value in mechanistic analogies, useful in classroom explanation, but as actual guides to thinking they broke down. Mechanism was too limited to encompass the variety of the human experience, for it precluded spontaneity. Here was another reason for rejecting Marxism. It was, he said, one of the errors of contemporary Marxism to rely on a mechanistic psychology.

> The men who now rule Russia combine this 'mechanist' conception of the relation between instinct and reason with a rigid metaphysical dogma of predeterminism, and are able by that combination to convince themselves that such a 'bourgeois' intellectual process as unbiased reflection before one acts in obedience to one's simplest animal instincts, is at the same time biologically impossible, and also biologically possible but politically and economically inadmissible. And they seem determined to stamp out among their fellow-citizens, with the thoroughness of the Spanish Inquisition, all those methods of inventive thought which originally enabled Marx to think and write *Das Kapital*.[51]

Wallas' won theories of human psychology gradually evolved during the writing of his social-psychology trilogy: *Human Nature in*

Politics, *The Great Society*, and *Our Social Heritage*, which will be analysed in subsequent chapters. What emerges in *The Art of Thought* is thus a culmination, a consolidation and refinement, of earlier positions. His conception of the human organism was that of a combination of living elements all of which tended to cooperate in securing the good of the organism, but each of which retained some measure of initiative, so that the cooperation was never perfect. This is a point of view which is entirely consistent with Wallas' pragmatic, anti-universal, more-or-less approach to all questions. From the time he had first rejected the monism of Bentham and of Marx, Wallas had resisted the temptation to accept single-cause explanations, or to see any circumstances as universally applicable. According to Wallas' psychology, human behaviour combined a disposition to cooperate with a disposition for independent action. Behaviour in particular circumstances was the resultant of the balancing of these competing dispositions. On the larger scale of the whole human organism, he explained man as a being with certain instincts or dispositions which tended to move him in one or more directions, together with a self-conscious will which could modify those dispositions. His own conception could be described as 'hormic',[52] a term he had not used before 1926, but which appropriately describes how he had always interpreted human nature. Hormism did not deny that all parts of an organism tended towards integrated action, but stressed that it was always a living and imperfect tendency.

> The behaviour of a steam engine is completely integrated; because the parts of the engine have no force of their own, and only obey the force of the steam from the boiler. The behaviour of the human organism tends towards integration, for otherwise the organism could not, as an organism, exist; but its integration is not complete, because its parts possess in varying degrees a force of their own.[53]

Wallas thus stood on middle ground. He rejected the liberal conception of the completely rational, self-conscious, autonomous will, and equally he rejected the mechanistic explanations of deterministic psychologies. For both he substituted the concept of 'an imperfect and improvable tendency towards unity'.[54] This is in complete accord with Wallas' general interpretation of reality as a continuum. Instead of a dichotomy between the conscious and

unconscious, Wallas saw an unbroken series of grades from the completely unconscious up to the highest forms of consciousness. In his own terms there is an analogy between unconsciousness-consciousness and peripheral-focal vision. And the same problem arises. As soon as we try to draw attention to the peripheral vision or the unconscious mind, it ceases to be peripheral or unconscious. Given that it is almost impossible to observe any instance of human behaviour which is either entirely unconscious or entirely subject to the conscious will, Wallas accepted that the student of the art of thought would have to choose a more or less arbitrary point from which he would assume that the conscious effort of the art begins.

Allied to the problem of a working conception of consciousness is the problem of a working conception of the will, where the same principle of the continuum applies. It became indeed a delicate question of definition as to what point we can apply the term 'will' to the less continuous, less unified, forms of animal behaviour. Does a dog, for example, 'will' to dig at a rabbit hole? To Wallas the answer is simply a matter of arbitrarily putting a mark at some point along an imperceptible gradation. This implies that any specific behavioural act will be partly conscious and partly unconscious, so that even the behaviour of the modern civilised man will share some of the qualities of the primitive organism.

Wallas therefore recognised limits to the control which could be exercised over external and internal behaviour, both physical and mental. It is true that some mental processes, attention for example, are almost totally controllable by act of will. As he had asserted earlier, we can, if we make the effort, attend to anything we desire, 'and therefore we can secure, with something like certainty', those mental processes which follow most closely on attention.[55] On the other hand, it was also true that feeling and emotion may be scarcely under control at all. Yet it is from this second area that any new art of thought must emerge.

> It is easy for us, again, to learn voluntarily 'by heart,' while making repeated acts of attention combined with the formation of silent speech-images; and we can often by a single effort of will remember a name which we have forgotten, or find the answer to a simple problem. But the mental processes which constitute the higher forms of thought, and which lead to the formation of new and useful ideas or decisions by distant and unaccustomed links of association, are very imperfectly controllable by any direct effort

> of will. The most perfectly trained scientist or poet can no more be sure that he will be able to make his mind produce the solution of a complex problem, or a new poetical image or cadence, or a really original sonnet on the death of a monarch or a president, than can the most perfectly trained clergymen be sure that he will feel really sad at Tuesday's funeral or really joyful at Thursday's wedding. It is this fact which leads to such pessimistic statements about the impossibility of improving thought by conscious art as that which I have already quoted . . . .[56]

Obviously if the will was unable to control thought, then an art of thought could not exist. But while there are the limits which Wallas had already described, he believed there still to be areas of thought, even creative thought, where the conscious will can have its effect. Wallas would not permit himself to believe that such an improvement was beyond human capacity. The relatively free, relatively rational, individuals of his psychological system could become more free and more rational:

> . . . while it is true that you cannot, by direct effort, secure great new thoughts, any more than you can write great new poetry, there are certain indirect efforts by which you can make it more likely that the great new thoughts will come into the world.[57]

Men thought for thousands of years before they had a name for thinking. Thought was not something external to the individual. It was part of the individual's psychological make-up. Thinking, as he demonstrated in *The Great Society*, was one of man's natural dispositions. And the art of thought, like any other art, 'is an attempt to improve by conscious effort an already existing form of human behaviour'.[58] It followed that a necessary condition for the study of thought was recognition of the relationship both of thought and of feeling to the whole life of the individual.[59] In practical terms the most disturbing problems of thought in the world of the Great Society stemmed from the volume of material to be absorbed.

> The modern thinker, if he is to help to control the forces which now bring human society to order or confusion, must read during his life a library of books and pyramid of newspapers, and must learn from science to live at a point of time that is continuous with a milllion years of the past, and at a point in space which is

> continuous with astronomical distances. He must co-operate intellectually with scores of foreign specialists in handling a body of accumulated knowledge a thousand times too great for the memory even of Aristotle to retain, and must profit by artificial means of observation a thousand times more accurate than anything which Aristotle could have imagined.[60]

In attempting himself to formulate the components of an art of thought which could come to grips with these problems, Wallas postulated the existence of four stages in the development of a new thought. The first three, as adapted from Herman von Helmholtz, the German physicist, were: Preparation, or the stage of the investigation of the problem; Incubation, or the stage in which there is no conscious thinking about the problem; and Illumination, which is the moment of the appearance of the 'happy idea'. To these, Wallas added a fourth stage, which he termed Verification, in which the validity of the idea was tested, and the idea itself reduced to exact form.[61] All these stages could take place at the same time. There may be the preparation of one problem, the incubation of another, and a verification of a third. Nevertheless, the stages are operationally distinct. Wallas then asked how it would be possible to 'bring conscious effort, and the habits which arise from conscious effort, to bear upon each of the four stages'.[62]

Preparation and verification he dismissed rather quickly. These both involved the hard, conscious, and systematic application of known rules and principles of logical method, experimental techniques, memorisation, and so on. Most people had considered them to be the sole componenets of thought, and through history they had been extensively analysed. Wallas felt there was little he could add to what was already known about them. Instead he focused on the little-known stages of incubation and illumination.

Incubation involved two propositions: (a) during the incubation stage we do not voluntarily or consciously think of the particular problem; (b) it is a positive fact that a series of unconscious and involuntary (or foreconscious or forevoluntary) mental efforts take place during this period.[63] In other words, when the conscious mind sets aside a specific topic, the unconscious mind will continue to deal with it. And the unconscious mind may establish new associations, or uncover new ideas, which the deliberately-willed, conscious mind would never reach.

The withdrawal of conscious attention from a problem may take

two forms: The period of abstention may be spent either in conscious mental work on other problems, or in a relaxation from all mental work. The first economises time and is therefore often to be encouraged. But in other cases of creative thought – scientific discovery, writing a poem or play, or the formulation of important political decisions:

> . . . it is desirable not only that there should be an interval free from conscious thought on the particular problem concerned, but also that that interval should be so spent that nothing should interfere with the free working of the unconscious or partially conscious processes of the mind.[64]

In this process of incubation, the human organism may gain much from the alternation of various forms of activity, including both mental and physical activity. Yet being busy, for the sake of being busy, could be destructive, could inhibit creative thought. From his own experience Wallas was well aware of the dangers that beset the academic who allowed himself to be diverted for too long into administrative activities.

Wallas had long insisted on the importance of leisure to creative work, of encouraging incubation by periods of complete relaxation. It was an insistence perhaps given added substance by his own rather indolent character. He delighted in remembering great thinkers who had done their most creative work during periods when normal habits were interrupted. He reminded us that many of the 'really great creative intellects' of the previous two enturies had breaks in their school lives, and 'were kept at home to wander about a park or a house with an old library'.[65] He noted with obvious, almost wistful, approval: 'Newton was wise enough, when he felt that creation was going to begin with him, to go to bed, although he was perfectly well.'[66]

Incubation is one of the most vital stages in creative thought, yet it is the stage which is most sadly neglected in formal education. Wallas took the strongest objection to those English public schools where time was entirely parcelled out into periods of work, play, and sleep. This deliberate prevention of leisure, this frustration of incubation, was intellectually debilitating, and ultimately contrary to the best interests of society and the individual. He had, for the same reasons, a marked antipathy to the highly structured system of the American graduate schools which left students little time from

lectures and assigned readings. But if relaxation was to be a part of the thought process, it had to be built into that process. Too long a period of relaxation, without frequent return to intense intellectual activity, is simply stultifying of all thought. He wrote critically of the long summer vacations American students spent at cottages and camps. The average healthy boy or girl, he said, needed only a short period of inertia before being ready to begin mental work again. As custom precluded the taking of academic books on the long vacation, the resulting boredom could easily blunt any impulse to intellectual keenness.[67]

Incubation was also the stage most seriously frustrated by modern living. The person who is to think productively must have time for leisure and relaxation. Even in *The Great Society* Wallas had seen the relationship between thought and the external environment. It was not simply that such things as quiet, an even temperature, and food, were desirable for the most effective thought, but in the conditions of the modern industrial city thought was impossible without them.[68] Society would do well to devote more of its time and resources to creating the kind of environment most conducive to constructive thought. It was an old issue, and even in his Fabian days Wallas had been interested in establishing the most favourable material conditions for efficient collective thought.[69]

Illumination is an even less controllable stage than incubation in the art of thought. If illumination is defined as no more than the instant 'flash' of inspiration, then it could not be influenced at all by a direct act of will. If, on the other hand, the 'flash' is thought of simply as the culmination of a successful train of association which might last from a few seconds to several hours, then obviously will could be brought to bear upon it. This is, of course, how Wallas approached it. The process of illumination could be complicated by the mixture of thought and emotion. It was therefore important to distinguish them. For Wallas, emotion could arise in the brain independently of any external nerve stimulus. He believed that the brain itself, 'in the process of associative thought', seems sometimes to have an 'urge of its own, revealing itself in consciousness as a feeling'.[70] A deterministic psychology would not allow this, which further explains why Wallas was so unhappy with determinism. Spontaneous emotion was an integral part of illumination. There was not just a thought, but a 'feeling' about a thought, which inevitably affected the way in which the conscious mind would react to that thought. This fact of the intimation of a coming thought

being coloured by emotion, by an affect, made the voluntary control of the process more difficult. The conscious attempt to examine and control an emotion, for example, might well destroy it.[71] Yet the object is not to suppress this emotion, which is the life of the illumination, but to identify it, and to understand how it affects the thought. In this context he quoted William James:

> If our purpose is nimble enough, and we do arrest (a passage, a relation, a transition in our thought), it ceases forthwith to be itself. As a snowflake crystal caught in the warm hand is no longer a crystal but a drop, so, instead of catching the feeling of relation moving to its term, we find that we have caught some substantive thing, usually the last word we were pronouncing, statistically taken, and with its function, tendency, and particular meaning in the sentence quite evaporated.[72]

The most concise summary of Wallas' views on the relationship between incubation and illumination, and the importance of both, is to be found in a brief article which he wrote at a time when *The Art of Thought* must have been nearly ready for the press.

> The spread in our own times of psychological inquiry is enabling us in the twentieth century to see more clearly than did our predecessors the mental conditions necessary for the discovery of new truth. The most important of these conditions are the patient expectancy with which the true thinker, after preparing himself by exploration and observation, awaits the coming of his thought, and the unflinching tenacity with which, when the thought comes he tests, accepts and declares it.[73]

All activities of a living organism have both an immediate effect on the organism, and a later, more permanent effect, on the future behaviour-pattern of the organism.

> Everyone, for instance, of our mental activities in the stages of Preparation, Incubation, Illumination, and Verification, not only helps to produce an immediate output of successful thought, but leaves our organism more able and more inclined to repeat that activity in the future.[74]

These latter effects are called habits. *The Art of Thought* describes

all manner of rules-of-thumb designed to develop good, i.e. efficient, habits of thought, which will economise energy and reduce the chances of repeatedly following the same blind alleys or making the same mistakes. The details are less important here than Wallas' confident belief that one could indeed produce a hand-book of principles which would improve the efficiency of the individual's habits of thought. The over-all message is that there must be a variety of techniques. The principles are there, but they are guides, not rules. They will vary according to the circumstances, and to the people who would use them. As always Wallas dislikes absolutes and insists on adding exceptions and qualifications to his own propositions. It is always a matter of tendency, of more-or-less, of shades of grey, of sometimes, or seldom, and never of black-and-white. Even when he writes of national or professional habits of thought, where he is prepared to accept that Englishmen, for example, think differently from Frenchmen, and lawyers from teachers, he insists that these are tendencies only. They are products of what today would be termed political cultures and political socialisation. He concludes that if the thinker is to get any advantage from the fact that he is a living organism and not a machine, he must be the master and not the slave of his habits.

> This antinomy between the stimulus of habit in time and place and circumstance, and the stimulus of breaking habit, is constantly reflected in the lives of those who are capable of serving mankind as creative thinkers. I have already discussed . . . the fact that, though without industry great intellectual work cannot be done, yet mere industry may prevent creation. But that fact constitutes the simplest of the problems of conduct which torment and perplex those who believe themselves to feel the urge of genius. There have been Shakespeares who were useless to mankind because they stayed in Stratford with Anne Hathaway, Shelleys because they obeyed their father, or were faithful to Harriet Westbrook, and Mary Wollstonecrafts who died as respected and pensioned school-mistresses. But there may have been many more Wagners who were destroyed by gambling, Byrons by sex, and Marlowes by drink, before they had created anything, and Descartes who stayed too long in camp.[75]

No rule, no principle, is therefore universally applicable. Sometimes

it is productive to break with an established pattern, sometimes it is even more productive to persist with the familiar. It all depends on circumstances. Even when he talks about the 'harmonious energy of the whole organism on which efficiency in thought depends',[76] Wallas backs away from an absolute statement. Harmony may be important, but not complete harmony at all times. Between moments of harmony there may come times of painful stress and discord, which give point to that harmony. New thought may emerge from either harmony or its disruption.

But over and above the practical difficulties in achieving a new art of thought, there was the even greater difficulty of persuading society of the necessity for it. Governments, said Wallas, were much more prepared to spend money on armaments, or activities which enhanced national prestige and national glory, than on educating their citizens. And even within the field of education itself there were strong pressures from those who saw education as a form of technical-professional, or career training, and from those who would use the education system for indoctrination in a particular creed or ideology. A new art of thought would not come easily. In *The Great Society*, written before the war, Wallas had been both enthusiastic and optimistic about the possibilities of increased efficiency in thought. By 1926 enthusiasm had been replaced by a mood of desperate urgings against an apathetic, unconcerned, and even hostile world. *The Art of Thought* thus ends on a pessimistic note: 'All men welcome improvements in the prevention of cancer, or the growth of wheat, but not all men are prepared to welcome improvements in the arts of unbiassed thought.'[77]

This was the link between the art of thought and the philosophy of education. The true purpose of education went far beyond the inculcation of skills. The job of the teacher did not stop at teaching the 'three Rs', or at training young people for adult careers. The task of education, as Wallas repeatedly stressed, was to prepare the young for a rich and full life in a civil community. This did not mean indoctrination in the unchallengeable values of a static society. It meant teaching people to realise their full potentialities, to make the most of the variety of individual talents. It meant not only teaching the young the answers to set questions, but also developing the capacity to think through the answers to questions not yet imagined. Above all, the supreme task of education was to lead people to value the faculty for unbiased thought beyond any other talent. Society had to pay more heed to the art of thought, and be more

appreciative of those who made constructive contributions to this art. *The Art of Thought* thus completed Wallas' reflections on the nature of education.

Wallas' practical experiences with English education in school, and as a school teacher, and his later involvement in the politics of the control and curriculum of education, influenced many of his attitudes to other issues. In particular it contributed to the reformulation of his ideas about democracy. He began to see here the contradictions between his own passionate belief in the moral ideal of democracy, and democratic institutions as they actually operated around him. The basic philosophy was predicated on the assumption that democracy was a viable force, that democratic change was possible. Yet experience in School Board politics seemed to undermine this assumption. Although the School Board franchise was relatively democratic, only a small minority bothered to vote. The indifference of the many enabled an organised and reactionary few to dominate the boards.

It was a circular problem. Because the majority of the urban population had too little education, with much of what they did have being of the wrong kind, they did not appreciate the vital importance of education, and so did not vote in School Board elections. And because they did not vote, the boards were left under the control of those who had no interest in changing the amount or kind of education the majority received. The School Boards brought home to Wallas the fact that a large uninformed and apathetic electorate changed the whole character of democratic institutions. Democracy could not in fact be what its earlier enthusiastic proponents, and some of its hostile critics, supposed it would be. Wallas' personal experiences made more meaningful what he had read about democracy in de Tocqueville and J. S. Mill. It was as a School Board and London County Council candidate that Wallas came to appreciate at first hand the dangers of 'exaggerating the intellectuality of mankind'. It was brought home to him how tenuous was the grip of democratic institutions on the life of its citizens, and he described his own experience at a polling place in a very poor district of London:

> The voters who came in were the results of the 'final rally' of the canvassers on both sides. They entered the room in rapid but irregular succession, as if they were jerked forward by a hurried and inefficient machine. About half of them were women, with

> broken straw hats, pallid faces, and untidy hair. All were dazed and bewildered, having been snatched away in carriages or motors from the making of match-boxes, or button-holes, or cheap furniture, or from the public house, or, since it was Saturday evening, from bed. Most of them seemed to be trying, in the unfamiliar surroundings, to be sure of the name for which, as they had been reminded at the door, they were to vote. A few were drunk, and one man, who was apparently a supporter of my own, clung to my neck while he tried to tell me of some vaguely tremendous fact which just eluded his power of speech. I was very anxious to win, and inclined to think that I had won, but my chief feeling was an intense conviction that this could not be accepted as even a decently satisfactory method of creating a government for a city of five million inhabitants.[78]

The nature of this dilemma, this contradiction between the goals and the machinery of democracy, became in essence the central theme of *Human Nature in Politics*, and is the subject of the next chapter.

4 The New Science of Politics

As has already been indicated, Wallas' own experience as a political candidate and as an elected member of the London County Council and of the London School Board, made him increasingly conscious of the defects of traditional approaches to political behaviour. There was clearly an enormous gap between the way people in fact thought and acted, and the way in which traditional democratic theory assumed they thought and acted. In the Introduction to *Human Nature in Politics*, Wallas noted that at the turn of the century representative democracy seemed so firmly established in Europe that even those countries where it was not yet achieved seemed to be moving steadily in that direction. And yet in those nations where the ideal of democracy was most whole-heartedly accepted, politicians and political students seemed puzzled and disappointed by their experience of it.[1] A new reconciliation between theory and fact was called for.

Wallas had earlier remarked on the disappearance in Edwardian England of that certainty and confidence which had inspired the early-nineteenth-century political reformers.[2] If optimism was still the dominant temper of the age, uneasiness and doubt were troubling more minds as the twentieth century dawned. A reviewer of *Human Nature in Politics* expressed exactly a mood shared by many:

> It is a grey moment. So many of our cherished watchwords are being reconsidered. . . . They have lost sting, and colour, and dash. What is wrong? We don't quite know. We are doing this all round. And it is rather a grim and dismal business. . . . Democracy! That is one of the words under revision.[3]

In the United States in particular, where the liberal-democratic ideology was most widely articulated, the corruption and in-

efficiency of political life seemed proof of the failure of that ideology. Wallas' lecture tour there in 1896–7 provided confirmation of his own fears that democratic electoral politics were seriously troubled.

> In politics, as in football, the tactics which prevail are not those which the makers of the rules intended, but those by which the players find that they can win, and men feel vaguely that the expedients by which their party is most likely to win may turn out not to be those by which a State is best governed.[4]

There were two dimensions to an understanding of the source of this fading of the democratic dream. The first stage was to explore the basis of the original confident optimism.

The nature of this first part of the problem had been suggested by Wallas in the *Life of Francis Place*. Wallas had been attracted by Place's capacity to understand and manipulate the realities of nineteenth-century politics, without losing his faith in the moral worth of democracy. Place had had no illusions, but he had not confused realism with cynicism.

> There is one danger to which those who are in close contact with the actual facts of political work are peculiarly liable, but which Place entirely escaped. He did not become cynical. It often happens that a politician, having started with the idea that he is following the rushing current of popular enthusiasm, and having found that his real work consists in creating, by all sorts of ingenious shifts, a poor semblance of interest among a deeply indifferent public, comes to think of himself as a charlatan, and of his work as a rather disreputable amusement. Place, however, understood the machinery of politics without despising it.[5]

Later Wallas began to reflect more on the implications of Place's attitude, and to ask what it was about Place that preserved his democratic faith. He found the answer in Place's confidence in the validity of Utilitarian psychology. Under the influence of Bentham and James Mill, Place had acted under the self-assurance that once he had demonstrated to the majority where their true interest lay, the public good, which was synonymous with the good of the majority, would automatically follow. He could therefore accept the failings of society around him as a temporary state which could be corrected. The assumptions of Utilitarianism seemed to provide a sure foundation for a new and better world. To those who

understood the workings of psychological hedonism, the way was open to establish those institutions which would maximise the greatest happiness of the greatest number. To Bentham and his immediate disciples, the marriage of Utilitarianism to the economic theories of Adam Smith meant the dawning of a new scientific age in which the 'unseen hand' would harmonise the egoism of each for the good of all.

However the facts of English social and political life in the nineteenth century had demonstrated the failure of Utilitarian doctrine. It offered no remedies for the injustices of a laissez-faire economy, and no solutions for the alienating impact of industrial capitalism. The practical consequences of the attempt to found a whole complex industrial policy, with its labour relations, poor relief, factory legislation, urban growth, public health and sanitation, and so on, on a 'few simple principles of human nature', called political economy, were distressing proof of the intellectual weakness of Utilitarianism. The noble life promised by Utilitarianism was within the grasp of only the very few. For the many life was inhumanly degrading and hopeless. And as Utilitarianism was bad in its consequences, it was also necessarily bad as a theory. To Wallas this much was obvious.

The next stage was to explain the divergence between theory and practice. What had gone wrong? The difficulty, as Wallas saw it, was that Utilitarianism was based on an inadequate psychology. Belonging to a pre-Darwinian era, it did not recognise that it was unsupported by any biological evidence. It was true that Bentham was no more ignorant of psychological facts than any other self-professed student of psychology of his day. But his lack of understanding in this area had more serious consequences than the many other, perhaps more obvious, defects in Bentham's writings.

> . . . when one reads his *Radical Reform Catechism*, with its insistence on annual elections as a sufficient means of securing that every representative should always vote in accordance with the interests of his constituents; or his account of the future action of the newspaper press as an effective 'Public Opinion Tribunal,' a modern politician is conscious of a painful sense of unreality. . . . If, in our time, there is, all over the world, a reaction against optimistic and mechanical conceptions of the working of representative democracy, Bentham and his disciples must bear part of the responsibility.[6]

The great error of Utilitarian doctrine was not its excessive intellectualism, which is commonly exaggerated or misunderstood. Bentham had, after all, made it abundantly clear that he understood the large part played by emotional associations in the language of politics.[7] The error arose from its reductionism, its attempt to reduce human motivation to the single, dichotomous, pleasure-pain drive. Bentham assumed a rational 'calculating-machine' psychology which was quite obviously deficient. The real defect, however, lay less in the over-emphasis on rational calculation of interests, and more in reducing the substance of the calculation to the balancing of the two forces of pleasure and pain. It was not just that Bentham supposed that men calculated, it was that he gave them too little to calculate with.

Bentham was moving in the right direction when he tried to discover the psychological basis of human activity, but his knowledge of psychology was insufficient for the task he set himself. Certainly the desire for pleasure and for the avoidance of pain were important variables in behaviour, but they were not, as Bentham claimed, 'sovereign masters', and it was not 'for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do'.

> Bentham's Utilitarianism, after superseding both Natural Right and the blind tradition of the lawyers, and serving as the basis of innumerable legal and constitutional reforms throughout Europe, was killed by the unanswerable refusal of the plain man to believe that ideas of pleasure and pain are the only sources of human motive.[8]

To illustrate the unhappy consequences of the single-minded causality on which Utilitarianism was based, Wallas turned frequently to the emotional crisis experienced by J. S. Mill in 1826.[9] Never was a young person subjected to a more intensive indoctrination in a creed than that which Mill received from his father and Bentham. Yet the inflexible mechanics of Utilitarianism were not enough, and the open-minded Mill collapsed under the strain of trying to adapt them to the real world around him. The Utilitarian world was entirely one of rational calculation: '. . . my father's teachings tended to the undervaluing of feeling . . . he thought that feeling could take care of itself.'[10] But in 1826, when he was twenty years old, Mill found that feeling would not take care of itself. He put to himself the question:

> 'Suppose that all your objects in life were realized; that all the changes in institutions and opinions which you are looking forward to, could be completely effected at this very instant: would this be a great joy and happiness to you?' And an irrepressible self-consciousness distinctly answered, 'No!' At this my heart sank within me: the whole foundation on which my life was constructed fell down. . . . The end had ceased to charm, and how could there ever again be any interest in the means? I seemed to have nothing left to live for.[11]

The relief came when he was reading the *Memoires* of Marmontel. Suddenly, at a particularly poignant passage, he was moved to tears.

> [Mill] discovered feeling and was saved. He had broken through the monist Utilitarian world of rational calculation to a new dualism, a world of thought and a world of feeling.[12]

Wallas argued consistently that *all* reductionist or monist explanations were follies. This was the core of his criticism of Marx as well as of Bentham and, later, of Freud. In the natural sciences, plurality and interaction of causes were fully accepted, but in politics there was still a tendency to think of each result as having only one cause, and of each cause as producing only one effect. It was, therefore, the responsibility of every political thinker to accept complexity as an empirical fact. His position is most clearly expressed in a review in 1925: '. . . society and the State are made up, not of simplified units of tendency, but of living human beings, impulsive, ignorant, passionate, but seldom either cruel or completely selfish.'[13]

Rejecting the simple reductionist psychology of Bentham, Wallas tried to create a modern political psychology which, accepting the diversity of human motivation, could deal more adequately with the stresses of an industrial-urban world. Here we can see the central theme of *Human Nature in Politics*. Democracy was under attack because democratic institutions did not achieve all that might have been expected of them. At first democratic principles had won the hearts and passions of young idealists. Now, as the new century began, those principles were entering a new stage where they were on trial.

The exposure of democratic illusions had led many, particularly

such Europeans as Le Bon, Pareto, and Sorel, to attack the entire intellectual basis of democracy. But in their 'realistic' re-appraisal of democracy lay the birth of a new generation of anti-democratic ideologies, arguing, not that democracy was undesirable, but that it was impossible. However Wallas retained his faith in the values of democracy, and refused to follow this road. He sought a twofold solution to the problem. Firstly he analysed the failures of democracy's original intellectual foundations. Secondly, he urged a more intensive study of psychology to re-establish the democratic ethic on a firmer base. The goal of *Human Nature in Politics* was a scientifically justified democratic society.

It is worth recalling that Wallas' interest in the science of society, while first fully explored in *Human Nature in Politics*, did not spring from nothing. The general inclination of his concerns is indicated as early as 1888, on the first page of one of his first publications, an article on Aristotle: 'I have sought rather to discover how far Aristotle's study and criticism of the various forms of society which he knew, led him toward a general science of sociology.'[14] Wallas concluded that in this respect Aristotle was unsatisfactory. In the following years he devoted more and more of his time to the search for what Aristotle had failed to find: an adequate scientific political psychology. It is important to note that while Wallas so strongly urged the application of psychological discoveries to the field of political science, his own knowledge of psychology, at least when he wrote *Human Nature in Politics* in 1908, was very limited. There is nothing in his writings to indicate that at this stage he had any acquaintance with the work of either Sigmund Freud or Karl Jung, although in his later writings he acknowledged his subsequent indebtedness to them. Wallas was much more effective in urging the need for the application of psychology to politics than in making any effective application himself. He had a tendency, exposed, not only in *Human Nature in Politics*, but also in his other books, to confuse the repeated assertion that social-political questions ought to be tackled psychologically, with actual demonstrations of applied psychology. Wallas was much more prone to exhort others to do things than to do them himself. As his student, Walter Lippmann, noted: 'He has not produced a political psychology, but he has written a manifesto for it.'[15]

Wallas very early came to the conclusion that it was the new discoveries of man's biological origins, suggested by Darwin, which seemed most likely to open the way to a clearer understanding of

human psychology. Men now had access to a body of psychological data unavailable to Bentham and his immediate disciples. It made possible a new emphasis on psychology which would be the most obvious departure from the traditional approaches of the nineteenth century. Wallas noted the effect of the change in the last year of his life.

> . . . and not only the quantity but the character of 'scientific' knowledge has profoundly changed since Mill urged that the methods of the physical sciences should be used in the development of the moral sciences. The science whose method Mill found most applicable to the social thinking of 1840 was physics. The science from which the thinker of 1932 expects to learn most is biology, with its subsciences of physiology, psychology, and physical and cultural anthropology. And the methods which are used or implied in biological or psychological work and which a social thinker must learn in some degree to understand and use are profoundly different from the methods of the physical sciences which Mill formulated.[16]

Today Wallas' reliance on what can be called a form of social-Darwinism seems old-fashioned. The adaptational approach to psychology developed by Darwin was almost universally discarded when it became clearer that the interaction between the biological inheritance and the social environment was not at all exact. Indeed, as the connection could nowhere be established with any precision at all, it was abandoned as a tool of analysis. There was another reason why Wallas was drawn to Darwin. The unit of analysis in Darwin's biology was the individual. Species change came about as the cumulative effect of individual adaptations to the environment. All of this was fully compatible with Wallas' own intuitive reliance on the individual. A social psychology which saw society, not as an autonomous force, but as an organisation created by individuals, and in turn reacting with individuals to define and limit the opportunities for individual initiative, seemed logically and historically correct to a person of Wallas' background and temperament.

In recent decades there have been great changes in the study of political science. But when Wallas began to work on *Human Nature in Politics*, older habits still prevailed. Utilitarian psychology, combined with liberal rationalism, was still an extraordinarily powerful

tradition, dominating most political studies. There was an appalling disregard of the evidence about human behaviour supplied by psychology. Political science in 1908 was either based on the Benthamite intellectual 'calculating-machine' type of psychology which de-emphasised the emotional, instinctive aspects of human behaviour, or rejected this to become totally legal-institutional, ignoring psychological factors altogether. The political scientist who relied on traditional sources of information about political man was 'still in the condition of the medical student trained by the study of Hippocrates or Galen'.[17]

> A political thinker so trained is necessarily apt to preserve the conception of human nature which he learnt in his student days in a separate and sacred compartment of his mind, into which the facts of experience, however laboriously and carefully gathered, are not permitted to enter.[18]

To demonstrate this separation of accurate political observation from any underlying philosophy of human nature, Wallas examined Ostrogorski's *Democracy and the Organisation of Political Parties* (1902), which analysed the results of fifteen years' study of the party systems of the United States and of England. Ostrogorski was 'a democrat and a friend of man',[19] who was aware of the excessive intellectualism and mechanical causality of the Utilitarians. To this extent Ostrogorski was much more realistic than many of his contemporaries and his book was a major contribution to our understanding of democratic politics. 'In his determination, however, not to lose faith and hope, one feels that M. Ostrogorski has kept his philosophy apart from his experience.'[20] This was the real defect of the book, rendering futile much of its otherwise excellent analysis.

> But no indication was given that Professor Ostrogorski's experience had altered in the least degree the conception of human nature with which he started. The facts observed are throughout regretfully contrasted with 'free reason,' 'the general idea of liberty,' 'the sentiments which inspired the men of 1848,' and the book ends with a sketch of a proposed constitution in which the voters are required to vote for candidates known to them through declarations of policy 'from which all mention of party is rigorously excluded.' One seems to be reading a series of

> conscientious observations of the Copernican heavens by a loyal but saddened believer in Ptolemaic astronomy.[21]

Ostrogorski, of course, did not take kindly to these criticisms, and in a long letter to Wallas he denied the relevance of biology to social studies. 'Between biology and sociology . . . there is no analogy.'[22] The English translation of *Democracy and the Organisation of Political Parties* included an Introduction by James Bryce, who, in Wallas' opinion, embodied all the worst failings of Ostrogorski himself. Bryce had referred to 'an ideal democracy' in which 'every citizen is intelligent, patriotic, disinterested'.

> What does Mr. Bryce mean by 'ideal democracy'? If it means anything it means the best form of democracy which is consistent with the facts of human nature. But one feels, on reading the whole passage, that Mr. Bryce means by those words the kind of democracy which might be possible if human nature were as he himself would like it to be, and as he was taught at Oxford to think it was.[23]

Such abstractions as 'ideal democracy', 'pure forms', and so on, obscured the study of politics and clouded the issues. In the Machiavellian tradition, Wallas insisted that the study of politics must, first of all, be concerned with things as they are, and not as one imagined them, nor as one deduced from some supposed self-evident assumptions, that they ought to be. The study of what ought to be was a meaningful and relevant study, but the study of both the 'what is' and the 'what ought to be' would be impossible unless one clearly separated the 'is' from the 'ought'. Later, in 1915, in reviewing Ernest Barker's *Political Thought in England from Herbert Spencer to the Present Day*, Wallas made the same criticism of Barker's insistence that political theory should be confined to the study of 'pure instances'. Wallas argued that 'Political thought exists for the sake of action, and action, unfortunately for us, does deal with the whole concrete world'. The consequences of basing theories on imagined pure types, rather than on the statistical ordering of the variety of the real world, would be that 'our most carefully considered actions will miscarry'.[24]

Democracy and the Organisation of Political Parties belonged to a tradition of political thinking which had as its central purpose the reformulation of the machinery of democracy. It looked to the era of

1776 and 1848 when men, 'in their moments of imaginative exaltation', envisioned an assembly of 'free', 'equal', and 'rational' citizens. To Ostrogorski the obvious gulf between the vision of democracy, and the political practices of England and the United States, was a consequence of the 'diseases' of democracy, the principal one of which was the institution of the political party. The task was to recognise and cure the disease and so return to the pure form of rational democracy. What Ostrogorski failed to recognise, said Wallas, was that

> . . . the whole trend of modern science has made 'free' the most difficult of all words to use in any exact sense. Darwin, and the biologists and psychologists who have written since Darwin, have made it also difficult to use the word 'reason,' of any state of human consciousness, without narrow and careful definition. Above all, experience has forced us to recognise, that the 'reasoning' of the citizens of great nations deals, not with a single world seen by all of them with equal clearness, but with views and memories and imaginations of things, so varied as to constitute a million different worlds.[25]

To Wallas, Ostrogorski and Bryce were representative of those many who, being unable to preserve their traditional concepts of human nature in the face of their experience of the political world, wanted to dismiss altogether the study of human nature. Having discovered that hedonism was an unsound psychology, they tended to reject all psychologies as equally unsound.

> The thinkers of the past, from Plato to Bentham and Mill, had each his own view of human nature, and they made those views the basis of their speculations on government. But no modern treatise on political science, whether dealing with institutions or finance, now begins with anything corresponding to the opening words of Bentham's *Principles of Morals and Legislation* – 'Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure'; or to the 'first general proposition' of Nassau Senior's *Political Economy*, 'Every man desires to obtain additional wealth with as little sacrifice as possible.' In most cases one cannot even discover whether the writer is conscious of possessing any conception of human nature at all.[26]

But it was not enough just to criticise Ostrogorski. With the abandonment of his idealised democracy a new dilemma appeared. From the ruins of the original intellectual basis of representative-democratic institutions, one could discern two new lines of thought. One line, that of the sceptics, emphasised 'the irrational, the subconscious, the passionate', as the really significant quality of mankind.[27] This was the approach of James Burnham's neo-Machiavellians who made no passionate defence of democracy, nor any attack upon it. They were content to assert just that democracy could not be. Michels' oligarchies, Mosca's ruling class, and Sorel's myths were all a denial of the possibility of democracy.

> To this class of thinkers it makes little difference whether in any given polity there are many voters, or few, or none. Czar and Kaiser, President and Premier, the leaders of Churches and parties, democratic or hierarchical, all can rule by the same appeal to imagination and affection.[28]

In such cynicism, democracy would wither and die. Those supposed realists who dismissed democracy as an unattainable utopia, a dream-world, could not be expected to struggle to preserve democracy against hostile forces. The denial of the possibility of democracy would be a self-fulfilling prophecy.

> At first sight, therefore, it might appear that the change in political science which is now going on will simply result in the abandonment by the younger politicians of all ethical traditions, and the adoption by them . . . of those methods of exploiting the irrational elements of human nature which have hitherto been the trade secret of the elderly and the disillusioned.[29]

The other line insisted on reason as the sole guide in politics, meaning here by reason 'the painful process of conscious inference from consciously co-ordinated premises'.[30] Those political scientists who followed this line would renounce the role of crusader and, in alliance with behavioural psychology, try to make politics a pure laboratory science. Democratic values would be set aside as irrelevant or, at best, not subject to scientific analysis. These were the 'pure' political scientists, especially influential in America, who ostensibly discounted normative theory and sought to create a new value-free empirical theory.

To Wallas there were, in such ultra-scientific approaches, as many dangers as in the complete negation of all science. The gravest danger was that of over-simplification, which would encourage scholars to concentrate on those political forms which lent themselves to laboratory-type analysis, and to disregard, or dismiss as irrelevant, that which could not be so easily manipulated. There was, as Wallas argued at great length, need for far more quantitative data in the study of politics. This was a basic Fabian position, strengthened by his own first-hand knowledge of the weaknesses of contemporary political studies. But while quantification was essential to understanding and analysis, not all things were quantifiable, and those aspects of political life which could not be reduced to numerical values could not simply be rejected, or discarded as unworthy of serious attention.

Wallas' self-imposed task was to trace a route away from the 'free-reasoning' wishful-thinking democracy of Ostrogorski and Bryce, while avoiding both the excessive cynicism and the over-simplified 'scientism' of the reaction to deflated optimism. The object was to fit both rational and non-rational inferences into the one explanation of behaviour.

> The mind of man is like a harp, all of whose strings throb together; so that emotion, impulse, inference, and the special kind of inference called reasoning, are often simultaneous and intermingled aspects of a single mental experience.[31]

There were others prepared to support Wallas' position. Political scientists were not the only ones to over-react against nineteenth-century rationalism. In the Wallas papers, for example, there is an undated letter from Professor Lionel Robbins which applied to the study of economics the same kind of criticisms which Wallas made of political science. After noting that the conception of 'economic man' was dead, Robbins continued:

> Nowadays I am inclined to feel that we are tending to go too far in the opposite direction. Many of the younger Americans, e.g., seem to go perilously near not only to a denial of any rationality in any human behaviour, but also to a denial of a human *capacity for rationality*.[32]

Wallas did not succeed in resolving all the difficulties in the usage

of the terms 'rational' and 'non-rational'. But for our present purposes the distinction is clear enough. By 'rational' he meant 'conscious, logical inference from external event to response', and by 'non-rational' he meant 'a response prompted, in some large measure at least, by a sub-conscious emotional, or automatic, or habitual, or instinctive reaction to a stimulus perceived as familiar'. A rational responses therefore involves perception and recognition of the stimulus, and a conscious selection of a response from a number of possible alternatives. Even if the response proves to have been a mistake, based on an inaccurate assessment of the situation, and resulting in disaster, the response is still considered rational. A non-rational response is one which involves no considered or conscious choice among alternatives, but is a subconscious reaction to the stimulus. It may be a 'good' or a 'bad' response, and still be non-rational. In terms of being appropriate to the stimulus, a non-rational response may therefore be perfectly acceptable behaviour. That is to say, Wallas used the terms 'rational' and 'non-rational' to distinguish ways in which responses are arrived at, and he did not mean to distinguish different kinds of responses as they might be seen by a neutral observer. This is the sense in which rational and non-rational will be used here.

Wallas' own psychological system, as first presented in *Human Nature in Politics*, begins with the individual as an organism embodying a set of attitudes and instincts. In terms which he admitted to be freely adapted from William James, he defined instincts as 'impulses towards definite acts or series of acts, independent of any conscious anticipation of their probable effects'.[33] Instincts in this sense were the source of much non-rational action. A great deal of human behaviour consisted of non-rational, instinctual responses to external stimuli. Later, in *The Great Society*, the concept of instinct would be refined into the much more useful concept of disposition. In *Human Nature in Politics* he distinguished the chief of these political impulses as affection, fear, ridicule, desire for property, pugnacity, suspicion, curiosity, and the desire to excel, each described in some detail in the first chapter of *Human Nature in Politics*.[34] The classification is obviously crude, arbitrary, and unsatisfactory. Wallas gave no evidence to show that this was either an exclusive or an exhaustive listing. But at this point this is less important than the recognition of a multiplicity of instincts, of a complex source of behaviour. Wallas obviously did not discover the non-rational components of human behaviour. Even Burke had

recognised both the importance of human nature to politics and the limited role of reason within human nature. 'Politics ought to be adjusted, not to human reasoning, but to human nature; of which the reason is but a part, and by no means the greatest part.'[35] And Bagehot, whom Wallas greatly admired, had anticipated very closely the ideas Wallas had elaborated on. Harold Laski made this point in a letter to Justice Holmes in 1923.

> [Bagehot] knew man as a vain little animal who liked to strut before his platoon, and dress up and work off his emotions; and he knew that it is simply silly to suppose that you can talk of a science of politics when the given material is human.[36]

But Wallas had gone further than Bagehot, and he had stressed, not only instinctual behaviour, but also the complexity, the multi-faceted nature of those instincts. He contended that the common inclination to categorise instincts, to conceive each instinct as a separate tendency directed towards some specific act, or series of acts, was an unrealistic simplification. Individual acts were more likely to be the end product of a whole set of impulses. It was important to remember that

> . . . in politics we are dealing not with such clear-cut separate instincts as we may find in children and animals, but with tendencies often weakened by the course of human evolution, still more often transferred to new uses, and acting not simply but in combination or counteraction.[37]

Wallas saw few actions as either purely rational, or purely non-rational. Most were to some extent modified by memory, by habit, and by thought. Nevertheless, despite all modifications and corrections, a greater part of man's social-political behaviour was still subconscious, or half-conscious. Having started from the individual human organism with a set of inherited biological impulses, Wallas then placed that individual in an external environment which acted upon it. The approach was still essentially Darwinian. Between the environment and the individual, the connecting link, the triggering process, was that of stimulus and response. Within the political environment there were various external stimuli: the events, and reports of events, in the political world, which impinged on the individual's set of attitudes, turning predispositions into responses and reactions.

Society changed as individuals adapted to changing circumstances, but as the individual's capacity for adaptation was governed by his biological nature, it was flexible only within narrow limits. In the modern world, with the technological explosion, the environment changed much more rapidly than human nature. Human beings were becoming aliens in their own environment. This was the basic cause of the stresses and strains which afflicted the modern industrial nations.

Although he believed that there had been few changes in human nature in the thousands of years of recorded history, Wallas acknowledged that there had been enormous political changes, produced in part by new habits of thought, and in part by 'new entities' about which we can think and feel.[38] In other words, changing circumstances, new events, new technologies, added new substance to political life. With each generation men had to react to different things or entities, while their own natures changed but little. In explaining how we receive and assimilate these new entities he postulated that before any entity can stimulate us to action, we must first recognise it. The external event will act as a stimulus only when it is perceived as similar to a previous occurrence of it, or as similar to something else that had been perceived previously.

> If the world consisted of things which constantly and arbitrarily varied their appearance, if nothing was ever like anything else, or like itself for more than a moment at a time, living beings as at present constituted would not act at all. They would drift like seaweed among the waves.[39]

But likeness, recognition, of itself is not enough to stimulate action. The thing recognised must also be seen as significant, as of some consequence to its perceiver. Some forms of significance are inherent in the nature of the stimulus, as in the growl of a wild beast, but others must be learnt, and many are artificially created. A great deal of social and political activity consists in the teaching of the significance of certain stimuli and in the creation of artificial and easily recognisable political likenesses or entities. Much of what is formally classified as education is training in the recognition and evaluation of socially significant symbols. The robes and rituals of a monarchy, and the ceremony of marriage, both establish political-social entities, recognisable for what they are by the repetition of their form.

Wallas further realised that some entities can be communicated *only* in symbolic form. We cannot see the State, or the law, or freedom. We can only see the word-symbol for State, or some other symbolic representation of it such as the crown, or a picture of the crown. Our first knowledge of such entities, and especially abstractions, is not of 'real entities' but of symbols of entities, and we must transfer meaning from the symbol to the thing symbolised. Here Wallas recognised that in dealing with symbols, and especially verbal symbols (language), there was a danger of over-intellectualising the process. While one effect of language is to stimulate the process of conscious logical inference, there is also a process of emotional association, of 'feeling' about a situation, which may have an even more powerful effect. There was the added dimension of the problem, explored at greater length in *The Art of Thought*, that the emotional associations conjured up by the mind by the presence of a stimulus, were seldom under the control of the conscious will. This fact contributed elements of instability and inconsistency to individual social behaviour. Few significant symbols were entirely neutral in their impact. From this Wallas concluded that much of the stimulus to social and political action came from the emotional association process of language rather than from that of logical inference. While we can make a conscious, rational translation from symbol to entity, we are likely to rely on an habitual, emotional association. The natural consequence is that often the translation will be inaccurate, imprecise, or ambiguous.

These considerations led Wallas into his pioneering explorations of the possibilities of mass propaganda. An awareness of the extent to which political behaviour is sparked by habitual, or instinctive, responses to external stimuli provoked an interest in the possibility of manipulating the stimuli to produce the desired responses. In this concern lies the genesis of all theoretical speculation on the nature of propaganda. Wallas neither coined the term 'propaganda'[40] nor initiated the study of it. But he was one of the very earliest to pay serious attention to the possibilities of the conscious direction of public opinion.[41] His approach, which is remarkably modern, was a natural development of his general theory of the political process. Given his conception of the roots of political activity, it is not surprising that he should come to suspect and fear 'the cold-blooded manipulation of popular impulse and thought by professional politicians'.[42] A realistic appraisal of human nature soon demonstrated that the majority of people were ignorant of, and

indifferent to, politics, and were therefore easy victims of skilful exploitation.

Such an understanding of the role of propaganda was another source of disillusionment with democracy. But as propaganda was based on the exploitation of non-rational behaviour, and as the non-rational component of human behaviour could be reduced (but certainly not totally eliminated), the power of the propagandist might in turn be lessened. One needed to be concerned, but there was no call for despair. One need not give up as hopeless the task of creating a responsible, democratic electorate. These were ideas which were more fully explored later when he came to consider forms of social organisation.

The basic psychological mechanism throughout Wallas' writings, and which lay at the core of his theories of propaganda, was that of association. Wallas' associational psychology, founded largely on William James' *Principles of Psychology* (1890), has long been regarded as obsolete. Yet, while its authority declined, Wallas did not abandon it. Even in *The Art of Thought* he treated association as the 'essential element' in 'inventive thought' by which 'one psychological event calls up another in the "telephone exchange" of the upper brain'.[43] Symbols, including all language, become stimuli which arouse attitudinal responses through the associations conjured up by the sight or sound of the symbols. Although men commonly attempt to intellectualise their responses, to explain their behaviour in logical terms, the initial attitude on which the response is founded is, almost always, an emotional reaction to the primary associations of the stimulus.[44]

Wallas expressed the view that some of the most important events in the evolution of politics had been the successive creations of new moral entities, including such ideals as justice, freedom, and right. Man had changed little, but the environment, the set of entities with which he had to deal, continued to change. In the development of new concepts, of new symbols to express or articulate the new entities, the process of logical abstraction had usually played a genuine role. But while the entity may have been created and refined through deliberate, conscious analysis, each entity must now be expressed through symbols, and symbols make their first and strongest impact through emotional associations.

> It is this . . . relation between words and things which makes the central difficulty of thought about politics. The words are so

> rigid, so easily personified, so associated with affection and prejudice; the things symbolised by the words are so unstable.[45]

The power of the emotional association to stimulate action was increased by this lack of stability in the objective reference of the symbol. The things named by such words as State, justice, *polis*, and so on, changed much more rapidly than the words. Aristotle, for example, had used the word 'polity' to mean a State where 'the citizens as a body govern in accordance with the general good', but in the twentieth century, 'the name which he defined is borne by the "police" of Odessa'.[46] Such a shift in reference of a symbol was inevitable. Institutions and political entities themselves changed fairly rapidly, not only through time, but from place to place. Further, because the full process of abstraction which led to the original formulation could never be completely communicated, each generation of users made its own adaptation and interpretation. The emotional impact remained long after the objective reference was gone.

> When the phrases of Justinian were used by a Merovingian king or a Spanish Inquisitor not only was the meaning of the words changed, but the facts to which the words could have applied in their old sense were gone. Yet the emotional power of the bare words remained.[47]

Political man thus moved within a constantly shifting environment, but, because the aspects of the environment are communicated through relatively stable symbols, mankind is often misled into thinking that the environment is also stable. The failure to perceive the extent to which the environment has changed can cause enormous stress within a society. In part this psychological strain could be eased by transferring to the new entities of the changed environment some of the emotional attachment of the older set of entities. This was one of the tasks of the propagandist, the 'manipulator of public opinion'.

For Wallas, one of the most important political entities in the modern State was the political party. The party had come into existence as a response to the emergence of modern mass representation. Unless they could be organised, the newly enfranchised masses would remain unstructured, amorphous, and therefore powerless. The party was the instrument for producing that organisation. It is in his discussion on the party that we can see most

clearly Wallas' attempt to redefine the nature of the political process; to steer a middle way between the older over-intellectualised optimism, and a newer cynical abandonment of all democratic values. Here he expressed concisely his conviction that reason and emotion both play a role in political decision-making.

> The origin of any particular party may be due to a deliberate intellectual process. It may be formed, as Burke said, by 'a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed'. But when a party has come into existence its fortunes depend upon facts of human nature of which deliberate thought is only one. It is primarily a name, which, like other names, calls up when it is heard or seen an 'image' that shades imperceptibly into the voluntary realisation of its meaning. As in other cases, emotional reactions can be set up by the name and its automatic mental associations. It is the business of the party managers to secure that these automatic associations shall be as clear as possible, shall be shared by as large a number as possible, and shall call up as many and as strong emotions as possible.[48]

By this process the party becomes a political entity which exists in the memory and emotions of the electors as a stimulus, capable of arousing responses and actions, and independent of the actions and opinions of the party leaders. It became a symbol with a whole range of emotional associations in the minds of individuals, as well as a specific organisational structure.

Wallas' analysis of party and electoral politics most clearly illustrates the break between his work and that of his predecessors. Traditionalists like J. S. Mill had spent time examining various methods of voting. There was nothing wrong with this activity in itself, but to Wallas the exclusive preoccupation with such problems appeared '. . . to suffer from the fatal defect of dwelling solely on the process by which an opinion is ascertained, and ignoring the process by which opinion is created'.[49] Both problems were, of course, equally important, and if Wallas appeared to give too much attention to the manipulation of the non-rational impulses behind opinion formation, it was to offset an imbalance stemming from the almost total disregard of this aspect of political life by previous writers.

These topics had been the themes of Part I of *Human Nature in Politics*, the part which had sparked the greatest public interest in the book. It was here that Wallas had first of all demonstrated the deficiencies of the liberal-intellectual assumptions that men always acted on conscious inferences as to means and ends. He had shown how the optimistic democratic theory of the nineteenth century had been vitiated by excessive rationalism, by the failure to recognise the part played in human behaviour by easily exploited and manipulated and semi-conscious emotional forces.

In the same opening chapters he had explained how often behaviour was guided by instincts and emotions towards political entities; entities which, in turn, were often symbols, abstractions from reality, becoming increasingly removed from reality in the process of abstraction. This was a new, innovative, argument and, while it might now be regarded as a commonplace, it upset much of the conventional wisdom about the study of politics. In a sense, his argument was altogether too successful:

> His description of the large part played by nonrational inference in political decision and of the dangers of its unscrupulous cultivation by propagandists was so convincing that it quickly became a platitude. In the process it was ripped from its context and magnified beyond proportion to his larger argument, which was then neglected.[50]

In this sense Wallas has been too readily labelled an empirical political scientist, the 'founder of behaviourism', the prophet whose teachings inspired Lasswell, Lazarsfeld, Easton, and the many others in their tradition. This is both true and misleading. Wallas did want to see the development of an empirical science for the study of political man. But he was forever a normative theorist, a moralist, who saw science as an instrument for clearing away the confusions surrounding our knowledge of political man. Political *science* was not, for Wallas, an end in itself. It was the means to a more certain foundation of political *morals*.

Wallas' criticisms of excessive intellectualism and reductionism were never intended to stand alone. They were no more than the first stage of a more complicated argument for the establishment of democracy on a firmer basis. The subsequent chapters, where he began modifying the impact of his opening remarks, were not a matter of drawing back. They were a necessary extension, an

integral part, of the main argument. Having rejected the mechanistic intellectualism of the nineteenth century, Wallas' next task was to restore rational inference to its appropriate role in the political process. It did not follow that because rational inference did not guide all our actions it had no part at all to play. In the modern age a great deal of human activity was simply the habitual, half-conscious response to external stimuli. But it was 'a great deal' and not 'all'. Most importantly, it was possible to reduce the proportion of non-rational responses and enhance the part played by conscious inference. Men could, and did, reason logically to political ends. Once this was realised, it would be possible to increase the role of reason in political behaviour.[51] 'Man has therefore to create entities that shall be the material of his reasoning, just as he creates entities to be the objects of his emotions and the stimulus of his instinctive inferences.'[52] The same general assertion of the importance of reason was the theme of a lecture in 1924.

> Men . . . differ from other animals in the fact that they can make direct and conscious efforts to produce the results that they desire, and that they can distinguish between those direct and conscious efforts and mere automatic impulse . . . the whole of civilisation since the Stone Ages has depended upon man's discovery that he can say to himself, 'I will try and I will do.'[53]

Measurement and quantification were the important contributors to the increased role of reason. Here the influence of the Fabian Society, reinforced by Wallas' own researches on Francis Place, was incorporated in a general theory of political science. Wallas urged that political scientists should set themselves the task of finding as many relevant and measurable facts about human nature as possible. And once collected, the facts would need to be sorted and classified. The scientific model for the process was to be biology rather than physics, and especially some of the statistical works pioneered by the biologists.[54] Fortunately, even at the time Wallas was first writing, the task of quantification was being made easier by new concerns, and new techniques, for the collection of political and historical data.

> It is difficult to realise how short a time it is since questions for which we now rely entirely on official statistics were discussed by the ordinary political methods of agitation and advocacy. In the

> earlier years of George the Third's reign, at a time when population in England was, as we now know, rising with unprecedented rapidity, the question of fact whether it was rising or falling led to embittered political controversy.[55]

The greatest opportunity for the practical application of newly available demographic data and social statistics was obviously in the fields of government and public administration, areas where Wallas was already anxious to see improvement and reform.

> Every year larger and more exact collections of detailed political facts are being accumulated; and collections of detailed facts, if they are to be used at all in political reasoning, must be used quantitatively. The intellectual work of preparing legislation, whether carried on by permanent officials or Royal Commissions or Cabinet Ministers, takes every year a more quantitative and a less qualitative form.[56]

And as governments and other agencies were becoming increasingly prepared to gather, preserve, and make available the primary evidence necessary for a new quantifiable social science, so statisticians were providing new methodologies to make the most productive use of such evidence. Not only was it becoming easier to provide quantitative answers to quantitative questions, but there was among social scientists a growing awareness that these could be the most rewarding types of questions and answers. While there were dangers in what he called 'adding machine research', Wallas was an enthusiastic supporter of increased use of mechanical calculators in universities to speed up research and to take the drudgery out of the collation of statistical data. Once man started thinking in terms of statistical curves, he could minimise the emotional content of any proposition, and so increase the prospect of dealing with it by conscious logical inference.

At the levels of both national government and local government, Wallas stressed the need for systematic thought on the science of administration and the development of quantitative methodologies. He regretted 'the loss of imagination, of intellectual adaptability, of mere indispensable knowledge' which followed the failure to apply a science of administration, or even any coherent philosophy, to local government.[57] The Civil Service, including municipal administration, could be the chief instrument of political invention in the

circumstances of the twentieth-century positive State. The Civil Service, before the reforms of the mid-nineteenth century, was the creature of patronage, lacking either the will or the capacity, to serve as a vehicle for change. But the new professionalisation of the Service, and its increasing technical efficiency, made possible the application of carefully thought-out principles to government.[58]

If anything, Wallas paid even more attention to reform in local government than in national. It was at the local level that the citizen had his most frequent and direct contacts with government. 'For the average English citizen the possibility of health, of happiness, of progress towards the old Greek ideal of "beautiful goodness," depends on his local government more than any other factor in his environment.'[59] Wallas contrasted this ideal of what local government might do, with what he saw of the practice of local government, especially during his lecture tours of the United States. There, individualism and a lack of any well-developed sense of public duty, had made city government a disgrace. Wallas' own ardent civic idealism was so offended by what he witnessed that he subsequently devoted a great deal of time to urging the cause of a highly trained, highly motivated, professional local administration, especially in the new expanding urban areas. 'To us, in our time, the issues of urban life are more urgent than those of rural villages or counties.'[60] In making his case he naturally ran into a good deal of resistance, for the dead-hand of tradition was always set against the inventors and innovators.

> The argument that what was good enough for our great-grandfathers is good enough for us is still in use. When Professor Graham Wallas suggested yesterday to the Royal Commission on Local Government that the time had come to abolish the system of appointment by patronage that still persists in our municipal civil service, one member of the Commission defended that system on the ground that it had once produced Nelson and Napoleon.[61]

Wallas spent his life countering such attitudes. Yet although many of the reforms he urged were made, there is little evidence that his own personal intervention was of any great significance. For all the importance Wallas attached to greater scientific efficiency in the Civil Service, for all his respect for Bentham as a political inventor, Wallas' own contributions to administrative reform were slight. He

was, as always, much more adept at inspiring and preaching than in actually doing things.

There were, as Wallas took pains to make clear, limits to what could be achieved by statistical methods. Certain aspects of politics were easily quantifiable. But, as already mentioned, other questions were not nearly so amenable to statistical calculation, and this did not mean that such other questions should, or could, be ignored. While Wallas believed in the power of the new, psychological, quantitative political science to increase our understanding of the political world, he also knew that such understanding did not, of itself, produce control over the political world.

> We may learn from our science to estimate exactly the forces exerted by the syndicated newspaper press, by the liquor saloons, or by the blind instincts of class and nationality and race; but how can we learn to control them? The fact that we think about these things in a new way will not win elections or prevent wars.[62]

For this reason he stressed that the political scientist must still be involved with values; with the defining of the goals of society, and not merely the methods for achieving them. Quantification for its own sake, without passion, without concern for ends, was a sterile exercise. It should be remembered that Wallas' whole life was motivated by his awareness of the enormous gap between the life experienced by the masses in the industrial cities, and life as it might be lived if human dignity was to have any meaning.

The fundamental question which occupied much of his thinking, was how to correct the mistakes, the tragedies, of industrial capitalism; how to restore to the modern city some of the conditions of the 'good life' of Periclean Athens. Wallas always had, in the back of his mind, Aristotle's comment in *The Politics* that 'Men come together in cities in order to live and remain together in order to live well'. Some years later, in writing *Our Social Heritage*, he reaffirmed his belief that the true purpose of social activity was to ensure that as 'large a proportion of the future population for as large a part of the day as possible should have zest in their work'.[63]

Political society was a human creation, and if humans were to mould a society more appropriate to their changing needs, they would have to know more about the nature of political societies, and of the men who created, adapted, lived in, and destroyed such societies. A necessary preliminary to the building of a good political

society was a workable science of politics. The quantitative analysis of politics was not, therefore, set in opposition to the study of political values. Quantitative data were needed to refine value goals, and to provide a surer means of achieving them. We needed facts, not to 'prove' values, nor to decide which values to pursue, but to place values on a more solid understanding of the society in which they would be pursued. Facts could also show the nature of the obstacles which might stand in the way of the pursuit of certain values. Values in turn gave meaning and purpose to the search for facts. Value-goals determined both the significance of facts and the use that would be made of them. Fact and value were operationally separable, but in application, totally interdependent.

These were the major components of Wallas' concept of political science. It was to be a study which could draw on modern psychology to formulate 'a conception of human nature much truer, though more complex, than that which is associated with the traditional English political philosophy',[64] and secondly, it would make as much use as possible of quantitative data in order to present a fuller and more accurate statement of problems and their solution. Wallas continued to believe in the worth of democracy, without being blind to its defects. His democratic faith continued to be in conflict with an elitist desire for a government by experts, a conflict he never fully resolved. He had convincingly repudiated the nineteenth-century psychological foundations on which representative democracy had been constructed. But this did not mean the rejection of the ethical aims of democracy. Here, unfortunately, Wallas was at his weakest. He knew the dilemma, and he had a feeling for the nature of the solution. But his work was no more than suggestive. The second part of *Human Nature in Politics* is largely a speculation on what might be. Here Wallas '. . . seems to be groping in the fog to find a way out. But he does not claim that it is anything more than that. All he contends is that the fog is there, and that the exploration is inevitable'.[65]

Wallas rejected the authoritarian solution of Plato for whom rule by public opinion was intellectually an untenable proposition. Wallas' fellow Fabian and good friend, H. G. Wells,[66] had followed Plato down the road of the philosopher-king and proposed a system of government by an intellectual-technological elite, which would have produced a managerial society. For a time Wallas had toyed with the notion of such a social reconstruction, but eventually he moved away from it. He shared with Wells the scepticism about

democracy as it then existed, but he was never a complete elitist. Although he was not naive about the capacities of ordinary men in the early twentieth century to govern themselves, he did not accept this as an unchangeable state of affairs. He did not believe that Plato's 'magnificent lie' was the appropriate instrument by which the wise would govern the foolish for their own good. Having discovered the limitations of government by public opinion, his response was not to accept this, but to work for a solution to extend those limits.

The meaning of life was to be found in the dignity of the individual. Here was the paradox in Wallas' writings. He had discarded liberal individualism in favour of Fabian collectivism, yet he did so for the sake of the individual. He had concluded that laissez-faire individualism, even as moderated by J. S. Mill, denied the possibility of individual self-development to all but a privileged few, while a collectivist society, if motivated by a spirit of social responsibility, opened up new possibilities for individual self-realisation for the many. Most of his later work was directed to the fuller development of this 'new individualism'.

5 The Great Society and the Good Society

In 1908, when Edwardian optimism and self-assurance were at their highest, Wallas' *Human Nature in Politics* had been like a bucket of cold water, damping down the easy assumptions of continuing progress and of the eventual universal triumph of rational democracy. Six years later, on the eve of the Great War, the mood of optimism had already slipped into one of unease and uncertainty. The nineteenth-century conviction of the inevitability of progress was dead. Yet paradoxically Wallas' third book was a reaffirmation of faith in the human potential. In the Preface to *The Great Society*, Wallas defined the relationship between that book and its predecessor:

> Now that the book is finished, I can see, more clearly than I could while I was writing it, what it is about; and in particular what its relation is to my *Human Nature in Politics* (1908). I may, therefore, say briefly that the earlier book was an analysis of representative government, which turned into an argument against nineteenth-century intellectualism; and that this book is an analysis of the general social organisation of a large modern state, which has turned, at times, into an argument against certain forms of twentieth-century anti-intellectualism.[1]

It is possibly a little naive to imagine that Wallas did not realise the purpose of his book until after its completion. He was clearly reflecting on its direction soon after the publication of *Human Nature in Politics*. There is, for example, a letter from Wallas to Alfred Zimmern dated 16 March 1909:

> . . . a new book on the art of adjusting the need of organisation as a basis for efficiency, with the facts of human nature, economic and social and ethical, as well as political. [It would consider]

> how to live an unnatural life in such a way as to afford that satisfaction to our inner nature, which is called happiness.[2]

And very shortly after 1908 he began to raise objections to William McDougall and others who might, at first glance, have appeared to be sharing his own attacks on nineteenth-century thinking. Nevertheless, the point is well made. *The Great Society* was more than a continuation of the previous book, to be read in light of it. It was also an attempt to correct a wide-spread misunderstanding of the message of *Human Nature in Politics*. That earlier book had been Wallas' most distinguished work, in which he defined the limits of the study of political science. His lasting reputation is founded principally upon it. Yet *Human Nature in Politics* might appear to some as uncharacteristic of Wallas. M. P. Mack noted that:

> The focus is wrong. Here the descriptive social psychologist, describing the effects of nonrational inference in politics, is in the foreground. In his later works, the normative moralist stands in front.[3]

This is both true and not true. Just as reading only *The Prince* gives one a misleading picture of the character and philosophic assumptions of Machiavelli, so a reading of *Human Nature in Politics* alone, especially if focused on Part One, will give a distorted picture of Wallas. A more careful reading of the whole book, in the context of Wallas' other writings, reveals the moralist, the reformer, who inspired the realist. The moralist was, perhaps, in the shadows in *Human Nature in Politics*, but even there he was never completely lost, and he re-emerged more forceful than ever in all Wallas' later works. Neither his rejection of Christian orthodoxy, and subsequent strident anti-clericalism, nor his attacks on nineteenth-century intellectualism, made Wallas an amoral cynic. A high sense of moral purpose dominated his whole life. *Human Nature in Politics* and *The Great Society* differed in stress, but not in intent.

Human Nature in Politics was published in the same year as William McDougall's *Social Psychology*, and Wallas was inevitably drawn into later confrontation with McDougall. At first the two books might have seemed to have much in common, for both opposed the simplistic rationalism of the nineteenth century. McDougall, for example, had turned from rational calculation to non-rational instinct as the source of behaviour:

> We may say, then, that, directly or indirectly, the instincts are the prime movers of all human activity; by the conative or impulsive force of some instinct (or of some habit derived from an instinct) every train of thought, however cold and passionless it may seem, is borne along towards its end, and every bodily activity is initiated and sustained. The instinctive impulses determine the end of all activities, and supply the driving power by which all mental activities are sustained; and all the complex intellectual apparatus of the most highly developed mind is but a means towards these ends, is but the instrument by which those impulses seek their satisfactions, while pleasure and pain do but serve to guide them in their choice of the means.
>
> Take away these instinctive dispositions with their powerful impulses, and the organism would become incapable of activity of any kind; it would lie inert and motionless like a wonderful clockwork whose mainspring had been removed, or a steam-engine whose fires had been drawn.[4]

But Wallas had been content to *modify* the role of individual reason. He did not wish to deny its existence altogether. The whole force of *The Great Society* was to correct any impression from his earlier book that he was as commited to extreme anti-intellectualism as McDougall. He made the point most clearly in a footnote in *The Great Society*, in direct reference to McDougall:

> I turned . . . somewhat anxiously to the pages of my *Human Nature in Politics*, in which I myself attacked the intellectualism of Bentham and his followers, to see whether I there fell into the same kind of anti-intellectualism which I here criticise. I find there is little or nothing which I should like to withdraw. I should, however, for my present purpose, write with a somewhat different emphasis. And there is one sentence which I should wish to modify, that in which I say: 'Impulse, it is now agreed, has an evolutionary history of its own earlier than the history of those intellectual processes by which it is often directed and modified.' (p. 25) This distinction between instinctive 'impulse' and intellectual 'process' seems to me to be open to the same accusation of projection on two planes which I have made above against Mr. McDougall's statement. I should now write it: 'Instinctive impulses, it is now agreed, have an evolutionary history of their own earlier than the history of those intellectual

> impulses by which they are often directed and modified.' I am the more inclined to make this correction after reading the headlines of a review of my *Human Nature in Politics* in the *New York City Mail*, where it is described as a 'Startling analysis' of a 'field of action into which reason seldom enters.'[5]

Wallas had perceived, correctly, that anti-intellectualism was easily translated into anti-democracy, and Wallas, despite a degree of scepticism, was essentially a democrat.

To counter the uni-dimensional limitations of deterministic psychology, Wallas developed the concept of complex dispositions (a term which will be more fully discussed later). He allowed that dispositions could certainly be 'instinctive', as McDougall had proposed, but he insisted that they could also be intelligent. Man had a natural disposition to rational behaviour. Thinking was not set in contradiction to instinctive, or purely 'natural' human behaviour. Thinking was an integral part of man's nature. 'Mr. McDougall does not hold, as I hold, that we are born with a tendency, under appropriate conditions, to think, which is as original and independent as our tendency; under appropriate conditions, to run away.'[6] In his opinion that intelligence was as much part of human nature as instinct, Wallas obviously did not stand alone. He acknowledged that his own position had been accurately articulated by, for example, C. S. Myers, who stated in a symposium on instinct and reason in 1910,[7] that both 'instinctive' and 'intelligent' behaviour involved a 'conscious awareness of ends', and both were 'plastic under the influence of experience and effort'. It was simply a difference of degree, not of kind. Instincts were 'relatively more fixed and less conscious and the intelligent dispositions relatively more conscious and less fixed'.

Wallas remained satisfied with this rather pragmatic approach. As usual he chose to set aside philosophic objections to the looseness of his terminology, seeing distinctions as linguistic issues, not as substantial practical problems. He was much more concerned to keep to his central theme: to steer a middle course between the excessive intellectualism of the nineteenth century and the excessive anti-intellectualism of the twentieth. The first of these excesses had been the source of much of the misery, unhappiness, and alienation of modern society. He had, he felt, adequately dealt with that intellectualist fallacy in 1908. The second excess posed many new threats to society, including even that of a military holocaust, for:

> . . . Such a war is made more possible whenever thought is represented as the mere servant of the lower passions, and a cynical struggle for life as the only condition which answers to the deeper facts of our nature.[8]

Human Nature in Politics represented one side of the argument – the discrediting of excessive rationalism. *The Great Society* represented the second side, the restoration of rational behaviour to a more effective role in social organisation. But it contained more than a theoretical explanation of society. It also embodied, to a much greater extent than *Human Nature in Politics*, Wallas' philosophy of life, his understanding of the meaning and purpose of the goals of social existence. Perhaps even more important was his unstated assumption that life does in fact have a meaning and purpose. When, in 1951, Professor Oakeshott delivered his inaugural address at the London School of Economics, his message was a refutation of much that Wallas had believed and taught. Oakeshott's pessimism made survival an end in itself:

> In political activity, then, men sail a boundless and bottomless sea; there is neither harbour for shelter, nor floor for anchorage, neither starting place nor appointed destination. The enterprise is to keep afloat on an even keel; the sea is both friend and enemy; and the seamanship consists in using the resources of a traditional manner of behaviour in order to make a friend of every inimical occasion.[9]

This was completely antithetical to Wallas' world outlook. For him there was always a destination. Like the north-west passage to Cathay, the route might be confused, difficult, almost impassable. But always there was a very clear vision of where one was going, and a confidence that the goal was ultimately attainable.

The goal itself appears as the unifying theme in almost all of Wallas' writings: a new quality in urban life, the environment and social organisation of industrial man. In the period between *Human Nature in Politics* and *The Great Society* he continued to read and reflect on the connecting threads linking what he knew of the psychology of human behaviour with the reality of urban-industrial society, and with his vision of what such a society might become. He was, during this time, particularly attracted by Thorstein Veblen's *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution*,[10] in which Veblen, in

Wallas' words, explored the relationship between the character of modern industrial society and the 'needs and tendencies of human nature', a problem obviously very close to the heart of Wallas' own interests. He developed this theme in *The Great Society*, where he put forward the proposition that man was born with a set of dispositions most appropriate to the 'world of tropical or sub-tropical wood and cave',[11] his natural environment in the beginning of his evolution. In the past, as time and changing circumstances drove men to new environments, they had been plastic enough to adapt their behaviour to new conditions, while the set of basic primitive dispositions remained unchanged. But in the modern age the conditions of the Great Society created an environment so different from the past, and so sudden in its transformation, that man's original elementary dispositions were of little value to him. Even his more recently acquired or learned dispositions were not easily adaptable. The Great Society had become an alien environment.

The early liberals believed that once the prescriptive restraints of Church and class were abolished, men would be free. On the basis of a faith in rational individual independence, it was assumed that modern society, by destroying old social ties, would make the individual totally self-responsible. Yet paradoxically the result was an environment in which the individual was lost in his isolation. Lacking old securities, and too uncertain to live alone, men became dependent on new quackeries, or became willing disciples of new messiahs. Genuine independence had become psychologically impossible for most. But while this was a cause of deep concern, it need not necessarily lead to despair. Wallas argued that although the modern industrial metropolis, as it existed, was an uncongenial environment for the development of the good life, this did not mean the abandonment of all hope. It meant, simply, that society had first to discover its purpose, and then had to work harder, and in new directions, to find a means of restoring that purpose to the city. The issues were urgent and critical, but they were not insoluble.

In the Wallas Papers the notes of an undated lecture, delivered sometime between 1908 and 1914, express his concept of the political and social elements which would bring that quality and purpose to modern life. The lecture, under the title, 'Art and the Economy', began by recalling the old England – in part, the England of his Devon childhood. 'There was a time when England was a nest of singing birds and when Shakespeare and his contemporaries fed from the English stage a fountain of high

thought and brave endeavour.'[12] Wallas undoubtedly romanticised this supposedly idyllic world of rural tranquillity. The past was never as sunlit or graceful as imagination would have it, nor was Shakespeare as widely appreciated as he seems to suggest. In his less emotional moments he must have been aware of the old order's many sore spots.[13] But it was still true that for the many, life at its worst in the pre-industrial era was never as foul as it was in the crowded slums of the industrial cities. The past was at least a rough standard against which the failings of the present could be measured. In this particular lecture, Wallas focused on the impact of the modern world on the place of art in society. At the beginning of the present century the enormous disparities in wealth denied the huge majority any appreciation, or even any awareness, of the world of beauty or of art. It was regrettably true that

> . . . for the vast majority of the English nation serious art is absolutely non-existent. . . . They read the police news or Reynold's Journal and they stare at the advertisements on the walls, but if you asked a working man how far he was conscious of an ideal supplied by art it would not be possible in most cases by any exercise of patience and ingenuity to make him understand what you meant.[14]

This was not a matter that concerned only artists. Art was not a luxury in the full life of the community; it was an essential component of that life. The society was poorer if it lacked an art which was part of the life of the whole people in the way that the medieval cathedral had belonged to all the community.

> There are men, chiefly among the extremely religious and extremely irreligious sections of mankind, to whom the whole practice and appreciation of art seems merely the substitution of a series of maudlin visions for the wholesome realities of life.[15]

Wallas could not accept this dismissal of art. He shared with William Morris the view that capitalism starved the spirit even more than it starved the body. This indeed was the true long-term evil of capitalism. Capitalism had the capacity to provide some measure of economic abundance, but its social and moral values, its preoccupation with materialism, its stress on competitive individualism, were all destructive of everything of lasting worth in

human society. This was the repudiation of capitalism which led Wallas into the Fabian Society. But in time he began to suspect that socialism, too, might be overly concerned with material values. For this reason he was fearful that collectivism, in its concern for economic reform, might have too little time or interest to remedy this spiritual starvation. He believed that our perceptions of the real world could be brought into coherent order only through artistic abstractions. Part of the mood of dissent and disillusionment which had led to his resignation from the Fabian Society stemmed from the Webbs' dismissal of art as extraneous to the real issues at stake. For Wallas, art was a real issue.

> It may happen in England as it has happened in many countries abroad that they [the revolutionaries] will consider all artists to be the parasites of their oppressors, all art to be a wilful and selfish delusion. Or it may be, if those who can work now work faithfully, that they will understand from the beginning that human progress and human happiness need many forms of service, and that the cause of freedom and brotherhood is also the cause of beauty and clear-sightedness.[16]

This latter prospect is an intrinsic component of Wallas' vision of the Good Society. The object was to find a way to a society in which the material conditions of social justice would exist in an environment of moral and aesthetic purpose. He believed that there must be more to life than just existence and material satisfaction. The problem was not simply one of correcting 'mere stupid social inequality'. That was relatively easy. But, 'all our schemes involve an increase in the number of clerks and mechanics and teachers with no essential change in their way of life'.[17] Before the Great Society could become the Good Society, much more was required. There was a need to stimulate desire for beauty and those other qualities which would make life worth living. Thus in 1931 he spoke of the need to 'create and quicken "wants", among the "wantless" inhabitants of the dreary streets and drearier workshops which . . . had spread over the marshlands of Lambeth'.[18] Here was the issue which so troubled Wallas, and about which the Webbs seemed totally unperceptive. The argument was taken up again as *The Great Society* was being published, when Wallas wrote elsewhere in a review of J. A. Hobson's *Work and Wealth; A Human Evaluation*:

> Never has civilized society needed so urgently as at present to ask itself the old Greek question: 'Where do I stand?' The nineteenth century has handed on to us a material environment in which we are hardly beginning to see our way, and a mass of specialized knowledge which leaves us bewildered among the ruins of our religions and philosophies. We dare not, however, let our tired minds rest till things have cleared themselves. Every day the newspapers warn us that unless we can think out some meaning and purpose for our corporate life disaster must follow.[19]

Hobson's book confirmed Wallas' own intuitive feeling that the Good Society involved much more than industrial efficiency and material abundance. Total preoccupation with production as a social goal, if it neglected concern over the ends of production, would be spiritually crippling. Wallas was prepared to accept that working people should work shorter hours, and perhaps even produce less, if by doing this they could enhance the sense of self-respect and dignity. As he wrote elsewhere:

> If only our whole population could come to think of themselves as being, like the free population of ancient Athens, human beings concerned in the production of a good life, and needing to produce and consume material wealth for that end, we might now break through the net of habit and suspicion which prevents us from either producing efficiently or consuming with zest.[20]

The dominant characteristics of this Great Society, the source of the modern dilemma, were the technological revolution and massive urbanisation. Already, by 1914, in those places where the transformation had first begun, the majority of people lived in large cities, which were in turn merely parts of still larger States. And with the change in the scale of human activity, there is a change in its character.

> Every member of the Great Society, whether he be stupid or clever, whether he have the wide curiosity of the born politician and trader, or the concentration on what he can see and touch of the born craftsman, is affected by this ever-extending and ever-tightening nexus.[21]

Here was the great break with the past. In the ancient world kings

and empires flourished and declined without impinging on the lives of the vast mass of ordinary human beings. For most, life was entirely circumscribed by the narrow boundaries of the immediate neighbourhood. The new world had destroyed parochialism. All men now shared the experience of society's fluctuations and changes. At first the industrial revolution, which apparently gave man full command over his physical environment, had seemed to offer an enormous betterment of human life. 'Fifty years ago the practical men who were bringing the Great Society into existence thought, when they had time to think at all, that they were thereby offering an enormously better existence to the whole human race.'[22]

In nineteenth-century Europe it had been an unquestioned article of faith that, while the Great Society might deprive men of some of the romance and intimacy of the old life, it would more than compensate for this by an increase in economic prosperity and security. But the promise had not been fulfilled. Material success had not produced happiness or social harmony. Those who exercised the greatest social power lacked not only social purpose, but any understanding of the meaning of social purpose.

> The Great Society has resulted in a degree of discomfort and uncertainty which was unexpected by those who helped to make it. Its successes have rather been in the removal of certain specific causes of Unhappiness than in the production of positive Happiness.[23]

Wallas was not alone in his scepticism about the human benefits of technological change. Indeed many of his thoughts were clearly derived from the pioneering sociologist, Emile Durkheim who, at the turn of the century, had begun to describe the disturbing effects of over-rapid social change. And Wallas' Fabian colleague, H. G. Wells, upset conventional wisdom by portraying Edwardian England as a society intellectually and morally disordered, and lacking any sense of meaningful direction. The problem was that the ordinary citizen, while recognising the power of the Great Society, did not easily identify with it. The world had failed to solve the 'difficult task of adjusting the vastness of the Great Society to the smallness of individual man'.[24] Later, in *The Art of Thought*, Wallas contrasted the 'natural' scale of life in ancient Greece with the overwhelming, incomprehensible scale of the modern city:

> The great industrial nations may perhaps in the next hundred years rebuild their cities, and scatter electrically-driven industries over the country-side. But, for good or evil, we shall never return to the 'natural' short-range environment of Plato's Athens.[25]

It was not only the size of the new city that created tensions, but also its anonymity, the separation of its bureaucracy and the provision of its essential services from the lives of the mass of the people. The result of all this was a form of society which provided no effective outlet for man's natural dispositions. And dispositions which found no natural outlet became, in Wallas' terminology, 'baulked dispositions', the cause of much of the nervous and mental instability of modern urban life.

Despite its material successes, the Great Society thus failed to provide that social cohesion without which it could not long survive. At times Wallas came close to concluding that the present scale of society transcended man's power of adaptation. However, his innate optimism prevailed, and he wrote *The Great Society* to suggest ways of restoring to society its necessary over-all cohesion, its vital sense of social purpose. The book had, as its organising theme, the belief that the cement linking modern man to the psychological impulses of his prehistoric past is the disposition to reason.[26] The rationale for *The Great Society* is a plea for a sustained organised effort to use the discoveries of social psychology to expand the role of reason in society. 'In a word, then, the purpose of the book is, avowedly, to find in the study of social psychology guidance for increasing the happiness of man.'[27] Wallas' own theories of social psychology which could turn the Great Society into the Good Society, were most fully developed in chapters II–X of *The Great Society*. There he defined the area of social psychology:

> The science of social psychology aims at discovering and arranging the knowledge which will enable us to forecast, and therefore to influence, the conduct of large numbers of human beings organised in societies. It is accordingly concerned mainly with the type, and treats individual variations from it rather as instances of a general tendency to vary than as isolated facts.[28]

Social psychology did not concern itself with all aspects of the human species. As a special division of psychology and anthropology, social psychology dealt 'only with the higher and more

conscious facts of human behaviour'.[29] By 1914 Wallas had begun to read extensively in the more technical areas of psychology, deliberately not confining himself to the field of *social* psychology, and by his own claim he had worked out his own social psychology from the application of 'pure psychology'. The psychology so developed was based on a belief in the existence of 'dispositions' or tendencies to behave in certain fixed ways. These dispositions were a refinement of the instincts he had described in *Human Nature in Politics*. The notion of a disposition, a 'tendency to behave', is far less rigid, or deterministic, than the notion of an instinct. Dispositions are consistent with a much higher level of conscious activity than seems implicit in the common usage of the term 'instinct'. Dispositions do not totally determine behaviour, but are simply inclinations which can be modified by other forces. The change was vital to Wallas' theories, for he included among the dispositions, a disposition to conscious behaviour.

Wallas proposed the concept of disposition as a necessary tool for the social psychologist attempting to link events with antecedent causes in a structured manner. He sought, therefore, to discover the character of those natural dispositions in man which contributed most to the formation and stimulation of his emotions, his will, and his intelligence, and which had the greatest impact on the habits and institutions of human society. Wallas himself recognised that there were some difficulties with the concept – difficulties which stemmed, in part at least, from his own rather limited knowledge of experimental psychology. He accepted that some dispositions were clearly physiologically based, in that it was demonstrably true that they could be affected by, for example, brain damage. But he was not prepared to go so far as to assert that *all* dispositions had a material basis. Having once made this concession, however, he did not go on to establish criteria for distinguishing physiological from non-physiological dispositions, nor did he explore at any length the implications of the distinction. He made the point and then dismissed it, for it was characteristic of Wallas to push aside critical definitional problems in so far as they did not seem to impinge on the practical issues immediately at hand. The same preoccupation with the practical that kept Wallas away from metaphysical abstractions also discouraged any deep interest in precise scientific definition.

There was the added problem that some 'psychological tendencies' were apparently acquired, and others apparently inherited.

That is to say, some behaviour could be traced to tendencies belonging to the nature of man, independent of his social setting. These he called inherited tendencies. Other tendencies seemed to be learned, to belong to man only in a specific social setting, and to change as the setting changed. These were acquired tendencies. Again, having asserted the distinction, and it is clearly an important one, Wallas brushed aside the problems of categorisation. He was content simply to conclude that there was a difference. Then, after arguing that acquired tendencies could not be inherited, he chose to restrict the term 'dispositions' to those tendencies, or characteristics, that are inherited, that therefore belong to mankind in general. Here he specifically repudiated the evolutionary-adaptation theories of Herbert Spencer, and gave up a good deal of his own earlier Social Darwinism.

> The biologists of our time have forced us to realise that such 'acquired characteristics' are not inherited. Each generation, except in so far as we create by selective breeding a somewhat better, or by the sterility of the finer individuals a somewhat worse, human type, will start, we are told, not where their fathers left off, but where their fathers began.[30]

This was a point of view that did not find universal favour. One reviewer commented: 'Much of Mr. Wallas's criticism is, to our thinking, vitiated by his pronounced anti-Lamarckian . . . views on heredity. . . . the non-transmission of acquired characteristics is dogmatically assumed by Mr. Wallas.'[31] The critic had a point. Wallas dismissed rather too readily the importance of acquired characteristics. It may well be biologically true that each generation starts no further ahead than the previous one but, despite his concern with education, Wallas paid too little attention to the impact of early socialisation. We may not *inherit* the knowledge of our fathers, but we acquire much of it long before we are aware of the process, or are called upon to use that knowledge.

In expanding the concept, Wallas further distinguished between 'elementary dispositions' (simple reflex actions, for example) and 'complex dispositions' composed of many elementary dispositions. But he then proceeded to make light of the distinction, suggesting that the practising social psychologist could seek explanations either through elementary or complex dispositions, whichever proved the most useful.[32] Generally he sought to explain actions in terms of

complex dispositions, but he failed to press the distinction. Here he aroused considerable opposition. William McDougall, for example, wrote him a long letter criticising the whole psychological basis of his argument:

> Another criticism I want to make is of what I would call a spurious pragmatism. This appears on p. 29 where you allow the equal validity of explanation by 'elementary dispositions' or by 'complex dispositions.' This comes out again on p. 148, 'It is largely a point of convenience where love is, etc. . . . ' I protest against this doctrine, that such questions are not merely matters of convenience; but that these fundamental dispositions must be taken seriously, we must try to reach agreement as to what exactly they are and can and cannot do, else we shall never get a psychology that will give us the practical guidance we need.[33]

McDougall further charged Wallas with too casually introducing too many dispositions, a criticism with which most readers of Wallas would have to concur. Wallas did not take the trouble to distinguish an exclusive and exhaustive scientific classification of dispositions from a casual cataloguing of examples. He also never succeeded in resolving the definitional problems of distinguishing elementary and complex dispositions. He failed even to provide any criteria for making such a distinction, and tended to dismiss critical methodological problems as irrelevant to the 'real' issues at stake. He understood what *he* meant by dispositions, and found that his understanding served well enough for the purposes he had in mind. He was not therefore inclined to probe the matter further.

> But the purpose of social psychology is to guide human action; and human action takes place in a world which pays little attention to the exact degrees of our knowledge and our ignorance. It is clear that we do possess the more complex dispositions, and that they do exercise an important influence on our social conduct; and important causes will, in every social problem, remain important, however inadequate our means of examining them may be, while unimportant causes will remain unimportant, however accurately we observe and measure them.[34]

The crux of his argument came as he applied the concept of

dispositions to the realm of social psychology, seeing in it a counter to the crude anti-intellectualism of the new generation of social psychologists. He did this by extending the idea of dispositions to cover 'instinctive' and 'intelligent' dispositions. The instinctive dispositions were principally those elementary physical dispositions such as blushing in certain circumstances. Intelligent dispositions were consciously guided and, as already pointed out, included the 'disposition to think'. This was his most obvious breach with extreme deterministic psychology. Man was guided, but not dominated, by his dispositions, and those dispositions included an inclination to independent rational action, a balancing of cause and effect, a capacity for reflection and inquiry. Further, the disposition to think gave man the power to improve his lot. Man's mind was not a slave to his passions, but his mind, coordinating those passions, could be the instrument for adapting man to his new environment. Man had the capacity to cope with the stresses of his new society, if he would but develop his mind. With conscious effort the rational element in political decisions might be strengthened. Society might expect that in favourable circumstances a greater number of people might use the power of individual rational judgement more often and more effectively. Human nature denied the possibility of a completely rational society, but it did not deny the possibility of an increase in existing levels of rationality. Here was the social and political application of the art of thought. Higher levels of rational response in human behaviour required not only 'clearer', 'more logical', 'more scientific' thinkers on specific issues, but also a more intensive consideration of the nature of thought itself and the conditions under which it would be most productive. The belief in an art of thought is predicated on the belief in an improvable rationality in behaviour.

To give added authority to his own interpretation of social psychology, Wallas looked critically at rival schools of thought. The major alternatives included the 'habit' psychology of Sir Henry Maine, the 'fear-pride' psychology of Hobbes, the 'pleasure-pain' dichotomy of Bentham, the 'crowd' psychology, based on imitation, sympathy, and suggestion, as put forward by Bagehot, Tarde, and Le Bon, and the social psychology of 'love' propounded by Comte. As might be expected, Wallas found all these psychologies too limiting, too reductionist, to be of any lasting value in reaching judgements about the direction of society. Habit, for example, was developed as a socio-psychological principle ge-

nerally by 'men who have spent a great part of their life in the exercise of autocratic discipline or the application of fixed rules',[35] and for illustration he cited Sir Henry Maine:

> Obedience is rendered by the great bulk of civilised societies without an effort and quite unconsciously. But that is only because, in the course of countless ages, the stern discharge of their chief duty by States has created habits and sentiments which save the necessity of penal interference because nearly everybody shares them.[36]

Apart from attacking Maine's Lamarckian assumptions that acquired habits could be inherited through 'countless ages', Wallas dismissed habit as a totally simplistic explanation of social behaviour. He did not deny the existence or importance of habit: 'The population of London would be starved in a week if the fly-wheel of Habit were removed.'[37] Later, in *Our Social Heritage*, he referred again to the critical importance of habit in social behaviour:

> Habit, like the arch in the Indian proverb, 'never sleeps'; and any break in social routine or disorganization of political institutions in a country ruled by habit without conscious consent may throw out of gear the whole system of subdivided co-operation on which modern civilization, and the existence of modern populations, depend.[38]

But habit was inadequate as a solitary guide in the rapidly changing circumstances of the Great Society. Habit required the constant stimulus of innovation, and a constant reappraisal of the ends or purposes to which habit was directed. Habit uncriticised in a changing environment could lead to the collapse of a society incapable of adapting to new circumstances. In the Great Society, too strong a reliance on habit could be fatal. What was needed, Wallas insisted, was new thought and new ways of thinking.

His criticism of the other reductionist schools of social psychology followed similar lines. There was much merit in what each had to say, but they were too exclusive, too narrow, in their application. Each took a valuable principle, a demonstrably relevant facet of human behaviour, and then insisted on presenting it as the one true, the sole, principle. And in doing so they destroyed their own credibility. Because Wallas' argument is, in each case, developed

along the same lines, there seems little point here in pursuing each case in detail. The total effect is a reaffirmation of Wallas' insistence on viewing the world from a multi-dimensional perspective, in which each effect is the end product of innumerable causes, not all of them recognisable, and operating with shifting force in changing circumstances.

The quest for a more satisfactory social psychology did not end in 1914. Even after completing *The Great Society* Wallas continued his criticisms of the existing state of psychological research. In 1915 he published a scathing review of Arthur Christensen's *Politics and Crowd Morality*. This is particularly important because it shows again how far Wallas' position was from the anti-intellectual behavioural bias too often attributed to *Human Nature in Politics*. After stressing that the most important intellectual need of the age was 'an adequate social psychology', Wallas repeated his earlier condemnation of the social psychology favoured by Christensen. This was founded on the system developed by Gabriel Tarde and Gustave Le Bon, in an extreme reaction to nineteenth-century intellectualism. Le Bon's work in particular was hostile to the basis of democracy. For Le Bon the principle of democracy, of rule by the many, was an offence against rationality, a reversion to primitivism.

Like Wallas, the Tardists had recoiled from the excessive formalism of Utilitarian psychology. But their reaction took a more negative form. Having once 'discovered the irrational' they sought to account for it by a three-step procedure. First, they turned to the study of behaviour of crowds, rather than of individuals. They then accounted for the assumed irrational behaviour of crowds as a process of imitation of a few 'originating individuals' by the passive majority. As a final step, this imitation was in turn explained by a very loosely developed concept of 'suggestion'. Suggestion could be either an external phenomenon, a foreign stimulus, or it could be internal, later called 'auto-suggestion'. Whatever form it took, suggestion influenced the individual, 'with no contributory effort of will on his part'. The reference of the term 'suggestion' was gradually extended to embrace 'any intellectual or emotional process except the pure reasoning of an imaginary omniscient and passionless individual'.[39]

Wallas had never been in sympathy with the Tardists. 'I myself find it difficult to understand how Tarde's book, even with the advantage of its air of scientific modernity, ever acquired so great an influence.'[40] He was offended both by the vagueness of the terms

'suggestion' and 'crowd' and by the monist reduction of all social behaviour to the effect of suggestion. In *The Great Society* he had objected to McDougall's use of 'suggestion' in his *Social Psychology* (1908)[41] and in general to the whole rather ambiguous status of the term.

> It would, therefore, I am convinced, tend to clearness in psychological statement if the use of the substantive 'Suggestion' were abandoned, and if the adjectives 'unconscious,' 'subconscious,' or 'incompletely conscious' took its place.[42]

Now he returned to this attack in the review of Christensen's work. To Wallas, society, as an organisation rather than an organism, had no independent existence. He therefore rejected the notion of a separate crowd psychology. The crowd was simply the sum of its parts. From the same basis he discounted doctrines of social will, conceiving society as no more than a set of relationships among individuals. Wallas, still a liberal individualist despite his Fabian affiliations, saw social action as simply the product of individual actions. Because he found the 'crowd psychology' approach so inadequate he was deeply disturbed by the extent of its influence and the harm it was therefore doing to the further development of a satisfactory social psychology.

He could see that social psychologies which diminished the role of the individual, and absorbed him in the 'mass' or the 'class' or the 'nation', led to the destruction of democracy. They could become a fertile ground for new, supposedly scientific, authoritarians.

> I believe, therefore, that it is a real misfortune for the world that a social-psychological scheme so inadequate as that invented by M. Gabriel Tarde and popularised by M. Le Bon should have acquired its present wide influence in the universities of America and Europe. That scheme was in its origin a reaction against the 'intellectualism' of the early nineteenth century. . . . History and their own observation showed the Tardists that mankind were ignorant and passionate; that their mental processes were often very different from those described in the logic-books: that they were never fully conscious of the causes of their own actions and opinions. . . .[43]

This was very much the conclusion that Wallas had himself reached in 1908. But Wallas had taken the further step of assuming that this condition of man was not irremediable. Having accepted the considerable evidence of irrational human behaviour, he did not conclude that therefore *all* the activity of *all* men at *all* times was irrational. He did not despair of human rationality. The message of *The Great Society* is that we should first recognise man for what he is, with all his warts and blemishes, then realistically determine the limits of what he might be, and finally seek ways of bridging the gap between the 'is' and the 'might be'.

> . . . one is inclined to say to Mr. Christensen, 'Let us recognise that all human beings are ignorant and excitable, that their consciousness is often "narrowed", and that they may sometimes excite themselves or each other into a condition of "Wach-hypnose." Nevertheless, men have to live and act in societies, and it is the business of social psychology to ascertain the conditions under which they are likely to live and act more wisely or less wisely.'[44]

The concern over the nature of the science of psychology remained at the centre of Wallas' thinking for many years. His interests gradually extended to include both the science of psychology itself, and the methods of teaching psychology at the university level. In 1921 he noted: 'At this moment the main danger to the psychological analysis of society is "inbreeding" – the exclusive study by social psychologists of each other's books.'[45] Such a study, said Wallas, had a 'delusive likeness' to the methodology of the physical sciences. But while chemists, physicists, and biologists seemed to base all their progress on an exhaustive study and comparison of the books and treatises of their predecessors, that process was not the essence of their method.

> Every important chemical or physical book is based on continuous laboratory work, in which the conclusions of each researcher are compared not only with the conclusions of other researchers, but with a fresh vision of the concrete facts.[46]

By contrast, the facts studied by the social psychologists were those of the feelings, the thoughts, and the behaviour of man in society. And such was the elementary stage of the science of psychology that

the social scientist needed to keep himself in as close touch with those facts as possible.

> Even for the analysis and synthesis of his material he should not trust exclusively or mainly to those writers who call themselves social psychologists. The work of realising the social significance of our new knowledge of the conscious and subconscious elements in human behaviour, and of adding to that knowledge, is now being carried on by hundreds of acute thinkers and observers, very few of whom will ever appear in a bibliography of social psychologists. The most important social psychological discovery or analysis in 1922 may appear in some work in the physiology of the ductless glands, or a treatise on criminal jurisprudence, or play, or a novel, or a piece of literary criticism.[47]

These thoughts gradually widened to a questioning of the very basis of a science of society, a questioning that led to increasing scepticism. In a lecture in 1930 he recalled that as a young man at Oxford he had read John Stuart Mill's *Logic*, and had accepted the validity of Mill's proposition that 'The backward state of the Moral Sciences can only be remedied by applying to them the methods of the Physical Science, duly extended and generalized'. But since Mill wrote in 1840, or since Wallas read Mill forty years later, much had happened.

> We all know that Mill's hopes of a society reconstructed by the method of Newtonian physics have been disappointed. Social events have obstinately refused to follow the path predicted by the laws of nineteenth century political economy: and few economists outside Moscow now speak with any certainty of any economic laws.[48]

With the work of Planck and Einstein, Newton's billiard-ball atom disappeared, and with it much of the certainty of physics. Scientists were becoming much more cautious about the use of the term 'scientific law'. Wallas quoted Sir Arthur Eddington as representative of the new thinking about science, an approach which Wallas had come to share.

> It now seems clear that we have not yet got hold of *any* primary law – that all those laws at one time supposed to be primary are in

> reality statistical. . . . In the reconstructed world nothing is impossible, though many things are improbable.[49]

Increasingly, therefore, statistical and quantitative methods offered the best prospects of a fruitful 'science' of politics, a view which Wallas had held earlier in his life, and which in later years acquired some authoritative confirmation from the physical sciences themselves. Deterministic psychologies, drawn from supposed physical science models, were discredited by the same scientific analogies. Such conclusions ought to have been a comfort to Wallas, who had always been suspicious of universal laws.

Yet when in his old age he returned to the themes which had guided his life, he was forced to acknowledge the failure of the world to find a new moral basis to replace that lost in his childhood. The world had not found a way to resolve the dilemmas of mass industrialism, and Wallas' writings became increasingly pessimistic in tone. One of the very last things he wrote expressed a mood almost of despair. He produced *The Great Society*, and then *Our Social Heritage*, in an attempt to awaken society to its mistakes, and to persuade mankind to embark on a serious search for ways to redirect the resources of the industrial world, to discover, and achieve, the Good Society. But the effort had apparently failed. The Great Society had not become the Good Society.

> Almost every directing idea which I learnt at my mother's knee, or in my father's church, or at school, has lost all authority, not only for myself but for the great majority of educated British people. The moral authority of the church has gone, and only a negligible percentage of the British Protestant population obey its directions for attending the Sunday services.
>
> The 'Victorian' standards of beauty and propriety in architecture, painting, literature, as well as dress and manners, have disappeared as completely as had the standards of the Court of Louis XVI in the Paris of the Directory. And while the patterns of our immediate past have been so largely destroyed, no new sound patterns, either clearly conceived, or generally accepted, have taken their place.[50]

Part II of *The Great Society* examined ' . . . existing forms of organisation in the Great Society with the purpose of discovering how far they can be improved by closer adaptation to the facts of

human psychology'.[51] It is here that Wallas is at his most pessimistic about the future of the Great Society and most persistent on the need to develop new modes of thought, new methods of organisation to save modern society. These issues become the central theme of the next chapter.

6 The Reconstruction of Society

In Part I of *The Great Society* Wallas had been exploring the relationships between the inherited psychological make-up of individual human beings, and the demands of the new urban-industrial society. In Part II he turned to an examination of the existing forms of social organisation in the Great Society to see if, and in what way, they could be adapted to the facts of human psychology. The tensions which accompanied the post-war technological advances gave added impetus to such an examination. Traditional social forms were apparently ill-suited to cope with the obvious stresses and strains of modern living.

For his conception of society Wallas clearly owes a great deal to Adam Smith. It was Smith who had first recognised how modern society had introduced different levels of social interdependence: 'In civilised society man stands at all times in need of the co-operation and assistance of great multitudes,'[1] but he could personally know only a very few people. Wallas followed this to show how life in the modern city depended upon the efficient organisation of water and food supplies, of transport, of sanitation, and of other services. Yet those who supplied these necessities seldom had any personal contact with the mass of those who depended upon them. It was this interdependence which ultimately unified the disparate individuals into a society. Some mechanism, in Smith's case that of the market, was necessary to bring about this cooperation and assistance in diverse interests.

From the same assumptions of interdependence Wallas argued that urban-industrial life meant more than increased numbers and space. It meant, in addition, a whole new set of human relationships, with new functions, unnecessary in a smaller community, becoming essential to the life of the Great Society. Older social arrangements were not always adequate to the new circumstances. 'The fact, therefore, that any particular institution works

well in Andorra, or worked well in medieval Florence, creates no presumption that it will work well in London.'[2] It followed that it was not enough merely to seek modifications of old forms. The new society demanded the invention of new organisations on a totally different plan. Implicit here is the assumption that society could in fact be consciously organised along a pre-conceived model. Rejecting any Marxist concept of social-political forms being dependent on economic structures, Wallas assumed that the organisation of society was amenable to conscious human effort. Within limits men could have any form of society they desired. And with technological change proceeding so rapidly and apparently so blindly, the task of designing an appropriate social order was one of desperate urgency.

The solution, however, would not easily be found in any existing political doctrine. Although Wallas had often called himself both a socialist and a collectivist, often implying that these were synonymous, he did not subscribe to any socialist-organic view of society. The point will be more fully developed later, but it should be apparent, from what has already been written in Chapter 2, that Wallas' socialism would be better described as a moral protest against the darker side of capitalism, and that his collectivism was simply his view on the most efficient organisation of individuals in a mass society. His was a very qualified socialism.

It was in *The Great Society*, when seeking to find the most appropriate term to describe the general idea of structured associations between human beings, that he first clearly and specifically rejected the concept of the organic society. He had begun by discarding such 'inanimate' references as 'mechanism' or 'system' because these carried the implication that human beings did not consciously influence each other at all. Equally he found fault with 'animate' references such as 'organism' or 'body' which implied that the association had a conscious life of its own, independent of the lives of the individuals that constituted it. In one sentence he demonstrated how far his own thinking was from the idealism of Rousseau, Hegel, or even T. H. Green, and from the class-consciousness of Marx. 'I myself believe that there is in fact no evidence whatever that a self-conscious society in that sense does exist.'[3]

He had developed the point further in a review, also published in 1914. There he had argued that either the relationship of the individual human being to a self-conscious society was analagous to

that of the living cell to the self-conscious individual, or it was not. But, he further argued, as there was no evidence to settle the matter as a point of fact, the choice between the two options could be treated as a matter of intellectual or emotional preference.

> I myself am convinced that the general acceptance of the doctrine of the Social Will not only would be likely to encourage what I hold to be the bad habit of believing things without evidence, but would also be likely to lead to that sort of easy-going optimism which one detects in some of the followers of Hegel. If a super-brain is thinking for us the necessity of undertaking the intolerable toil of thought for ourselves seems less urgent.[4]

In order to avoid the implications of both mechanism and organism, Wallas adopted the term 'organisation' which seemed to suggest an arrangement of constituent parts that were alive, without suggesting further that the arrangement had an independent 'superlife' of its own. An organisation could be an artificial, and therefore controlled, structuring of organisms. It will be recalled from Chapter 3 that in his last complete book, *The Art of Thought*, Wallas had a good deal to say about the human organism, the constituent element of the artificial political organisation. His conception of the human organism was that of

> . . . a combination of living elements, all of which tend to co-operate in securing the good of the organism (or of the species . . .), but each of which retains some measure of initiative – so that the co-operation is never mechanically perfect.[5]

Society, then, was an organisation of organisms. The approach to an understanding of the role and function of this social organisation was through what Wallas termed the psychological 'planes of consciousness': Cognition, Feeling (or Affection), and Conation (or Willing). These three components did not exist apart from each other and, at the individual level, every mental process contained elements of all three. Nevertheless, following McDougall, Wallas acknowledged that in any given situation one element would likely be dominant and 'we may legitimately call a mental process by the name of its dominant aspect'.[6]

The same system of classification could be applied to organ-

isations. Although an individual, conscious, member of an organisation is 'always simultaneously knowing and feeling and willing', the organisation itself could be predominantly concerned with one aspect only and could be classified by reference to that one. A Royal Commission, for example, was predominantly an organisation concerned with knowing, and could be fairly labelled as such. Yet the conclusions of the individual commissioners would be affected, not only by their knowledge, but also by their feelings and their desires, so that a Royal Commission could become also in part a will-organisation: 'a machine by which persons of different desires are enabled to form compromises and act by the votes of the majority'.[7] In a similar way a trade union was basically a will-organisation which would also of necessity be from time to time a thought-organisation.

From the very beginning there were grave difficulties with this classification. Feeling, in particular, could not be put into the same 'plane of consciousness' as knowing and willing, particularly when 'feeling' is freely translated into 'happiness', as Wallas in fact translated it. He took for granted that the ultimate type of feeling at which society should aim is the feeling of happiness. In Wallas' terms it is possible to discuss the efficient organisation of thought and will. But happiness is different. Happiness is not separately organised. Rather it is the criterion for the measurement of success in organising thought and will. It becomes clear that the organisation of happiness involves a very different order of consideration from that involved in the organisation of the other 'planes of consciousness', although Wallas did not admit this.

Before continuing with this line we should look in greater detail at the organisation of thought and will. Wallas had a continuing interest in the nature of thought which began with his earlier studies of Bentham, was continued through his work in education, and culminated in *The Art of Thought*. As always in political-social matters, the process of rational thought tended to come into conflict with man's primitive passions, to the detriment of rational thought. The first step to counter-balance this tendency, or at least to mitigate its impact, was to understand the nature of organised social thought.

In Part II of *The Great Society* Wallas' primary concern was less with thought as an individual experience, and more with the development of more efficient social arrangements for organised thought, in short, how to make and political-social organisation a

more effective instrument for the achievement of long-term social purpose. Such an objective in turn demanded that the organisation be able to maximise the allocation of its human and material resources.

Wallas began his examination of organised thought by clarifying the distinction between that and individual thought. Before the invention of writing those who thought seriously at all did so, either in privacy of the basis of their own imagination, memory, and experience, or in small groups on the basis of personal, face-to-face conversation. This was individual thought.

> As soon, however, as writing was invented, it was possible for intercommunication of Thought to take place without bodily presence. A thinker could then write in solitude arguments addressed to unknown readers, or read in solitude the arguments of others. In such a case Thought is 'Individual' if the moment at which it takes place is alone considered, and 'Organised' if the whole process from the original writing to the final reading is considered together.[8]

In the Great Society this last form of organised thought had become typical. Although there were still many opportunities for individual thought, most of that intellectualised activity which depended upon organised communication with others now took the form of silent reading rather than by hearing or uttering spoken words. It was, as Wallas called it, 'impersonal' thought-organisation. Wallas knew that even personal communication, if it was to be successful, required some measure of organisation. It was necessary that the participants should be familiar with all the delicate shades of meaning of the language they were using, and all would need to be accustomed to make use of similar rules of thought and argument. It would also be necessary for all participants to have a large common body of knowledge about the subject matter and about each other. Most important of all, the participants would have to have a common desire to pursue the truth through their discussion.

Modern impersonalised thought needed an even higher degree of formal organisation to deal with its complexities. The quantitative demands of modern knowledge, combined with the restrictions of time, led to a decline in the dialectic as the most useful method of inter-personal thought organisation. Private reading was so much

quicker than conversation. Therefore modern impersonal thought-organisations would have to take into account the needs and demands of those who communicated with each other only by the written word, or at infrequent meetings where they might discuss the reports or information written by others who were not present.

Wallas, as an ardent committee man, had great faith in the possibility of improving thought-organisation and, consequently, of resolving the dilemmas of the Great Society, through more efficient committees. Committees were ostensibly thought-organisations, designed to bring people together in order to achieve some coherent purpose, but often they were absurdly ill-adapted to enable their members to think in concert. In many instances the committee members themselves did not fully understand their role.

> I have myself, during the last twenty-five years, sat through perhaps three thousand meetings of municipal committees of different sizes and for different purposes, and I am sure that at least half of the men and women with whom I have sat, were entirely unaware that any conscious mental effort on their part was called for. They attended in almost exactly the same mental attitude in which some of them went to church – with a vague sense, that is to say, that they were doing their duty and that good must come of it. If they became interested in the business it was an accident. Of the remaining half, perhaps two-thirds had come with one or two points which they wanted to 'get through,' and meanwhile let the rest of the business drift past them, unless some phrase in the discussion roused them to a more or less irrelevant interruption.[9]

In these conditions many committees became no more than the machinery by which a few were enabled to ensure that their will prevailed. All this would seem to negate Wallas' own high opinion of the role of committees, but in practice much of the actual creative thought in such bodies would be done in solitude either by their members or by their paid officials. In these circumstances the formal committee became more than ever an organisation for acting rather than thinking. This was no bad thing. In the complexity of modern affairs efficient thought required the time for uninterrupted perusal of reports and minutes. A committee meeting where all wanted to talk and few wanted to listen was not by itself a conducive environment for the most thorough appraisal of often highly

technical matters. But the combination of careful preparation by paid qualified officials, as organised thought, with committees and councils, as organised will, had the potential of extremely efficient action for the common good. Committees where the members 'did their homework' and recognised what was expected of them, were a sound form of organisation. Most actual committees were not all that efficient, but with proper understanding of role and function, and with proper preparation, committees could become valuable agencies of organised thought.

From these general considerations Wallas turned specifically to the institutions of British government. Because of his bias towards 'thought on the great scale', he had little respect for Parliament. Parliament did not measure up to his demand that democracy be also efficient. Parliament, intended as a thought-organisation, was ill-adapted for that purpose. It was not equipped, either in its personnel or in its procedures, to search after the truth. The enormous growth in the legislative and administrative activity demanded of modern government exceeded the capacity of Parliament. This was understandable, for institutions and procedures developed in the age of laissez-faire could not be expected to cope with the pressures of the positive State. Under the influence of disciplined political parties, Parliament had become simply a will-organisation, and even there its role was better performed by Cabinet. Wallas had great affection for Cabinet and the Civil Service. After the general election of 1906, which carried the Liberals to power, he wrote:

> In the next Parliament a strong and authoritative Cabinet will be essential. It will have to lead Parliament, control the Civil Service, and deal with the tremendous issues of foreign and Imperial politics, as well as to maintain the loyalty and efficiency of the Liberal Party.[10]

The facts of life made it inevitable that Cabinet assume a dominant role in British politics. The very nature of Cabinet and its responsibilities demanded that it gives a good deal of its time to organised thought. And within Cabinet the party discipline which frustrated thought in the House of Commons gave a powerful impetus to constructive action. Normally all members of Cabinet were members of the same party and had a strong motive to work together to keep that party in power.

There were, of course, difficulties, mostly the consequence of the special circumstances of the Great Society. Most importantly there had been an enormous increase in the work of the State. Such was the volume, detail, and technical complexity of the work brought before the modern government that there was never enough time to give appropriate attention to all of it. Even as early as 1889 Lord Rosebery had described Cabinet meetings as 'the collection of the heads of departments at sparse intervals to discuss hurriedly topics for which they are often unprepared'.[11] As modern commentators such as R. H. S. Crossman have reminded us, this problem has become even more acute today, and perhaps if Wallas were to attend a modern Cabinet meeting he might revise his opinions of its efficiency as a thought-organisation. Cabinet itself would be helpless without a patronage-free, impartially recruited, professional Civil Service. The Civil Service, including the local government administration, seemed the one instrument most readily adaptable to the demands of the new society. Thus in 1914 Wallas wrote: 'The success of social reform in a modern state is dependent on the existence of an efficient Civil Service.'[12] And the message was repeated twelve years later: ' . . . and it is on the increased efficiency of local administration that the [Labour] party rests most of its hopes for social progress and social equality.'[13]

It was, of course, implied in Wallas' Fabianism that he should favour a more efficient administrative machinery over revolution as an instrument of social change. It was surely only a Fabian who could define the 'master-art of government', as the 'use of intellectual initiative for the creation of such administrative machinery as shall produce in its turn further intellectual initiative'.[14] The belief that the instrument of social reform should be the professional career Civil Service, instead of the people's elected representatives, reflects Wallas's rather ambiguous attitude towards democracy.

Despite his professed, and genuine, desire to improve the lot of the ordinary English 'man in the street', he shared with his former Fabian colleagues an elitist disparagement of the ordinary man's competence to help himself. He believed in the goals of a democratic society, defined as greater social equality, but distrusted existing democratic machinery. The most concise statement of Wallas' views on democracy is contained in his own prospectus for a lecture on 'The Limits of Democracy' which he delivered in 1921. In the

outline of what he would be saying he wrote:

> Much of the political basis of the collectivist propaganda of the eighteen-eighties has been modified by experience and analysis. We no longer assume that a system of territorial voting for local and central councils by universal suffrage will, naturally and easily, lead to the co-operative achievement of the best possibilities of human life. We all recognise the need of the other factors set out in this course of lectures; and many of us doubt whether representative territorial democracy should play a dominating, or even a large, part in future human co-operation. In examining this doubt I shall assume (a) that it is not desirable that any large and sudden diminution of the numbers of mankind by disease and starvation should take place, (b) that it is, therefore, desirable that human beings should continue to co-operate for certain economic, social, and intellectual purposes, in units not smaller than a modern industrial state, (c) that beings whose powers and impulses correspond to the needs of the stone ages cannot, by the use of any social expedients whatever, co-operate on such a scale without effort or with complete success; (d) that it is desirable (partly because of men's recently increased powers of killing and maiming each other and destroying the material means of supporting life) to secure co-operation with a minimum of violence.
>
> Given these assumptions, I shall argue that certain vitally important social functions should in modern communities still be assigned to political democracy: by which term I shall here mean (i) the expedient of territorial representation, and (ii) the acceptance of the convention of the dependence of social compulsion on the consent of a numerical majority of the community concerned. Success, however, in the use of democracy will require many improvements in the areas and structure of the representative system, and in its relation to other factors in the problem, and, in particular, to the press. Improvement requires invention, and invention depends on that kind of continuous open-mindedness against which Calif Omar, some Communists, the conductors of the Plebs classes, and, I believe, certain members of the Society of Jesus, have protested. Success in the working of democracy will also require a general recognition of the difficulty and artificiality of the task, and a willingness among the citizens so far to respect each other's

> personality as to prefer persuasion to compulsion, and to encourage intellectual initiative and responsibility even in Members of Parliament chosen by party committees.[15]

From this position of qualified scepticism about the nature of democracy we can see that there remained always a good deal of John Stuart Mill in Wallas' thinking. This had been the warning in *Human Nature in Politics:* the institutional arrangements of representative democracy were insufficiently adaptable to the human material they had to deal with. Democracy as practised in the early years of the twentieth century could all too easily be exposed as a fraud perpetuated by a few wealthy owners of newspapers upon the uneducated many. Although in *The Great Society* his focus was on the possibilities of reform, the warning was still there:

> In particular the methods by which the less eager working-class voter is induced to go to the poll are felt to an increasing extent to offend against a vague but deep-seated sense of the terms on which alone men can live permanently together.[16]

The circumstances of modern living, as Wallas had first pointed out in *Human Nature in Politics*, made inevitable the attempt to control public opinion through the 'manipulation of popular impulse', or propaganda. In *The Great Society*, and later in *Our Social Heritage*, Wallas expanded on this theme, and demonstrated how propaganda had emerged from a peculiar combination of economic, social, and intellectual forces existing in the early and middle years of the nineteenth century. Other factors contributing to the rise of propaganda were advances in communications technology which rapidly overcame the barriers of time and space; the rapid growth in population, and its concentration in sprawling, socially-stratified cities (a factor that led men to be more aware of themselves as a 'mass' than as individuals); the practical experiments in mass psychology in the fields of commercial advertising; and the gradual reduction of bribery and intimidation as means of political persuasion.[17] Most importantly, the assumptions of nineteenth-century thinking had led to a gross misconception of the part that could be played by the individual elector in the political process, and of the steps by which the elector arrived at his political decisions; circumstances which left the way wide open for the cynical exploitation of non-rational behaviour, for 'the manipu-

lation of the electorate by the great interests for their own ends'.[18]

The propagandist depended for his success on the extent of irrational motivation in political behaviour, the effect of which, in turn, was heightened by a general lack of interest in politics and a disinclination to acquire the necessary knowledge. And it was central to Wallas' argument that the modern industrial State made sustained reasoning on political questions impossible for the majority of men, including some of those mentally capable of highly intelligent action. In normal circumstances genuinely creative thought can be achieved only with material comfort, a proper psychological approach to the value of reflective thought, and the development of the necessary faculties. Industrial society, with its poverty, noise, and dirt, and its materialistic philosophy, denied these facilities to all but a very small percentage of its citizens. 'The proportion of working men who can now talk freely at their work, in convenient groups, meeting day after day, must be almost negligible.'[19] Employers could not be expected to allow their workers to spend any length of time discussing social or political questions in factory or office; and the long hours, heavy work, and the unhealthy overcrowded dwellings of the working classes did little to encourage informal political discussions in the home. Those whose incomes permitted them to live in the less physically intolerable surroundings of the suburbs found that their lives there were spent for the most part among strangers, since social conventions inhibited easy intercourse among neighbours. When time and opportunity were found for discussion, the materialistic outlook of so many of the prosperous did much to ensure that broad social issues would not be introduced in the conversation, which was further limited by rigid conventions.

As the city worker, both in the office and in the factory, consequently became more and more dependent for his opinions on the ready-made judgements of the political 'experts', there resulted a vast increase in the amount of uncritical reading – a trend accentuated by the rise of cheap, mass circulation newspapers. The very nature of society provided the propagandist with an audience ready and willing to receive the message he was now, for the first time, technically equipped to deliver. If this tendency was to be countered, Wallas argued, there would have to be conscious planning in order to provide the material conditions of productive thought, that is, such things as shorter hours of work, better housing,

public reading rooms, libraries, and so on. Even at the official level this was important, and Wallas looked at the American Congress which, in its material conditions at least, offered so much more than the House of Commons. The provision of adequate office space and secretarial and research services, all offered to the Congressman who would use them much better opportunities for effective thought than the cramped quarters of the House of Commons.

The Art of Thought had explored thought as an individual experience, to be understood through a knowledge of individual psychology. In *The Great Society* the focus was on organised thought, and especially constructive thinking by governments and bureaucracies. Organised thought was to be approached through social psychology and public administration. Nothing would be gained, wrote Wallas, by denying the obstacles to organised thought imposed by the conditions of the Great Society. All one could do was to learn to adapt them to the demands of modern civilised life. As knowledge of the facts of ordinary human living was the foundation-stone of successful politics, political schemes which ignored man's limitations were foredoomed to failure.[20] Man now had to learn to live with new circumstances and find new ways to ensure that they could be made to produce morally worthwhile ends.

But before men could turn to the efficient organisation of thought to produce desirable ends, they had to will both the ends and the search for effective means of achieving them. They had to will change. Thus from the organisation of thought, Wallas turned to the organisation of will. And just as earlier he had exposed the tendency of society to exaggerate the influence of rationalism in human behaviour, here he began by warning against the dangers of exaggerating the scope of conscious willing:

> The events indeed which we ascribe to the corporate decisions of communities are usually the resultants of a number of interacting causes – the Wills of those persons whom the machinery of the community has brought into organised relation wih each other, the unorganised Wills of individuals, and the circumstances of the case, which no one may have realised and whose effects no one may have expected.[21]

If, therefore, organised will was to prevail more frequently, and more effectively, over both chance and the unorganised will of individuals, more attention would have to be paid to the machinery

of the organised will. The world as Wallas saw it was ruled neither by the arbitrary whims of God or fate, nor by the blind forces of history. There was no place in his thinking for any kind of historicism, dialectic or otherwise. This is a vital component of Wallas' thinking. It demonstrates the enormous extent to which liberal individualism still influenced him. Wallas' was a homocentric world, existing for man's use. Man had made the world as it is, and had it in his power to make it as it might be. The world could either drift, because men had neither the knowledge nor the will to control it. Or it could be consciously directed towards preconceived ends. There were no other historical or economic laws which determined, in any absolute sense, its course. But the world could only have a collective plan, or indeed do anything consciously, in so far as the machinery existed '. . . enabling certain definite persons, whether many or few, to consciously formulate their desires on some point with the expectation that "the world" will carry those desires into effect'.[22] But at present we lacked not only any coherent collective plan, we lacked also the machinery which would make a collective plan possible. Thus even before one could begin to solve the frightening social problems of the Great Society, one would have to tackle the problem of devising effective will-organisations equipped to deal with the larger social issues.

The 'social issue' as articulated by Wallas became a question of which form of organised will would direct the resources of the State. Disregarding both the arbitrary whim of despots, and the all-encompassing authority of the modern totalitarian State, he recognised three major will-organisations possible within a generally democratic framework; Private Property, meaning some form of liberal individualism; the State, meaning some form of democratic socialism, based on territorial representation; and Non-Local Associations, meaning some form of Syndicalism.

When the Great Society was born, private property was the dominant mode. The economists of a hundred years ago took for granted that unrestricted private property was the most effective form of industrial organisation and 'family accumulation the main impulse by which it should be directed'.[23] But by 1914, as Wallas recognised, things had changed.

> Pure Individualism now represents, however, a rapidly shrinking body of opinion. The substitution of concentration for competition has destroyed in the largest and most characteristic

> modern industrial units the old presumption (never very sound) of identity of interest between producer and consumer.[24]

Wallas had already, in many of his other writings, expressed his views on the defects and failings of individualistic capitalism, and he did not devote much space to them here. Private property was simply dismissed as an inadequate foundation for organised will. It had had its chance and had failed. The crisis of the Great Society was of itself proof of that failure. Instead he turned to the collectivist alternative. Collectivism, or some form of public ownership or control of the economy, was the logical consequence of the demands which would be created by universal suffrage. For Wallas, then, collectivism, Socialism, and mass democracy became almost interchangeable terms.

> Collectivism substituted a direct aiming at the public good for a very hypothetical calculation that the public good might indirectly result from individual and family accumulation. It encouraged and depended on conscious public spirit, instead of a blind property-instinct distorted by the disappearance of its original environment. Above all it seemed that a democratic government would necessarily use the enormous wealth-producing power of the Great Industry so as to lessen instead of increasing economic inequality.[25]

We see here further intimation of the limited nature of Wallas' socialism. It contained no plan for the re-alignment of the class structure of society, and certainly held up no vision of a classless utopia. Starting from the proposition that the nature of capitalism had made it easier for some individuals, as individuals, to oppress other individuals, Wallas' collectivism was simply an organisational solution for the amelioration of those individual injustices and inequities. It was a machinery to ensure the maximum social good for the greatest number of individuals in an urban-industrial society. It was reformism, rather than socialism. Given this limited aim of collectivism, this perception of it as a means to a fuller individual life, rather than as an end in itself, Wallas was more prepared than more doctrinaire socialists to admit weaknesses and dangers in the collectivist society. These weaknesses were not such as to offset the advantages collectivism had over pure private property as a form of social organisation, but they existed none the

less, and men had need to be aware of them. Typically Wallas, instead of contrasting the 'good' socialism with the 'bad' capitalism, was content to assert that socialism, which was not all good, was better than capitalism, which was not all bad.

Thus it is clear from *The Great Society* that by 1914 Wallas had modified much of his earlier Fabian optimism about the social harmony that would automatically follow the collective ownership of the economy and the democratisation of its political institutions. The problems were far more complex than enthusiasts such as Mrs Besant had imagined.[26] He recognised that mere institutional change, without careful preparation of the human material of those institutions, would be futile. Increasing democratisation, which was the precondition for the triumph of collectivism over private property, and which was inevitably followed by the increasing power of the State, also extended the opportunities for the unscrupulous few to manipulate the gullible many.

> But the graver dangers of representative government arise from the fact that the manipulation of other men's wills for ends believed to be good for them may shade imperceptibly into practices whose end is the advantage of the manipulator. This danger is always near in a country where democracy co-exists with great social inequality.[27]

Propaganda thus seemed to be one of the endemic diseases of democracy. As long as there were great economic disparities, those with the greatest amount of wealth would use that wealth to gain access to the instruments of political and social control. The purpose would primarily be to perpetuate the unequal distribution of wealth. The collectivist society, which was the logical outcome of universal suffrage, would therefore disintegrate into fraud unless new forms of social organisation were introduced. The continued health of collectivism depended upon the efficiency of the machinery by which the collective will was ascertained and enforced. There were two approaches to attacking the problems of propaganda. The first was through a greater measure of social equality, which would reduce the power or need of the wealthy few to dominate the communication media. The second route was through improved arts of thought which would increase the power of the individual to resist the blandishments of the propagandists.

The third form of will-organisation was Syndicalism, which

Wallas had already dismissed as a form of will-organisation that embodied an even greater potential for oppression than private property.[28] In *The Great Society* he simply restated his opposition, without offering any new arguments, although in *Our Social Heritage* he took up the attack again with renewed vigour. Wallas had toyed briefly with Syndicalism and Guild socialism just after he resigned from the Fabian Society. But the more he explored the implications of vocational organisations, as the basis of the organisation of the whole society, the more rapidly his enthusiasm changed into outright hostility. Not being inclined to extreme positions, he was quite happy to accept that there were some not inconsiderable social values in certain forms of vocational organisation. A common occupation created a feeling of solidarity, and a willingness to cooperate not easy to achieve elsewhere in the modern mass State. But the price was too high. Vocational organisations all too often became the bastion of entrenched interests, restrictive practices, conservatism, and exclusiveness.

> This difficulty becomes more acute when the vocational bodies as a whole make it their policy to support each other's claims; and with this purpose attempt to weaken or abolish the ultimate controlling power of the parliamentary state.[29]

Looked at through a 'haze of romanticism', as Wallas believed that G. D. H. Cole looked at it, Guild socialism seemed a political-industrial democratic utopia.[30] But the harsh reality, learnt from the history of actual guilds, was very different. The guilds had never distinguished their own good from the general good. In *Our Social Heritage* Wallas built up his case against Syndicalism and Guild socialism by a detailed account of those vocational organisations which already possessed both considerable autonomy and considerable political power. He looked first at the professional organisations, and in particular at the law, always a target of his social criticism. 'As things are, the legal profession in England exemplifies in the most extreme form all those defects of vocational organisation which are most injurious to the community.'[31] The lawyers were guilty of every charge of obstruction and reaction. He quoted with relish Arnold Bennett's conclusion that the lawyers were 'among the most vicious opponents of social progress in Britain today'.[32] They carried the policy of 'make-work', beyond the dreams of the worst unions of plumbers and bricklayers. The failure of the legal

profession to accept, or even recognise, its social responsibilities was particularly damaging because the law was the framework of the social machine. Through an imaginative legal process it would be possible to achieve 'an incalculable improvement in human relations',[33] but any such hope was frustrated by the closed society, the jealousy, and the preoccupation with self-protection displayed by the legal profession.

The lawyers were merely the most extreme example of the evils of too heavy a reliance on professional organisation. They were not alone. Other organisations, those of the army, of medicine, of journalism, and of teachers all displayed the same faults.[34] All put the interests of the profession, interpreted as a resistance to all change, ahead of any service to the community. All used their monopoly powers to restrict access to their vocation, and all clung with passionate loyalty to existing methods. Because the self-governing professions were essentially conservative forces, their influence was particularly dangerous in an age when bold thinking and imaginative innovation were urgently called for. The professions and, indeed, all forms of vocational organisation, including the unions and the guilds, failed as forms of social organisation likely to produce the Good Society.

In sum, all three major forms of will-organisation, private property, State collectivism, and vocational organisation, could be shown to have serious defects, and to be insufficiently adaptable to the crises posed by the Great Society.

> Neither Individualism, therefore, nor Socialism, nor Syndicalism, afford by themselves a single sufficient basis for the Will-Organisation of the Great Society. It may be that no satisfactory Will-Organisation of human beings with their present limitations, in a society on so vast a scale, is possible, and that we must ultimately choose either to live on a smaller scale, or to pay for the advantages of the larger scale by constant dissatisfaction with our relations to each other. But the effort of inventing a better Will-Organisation than now exists is at least worth while.[35]

But while the defects were obvious, the actual remedy still escaped Wallas. In *The Art of Thought* he was forced to admit that 'the individualist, collectivist, and syndicalist conceptions of industrial organization have all been discredited, but no new conception has established itself'.[36]

After thought-organisation, and will-organisation, Wallas turned, in the final chapter of *The Great Society*, to the third element, the organisation of happiness. The opening lines: 'In considering how the Great Society can be so organised as to produce the maximum amount of Happiness,'[37] set not only the theme of this one chapter, but also, in a sense, the motivating idea of Wallas' whole political philosophy. While Wallas had previously condemned the Utilitarians for their reductionist psychology, he accepted from them the concept of happiness as the ultimate social goal, a conception which remained implicit in everything he wrote. It was an old issue. In a letter to Alfred Zimmern in 1909 he had stated that one of the central problems he was focusing on was that of devising methods by which we would live 'an unnatural life in such a way as to afford that satisfaction to our inner nature, which is called happiness'.[38] Happiness was the criterion by which one tested the efficacy of forms of thought-organisation and will-organisation. A more precise and useful term than pleasure, happiness was the indicator that man was living a life close to the Aristotelian idea of the socially good. But although he adapted the Utilitarian principle of 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number', he, like the Utilitarians, failed to consider the consequences of the contradictions within the formula. Was society to aim at the greatest total sum of happiness possible, or at the greatest number of happy people? Wallas offered no means of resolving the conflict between these two aims.

The existing forms of thought-organisation and will-organisation in the Great Society had been found to be deficient. These were serious problems. But an even more fundamental issue was whether the Great Society was, or could become, an efficient organisation for the creation and preservation of happiness. If one was forced to conclude that no effective happiness-organisation could flourish within the structure of the Great Society then one would have, if not a final judgement, at least a serious argument that the Great Society ought not to exist at all. Wallas, naturally, was unwilling to subscribe to any such defeatist position. Indeed, one purpose behind the writing of *The Great Society* was to stimulate the search for forms of social organisation more productive of happiness than those which then existed. Although, as many critics pointed out, Wallas was much more at home in defining the problem than in inventing solutions, there is at least implicit in his writing the assumption that solutions can be found.

Wallas also wanted to make clear that, even as it was now

constituted, the Great Society had not been totally unproductive of human happiness. Particularly within the 'unfriendly natural environment of a Northern climate',[39] men lived longer and in greater comfort than before, disease was less terrible, and poverty less oppressive. With all its injustices, the Great Society did not subject men to chattel slavery or predial serfdom. Things were not all bad. This was the note of hope, which also implied that things could be better. Yet despite these indisputable achievements of industrialisation, there was still a deep sense of unease, of disquiet. By its very nature organised industrial work provided fewer opportunities for individual happiness than the work of an earlier age of craftsmen:

> That, indeed, which chiefly angers and excites us now, as we contemplate the society in which we live, is not a conviction that the world is a worse place than it has ever been, but the feeling that we have lost grip over the course of events, and are stupidly wasting the power over nature which might make the world infinitely better.[40]

The great difficulty arose from the fact that industrial society had lost sight of its purposes. Too many 'experts' were looking at the wrong problems. Too much energy was directed to the tasks of 'scientific management', to the achievement of the maximum conditions of productive efficiency in a technologically sophisticated society. Too little attention was given to questioning the ultimate purpose of increased production. Maximum output was uncritically accepted as the appropriate goal of society. But, as Wallas had repeatedly said, productive efficiency which disregarded happiness as an end to be achieved would be disfunctional:

> But [scientific management's] main defect will probably be found to be that which it shares with the classical political economy, the over-simplification of the problem by using the subordinate end of maximum output in dealing with factors where the more ultimate end of maximum human happiness or human good would be more appropriate.[41]

No new organisation of society could ignore industrial efficiency. Wallas was no dreamer trying to thrust the world back into some highly fanciful pastoral paradise. Almost his whole adult life was

spent in London and he was prepared to accept that urban life was becoming the dominant mode for most men. All that he asked was that the society should reconsider the purposes of industrial expansion, to reflect on the scale of its activities, and to be so structured that in certain circumstances it could sacrifice some measure of wealth production for a greater measure of social happiness. No society could long safely ignore the dignity and self-respect, as major components of social happiness, of any large segment of its population. Long before the contemporary environmentalists were decrying the destruction of our natural and human resources by an industry insensitive to anything other than profits, Wallas was urging the Great Society to reflect on, and reconsider, its goals.

Wallas' fourth book, *Our Social Heritage*, is a logical continuation of the argument in *The Great Society*. Indeed it is almost impossible to discuss the two books independently. They are part of a continuing reflection on the relationship between man as animal, with physiological and psychological dispositions, and his social habitat. Thus in the last pages of *The Great Society* Wallas had introduced the terms 'nature' and 'nurture' to describe two components of human social behaviour, and in *Our Social Heritage* he developed these concepts further as he continued to reflect on the relationship between man's traditional ways of life and the modern urban-industrial environment. But while one must deal with the two books together, it is necessary to recall that *The Great Society* had been written on the eve of the First World War, and *Our Social Heritage* just a few years after the return of peace. The themes in the two books are the same, but there is a shift in mood. The war had greatly distressed Wallas. He was a pacifist at heart who just before the war had been chairman of the British Neutrality Committee, which Bertrand Russell had helped found. Apart from the human misery it brought, the war seemed to offend against everything Wallas had preached about rational human organisation. After the war, therefore, there is a stronger note of pessimism in his writings, a note quite apparent in *Our Social Heritage*. There he wrote in his opening chapter:

> We all feel, indeed, in 1920 much more humble, when approaching the problem of social and intellectual reconstruction, than did the followers of Rousseau or Adam Smith before the French Revolution, or the followers of Bentham, or Godwin, or Hegel, or

> Mazzini, after the world-war that ended in 1815. But the urgency of our task is greater. The new fact of modern industrial organization is spreading over the earth, and we have learnt that the dangers arising from that fact are equally universal. Unless, therefore, an attempt is now made, in many countries and by many thinkers, to see our socially inherited ways of living and thinking as a whole, the nations of the earth, confused the embittered by the events of 1914–20, may soon be compelled to witness – this time without hope or illusion – another and more destructive stage in the suicide of civilization.[42]

The problem in *Our Social Heritage* was basically the same as in his two previous books: how to adapt a changing social environment to the needs of modern man, who was not infinitely flexible, but was influenced both by socially acquired characteristics, and by a relatively fixed nature. By 'nature' Wallas meant man's inherited characteristics, including both his biological structure and his inherited psychological dispositions. Man's acquired characteristics, which Wallas termed his 'nurture', took two forms. There were, first of all, those behaviour patterns which each of us acquires on the basis of personal experience, without learning them from any other persons. As these remained individual and personal, they were not a matter that concerned him. Secondly, there were those learned expedients, habits, and knowledge which are passed down from generation to generation. These latter constituted the social heritage. In *The Great Society* he had undervalued the significance of acquired characteristics, and the new book was an attempt to remedy this weakness. The special focus of *Our Social Heritage* was the attempt to relate this social heritage to the conditions of the Great Society.

Wallas was now more than ever aware of the extent to which the various forms of social behaviour, including ways of thinking, are affected in some way by both our natural, biological inheritance and our socially acquired characteristics. Patterns of behaviour therefore can be expected to differ from society to society to the extent that each has a different social heritage. And because of all animal species it is man that has the most extensive social heritage, it is man that is most dependent on that heritage for survival.

> We have become biologically more fitted to live with the help of our social heritage, and biologically less fitted to live without it.

> We have become, one may say, biologically parasitic upon our social heritage.[43]

Although man's nature, especially his biological nature, is relatively fixed, it is not completely rigid, and does change slowly. Thus Wallas maintained that through time man has evolved, and is still evolving, certain modifications to his biological structure and instincts which increase his capacity to acquire and make use of his social heritage. Man has developed a much wider-ranging and more untiring curiosity than the other animals, and he has a greater power to respond to suggestion and to form new muscular and nervous habits. With the evolution of the instinct of speech, for example, there have been corresponding structural modifications in the speech organs in the mouth, throat, and brain. Wallas even believed that because we have accumulated conventional language-systems, and have become increasingly dependent on their use, we have evolved a biological instinct, 'impelling us to learn and use conventional words'.[44]

He made an important distinction between those simple physiological reactions, which he characterised as lower order activities, and the more conscious, or higher, processes and activities. The self-conscious will has, obviously, much greater potential for control over the higher activities than over the lower. In particular those forms of muscular and mental effort which are of the greatest importance to us in civilised society rely most heavily on a self-conscious will, which itself is mainly a product of the social inheritance. From this he argued that *sustained* muscular and intellectual effort, being unnatural, was largely dependent on the process of social inheritance. Almost all our social behaviour is learnt rather than spontaneous activity.

There was a shift in emphasis in *Our Social Heritage*. In his earlier writing he was concerned to demonstrate how man's capacity to accommodate himself to the Great Society was limited by his inherited biological nature, his basic human dispositions. Now he was conceding a much greater role, in social-political activity, to the set of socially acquired characteristics called nurture. The dual source of behaviour in 'nature' and in 'nurture' can be most clearly seen in various forms of cooperative enterprise. Some kinds of group cooperation, especially in such acts as fighting and hunting, are 'natural', in that they belong to man's biological past. But the scope of natural cooperation is limited or defined by the size of the group,

and by the type of action on which cooperation is required. As soon as these limits are exceeded, socially acquired forms of group cooperation must be introduced. These other forms, particularly those of political and administrative decision-making in the modern urban society, are artificial. And because they are artificial, they will produce the same kinds of nervous strain as do artificial forms of individual manual and mental work. Yet the circumstances of modern society create a high and continuing demand for artificial cooperation. The problem was how to achieve it most efficiently and without sacrificing the fundamental goal of all social activity: happiness. A crude economic compulsion was too simple, ignoring the complexity of man's psychological make-up and the full range of the desires which motivated him. Similarly mere discipline and habit, as advocated by many conservative thinkers, were not enough: 'No thinker in the world, except perhaps in Japan, or in the administration of the United States Steel Corporation, or the clubs of officials and soldiers in British India, would to-day be satisfied with that basis.'[45]

It had to be recognised, said Wallas, that the environment of the modern industrial society gave no encouragement to the many to cooperate beyond the minimum level necessary for survival. There was no incentive for the average individual to prefer the good of the whole community to his own personal advantage. Because the rewards of society were so unevenly distributed, there was no 'pay-off' for cooperation by the underprivileged. Therefore before any large proportion of the population can be expected to play, voluntarily, an active role in artificial, social cooperation, the nation must achieve a much greater approximation of social and economic equality than at present. Until Disraeli's Two Nations had become more nearly one, a narrow insistence on selfish concepts of security would make it impossible for the whole population to think of themselves as human beings all concerned in the production of the good life Those with little would have no incentive to cooperate with either those who had much, or those who had nothing. But equality alone was not enough.

> An approach to social equality will not, however, produce social contentment, unless it is accompanied by two other conditions: firstly, a better understanding of the nature of the social co-operation created by 'money-economy'; and secondly, a greater positive liking by men and women for the work they do.[46]

Once again Wallas saw the basic social problem as a consequence of the alienating impact of capitalism. The necessary condition of people enjoying their work demanded the creation and substitution of a new set of values for those of capitalism. Success in a capitalist system was defined exclusively in terms of material rewards, but materialism was an insufficient foundation for a good society. This was the familiar message that the Great Society had failed to become the Good Society, because the values which led to the birth of the Great Society frustrated any attempt to create a Good Society.

In the modern world the most critical and difficult form of artificial group cooperation was that which would have to be developed among nations. In England Wallas was one of the earliest and most ardent supporters of the concept of the League of Nations. He was a sincere advocate of the idea of world peace achieved through international cooperation. But international cooperation in its turn required a high level of international organisation. Cooperation at this level became highly artificial, completely dependent on socially inherited knowledge and conscious effort. International peace would not be secured naturally or spontaneously, for men do not naturally cooperate with those they regard as alien. There is a natural suspicion and distrust of peoples of different race, colour, and language. Here we see again the two facets of Wallas' world-view: his recognition of the huge role played in our behaviour by primitive psychological dispositions, and his optimistic faith that, with the proper knowledge and effort, reason could be given a larger role. Men had to bring their instincts of hatred and suspicion under control, but they were fortunate in that they had the capacity to do this.

> We must so strengthen the impulse to think and the habit and art of rational calculation, and so realize the significance of our conclusions, that we may be able to resist or modify or divert some of the strongest of our instincts.[47]

How nations reacted to each other would in turn be influenced by the way in which individuals themselves conceived the idea of their nation. Exploration of this matter again drew together threads of the concept of propaganda, of the use and manipulation of stereotypes and images. The monopolisation of propaganda in the wrong hands, i.e., the hands of the wealthy few, subverted the whole principle of democracy. Propaganda, however, used in the public

service, could become an instrument of the general good. Most certainly it could become a powerful instrument for achieving national cooperation.

> . . . we should consciously aim at creating in our own minds and in those minds whose training we influence, such an idea of our nation as will form the most reliable stimulus to large-scale co-operative emotion and co-operative action.[48]

The new nations of Europe certainly understood the power of propaganda to build a sense of national identity and a spirit of national patriotism. Older nations such as England might look disdainfully at the techniques of instant nationalism, but they could not afford to ignore the significance of what was being done. There was little prospect for world cooperation until those in power in every nation learnt to control and understand the power of the press.

But if society was to remain true to its ultimate purposes, this artificial creation of the feeling of citizenship, of national identity, would have to be achieved without the huge suffering and waste which followed similar attempts by dictators such as Lenin. The only way, morally acceptable and likely to have long-term success, was through the careful use of the educational system. Here old themes were revived: Wallas' Fabian faith in social change through the education of the new generation, and the ultimate moral end of social life. In practical terms this meant that the industrial nations had a double responsibility. They had, first of all, to make a conscious effort to build a spirit of national cooperation, and secondly, they had to develop a social transformation without which the organisation itself would be sterile. In the nineteenth century the solution to these problems had been found in a combination of representative democracy based on an extended suffrage and territorial constituencies, together with joint-stock capitalism, a device which made possible the carrying on of enterprises too large for individual action through self-governing corporations. But, as Wallas had so often asserted, there were huge defects with this combination. Not only had capitalism revealed itself as a de-humanising form of social organisation, but the association of capitalism with democracy had descredited democracy itself in the eyes of many of the working classes. The point made in *The Great Society* was now repeated in *Our Social Heritage*.

> . . . and a large part of the present working-class disgust with democracy has come from the discovery that a class of owners and managers controlling most of the means of publicity, and monopolizing many of the higher forms of education, were able to baffle any attempt to bring about economic equality by the use of the vote.[49]

Wallas showed an increasing consciousness of the power of the press. He saw the newspaper as constituting a huge social danger. It was a highly elaborate piece of machinery by which

> . . . one man, or a few men, can flood the country every day with incitements to hatred, animosity and violence against any individual or nation or cause or ideal. . . . [The press was] a great super-papal establishment with its myriads of worshippers and its infallible and omnipotent heads, to offend whom means extinction.[50]

More and more, therefore, class-conscious industrialised workers were turning to the alternative of Syndicalism, or Guild-socialism, or some other form of vocational organisation. But Syndicalism had already been rejected as an unacceptable form of social organisation, creating more new difficulties than it resolved. Therefore society had to search, urgently, for some substitution for monopoly capitalism which would offer mankind some more worthwhile goals in life than either totalitarian dictatorship or the narrow-minded fragmentation of Syndicalism.

Our Social Heritage concludes with two chapters which at first sight might seem to be a digression from the central themes, but which are nevertheless relevant to the general problem of the adequacy of various forms of social organisation. The earlier chapters discussed particular forms of thought and possible alternatives, all written '. . . with a constant fear that they will prove to be inadequate, even when taken all together, to preserve us against worse disasters than those from which we are now suffering'.[51] The final chapters consider two 'world-outlooks', both of which make claims to be able to provide a complete basis for the good life for all of mankind. The first of these is science, with its general concepts of the immutable relationship of cause and effect, and the second is tradition, as embodied in the organisation of the Church.

Science offered man a growing sense of power in dealing with his

environment. But it is the misfortune of science that its reliance on the idea of causation revives the old dilemma of necessity and free will. Man is prepared to accept the whole universe as a finite interrelated unity, governed by universal necessity, but at the same time he is possessed of a passionate conviction that the human will is somehow 'free'. He is not prepared to accept that his own volitions are as immutably dependent on antecedent causes as anything else in the universe.[52]

Wallas' own resolution of these two opposing convictions was typically ambiguous. He sought a middle route which would allow him to accept both propositions without having to recognise a contradiction. He put forward the proposition that some facts of human behaviour appeared to be as 'caused' as the behaviour of a falling stone, and that other, more complex facts, seemed to be far less inevitable. Life was both caused and not caused. The distinction was in similar terms to the distinction between simple and complex dispositions. Scientific causation could account for a great deal of our simpler, instinctive activities, but some element of conscious willing was a necessary component of more complex behaviour. Wallas offered no criteria for determining any boundary line between causally determined behaviour and consciously willed behaviour, although it would be consistent with his general philosophy to suppose that he conceived a kind of continuum from the least conscious to the most conscious activity, with specific acts located at various points along it. This would suggest that every action would contain some element of antecedent cause and some element of conscious volition.

From this 'more-or-less' position he was again able to attack the simple deterministic psychologies of Hobbes and the political economists. Even Darwin, by demonstrating 'that human instincts could be brought within the conception of biological evolution',[53] increased the tendency to over-simplify human motivation. The great danger of science, particularly science as popularised in the daily newspapers and in ordinary conversation, was that it heightened the individual's feeling of impotence in the face of the great forces of scientific laws, whether of history, psychology, or the natural sciences. And a feeling of helplessness paralysed that sense of initiative and involvement without which democracy could not survive. Science, which offered huge possibilities for a fuller understanding of our condition, also encouraged '. . . forms of thought which treat the impulses of the majority as more capable of

scientific treatment than the impulses of the individual'.[54] Ever since *Human Nature in Politics* Wallas' message had been the same: let us be scientific, let us quantify, and measure, and seek causes, but, at the same time, let us not presume that the techniques of science provide a necessary and sufficient explanation for *all* the complexities of human behaviour. There are some truths which cannot be quantified or measured, and which have no cause except human volition, and these are part of the complexity of human existence.

The Christian religion, in contrast with science, was founded on the reality of human volition. It stressed the responsibility of the individual for his own actions. The very notion of sin, as taught by Christian theologians, implies self-willed action. But it will be recalled that Wallas had rejected orthodox Christianity in his youth, substituting for it a kind of ethical Stoicism. Here, in the final chapter of *Our Social Heritage*, he renewed his attacks on the organised Church, especially as represented by the Anglican and Roman Catholic Churches, condemning them as organisations incapable of giving life and meaning to the ethical precepts of traditional Christianity. In reference to the behaviour of all the national Churches during the Great War he noted: 'The evidence seems to point unmistakably to an inverse statistical correlation between membership of those churches, and an attitude of protest against the national wrong-doing.'[55] The Churches were unable to offer any practical guide or example in day-to-day ethical conduct. In some cases it was because there was no logical connection between the rites and rituals of the Church on the one hand, and a consistent ethical scheme on the other. In other cases it was because the Church, as an organisation, revealed all the most dangerous tendencies of a guild. It became a closed organisation, separated from the lives of those it was supposed to guide and influence. Wallas, in his secular evangelism, looked beyond formal Christianity for hope:

> Something more like the 'philosophies' of Zeno and Epicurus in the Roman Empire may have a better chance. If our educational systems are not starved by war and the consequences of war, they may so develop that whole populations will have access to the outlines of agreed knowledge and to the emotional appeal of great literature. Differences in mental training may follow differences of individual nature, and not differences of hereditary class or caste. If so, Bagehot's assumption that political authority must be

based on 'the credulous obedience of enormous masses,' and the corresponding assumption underlying the phrase, 'the Mass for the Masses' may seem less convincing than they do now, and many social and professional and racial hindrances to the free exchange of thought may be broken down.[56]

At the end of three books on man's condition and his relations to society, we are left in a curiously flat position. We have had presented a world-view which sees man as a highly complex, multi-faceted, multi-motivated being, directed in several ways by his biological dispositions, his social conditions, and his independent free will. This complex man is acting in an environment which is still alien to some of his most basic inherited dispositions, forcing him to rely more heavily on his capacity for conscious volition. We are presented also with a sustained critique of existing forms of social organisation. None provide a sufficiently fertile ground for the development of man's capacity to adapt to the new urban-industrial society. The forces which created the Great Society inhibit the forces necessary to bring the Good Society into being. But having gone this far, and having added the urgent plea for the consideration of new forms of social organisation, Wallas leaves us. The central theme of Wallas' social trilogy is the need to rethink the social-organisational basis of our life, but we are left with no clue as to the form of that new organisational base. We are told what is wrong with the old. We have no idea what the new might be, except that in some way it might recreate the spirit of Periclean Athens in modern London.

7 In Defence of Liberty

As might be expected of a person of his background, Wallas became involved in a large number of 'civil rights' causes. His life was motivated by a deep passion for social equality. As Laski said of him, 'He hated privilege with something of the fine indignation of his own hero, Bentham.'[1] He was constantly defending minorities, supporting the oppressed, championing the victims of social injustice. His principal enemies were the established Church and its 'dead hand of tradition' which lay heavy on the advocates of progress, the newspaper barons who manipulated public opinion in their own interest, and all who opposed, or feared, the unbiased search after truth. In 1929 for example, he led, and was the principal spokesman for, a deputation to the Home Secretary on behalf of the Society for the Abolition of the Blasphemy Laws, urging the repeal of laws which still permitted prosecution for attacking the doctrines of the established Church.[2] In 1916 he was one of the defenders of Bertrand Russell, protesting the British Government's refusal to allow Russell a passport to visit the United States because of Russell's opposition to the war. On this issue, in a letter to the Home Secretary, Herbert Samuel, Wallas wrote:

> By refusing to allow a leading English philosopher to take up an American chair without pledging himself to say nothing in dispraise of British policy in the future – whatever that policy may be – the Government advertise the fact no American must take the statement of any Englishmen who *is* allowed to come as being sincere and unbiased. The Americans believe that they are being treated like children, and that something is being hidden from them.[3]

His concern was not just an emotional reaction against authority, it was the reasoned proposition that the suppression of liberty was ultimately contrary to the best interests of authority. The British Government lost more by silencing Russell than it did by allowing

him to criticise it. In April 1915, he indicated his sympathy with the Emergency Committee for the Assistance of Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians in Distress, whose aims were to help those German and other intellectuals not in sympathy with the war policy of the central powers. His attitude to Germany during the war was not in line with the prevailing British mood of hysterical xenophobia. Near the end of 1914 he wrote:

> You, yourself, ask me not to hate Germany or to believe lies about the Germans. All my life since I was in Germany during 1884–5 I have admired and loved German literature, and many things in German life. I was, till the war, a member of the 'Anglo-German Friendship Society,' and am proud that Edward Bernstein and other Germans are my friends. I have agreed with the Social-democrats in hating Junkertum, and, if I had been in Germany I should probably have spent some time in prison for saying so.[4]

Also at the international level, in May 1928 he initiated correspondence in the *New Statesman* and the *Manchester Guardian* protesting Fascist terrorism in Milan. Before the war, he was a member of the Neutrality Committee, and after 1918, an enthusiastic supporter of the League of Nations.

One cause that deeply distressed him was the decline of civil liberties in the United States after the war. Although Wallas several times visited, and lectured in, the United States, there was never any doubt from his writings that he greatly preferred the English way of life to the American. In particular he was dismayed by the apparent ease with which civil liberties could be attacked in the United States, and by the lack of protest against this in the United States itself. His criticisms of the intolerance of American public opinion, of its passive acceptance, even approval, of the silencing of dissidents, seem to echo the earlier warnings of de Tocqueville. In 1920 he wrote:

> On earlier visits I had noticed that, in spite of a wide-spread habit of personal good nature, majorities in America are apt to deal rather summarily with minorities. But this time it seems that the whole tradition of political toleration has been broken: that freedom of speech and writing and meeting has become an open question; and that many important newspapers and politicians,

> supported by a large body of public opinion, approach that question with a presumption against freedom.[5]

This not only offended Wallas' sense of justice, he saw it as a rejection of the message he had been preaching about the necessity for greater political invention and creative thought. The huge problems of the Great Society could be resolved only through sustained intellectual effort to minimise the impact of men's less rational dispositions. Now the United States, the most advanced example of the Great Society, was turning its back on the only way to salvation. It was not only morally wrong, it was politically short-sighted.

> As a fact, in spite of numerous and important exceptions, the great mass of American writing on social and political subjects has seemed to many outside critics timid and conventional. And some American leaders in industry and finance and politics – men who would never dream of employing a timid and conventional chemist, or engineer, or surgeon – are, I honestly believe, content that it should be so.[6]

All these causes, and those listed here are merely examples of a wide-ranging concern for human liberty and dignity, are part of a ready acceptance of liberty as one of the primary values of the Good Society. But liberty for Wallas was a complex concept. There is always something of a dilemma for the collectivist who would also be a liberal. The desire for a high level of social planning for the common good has to be reconciled with the preservation of the greatest possible degree of individual freedom, and inevitably this poses difficulties. There are, of course, some who will still argue that there can be no reconciliation. F. A. Hayek, for example, has proposed that freedom and planning are antithetical concepts.[7] Planning, by imposing a prior restraint on the individual's discretionary acts, violates freedom. Wallas would dismiss such a judgement because of its over-simplified understanding of liberty. Hayek's argument is valid only within the context of a very narrow definition. Indeed, Wallas' argument could not be conducted in Hayek's terms at all, for the social debate about the role of liberty could not be resolved without also questioning the meaning of liberty. In effect the meaning attached to the term defined its social role.

Wallas's own broader approach to freedom, a term he used interchangeably with liberty, began with a reaffirmation of the high value to be placed upon it. Writing in 1915 he had suggested that the German experience might seem to indicate that the ' "freedom" of a nation organised for modern industrial and military purposes' would be restricted to 'an original act of assent, followed by a permanent submission of the will'.[8] If this was true, then those who, like Hayek later, argued that central planning and organisation denied the possibility of freedom, might be correct. But Wallas was not prepared to accept this defeatism and he claimed that most Englishmen shared his hope that efficient organisation could be compatible with 'that continuous possibility of personal initiative which we vaguely mean by freedom'.[9] He sought to bring about the conditions in which social planning could co-exist with personal freedom, in which, indeed, social planning would be the means to freedom. Wallas saw common social action as the deliberate organisation of expedients by which the greatest possible number of individuals could hope to realise their fullest potentials as human beings.

In *The Great Society* he opened up the question of the purpose of freedom. He asked why freedom was a value to be sought, and how it stood in any hierarchy of values. 'Ought all social enquiries to be based on the assumption that Freedom is the absolutely essential condition of human Happiness, and if so, what does Freedom exactly mean?'[10] In responding to his own question, Wallas posited that freedom ought to be considered, not as an external social arrangement, but as a state of consciousness, which might be expected to result from certain social arrangements. It was not enough to be free, in any objective sense. One must also subjectively feel free, and a '. . . man feels "free" when his acts and sayings and thoughts seem to him to be the expression of his most real and spontaneous motives'.[11] The failure to recognise freedom as a psychological state of mind was the most serious deficiency in the old laissez-faire uni-dimensional concept of freedom as the mere absence of restraint.

Men may not be free in the sense of 'feeling free' even when they are not subjected to any external physical or legal compulsions. They may be bound by conventions, or prejudices, or animal passions, or the striving for money for its own sake rather than as a means to other ends. Real freedom is that freedom which liberates the 'spirit' or 'soul' of man, and which has as its goal the

maximisation of happiness. Freedom in this sense was thus defined, not in terms of legal restraint, but in terms of goals which could be achieved. This positive interpretation came very close to T. H. Green's definition of freedom as 'the positive power or capacity of doing or enjoying something worth doing or enjoying'.[12] As in other instances, Wallas accepted Green's conclusions, while rejecting their idealist foundations. Above all, Wallas emphasised that if liberty had any meaning at all, it would have to embrace also some concept of equality of liberty. When E. H. Carr wrote 'The price of liberty is the restriction of liberty. The price of some liberty for all, is the restriction of the greater liberty of some,'[13] he was expressing a philosophy of life very close to that of Wallas. Liberty was for all, not just the already privileged few. And as historical experience had already demonstrated that the removal of legal restraints, especially over economic competition, led only to great inequalities, such simple discarding of restraint was an unsound basis of liberty.

In *Our Social Heritage*, the question of liberty was again taken up at some length. Wallas continued to see liberty, neither as a metaphysical abstraction, nor as a political absolute, but as a psychological condition. It was a state of feeling free, a feeling which, in turn, depended on the nature of the obstacle to freedom and the circumstances of the particular situation. It is not enough to say that we lose our freedom when our impulses are blocked. That is something that happens to us all the time. The forces of nature, our own physical and mental limitations, and the resources at our disposal, all from time to time frustrate our immediate impulses, but do not necessarily thereby make us feel unfree.

It is the blocking of an impulse in circumstances where we subjectively feel that it ought not to have been blocked, or at the behest of those we subjectively feel have no 'right' to so obstruct us, that violates our freedom. We do not feel free, and therefore are not free, when our normal expectations of self-willed actions are frustrated. This is crucial to Wallas' argument. The factor that makes the blocking of an impulse an attack on freedom is the existence of a normal expectation that the impulse will not be blocked. This feeling of frustration arises, in particular, when there is an infringement of our power to act according to our inherited dispositions, when we are unable to act as our nature seems to require us to act. In this sense Wallas saw the intimate connection between the principle of liberty and both man's primitive instinctive behaviour and the expectation of liberty of action which

arises as part of his social heritage. That is to say, the expectations of self-willed action, and therefore the possibilities of the denial of liberty, are attributes of society, varying according to time and place. In this sense liberty was not a single, universal abstraction, but was tied to a specific social context. Liberty in any given age meant freedom from forces found repressive in that age.

> No way of livng, therefore, can now be so 'natural' to us as never to involve the obstruction of impulse; the principle of Liberty can never be absolute, and in the organization of our society we must ask, not merely how we are to prevent the occurrence of the feeling of unfreedom, but how we are to live the good life.[14]

Given this relative psychological basis of liberty, it is easier to see it, as Wallas saw it, as a many-faceted positive conception, manifested in many different types of social and political organisation. This, he said, was not something he had discovered for himself. Pericles, for example, in his funeral oration, had described the many aspects of Athenian life which contributed to the Athenian's confidence in his own freedom. In Wallas' opinion, Pericles' psychological insight into the problem of liberty was more acute than that of J. S. Mill. Mill had, admittedly, also attempted a psychological foundation of liberty, seeing it as 'the due satisfaction of the natural impulses of man',[15] but Mill's psychology was too limited, and the transition from psychological theory to practical advice was weaker still. From his narrow viewpoint in the security of the middle classes, Mill could not see the difficulties raised by his apparently simple principle that 'the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others'.[16] The possibilities of harm to others were much more extensive and varied than Mill was capable of recognising. Further, the exceptions to individual liberty he offered in the name of the interests of the community made his whole conception meaningless. Liberty was a complex concept which could not be explained in terms of a simple negative absence of restraint, against which one set a number of practical exceptions.

> It is only when Liberty ceases to be 'one very simple principle' subject to unexplained exceptions, and is thought of as a careful quantitative and qualitative co-ordination between known psy-

> chological facts and actual social expedients that any fertile definition of its becomes possible.[17]

This approach to liberty made it was easier to see it more as a means to an end rather than as an end in itself. Liberty was higly prized because it was one of the conditions for the foundation of the Good Society, but *only one* of them. Liberty and planning, instead of being exclusive concepts, were complementary.

> But the object of wise law and sound policy is a good human life. Liberty is one of the conditions of such a life; but the deliberate invention and organization of expedients for making common action effective is another condition.[18]

This was liberty, or freedom, in the full sense of the capacity to pursue ends worth pursuing. For Wallas the proper aim of society was positive freedom, this power of all men to pursue the good life in the fullest meaning of that term. As he said later, in a lecture in 1930, now that the political machinery had been democratised, and the world was tending to greater economic equality, it was important that men should pay more attention to desiring the 'proper things' instead of being exclusively preoccupied with the means of achieving immediate desires.[19] And the 'proper things' were not necessarily the same for all, but could differ according to their nature and their nurture. Whatever they might be in detail, they had in common their contribution to the more permanent good, the moralising of the citizen.

This was the new social problem. The Great Society had solved the problems of production. But before the Good Society could be born men had to solve the problems of consumption – not only how to consume, but how to desire to consume the 'right' things, how to make consumption genuinely satisfying. Short-term gratification could be derived from the accumulation of material goods, but long-term happiness required the satisfaction of man's deeper longings – a sense of individual worth and dignity and, perhaps above all, a sense of 'spiritual harmony'. Men were free when they had it in their power to reach such harmony.

With the development of the positive concept of liberty, and as the practical political manifestation of that concept, came the parallel development of the positive State.

> During the last hundred years, in all the civilized communities of the world, the functions of Government have changed from being mainly negative into being mainly positive, that is to say, Governments have come to be engaged not merely in preventing wrong things from being done, but in bringing it about that right things shall be done.[20]

Wallas maintained that the change from the negative to the positive State was not really a matter of political preference. It was the inevitable consequence of the scale and technical complexity of modern industrialisation. Society certainly had some choice over the details and speed of change from negativism to positivism. But a modern society could not maintain the old laissez-faire approach and survive. Debates about private enterprise versus a planned economy were therefore really rather pointless. We could meaningfully argue about the range of planning, about how planning should be done, and about who the planners might be. But extensive central control over the economy was a fact of modern life that could not be debated away. We did not have the option of returning to the old order.

And the need for government intervention changed the character of government itself. The old political forms, especially in the fields of administration, could not cope with the demands of modern government. Because governments had vast new responsibilities, they had to develop new skills, exploit new talents, and invent new procedures.

> Now the main difference between a State which has to do things and a State which has to prevent things being done, arises from the fact that the prevention of wrongdoing can be carried out by one man with disciplined human instruments merely carrying out his orders. A negative Government only requires courage and consistency in its officials; but a positive Government requires a constant supply of invention and suggestion, and invention and suggestion take time.[21]

The positive State was necessarily a government of experts, which implied a carefully recruited, highly trained, professional Civil Service. These were the themes that appeared time and again in Wallas' lectures and papers. If we were to become dependent upon the public administrators, it was in our own interest to make sure

that those administrators had the highest possible qualifications for the job.

The final picture which emerges of Wallas' concept of liberty in the positive State is an amalgam of the various major influences in his life. The Fabian version of 'applied', non-doctrinaire socialism, made more efficient through an improved art of thought and science of public administration, becomes the instrument for the achievement of social purpose. As the problems of means are solved, more attention can be given to the definition of ends. The ultimate goal is the creation of the modern industrial *polis*, a melding of Christian humanitarianism, without Christian dogma, with the free spirit of classical Athens, in an urban-industrial setting. It is essentially a utopian vision in which a professional public service, imbued with the highest ideals of public duty, will consciously create those material conditions under which, for the first time, the urban masses will be able to live in dignity and self-respect. The Good Society, built out of the Great Society, will at last become the free society.

Closely related to the question of liberty is the question of rights. And again Wallas argued along relativist lines. Rights were real things which arose from real and permanent facts of human psychology,[22] but their application was relative to specific social circumstances. The assumption that any one set of rights was an absolute which could in no way be legally challenged was a most dangerous misinterpretation – a substitution of the metaphysically universal for the psychologically relative. Wallas' approach to rights drew much from Bentham, who had dismissed natural rights as 'simple nonsense', and 'natural and imprescriptible rights' as 'rhetorical nonsense, nonsense upon stilts'.[23] But it did not follow from this that rights were meaningless, or unimportant. Rights, to Wallas, were those things which the members of a society from time to time recognised as necessary to the satisfaction of their psychological needs. The fact of such psychological need was the proof of the existence of rights as such. It did not establish the details of specific rights. There was a 'natural right' to live according to one's nature. Rights varied in time and space, but in any one setting they were real, definable, and identifiable. They were not relative in the sense of being mere creations of individual imagination or whim. But the absolute rights of one society might well be different from those of another society.

The apparent ambiguity of Wallas' approach to democracy has

already been discussed in Chapter 6, but here we can see how his perception of liberty, equality, and rights help to clarify that ambiguity. To Wallas democracy was an ethical concept. It embodied the maximum individual liberty, and the maximum equality of liberty, possible within a given social framework. And liberty itself was a positive conception of the power to achieve true happiness, a conception far removed from the principle of economic laissez-faire. It thus involved both a degree of social planning to provide a 'fair' distribution of the material resources necessary for happiness, and universal education in the meaning of 'true' happiness. Here lies another part of the reason for his eventual falling-out with the Fabians.

> Webb thought of democracy as government by a scientific elite who knew, and gave the people, what was good for them. Wallas saw it as teaching the community to want the good life, in Aristotelian terms, and to learn to secure it for themselves.[24]

Like Webb, Wallas accepted that the existing institutional arrangements for representative democracy in England were ill-suited for the high moral purpose he demanded. Indeed, he was even more aware than Webb how ill-adjusted the existing political arrangements were to man's basic psychological dispositions. This is his criticism of democracy. It was not an attack on the precepts of democracy, but on the inappropriateness of democratic machinery to realise those precepts.

Wallas' relativist position, his distrust of absolutes and universals, naturally influenced his attitude to democracy. Accepting that no man possessed *the* truth, he did not, like Ostrogorski, reject parties. Party politics for Wallas were an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of differing points of view. Parties demanded compromise, not only among themselves in the government of the State, but also within themselves, as between the party and the individuals who comprised it. The individual party member, as a member, could not maintain a position of personal infallibility. That men should be forced to compromise was not for Wallas a sign of weakness, but of strength.

> And yet, much of that which M. Ostrogorski describes as an obvious proof of the degradation of English politics, seems to point vaguely at a not unworthy ideal. That men should make

> compromises between opinion and loyalty, between self-confidence and self-distrust, may be not only not inconsistent with democracy, but necessary to its continued existence.[25]

But again, in contrast to Webb, Wallas was not content to focus on institutional reform. He was convinced that the precondition to changing the machinery was the development of a much deeper understanding of the purpose of such change. This involved the sustained, systematic reflection on the goals of the Good Society. There was little point in improving the machinery without a clearer perception of the ends it should accomplish. And further, men could not be expected to improve their institutional arrangements for thinking and acting unless they paid much closer attention to the art of thought itself. Before men could think more effectively about specifics, they had to learn to think about thinking. Wallas believed in democracy, but he was pessimistic about the ease and speed with which it could be realised. His attitude, in brief, was one of critical goodwill.

These, then, were the components of Wallas' thought. He criticised prevailing assumptions about the basis of human social behaviour, proposed alternative institutional arrangements, and all always within the normative framework of the Good Society. All his books bring together these descriptive, critical, and normative elements, but as he grew older, the normative component became more obvious. Looking at his work as a whole, the contributions to social psychology, to public administration, fade, and the moral passion which inspired it all comes to the front.

This is the strange paradox of Wallas' position. Almost universally he is remembered primarily for two things: his status as one of the inner group who created Fabian socialism, and his contributions to 'behavioural' political science, and especially the latter. It is now a standing practice for writers on the development of the modern science of politics to make reference to Wallas' pioneering efforts. Yet the references are almost always brief, almost formal, a mere sentence or two. The modern generation has come to appreciate that Wallas' long-term contributions were more suggestive and inspirational than substantive. And almost invariably references are confined to *Human Nature in Politics* and, in that contetxt, to Wallas' warnings about the dangers of exaggerating the intellectuality of mankind.

Yet Wallas was much more appalled and frightened by the anti-

intellectualism of the twentieth century than by the naive over-intellectualism of the nineteenth. Anti-intellectualism, the denial of even the possibility of a free, rational will, made nonsense of any dream of a new *polis*. Wallas attacked the nineteenth century's unrealistic assumptions about the role of reason in order to teach men to think more clearly about how to improve the human condition. He had no wish to deny them the capacity to think at all. And so his attacks on anti-intellectualism were much more important to him than his criticisms of excessive rationalism. This supposed socialist critic of intellectualism spent the greater part of his career trying to advance the role of reason in society in order to improve the quality of individual life. He devoted most of his later writing either to refuting the opponents of democracy, or to attempting to increase the role of individual rational free will in human social behaviour. Thus he viewed progress, not as the inevitable outcome of historical forces, but as an object of human desire and will. If man would but use his talents, his knowledge, and his will, he could advance the range of happiness in society.

The almost wilful misinterpretation of Wallas, the failure to see him as he really was, a moral reformer, is largely a matter of timing. *Human Nature in Politics* was written at the crest of Edwardian optimism. The book was thus a dramatic challenge to existing habits of thought. And in the years immediately following its publication events seemed to give it an added authority, a touch of prophecy. The decade after 1908 saw the end of the self-assurance and certainties which had bolstered previous generations. War and politics had demonstrated how quickly passion supplanted reason in human behaviour and how easily the rich and the powerful could control the machinery of democracy for their own purposes. *Human Nature in Politics* was also written at a time when the intellectual climate was receptive to new challenges. Other forces were tending to substantiate Wallas' assault on excessive rationalism.

> Political rationalism was a growth of the period when the conception of Newtonian physics dominated human thought, a science which was predominantly mathematical and deductive. The thesis of the essential irrationality of the political animal has been . . . rendered inevitable, by the Darwinian biology.[26]

The Darwinian concept of change through the slow accumulation of slight differences is necessarily contrary to dramatic change

through the intervention of individual will. Darwinian biology is also the primary source of modern psychology which attempts to reduce human behaviour to a laboratory science. This is part of Wallas' dilemma. Darwin had been one of the most important influences in his early life, the obvious source of his first attacks on excessive intellectualism. Yet other elements in his background rejected the denial of free will. He was simply not prepared to consign humanity to the laboratory.

The history of his own thought on the usefulness of *science* in the social sciences therefore went through a change. What started as enthusiasm gradually became lukewarm and finally faded into increased scepticism. He remained convinced of the need for a more extensive use of quantitative data in the social sciences, while being aware of the danger of letting social science research become too dependent on the calculating machine. But over time his confidence in the value of the contributions of biology and psychology gradually waned. There was still a great deal of room for new knowledge in the social sciences, but by 1928 he could write in a letter: '. . . what is still more wanted is the co-ordination of existing knowledge, the invention and spread of new ways of conceiving man's relation to his environment, and the invention of new forms of social organisation.'[27] Wallas was, in fact, unwilling to accept the wider implications of a deterministic psychology. Then by the time he came to write *The Great Society* and *Our Social Heritage*, there was in the Western world a dominant mood of cynicism about the democratic ideal. His attempt to revive faith in a rational utopia seemed irrelevant to the new age. What was once innovative now became old-fashioned. And as events seemed to pass him by his influence began to wane.

There is support for the proposition that by the 1920s Wallas' creative energy was exhausted. His later writings tended to become reformulations of previous inspiration. There was still much to be learnt from Wallas' last books, but it was the gleanings of an earlier harvest. Wallas ultimately failed to produce the synthesis needed to make a coherent whole of his work. A unity was in fact there. The instinct to teach which took him to his first career, and the social conscience which took him into, and out of, the Fabian Society, are implicit in all his work. But he lacked finally the capacity to make the fullest use of the rapidly developing science of psychology to weld all his imaginative exhortation into a structured science of society. He was too much a child of the nineteenth century

to be confident in adopting the techniques of the twentieth. His dilemma is seen particularly in the area of psychology. By insisting on the importance of a psychological approach to politics Wallas offended many of the traditionalists of his own generation. A.D. Lindsay, for example, when reviewing *The Great Society*, praised the book for what it attempted, but made clear his own doubts that *any* psychology could be scientific.[28] And Ernest Barker was even readier to dismiss the psychological approach. In a letter to Wallas he wrote:

> Psychology always seems to me, on its social side at any rate, entirely a description, and what is worse a highly hypothetical and imaginary description, of states of consciousness. But I always feel that description is not explanation. If we want to explain society, we must do so in terms not of hypothetical states of consciousness, but of rational purpose.[29]

But while he thus put himself out of step with the more traditional philosophic or institutional political scientists, Wallas did not make his mark with the new generation coming to prominence, especially in the United States, who moved with much greater ease and familiarity with the new behavioural knowledge and methodologies. Certainly he influenced a great many American thinkers, especially those who, like his principal American disciple, Walter Lippmann, had had personal contact with him. His American lecture tours were enormously successful and some idea of his prestige in the United States can be gathered from the extensive and enthusiastic reviews his books received in North American journals and newspapers.

But, by and large, Wallas' influence was with a generation of American political scientists already being dismissed as out-of-date. The newer, more brittle generation of behavioural political scientists might remember Wallas as that old-timer who first suggested that the study of politics might be enriched if allied to the study of human nature. But they had gone much further than he ever went, and he had nothing new to offer them. And in particular the moderns who assiduously set out to create a value-free social science were not interested in listening to a person who suggested that the reason for studying human behaviur was to overcome the existing obstacles to the achievement to ultimate moral values. The

generation after his death mocked, or ignored, his insistence on moral purpose.

The total effect of all Wallas' writing is peculiarly ambiguous. Approached for the first time it stimulates, excites the imagination, and adds new insights to what one already knows – adding a new dimension and richness to the familiar. But longer acquaintanceship leaves one curiously flat. There is a sense of waiting for something to happen. But it never does. Wallas was magnificent in suggesting what ought to be done, and was the obvious inspiration of dozens of books which followed him, but his own positive contributions were slight. Thus while he urged the importance of the quantitative measurement of political phenomena, he himself made virtually no use of statistical data, or statistical techniques. While his books urged others to quantify and to measure, they are not quantitative themselves. One feels that Wallas would have been delighted with the modern world of computers, but would never himself actually have run a programme.

Similarly, although all his major works stress the relevance of psychology to the study of political man, his own psychology is largely unsystematic and descriptive. He does not develop a complete scientific social psychology of his own, and seems content to draw from a random reading of psychological texts those tenets which seem to substantiate the conclusions he had already formed. As in the case of statistical techniques, he was far more successful in exhorting others to develop a social psychology than in doing so himself. And, as has already been suggested, he was often dismayed at the direction in which social psychology seemed to be going. Psychology seemed to produce unexpected and unwelcome answers.

The simple truth is that while Wallas sought help from behavioural psychology, he was never himself a behavioural psychologist. He was throughout his life what he was from the beginning, a nineteenth-century moralist, distressed by the terrifying human consequences of the economics of the Great Society. He looked to the twentieth century for methodologies to resolve the problems of society, but they were always unfamiliar methodologies. He seemed confident that new discoveries in biology, in psychology, and in social statistics would provide the answers he sought, but he preferred that others should follow his guidance in actually applying the new discoveries. For himself it was enough to keep reaffirming the goal which lay behind everything he did – in both

his teaching and in his writing. Always he asked how it might be possible to remake the modern industrial city into a place where ordinary human beings could live lives of reasonable happiness and dignity. He taught, he preached, and he reasoned with this one fixed purpose in mind.

This is what Wallas meant by the new *polis* in the Great Society. Because throughout his writings there is a steady reiteration of this theme, it is important to appreciate exactly what it involves. We must understand that Athens was a model, not of institutional arrangements or civic administration, but of a certain spirit permeating the relationships of citizen to citizen and of citizen to State. Wallas had no far-fetched plans for rebuildingLondon on Athenian lines, for dividing the city into tribes and demes, or for reintroducing slavery, nor did he admire the ridiculously inefficient system of Athenian public finance. It was thus not simply an ancient Greek city, a relic of a past long gone, that Wallas loved. It was the *polis*, as exemplifying a particular life-style, a moral community of voluntarily shared social responsibilities, that attracted him. Of course Periclean Athens was not the only possible moral community, nor was it a community without defects of its own. Many other elements more appropriate to the changing scale of human society, and recognising technological change and international responsibility, contributed to Wallas' vision of such society. But Athens was a convenient short-hand reference to what he had in mind. When he wrote of the *polis*, or of Athens, or of Pericles, he could expect most of his generation to know what he was talking about. Wallas' intellectual circle, those of his time for whom he primarily wrote, had almost all been educated in the same classical tradition. He was himself a colleague of, and had extensive correspondence with, Alfred Zimmern, author of the widely acclaimed study, *The Greek Commonwealth*.[30] Thus when Wallas spoke of the *polis* he could be understood, without going into extensive detail.

It should be clear from what has already been written what this concept of *polis* meant to Wallas, but perhaps a summary is necessary to pull together a number of strands. The primary idea , the force of the whole vision, is a reaction against the liberal-capitalist stress on material possessions, where a man's worth is measured by the cash value of the things he owns. It was not so much what industrial capitalism did that offended, but the spirit with which it did it. Wallas was no religious primitive who rejected

all technological innovation. He did not wish to reverse or deny the twentieth century. Industrialisation, urbanisation, population growth, and national States were facts which had to be accepted. A literal rebuilding of the Athenian *polis* was therefore impossible. But one might be able to infuse modern society with the spirit of Athens, to recall from Aristotle that while the State originated in the bare needs of life, it continued to exist for the sake of the good life. This was the lesson the Great Society had forgotten and unless it remembered it, unless the Great Society turned its resources to building the Good Society, it would collapse.

The Good Society would be one in which all men could find pride and satisfaction in their work, where life was lived with zest and purpose, and in particular, a society in which competitive acquisitiveness would be replaced by voluntary cooperation in a shared venture. The venture itself was a total life of moral and aesthetic purpose in which production and consumption were a means to a richer living shared by all men, not simply the sole end of life for a favoured few.

Wallas' collectivism therefore was more a reaction to the crude materialism of laissez-faire than coherent socialist gospel. Mack accurately described him as 'the apostle of resurrected individualism',[31] who saw individual liberty, defined as the capacity to secure an enlargement of the human spirit, better secured through collective social action than through the competitive machinery of the market. The message of *Human Nature in Politics* was that unchecked individualism resulted in the concentration of the instruments of democratic control, especially the mass media, in the hands of the wealthy few who showed no disposition to use them for the general good. A revived sense of community, of social good, leading to collective action, was the necessary step for returning power to the community at large. The common good, the 'greatest happiness of the great number', required collective social action and collective social institutions to make such action more efficient. This, too, was a doctrine that appealed to the left-wing Progressives in the United States. Kenneth McNaught has noted that to many American socialists, 'Graham Wallas expressed what seemed best in British radicalism, particularly the challenging idea of an intellectual elite's social responsibility'.[32] Walter Lippmann in particular assumed the role of leading American voice of Wallas' brand of Fabian socialism. But after a discouraging experience in practical municipal politics in 1912 Lippmann, while remaining

emotionally sympathetic, moved away from any overt espousal of socialist policies. America in the years after the First World War was not a fertile soil for British socialist ideas.

Later, the experience of the war and the rising dictatorships in Russia and Italy, forced Wallas into a growing mood of pessimism about his own socialism. The utopian vision remained, but he became increasingly doubtful of the efficacy of institutional reforms in bringing about the necessary changes. The dictatorships also compelled Wallas to modify his previous optimism about the consequences of collectivism. Individualism had demonstrably failed, but it was no longer possible to maintain that collectivism automatically meant a freer, fuller life. In later years he preached more, but offered fewer practical solutions. At the end Wallas was, as he began, an evangelical humanitarian. A psychological science of politics, reformed political institutions, the elimination of inherited political-social influence, collectivism, a new art of thought, were all merely means to that end, to be used only to the extent that they might be productive in making the world a more beautiful, interesting, and fulfilling place. A world, in short, in which people could be happy.

Through the many years he was a teacher, hundreds of people came under Wallas' influence. Many owed their first impulses to creative work to his inspiration, and many have recorded their indebtedness to him. There is universal agreement that he had few rivals as a teacher, principally because he was a most kindly human being, with a genuine interest both in his subject matter and in those he taught. He was rather slow-working, patient, sometimes given to an unself-conscious pomposity, fond of lecturing humanity on its failings, but in a spirit of generous forgiveness and understanding rather than spite. He warned in order to improve. As Gilbert Murray expressed it, 'He was always studying human nature, always amused by it, laughing at it, but not bitter about it; studying in order to help, not to destroy'.[33] He mistrusted the abstract and the metaphysical, preferring to set his principles in the world of direct sense experience. He was an eclectic with a wide-ranging imagination and interest so that he was able to inspire and stimulate, but he was insufficiently systematic, too cautious about the use of universals, to be a genuine inventor. He led others to do much more than he ever did himself. One is perhaps left with Laski's verdict:

> Did I remark to you that I am beginning to discover that there is a genuinely English mind? I see that when I talk to Wallas, who is full of real insights, can never concentrate on any subject, never argue about it abstractly, is always driven to the use of concrete illustration, is rarely logical and about eight times out of ten patently in the right.[34]

It may be that a new generation, dissatisfied with the apparent sterile amoralism of behavioural political science, is ready once more to listen to the moral conviction which motivated Wallas. There seems at the time this is being written a turning away from barrenness of a 'value-free' social science, and a new readiness to accept that social activity without social purpose is essentially unrewarding. There is no rejection of behaviouralism, but among a growing number there exists a feeling that empirical research unsupported by moral conviction is a barren enterprise. There is, perhaps, a new age, willing not only to read *Human Nature in Politics*, as a kind of historical-intellectual curiosity, but also *The Great Society*, and *Our Social Heritage*, as the starting-point for reflection on the purpose of political activity, to ask not only 'how?' but also 'why?' Since the 1960s there has been a new concern for the quality of life in Western society. The traditional assumptions of the universal benefits accruing from expanded industrial production and the increased quantity and variety of material consumption, are under fierce attack. More, and bigger, and better, are no longer accepted as synonymous terms. Those who live in modern cities, especially in North America, are more than ever prepared to admit that material progress and technological innovation do not automatically produce happiness and social harmony. A growing awareness of the limits of our natural resources has given us a totally new perspective on the values of conservation. And increasingly the prices we have to pay for industrial growth – the price of pollution of lakes, and rivers, and the air, of the loss of open space, of sense of community, and the loss of peace, harmony, and privacy, seem too high. The new environmentalists, who articulate these concerns, share Wallas' fear that the Great Society is inimical to the Good Society. And, like Wallas, they want to recall the Good Society, to find, once again, the harmony of the *polis*. Wallas is thus likely to find today an audience more sympathetic, more willing to listen, than that of twenty or thirty years ago. Graham Wallas is perhaps more relevant today than any time since 1908.

Notes

CHAPTER 1

Note: The pagination for note references to Wallas' books is from the following editions: *Life of Francis Place*, 1918 revised edition; *Fabian Essays in Socialism*, 1948 Jubilee edition; *Human Nature in Politics*, 2nd English edition, 1910; *The Art of Thought*, 1931 reprint in the Jonathan Cape 'Life and Letters' series; *The Great Society* and *Our Social Heritage*, first London editions.

1. Introduction to John Ruskin, *The Two Paths* (London: 1907) reprinted in *Men and Ideas*, 75–80.
2. John Ruskin, *op. cit.*, 93–4.
3. 'The Future of Cowper-Templeism', *Nation*, 5, 24 July 1909, 597.
4. H. W. Nevinson, *Changes and Chances* (London: 1923) 30.
5. *Art of Thought*, 111; see also 289.
6. 'Let Youth But Know', *Speaker*, 20 January 1906, reprinted in *Men and Ideas*, 154.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *The Art of Thought*, 289.
9. 'Government', *Public Administration*, 6(1) 1928, 6.
10. Fragment on 'Education', Wallas Papers.
11. 'A Criticism of Froebelian Pedagogy', first published in *Child Life*, July 1901, and reprinted in *Men and Ideas*, 137.
12. 'Darwinism and Social Motive', *Inquirer*, 28 April 1906, and reprinted in *Men and Ideas*, 92.
13. *Human Nature in Politics*, 286.
14. M. J. Wiener, *Between Two Worlds: The Political Thought of Graham Wallas* (Oxford 1971) 8.
15. *Human Nature in Politics*, 187.
16. 'L. T. Hobhouse', a review of J. A. Hobson and Morris Ginsberg, *L. T. Hobhouse: His Life and Work, New Statesman and Nation*, 25 April 1931, 326.
17. 'The Education of Beatrice Webb', a review of Beatrice Webb, *My Apprenticeship*, *The Nation*, 38, 6 March 1926, 779.
18. Report of Wallas' Presidential Address to the Rationalist Press Association in 1926, *Literary Guide and Rationalist Review*, 361, July 1926.
19. Sidney Webb, 'Graham Wallas', *Economica*, 38(4), 1932, 403.
20. From a letter to Archibald Henderson, 3 January 1905, in *Bernard Shaw: Collected Letters, 1898–1910* (London: 1972) 490.
21. Beatrice Webb, *Our Partnership* (London: 1948) 123. Italics in original.
22. Max Beer, *A History of British Socialism* (London: 1953) two-volume reprint, II, 280.

23. A. M. McBriar, *Fabian Socialism and English Politics, 1884–1918* (London: 1966) 149.
24. MS notes, dated '1932', possibly intended for inclusion in *Social Judgement*, Wallas Papers.
25. See Wiener, *op. cit.*, 6.
26. Sir Sydney Caine, *A History of the Foundation of the London School of Economics and Political Science* (London: 1963).
27. London School of Economics, *Student Handbook, 1925*, 'An Historical Note'.
28. Beatrice Webb, *Our Partnership* (London: 1948) 86. Italics in the original.
29. 'A Library of Political Science', *Daily Chronicle*, 7 April 1896.
30. Caine, *op. cit.*, 39–40.
31. Wallas' original lectureship was designated the 'Hutchinson Trust Lectureship', because he was paid by the Trust instead of by the School. (See F. A. Hayek, 'The London School of Economics and Political Science, 1895–1945', *Economica*, New Series, 31(1), 1946, 3.)
32. H. J. Laski, 'Lowes Dickinson and Graham Wallas' (obituary notices), *Political Quarterly*, 3(4), 1932, 464.
33. *Life of Francis Place*, 37–8.
34. Review of the *Life of Francis Place* in *Pall Mall Gazette*, 17 February 1898.
35. From a review of the *Life of Francis Place*, in *Westminster Review*, April 1898, 462.
36. *Life of Francis Place*, 324n.
37. *Human Nature in Politics*, 121.
38. The *Life of Francis Place* was very widely reviewed. Wallas himself gathered more than fifty reviews together in a scrapbook, including one from the *Master Tailor and Cutters' Gazette* for September 1898, which noted with some pride that the hero was himself a tailor.
39. 'Physical and Social Sciences' (1930), from *Men and Ideas*, 208.
40. 'Effective Social Research', *New Republic*, 12: 8 September 1917, 156.
41. 'The Village Tragedy', Wallas' review of J. L. and Barbara Hammond, *The Village Labourer, 1760–1832*, in *The Nation*, 11 November 1911, 248.
42. J. Bentham, *Chrestomathia*, quoted by Wallas in 'Bentham as Political Inventor', (1926) and printed in *Men and Ideas*, 36.
43. 'Bentham as Political Inventor', *ibid.*, 36.
44. *Ibid.*, 33.
45. *Ibid.*, 34.
46. 'Jeremy Bentham', *Political Science Quarterly*, 38(1), 1923, 47.
47. Article on 'Bentham, Jeremy', in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (1930) 519.
48. *Ibid.*
49. From a speech at the Reform Club Banquet, 16 May 1928, on 'Philosophy', subsequently published by the Liberal Publication Department.
50. 'A Criticism of Froebelian Pedagogy', *Men and Ideas*, 139.
51. Beatrice Webb, *Our Partnership*, 37.

CHAPTER 2

1. See, for example, Max Beer, *A History of British Socialism*, vol. II, chap. xiv (1940); Margaret Cole, *The Story of Fabian Socialism* (1961); Anne Freemantle, *This Little Band of Prophets: The British Fabians* (1959); A. M. McBriar, *Fabian*

Socialism and English Politics, 1884–1918; and E. R. Pease, *The History of the Fabian Society* (1916).

2. Beer, *A History of British Socialism*, II, 274.
3. As quoted by Pease, *The History of the Fabian Society*, 32.
4. *Ibid.*, 34.
5. 'Socialists and the School Board', *Today*, 10: 1888, 126.
6. Bernard Shaw: The Basis of Socialism: Economic
   Bernard Shaw: The Transition to Social Democracy
   Sidney Webb: The Basis of Socialism: Historic
   William Clarke: The Basis of Socialism: Industrial
   Sydney Olivier: The Basis of Socialism: Moral
   Graham Wallas: Property Under Socialism
   Annie Besant: Industry Under Socialism
   Hubert Bland: The Outlook
7. Wallas Papers.
8. *The Art of Thought*, 299.
9. Pease, *The History of the Fabian Society*, 90–1.
10. McBriar, *op. cit.*, 73.
11. Sidney Webb, 'The Basis of Socialism: Historic', *Fabian Essays*, 32.
12. Wiener, *op. cit.*, 125.
13. See, for example, 'The American Analogy', *Independent Review*, November 1903.
14. Beer, *op. cit.*, II, 287.
15. From the syllabus to a lecture, 'Ends and Means in Democracy', 30 October 1930. Wallas Papers.
16. From the Introduction to R. M. Dawson, *The Principle of Official Independence* (London 1922), xiv.
17. 'Socialism and the Fabian Society' (a review of E. R. Pease, *The History of the Fabian Society*) *New Republic*, 24 June 1916, as reprinted in *Men and Ideas*, 104.
18. See 'Property Under Socialism', *Fabian Essays*, 125.
19. The policy of 'permeation', advocated most vigorously by Webb and Wallas, was opposed by other Fabians, including Hubert Bland.
20. 'Socialism and the Fabian Society', *Men and Ideas*, 103.
21. Pease, *op. cit.*, 24–5.
22. G. B. Shaw, *Shaw: An Autobiography 1856–1898*, selected from his writings by Stanley Weintraub, New York, 1969, 173–4.
23. McBriar, *op. cit.*, 11.
24. 'Socialism and the Fabian Society', *Men and Ideas*, 104.
25. Letter from Wallas to E. R. Pease, 4 February 1916. Wallas Papers. See also 'An Economic Eirenicon', *Today*, 1889, 80–6. Fabian economic theories are discussed at length in McBriar, *op. cit.*
26. Letter from Wallas to E. R. Pease, 4 February 1916. Wallas Papers.
27. 'Socialism and the Fabian Society', *Men and Ideas*, 105.
28. *Our Social Heritage*, 247.
29. *Ibid.*, 173.
30. Pease, *op. cit.*, 92.
31. 'Property Under Socialism', *Fabian Essays*, 124.
32. Wallas Papers.

33. From the *Basis* of the Fabian Society, 1887, printed as an Appendix to Pease, *op. cit.*, 269.
34. Beer, *op. cit.*, II, 285.
35. McBriar, *op. cit.*, 108.
36. 'Property Under Socialism', *Fabian Essays*, 126.
37. *Ibid.*, 130.
38. *Ibid.*, 126.
39. Memorandum to the Coal Industry Commission, 1919. Wallas Papers.
40. 'Property Under Socialism', *Fabian Essays*, 136.
41. From a highly critical review of A. T. Hadley, *Economic Problems of Democracy*, in *Economic Journal*, 33: December 1923, 524.
42. 'English Teachers' Organisations', *New Statesman*, 5: 25 September 1915, 586.
43. 'Property Under Socialism', *Fabian Essays*, 136.
44. From a review of R. H. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, in *Nation*, 29: 11 June 1921, 401.
45. 'The Beginning of Modern Socialism', *Sociological Review*, 3: 1910, 44–50.
46. 'Working Class Economics', summary of a lecture to the Fabian Society, 4 November 1892, published in *Fabian News*, December 1892, 37.
47. *The Great Society*, 393.
48. 'Property Under Socialism', *Fabian Essays*, 139.
49. M. P. Mack, 'Graham Wallas' New Individualism', *Western Political Quarterly*, 11(1), 1958, 19.
50. The Archives of the Fabian Society, now held by Nuffield College, Oxford, contain several letters from Wallas, disagreeing with the content of Fabian manifestos and pamphlets.
51. Letter of resignation, dated 24 January 1904, as published in *Fabian News*, 14(2), February 1904, 6–7.
52. Letter from Wallas to E. R. Pease, 24 January 1904. Fabian Archives, Nuffield College, Oxford.
53. Wiener, *op. cit.*, 38.
54. From H. G. Wells' review of *The Great Society*, in *The Nation*, 4 July 1914.
55. 'Socialism and the Fabian Society', *Men and Ideas*, 106.
56. Mack, *op. cit.*, 15.
57. Manuscript note, possibly intended for use in *Social Judgement*, Wallas Papers.
58. See 'English Teachers' Organisations', *New Statesman*, 5: 25 September 1915, 586–7.
59. *Ibid.*, 587.
60. *Ibid.* The LCC is the London County Council and the NUT is the National Union of Teachers.
61. Review of R. H. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, in *Nation and Athenaeum*, 11 June 1921, 401.
62. 'Property Under Socialism', *Fabian Essays*, 137.

CHAPTER 3

1. *Our Social Heritage*, 70.
2. Wiener, *op. cit.*, 38.
3. 'Socialists and the School Board', *Today*, 10: November 1888.

4. *Our Social Heritage*, 52.
5. 'Property Under Socialism', *Fabian Essays*, 137–8.
6. 'The Future of English Education in the Light of the Past', in H. B. Binns, *A Century of Education 1808–1908*, reprinted in *Men and Ideas*, 165.
7. *Ibid.*, 166.
8. *Ibid.*, 169.
9. 'The Local Authority for Secondary Education', *Speaker*, 16 March 1901.
10. *Ibid.*
11. From the MS of a lecture 'On Education' given in the Spring of 1886. The MS carries the additional notation, 'My First Public Lecture', Wallas Papers.
12. 'Socialists and the School Board', *Today*, 10: November 1888.
13. *Ibid.* See also 'The London School Board Election', *Speaker*, 27 October 1900.
14. See Wallas' lecture to the Fabian Society, 'The Coming School Board Election', as reported in *Fabian News*, 4: April 1894, 6.
15. For a very different approach to religious teaching, by a Fabian, see Beatrice Webb, *Our Partnership*, 241–2.
16. *Ibid.*, 257.
17. See the Report of Wallas' Presidential Address to the Rationalist Press Association in 1926, in *Literary Guide and Rationalist Review*, #361: July 1926.
18. 'Beyond the Reach of Objection or Controversy', *Nation*, 40: February 1927.
19. There are several good factual histories of English education which deal in detail with this complicated question. They include H. C. Barnard, *A History of English Education from 1760* (London: 1969) and Eric Eaglesham, *From School Board to Local Authority* (London: 1956). Wallas' own brief interpretation of this history is in his paper, 'The Future of English Education in the Light of the Past', published in 1908 as an Appendix to H. B. Binns, *A Century of Education, 1808–1908*, and reprinted in *Men and Ideas*, 163–74.
20. 'The Local Authority for Secondary Education', *Speaker*, 16 March 1901.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Hansard*, vol. IX, 798, 13 July 1807.
23. Quoted in 'The Local Authority in Secondary Education'.
24. Letter from Webb to Wallas, 6 September 1900. Wallas Papers.
25. 'Socialists and the School Board', *Today*, 10: November 1888.
26. From lecture 'On Education', 1886. Wallas Papers.
27. In *Atlantic Monthly*, November 1919. Cited in *Our Social Heritage*, 98.
28. *Art of Thought*, 231–2.
29. *Ibid.*, 285.
30. *Ibid.*, 270.
31. *Ibid.*, 271.
32. *Ibid.*, 268.
33. This was published in *Child Life*, July 1901, and reprinted in *Men and Ideas*, 133–150, under the title, 'A Criticism of Froebelian Pedagogy'.
34. *Ibid.*, 135.
35. Froebel, *The Education of Man*, translated by J. Jarvis, 1826, 5.
36. 'A Criticism of Froebelian Pedagogy', 137.
37. *Ibid.*, 138.
38. *Ibid.*, 144.
39. *Ibid.*, 148. The general attack on Froebel was renewed in *Our Social Heritage* in 1921, and in *The Art of Thought*, in 1926.

40. *The Great Society*, 185.
41. *The Art of Thought*, 23.
42. 'Physical and Social Sciences', Huxley Memorial Lecture, 1930, as printed in *Men and Ideas*, 201.
43. *The Art of Thought*, 25.
44. *The Great Society*, 191.
45. *The Art of Thought*, 228.
46. From 'Mental Training and the World Crisis', an address delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Association of University Women Teachers, 8 January 1924. *Men and Ideas*, 187–8. A great deal of the material from this paper reappears in *The Art of Thought*.
47. *The Art of Thought*, 28.
48. *Ibid.*, 288.
49. Letter to Elie Halevy, 7 April 1925. Wallas Papers.
50. From a letter to E. D. Adrian, the British physiologist, 14 August 1923. Wallas Papers.
51. *The Art of Thought*, 34–5.
52. Hormism was a term he derived from T. P. Nunn, *Education, its Duty and First Principles* (London: 1920).
53. *The Art of Thought*, 38.
54. *Ibid.*, 49.
55. 'Mental Training and the World Crisis', 188.
56. *The Art of Thought*, 54.
57. 'Mental Training and the World Crisis', 191.
58. *The Art of Thought*, 59.
59. *Our Social Heritage*, 44.
60. *The Art of Thought*, 232.
61. *Ibid.*, 79–80. Here he also acknowledged his indebtedness to Henri Poincaré, *Science and Method* (1914).
62. *Ibid.*, 82.
63. *Ibid.*, 86.
64. *Ibid.*, 87.
65. 'Mental Training and the World Crisis', 194.
66. *Ibid.*
67. *Our Social Heritage*, 53.
68. *The Great Society*, 194.
69. Fabian Lecture, 14 March 1892, 'The Conditions of Self-Government', reported in *Fabian News*, 2(2) April 1892, 5.
70. Letter to E. D. Adrian.
71. *The Art of Thought*, 109.
72. William James, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. 1, 244. As cited in *The Art of Thought*, 122–3.
73. 'A Gentile Hope for the Dreamers of All Races', – on the New Hebrew University in Jerusalem – *The New Palestine*, 27 March 1925, 316–7. During the 1920s Wallas was an enthusiastic supporter of the Zionist movement. In 1926 he was elected an Honorary Vice-President of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
74. *The Art of Thought*, 133.
75. *Ibid.*, 148–9.

76. *Ibid.*, 161.
77. *Ibid.*, 307.
78. *Human Nature in Politics*, 229–30.

CHAPTER 4

1. *Human Nature in Politics*, 2.
2. In his review of Alexander Kent, *The English Radicals*, in the *Speaker*, 21 October 1899.
3. Review of *Human Nature in Politics* in *The Commonwealth: A Christian Social Magazine*, 14: February 1909.
4. *Human Nature in Politics*, 4.
5. *Life of Francis Place*, 192.
6. 'Bentham as Political Inventor', *Contemporary Review*, 129: March 1926. From *Men and Ideas*, 44–5.
7. See, for example, his *Handbook of Poitical Fallacies*.
8. *Human Nature in Politics*, 13; see also 121.
9. See, in particular, *Social Judgement*, 88ff.
10. J. S. Mill, *Autobiography*, World's Classics Edition, 93.
11. *Ibid.*, 113.
12. Mack, *op. cit.*, 23.
13. *Manchester Guardian*, 10 August 1925. A review of H. J. Laski, *A Grammer of Politics*.
14. 'Aristotle on Wealth and Property', *Today*, 10: July 1888, 16.
15. Walter Lippman, *Preface to Politics*, New York, 1913, 78. See also G. D. H. Cole, 'A Disappointment', *Daily Herald*, 25 May 1921, cited in Wiener, *op. cit.*, 204–5.
16. Unpublished MS notes, dated '1932'. Wallas Papers.
17. *Human Nature in Politics*, 123.
18. *Ibid.*, 124.
19. 'The American Analogy' (a review of *Democracy and the Organisation of Political Parties*), *Independent Review*, 1: November 1903, 506. Note also the lengthy comments on Ostrogorski in *Human Nature in Politics*, 124–6.
20. 'The American Analogy', 507.
21. *Human Nature in Politics*, 125.
22. Letter from Ostrogorski to Wallas, 15 August 1909, Wallas Papers.
23. *Human Nature in Politics*, 126–7.
24. *Nation*, 17: May 1915.
25. 'The American Analogy', 508.
26. *Human Nature in Politics*, 12.
27. 'The American Analogy', 508.
28. *Ibid.*, 509.
29. *Human Nature in Politics*, 176–7.
30. 'The American Analogy', 509.
31. *Human Nature in Politics*, 99.
32. Wallas Papers.
33. *Human Nature in Politics*, 25.
34. The question of 'instincts' is further discussed in a paper in 1919, 'Instinct and

the Unconscious', *British Journal of Sociology*, 10: November 1919, 24–6.
35. Edmund Burke, 'Present State of the Nation', *Works*, I, 280.
36. *Holmes-Laski Letters* (London: 1953) 540. (Letter of 16 November 1923.)
37. *Human Nature in Politics*, 29–30.
38. *Human Nature in Politics*, 61ff.
39. *Ibid.*, 62.
40. The first use of the term 'propaganda' in English appears to be by W. T. Brande, in his *Dictionary of Science, Literature and Art*, in 1842. Wallas does not use the word at all in *Human Nature in Politics*, although he does use it the following year in a paper, 'The Money Power at War', *Nation*, I: 1909.
41. For a brief history of theoretical speculation on propaganda see T. H. Qualter, *Propaganda and Psychological Warfare* (New York: 1962).
42. *Human Nature in Politics*, 201.
43. *The Art of Thought*, 61.
44. *Human Nature in Politics*, 101.
45. *Ibid.*, 75.
46. *Ibid.*, 76.
47. *Ibid.*, 77.
48. *Ibid.*, 83–4
49. *Ibid.*, 218.
50. Mack, *op. cit.*, 15.
51. 'Reason' is used here in the sense of direct, conscious, logical inference.
52. *Human Nature in Politics*, 115.
53. 'Mental Training and the World Crisis', address delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Association of University Women Teachers, 8 January 1924. In *Men and Ideas*, 188.
54. Wallas was particularly impressed with the statistical methodology used by the biologist Karl Pearson, who did much pioneering work in normal distribution curves. See *Human Nature in Politics*, 132–3.
55. *Human Nature in Politics*, 245.
56. *Ibid.*, 155–6.
57. See Wallas' Preface to E. D. Simon, *A City Council from Within* (London 1926).
58. See Wallas' Inaugural Lecture to the Institute of Public Administration, 1927–8, published in *Public Administration*, 6(1) 1928, under the title, 'Government'.
59. Preface to Simon, *A City Council from Within*, vii.
60. From a review of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *English Local Government*, vols. II and III, *Economic Journal*, 18, June 1908.
61. Editorial in the *Manchester Guardian*, 2 March 1929.
62. *Human Nature in Politics*, 168–9.
63. *Our Social Heritage*, 108.
64. *Human Nature in Politics*, 167.
65. H. J. Ford, review of *Human Nature in Politics*, in *Yale Review*, May 1909, 102.
66. Wallas had co-sponsored Wells for membership of the Fabian Society. Wallas and Wells had spent time together in 1902 on a walking tour in Switzerland. A not-too-fictionalised account of this trip is given in Wells' *The New Machiavelli*, in which Wallas appears, thinly disguised, as Willersley.

CHAPTER 5

1. *The Great Society*, Preface.
2. Wallas Papers.
3. Mack, *op. cit.*, 18. The same point was made by M. J. Wiener: 'Wanting to reconstruct liberalism, Wallas found he had given unintentional comfort to his enemies. *Human Nature in Politics* had been introduced into a climate of opinion beginning to be deluged by a general wave of revolt against rationalism, and it was thus received as part of this wave.' *Between Two Worlds*, 131.
4. William McDougall, *Social Psychology* (1908), 44.
5. *The Great Society*, 44, fn 1.
6. *The Great Society*, 43.
7. As reported in *British Journal of Sociology*, October 1910, and cited in *The Great Society*, 44–5, fn 2.
8. *The Great Society*, 46. (Remember that this was published just before the outbreak of the First World War.)
9. Michael Oakeshott, 'Political Education', inaugural lecture at London School of Economics, 1951.
10. Thorstein Veblen, *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution* (New York: 1915) reviewed by Wallas in *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 30: 1915, 179–87.
11. *The Great Society*, 64.
12. MS notes from an undated lecture delivered between 1908 and 1914. Wallas Papers.
13. His review of the Hammonds' *The Village Labourer, 1760–1832* in *Nation*, 11 November 1911 (see Chapter 1) establishes that Wallas was fully cognizant of the harsh cruelties of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
14. MS notes from an undated lecture delivered between 1908 and 1914, Wallas Papers.
15. *Ibid.*
16. *Ibid.*
17. *The Great Society*, 7–8.
18. From a speech at Morley College, 14 November 1931.
19. 'The Economics of Human Welfare', a review of J. A. Hobson, *Work and Wealth: A Human Evaluation*, in *Nation*, 15: 27 June 1914, 495–6.
20. 'Occupational Recruiting', *Nation and Athenaeum*, 31 July 1926, 493.
21. *The Great Society*, 4.
22. *Ibid.*, 5.
23. *Ibid.*, 343.
24. *Ibid.*, 359.
25. *The Art if Thought*. 232.
26. His interest in the primitive antecedents of man's psychological make-up is well illustrated by his highly favourable review of Thorstein Veblen's *Imperial Germany* (see Note 10 above).
27. From Durant Drake's review of *The Great Society* in *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*. 12(1) 1915.
28. *The Great Society*, 21.
29. *Ibid.*, 22.
30. *Ibid.*, 8–9; see also 75.
31. E. Belfort Bax's review of *The Great Society* in *Justice*, October 1915.

32. *The Great Society*, 28–9.
33. Letter from William McDougall to Wallas, undated, but apparently written shortly after the end of the First World War. Wallas Papers. Unfortunately we do not have a copy of Wallas' response.
34. *The Great Society*, 33.
35. *The Great Society*, 74–5.
36. Sir Henry Maine, *Popular Government* (1885) 63, and cited in *The Great Society*, 75.
37. *The Great Society*, 78.
38. *Our Social Heritage*, 87.
39. From a review of Arthur Christensen, *Politics and Crowd Morality* in *Hibbert Journal*, 14, October 1915.
40. *The Great Society*, 125.
41. *Ibid.*, 132.
42. *Ibid.*, 136.
43. From a review of Arthur Christensen, *op. cit.*, 224–5.
44. *Ibid.*, 227.
45. From a review of Morris Ginsberg, *The Psychology of Society*, in *Clare Market Review*, 1921.
46. *Ibid.*
47. *Ibid.*
48. 'Physical and Social Science', the Huxley Memorial Lecture in 1930. From *Men and Ideas*, 203.
49. Sir Arthur Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World* (1928) 98. Cited by Wallas in 'Physical and Social Science', *Men and Ideas*, 204.
50. From an unpublished MS 1932. Possibly intended for *Social Judgement*.
51. *The Great Society*, 249.

CHAPTER 6

1. Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations* (London: 1964) vol. 1, 12. Wallas' early familiarity with Smith's work is indicated in his review of John Rae, *Life of Adam Smith* in *Daily Chronicle*, 28 May 1895.
2. *The Great Society*, 254–5.
3. *Ibid.*, 251.
4. 'The Economics of Human Welfare', a review of J. A. Hobson, *Work and Wealth: A Human Valuation*, in *Nation*, 15: 27 June 1914, 496.
5. *The Art of Thought*, 36.
6. *The Great Society*, 252.
7. *Ibid.*, 252–3.
8. *Ibid.*, 256.
9. *Ibid.*, 293.
10. 'Remember 1880', *Speaker*, 27 January 1906.
11. Cited by Wallas in *The Great Society*, 282.
12. 'Parliament and the Report on the Civil Service', published anonymously in *New Statesman*, 25 April 1914.
13. Preface to Simon, *op. cit.*, xiv.
14. 'Parliament and the Report of the Civil Service.'

15. Prospectus for 'The Limits to Political Democracy', a lecture at King's Hall, London, 28 October 1921. It was the first in a series of six lectures on 'The Limitations of Social Democracy'. The other lecturers were G. D. H. Cole, Lord Haldane, Sidney Webb, A. E. Davis, and G. B. Shaw.
16. *The Great Society*, 316.
17. The circumstances leading to the development of modern propaganda, as adapted from some of Wallas' ideas, are more fully developed in Qualter, *op. cit.*
18. Ernest Barker, *Political Thought in England, 1848–1914*, 232.
19. *The Great Society*, 299–300.
20. A. D. Lindsay's review of *The Great Society* in *Political Quarterly*, September 1914.
21. *The Great Society*, 306.
22. *Ibid.*, 307–8.
23. *Ibid.*, 311.
24. *Ibid.*
25. *Ibid.*, 315.
26. Mrs Besant's 'Industry under Socialism' was one of the original Fabian Essays. See *The Great Society*, 323.
27. *The Great Society*, 321.
28. In *Human Nature in Politics* and in 'Syndicalism', *Sociological Review*, 5: 1912, 248–50.
29. *Our Social Heritage*, 107.
30. *Ibid.*, 117.
31. *Ibid.*, 122.
32. From *Daily News*, 4 August 1915. Cited in *Our Social Heritage*, 122.
33. *Our Social Heritage*, 124.
34. See also, for example, a short article, 'English Teachers' Organisations', *New Statesman*, 5: 25 September 1915, 586–7, which is critical of granting too much internal authority to professional teachers' organisations.
35. *The Great Society*, 329.
36. *The Art of Thought*, 24.
37. *The Great Society*, 341.
38. Letter, 16 March 1909, to A. E. Zimmern. Wallas Papers.
39. *The Great Society*, 343.
40. *Ibid.*, 344.
41. *Ibid.*, 350.
42. *Our Social Heritage*, 24–5.
43. *Our Social Heritage*, 19. To this Wallas added his own footnote: 'This statement does not, of course, involve any Lamarckian assumption of the biological inheritability of acquired characteristics. It is only necessary to assume (a) that those families which were more able to acquire and hand down social heritage would tend to survive, and (b) that those parts of our bodily and nervous structure which the existence of the social heritage rendered unnecessary or less necessary for survival would tend to degenerate.'
44. *Ibid.*, 20.
45. *Ibid.*, 87.
46. *Ibid.*, 90.
47. *Ibid.*, 201.

48. *Ibid.*, 101.
49. *Ibid.*, 103.
50. From George Sampson's review of *Our Social Heritage*, in *The Bookman*, 60: 1921, 100.
51. *Our Social Heritage*, 240.
52. *Ibid.*, 241.
53. *Ibid.*, 248.
54. *Ibid.*, 250.
55. *Ibid.*, 255.
56. *Ibid.*, 283.

CHAPTER 7

1. H. J. Laski, 'Lowes Dickinson and Graham Wallas', *Political Quarterly*, 3(4) 1932, 465.
2. *The Blasphemy Laws*, Verbatim Report of a deputation to the Home Secretary, 7 November 1929, published by the Society for the Abolition of the Blasphemy Laws.
3. Letter to Herbert Samuel, 27 October 1916. Wallas Papers.
4. Draft of a letter to a Dr Larsson, in Stockholm, dated 11 November 1914, but marked by Wallas, 'Not sent'. Wallas Papers.
5. 'The Price of Intolerance', *Atlantic Monthly*, 125: January 1920, from *Men and Ideas*, 109.
6. *Ibid.*, 113.
7. F. A. Hayek, *Road to Serfdom* (London: 1944).
8. 'English Teachers' Organisations', *New Statesman*, 5: 25 September 1915, 587.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *The Great Society*, 380–1.
11. *Ibid.*, 381.
12. T. H. Green, Lecture on 'Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract', 1881.
13. E. H. Carr, *The New Society* (1951) Beacon Press Edition, 109.
14. *Our Social Heritage*, 162.
15. *Ibid.*, 164.
16. J. S. Mill, *On Liberty*, Everyman Edition (London: 1948) 73.
17. *Our Social Heritage*, 168.
18. *Ibid.*, 166–7.
19. From the prospectus for a lecture, 'The Ends and Means of Democracy', 30 October 1930, Wallas Papers.
20. 'Government', *Public Administration*, 6(1) 1928, 3.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Our Social Heritage*, 183.
23. Jeremy Bentham, 'Essay on the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen' (1791).
24. H. R. G. Greaves, review of Wiener, *Between Two Worlds*, in *Political Quarterly*, 1972, 124.
25. 'The American Analogy', *Independent Review*, 1: November 1903, 511.
26. E. S. Corwin, 'The Democratic Dogma and the Future of Political Science', *American Political Science Review*, 23(3) 1929, 579.

27. Letter to a Mr Fosdick, 25 November 1928. Wallas Papers.
28. A. D. Lindsay, review of *The Great Society*, in *Political Quarterly*, September 1914.
29. Letter from Ernest Barker to Wallas, 15 July 1914. Wallas Papers.
30. Alfred Zimmern, *The Greek Commonwealth*, first published in 1911. In the Preface to the first edition Zimmern acknowledged the 'help and encouragement' he had received from 'my old teacher and present colleague, Mr. Graham Wallas'.
31. Mack, *op. cit.*, 14.
32. Kenneth McNaught, 'American Progressives and the Great Society', *Journal of American History*, 53: 1966–7, 512.
33. Gilbert Murray, Preface to *Men and Ideas*, 6.
34. Letter from Laski to Holmes, 28 December 1920. *Holmes-Laski Letters*, 303.

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A. PUBLISHED WRITINGS AND MAJOR REPORTED PUBLIC LECTURES

This is based on the first listing of the writings of Graham Wallas as compiled by M. J. Wiener (*Between Two Worlds*, 217–21). Although a number of additional items have been added it is doubtful if even yet the listing is complete.

'Personal Duty Under the Present System', *Practical Socialist*, July 1886, 118–20, and August 1886, 124–5.

'Aristotle on Wealth and Property', *Today*, 10: July 1888, 16–20, and August 1888, 49–53.

'The Chartist Movement', *Our Corner*, 12: August 1888, 111–8, and September 1888, 129–40.

'Socialists and the School Board', *Today*, 10: November 1888, 126–32.

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What to Read, Fabian Tract # 29, first edition, 1891, fourth revised edition, October 1901.

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'Working Class Economics', a summary of a lecture delivered on 4 November 1892, and printed in *Fabian News*, 2(10) December 1892, 37.

'Origins of English Local Government', a summary of a lecture delivered on 15 July 1892, and printed in *Fabian News*, 2(6) August 1892, 22.

'The Coming School Board Election', a summary of a lecture delivered on 16 March 1894, and printed in *Fabian News*, 4(2) April 1894, 6.

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'The Local Authority for Secondary Education', *Speaker*, 16 March 1901.

'Religion and Empire', *Inquirer*, 29 June 1901.

'A Criticism of Froebelian Pedagogy', *Child Life*, July 1901, reprinted in *Men and Ideas*, 133–50.

'Local and Central Government: Their Relation in Education', *Morning Post*, 17 October 1902.

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'London Education Bill: Its Administrative Futility', *Morning Post*, 9 April 1903.

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Index

Adderley, Charles, 55
administration, public, 38, 42, 98, 130–2, 136, 147, 162
  civil service, 20, 29, 98–9, 131–2, 161–2
Adrian, A. D., 178
advertising, *see under* propaganda
Alderson, Mr Justice, 19
anarchism, 28
Anglo-German Friendship Society, 155
anthropology, 83, 113
anti-clericalism, *see under* religion
Aristotle, 4, 5, 6, 9, 69, 82, 94, 100, 142, 170, 179
art, social role, 48, 108–10
art of thought, *see under* thought
Art of Thought, The, 19, 56, 57, 63–76, 92, 93, 112–13, 127, 128, 136, 141
association, psychology of, *see under* psychology
Austin, John, 34

Bagehot, Walter, 22, 90, 117, 152–3
Barker, Ernest, 85, 167, 183, 185
Barnard, H. C., 177
Bax, E. Belfort, 181
Beer, Max, 25, 29, 173, 174, 175, 176
behaviour, *see under* psychology
Bennett, Arnold, 140
Bentham, Jeremy
  association with Francis Place, 16
  influence on Wallas, 9, 20, 128, 154, 162, 184
  political invention, 19–20, 99, 174
  psychology, 20–2, 66, 78–80, 83, 86, 105, 117, 144, 174, 179
  social reformer, 21
Bernstein, Edward, 155
Besant, Annie, 139, 175, 183
Binns, H. H., 177
biological inheritance, *see under* inheritance
biology, *see under* science, biological
Bland, Hubert, 25, 27, 175
Brande, W. T., 180
British Library of Political Science, 13
British Medical Association, 44
British Neutrality Committee, 144
Bryce, James, 85, 86, 88
Bunyan, John, 40
Burke, Edmund, 89–90, 95, 180
Burnham, James, 87
Butler, Samuel, 3

cabinet government, 131–2
Caine, Sir Sydney, 12, 13, 174
capitalism
  discrediting democracy, 149–50
  political/social consequences, 23, 36–8, 40, 45, 79, 100, 109–10, 126, 137–8, 148, 149, 169–70
  see also under liberalism
Carr, E. H., 158, 184
Chartist Movement, 16
Christensen, Arthur, 119–21, 182
Christianity, *see under* religion
civil rights and liberties, *see under* liberty
civil service, *see under* administration, public
Clarke, William, 26, 175
class, social/political
  aristocracy, 29
  education and the class system, 50–2, 54–6, 149–50
  effect on democracy, 134–5, 139, 149–50
  Fabian approach to, 10, 31, 138
  liberal view of, 108
  Marxist concept, 126

class, social/political (*Contd*)
middle class, 55, 159
working class, 10, 16, 31, 51–2, 54–6, 134–5, 149–50
clericalism, *see under* religion
Coal Industry Commission, 36, 176
Cole, G. D. H., 140, 179, 183
Cole, Margaret, 174
collectivism
collectivist propaganda, 133
collectivist society, 38, 102, 138–9, 141, 156
Wallas' collectivism, *see under* Wallas
complexity of life, *see under* Wallas, philosophy of life
Comte, Auguste, 22, 117
Conservative Party, 52
consumption, *see under* Great Society
cooperation
international, 148–9
social, 118, 125, 133, 146–8, 170
Corwin, E. S., 184
Cowper-Templeism, 173
Crossman, R. H. S., 132
crowd psychology, *see under* psychology
Darwin, Charles
influence, 5–7, 9, 22, 59, 83, 90, 166, 173
philosophy and method, 6, 61, 90, 151, 165–6
psychology, 79, 82–3, 86, 166
social Darwinism, 83, 115
Davidson, Thomas, 25
Davis, A. E., 183
Dawson, R. M., 175
democracy
belief in, 44, 78, 95, 96, 101–2, 106, 163–4, 165
contradiction between theory and practice, 75–6, 77–82, 86, 93, 103, 133–4, 148–9, 163–4
development, 17
education and, 50–2, 54–7, 75
effect on class, 134–5, 139, 149–50
Fabian attitude to, 10–11, 28–30, 42, 132, 163
'ideal type', 85, 88
impossibility of, 82, 87
machinery, 131–4, 139
nature of, 29–30, 57, 75, 96–7, 131–2
threats to, 120, 151
Wallas' concept of, 28, 42, 44, 79–82, 88, 96–7, 101, 133–4, 138, 162–4
de Tocqueville, Alexis, 75, 155
Devon, 1, 39, 108
Diogenes, 21
dispositions, *see under* psychology
Disraeli, Benjamin, 147
Drake, Durant, 181
Durham, Lord, 17
Durkheim, Emile, 112

Eaglesham, Eric, 177
Easton, David, 96
economics
Fabian economics, *see under* Fabian Socialism study of, 88, 122
Eddington, Sir Arthur, 122, 182
education
administration and policy, 14, 41, 44, 45, 57, 75, 163
class basis, 50–2, 54–6, 149–50
clerical influence and control, 2–3, 8, 11, 47, 52–4
compulsory, 58–9
curriculum, 49–50, 53, 54–6
in the United States, 57, 70–1
instrument of social change, 34, 45, 47–8, 51, 59, 74, 149
philosophy of, 48–62, 70–1, 74–5, 152–3
propaganda, 51, 59, 74, 91
public school, 3–5, 47, 70
elections and electioneering, 43–4, 75–6, 78, 95, 133
elitism, 31, 42, 101, 102, 132, 163
Emergency Committee for the Assistance of Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians in Distress, 155
emotions, *see under* psychology
Engels, Friedrich, 31
entities, political, 91–7
environment, influence of, 57, 60–1, 90–1, 93–4, 108, 145, 147, 166, 172
equality, economic and social, 138–9, 147, 154, 158, 160

evangelism, *see under* religion

Fabian Essays in Socialism, 25–8, 34, 36, 37–40, 45, 48
Fabian Socialism,
  administration, science of, 29, 38, 42, 132, 162
  attraction for Wallas, 2, 9, 10, 26, 38, 40, 97, 102, 110, 120, 139
  class attitudes, 10, 31, 138
  democracy, 10–11, 28–30, 42, 132, 163
  economic theory, 31–6, 40, 139
  education, 34, 50–1, 55–6
  elitism, 31, 42, 132, 163
  gradualism, 28, 30–1, 32, 34, 51
  history, theory of, 33–4
  influence in United States, 170–1
  London School of Economics, 12–13
  Marxism, opposition to, 10–11, 31–4
  pragmatism, 11, 17, 29, 35
  role of the State, 28, 35–6
  social science methodology, 88, 97
Fabian Society, 5, 9, 10–11, 25–42, 97, 110, 140, 164, 166
  Fabian junta, 23
Fascism, 155
Fellowship of the New Life, 25–6
Ford, H. J., 180
Fosdick, Mr, 185
freedom, *see under* liberty
Freemantle, Anne, 174
Freud, Sigmund, 81, 82
Froebel, Friedrich, 59–62, 173, 174, 177

George, Henry, 9, 34–5
Germany, 155, 157
Giddy, Davies, 54
Gilkes, A. H., 4
Ginsberg, Morris, 173, 182
Godwin, William, 144
Good Society
  character of, 9, 29, 110–13, 123, 160, 162, 164, 170, 172
  obstacles to, 36–7, 108, 113, 123, 141, 148, 153
  social goal, 4, 30, 38–9, 100, 107, 123, 142–3, 160, 162, 164–5, 170
  see also under Polis
government, study of, *see under* political science
gradualism, *see under* Fabian Socialism
Great Society
  character of, 57–8, 108–9, 111–13, 123–4, 125–6, 129–30, 132, 136, 142, 145–8, 162, 169, 172
  consumption in, 160, 170
  outlook, 63, 110, 113, 144, 169, 170, 172
  problems, 68, 130, 132, 137–8, 141, 153, 156, 168
  see also under urban-industrial society
Great Society, The, 39, 44, 62–4, 66–8, 71, 74, 89, 103–7, 110, 113–21, 123, 125–6, 139, 140, 142, 144, 145, 149, 157, 166, 167, 172
Greaves, H. R. G., 184
Green, T. H., 7–8, 33, 126, 158, 184
Guild Socialism, 43–5, 140–1, 150
guilds, 44, 140–52

habit, psychology of, *see under* psychology
Hadley, A. T., 176
Haldane, Lord, 183
Halevy, Elie, 65, 178
Hammond, J. L., and Barbara, 18–19, 174, 181
Hampstead Group, 26, 32
happiness
  organisation, *see under* organisation, happiness
  social goal, 29, 39–40, 104, 112, 113, 128, 142–4, 147, 157–8, 163, 165, 170, 171, 172
harmony, social/psychological, 39, 74, 112, 160, 172
Hayek, F. A., 156, 174, 184
Hegel, G. W., 126, 127, 144
Helmholtz, Herman von, 69
Henderson, Archibald, 173
Hewins, W. A. S., 13
history, nature and method, 18, 33–4, 36, 137
Hobbes, Thomas, 5, 22, 117, 151
Hobhouse, L. T., 173

Hobson, J. A., 110–11, 173, 181, 182
Holmes, Mr Justice, 90, 185
hormism, 66, 178
human nature, 6, 18, 21, 22, 43, 79, 84–6, 90–2, 95, 97, 103, 106, 171
  nature and nurture, 144–7, 160
Human Nature in Politics, 17, 23, 30, 44, 65–6, 76, 81–4, 89, 96–101, 103–7, 114, 119, 134, 151, 164, 165, 170, 172
Hutchison, H. H., 12–13, 174

Ibsen, Henrik, 48
idealism, philosophic, *see under* philosophy
imitation, *see under* psychology
India, 147
individualism
  characteristic of Wallas, *see under* Wallas, individualism
  liberal, *see under* liberalism
industrial revolution, 1, 112
industrial society, industrialisation, *see under* urban-industrial society
inheritance
  biological, 144–7, 160
  social, 144–53, 159
instincts, *see under* psychology
intellectualism
  intellectualist fallacy, 23, 82, 92, 93, 95, 96, 103–4, 119, 134
  rejection of anti-intellectualism, 96–7, 103, 105–7, 117, 119, 165
  Utilitarian, 80
  see also under psychology, behaviour
international cooperation, *see under* cooperation
international organisation, *see under* organisation
invention, social/political,
  Bentham, 9, 19–21, 99
  need for, 20–1, 62, 133, 161
  science of, 22, 161
Italy, 155, 171

James, William, 72, 89, 93, 178
Japan, 147
Jevons, William S., 32
Jung, Karl, 82

Kent, Alexander, 179
knowledge, importance of, 15, 26, 62, 64

Labour unions, *see under* trade unions
Lamarck, Jean, 115, 118, 183
Larsson, Dr, 184
Laski, H. J., 14, 90, 154, 171–2, 174, 179, 184, 185
Lasswell, Harold, 96
Lazarsfeld, Paul F., 96
League of Nations, 148, 155
Le Bon, Gustave, 82, 117, 120
legal profession, 44, 140–1
Lenin, V. I., 40, 149
liberalism
  Fabian attitude to, 10–11
  individualism, 11, 102, 120, 137–8, 141, 156
  laissez-faire, 28
  rationalism, 23, 29, 66, 83–4, 108
  social/political consequences, 37, 171
  see also under capitalism
Liberal Party, 131
liberty
  civil, 154–6
  condition of happiness, 157, 160
  individual, 108, 156
  positive and negative, 160–2
  psychological state, 157–60
Life of Francis Place, 15–18, 22, 23, 26, 78
Lindsay, A. D., 167, 183, 185
Lippmann, Walter, 82, 167, 170–1, 179
local government, 20, 36, 98–9
Local Government Information Bureau, 41
London County Council, 14, 47, 75, 77, 176
London Mechanics' Institute, 17
London School Board, 14, 47, 58, 75, 77
London School of Economics and Political Science, 12–14, 23, 51, 107
London Society for University Extension, 12

Machiavelli, Niccolo, 85, 104
Mack, M. P., 40, 104, 170, 176, 179, 180, 181, 185

Maine, Sir Henry, 22, 117–18, 182
managerialism, 101
Marx, Karl and Marxism, 5, 10–11, 22, 28, 31–4, 36, 37, 40, 45–6, 65, 66, 81, 126
materialism, 36–7, 109–13, 148, 169–70, 172
Mazzini, Giuseppe, 145
McBriar, A. M., 28, 31, 174, 175, 176
McDougall, William, 104–6, 116, 120, 127, 181, 182
McNaught, Kenneth, 170, 185
mechanism, *see under* psychology
meritocracy, 29
Michels, Roberto, 87
Mill, James, 16, 19, 53, 78
Mill, John Stuart, 29, 75, 80–1, 83, 86, 95, 102, 122, 134, 159, 179, 184
monism, 23, 33–4, 66, 81, 120
  see also under reductionism
morality
  moral protest, 36–7, 126
  moral theory, 6, 96, 100–1, 104, 123, 136, 149, 152, 164–5, 167–8, 169
  personal, 3, 9, 25, 104, 172
  see also under political science, normative
Morris, William, 38, 109
Mosca, Gaetano, 87
Murray, Gilbert, 171, 185
Myers, C. S., 106

nationalisation, *see under* property, public and private
nationalism, 148–9, 170
National Union of Teachers, 44, 176
Neutrality Committee, 155
Nevinson, H. W., 3, 173
Newton, Isaac, 70, 122, 165
New Zealand, 39
nominalism, 33
Norway, 39
Nunn, T. P., 178

Oakeshott, Michael, 107, 181
Olivier, Sydney, 5, 9, 10, 26, 27, 31, 175
optimism – pessimism
  nineteenth century, 30, 77, 103
  Wallas', *see under* Wallas, optimism
organisation
  happiness, 128, 142–4
  international, 148–9
  professional, 44, 140–1
  social
    classification, 127–8
    creation of new, 126, 139, 149–50, 166
    forms of, 45–6, 63, 93, 100–1, 103, 107, 125–7, 137–8, 150–3
    individual liberty and, 157–9
    model, 39, 42
    organic/inorganic society, 45, 120, 126–7
  thought, 62, 128–36, 142
  vocational, *see under* Guild Socialism
  will, 42, 128, 131, 136–42
  see also under Great Society, urban-industrial society
organism, biological, 59, 66–7, 72, 90, 127
Ostrogorski, Moisei, 84–7, 88, 163, 179
Our Social Heritage, 33, 45, 48, 56, 57, 66, 100, 118, 123, 134, 140, 144–52, 158, 166, 172
Owen, Robert, 9, 38
Oxford University, 4–5, 7, 9

Pareto, Vilfredo, 82
parliament, 30, 131, 133–4
Parliamentary Reform Bill, 1832, 16, 17
Pearson, Karl, 180
Pease, Edward R., 27, 31, 32, 41, 175, 176
Pericles, 100, 153, 159, 169
philosophy
  Darwinian, *see under* Darwin
  metaphysics, idealism, 7, 8, 21, 33, 65, 114, 158
  role of, 21
  Wallas' philosophy of life, *see under* Wallas, philosophy of life
physiology, 65, 83, 114, 144, 146
Place, Francis, 15–17, 18, 19, 26, 78, 97
planning, economic and social, 156–7, 161
Plato, 21, 57, 86, 101, 102, 113
Poincaré, Henri, 178

Polis (Athens), 4, 9, 36, 39, 46, 48, 57, 94, 100, 113, 159, 162, 165, 169–70, 172
political behaviour, *see under* psychology
political culture, 73
political invention, *see under* invention, social/political
political parties, 84, 86, 94–6, 131, 163–4
political science
  need for quantitative methods, 88, 97–8, 100–1, 123, 152, 166, 168, 172
  normative, 87, 96, 100–1, 104, 123, 152, 164–5, 167–8, 172
  science of politics, 82, 84–101, 104, 164, 167–8
  traditional, 4, 5, 84–6, 167
  Wallas as political scientist, 10, 18, 23, 164–8
political socialisation, 73
progress, belief in, 103, 165
propaganda and public opinion, 91–6, 102, 134–6, 139, 148–9, 154, 180
  language, 92–3
  the Press, 134, 135, 150, 154, 170
  propaganda as education, 51, 59, 74, 91
  socialist, 12, 51, 133
property, public and private, 32, 35–6, 40, 137–40, 141
psychology
  acquired and inherited characteristics, 114–15, 145–7
  associational, 20, 69, 71, 92, 93–4, 95
  behaviour, 23, 68, 83, 87–92, 104–7, 113, 119, 125, 135–6, 146–8
  Bentham, *see under* Bentham
  crowd, 117, 119–20
  Darwin, *see under* Darwin
  determinism, 66, 71, 106, 117, 123, 151, 166
  dispositions, 63, 66, 68, 106, 108, 113–17, 144–5, 148, 151, 158, 163
  emotions, 71–2, 88, 92, 114
  habit, 72–4, 90, 92, 97, 105, 117–18, 147
  instincts, 22, 65, 66–7, 84, 89–90, 92, 104–6, 114, 117, 146, 148, 151
  liberty, 157–60
  mechanistic, 33, 65, 66, 97
  rights, 162
  social/political, 22, 81–4, 86–97, 101, 104, 107–8, 113–22, 136, 144–7, 164–5, 167
  suggestion, 117, 119–21
  teaching of, 121–2
  theories, 20–2, 66, 77–80, 82–3, 86, 117–21, 151
  thought, 65–76, 93, 136
  Wallas' practical knowledge and experience, 59, 65–6, 82–3, 121, 164, 166, 168
public administration, *see under* administration
public opinion, *see under* propaganda and public opinion
public ownership, *see under* property, public and private

Qualter, T. H., 180, 183

radicalism, 15–17, 170
Rae, John, 182
rationalism, 7, 8, 9, 11, 23, 52, 59
Rationalist Press Association, 173, 177
rational–non-rational behaviour, *see under* psychology, behaviour
reductionism, 21, 22, 33, 80–1, 96, 117, 118, 142
religion
  Anglican Church, 8, 11, 52–3, 152, 154
  Christianity, 3, 6, 7, 8–9, 52–3
  clericalism/anti-clericalism, 2–3, 8, 11, 47, 52–4
  evangelism, 1, 3, 9, 19, 23, 36
  influence on education, *see under* religion clericalism/anti-clericalism
  political/social force, 108, 109, 150, 152–3
  religious teaching, 3, 4, 53
  Roman Catholic Church, 8, 152
revolution, 10, 30, 34, 40, 45
Ricardo, David, 32

rights
civil, *see under* liberty, civil nature of, 162
Robbins, Lionel, 88
Rosebery, Lord, 132
Rousseau, J. J., 59, 126, 144
Royal Commission on Local Government, 99
Ruskin, John, 1–2, 19, 38, 173
Russell, Bertrand, 144, 154
Russia, 65, 171

Sampson, George, 184
Samuel, Herbert, 154, 184
science
biological, 22, 23, 60–1, 65, 79, 82–3, 85, 86, 90–1, 151, 165–6
physical, 63, 83, 121–2, 165
scientific method, 6, 7, 9, 63, 83, 88, 121–2, 152, 165–6
social, *see under*, anthropology, political science, psychology, and sociology
world outlook, 150–2
secularism, 7, 9, 23, 152
Senior, Nassau, 86
Sharp, Dallas, 57
Shaw, G. B., 5, 10, 12, 26, 27, 29, 31, 42, 173, 175, 183
Simon, E. D., 180, 182
Smith, Adam, 79, 125, 144, 182
social Darwinism, *see under* Darwin
social heritage, *see under* inheritance, social
socialism
democratic, 9, 137–8, 141
evangelical, 23, 36
ideals, 38–40, 110, 126, 170–1
propaganda, 12, 51, 133
see also under anarchism, collectivism, Fabian Socialism, Guild Socialism, Marx and Marxism, Syndicalism, utopian Socialism
Socialist League, 38
social justice and reform, 3, 6, 7, 10, 18, 19, 21, 25, 37–9, 59, 104, 110, 132, 138, 149, 154–6
social life, purpose of, 28, 37–9, 107, 110–11, 129, 142, 149, 162, 164–5, 170, 172
see also under, Good Society, and happiness, social goal
social organisation, *see under* organisation, social
social research techniques, 18, 22
Society for the Abolition of the Blasphemy Laws, 154, 184
sociology, science of, 82, 85, 166
Socrates, 6
Sorel, Georges, 82, 87
Spencer, Herbert, 115
State, the
concept, 4, 28, 33, 35–6, 92, 94, 111, 137, 139
positive – negative, 132, 160–2
statistics, social, *see under* political science, need for quantitative methods
Stoicism, 152
suggestion, *see under* psychology
symbolic communication, *see under* propaganda and public opinion
Syndicalism, 42, 43–5, 137, 139–41, 150

Tarde, Gabriel, 22, 117, 119–21
Tawney, R. H., 44, 176
Technical Education Board of London, 47
technology, technological change, 63, 91, 111–12, 125–6, 170, 172
thought
art of, 22, 64, 66–8, 162, 171
conscious/unconscious, 66–7, 69–72
disposition to think, 68, 106, 117
efficiency of, 62–3, 72–4, 135–6
importance of leisure, 70–1
necessity of new forms, 64, 68, 74, 118, 139, 156, 164
organisation, *see under* organisation, thought
psychology, 62, 65–72, 90, 93, 128–9
social and individual, 128–9
trade unions, 37, 42, 128, 141
tradition, 150, 152

United States of America
capitalism, 37

United States of America (*Contd*)
civil liberties, 155–6
Congress, 136
democracy, 77–8, 86
education, 57, 70–1
Fabian influence, 170–1
local government, 99
political science, 96, 167–8
Wallas' visits, 14, 37, 78, 99, 155–6, 167
United States Steel Corporation, 147
University of London, 48
urban-industrial society, 1, 42, 57, 71, 81, 91, 100, 108–9, 111, 123, 125, 135–6, 138, 143–7, 153, 161, 162, 170, 172
industrial efficiency, 111, 143–4
see also under Great Society
urbanisation, 48–9, 81, 99, 111, 112–13, 134
Utilitarians, 10, 78–81, 83, 84, 119, 142
see also under Bentham, James Mill, and J. S. Mill
utopian Socialists, 31, 38

Veblen, Thorstein, 107–8, 181
vocational organisations, *see under* Guild socialism

Wallas, Gilbert I., 1, 3, 47
Wallas, Graham
administration, public, 38, 98–9, 130–2, 161–2
administrative experience, 14, 47, 58, 70, 99–100, 130
art, social role, 48, 108–10
assessments of, 114–15, 153, 164–8, 170–2
biological sciences, 22, 23, 60–1, 65, 79, 82–3, 85, 86, 90–1, 165–6
birth and childhood, 1–4, 23, 108
British government, 131–4
capitalism, 23, 36–8, 40, 45, 79, 100, 109–10, 126, 137–8, 148, 149–50, 169–70
character and personality, 23–4, 171–2
class, social/political, 50–2, 54–6, 126, 134, 138, 149–50
collectivism, 38, 45, 102, 110, 126, 138–9, 156, 170–1
cooperation
international, 148–9
social, 125, 133, 146–9, 170
death, 14
democracy, 28–30, 42, 44, 50–2, 54–7, 75–6, 77–9, 80–2, 84–8, 93, 95–7, 101–2, 106, 120, 131–4, 138–9, 148–9, 151, 162–4, 165
economic theories, 31–3
education of, 3–5, 23, 47
education theory, 2–5, 8, 11, 14, 34, 41, 44, 45, 47–62, 70–1, 74–5, 91, 149, 150, 152–3, 163
elitism, 101, 102, 132
environment, influence, 57, 60–1, 90–1, 93–4, 108, 145
equality, economic and social, 138–9, 147, 154, 158, 160
Fabian Socialism, 2, 9–10, 26–42, 55, 102, 110, 120, 132, 139, 162, 163, 164
Fabian Society, 5, 10–11, 26, 30, 40, 41–3, 110, 140, 163, 164, 166
Good Society, *see under* Good Society
Great Society, *see under* Great Society
Guild Socialism, 43–5, 140–1, 150
happiness
organisation, 128, 142–4
social goal, 29, 39–40, 104, 112, 113, 128, 142–4, 147, 157–8, 163, 165, 170–2
harmony, social/psychological, 39, 74, 112, 160, 172
history and historical method, 18, 33–4, 36, 137
humanitarianism, 3, 48, 162, 171
human nature, 6, 18, 22, 43, 79, 84–6, 91–2, 95, 97, 103, 106, 144–7, 160, 171
individualism, 3, 29, 45–6, 83, 102, 120, 137–8, 141, 156, 165, 170
intellectualism, 23, 80, 82, 92–3, 95–7, 103–7, 117, 119, 134, 165
international organisation, 148–9
invention, social/political, 19–22, 62, 99, 133, 161
knowledge, importance, 26, 62, 64

liberalism, *see under* Wallas, individualism
liberty, individual and civil, 108, 154–62
local government, 36, 98–9
Marxism, 5, 22, 31–4, 36, 40, 45–6, 65, 66, 81, 126
materialism, 36–7, 109–13, 148, 169–70, 172
monism, 23, 33–4, 66, 81, 120
moralist, 3, 9, 36–7, 96, 100–1, 104, 123, 126, 136, 149, 152, 164–5, 167–9, 172
optimism – pessimism, 74, 123–4, 139, 144, 164, 171
organism, biological, 66–7, 72, 90, 127
philosophy
  metaphysics, 7, 8, 21, 33, 65, 114, 158, 171
  of life, 4, 7, 9, 22–3, 43, 45–6, 59, 62–3, 107, 142, 158, 168–72
physical science, 63, 83, 121–2, 165
political parties, 86, 94–6, 131, 163–4
political science, 4, 5, 82, 84–101, 104, 123, 152, 164, 167–8, 172
political scientist, 10, 18, 23, 164–8, 172
pragmatism, 7, 36, 66, 106, 116
propaganda and public opinion, 92–6, 134–6, 139, 148–9, 154
property, 34–6, 40, 137–40, 141
psychology, 20, 23, 33–4, 42, 59, 63–9, 71–4, 78–84, 86–97, 101, 104–8, 113–25, 135, 136, 144–52, 157–60, 164–8
rationalism, 7, 8, 9, 11, 23, 59
reductionism, 21, 22, 33, 80–1, 96, 117, 118, 142
religion, 1, 2, 3–4, 7–9, 11, 19, 36, 52–4, 104, 109, 150, 152–3, 154
  evangelical background, 3, 7, 9, 36, 171
  loss of faith, 2–3, 8, 23
rights, nature of, 162
science, 6, 7, 9, 23, 60–1, 82–3, 85, 88, 90–1, 121–2, 150–2, 165–6
secularism, 9, 23, 152
Social Darwinism, 83, 115
social heritage, 144–53, 159
socialism, 9, 23, 36–40, 126, 137–8, 141, 164, 170–1
  Fabianism, Guild Socialism, and Syndicalism
  see also under Wallas, collectivism
social justice and reform, 3, 7, 10, 18, 19, 21, 37–9, 59, 104, 110, 132, 138, 149, 154–6
social life, purpose, 37–9, 107, 110–11, 129, 142, 149, 157, 160, 162, 164–5, 170, 172
social organism, 39, 42, 45, 63, 93, 103, 107, 120, 125, 137–8, 149–53, 157–9, 166
State, in theory and purpose, 4, 33, 111, 132, 137, 139, 160–2, 171
Syndicalism, 43–5, 137, 139–41, 150
teacher, 4–5, 10, 11–12, 14, 23, 24, 47, 75, 171
technological change, 63, 91, 111–12, 125–6, 170, 172
thought
  art and psychology, 22, 62–74, 90, 93, 106, 117, 118, 128–9, 135–6, 139, 156, 162, 164, 171
  organisation, 62, 128–36, 142
United States, visits, 14, 37, 78, 99, 155–6, 167
urban-industrial society, 1, 57, 71, 81, 91, 108–9, 111, 123, 125, 135–6, 138, 143–7, 149, 153, 170
urbanisation, 48–9, 81, 99, 111, 112–13, 134
utopianism, 28, 39
will
  concept, 66–8, 71, 127, 146, 151–3, 165
  organisation, 42, 128, 131, 136–42
Zionism, 178
Wallas, May, 11
War, First World, 30, 43, 53, 144, 171
Webb, Beatrice, 10, 12–13, 23, 26, 52, 173, 174, 177
Webb, Sidney, 5, 9, 10, 12–13, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 52, 55, 163–4, 173, 175, 177, 183
Webb, Sidney and Beatrice, 42, 43, 110, 180

Wells, H. G., 101–2, 112, 176, 180
Wiener, M. J., 29, 173, 174, 176, 179, 181, 184
will
  concept, 66–7, 127, 151–3, 165
  conscious/unconscious, 66–8, 114, 146
  organisation, *see under* organisation, will
Workmen's Combination Acts, 16

Zimmern, Alfred E., 103, 142, 169, 183, 185
Zionism, 178