SHERMAN KENT

INTELLIGENCE

STRATEGIC

FOR NORTH AMERICAN WORLD POLICY

PLEAMAR EDITORIAL

Strategic Intelligence
For American World Police

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To my friends and colleagues in the Research and Analysis branch of the Office of Services Strategic.

To the Europe - Africa Division and especially to the old Africans.

R.A.W-, C.J.B., H.C.M., R.P.S., J.L.H., J.R., R.G.M., H.L.R., G.C., W.C., W.B.K., S.P.K., D.C., D.S. R.C., A. H. R., L.S.W. Honorary Africans.

P R E F A C E

This is a book about intelligence; not the intelligence that psychologists try to to measure in a specific human mind, but the type of intelligence that one must have strategist to outline their plans and carry them out. Intelligence, as I describe it, is the knowledge that our men, both civilian and military, who hold high positions, they must possess to safeguard national well-being.

Although there is a good dose of understandable mystery in it, intelligence is a simple thing that is evident in itself. As an activity, it is the pursuit of a certain kind of knowledge; as a phenomenon, it is the knowledge resulting. In a reduced scale, it is what we all do every day. When a housewife decides to stretch her budget, when a doctor diagnoses an ailment, when any staff takes a decision regarding a problem generally carries out preliminary work on intelligence. Sometimes the work is so simple and instinctive that the person does not recognize it. as intelligence, just like finding the right mechanic in the classified section of a telephone directory. Sometimes it is formal, arduous, and systematic, like Arthur's brilliant analysis. Koehler on the ladder, in the case of Lindbergh. But, whether done instinctively or through a conscious, skilled mental effort, intelligence work is not, essence, more than the search for a better and simpler answer.

As I will demonstrate in this book, strategic intelligence is an extension of that search for useful knowledge. The extent, however, is verified in several directions.

To begin with, the knowledge that strategic information must produce, it deserves a more prohibitive adjective than "useful." It could be called vital knowledge for national survival and as such it becomes dark and enormous. Then there is also the extensión en sutileza, porque algunos de los problemas relativos a la supervivencia national, involve great speculations about the strength and intentions of others states, the estimation of their probable responses to the acts that we ourselves We are ready to begin. These problems can only be resolved through techniques. specialist's expertise. This extension in experience or expertise is considerable. In the search for subtle knowledge, often difficult barriers arise, which are placed specially for other nations and disguising them requires methods that generally are not relatives to the average of people. These methods constitute a third extension class, which leads to the realm of clandestine investigations. (That said,

Step, this phase of the information work - the most dramatic - is generally exaggeratedly emphasized by the profane mind.

The latest extension is in the dimension of size. The knowledge that the strategic information must produce, it is very large in bulk, so large that, in time of war, hundreds of thousands of practical people can barely keep up with the work. In times of peace, the task is proportionately enormous. This means that the process of information becomes a group effort - as opposed to an individual one -; there must be a complicated and careful division of labor and, as a result, there are produced problems of personnel, organization, administration, and human relations, which are peculiar to the nature of the company and in no way characteristics of all the family and domestic searches for the truth.

Despite their importance, these extensions, as I have come to call them, are external to the bottom line; the work of information remains the simple and natural attempt to achieve the kind of knowledge on which a favorable course of action can be based. And we could qualify strategic information as the knowledge about which They must rest, both in war and in peace, the foreign relations of our Nation. If foreign policy is the shield of the Republic, as Walter has called it Lippmann, then strategic information is what puts the shield in place. suitable and at the right moment. It is also that which is ready or prepared. to guide the sword.

Never before, in our history of times of peace, have they been so high. the pulls of foreign policy. This would indicate that never before was it so it is important that the information mission was fulfilled appropriately. Not However, on the path of proper compliance, a core of confusions arises. that exist between those who produce information, those who use it and those Who are their beneficiaries: the citizens. Many of these confusions arise due to to the inaccuracies that have been created in the language of information and that were included in permanent form in the manuals. If the following pages contain new words to information work, if they seem improperly applied to their meaning, I allege, as once he did it John Locke, that 'may perhaps be criticized for irrelevant criticism, in a speech of this nature, to find erroneous words and names that have prevailed in the world. And it might still not be inappropriate to offer them new, when the old ones they can lead men to errors...

The plan of this book is simple. It is based on three distinct and independent things. which devotees of the information usually refer to when they mention the word. In the First Part, I consider information as a kind of knowledge ("What information have you obtained about the situation in Colombia?"). The chapters of this part deals with its wide and varied content.

In the Second Part, I consider information as the type of organization that produce knowledge ("Information could provide acting people, exactly what you desire). The chapters deal with the administrative and organizational problems of the central and departmental information.

The Third Part considers information as the activity pursued by the organization of information. ("Information - as a task - prior to planning "It must have been intense." In these chapters, I explain what the work means. information and the scope, which, in my opinion, have their peculiar problems.

With a book of this kind, the author is very connected with friends, associates and other people who consciously or unconsciously have contributed to its writing. Almost everything I have written here has been the subject of long discussions with the brotherhood of information. My general gratitude goes to my teachers and colleagues from what was once the "Office of Strategic Services": General Donovan, General Magruder, William L. Langer, Edward S. Mason, Rudolf Winnacker, Donald Mc Kay, Richard Hartshorne, Arthur Robinson and many others. Within a parenthesis particularly they would list Charlotte Bowman, John Sawyer, Robert Miner, Beverly Bowie and Bernard Brodie that they have read, re-read, edited, corrected, criticized, and suggested. Without his help, the composition work would have been really difficult. I want to thank Alfred Mc Cormack, another one of my former bosses due to his numerous and profound thoughts and suggestions and to Arnold Wolfers, Willmoore Kendall, Percy Corbett and Whitney Griswold, for reading the manuscript and for your kind advice.

To the command, to the general staff, and to the members of the first class of the School National War, where I had the honor of serving as one of the civilian instructors. residents, I owe my deepest thanks. The atmosphere of the school, the great kindness of its officials and the stimulating and enlightening discussions that were held, are points what I wish to express with gratitude. Without intending to attribute approval to them or disapproval regarding the content of this book, my thanks go to the vice admiral D. Harry W. Hill, to Major General D. Alfred M. Gruenther, to Major General D. Truman Landon and Mr. George Kennan. My thanks also to the brigadier generals. Timberlake and Picher and Colonels Werner, Sweeny, Tuitty, Wolfenbarger, Hertford and Moore and Captains Evenson and Wellings.

Most of the work was carried out during a scholarship I was awarded by the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation. Like all the colleagues from the I want to expressly express my thanks to that institution, my deep recognition of its generous and foresightful founders and its kind and efficient secretary General, Doctor Henry A. Moe.

I want to express my gratitude to George S. Pettee for any unconscious "loan" from his book The Future of American Secret Information (Washington D.C.) 1946), which served as a guide in the literature of strategic information. Although I I find myself in opposition to many of his opinions, all the devotees of the information, including myself, we owe gratitude for the promptness with which he formulated his own war experiences, taking them to the print.

I want to express my gratitude to my University (Yale) and to my Department. (History), to extend my license - due to absence - for another complete academic year, making it possible for me to focus on the work I had at hand.

Finally, I must thank the director of Princeton University Press, Datus Smith. for your interest in my project and your wise advice.

The notes extracted from Public Opinion, by Walter Lippmann, have been used with the kind permission of its publisher, the Macmillan Company.

SHERMAN KENT

Department of History, Yale University, October 1, 1948.

NOTE FOR THE SECOND EDITION

This second edition gives us the opportunity to introduce some corrections. less than the previous one. And it also allows for the inclusion of some very important lines.

This addition – which could very well be one of the reasons that cause one to lose the dream in the middle of the night - consists of remedying the regrettable omission of gratitude I owe to President James R. Baxter. From the handful of professionals with Who started the work of his organization, General Donovan, Mr. Baxter is one of those to whom we owe the most are those of us belonging to the Research and Analysis Branch. Not only because he was a key man in the organization, but because he was our first director. From him and his team, we learned those priceless lessons about the problems of intelligence, and with it we have huge gratitude for all the victories we achieved under your leadership, and those we obtained upon returning to your school, in full war. To him goes my belated, but heartfelt gratitude.

S.K.

Septiembre 1 de 1950.

First Part

INFORMATION IS KNOWLEDGE

CHAPTER I

INFORMATION IS KNOWLEDGE

Information means knowledge. If it cannot be made to encompass or signify all knowledge at least means a surprising quantity and assortment of knowledge. This book refers only to a total part, but, perhaps, the most part important. It refers to the part known in information work as 'information' "high-level foreign positive." This phrase is too brief to describe the kind of knowledge that our State must possess with respect to other States, in order to ensure that your cause will not suffer nor will your enterprises fail, because your men of The state and soldiers project and act in ignorance. This is the knowledge about the on which we base our high-level national policy towards other States in the world.

Note that what has been excluded. First, all knowledge of our own domestic scene. Foreign positive information is really "foreign" in its purpose, end, and substance. It has no relation to what happens inside. from the United States or in its territories or possessions. Secondly, everything is excluded. knowledge related to the function of the police. The word 'positive' enters into the phrase to denote that the information in question is not the so-called 'counter-information' and "counterintelligence" nor any other kind of information designed to uncover traitors domestic or imported foreign agents. The words 'high level' aim to exclude the so-called 'operational' information, tactical information, and information from small military information in battle, known as combat information. It what is the essential knowledge for our well-being and safety, which is both constructive knowledge with which we can work towards peace and freedom all over the mundo, como el conocimiento necesario para la defensa de nuestro país y sus ideales. Parte This knowledge can be acquired through clandestine means, but the bulk of it must be acquired through prosaic observations and open investigations and direct.[1]

It should be recalled - in advance of later chapters of this book, that they analyze the information as a process - that the information activity consists of basically in two classes of operations. I have classified them as operation of recognition (surveillance), by which I mean the numerous means by which the contemporary world is subject to intense and systematic observation and operation of research. By this last point, I mean the

1. Appendix I provides a brief discussion on all types of information, separated from each other in two booklets. and tries to demonstrate the interrelationship between the types of keys.

attempts to establish effective standards based on what has been observed in the past and to the attempts to take advantage of what seems to be happening currently. The two operations are virtually inseparable, although for administrative reasons and others, they often find themselves physically separated. In actual practice, there are generally two major states different, each of which cultivates its respective specialty of surveillance or research. But, no matter how separated they are in the administrative diagram or in the the development of their own techniques are closely linked by their common devotion to the production of knowledge.

How to describe this kind of knowledge? There are at least two means of do it. One, is to qualify positive foreign information as the substance of the

humanity and foreign nature. This includes an almost endless list of the components of humanity and nature. These lists can be alphabetical or thematic. Whatever they were, they would occupy hundreds of pages and would not be of interest to readers of a book of this class.

The other medium, which I have adopted, is neither alphabetical nor thematic. It could to call oneself functional. It starts from the premise that our State, in order to survive in a In a world of competing states, it must have two types of state policy. One is its own positive policy, directed outward, undertaken by the interests of a better world order and a higher degree of national prosperity. The other is politics protective-defensive, necessarily undertaken to counteract those policies of others States that are hostile to our national aspirations. This second class of politics Our policy for national security could be better named. I make this distinction. artificial between positive and security policies, for the clarity of the present analysis.

Let's first consider our positive policy. To be effective, your builders, designers, and supplementers must have sufficient capability to select the necessary persuasive instruments from a long list of possibilities. Will it be a resolution in the UN, will it be a diplomatic act, will it be an insinuation or a threat? diplomatic or economic, it will be propaganda or information, it will be an act of force, it will be a combination of several things?. The builders, designers, and supplementers must also know where, how, and when to apply the instrument of their choice. Now well, neither the selection nor the application can be carried out without reference to the attitude of the Second part. Before political leaders do anything, they should know:

How will the other country receive the policy in question and what has been prepared for counter it.

What is lacking in the other country in terms of counterattack forces, for example, their points? specific vulnerable groups.

What is being done to organize your protective forces.

What is being done or can really be done to cover those vulnerable points? specific.

In this way, our political leaders see the need to possess a huge amount of knowledge about foreign countries. They need knowledge that is complete, safe, to be delivered on time and to be able to serve as a basis for the action. To put their positive policy into action, they must first possess a knowledge about other countries as objective entities. For example, they will have to know about:

a) The physical characteristics of those countries, that is to say, their natural topography, environment environment and the multiform permanent structures that man has added to the landscape (its cities, its agricultural and industrial enterprises, its facilities of transport and others).
b) Su población; cuántos habitantes, dónde se agrupan, en qué se ocupan
c) The state of the arts, sciences, and techniques of that population (and in this, I would include myself) the state of its armed forces.
d) The nature of their political systems, their economies, their social groups, their codes of morality and the dynamic interrelations that prevail among all of them.

Armed with this knowledge, the leaders of positive politics will be able to to activate insurances at least so that if they fail, their failure cannot be blamed on their ignorance.

Secondly, let us consider the other kind of politics, that is, our politics. intended to maintain national security. In the interest of security, our leaders politicians must constantly take into account the positive policies of other countries or States. Some of these policies must be considered by us as hostile to our interests and we must take the necessary steps to block them. Others, it is It is advisable to cut them off halfway. To build and operate in this kind of policies. for security, we must possess a second class of more extensive information about the foreign countries and in this case the knowledge must be complete, safe, opportune and capable of serving as a basis for action. We must understand the nature and weight of the instruments that those countries can gather in defense of their own policies and We must know the direction that those policies may take. We need to know that, don't we? not only to avoid being caught off guard, but also to find ourselves in a position defensive or offensive when the policy is launched. When one knows such things, one knows much regarding the strategic height of the other country. In chapter IV I will explain the phrase strategic stature. And about the theory that there is some relationship between what a country adopt as an objective and what is believed to be expected to be accomplished, the knowledge of strategic stature constitutes, at least to some extent, the knowledge of the probable intentions of the other country.

From the above, it can be seen that, for me, the first class of information to acquiring is essentially descriptive and informative. It is descriptive concerning things. relatively immutable such as land, hydrography, and climate; it is descriptive in relation to the mutable things but no less permanent, like the population. And it is also so, regarding of the most transitory phenomena caused by man, such as the structure economic or governmental. With this kind of knowledge, our leaders can trace the lines of orientation of our positive policy, of our peace strategy and of war.

The second type of information to be acquired relates to the future and its possibilities and probabilities; how another country could organize its internal forces to service of its foreign policy and strategy; how it could try to use those powers in against ours, when, where and with what effectiveness. There where the first class of information was descriptive, this is speculative and evaluative.

Within these classes of things to be known, we can then perceive the statistics. the dynamics and potentials of other countries; we will perceive the established things, the ones that are currently underway and those that the future probably holds. All of this gathered, forms the set of what I have called high foreign positive information level or as I will call it later: strategic. Incidentally, it also indicates the three main ways in which strategic information is addressed by organizations of intelligence. These forms are: the basic descriptive form, the common form informative and the speculative - evaluative form.[2]Later on

2. This is the first point where I will depart from some of the accepted uses in the language of Intelligence. As I have noted in the preface, I step aside due to the great confusion one encounters in the lexicon of the subject. What I have called basic form descriptive, goes by various names such as basic research, fundamental research, basic data, monographic data, etc. It which I have called informative current form, has been classified as current intelligence, current evaluations, assessments currents, reports, strategic material, active intelligence, etc. What I have qualified in a speculative-evaluative manner is known as appreciations, strategic appreciations, evaluations, staff intelligence, information on possibilities and others.

About the theory of intelligence consumers who are interested in things from the past, present, and future, I have adopted the time element as an element of paramount importance. This allows for an easy and consistent arrangement of the matter at hand, information and allows for the postponement of cataloging that matter according to the use it will be intended for, to consumers, etc. For do them later in a more appropriate manner. Very few devotees of information have done that in the past. Many of them, when establish their own categories of information classes, have differed, within the same list, in several factors of discrimination. Hence, important directives of the information brotherhood can be found that contain a list of the ["1) Basic research;","2) Strategic information;","3) Technical information;"]
4) Counter-information; 5) Tactical information; 6) Information on possibilities and assessment. These categories are not at all modes, mutually exclusive nor do they agree with each other.

I will refer to each of these forms.

In the upcoming chapters, I will provide a description of the diversity and size of the substantive content of strategic intelligence. It is not necessary to say what it is. extremely diverse and large. But this does not imply that strategic intelligence hello, whether continuously occupied with each of the topics in the gigantic content general, or whatever is exclusively responsible for gathering all the data that makes up the content. I want to clearly establish those two points.

Intelligence must be able to take charge of the body of topics that I will consider, and over the course of the years, it is conceivable that you will have to take care of everyone and each of those points at least once. However, it will tend to take care of a only matter only when that matter is part of a threat to our national interest or it is required by the future course of action. One of the biggest problems that they continually confront in the management of intelligence, it is deciding which matters specials must be monitored, informed or become the object of an investigation descriptive or speculative. Equally difficult is deciding their order of priority, The the peculiarity is that intelligence is always completely occupied, but occupied almost exclusively on relatively few matters of real national interest. At the same In time, intelligence must be ready to handle a huge number of matters.

Gathering the necessary materials to manage that enormous number is a task. that intelligence does not act by itself. Intelligence shares that task with certain number of institutions, both public and private. Allow me to limit myself simply to public institutions.

Although the projecting politicians and operators of the federal government (both civilians like military) are just the users or consumers of the finished product of the intelligence, they themselves are often important collectors or producers. As men who act in the world of affairs, develop, as by-products or derived from their main jobs, large amounts of material that is of interest or is important to strategic intelligence. In that case, the most important to mention is the official of the foreign service who serves in a position or post abroad. Their task The main role is to represent the interests of the United States in that country, but a a very important subproduct of your task is the cable, dispatch or report that you send to your country. Do not merely talk about the information cable, but also about the so-called "of operation." Because in his capacity as a presenter from the United States, he must know a lot. Before, when one is about to make a decision, they must know how to provide many explanations to his superiors in his country when he has made that decision or when he asks for advice. Although the primary purpose of such communications is operational, it is often they can hardly be distinguished from those that plainly indicate the new events from the date. And hence the official serving abroad, even if not specially trained as an intelligence service man, constitutes by virtue of his position and talent, a valuable and effective provider of information.[3]

There are still others in public life, such as the members of commissions. specialists, U.S. delegates to international conferences, congress members on travel, and it should be remembered, during the next chapters, that such people perform significant contributions to the total task of intelligence. They should not be forgotten either. the involuntary contributors who do not act in public life: the writers, journalists, scholars, businessmen, travelers, even the governments themselves foreigners (in their reports or official news), who provide invaluable help. Not I would like no reader to form the concept that intelligence by itself

3. For certain key points around the world, the Foreign Service recognizes the need for special training and the Officials sent there could be considered intelligence officials, in a certain sense of the word. most of them, however, may not have, among their duties, the one of intelligence in that sense.

alone must produce from nothing and through the search the prodigious amount of data that It should always be on hand. Clarifying this point, however, does not exclude in no sense the part, extremely important, of the total that intelligence produces on its own and on its own account. Part of that total is necessarily confirmatory; part is supplementary or complementary to what is already possessed; part is completely new and vital and does not need further clarification. The part is not only new and vital, but it is material that no agency could actually obtain, except for intelligence the same. All this, plus the time and the skilled intelligence organizations employed in your appreciation, analysis, and tabulation form the substantive content of our specialty categoría de conocimiento.

CHAPTER II

SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT:

1) THE BASIC DESCRIPTIVE ELEMENT

The descriptive element of strategic intelligence is fundamental concerning the two others that I will describe. It is the foundation that gives meaning to daily change and the foundation without which speculation about the future could have no meaning.

The basic descriptive element must be related to many things or at least you must be prepared to relate to them. In the following pages, I will address the sufficient to evaluate the use I make of the word 'many'. I will extract my examples of both peace and war strategies, but they seem to weigh more towards the the side of the war is only due to the fact that the time of war has offered in the past a richer informational experience and an experience that can be further discussed freely that the current international affairs.

In the recent conflagration, most of the belligerents compiled encyclopedias about the countries with which they were at war, about those that had projected to occupy or that in any other way fell within its orbit. These encyclopedias could be conceived as a large archive of arranged knowledge in folders in a filing cabinet or in the form of a finished book. Agencies of information from all over the world possesses that kind of file and writes that kind of study. The British call them studies on information, monographs; we have called them called strategic inspections, topographic information studies, monographs of land; the Germans called them summaries of military-geographical information or naval-geographical information. Its main purpose was to provide the strategic planner, of sufficient knowledge regarding the country in question, in order to carry out their calculations regarding their conditions as a combat zone. In reality, they would be for hundreds of others. uses and not all of them were military in the strict sense of the word. A glance at the The table of contents of a typical German book will indicate the end, if not the depth, of knowledge required for military purposes.

I) General aspect. Location. Borders. Areas. History. Structures: governmental and administrative.

II) Carácter del país. Formación de la superficie. Tierras. Terrenos. Clima. Water supply.

III) Habitantes. Nacionalidades. Idiomas. Idiosincracias. Distribución de la población. Establishment. Health. Structure of Society.

IV) Economía. Agricultura. Industria. Comercio e intercambio. Minería. Pesca.

V) Transport. Railways. Roads. Ports. Airfields. Rivers.

VI) Military geography. Regional details of military interest.

VII) Existing military establishment. Army: Order of battle. Fixed defenses. military facilities, supply. Armada: Battle order, the fleet, coastal naval installations, naval aviation, supplies. Air: order of

battle, military aviation, air facilities (see list of airfields, etc. Special appendix) lighter than air, supplies.

VIII) Special appendices. Biographical data on key figures of the government. Local geographical terminology. Description of rivers, lakes, canals. List and especificaciones de usinas eléctricas. Descripción de caminos. Lista de aeródromos and the most important landing fields. List of the telegraphic lines and most important telephone companies. Currency, pesos and measurements. Beaches (like for amphibious military operations.

A table of contents is merely a skeleton of the matter; it does not reveal the character. and measure of the tissues that cover it. Consider, as an appreciation of the detail in a manual of this kind, the type of knowledge that lies behind some of the simple enumerations.

Take for example the chapter on 'inhabitants'. There you will find even the most... small observations about the population: age brackets, sex, groups, distribution regional and others. When one reflects that few states in the world dedicate to their vital statistics the effort that our census officials dedicate to ours and that even the relatively secure figures in those States result only after a labor huge, understands the importance and perhaps the magnitude of the population division and human tail of strategic information. The study in question includes also sections on social structure and social idiosyncrasy, with analysis of the social groups, ethnic groups, minority groups, religious groups, clubs, lodges, secret societies, etc. And what do those groups and their members feel about God, the education, filial piety, personal hygiene, capitalism, love, honor and the foreign. There are sections on public welfare, education, and opinion. public media.

Take the chapter on 'transportation' and consider the details presented with each transportation system. The roads section begins with a map of the road network; then follows a description, kilometer by kilometer, of the main routes, with observaciones sobre superficie, anchura, declives, curvas, terraplenes, desviaciones, cortes and bridges; then a general appreciation of the route in question is provided. All of these data, seemingly endless, have been collected to allow the lead designer and As a transportation specialist, do the following calculations: What is the maximum speed? that the largest and heaviest vehicle can maintain on the road from A to B and how many of these vehicles can pass over the road at that speed before the When does the road (and consequently, the vehicles) begin to disintegrate?

In a similar way, it happens with railways. Here too, the gauge, the the number of roads and the routes (in the plain) are described in general and detailed maps; In addition, a profile design provides what could be called the vertical dimension of the route. A well-designed profile provides more illustration than data about the slopes; it can be (and often it is) a kind of map kilometer by kilometer, terminals, workshops, etc. Along with the maps and profiles, there is a profusion of other data: subdeclines, ballast, characteristics of the crossings, weight and length of the rails, rail joint, signal systems and availabilities; also an inventory of the types of locomotives and rolling stock. With all that material gathered, the designers have the necessary data to calculate the capacity of the railway line, what they should look for in the direction of supplementary driving force and cars if there is a plan to use that line and which ones

they are maintenance problems. If you do not have that data, the strategic information has failed.

Regarding the ports, there is another type of data: protected water areas, water depth (at ordinary spring tides and with low water), dikes and water depth at the sides of the dikes, cranes on the dikes, means of transport to clear the dikes and the port area, warehouses and facilities of port storage, local situation of stowage, means of repair, etc. All this and many more things - all of them in detail - must be known before being able to plan the effective use of the port that has been projected to be captured intact and intended for its own use. Many of these things can be easily discovered; others are not known, because no one has been able to ask properly and others are also impossible to find or they are outside the scope of responsibility for strategic information.

For example, the transportation officer responsible for the unloading of our men and teams at the port of Algiers immediately after the assault, it was fine provided with the most detailed reports about that port, but the information failed him in two aspects at least. It was not mentioned that virtually every square yard of the space in the docks was blocked with huge barrels of wine and similarly large ones uncomfortable bales of straw. Before he could unload his own items, he had to prepare a free space for them. This was a case of unforeseen contingency. The other failure is harder to excuse. One of the duties of the transport officer was to ensure that a certain number of combat aircraft have been unloaded and transferred near the Maison Blanche aerodrome in the shortest time possible. If I could have had the the certainty that fully armed airplanes of that type could have been disembarked, made to run through the docks, taken out of the port area and launched onto the road, I would have loaded them on the deck ready to fly. But there wasn't sure about the width of the streets along its possible route, so that they made them take off their wings. If the information had been anticipated for such a case or if it had having received reports on this, the officer would have had an answer to his question, saving him time, because at least one of the routes proved to be wide enough to the company.

Take the chapter on existing military establishments. Assuming sitting that the existing forces do not constitute a very reliable indicator of potential warlike[4]there is an advantage in knowing what exists as a core of military power and the chapter in question tries to describe precisely that. Describe the components of the formed forces. Broadly speaking, the most important ones. of those components in the physical aspect are: the number of men under arms; their distribution among the three forces: land forces, air forces, and naval forces; their tactical and administrative organization; the quantity and quality of its equipment, both large and small; the inventory of weapons according to type and 'performance', the fixed defenses; inventory of aircraft and armored vehicles according to their type and performance; the nature of the military installations: arsenals, airfields, repair stations, shipyards, etc. and the nature of its supply, assistance, and medical services. In the non-physicist, there are other broad components: recruitment methods and standards; methods and extension of training; experience under arms and experience in combat; quantity and quality of officers; quality of staff work; the identity of the important officials; the nature and strength of military tradition; the degree of esteem in

4. This will be discussed in chapter IV, in the speculative-evaluative aspects of the information.

that the nation has to its armed forces. All these things are grouped into two intangible conceptions: military and moral expertise. If the traits had been a little more detailed, this enumeration would have been many times longer.

For example, consider a single one of the small points in the previous. enumeration of major factors: the operational aviation field. Regarding it, there are a multitude of things that must be known. First of all, it must be analyzed from the point of view next: how a potential enemy could use it and how it would serve their purposes; What is its exact location on the map and its location in relation to other fields? supply centers; what is their elevation above sea level; with what facilities supply account (its place in the transportation and communications network, in the network of electric energy, the nature of its workshops and hangars, barracks, its facilities of storage of lubricant and fuel, its facilities for storage of ammunition); what kind of devices can be fitted in it and how many (length and types of the tracks and roads for cars, fences, signal towers, and dispersal areas); what risks presented for air navigation (weather, time, mountains, and other obstacles) natural, electrical cables); what means does it have for the protection of the positions antiaircraft and smoke installations.

Secondly, this same field could be analyzed from the point of view of its readiness for attack. In this case, many of the features noted above; but there are also some new ones, of which are the Main features: what are their identification characteristics observed from the air, what amount and type of masking is used or can be expected, what degree of vulnerability do their man-made installations have and what degree of recovery in case of being subjected to an air bombardment.

Third, it could be analyzed from the perspective of its use by those who capture, in case of being captured. This analysis would require an even greater amount of detailed data on the equipment inventory. It would be important to know if the workshops of Machines, if taken intact, could be used for the repair of the machines themselves. devices. If they were not useful, what modifications would need to be made to them. When they have met the sufficient data to answer those questions and many more, regarding all the military aviation fields of the country, this fragment of the has been completed chapter on installations or major components of armament, such as naval bases, arsenals, battleships and once again the knowledge gathered to respond to the same in a part of the content of strategic intelligence.

We hope that the lines that precede indicate the end, depth, and nature of a compilation of knowledge that should serve a certain aspect of the art of war. Before Upon reviewing the encyclopedias of peacetime strategy, I would like to indicate the substantive character of three other aspects of strategic time information war, of the descriptive category: the information on strategic air bombing, of political and economic war and military government.

1. Strategic bombing.

The critical point of strategic bombing (assuming one has a air force capable of hitting the target and bombers that can defeat it) is the selection of the objective. Assuming urgency in the dimension of time, one must try to choose those sectors of the enemy's war machinery, whose destruction will weaken them the most significantly, quickly and permanently its shock power on the front line. As there could be several of those sectors and since not all of them can be destroyed at once

"raid" (not yet carried out with the atomic bomb), one must not only identify those targets, without arranging them in order of importance. The issue of identifying objectives and objective systems, in terms of what their loss would mean for enemy strength and the issue of establishing the priority of its destruction will be described appropriately in a later chapter, where I will address the speculative-evaluative aspects of the strategic information. But both before and after this important operation evaluative, there are two others that greatly participate in the descriptive.

The objectives being pursued essentially constitute the vulnerable areas of the way in which the enemy conducts war and keeps a society functioning and these areas more vulnerable cannot be chosen from among the less vulnerable until they have a ample and abundant knowledge about the complete enemy livelihood and its complete manner to wage war. Hence, while the encyclopedia of the one planning the bombing strategic does not need to include in detail all the necessary data for the ground force (such as strategic geography and public health), overlaps with this encyclopedia in some points and in others it goes further. For the bombing of a Germany or a Japan, I had to describe the national economy as if the description was intended for Funk's use. by Speer or by Ishibashi and Fugiwara; it had to reach up to the standards of the institutions social as to serve Himmler and Goebbels or Konoye and Tojo. Before the planes took off on their first mission of systematic destruction, those who planned the Germany's bombing should have a broad knowledge of production ball bearings, synthetic rubber, and fuel.[5]

5. See the 'Full Report' and the 'Summary Report' of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (European war) (Washington G.P.O., September 30, 1945) and the "Summary Report" of the Bombing Inspection U.S. Strategic (Pacific War) (Washington, G.P.O. July 1, 1946).

Moreover, before having decided that those sectors of the economy were the ones whose destruction would produce the most significant, rapid, and permanent weakening of the military capabilities of Germany, they had to acquire extensive knowledge about others sectors. The decision to send the B-29s against the Japanese aviation, the factories of motors, arsenals, electronic plants, oil refineries and finally against the urban population concentrations were supported by a similar "stock" of encyclopedic knowledge.

Once the strategic vulnerabilities have been identified and the order established priority in the attack, a more descriptive knowledge was required to carry out the attack. Our bombers were to bomb man-made material structures, structures that the enemy was trying with all its strength to hide from knowledge, to the cameras and in plain sight. The determination of their exact location, the ease with which they could to be repaired and others, constituted, even more of a descriptive knowledge, of which the strategic information was, in part, responsible. And I say in part, because another part of the the work corresponded to operational intelligence.

2. Political and economic war

War is not always conventional; indeed, a large part of the war, of the remote and the closest, has always been carried out with unconventional weapons. I will classify those weapons as political and economic and the kind of war in which they are used. like political war and economic war. In these two unconventional wars, it is about

to do two things: weaken the will and the ability to overcome, as well as that of the allies. Political war could be defined as an attempt to achieve those ends with any available means, except: 1) economic means (which I reserve) and 2) the orthodox military operations. Economic warfare could be described in the same way, investing the appropriate terms. In their most courteous aspects, both wars have their peace applications; both are used as instruments of the grand strategy of the peace and both have their own information demands in both war and peace.

If the reader wants to take a moment to briefly reflect on the meaning from my definition of these two wars in their military and peaceful aspects, you will understand that they encompass a wide range of possible activities aimed at a wide range of objectives. Let's consider some of them. In the political aspect, we can start with the international alliances or international friendships that can be affirmed or broken or international hostilities that can be softened or exacerbated.

Within a given national state, there is a broad sphere of objectives. potentials: first of all, the armed forces and their moral problem. Then there are the political dissidents, poorly adjusted social groups, the less privileged minorities and Aware of this, the worker leaders, the mothers who lost their children, the pacifists, the dissatisfied housewives, the messiahs that emerge, the officials of government, gullible or corruptible, and hundreds of other categories of the elements of the discontented population, fed up, dissatisfied, upset, outraged.

In the economic aspect, there are international financial treaties, the international trade relations and within the country itself, some weak points in the domestic economy that can be achieved through non-military methods.

The instruments that total war suggests for the exploitation of those objectives, They are numerous and mostly as brutal as war itself. To begin with by the softest extreme, we will mention the instrument of truth itself: truth openly provided by radios of known origin and through newspapers in miniature (thrown from planes). Such aspects of political warfare were typical of our own War Information Office and the British Broadcasting Corporation. Then comes the distorted truth that we call open propaganda, with which we pleased to associate the names of Lord Haw, Axis Sally, Tokyo Rose and the Japanese artist that the rude designs in five colors of what the Yankees did in Sydney at the widows of Australian soldiers on campaign. Below, in the list, appears what it is called black propaganda, which is supposed to come from dissident elements within from the enemy population itself, but which is actually carried out in great secrecy from the exterior. Sometimes black propaganda is carried out by radio, other times by leaflets, through by false newspapers, by forged letters, by any means that comes to mind to a perverse ingenuity.[6]The instruments discussed so far are applicable to the objective by remote control; but there are others that can only be used by penetrating the lines enemies. This group of instruments is led by the invented and fabricated rumor. run through the spoken word; also includes bribery, perjury, intimidation, subversion, blackmail, sabotage in all its forms, kidnappings, traps fool's errand, the murder, the ambushes, the sniper, and the underground army. Include the clandestine delivery of all necessary tools: the undercover personnel, the radio and printing devices, the poison, the explosives, the incendiary substances

6. See Undercover Girl, by Elizabeth P. Macdonald. (New York, 1947).

and the portable weapons and the instruments for the assassins, the guerrillas, and the formations paramilitaries.

The instruments of economic warfare are simple and almost pure, in comparison. In a word, it consists of the carrot and the stick like the story of the donkey or politics. of the hat and of persuasion. Translated into more or less technical terms, they include: the blockade, the freezing of funds, the 'boycott', the embargo, and the blacklist on one side; the subsidies, loans, bilateral treaties, barter, and trade agreements on the other hand.[7]

Before risk calculations, effort application and probable effectiveness of the attack, all phases of the policy must be understood, society and the economy, appreciating their vulnerabilities and selecting the methods of application. A political war as deadly as the one the Germans waged in Europe before and after the initiation of hostilities and like the one the Japanese applied to the Sphere of Prosperity of East Asia was based on surveillance and research the most careful and meticulous imaginable. Safety, skill and

7. See The Hidden Weapon: The Story of Economic Warfare. David L. Gordon and Reydon Dangerfield. (New York 1947).

opportunity with which they dispersed and activated this dissident group and with which they increased the concern and apprehension created by that other; with which they aggravated this pressure and that squeeze; with which they confused a certain group of officers disturbing them; with which they would pull a country into their own economic orbit or take it to another virtually bankrupt, was only a direct result of the descriptive knowledge that They would have prepared the information operations for that use.

3. Military government

After the war, the responsibilities of our armed forces continued. with the civil affairs activities of the military government of the occupied territories. The Army Naval Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs Military and Civil Affairs for the Army and Navy[8] that establishes the principles that they serve as a general guide... (for the exercise of) military government and control of affairs civilians in territory occupied by United States forces" presents a list of the

Edited by the Department of War as FM 27-5 and the Department of the Navy as OPNAV 50-E-3, dated 22 de diciembre de 1943. P.1.

responsibilities of the occupants, list of thirty-three specified sections and one miscellaneous. They are 'Politics and Administration. Conservation of Law and Order.'

Supervision of Military and Civil Cuts. Civil Defense. Civil Supply. Health Public and Health. Censorship. Communications. Transportation. Port Tasks. Services. Public. Currency and Banks. Public Finance. Control of Goods. Prices and Racionamiento. Agricultura. Industria y Manufactura. Comercio e Industria. Trabajo. Custody and Administration of Property. Information. Disposal and Reallocation of Displaced Persons and National Enemies. Education. Records and (in case of they might have forgotten something) Miscellaneous.[9]

Of course, the degree of responsibility of the occupant within any of the the divisions noted above, is circumscribed by the nature of its mission; after still, it will not try to bring the country to the same level of satisfaction demanded of its sovereign previous. It will seek to direct it merely with one eye on the repression of those evidence of dissatisfaction: "indisposition and restlessness," as the formula states. But even so, the responsibilities are enormous, so much so that they cannot be faced without a very careful evaluation of the objectives, without a careful evaluation of the policy and without an infinite number of extremely detailed plans. Here we find

9. Ibid., pp. IV, V.

another legitimate demand for the descriptive element of intelligence, since it is impossible for the man invested with the responsibilities of the occupant to take the steps suitable until knowing the nature of the society, politics, and economy with which it must entenderse. La información lo abastece de nuevas enciclopedias, que esta vez deben tratar new aspects of a familiar land. When they address the government, they cannot do so. like something that is to be subverted by political war. When they talk about a plant industrial, they cannot do it as if it were to be bombarded. They must deal with those characteristics of the government and industry that the occupant must retain for their own use. When referring to a railway line, they cannot repeat the necessary data to to make it fly or to establish a military train of its own on it; they must refer instead to the way to handle it correctly, providing the necessary knowledge to return to make it work.

In the previous pages, I have tried to touch on certain kinds of knowledge. generales, cuyos primeros ejemplos sirven a los requerimientos estratégicos de la guerra y whose last examples fall under the demands of the post-war period. However, before abandon the subject, I will mention two more classes of encyclopedia, which are typical of restoration of peace and to peace itself. The former could be called a manual of peace; the second, study for general purposes.

At the end of the First World War, the British delegation sent to negotiate the peace, arrived in Paris equipped with a certain number of blue books. Backed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and used by the delegates, were what we could call a 'Bacdeker' for peace builders. In short and clear paragraphs and in appendices that contained the most important state documents, treaties, etc. intended to serve the minimum needs of the officials responsible for drafting the treaties. A summary of the table of contents of the two volumes on Austria-Hungary will indicate the general nature of the work.

The study is broken down, in principle, into seven components. regions of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire: 1. Austria-Hungary; 2. Bohemia and Moravia; 3. Eslovaquia; 4. Silesia Austríaca; 5. Bucovina; 6. Transilvania y el Banat; 7. Rutenia Hungarian. Within each of the regional sections, proceedings were carried out more or less constant, according to the theme. The Bohemia and Moravia section comprised 109 pages

of 'standard' size. No one who read them could ignore anything about the main ones. ethnic and economic problems that would beset the men responsible for tending to the western borders of the new Czechoslovakia, nor could it fail to comply with its duty at the peace table.

There were many other manuals in the series, and each one dealt with the phenomena of a specific country that would surely have to be discussed. For example, the book about France contained a long and detailed section about Alsace-Lorraine; that of Germany had sections on Silesia, the Kiel Canal and Heligoland and the Colonies; the book that dealt with from Turkey, it included an excellent study on the straits in question; and there was also, a short but comprehensive study on the Yugoslav Movement.

Could there be something like a manual of general purposes for peace, a manual that contained the necessary knowledge for peace triumphs and the knowledge necessary to reject aggression with a dynamic defense? The answer is yes. A A similar manual would be very much like some of the encyclopedias already described. The dedicating funds for a general-purpose manual program is another matter, especially if it is a Congress dominated by economic ideas. Perhaps such a program could be built within a government where the dimensions of the substantive needs are known and then granted to our learned institutions, which, in the final analysis, constitute one of our most invaluable strategic resources.

So far, I have limited myself to the form of the basic descriptive element of the strategic information, which is broader in one dimension, and at the same time tends to to be limited in another. In a sense, the strategic examination of war or the manual for the Times of peace should be conceived as instruments of introduction or presentation; the study class that a man resorts to when he completely lacks knowledge of a topic. In addition to the encyclopedia, there are at least two other forms that deserve mention: It is the limited and deep study and what is called 'immediate information'. Since Many of the examples from the last pages were taken from a war context, The next ones will be taken from a context of peacetime.

The limited and in-depth study. The national objectives for peacetime for this country, they are numerous and the great strategy to obtain them is a matter that presents many facets. In the search for examples of the kind of limited and deep information descriptive to support this strategy, one feels virtually overwhelmed by a a multitude of possibilities. Wherever in the world you direct your gaze, you stumble upon with a national objective. In a randomly chosen day's New York Times, there was among[10] fifty and sixty new items of interest (varied degrees of interest, really) for many officials of our federal government. The points from the Times that day discussed fourteen independent sovereign states, three dependent areas, five

[10] The day was February 26, 1947.

areas under U.S. occupation and five important issues for the entire Council the United Nations. Someone in the government - who presumably received the news to through his own communications even before reading the Times -, he had to start a action, to continue an action or change the course of the action that had already begun. It It is assumed that this news reached Washington from a well-informed source. If Washington was prepared to work on the points in question, what should they have done? to have possessed in the sense of complete, applicable, and exact knowledge?

As Secretary of State, Will Clayton appeared, in accordance with those new items, before the Foreign Relations Committee to explain and defend a request for 350 millions of dollars, to continue the functions of the UNRRA under a new policy. One of the beneficiaries of the relief funds would be China. Mr. Clayton he stated that the relief distribution would be strictly supervised and controlled by the United States, as a benefactor. It can be assumed that, when placing his order, Mr. Clayton I knew there were people in China who died of hunger; that the situation was unethical for some of our interests and objectives and that it was in our hands to do something about it defense of these objectives and interests.

An important political decision involving sums from the treasury. national, it should be based on the kind of detailed and precise knowledge characteristic of the descriptive element of intelligence. If this is the case, what kind of knowledge And on what subjects should Mr. Clayton have possessed?

First and foremost, I needed to know how many inhabitants there were in China. I had to know so that when I learned the second thing, that is, how many of them were dying of hunger; he could form his own idea about the extent of the calamity. Was there a 2 percent or 15 percent dying of hunger? Then I had to know if the death of that percentage of the Chinese population was something that happened every year or if it was something what was happening now, due to the special post-war conditions. That is to say, I had to know if China's normal or potential food production met the demands of the population. I had to know all this to decide the basic question: did it have any utility our attempt to feed the Chinese? Because if the local food deficit was chronic and the Chinese were chronically unable to produce enough food and to accumulate foreign exchange needed to import enough food, what purpose could it serve to adopt the Chinese as a permanent burden? If this was the case and if it was one of Our national objectives are to achieve a healthy, united, and democratic China, right? Could we perhaps approach the matter in another way?

But assuming that the knowledge acquired by Mr. Clayton assured him that the situation was special and not chronic what else should I know? I should know how much food and what kind would be necessary to relieve the situation; how it was distributed normally the food in China and if these distribution systems were, in part, guilty of hunger; if they were, one should know how those mistakes could be remedied with regarding the food that I proposed to send to China and whether the task of remedying them would not be too huge to carry out. I also needed to know what kind of foods they were acceptable to the Chinese. Yet seriously malnourished people are surprisingly demanding regarding the components of their diet, as was verified after the last war. I had to know - in case the Chinese insisted on the rice - if the market world rice miller was in a position to deliver rice in exchange for dollars and the things that dollars can buy. I should have known, to the extent that such things can be known. things, what political and international consequences would follow a successful operation of nutrition provided by us.

To face China's relief position, one can imagine Mr. Clayton. the setup of a study that answered all these questions and many more and that would be essentially descriptive. It would also have required a huge amount of work for part of an intelligence team, because knowledge of that nature would not be found transcribed into organized files ready for use. Regarding the benefits that

we could wait when bringing China to the surface, its discernment is a task of appreciation and evaluation, which we will describe in another chapter.

Immediate information. The last category of strategic information - the descriptive - it is what people call "immediate information" or "ask Us," as in the radio audition.

The type of knowledge that she provides is commonly a result of answers given to some innocent questions, such as: Which side of the road does skating cars in Petsamo? What is the best map of southern Arabia? What is the What is the water depth along the Transverse Jetty of Casablanca? What are the Characteristics of electric current in the commercial areas of Sydney? How much copper? produjeron las minas de Bor en 1937? ¿Cómo es el abastecimiento de agua en Hong Kong? When was the last time Lombardo Toledano went to Venezuela? What are the units? administrative of the USSR? And so on.

With this kind of questions, the answers to which are generally given in words, there are other questions that can only be answered with the map, the diagram, the plan or the photograph. The descriptive element of the strategic information must store those items or know where to find them.

In some cases, such questions have strategic importance; in others, they do not. On the other hand, it can be argued that if an organization can answer questions similar ones, has archived the necessary knowledge to respond to others much more important. As unpleasant as this function is to strategic intelligence, it is probably a legitimate function and its substantive content an important fragment of his total knowledge.

As described, it can be seen that, to "ensure that our cause will not suffer and that our policy will not fail due to being misinformed," our organizations of intelligences must be prepared to describe a large number of phenomena. Without embargo, they must still be prepared for more. Because the description implies a the stopping of the march of time and the march of time cannot be stopped. Descriptions of the things from yesterday no longer have relevance tomorrow. To remedy the inherent effects in a necessary, but artificial stop of the clock, is essential a second element of information. It is the current informative element, intended for keep certain descriptions up to date.

CHAPTER III

SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT:

2) THE CURRENT INFORMATION ELEMENT

The preceding pages have referred to a knowledge about people and things such how they were or were at a given moment. The phenomenon of life that appears in the Formal encyclopedias can be considered as frozen in a moment of their course. A data accumulation like the one described could be virtually all the strategic information needed if it were not for the element of mobility in the human events. However, the fact is that, practically, nothing of the known to man, remains completely still, and that the most characteristic The important aspect of man's struggle for existence is change. Knowledge acquired to meet the demands of the grand strategy must always take this into account element change. Keeping track of the modalities of mutation is the function of strategic intelligence in its "current informative" phase.

Before embarking on an analysis of the areas of human activity in the where the change occurs and where intelligence should notice those changes, it is necessary point out that the paths along which mutation moves are very bifurcated and that there are many kinds of changes or mutations. For example, they have so much importancia el sabe que el poderío militar de un enemigo en potencia es desmovilizado, like knowing that it is reorganized or simply reoriented around a new weapon or a un nuevo concepto táctico. Tan importante es saber que el nivel de prosperidad de una the friendly nation is rising, like the knowledge that decreases. The knowledge that has been establishing a friendly government in a previously hostile country is such importance of knowing that a friendly government has fallen in a friendly country up to the moment of that fall. In reality, sometimes it is more important to know the direction of the change, that the absolute terms of quantity, extent, effect, etc. Hence the matter from the direction, without strictly falling within the boundaries of the content, is one of the higher significance.

If the informational phase of intelligence is to do the work, in what areas Should the specific aspects of human activity observe change and point it out? Or, put in other words, if a very important part of the information is the observation of developments (surveillance) day by day, what phenomena should be placed under surveillance?

There are two ways to approach the answer to this question. One would be to make a list of areas according to their known or anticipated priority, in the interest of the great strategy of that country. If this method were adopted, the first point of observation, in the year 1949, for the United States, would necessarily have been directed towards a program of atomic research in a foreign nation, towards biological weapons and chemicals or towards the success or failure of the International Communist Movement. The second the method was aimed at the changes produced in the world's armed facilities or in global economic well-being or in global political stability or in its moral fervor towards justice. It would take a very tough man to establish these priorities, and I have the feeling that the resulting list would not have even the encouraging element of the certainty, nor the comforting quality of logic.

The second approach to a content analysis would be followed by according to some established and logical standard of humanity and human activity... which it would be to fall back into the old patterns in which men who profess the sciences

social sciences have used for decades. This method has the advantage of logical order, but there is a risk of drowning important matters in a quagmire of trivial issues importance. But since the purpose of this chapter was to explain the substance of an element of strategic intelligence and not serve as a exhortation to the intelligence agencies operating currently, I will adopt the later method and follow its subdivisions formals.

1. Personalities

About the theory that the basic descriptive element will have recorded in its files biographical and recorded in their biographical encyclopedias the names of people who were important at a certain time in the past, the informative element must stay updated of the comings and goings and relationships of those characters. More importantly: it must, furthermore, to delve beneath the surface of the past to discover the emerging figures of tomorrow. Who knows the name of the British Prime Minister or the leader of the Communist party? French in 1960? Who knows the head of the Soviet Union in 1955? Who will be the leader? from the general staff of the Yugoslav air force? Who will be the leaders of a Palestine divided? Who will be the president of Lever Brothers or of Química Unida? Who will be the director of the Pavlov Institute and the leader of the Latin American Confederation of Labor? The men who will someday take on those tasks are alive at this moment. Where Are they? What are they doing? What kind of people are they?

The future does not have complete freedom to appoint such officials by a random choice. The possibilities are that the future will be forced to make its selection from a very limited number of candidates. These candidates are, in this moment, those that arise in business, in militarism, in international trade, in politics, in the arts (let's not forget Paderewski), in education and in the conspiratorial undercurrents. The task is to identify those potential leaders and watch their rise, so that, when revolutions break out or occur deaths, whether violent or natural, may lead to identifying possible human replacements of deposed or of the dead.

Since the moment man is both the product and the creator of his environment environment, and since no two men are exactly the same, an operation of information that intends to carry out an informative work must know a lot about They. You should know about their character and ambitions, their weaknesses, the influences. they can exert and the influences against which they are weak. He must know about their friends and relatives and the political, economic, and social environment in which they act. Only by knowing those points, can the emergent character be invested with the dimensions of leadership and Only by knowing that data can one assume what trends or changes will result. the new leader when he assumes power.

2. Geography

Based on the fact that there are already descriptions of what I have previously called the physical characteristics of other countries, the devotees of current information must continuously improve and extend those descriptions. They should not only inform about the new changes introduced by man in the landscape - many of which appear in section 4, below - but they must also be aware of all the new Geographic and physical knowledge. What new facts are known or may be

observed in matters such as degrees of erosion, rivers and ports, climate, beaches, hydraulic plants or potable water supply. What has been discovered or can be noticed. In the domains of hydrology, geodesy is to what geology is, etc.

3.Military

Again, assuming that the armed forces in existence - as outlined in the previous chapter - have been carefully described in an era or moments determined, the informative element has the obligation to stay updated on the developments made within the current regulations. Must know the new legislation which will establish the size and quality of the forces for the coming year or years; it must be aware of recruitment rules and their success or failure and changes carried out in the training of recruits and officers; must be aware of the advancements In the training of the troops, from what social layer is the officer corps chosen? economic status of men and officials. Despite the difficulties, it must stay informed those changes that the other country considers as military secrets: things such as new warships, new types of aircraft, new weapons of all kinds, new devices to improve combat effectiveness, changes in morale and loyalty[11] the force towards its government and in its regional, political, religious, and nationalist orientation.

4. Economic

Based again on the theory that manuals have paralyzed the machinery. economic at a specific point in time, describing it, the informative element is obliged to keep up with current economic developments. Must take note of the birth of new doctrines and economic theories. You must pay attention careful with the administrative changes in the armed forces and must note the changes that are carried out in the government's economic policy, a policy that affects the industry, the organization of businesses, agriculture, banks, finance, and trade foreigner.

11. It is difficult to say and perhaps pointless to try to decide whether matters such as anti-corrosive marine paint, the atabrina, the radar, the use of blood plasma and a great number of similar issues can be grouped under the heading Military or some other. Perhaps their correct location could be determined according to the level of secrecy in which their holders keep them. they maintain. It clearly seems that very confidential matters such as espionage and counterespionage correspond to this subdivision.

You must be aware of the changes that occur in the volume and distribution of wealth and national income, changes in the 'standard' of living, wages, and jobs. It must monitor the new crops and the development of new farming methods, the changes in agricultural and livestock machinery, land use, fertilizers, projects of crops and others. The discovery of new industrial processes must continue, birth of new industries and the excavation of new mines. It must continue the development of new public services and the extension of those that are already established. It must account for the changes in the techniques and instruments of distribution, of the new transport routes and changes in the inventory of transport units cars and trucks, locomotives and carriages, transport planes, coastal ships, canals, and transoceanic merchant ships). Perhaps the most important thing, in this age of the

nuclear fission, must be to note the events in new natural sources, about everything at the moment of the discovery of high-grade uranium deposits.

5. Politics

The informational element must pay strict attention to changes of nature. basically constitutional and to events similar to those that have occurred recientemente en Francia e Italia y que muy pronto podrían producirse en cualquiera otra part of the world. It should observe how the units align on important matters. political power or how those units can break apart into factions, disintegrate into other groups or join in 'block'. You must monitor the changes that occur in the doctrine basic policy of those groups. It should take note of changes in the relationships between the central, regional, and local political authorities and the biggest political deviations towards domestic, foreign, colonial, and imperial problems. It must continue to follow the new legislations that could affect political expression to make it less or more free. It must monitor the results of national and local elections and the figures policies that arise, mentioned above. It must follow the course of the new ones. pressure groups and other types of organizations that can exert political influence from outside the structure of the party. Must be aware of the new techniques governmental and administrative.

6. Social

Perhaps the most important of the social phenomena is the informative element. it must be monitored, it is the population. And it must be monitored in all its aspects: its increase or decrease their growth averages and decrease, the changes in the groups of age, its occupation groups and its consumer groups. It must monitor the changes of distribution between city and countryside, between region and region. It should take note of the migrations within the country and emigrations and, until time and residence he must keep an eagle eye on the displaced people.
There will also be changes in the social structure that are ascending to a position eminent social and economic? What groups or classes of groups are descending? Which ones? they are the developments within that particular element of the population, known as "workforce"? The informational element of intelligence must remain informed about its changes in size and structure and, above all, it must monitor how it is being organized and under what directives for their struggle with the employers.

What happens with the members of the Church, who becomes part of clubs and What kind of clubs are these, who founds new lodges, secret societies and cooperatives? Intelligence in this regard must also know a large number of others cosas sobre la sociedad, tales como cambios en los medios de vida, desarrollo de nuevas housing, changes in household economy and family entertainment. It must keeping up with changes in tastes, manners, and fashions. Must follow the program of educational institutions at all levels and worry almost as much about the changing content of elementary history texts, such as those regarding changes in the subjects of higher and professional schools. It should deal with politics governmental towards education in all its aspects and the changes in relationships between government organizations and non-governmental organizations, such as churches,

trade associations, clubs, and societies. You must be aware of the changes in relationships between minority groups within cultural and social groups economic, and must monitor the changes that occur in the statutes and laws, which to its they change the course of human behavior through the population.

7. Moral.

Within the broad scale of the moral issue, the informative element must observe the changes produced in the basic life doctrines: the increase or decrease of the religiosity, of patriotism or nationalism, of faith and trust in the reigning order and in national myths. One must be aware of the changes in popular attitudes towards the ["private cleaning","the governing party","civil marriage","education","rights"] of minorities, universal military training, etc., to name a few of the points most important.

8Scientific - technical

As a large part of the future world will be the product of science and technology, the The informative element must monitor them with particular attention. Must know about any development that could be important or significant for the considerations of foreign policy, in mathematics, physics, chemistry, zoology, geography, the oceanography, climatology, and astronomy. You must know what happens in the world of the social sciences. What do sociology and economics students do or discover? psychology, geography, laws, history? What new ideas are they developing that one day they may have the influence of the discoveries of a Locke, a Rousseau, a Darwin, a Pavlov, a Freud or a Haushofer? What is happening in the medical schools and in the clinics, what are the new diagnoses, the new medicines and the new treatments? What is happening in the field of telecommunications: the telephone, the telegraph, the submarine cable and, above all this, the radio? What is happening in the world of cartography? What new areas of the world and what new phenomena of life are settling on the map? What old theories are being applied to new companies, what new uses can there be? Give to the old materials? Is all that, or part of it, applied to the armaments? How?

The preceding paragraphs cover a huge part of the ongoing activities. humans. I have written them with the intention of giving an idea of the dimensions of the matter and not as an exhortation to the informers of the surveillance or observation force, to keep every square inch of it under active and constant observation. It must to take as an attempt to describe many of the real and many of the potential responsabilidades de la función informativa. La pregunta que enseguida surge, es esta: What fragments of this enormous whole should, in fact, be put and kept under. exam? There is no categorical answer. The only answer is the one that could be given in form of a differential, namely: only those fragments that are positively appropriate or related to current national issues and other problems that could to arise. The first to be addressed must be those matters of proven importance national, which will vary from country to country and from time to time.

For example, what happens in the French General Confederation of Labor, in the Politburo, in Zionism, in Perón's government, in the Filipino cabinet, in the mines of

uranium from Joachimstal (Czechoslovakia), at the Pasteur Institute, is of greater significance national that the extension of the railway from Ouagadougou, the new Mexican budget or the changes in the illiteracy rates of China. However, this does not mean when matters that at a certain moment are relatively unimportant - like those the last ones we mentioned – may not someday, and under other circumstances, deserve priority. Nor does it mean that all issues are of primary or even secondary importance. importance, they must be identified by some simple rule of common sense, such as the rule of "national interest" that I have given. Perhaps, the greatest difficulty that must be dealt with is the inspection force when performing the informative function is not precisely the accumulation of knowledge about current or foreseeable problems, but looking towards the future and try to identify the issues that will one day become problems.

As the informative element carries out its task, it continually adds, freshness to the content of the basic descriptive element. More than that, because by maintaining the aesthetic knowledge up-to-date, also maintains an extended bridge between the element descriptive and what I have called the speculative-evaluative element, a bridge between the past and the future.

CHAPTER IV

SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT:
3) THE SPECULATIVE-EVALUATIVE ELEMENT

To present this element of strategic intelligence, the most important and the more complicated, a brief review of several evident facts must be carried out.

The world that the United States must deal with is mostly composed of of independent sovereign states and the type of relationships they must maintain encompass all the shades, from the most peaceful to the most warlike. For many and diverse we strive to achieve a better world order: we accept collective agreements achieved at the UN and we carry them out; we reached bilateral agreements and multilateral agreements with other states or groups of states and we comply with them; we exert pressures of many species, for the benefit of global well-being and our own security, and we go to the war. To carry out this vast amount of enormously complicated matters, We must be prepared. We have to be ready for the future; we must dedicate each effort to be well protected against their contingencies; we must not be caught off guard due to unexpected events. In the upper strategy, nothing that happens can be considered unexpected.

The problem of this chapter is the analysis of what the United States must know. In order to be prepared; what should one know regarding the future importance of others. sovereign states; the courses of action they could undertake by themselves, and the courses of action that they could adopt in response to some external stimulus. The knowledge of what we deal with is much more speculative than that which we discussed in the last two chapters, that is, the basic descriptive and the current informative. Its acquisition puts in I play the power of evaluation and reasoning of the researcher and that is why I have referred to as the speculative-evaluative element of strategic intelligence.

What knowledge should the United States have regarding the future of others? States, in order to take necessary precautions?

Let me, first of all, create a hypothetical state: Great Frusina, in order to use it to answer this question and the subsequent ones.

Regarding Gran Frusina, the United States should know two things, which are: 1) {"question_1":"What is the strategic height of Gran Frusina?","question_2":"And 2) What specific vulnerabilities?"} It has Great Frusina, how do they qualify its strategic stature? As I hope to demonstrate, yes The United States can answer these two questions, it will be on the right track to Tell the following, which is: What courses of action could Gran Frusina: a) start on its own same and b) adopt in response to the courses of action initiated elsewhere? It is very difficult to answer all these questions, but that is not the problem here. Here the problem is limited to pointing out the kinds of things we must know and the methods that we must employ to start producing responses. The problem is identifying the classes of knowledge that constitute the solid path from which they start our speculations, the compass that should guide them in their flight. The identification of such knowledge cannot be realized until, at least, two recent terms coinage (strategic stature and specific vulnerability), do not receive a little more of precision and definition.

Strategic Height[12]

Strategic stature is understood as the amount of influence that Gran Frusina can

12. One of my critics has raised strong objections to the use I make of the word stature. As a purist, he has pointed out correctly does not completely match the dynamic role I have assigned to him, that is to say it is about a the word most immediately related to ecstasy than to action. My answer is that contemporary uses they allow an expression such as 'the stature of British diplomacy', because it designates something more than its height, weight and circumference. Diplomatic stature includes tact, persuasive power, intelligence, and wisdom, just as it They manifest at a conference table or in any other place. Stature, in this sense, is the latent power, whose Entry into the diplomatic field will transform into dynamic power.

Act in an international situation in which the United States has a great interest estratégico. Esta es una declaración muy amplia; y no lo es por inadvertencia. Por ejemplo, By international situation, I mean any differences of opinion. misunderstandings, disputes - minor or major - that can occur between states independientes y que tienen una relación remota o inmediata con la seguridad mundial. Me I refer to any of the dislocations in the relationships between states of the world that, by their nature, they can have an adverse effect on the safety and material well-being of Gran Frusina. Given the unity of the contemporary world, there will be few situations where which Gran Frusina may disdain, as they are not related to her safety and well-being and yes many, in which he will exercise some kind of influence. By influence, I mean to signify the influence exerted through any of the instruments that states employed in times of peace or war; the influence exerted through persuasion, the propaganda, political and economic threats, incentives and punishments; through of acts of retaliation (in the non-technical sense); threats of hostility and war itself. The strategic stature is, therefore, the total sum of the means, soft and hard, that has great frusina, to which must be added his willingness to employ them and his expertise in use them.

To achieve strategic stature, there are a number of things that must be known. and the first of them is the probable 'objective situation', in [13] which it could be expected that Gran Frusina would exert influence or weight. There are at least two elements that in a objective situations can always be present: they are the geographical element and the time element. There are other elements that tend to differ from one situation to another. Citing several at random, for illustrative purposes, would merely be making a list of intangible things. such as the degree of real or imaginary gravity of the situation and public perception of gravity by the nation of Great Frusina; the degree of acceptance of sacrifices What must the nation do to resolve the situation; what allies will it have, that is to say, with what friends can count on Gran Frusina to support the situation and with what support and with what Can friends count the enemy of Great Frusina?

By 'objective situation' I designate the situation as it exists in the understanding of the existence of some Being hypothetical omniscient. I refer to the situation nuanced with the subjective characteristics with which an observer human and with prejudices, it will almost certainly adorn it. I use the word "likely" because considering that the Knowledge of the objective situation is highly desirable; any non-omniscient being (e.g., a fragile human being) He probably can never truly understand the objective fact. He should, however, make an effort even if it it hurts.

The constant and varied elements of the situation described above often.
primordial importance. That is to say, that the geographical position of the contenders, time, the forces that can be commanded and the probable coalitions, can impose themselves, and the situation to be liquidated according to them[14]But many situations arise in the that do not dominate those elements and in these cases there are two other elements, extremely important, that must be known before one can start measuring the strategic stature of Great Frusina.

The first of these is the weight, application, and effectiveness of non-military instruments. of policy and strategy of Great Frusina. The second is what people have called the military potential of Great Frusina. Let's analyze it one by one.

Non-military instruments of Gran Frusina refer to the degree of pressures, with exception of the great pressure of military operations, which range from the simple act of send a formal and well-written note of objection or invitation, up to things that are complicated and

14. For example, if the government of Liberia were to clash with the government of Paraguay (or vice versa), for any reason determined, one might assume that the offended State could comfortably go by without making much noise about it. previous years and not too far away, when the sovereign components of the world were united as less strength and the projection of power of even larger States was a slower and more complicated process than that of today, It was very common for each person to settle their own affairs.

Dangerous like an embargo, a blockade, or other types of economic sanctions. Also such acts are designated, like telling Cuba that we will not continue with our narcotics used in therapy, provided that there is the presence of Mr. X, a man well known to us as a drug supplier and a bad person in in general and for whom one of our states has made great expenditures to seize him, sentence him and imprison him and then deport him to his own country. We do not wish to have the gentleman X in our vicinity and, therefore, we turn to a soft and non-military means of get rid of him.

The use that the Soviet Union gave to the Comintern and now to the Cominform, the instruments related to the infiltration of the party and frontline organizations, the trade by the state and even the World Federation of Trade Unions, they offer examples of this type.

Grand Frusina will have such pressures to move, such strings to pull, such needles to manipulate. Its knowledge and weight, application and effectiveness, are part of the necessary knowledge to estimate your strategic stature in a given situation whose objective facts are already discernible.

Military potential refers to the possible power to wage war. It could be of usefulness when discussing military potential, making a distinction between real military strength in the existence of Great Frusina and its mobilizable military force. This distinction is artificial, because much of the force in existence is not found complete or uniformly mobilized; it is not entirely prepared to take action at a moment's notice.[15].
One must 'take the lid off', so to speak, and that act - through the line of attack, the arrangements. and provisions for supply and auxiliary services, etc. -, it is not distinguished easily of the characteristic and essential aspects of mobilization. But, even when

The existing force needs some final touch, there could be units that were already there. completely mobilized and ready to start fighting. Hence the distinction.

Ahora, el problema que se nos presenta es qué deben saber las organizaciones de intelligence regarding the situation, non-military instruments, the force in existence and the military potential of Great Frusina, to carry out an evaluation of its stature strategic in a foreseeable or determined situation.

Regarding the situation. Note that this special situation has not been produced yet and that the first problem that must be faced the

15. Our garrison troops on the island of Oahu were considered mobilized forces on the morning of the attack. Pearl Harbor. However, while the attack was taking place, some of those troops were in the process of receiving weapons of a supply sergeant. The latter, an orderly man, required each soldier to sign a receipt for the weapon I was taking. This is an example of what I mean by "removing the lid" in an extreme situation.

intelligence is trying to imagine what it will be like when it happens. To give flight to your Imagination, intelligence must possess a large part of descriptive knowledge and informative that we have discussed in the previous chapters. For example, you should know a lot about the political and economic structure of Great Frusina, about the political tensions internal and economic, regarding their foreign relations and the apparent grand strategic plan within which it operates. Intelligence must know a great deal about the strategic geography of all parties regarding the situation must have some kind of rational basis to calculate the time factor.

The information staff had to keep the organization well informed of the developments that were monitored clandestinely and openly, so that speculation iniciara desde el punto más extremo del camino y el vuelo de la imaginación tendiera hacia the one that seemed to be the most suitable direction.

It may be worth mentioning here that the calculations about height strategic that are not based on any kind of imagined anticipated situation or reasonably assumed, they do not reach any practical result. It is just the texture of the situation that provides a basis and meaning to the subsequent elements of the speculation. Talking about military and non-military instruments without setting the limits about the situation in which they are to be used, to speak of them as if they were to be the same For all situations, it lacks, for me, meaning. There cannot be things such as a calculable national potential - potential for achieving goals by peaceful means or bellicose -, while the calculations are carried out in a vacuum. Only when it has been fixed the opponent, the time, the place and the probable means to be used, can be based on those calculations.

Regarding non-military instruments. I repeat, the knowledge about them is based on what intelligence has been able to uncover about the internal stability of Gran Frusina and the strength and means with which she has conducted her international affairs in the past. The information may imply which of those instruments will be used and with what weight and effectiveness will use it only when their knowledge about Gran Frusina is comparable to that of its own foreign minister and that of its own head of state. The intelligence one can expect to possess such knowledge only after having studied deeply and systematically their politics, society, economy, and the moral character of their people and when has been temporarily able to get into the inner circle of the Minister of Foreign Affairs exteriors of Gran Frusina, observing the situation from their particular perspective. This

Yes, again, the class of knowledge we have discussed in the last two chapters.
Ideally, it is coldly objective and complete, it is safe and thorough.

In practice, however, it often lacks all those qualities. It doesn't matter.
no matter how hard the intelligence personnel worked, it doesn't matter with what expertise and dedication work, they cannot objectively and truly describe everything in the most secure way. Certain phenomena evade all description. Perhaps they are super secret and have been felizmente ocultos a la vista, como el torpedo de aguas poco profundas de los japoneses. Maybe they are there and always have been - in plain sight of everyone - to be measured and noted, but have gone unnoticed for a number of reasons. Take for example the small colony of Italians (born in Sardinia) that has existed in Tunisia; the beaches of a certain number of islands in the South Pacific; possible weights per axis and availabilities of the Balkan railways. I repeat that they may have always been there and have been described with accuracy but they are no longer open to a new review and the published descriptions they have been lost. Confronted with the need to provide comprehensive objective descriptions of semejantes fenómenos, la inteligencia no puede simplemente pronunciarse. Inevitably it falls on the kind of description that in itself is nothing more than a small speculation between two known and related phenomena, with a deduction pure or a sequence derived by analogy.

Regarding military potential. First, the knowledge about the forces in existence partially or entirely mobilized, may be provided by the individuals who they report on such matters. In the intelligence organization, those who report on those issues are the military, naval, and air attachments, openly sent to Great Frusina and those who are allowed to know certain information about the provisions and military establishments of Great Frusina. Great Frusina allows this in exchange for a conocimiento similar sobre los países a los cuales envía sus propios agregados militares. Naturally, they try to keep some features of their armed forces secret. such as the newest weapons, the techniques for their use[16]and new tactical doctrines, that Gran Frusina is regarded as a great national resource that must be kept hidden. When these matters are discovered and reported, however, their discovery is to the result of clandestine intelligence operations. Generally, each country knows quite a bit about the existing forces in all the other countries and also about the most of their weapons. What they may ignore will be related to weapons of a certain nature highly effective, weapons that Gran Frusina has hidden so well, that not even to his

16. To be more explicit, I will say that it is known that the USSR has great skill in the use of rockets, but it is unknown exactly how they are used. It is common knowledge that the United States has a radar bombing team, but the The technique of using such equipment is considered a military secret.

Their own troops have been allowed to practice with them and get to know them.[17]

To find out about the mobilizable military establishments of Great Frusina, or as it has been called, the military potential is a gigantic task. If it weren't for the element more important in the strategic stature of Great Frusina and something that must be done obligatorily by their opponents, they would never try to make the calculation. But as Too often it is the force or the threat of it that decides disputes. international or liquid situations like the ones I speak of, it is an imperative mandate the

to have a certain reasonable appreciation of the power that Gran Frusina may have at its disposal in certain conditions.

I say that the computation that intelligence must attempt is a huge task. And the I say, because it involves seeking the answers to the following and prodigious questions: What amount of active military power or rather, lethal energy, it can extract from itself Great Frusina; how many men and with what training to fight on land, air, and sea, armed with everything the Complicated weapons of modern combat can be produced by Gran Frusina and in how much time; what amount of that force could be ready to throw into the field of more battle strategically

17. The atomic bomb is the most eloquent case. It would take a superhuman effort to discover the names of the men who knew how many bombs were in existence and it would likewise be difficult to name those who know how it works the bomb.

advantageous or necessary and to maintain it there?

What must intelligence know to answer such questions? It must to know a large number of facts and a method to combine them. Must know a lot about the real and latent resources of Gran Frusina[18]and must have the will, the wisdom, and the highly technical expertise to rectify or arrange your knowledge of these facts as the General Staff of Great Frusina and its Production Management office the [19] they would have arranged before making their risky decision. Nowhere in the operation of intelligence is more important than the professional training of the intelligence producer; the synthesis task in which he embarks is a task that requires the utmost from him. competence in one or more of the sciences of politics, economics, geography, and art military. I could not undertake it unless I had a natural familiarity with the lite--

18. In my opinion, the greatest mistake that can be made in calculating military potential is to confine attention to the resources and neglect the power of the country to combine them, in order to obtain an appropriate final product. According to a direct numerical calculation of resources, there is the likelihood that India and China could become a threat to United States. No conclusion could be more useless.

19. See United States at war (Washington, D.C. G.P.O., 1947) by the United States Office of Budget. for the most complete and the only official account of the process of our mobilization. This requires reading it. document for all students of war potential.

literature and the techniques of the relevant disciplines.

Let's talk now about the resources of Gran Frusina. We will analyze them first. And I will be brief about it, not because they lack importance, but because the people who it deals with the mobilization and the foundations of national power, it is found endlessly busy with them. So endlessly, in fact, that sometimes one there is an impression that the issue of military potential is simply a matter of identify quantities of men, of steel, of kilowatt-hours, of machines, of lines rail and trucks, etc., adding the quantities and obtaining from the resulting sum a a kind of index number full of meaning. I cannot agree with this. method of calculating the war potential. In this way, without wanting to give the impression that Everything is already possessed, having an outline of the current resources of Gran Frusina, allow me to list them.

The first is its geographical location and the quality and extent of its territory. Then comes the population, quantitatively speaking, especially that part understood between the ages of 17 and 45, and, qualitatively speaking, their health, vigor and general and technical education level. Thirdly, there are the raw materials and the energy sources that it possesses or has unequivocal access to: mineral (including the uranium), forests, fishing, hydraulic power, etc. Fourth, food and foodstuffs. Fifth, industrial plants standing and the means of distribution of the finished product. Sixth, transportation network and inventory of vehicles. Seventh, the political structure of the State and its stability. Eighth, the social structure and the inventory of virtues that The population possesses as a set of social beings. Ninth, the moral quality of the people. and the class of values for which they are prepared to make sacrifices. Sometimes, this list it is reduced to the first three points: human flow, raw materials, and main equipment, and Others can extend, as can be observed, to fill pages and more pages.

If intelligence knows the facts noted above or has their approximation part of the knowledge required for a computation of military potential. But it must also to be aware of the mobilization process and what it entails. Intelligence must know this before being able to apply a method to the data and obtain a useful result. Let's say, then, that mobilization is essentially a matter of national adjustment or readjustment internally. A country organized for the well-being of its citizens and for their security must to know how to put in front, in the very front row, that security and the well-being of the citizens an appropriate distance in the rear. And a country that has never assigned preference place the well-being of its citizens, will relegated this consideration even further back than it should be.

This means that a certain large percentage of the most productive group of the population – men and women between the ages of 17 and 45 are torn from civilian life and placed inside a uniform. Before the mobilization takes place, this group can cover 10 percent of the total population and even more. It also means that it (as a group) is maintained and supplied with food, shelter, clothing, medical care, transportation, communications and securities at a much higher level than I enjoyed in life civil. Finally, it means that this group is equipped with the complicated and expensive weapons are implemented and they are taught to use them in the most effective way. For this situation There must be adjustments. What are these adjustments? What level of success can Gran achieve? Frusina when carrying them out? These two questions constitute the starting point for measuring the net effectiveness of mobilization.

The adjustments in question must take place, above all, within the policy of Great Frusina. Even if their government may be dictatorial like Hitler's in 1936, it must there are still many knots to tighten. The more concentrated the political power is in in times of peace, the adjustments should be greater; because the measures of Gran Frusina are it is prepared to take at any point of the adjustment of its national life, require that to the arm the government executive is granted almost plenary powers.

To begin estimating the capacity of Gran Frusina for mobilization, the intelligence must have at hand a comprehensive catalog of political knowledge possible and with this knowledge, intelligence must try to anticipate the degree of success that the statesmen of Great Frusina may achieve in the adjustment of their peace policy. to meet the conditions of war.

Secondly - and these are the most important - the adjustments that the new The government must now initiate and supervise the adjustments in the economy of Great Frusina. Before intelligence directs its gaze towards specific sectors of the economy, in order to

to discover how they are functioning, there are three things about which intelligence must to possess certain knowledge. These are the things that will influence every decision made regarding the war production and the civil life 'standard', and that, in fact, almost they will predetermine the magnitude of the mobilized power that the nation will be able to dispose of. These Two elements are: 1) the amount of 'fat' in the economy (this could be considered as another kind of "fat") and 2) the amount of flexibility that the economy is capable of.

"Fat" and "slack". It has not been possible to find the appropriate translation for our lexicon, without distorting what the author wants to express. By 'Fat' we interpret real possibilities and resources.

By 'fat' I mean elements such as some of those that Great Britain possessed. at the beginning of World War II: extensive external funds, a great navy merchant, access to the necessary raw materials and the credits to purchase them, without to embark on current production, a great supply of excellent up-to-date equipment, a huge existence of finished articles, a national diet of three to four thousand calories per day, etc. It could be said that the most important elements of 'fat' in In Germany, there was an excess capacity of machine tools, a large amount. of flamboyant plants and new homes. The Italians, in turn, practically lacked she.

By 'slack', I mean things like the 40-hour week, the 12 to 16 years of education for youth, a small proportion of women within the workforce labor, the unemployment of work as well as of capital, the partial utilization of equipment only, etc.

By flexibility, I mean the economy's capacity to convert sheets of Arrows and pods in swords and that on time. I refer to the capacity of the technicians to convert typewriter factories into machine gun factories and dedicate to the food manufacturers to the production of fuzes and grenades. I am referring to the skill to convert the residues into synthetic products when the source

natural fabrics have dried up.[20]When you have the elements to calculate the real possibilities, the 'surpluses' and the flexibility of the economy, one is armed with a kind of basic knowledge that facilitates the attainment of knowledge further economic.

Adjustments within the economy must occur along two lines. mainly; the economy must produce a much greater quantity of goods, many of which are ammunition and at the same time, the economy must provide a "standard" of a tolerable life for the civilian population. To achieve both goals, the economy must should be handled with the utmost severity. What must intelligence know to measure the scope of management and the results?

You must know what expansions in capital equipment, in power resources, and in force of

20. As you can imagine, there are many types of computers with military potential; among them, there is a class that, constantly, seeks to find a key point in the mobilization process that will serve as an index throughout the difficult process. Some in this group hope to find the answer to their prayers in the national income; that is to say, they hope

find a way to correlate national income with military potential, so that when the former is known, the second is also known. Others tend towards the kilowatt hours. There are several other schools. It has seemed to me that his neglect of other general factors – particularly this factor of economic flexibility – makes it very vulnerable their conclusions.

work[21]they are being plotted; you must know which strategically necessary raw materials are they are being stored, and, regarding those that are scarce, what success is being achieved in the development of substitutes.[22]You must know how quickly and efficiently it is being reformed indus

21. Regarding the German mobilization for World War II, it is interesting to note that until 1936 the Nazis had they were enchanted by unemployment and had partially solved the issues, coining the slogan: 'Cake, Children, Church' (kitchen, children, church) for women. German women, in response to this party exhortation, returned to the kitchen, leaving the free work for men. When the mobilization began, (which was not known as such), in 1936, the economy could have used advantageously a greater workforce; the party did not dare, for political reasons, to renounce the 'slogan' and call for women to factories. Certain types of economists who rarely bow to anything but a strict economic consideration, They can analyze this profitably, because this is a case where a political compromise was imposed, even when it involved a serious economic penalty. See 'Economic Preparation and Warfare Conduct under the Nazi Regime' by Frank D. Graham and J.J. Scalon (Mimeographed report from the Historical Division, Washington D.C. April 10, 1946). Cited here or elsewhere by written permission from the editor.

22. When preparing for World War II, the Germans had to make many extensive adjustments of this kind. Preventing the shortage of crude oil, rubber, high-grade iron ore, sulfur, copper, natural fibers, and a large number of others subjects, they made a provision of synthetic oil, rubber, and fibers; they developed methods for the utilization of their own deposits of low-quality iron and found suitable substitutes for the materials they could not manufacture synthetically or store. The Allied information did not fully assess the German capacity to do all that. It tended to refer to scarcity as issues. main ones on the list of specific German vulnerabilities. In reality, that was not the case. The actual vulnerability existed in the land of human flow, of which a portion too large must have been allocated to the relatively ineffective production of the substitutes.

heavy tria, to produce instead of peace machines, the war machinery and the lightweight, to produce grenade fuzes, range finders, radar components, and weapons small. One must know these things - as far as they can be known or appreciated - ar hundreds of things like that. Then you must know how to measure the way the government is run. in its adjustment part: how it distributes raw material, how it makes its contracts with the private companies, how they finance the essential blocks of the war industry, how it carries out the equitable distribution of the scarce goods among the consumers and how shore up inflation. You must know what level of tolerance the government can provide to a situation in another way intolerable for the civilians who must produce the implements warlike, to suffer the hardships that must be produced by war implements, to suffer the hardships economic aspects of war, enduring its tragedies and still being deprived of incentives active participation.

None of the things I have mentioned can be known in the same way as that one can know the number of kilometers of the paved streets of the city or the number of sugar refineries in the county. To possess the necessary knowledge in order to to estimate the economic military potential, intelligence must have something more than a list of capital goods, the workforce, and raw materials; it is necessary that it has a great general wisdom regarding the ability of Gran Frusina to bring those together. resources, to the strength of its political authority to its unity and resolution, to its competence

directive. The worker or intelligence worker must possess the willpower to transform yourself into the chosen citizen of Great Frusina to lead the mobilization. You must understand that the problems you are facing have magnitude of national survival and that can resort to any means, dirty, unorthodox, illegal, if it achieves those results.

The third group of adjustments related to mobilization and on which must Knowing intelligence is the group of social adjustments; it must have authority over them. sufficient knowledge, if you want to complete your calculations on military potential. You must to know how people will adjust to the loss of luxuries, comforts, and even things necessary; how they will react to the poorer and more scarce food and clothes, if not more scarce, the more difficult living conditions due to overcrowding and civil liberty less; how they will take the departure of their young people, the breakup of families, and businesses relatives and the sad perspective of human losses. As in the case of adjustments economic, few of these things can be definitively and positively known. The intelligence must be adjusted to the approaches that sometimes arise from indirect methods of investigation. If it cannot be discovered exactly through public opinion polling, For example, how people are reacting to rationing, you can find evidence. indirect hints from them following the changes in government regulations rationing. This can be found in the newspapers and can clearly indicate that the black market is thriving or civil submission is high. It cannot be emphasized enough. too much the importance of the indirect approach where the direct one is impossible, neither one can stop insisting on the fact that projecting the indirect approach - "formulation of the method" could be referred to in formal terms - it is, in itself, an act. of information and an essential part of the entire intelligence process.

The last class of adjustments that the inhabitants of Great Frusina must make and of the which intelligence must take due note are those that are included within the code of their national morality, within their established values of good and evil. Here, perhaps, some of the most difficult tasks that must be faced in the work of intelligence and some of the most important to solve. Given the assumption that the intelligence can directly align with the accepted moral values of life in time of peace and under the assumption that these values are not all the most suitable for lead to victory in war, the government's problem is trying to alter these values or remodel them. The problem of intelligence is to say how people will react. in response to these attempts. For example, let's suppose that the inhabitants of Gran Frusina were created in respect for the message of Jesus: how easily will they make the transition to a war morality in which all diabolical things are, pragmatically at least, justified? How many pacifist beings or conscious opponents? If they constitute a large number, how will your point of view affect the success of the mobilization? Or let's suppose that the inhabitants of Gran Frusina, like some of the Easterners, apparently contemplate indifferent to preserving life and as soldiers do not expect to survive the war, in Reality often seems to welcome death: what information can be extracted? from this attitude, can it qualify your general conjecture about the military potential? A proper investigation along these lines in Japan, for example, would have given us much has been said about the long-range capability of its air force.

The preceding pages have been directed to the first of two questions that arose. Regarding the mobilization: what adjustments should Gran Frusina make to change the peace occupations in preparations for the use of armed power? The second

The question remains to be answered and it is: What success can be achieved? As we are talking about primarily regarding the knowledge of mobilization and not the process itself, this The question could be better formulated as follows: What should be done to appreciate the what success would the mobilization effort of Great Frusina achieve?

It must be known above all and with the greatest certainty possible, one's own appreciation of Grand Frusina about the situation against which she is willing to mobilize. How does she they combine the elements of time and space (geographical kinship) in the probable calculations of Gran Frusina? Do you have time to prepare?, and once mobilized, can you waiting to project its military power to a specific point on Earth, where it will be most convenient or advantageous?

Second, many of the other things mentioned above must be known. especially what I have called "real possibilities," "surplus," and flexibility of the economy.

Third, it must be known what skill and will Gran Frusina is capable of displaying. to plan, coordinate, and carry out the enormous task of managing the mobilization.

Fourth, something must be known about the likely performance of the government regarding the civil economy. Will it perform its functions well and will citizens understand it? Will you be able to see results from your efforts and sacrifices, or will things just appear? as lazy as the pessimists had predicted?

When the speculative element of strategic intelligence knows about these things - As a result of extracting basic data from the descriptive and informative elements, we Hello, you are on the right path to understand the dimensions of the strategic stature of Gran. Frusina.

Specific vulnerability.

In the speculations about the future of Gran Frusina, mere made of analyzing and summing its strategic asset. Subtractions need to be made before to be able to obtain a realistic outcome or assessment of your future weight in the world and the courses of action that can be initiated or chosen in response to an external stimulus. The The negative amounts in question are what I call their specific vulnerabilities.

With these words, I do not refer to the general condition of the lack of defense of their borders or the destructibility of their cities or anything else similar that can to be common to a large number of States and can constitute a great strategic weakness against which a strong opponent can direct their general attack, if the war is waged inevitable. Assuming that Gran Frusina is one of the strongest powers in the world and that the frontal attack with any of the military or non-military instruments of the great strategy is too costly to even consider, does it have any weaknesses? whose exploitation will yield disproportionate results with the deployment of effort? Yes those points exist, it has what I call specific vulnerabilities. The problem is: What must be known to understand the location and nature of vulnerabilities? specific to Gran Frusina?

The answer to this question is that all species of must be possessed. encyclopedic knowledge described in the last two chapters 23 and of them select, through analytical process, those factors of the life of Gran Frusina that are vulnerable to the weapons they possess

23. To the devotee of information, too anxious and not very responsible, a sound piece of advice should be directed at this point. search for specific vulnerabilities, no information operation can conceivably dare to scrutinize everything horizon of Gran Frusina. The discovery that all dentist chairs are made in a single factory that is vulnerable to sabotage or air strike or that ration tickets are easily counterfeit or that there is a hidden pacifist sect among the mountains, cannot justify the time needed to discover those facts. Assuming that those matters are vulnerabilities and specific enough to please anyone, their happy exploitation by an external power will not mean more than a minor inconvenience for the government of Great Frusina. People will use rocking chairs in the dentist's office; they will be printed or no new rationing books; the pacifist sect will be eliminated at the cost of a slight loss of government. The search for Specific vulnerabilities must take place in the sense dictated by good judgment and knowledge of one's own limits. exploitation tools. It should be limited by the doctrine of comparative costs: if a burden of 1,000 can be imposed Tons by air, will more converts be achieved with explosives or with pamphlets? If the latter is chosen, it will probably be delayed in the research regarding the weakness of civil morality and the appropriate content of pamphlets. But, conversely, the size of the A pile of debris does not necessarily constitute an index of effectiveness.

Weapons, as noted earlier, can be of many kinds: psychological, political, economic, and military.

During World War II, we identified, and we did not do it badly, a large number of specific vulnerabilities of our enemies. Without a doubt, our identifications correctly rushed the victory. Among the most readily available examples of happy selections in the field of strategic air bombing includes attacks on production plants synthetic oil and planes in Germany and the Japanese cities and transports of Hokkaido-Honshu coal. On the other hand, the attacks on certain phases of transportation German and Japanese fleet, cannot be considered as attacks on targets. specifically vulnerable. The knowledge that dictated those last operations, I can have been better and more complete.

During times of peace, many examples of vulnerabilities can be counted. specific as during wartime and their exploitation by instruments not grand strategy military. For example, the ambivalent position of the Soviet Union with Regarding the western borders of Poland, it is a case. To the Poles, the USSR said: "We assure you the Oder-Neisse line," and to the Germans in the Soviet occupation zone. and whose support the Russians longed for. I told them: 'As agreed in Yalta, the Oder line - Neisse is not a settled matter." Mr. Byrnes, in the speech delivered in Stuttgart in September 1946, he used the political instrument to exploit this vulnerability. When asked the Russians if they had decided how that border would be set, forced them to close one decision that they wanted to keep open. It will be remembered that the Russians had to abandon the double comfortable position in favor of the Poles, thus losing support in Germany. That was precisely Mr. Byrnes' plan.

Other comparable examples can be found almost every day in the newspapers.

Probable courses of action; assessments.

I said that if one possesses knowledge of the strategic height of Gran Frusina, knowledge of its specific vulnerabilities and how that country can observe them and knowledge of the height and vulnerabilities of other countries that participate in the In a situation, one is on the right track to predict their probable courses of action.

To increase the safety or accuracy of the prediction, one should possess two additional knowledge. First, I should know the courses of action that Gran

Frusina has followed in the past. Does the history of its foreign policy reveal a pattern? Which one will adhere? Has it followed certain lines of international conduct for so long, that have become proven traditions? Or are they myths based on the irrationality? Will those myths or traditions exert an influence – even if just a illogical influence - on her probable present course of action? Does Gran Frusina have a old friend with whom he will never break ties; has had over the years a real need for an 'eastern ally'; has a traditional 'imperial lifeline' that maintain or have the urgent need for ice-free ports? Knowledge of this class is important, but it must be used with caution. Because while the strength of the tradition is strong, the present moment could be precisely the moment when Great Frusina is forcing herself to break with the past.

Second, it should be known, as accurately as possible, how they estimate the citizens of Great Frusina their own height in the situation. Great Frusina is not itself same immune to misjudgments and as we have already seen in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II are capable of interpreting it sideways. the situation, exaggerating its own conditions for success or despising the strength of their opponents.

In summary, it could be said that if the information is assembled from the various types. of knowledge that has been discussed in this chapter and organizes the variety of elements that they enclose, should find themselves in a position to make subtle assumptions - for the general, calls for appreciation - regarding what Gran Frusina or any other country would do probably in any given circumstance. Note that intelligence does not claims that its prophecies are infallible. Intelligence is limited to asserting that the the answer you provide is your deepest and most objectively based appreciation and more carefully considered.

In that sense, intelligence could have a reasonable opinion regarding the policy that a country could initiate within the next year on its own will. If one I would like to know, could intelligence assess the probabilities of nationalization of a particular British industry in the next six months and the effect that such a measure it would produce on the balance of payments of Great Britain. Similarly, intelligence It should be able to assess the reactions of another country as an external stimulus. How would such or such country react to a stimulus such as a U.S. policy? the policy of some other power besides the United States, an act of God or natural disaster? What would be the likely reactions of the USSR, for example, in response to an arrangement, whereby the United States secures rights over air facilities and naval forces of Mers el Kebir, Bizerte, Malta, Cyprus, and Alexandria? What would they be in the face of a violent leftist deviation of the British Labour Party or the emergence of control of the Communist Party in France?

Before leaving this topic, the following question must be asked: in terms of the myriad of grades entered throughout this line, what value does it have "knowledge" that arises from this element of strategic intelligence? Are the "Estimated" calls of any valuable intelligence? My answer is yes; they have a great value if they are appropriately based on trustworthy descriptive data, in insurance reports are made after a careful analysis. The value may not be an absolute and final one; speculative evaluation or estimation may not be exactly safe, but if individual lives and national security are at stake, I I would prefer the strategic height indices, specific vulnerability, and probable courses of

action, such as arising from this phase of strategic intelligence, to the indices given by the only alternative, that is, the 'crystal ball'. Indeed, more than one appreciation speculative carried out by the experts adhering to those lines, has resulted amazingly close to what has really happened. The social sciences have not they have not yet achieved the accuracy of the natural sciences; they may never achieve it. But, Despite the profound methodological problems they encounter, they have made progress. prodigiously in the last fifty years. Taken as a body of wisdom About humanity, its achievements are not limited merely to description, but in form. Most importantly, they extend to the prognosis. If it had not been so, this book would not have content a chapter about this element of long and extensive information work scope.

A note on capabilities.

Although this discussion has confronted the possibility of war and mobilization of armed power and, despite having resorted to many examples from wartime, has I hope it is now contained in a context of peace.

It has been written as if we were directing our peace policy towards the the preservation of national peace and security, but at the same time, remembering that we could be pushed into a war that we had to win. The question could be asked of the Next step: What happens with the speculative-evaluative element of intelligence? strategic, if the state is at war? What changes do speculations undergo due to the introduction of the state of war? This is the answer: our speculations change in emphasis and direction, but in no other fundamental sense.

For example, the components of strategic stature are altered in a certain way. To begin with, the situation may naturally be clearer when it is already at hand.

Our what belongs to the future.[24]We are probably capable of giving more degree of certainty regarding the time factor: When can we expect the greatest effort? We are probably in conditions to discern the elements much more clearly geographical and spatial aspects of the situation and to foresee exactly the place or places of attack principal or of discussion. The alliances of oneself and of the adversary will also be much clearer, although we can never exactly foresee the twists.

Secondly, although the enemy is still using their non-military elements. of great strategy, these have been turned into almost military instruments. Pressures policies and inductions are used without gloves, turning into a political war - psychological. Similarly, through another procedure, the economic war begins.

The armed forces in existence are now the fraction already mobilized, plus those that son

24. However, the advent of war does not provide us, in any way, with absolute certainty about the situation. The unexpected events of the last war prove it. I doubt any strategic prophet on September 1st 1939, had anticipated the date of Italy's entry into the war, the date of the German attack on the USSR, the date of Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the date of Italy's surrender. On September 1, 1939, we knew more about the situation that a year earlier, but we did not have a perfectly clear picture of the changes that were they would produce in the situation in some of their largest proportions.

mobilized during the emergency period. And the great question arises regarding the military power, now qualified as capabilities [25] from the country. When the military they use the word 'capabilities', they mean the ability of a State to achieve a given objective, expressed in time and strength. They apply the word to themselves as well as to the enemy. In a situation where the enemy's objective is precisely defined - es decir, su objetivo de contener una operación anfibia (Normandía) o capturar un objetivo vital strategic (Stalingrad) or destroy the enemy's capacity through aerial bombardment continue in the war (the first 'blitz' on London or the attack with V weapons) or destroy on merchant shipping (the Atlantic campaign) -, a broader definition is permissible and more explanatory. We could say, in this case, that 'capabilities' means the amount of armed forces (land, naval, and air power) that the enemy can deploy in a line of battle or battle lines and maintain there at maximum ac -

25. This is a military word that has been used for a long time and I have kept it as it is to use it properly. in this place. (In English: capabilities). The temptation to use it in a peace context as an alternative for "strategic stature." Having done so, it could be considered a temporary favor to military readers, but the the final result would have been to ruin one of the few words in the vocabulary of information that still remains Pristina.

operational activity, without undue harm to the comprehensive strategic needs, without forcing or ruin the war economy of the country and without breaking the stability of the policy and the society.

The aspect of mobilization is, technically at least, a dying factor or dead, because the problem of the military potential in peacetime has been transferred to the problem of maintaining the armed forces at the level of maximum operational activity. Almost all factors of military potential still largely belong to the calculation that the intelligence must carry out, but since the war began, the word 'potential' it should be abandoned or restricted.

Specific vulnerabilities have intensified their importance and their identification. It is one of the greatest tasks of intelligence. They are being exploited with all weapons. available and effective and defended with all the skill, strength, and power that the enemy you can put it in the task.

Our side will be calculating the courses of action available to the enemy, in terms of our appreciation of their capabilities. Military doctrine does not seek to be so specific enough to point the finger at the only course of action that the enemy seems to take more likely willing to continue, nor does it try to focus on identifying what is often calls the "intentions" or "likely intentions" of the enemy. In a appreciation of the courses of action for which the enemy is capable, is used the military formula known as 'situation assessment'. In general terms, this formula is developed as follows: 1) knowledge of the environment, by example: the land, the time and the climate, the hydrology, logistics, etc.: 2) knowledge of the enemy's cash and the disposition of their forces; 3) knowledge of one's own forces; 4) probable courses of action available to the enemy[26]The courses of action are they will study first and foremost, but not less importantly, in the fields of relationships political and economic.

To assess the enemy's capability in wartime one must possess the main categories of knowledge necessary to measure what I have called the strategic stature and the specific vulnerabilities of peacetime. For To know the likely courses of action, one must know largely the same kind of thing. What I needed to know to appreciate the probable courses of action during peacetime.

In noting these similarities, we must not forget a very large dissimilarity. In time of peace is not a task that is too difficult, namely because of the type of knowledge basic that one

In a later chapter, I will discuss the formula of 'situation appreciation' in more depth.

must possess to make these speculations (excepting the USSR). Before the second World War One could have known a lot about any country on the globe and now, after the war, the same happens without great effort (except for the USSR). But, during a war, when the enemy knows perfectly well the importance to keep others in ignorance, the acquisition of basic knowledge is another issue. Much of it can be obtained through perfectly visible channels, but the effort needed to achieve it has multiplied many times.

Throughout this chapter, the theme has been that of speculative knowledge. To discuss this element in the content of strategic intelligence, I could have given the impression that speculative knowledge is a common element. If I have given that print, I want to correct it. Knowledge is not common. It is the rarest ingredient in the landscape of intelligence is produced only by the most competent scholars who this country possesses. It requires its producers to be experts in the field, impartial in the presence of new evidence, ingenious in the development of research techniques, imaginative in their hypotheses, sharp in analyzing their own preferences or prejudices and skilled in presenting their conclusions. It demands from its producers the the best of professional training, the highest intellectual integrity and a great amount of universal wisdom. In that case, I am not referring to what we could call registered fact, but rather to that subtle form of knowledge that comes from a set of well arranged and ordered brain cells.

E N D SECOND

INTELLIGENCE IS ORGANIZATION

CHAPTER V

INTELLIGENCE IS ORGANIZATION

Intelligence constitutes an institution; it is a physical organization of living beings. that pursues, as its end, a special class of knowledge. A similar organization must be prepared to place foreign countries under surveillance or observation and must be prepared to explain their pasts, their present, and probable futures. Must have the assurance that what I produce in terms of information about those countries will be useful to the people who make the decisions, that is, that it is appropriate for their problems, that it is complete, safe and timely. It follows that such an organization must have a team of expert right-handed individuals who at the same time know what the strategic problems are and the current foreign policy and dedicate their professional expertise to the production of a useful information about these problems.

In discussing the organization in this chapter, I do not intend to embark on its administrative aspects. However, there are certain organization problems that I will detail extensively in a chapter (VIII). In this section, I want to limit myself to some general comments on organization and the types of people she must include.

Some team members must be particularly skilled as observers about the ground and as such will form the bulk of the observation force abroad. They are the men stationed in foreign capitals whose mission is to observe and inform. They are the people who largely provide what I have called the element. current information of strategic intelligence. What are the qualities that make of the discovered foreign observer, [27] from the information officer or the attaché, ideal men?

To begin with, there are certain superficial qualities that are by no means the least important. You should not dislike foreigners or living with them; you must adapt to the living conditions abroad; it must show a certain outward expression of kindness with the people. Too often, men who possess these obvious qualities superficial and none of the deeper ones are chosen for duties abroad. It is this is a bad policy, because a man like that cannot be much sharper as observer that any American tourist or expatriate. What it must have for above all, it is a high capacity to detect the most significant and a great sensitivity to notice the changes that occur in the matters it is monitoring. Has acquired that sensitivity by becoming a specialist in their field. These qualities that has acquired through study and experience, constitute the screen of sensitivity that place in front of the foreign scenario.

But not everything that screen collects may interest the organization of intelligence in your country will only be interested in certain things. To select those things, you must to have a second screen that was made in the United States. That is, it must be found so deeply sensitized regarding the informational demands of the strategy and the foreign policy of your country, as well as regarding the foreign scene that you are observing. One must know what is desired, what is important, and what lacks importance.

Finally, it should not merely be a passive receiver of impressions. It must continuously asking embarrassing questions of oneself. One must be imaginative in the search for new sources of confirmatory or contradictory information, it must to become a critic of each new evidence, one must be patient and careful in the the ordering of events that are indisputable must be objective and impartial in its selection of hypotheses. In summary, although their work is not primarily a job of

27. We have not said that the primary quality of a clandestine observer is an impenetrable coat or hideout, that At the same time, do not unduly restrict your observation activities. You may possess other things besides shelter.
many of which are the same as those that will be described for the uncovered observer.

research must possess qualities and the command of the technique of a researcher trained.

All of this means that the intelligence service must recruit within its organization, trained people, practical and must keep them in the offices of their country until they have familiarizado enteramente con las cosas que su gobierno deseará saber y debe cuidar que, once in the campaign, we will keep you continuously informed about the changes in the government's information requirements. The open observation team in the foreign constitutes, thus, an extension of the observation and research team that remains in the country. At least, that's how it should be. Its intimate connection with the body of in its own country, it must be affirmed and formalized through the rotation of assignments.

In addition to the people who perform observation duties abroad, the The intelligence organization has, of course, an establishment in the country. The body of this establishment within the country focuses on observation work based on the country and a research work. In the case that internal observation is a open occupation, there is a large overlap between the qualities of men of observation and those of research. In reality, the tasks of both merge so completely, that very often, a single man does both jobs at the same time. In your observation task notes what you extract from the radio broadcast of the day, from the reports of the foreign press, from the key newspapers of the foreign country of your specialty, and from the cables and reports from observers and delegates. Meanwhile, in their work of research - which may be conducted at the same time -, the data it acquires Every day while watching the daily parade of events, they are often important pieces. of study. If you do not stay informed about what is happening today, your research it will lose sharpness and direction, not to mention fullness.

The necessary qualities for a man of open observation in functions, they have equal strength application in the observation and inner research group. This People must also know inside out the prevailing problems of foreign policy. to be made up of highly trained students in the matters that constitute problems with that policy, must have the necessary capacity for research careful and objective impartial analysis. Part of your work will enter the field of the natural sciences; mostly in the so-called social sciences (in which including military art). The questions that must be answered are obscure and can be resolved only through the knowledge of foreign languages and the techniques of criticism in the meaning only understood by the man who has lived with them and understands their subtleties almost by intuition.

Let's consider, for illustrative purposes only, two small problems inherent to our landing in North Africa. Long before that operation was combined, The United States, through an agreement with the Vichy French government, sent to French Morocco, Algiers, and Tunisia, occasional maritime shipments of goods from consumption, including petroleum-derived products, cotton bales, sugar, and tea. Meanwhile, and especially in the summer of 1942, the potential propaganda value of these

merchandise was well understood: if they could be adequately packaged and if they could carrying some kind of message about our cause would be much better. What could it be? this message? What language should it be written in? How should it be phrased? The the problem was, essentially, one well known to our specialized men in propaganda. But, how to tackle it? They could come up with a slogan that would be very successful applied to the Americans, but the audience in question was not American, but French and Arab in its majority. How can the soul and consciousness of colonial France be reached and the North African Arab? One must know about their psychologies, ideologies, habits of thoughts and ways of expressing oneself, as much as is known about the citizens themselves.

Out of the many risks that needed to be overcome, let's take the writing of the Message in Arabic language. The language is one of the oldest, and currently, it is being quickly adapting to the new world that those who speak it are facing. Many things have happened since the Quran was written; the new concepts of democracy, totalitarianism, liberalism and others must have a nomenclature before they can be expressed. The modern Arab journalists, politicians, and professors are doing just that and our experts, who only know the language of the classical Arabs, could not translate the message in question. The American man in charge of the job is the one who not only knows the modern Arabic language used in journalism and spoken, but rather those particular subspecies of new language that is written and spoken in the local centers of Arab culture in Africa from the northwest: Fez and Morocco, Oran, Constantine, and Kairouan. Unless a intelligence organization can create a man similar, either by extracting from his the resident body or its list of consultants will fail in its obligations.

Another problem was the issue of appreciating the available local workforce, with the that an army could count on in Spanish Morocco. If the problem had been delivered to some expert in human flow calculations, but innocent of the situation especially in Spanish Morocco, the answer would have been very incorrect. The expert I would have taken the wrong path by taking the census figures from Spanish Morocco. for its written value, it would continue in its mistake assuming that the people listed in the census could be physically accessible, assuming that incentives could be devised to make them so to work and assuming that, once employed, they could perform the type of task that is require of them. Without an expert on Spanish Morocco helping the person in charge of the human flow to tell him that the census was inflated, that people were scattered in small communities throughout the troubled country, virtually lacking communication; the last thing those people would do is work and that, if they could be induced to work, the supervision problem would be enormous; in summary, without a man to carry out the local corrections, the result would have been disastrous. A man like that can develop the necessary competence only thanks to the suggested method. An organization of Intelligence must possess a large number of true experts alike.

These examples are not cited to suggest that we have failed on the beaches. from North Africa, if we had not known how to write the Arabic language of French Morocco or if we had estimated the local labor supply from Morocco favorably Spanish. Different examples could prove that, without a particularly In detail, the costs of our landings would have been appreciably much higher. highs.

My opinion is that not everyone can perform professional work in a intelligence organization; and that an intelligence organization is a collection strange and wonderful of devoted specialists fused in a vigorous productive unity.

In a sense, intelligence organizations must resemble a little bit like a great university. They must possess the people for whom research and thought rigorous constitute the breath of life and must, in accordance, have great tolerance towards the strange beings and the eccentrics with a unique talent. They must guarantee a kind of academic freedom of inquiry and should exclude those who undermine that freedom highlighting their occasional errors. A difference based on them must be built. in the enormous difficulties that often entail the search for truth.

Intelligence organizations must have appropriate facilities, among others what occupy the first place a library and a quiet place to work. The The library must contain both published reference work and the set of classified documents that constitute today's news and the raw materials of analysis of tomorrow. The library must be well organized, I mean, it has to be organized according to the ideal of North American libraries. It will not be, of course, a huge library, but it will be extensive in the field of current events foreigners.

As for a quiet place to work, I mean something more leading to concentrated intellectual work in the space of just 40 feet squares per person that prevailed during the war.

But that intelligence organizations have some resemblance to a university is not enough. They must move at a faster pace and observe a greater attention to topics that seem dead or indifferent, even if it may involve, unfortunately, sometimes, a sacrifice in terms of accuracy. The intelligence organizations must also have many of the qualities of our major metropolitan newspapers. After all, many of their duties have a close resemblance to those of an important newspaper. They monitor, inform, summarize, and analyze. They have their foreign correspondents and the local body. Like newspapers, they have their own sources of information, their rapid and secure communications. They have their responsibilities for perfection and safety, with immeasurable punishments larger for the omissions and errors. They also have their deadly dangers. They struggle also with the same huge problem of handling news in millions of words per day and ensure that every man of his body receives all the messages that fall adequately within their specialty. They even have the problem of editorial control and the difficulties of reproduction and dissemination. In these terms, it is logical that the intelligence organizations should pay more attention to journalistic organizations and adopt those phases that are necessary for them.

In addition to the journalistic and university aspects, the organizations of intelligence must have certain characteristics of a good business organization. Not It is by inadvertence that the language of intelligence organizations is weighed with commercial words. Intelligence can be considered – and indeed it often is – as an organization aimed at the development of a product (knowledge) with raw materials (all kinds of data) and work (very skilled, but not practical in the sense commercial of the word). The product, to deserve that classification, must be above of the 'standards'. It must be prepared in a multitude of ways to meet the various demands. Some consumers want it in semi-finished form (notes, with comments about them), others want it finished but in bulk (the encyclopedia), the the majority wants it in small quantities and well wrapped in luxury paper (the summary of a page on the world situation in words of two syllables or less). Not only in your

packaging, but in its internal development, the product must guide and reflect the fluctuations in customer taste, or better yet, customer demands. Hungary threat to become communist: the Hungarian ingredient must be increased. There is a disturbance in Panama for the base issue: the dose of the Panamanian ingredient will be greater. Using your experience can anticipate - and even create - the demand for a new product, but only by maintaining quality can one expect continuous acceptance. Like many producers of consumer goods, intelligence will achieve its greatest market success when your product exhibits unmistakable signs of superior research, both development, appropriate design and careful production.

Intelligence organizations compete with each other. They must study the market and develop its unexplored corners. They must maintain small forces of salesmen, decent and highly intelligent who not only launch the product and appreciate the customer's reaction, but also discover the problems of the new ones consumers with a view to the development of new products. They must know how to outline plans for the future.

Their organizations must have these business characteristics and although it is said Both journalists and teachers are equally allergic to guidelines or rules. of organization, organizations must be established by guidelines and operate decently respect towards them. But at the same time, they must possess a certain fluency in their structure; they must strive to possess the ability to shift power from a unit not used to its full capacity to another recharged upon maximum loads occurring unexpected. They should not allow a unit to dedicate interest to any operation of little importance. They must strive to undertake painful reorganizations when the sheet of the balance as I indicated. They must have the ability and willingness to undertake tedious tasks. and apparently little profitable due to the desire of their best clients, and above all, they must not trying to sell more than their capacity allows.

What I have said about the organization of intelligence is so real and applicable in times of peace like in times of war. Because of the fact that a poor development of the The intelligence of a deficient organization in a war has its highly severe punishments. dramatic, it is not logical to assume that there are no similar punishments in peace. The mistakes in the great strategy of peace may not produce the spectacle of a battlefield unnecessarily disastrous, but sometimes they produce something much worse.

CHAPTER VI

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

As can be seen from the preceding, the intelligence of grand strategy and the national security does not arise spontaneously as a result of the normal process of government; it is produced thanks to a complicated machinery and an intense effort. In

In this chapter and the next two, I will talk about certain aspects of the machine. intelligence. I will start with our own Central Intelligence.

On January 22, 1946, President Truman sent a "memorandum" to the secretaries of State, War and Navy, in which he ordered: "that all activities of the federal foreign intelligence were planned, developed, and coordinated in such a way that the most effective fulfillment of the intelligence mission related to the national security." The "memorandum" continued: "I hereby appoint you, along with another person who will be named by me as a personal representative;[28] as National Intelligence Authority to fulfill that purpose.

Admiral Leaby was later appointed to that office.

Later, it continued: '2. Within the limits of the available credits, each one you will designate from time to time persons and facilities of your respective departments, which will collectively form a Central Intelligence Group and, the address of a Central Intelligence director will collaborate with the authority of National Intelligence will take its place as always without a vote.

With these words, the president created for the first time in our formal history and official central organization of strategic intelligence[29]It will be noted that the Group of Central Information did not constitute the usual type of commission or council. It was formed in response of an executive order from the president and not a law from Congress and depended on three established departments of

29. During World War II, the Combined Intelligence Commission of the Combined Chiefs of Staff took charge of the strategic intelligence mission during wartime. Its various subcommittees and commissions of work included representatives not only from the Army, Navy, and Air Force, but also from several of the civil organizations, especially from the Department of State, the Office of Strategic Services, and the Administration Foreign Economic. The Joint Intelligence Committee was thus a kind of central intelligence organization, but its sphere was thus a kind of central intelligence organization, but its sphere of activity was limited by the nature of its wartime mission; the other group, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, related to the
First, it never had an Executive Order proclaiming its formal existence.

of the government regarding its personnel and funds.

While this arrangement was advisable in that it allowed for rapid establishment of a central intelligence organization, also possessed evident disadvantages. The first of them was uncertainty. Who could predict when the "available credit limits" would narrow down to the point where departments Would they be unable to 'assign people and facilities' properly? Who could? to say whether the Congress is favorably disposed towards the idea of central intelligence up to that point I could not destroy it through a huge reduction in the budgets of the departments that support her? Under these circumstances, what first-class civilians They would look for employment, what excellent officers would they try to be assigned there? The lieutenant General D. Hoyt S. Vandenberg (now general), the second director of intelligence central, enfocó su atención sobre el problema. Debido en gran parte a sus esfuerzos, que se throughout his entire tenure as director, the central intelligence was legitimized in a law of Congress. Title I, section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947

[30] establish a Central Intelligence Agency and convert the matter of its budget in a case study

30th Eightieth Congress, first session. Public Law 253.

annual Congress. Let's examine the statute.

Perhaps I should say above all that its meaning was to exclude, at least for entonces, una larga argumentación respecto a la forma esencial que debía tomar la central intelligence In the last days of the war, this problem was pressing reality and centered around this basic question: whether it should be a kind of maintenance and administration organization. The most extreme adherents to the idea of the operant organization argued that an agency with almost a responsibility exclusive to the intelligence of grand strategy and national security, would be the only one capable of adequately performing that task. Considering that they did not propose to exclude completely the departmental intelligence, they insisted on a central organization, that would carry out by herself the functions described in the current doctrine as a meeting, evaluation and dissemination or as I have classified them: observation, research and dissemination. As such, it could not help but duplicate a substantial part of the functions of departmental intelligence. It would have a headquarters of appropriate size: very large. It would not be part of a political or operational department or a government agency. It would be a vast and living reference encyclopedia separate from all departments and similar organisms and dedicated to their service. Some of its proponents would inform the chiefs of the Combined General Staff, others to the president.

Around the defense of such organization revolved solid arguments in favor and against against a highly centralized administration. In my view, these were moving peripherally to the actual results. In a highly significant matter, the propagators of the great operating company had a strong argument. It was: if they introduce in the intelligence gathering phase - especially the gathering phase discovered – the new organization could do a more perfect job than was being done currently.

The majority of the discovered meeting was then and is now, held by the representatives abroad of those government departments occupied with our foreign relations. The three departments of the Forces, as well as the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, Treasury, Justice, and others, send attachments and the Department of The state, which is at the forefront of all of them, sends its officials from the Foreign Service and aggregates. For reasons deeply rooted in tradition and practice administrative, the quality of that external force of observation and gathering has been below below the 'standard'. Some of its members have had other duties, too much numerous, to allow them to carry out a good observation and reporting task; some they have possessed the time and the inclination, but not the necessary competence; others have They had the time, but they neither had the inclination nor the competence. But they did not let's forget about those who have been brilliant in their task.

Now it can be argued that a new institution responsible for this function observation and information, would be in a strong position to break with any ministerial precedent and deploy an expert and cunning force on the ground. The possibility of

better foreign information may constitute the strongest argument in favor of the highly centralized intelligence.

At the same time, such centralization violates what, for me, is the only and most important principle of successful intelligence, that is, the close contact of the information producers with users or consumers of intelligence. Even within from a single department, it is quite difficult to develop trust classes between producer and consumer that only make possible the completion, opportunity and applicability of the product. There are significant barriers to this trust, even when the intelligence is carried out by people who wear the same uniform, are in the same building or follow the same line of work. But how much greater difficulty exists to establish that trust between the no man's land that currently extends between the ministries! It would be too easy for an organization such as this to isolate itself from a real intimacy with the departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force; living in relative innocence about their particular fears and the small but significant changes in their goals, Politics and plans. It wouldn't be impossible for a similar organization to steer incorrectly. their efforts, observing the events incorrectly and reporting on matters of little interest. Furthermore, his distancing from daily ministerial affairs would have an effect severely adverse regarding the applicability of its research products. And it would not be a lot to say, including that the directives directed to the department by the own president, they could not alter this situation. The departments that inevitably they support the main responsibilities for the grand strategy, they would continue with their own intelligence work and would keep their distance; they might not show themselves fully willing to pass on to the organization the product of their own operations of intelligence. And even less would they wish to pass on information that they were enabled to consider 'operational information'.[31]In matters of interest

31. Administrative practice likes to try to make a distinction between what it calls communications of operational information and communications. In many cases the distinction is valid. For example, a wire concerning to the payroll, item and journey of the body of an embassy, let's say in Lima, has operational importance but not of information. However, other cables that are primarily intended for operations may possess a important nature of information.

Interdepartmental, such as those handled by the old Coordination Committee State - War - Navy, it could be said that each department would support itself in the knowledge produced by its own people.

There would be little willingness to revere the opinions and facts produced by the agency, just because it was central.

The National Security Law, as it applies to the Intelligence Agency Central, tries to conjure that danger in different ways. One of them is to reject the idea. of the large independent operating organization and establish a body mainly dedicated to the coordination of ministerial intelligence. Examine the text of the law.

His fourth paragraph (paragraph D) describes the function of the new Agency. Central Intelligence says:

"In order to coordinate the intelligence activities of the different departments of governments and organizations, in the interest of national security, shall be duty from the Agency, under the direction of the Council of

National Security:[32]

1) To advise the National Security Council on matters concerning the above intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government in what relates to it refers to national security.

Suppose, for example, that a communication comes in which you they are requesting supplemental funds for the trip. A similar request would normally require an explanation and in the Explanation could very well contain information of great importance. The common transport in Peru. they could have suddenly become inadequate or insecure or untrustworthy, which puts the mission in great disadvantage. The mission must make special arrangements for its senior staff. If the recent issues produced in public transport, have not been the subject of a report, the 'operational' communication in question could to be the only word that would reach the country on the subject. And if this particular communication were considered closely linked to the concept that its content had essentially operational importance, the receiving organization it would seem to be hiding information about the land.

32. See section 101 of the National Security Act. The president of the Council could be the president or the one he will design among its members. These could be the president, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense (see section 202 of the law), the Secretary of the Army (see section 205), the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force Air (see section 207), the president of the Armament Council (see section 213), and the president of the Council of Research and Development (see section 214). Hence, the new National Security Council replaces the former National Information Authority as the interdepartmental organization to which the Agency is accountable. Central Intelligence.

2) Formulate recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government, in terms of national security.

3) Correlate and evaluate information related to national security and to provide for the correct dissemination of said intelligence within the Government, using, where appropriate, existing organisms and facilities: provided that the Agency did not have police powers, to summon, to compel by law or security functions interior; as long as the departments and other government agencies continue gathering, evaluating, correlating, and disseminating departmental intelligence and provided that the director of Central Intelligence is responsible for the protection of sources and methods of intelligence from unauthorized origins.

4) Carry out, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, the additional services of common interest that the National Security Council may tidy up from time to time.

5) Perform other functions and duties related to intelligence that affect national security, that the National Security Council determines that can be fulfilled centrally with greater efficiency

Allow me to pause briefly at this point. Certain matters are quite clear.
en este párrafo. Comencemos con el más claro: la Agencia no tendrá funciones de policía.
The American public, which rightly feared any connection between intelligence and
the police power and that on various occasions has been misled by newspapers
irresponsible, it can bury the specter of an American Gestapo or MVD. Similarly
It is clear that the Central Intelligence Agency does not replace intelligence.
departmental; the function of the Agency is to increase its effectiveness by coordinating it and supplementing it. The fact that the Central Intelligence Agency cannot usurp functions performed most appropriately in the departments, seems to be adequately guaranteed by its subordination to the National Security Council, which are part of the secretaries of the departments in question. Lately it is fine.
Of course, the Central Intelligence Agency will have certain operational functions. (subparagraphs 4 and 5) and that they must be interpreted either directly in aid of the departmental intelligence or as an indistinguishable part of its overall mission of coordination.

A little less clear is the matter of advising the National Security Council.
about departmental intelligence and making recommendations for its coordination.
Obviously, the Central Intelligence Agency can advise and recommend only when
know practically everything there is to know about departmental intelligence. This
implies that the Central Intelligence Agency should have an unlimited right to
inspection, but no such right is granted by law. For more security, the
next paragraph, e), considers the inspection, but the inspection in question seems to be
an intelligence (knowledge, the product of activity in intelligence) and not of the
departmental activity that produces it. It could be argued - and I imagine it has been already
that the right to inspect the product includes the authority to judge the operation that
it elaborates. But there is a considerable difference between this right to trial and a right
of inspection as inspection itself. I suppose that any person in charge of the terrifying
the task of coordinating national security intelligence would sleep much better if its
inspection rights were declared or defined a little more carefully and
fully.

A basic issue in all the discussions presented is the meaning of the
words "national security". As I have stated before, all the designs
Foreign policy and grand strategy are inextricably intertwined. Is politics
from the United States regarding the UN a policy that arises from our desire to
promote a better world order or a policy that arises from our stubbornness for the
national security? Does our policy on atomic energy arise from one or the other? Is it
our policy on the organization of international trade undertaken due to
nuestra prosperidad material, de un mejor orden mundial o de nuestra seguridad nacional?
And, personally, I would not be bold enough to risk a categorical answer to
Any of those questions, I don't feel cowardly for not doing it. I find it difficult.
imagine that the Central Intelligence Agency can be bolder and I suppose therefore
that the intelligence functions of the Agency will actually be considerably more
broader than those that might have a national security structure in the concept of the
law. In fact, I can only conjecture that under the heading of 'Security Intelligence
"national", the Central Intelligence Agency will find itself in all the
extensions of high politics and grand strategy information. On this not
extend the law. Perhaps it is not necessary.

The following paragraph, e), is dedicated to affirming the assurance that the Agency of Central Intelligence has the ability to 'correlate and assess intelligence related to national security...[33]Says: "In the extension recommended by the Council of Following-

[33]. See article 3 of paragraph d).

National dad and approved by the president, this intelligence of the departments and government organisms, except as stipulated later, related to security national, will be open to the inspection of the Central Intelligence director and such intelligence, regarding national security and in possession of said departments and others organismos del Gobierno, excepto lo estipulado más adelante, debe ser puesta a disposición from the director of Intelligence for its correlation, evaluation, and dissemination. Having in however, it states that at the written request of the director of Central Intelligence, the the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation will make available to the director of Central Intelligence the information for its correlation, evaluation, and dissemination that could be essential for national security.

The meaning of the paragraph is very clear: if Central Intelligence receives the mandate to correlate, evaluate, and disseminate a certain type of knowledge and if it should not be produce that knowledge through research, so it must have access to the files of the organizations that produce that knowledge through research. The The Central Intelligence Agency must have the right to inspect (that is, the right to to see the files), because it is not reasonable to demand that the Central Intelligence Agency Acquire knowledge through the title of the document in which it may appear. Without the right of inspection, the Central Intelligence Agency would not be able to perform; it would have to to ask the departments for knowledge whose existence I would not know for sure. And in the case of receiving a negative response from the department, I could not have never the certainty that either the department ignored the possession of the information or had it. lost or held it voluntarily.

In addition to the right of inspection, the Central Intelligence Agency must have also the right to use the information that the departments produce through the search. Hence the phrase: said intelligence... "will be made available to" the Agency of Central Intelligence.

The special position enjoyed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation among the other departmental intelligence organizations are worthy of mention. If I do not mistake, the Central Intelligence Agency does not have the right to inspect the Office Federal Investigation. When you want information that, in your feeling, you possess the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency must request it for written. In the best case, this procedure constitutes a barrier between the two organizations and in other circumstances it can become an impenetrable wall.

The main function of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is peripheral to that of the Central Intelligence Agency and most of the information that the office can producing through the search will not interest the agency. For example, the agency does not will probably have interest in the domestic intelligence of the office, relative intelligence to their duties of reinforcement of the law. On the other hand, there are matters in which the works of the office can be of immense importance to the agency. By the terms of the law, the the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency receives or does not receive information about the

knowledge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation relies too much on things intangibles such as good relationships between agencies and personal friendships.

The preceding paragraphs of the law place the Central Intelligence Agency in a appropriate interdepartmental environment, establishes the position of its director and mentions especially regarding its staff.

Paragraphs a) and b) place the Central Intelligence Agency under the Council of National Security and refer to a certain extent to the director's problem. According to with the text, it can be either a commissioned officer of the armed forces or an individual of civil life. His salary will be $14,000, regardless of his previous status. This This means that if he belongs to any of the forces, he will receive his service pay plus the additional amount that raises the sum to 14,000 dollars. Furthermore, as an official not it will be subject to command: “it will not be subject to any supervision, control, restriction or prohibition (both military and of any other kind), more than what was necessary If I were a civilian... He will not have or exercise supervision, control, powers or functions (other than those it possesses... as a director), regarding the armed forces or any derivatives of these... After having fulfilled his duties as director of the Agency Central Intelligence, your service cannot be blamed for any incapacity due to having been absent from duty.

In making these stipulations regarding the director, Congress tried to overcome certain objections to entrusting the task to a military officer. These Objections could be described as follows:

1) The duration in the employment of an officer of any of the armed forces is probably short. Moreover, it can be finished at the same moment as a A change in senior management could cause enormous damage to the organization. The reason this situation can be found in the demand from the armed forces themselves his best officers and in the aversion of the officers, to separate from their duties specific too much time in order not to damage their professional military career. In stipulating the high salary (superior to any, except that of the five-star general stars) plus the guarantees that the absence of service would not cause incapacity, the Congress offered an incentive for a long and continuous protection for the official who I would make use of it.

An officer on assignment at the Central Intelligence Agency, from one of the forces and not separated from its command chain, it may not have the freedom to act with complete impartiality towards the other forces represented in the agency and could have duties within their own force that will harm their devotion to the Central Agency of Intelligence. By specifically separating it from the chain of command, Congress has treaty to avoid these objections. But even so, Congress has not taken all into account the objections; those that remain will be considered in the last half of this chapter.

El párrafo c) de la ley, da al director el poder de “finalizar el cargo...” de cualquier agency member, 'when it deems such determination necessary or advisable to the interests of the United States." The director's power in this regard surpasses the guarantees of tenancies written in the civil service legislation. At the same time, this law it stipulates that persons thus exempted will have no difficulty in seeking and accepting employment in any government agency.

This paragraph is dictated by the staffing problem that everyone faces. departments and federal agencies - intelligence and others - responsible for security national. Those employees of such organizations and within the government in general, must

be loyal and discreet. But, in the so-called security agencies (of the State, army, armed forces, air forces, Atomic Energy Commission, Federal Bureau of Investigation Central Intelligence Agency, among the most notable), this is not enough. Some of their employees and all those from the Central Intelligence Agency must enjoy certain degree of special trust and security. It can be argued that if a man has habits irregular or abnormal subtleties in character, could be subject to pressures analogous to blackmail; that, if a man has relatives living under the control of a foreign state, can be subject to similar pressures. People under these circumstances do not are as trustworthy as others and a security agency must avoid the employ them. Once employed, the agency can un-employ them without harming its rights and employment hopes in any other government agency.[34]

34. We have not stated that a person with a primary and demonstrable allegiance to a foreign power or to a an ideology incompatible with that of the United States has even fewer reasons to be employed in a security agency or, in any case, in any government dependency. But for the same reason that the problem of loyalty is much broader than that of security in an information organization, a full discussion of it does not it would seem suitable for a book of this kind.

What is true for security agencies in general is true for their intelligence compartments and even more for the Central Intelligence Agency. Because, unless the Central Intelligence Agency is known or considered as the the safest place in the government would not enjoy the complete trust of the agencies which is considered the central one. And, if it does not possess that trust, it would have no functions. Hence, that paragraph c) of the law is vital for the existence of intelligence central.

The authors of the following paragraphs of the national security law have recognized three basic issues for the execution of a national security intelligence. They have recognized the fundamental importance of departmental intelligence and have not harmed in the interest of central intelligence. They have acknowledged that intelligence departmental must be manipulated ('coordinated, is the word they use) by some superior power, to have the assurance that it meets the demands of security national. And, finally, they have understood that certain tasks are essentially operational in total intelligence effort assistance was better to be undertaken centrally. It should be understood and applauded that the lawmakers have not extended regarding how intelligence should be coordinated and supplemented departmental. However, the question is: does the law provide the Intelligence Agency Central and its director enough freedom to do a good coordination job and supplementation? To answer this question, it is necessary to say what good implies work in question. In the rest of this chapter, I will try to answer that question with regarding my notions of what the job demands, starting with the function of coordination or management.

The task of coordinating departmental intelligence activities is very important. It is even more important than the coordination of the knowledge produced those activities. Because, unless the coordinating agency can exercise some influence over what should and should not be produced, it's hard to see how the the coordination of what is nominally produced always constitutes an operation productive. Therefore, I believe that the primary task of the Intelligence Agency Central is constituted by a certain kind of oversight over activities

departmental. Allow me to be clearer about the departments and agencies in issue.

In the first case, the departments in question are the four departments that they have the main responsibility for national security, that is, of the State, Army, Navy and Air Force. In times of peace, the Department of State requests, and generally obtains, primacy in the field of foreign policy, which, as I have indicated anteriormente, incluye la manutención de la seguridad nacional como uno de sus objetivos. Hence, in this document, the Intelligence activities of the Department of The state has or should have a high degree of importance, gathered under the seal of the Central Intelligence Agency.

In the second case, the departments and agencies in question are those such as the of the Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, Justice, the Tariff Commission and others, whose primary responsibilities are limited to the domestic sphere, but whose participation in the foreign affairs are not insignificant. How domestic and foreign policies are made more and more difficult to separate, even a department with the name Department of The Interior often finds itself dealing with exterior matters. In fact, the Mines office the Interior carries out extensive observation and research on mining resources of foreign countries. The point is that, in addition to the four largest, there is a group less than twenty or more organizations that contribute significantly to the total. federal knowledge and therefore fall under the coordinating power of the Agency Central Intelligence. The task of coordination, as I understand it, requires that the the agency follows six lines of administrative activity.

First: You must clearly establish the jurisdiction of the various organizations. of departmental intelligence. That is to say, we must define which matters each one will follow and what issues he will not address. For example, he can tell the Department of Agriculture that improve your activities regarding external agricultural intelligence and inform the Department of the State that abandons that field. He can tell the Intelligence Division of Department of the Army that abandons certain aspects of economic intelligence and to tell the Department of Commerce that it assumes that responsibility.

Second: having established the departmental jurisdictions, it must be maintained the order in them. That order must be a continuous process and must be carried out with great tolerance and wisdom. It will consist of three subactivities: 1st) It will deal with the inevitable expansion of one jurisdiction within another. Otherwise, the Intelligence Agency Central will pursue unnecessary duplications of functions. I would like to elaborate on the the word 'unnecessary' and ensure that all apparent duplications are not really true duplications. Those who see duplication at the first sign of similarity in two functions and that try to accuse one of them of extravagance, often and in the long run, They cost the Government a pretty penny. 2°) The Agency must ensure that each the department fully exploits all the area of its jurisdiction. What I mean by this is that it should not allow a department to take and choose matters within its jurisdiction and avoid those that I find unpleasant or relatively useless for purposes purely departmental. No department will be able to evade its assigned ones. responsibilities, thus allowing a clear understanding to form in the overall picture. 3°) It will have to enlarge some of the jurisdictions established by the addition of new ones matters, if it seemed or was necessary for national security. For example, the responsibility for knowledge about spacecraft may someday be assigned to some departmental jurisdiction.

Third: To return to my main coordinating lines of activity, the Agency Central Intelligence should carry out a continuous intelligence recognition. departmental, to ensure that your product maintains its quality level and that the contribution that each departmental team provides to an interdepartmental project, the individual contributions would have no utility, nor can they be transformed to they have it. The head of the central intelligence project will be forced to do a part substantial of the original work again and conduct searches. As I will indicate more Go ahead, this must be avoided at all costs.

Fourth: If a departmental intelligence organization were at fault, the central intelligence must be willing to find the error and help correct it. For example, about the theory that the intelligence demands of high politics are much lower that the demands, some department must have surely failed in its duty. It could It is possible that this superior project requires something similar to a table of global tonnage of towboats and that if the Department of Marina has never been obliged, with previously, to maintain a record of tugs, the Naval Intelligence Office does not could respond. If such information were indispensable for the project, the intelligence central will have to be willing to ensure that the Naval Intelligence Office obtains the funds and personnel necessary to undertake the production of that intelligence on the towboats.

Fifth: The central intelligence must direct directly or indirectly all the interdepartmental projects; by projects, I mean the studies that will require observation and research along a very wide front that are intended for the White House, to the cabinet, the National Security Council and to the chiefs of the general staff combined. Projects of this nature will put at stake the resources and expertise of the whole federal intelligence and must be carried out under the responsibility of the Central Agency Intelligence. I have large orders in mind such as the influence of the Vatican on world affairs, the likely growth of international communism and the effect produced on global adjustments due to the new movement of the so-called zones pending. It could be that the central intelligence had one of its own members as project supervisor, or that the supervisor may have been temporarily taken to loan of a departmental intelligence equipment. In any case, the the supervisor will be primarily responsible to the director of the Agency of Central Intelligence or its representative.

Sixth: The Central Intelligence Agency must take note of the departmental intelligence personal policies. Must be fully aware of the difficulties that the civil service and the departments themselves cause to the work of intelligence. It will play an active role in ensuring that recruitment and training take place for intelligence. departmental, suitable people.

To fulfill these six types of coordinated activity, the Central Agency of Intelligence must be guided by a single and elevated principle: it will stay away from main substantive work. The Central Intelligence Agency will form its team with a few men of the highest professional competence in appropriate fields of study. It will need to have several prominent economists and political scientists, some specialists in international relations and some specialists in the art of war; must to have a rather large number of young men who have begun to outline their professional path. However, this body will intervene as little as possible in the work creative noun. He will confine his activities to the management of the projects.

interdepartmental, to the critique of the departmental contributions to such projects, to the investigation of the reasons why a certain contribution departmental is inadequate or erroneous. Its task is, what could be called, ordering. of the professional competence of departmental teams and, consequently, that of convert departmental deficiencies into departmental functions. As soon as the Central Intelligence Agency deviates from this principle as soon as it deals with trabajo substantivo y produzca ella misma estudios descriptivos o evaluativos, se They will produce disorders. Because, by doing so, it will become little more than a fifth. superior research and observation team, entering into direct competition with its subsidiaries and with a great disadvantage. Competes with them for professional staff, in a market that is already close to the point of strangulation; it competes with them in the construction of a basic documentation library and the fact of entering late in this area, it puts her at a disadvantage. There are few consumers who do not are also served by departmental intelligence teams or by a ad hoc combination of them; consequently, it competes to have consumers and to to guide them. This guidance will be provided reluctantly to an organization that is administratively separated from the consumer and has no operational responsibility.

A competition of this kind will be annoying and frustrating. Intelligence the departmental will feel a desire for revenge and, through sordid and well-known traps bureaucratic issues can render the entire program of the Central Intelligence Agency useless. No the hostility will not be created in the six lines of administration that I have proposed; for the opposite. But I don't think it will last forever. Because of the role that has been assigned to the The Central Intelligence Agency is not of a competitive nature, but one that the departments will pay homage once they have recovered from the original 'shock'.

Some may argue that the agency cannot judge substantive competence in the departments, unless it has a body that can surpass intelligence departmental on its own ground. With this, they want to mean that the agency cannot to maintain the level of departmental standards, until it constitutes a research organization so powerful that it is virtually the sum of the forces combined from all departmental bodies. I cannot fully display myself from I agree with this point of view; I do not believe that a critic, in order to be constructive, should know everything that the person subject to his criticism knows. I believe, on the other hand, that a wise critic and an expert can uncover flaws in an argument or point out the weaknesses of a someone else's work, without the need to be technically equal or superior to that other person. The the type of critic I am referring to is the oldest statistician in his profession, the man who has traveled the path of detailed duty or original work and therefore possesses a great ability to discern the good and the bad in the work of others. He is the man who knows their profession in depth, who actually guides it, not doing the small ones. works of the principles or halfway through a career, but through the mature and reflected works of all of it. I would like these – about a dozen, more or less, helped perhaps by intelligent assistants - they were civilians. They will not only be more abundant available civilians for that task, but they could move more fluidly from one force to another. Perhaps with greater fluency than an officer of one of the forces. If more is needed a dozen of them, there is no reason to deny them, as long as they clearly understand that your duty is criticism and direction, not observation or investigation.

The problem of recruiting a dozen such men is perhaps the key problem of the entire program that I have described; without them the program will never work. I believe, without embargo, they can be recruited, but only under the following conditions:

The program they are about to inaugurate must have been thought out to the last detail. detail. Moreover, the Central Intelligence Agency must have conducted surveys in the National Security Council ensuring its support. No man of the caliber to which I mean, they will undertake a task of this nature without having some exact notions. about the possibilities of success.

2) Si han de ser civiles, el director de la agencia tiene que ser un civil. La Ley de National Security has overlooked the main issue. And that is, while an officer of the forces Armadas Sea, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, it is almost inevitable that his team immediate is also military. Similarly, it is almost inevitable that it will establish its organization according to the familiar scheme of the military high command, and will fill everything higher echelon - has occurred very often - with army officers, the forces air and the navy. The destinations of the high command will depend on this way, probably, based on criteria such as appropriate range, availability, and weapon. Some of the officers will be there because they are colonels or captains with no other assignment and others, merely, to maintain a balance of power for power in the organizational chart. Some of the members of this group will have little professional competition in the specialized task of high-level intelligence, and others will have little interest in it. In summary, the people to whom the civil experts will submit their reports and with the those who will have to work will be chosen with a very different criterion than that which prevailed in carrying out the appointment of those civilians. They will not consider that this the situation favors their tasks and despite the conditions of goodness or capacity that they possess directors will be recruited with difficulty.

Of course, there is the nominal alternative of appointing a military director and to form the upper level of coordination with the most capable men of the forces the same. I am not one of those who assert that the forces do not have adequate officers. professional training for the task. On the contrary, I also know, however, that the forces will hesitate to appoint those officials for intelligence and that the same officials they will reluctantly accept those destinations. A long career in intelligence is not the best way to advance in a military career.[35]Understand that the privileges and the immunities provided by Congress to the director (whether he is an official) do not extend to the other military personnel designated in the Central Intelligence Agency. But let's suppose that the forces designate the officers for the agency, and that they willingly accept they start the task. for example, if someone You have to investigate some deficiencies in the

In the next chapter, I will elaborate on this problem.

intelligence activities of the army, that person must be an army officer, but I do not argue that such a coordination team will have more difficulties dealing with the military departments that with civil departments. By a naval officer or from the air. However, it may occur that the the right man better for that task

wear the blue uniform. And if someone has to give unpleasant advice to the Department of State or Commerce, it would be better if it did not have any kind of uniform. Create a a coordination team where all are military is to steal fluidity or freedom from action regarding the forces and undermine their success with the civil departments.

Let's assume that the directory of the Central Intelligence Agency is civilian and that recruits its own professional master coordination staff. What happens with the Remaining problems? They are terrible. Let's take the issue of defining the jurisdiction of a a certain intelligence organization: from the Ministry of Army, let's say.

Everyone will agree that the positive intelligence of the Ministry of the Army it would produce knowledge regarding the land forces of foreign countries. It will only be up to where I can go well. The second question arises immediately: What is Does it mean by land forces: the force in existence or the mobilizable force? Let's see what happens then. The Army Ministry will argue that the knowledge of the ground forces in existence are only a fragment of what I had to know; it will say that the force in existence constitutes only an uncertain symbol and leads to error, of the total ground force that could be mobilized in wartime. It is against the force potential, against which our army must be warned not against the fragment in existence. Now, that mobilizable force is not a simple thing and calculating its size and strength of impact is not a simple matter of military intelligence that can obtain easily. As I have tried to demonstrate in Chapter IV, the calculations of the mobilizable force is mainly based on the knowledge of phenomena political, economic, social, and moral. To estimate the mobilizable or potential force warlike, the intelligence of the Ministry of Army must have infinite and great ramifications, and extend to other departmental jurisdictions.

Let's suppose now that the Central Information Agency restricts jurisdiction. of the Army Department and causes other departments - in this case, especially the State and Commerce - provide the necessary political and economic knowledge to carry out that calculation. Two reactions will occur. One, from the Ministry of Army, to indicate that he is not satisfied with the material he receives. He will say that what State and Commerce is inadequate or not suitable for that kind of calculation. another reaction will occur in State and Commerce, which will argue that their organizations of intelligence is already too busy with its own departmental duties and that they do not want to take charge of anything from the Department of the Army.

Oh, perhaps the reaction of State and Commerce will occur in the sense that they will claim that they would be very satisfied to work for the Department of Army, if it were it will show more specific and clear in its demands. As the matter stands, they will cry out, the The Ministry of the Army is being overly cautious regarding the large project in which They are supposed to intervene or contribute. Until knowing the final use or destination. what will be given to the material they deliver, they will not be able to perform a satisfactory task. In reality, they can still go further and claim that this will be the last time they help the Ministry of the Army if it does not grant them the trust they deserve and does not provide them with the guidance class they need.

These arguments and counterarguments will inevitably lead, in a more and deeper into the Central Intelligence Agency under the supervision of the operations of departmental intelligence. If the Central Intelligence Agency has having the right men on your team will be an excellent advantage for the country. But this will not be seen the same way by the members of the second part. It will make them

very little grace and therefore the agency will have to be strong and competent to withstand a 5-year storm.

The inconveniences that the Central Intelligence Agency itself believes in those Jurisdictional problems will worsen when they fall, let's say, on the Department. of the State, due to some unsatisfactory contribution to one of its own projects interdepartmental of the agency. Its subsequent investigation in the organization of intelligence of the State Department will create, at least for a time, a situation of tightness. The State, like other departments, will stumble upon difficulties to to accommodate to what it will consider a detriment to its sovereignty.

But the Central Intelligence Agency will improve its position with its subsidiaries. when I fought for them. If the poor performance of the State Department were produced due to a lack of equipment and this lack arises from an unreasonable decrease in its Budget, the agency's defense to secure more funding will win friends. This and the fact that departmental intelligence desires good senior management, they may soften some of the sharp edges of the unpleasant activities of the Agency Central Intelligence. If it can manage to gather information problems that everyone they consider it to be of national importance; if it can provide project supervisors high-quality interdepartmental and a good team of work, you will be able to win favor. with the departments and neutralize much of the departmental anger. The fact that It will not be competing with the departments, it will be one of the strongest points it will have. in his favor.

In most circumstances, the task I have outlined for an Agency Central Intelligence of my choice will be extremely difficult. But the text of the law does not describe to me the best of circumstances. To begin with, it does not make civil to the agency specifying that the director must be a civilian, and allowing an officer of the armed forces occupy that position, gives the Central Intelligence Agency an aura of militarism. This could turn into a positive disadvantage, because enabling the The accumulation of military personnel in the upper echelons will harm the recruitment of civilians. professionals and competent in what I have called the spheres of coordination. No let's forget that the main object of the particular intelligence task of the Agency Intelligence Agency is much closer to the so-called civilian specialties. that to the military.

But, as I have already indicated, the fact of not having high-caliber civilians on the team Coordination is not necessarily a disaster. The armed forces have people. able for the task, if they want to give them a destination while keeping them in it for a long time. Let's assume they do so. Under these conditions, does the Central Agency have Intelligence something that supports it, in the sense of legally established powers, to carry out the work that I have described.

I don't think so. Because the lawmakers have been too busy in the wrong address. They have given the Central Intelligence Agency access to the product of the departmental intelligence activities, but not the activities themselves. It is true that they have granted the agency the right to make recommendations on those. activities, but they have not directly granted him the right to research. Under the Well, if the Central Intelligence Agency is going to make such recommendations, it will have to to base them not on direct firsthand knowledge regarding what they are activities, but rather in knowledge about them obtained through a study on their final product. This process seems unnecessarily torturous to me.

Let's assume that the director of the Central Intelligence Agency checks that there is something wrong in the departmental intelligence and let's also assume that, due to the limitations imposed by law cannot make precise and fair recommendations to the National Security Council. Let's assume that the latter is not impressed at all. minimum due to the recommendations made. However, this does not prevent the agency director from to be under the terrible responsibilities created by the law. If one cannot obtain what it needs departmental intelligence and if it does not have the power to make it produce departmental intelligence what it needs, its path is clear: it must start to produce his own intelligence from scratch. He must engage in observation activities and investigation, on a large scale. And, as I have already pointed out, by doing so, it will become, automatically, in competitor of the departments. Given the circumstances, it cannot wait for the triumph to be yours; the departmental intelligence, no matter how ineffective it may be, always has certain important and invariable advantages. The most that can be expected in in such a case, it is a draw position.

Up to this point, I have limited myself to the first of the two main functions of the Central Intelligence Agency, that is, the coordination. Let's now talk about the second, that is, the operational or operational function. Its nature is clearly described in the sections 4 and 5 of paragraph d) of the law, and consist of compliance, for the benefit of the departmental intelligence, for those tasks that can be carried out more effectively centrally, along with some tasks assigned by the National Security Council. The intención es clara y su posibilidad de ejecución muy elevada. En sus operaciones, la Central Intelligence Agency will work for the cause of the departments. If the agency If you wish to do it for your own benefit, you must first obtain the approval of the Council. National Security, which includes the secretaries of the relevant departments. And those will show an appropriate amount of interest in the operations. departmental, which is fair and logical.

In line with what I have said about the Central Intelligence Agency and the coordinator function, I repeat now: the operational functions of the agency will not be in competition with departmental functions. Whatever the product of these operations, it will be a product intended to meet a requirement or a demand of the departmental intelligence. Or will it be a product intended to meet the demands of some interdepartmental project. It will not be something that the Central Intelligence Agency too important for departmental use or too outside the orbit of all departmental jurisdictions. Because as soon as the Central Agency Intelligence operates and produces new substantive knowledge solely to be credited in his own account, and as soon as he passes this knowledge to someone consumer without involving the departments in the procedure, the Agency The Intelligence Center will be fully dedicated to substantive work. All the criticisms that will arise if their coordinating activities lead her to research original and creative, would rise in this second case.

In my opinion, the worst thing the agency could do would be to start operations in aid. from a domestic research team and try to produce knowledge superdepartmental without the intervention or collaboration of the departments themselves. If the departmental intelligence will reach a condition or state so inferior that it would not deserve the trust of the Central Intelligence Agency, then the duty of the agency would be to rebuild departmental intelligence, not try to replace it. Because if the Agency The Intelligence Agency insists on its purpose of carrying out all intelligence work and, by

Therefore, trying to reduce departmental organization to impotence will not succeed.
It may survive the battle in the form of an agency, but no longer as central, and even to such instead, without deserving the title of intelligence agency.

CHAPTER VII

DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE

By departmental intelligence, I refer to the organizations, within certain departments and federal agencies that are dedicated to intelligence production (knowledge) of what happens abroad. There are many such organizations - such twenty times or more-, but the most important ones are the ones that are found, as I have already said, within the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force. You are organizations - the Intelligence Research Office and the Meeting Office Dissemination, from the State Department; the Intelligence Division of the Department from the Army; the Naval Intelligence Division of the Navy Department and the Division of Air Force Intelligence - are those that, according to the nature of things, should to produce or possess the ability to produce most of the basic knowledge necessary for our high-level foreign policy and our grand strategy. The rest is product of the Central Intelligence Agency and the other peripheral departments to the problems of foreign relations.

The task of each of the four main departments is easy to describe. theoretically, although, as I have already explained in the last chapter, it is difficult to describe in practical terms. In theory, your job consists of describing, observing, and reporting and then speculate on the future of those phenomena that occurred outside that are present within the jurisdictional competence of the department. Therefore, our service of Air Force intelligence will be dedicated to foreign military aviation and our intelligence service of the Department of State, to foreign political activities and perhaps also to the economic ones. The task of each of the four departments The elderly will tend to be double. Ideally, it will first produce all the knowledge. required by the departmental policy and, second, even more quantity of the same type of knowledge to meet the demands of national policy. That is, that the departmental intelligence has obligations towards the department that sustains it and also for the higher national policy guidelines that are below that one. This last obligation can force an intelligence organization to produce a knowledge, within the sphere of interest of the department, of a breadth and in a degree of extension, which may not be necessary for direct departmental consumption. This is the kind of extra knowledge that the Central Intelligence Agency must have. end of developing their long-range interdepartmental study program.

To fulfill this dual task, departmental intelligence must possess a appropriate organization and staff. Let's first talk about the staff. I place it in First of all, because the appropriate personnel constitutes the true and essential problem: not there is no substitute for it.

The staff of a departmental intelligence organization encompasses several main categories.

First and common to all organizations, administrative staff must be present, the people who ensure that the mail is received and dispatched, that the equipment has workplaces and the necessary instruments, that the teams receive their pay; that

All the multiple regulations governing departures, trips, averages are observed.
efficiency and working days; that the position classifications are in accordance with
las regulaciones de la Comisión de Servicio Civil y que el presupuesto esté preparado y sea
submitted in order and on time.[36]

36. I will not speak again about this group of people, because the problems that affect them do not constitute, in any way
way, peculiar problems of an intelligence team. However, I hesitate to abandon the ground of strength.
administrative in government work, without making some comments applicable to your own experience in the
intelligence and, I suspect a civil servant in other branches of the government.
In principle, I would always side with those who advocate for administrative decentralization. I understand
perfectly the hardships imposed by an organization

Next comes the group of office workers. It is composed of the people who
they carry out the bureaucratic work for the administrators, but, more importantly, it includes
those people who extract and physically distribute the final product of the operations:
the studies, reports and 'memorandums'. It could be further extended to include the various
categories of printers: mimeographers, photographers, map printers,
the binders of manuscripts and although I do not intend to flatter them, I could include in this
group those who tend to represent the language of letters and numbers with the
pictorial language.[37]

loose administrative, but I am convinced that they are much lower than those caused by the other extreme: a fortiori
in the government, where the main administrative problems date back to the outdated obscurities of the Statute
of the Civil Service, the smallest unit of any government office that does not have an administrative agent to
to present your case (and to represent it with fervor and without malice) before the highest administrative office, you will not be lucky. The
civil service system, according to its current web of rules and regulations, must inevitably seem somewhat like
a conspiracy against the competition. The only way a subordinate unit can remain in operation is
paying his own administrative champion to pave the way, with great effort, to the surface. Without a great
amount of such decentralization and resulting combat, there exists the calm that seizes the dead cities: the office
The frontline is carried out by the commission and the survival of incapacity throughout the organization is
convert into agenda.
37. Regarding the latter – the visual presentation experts – I have several opinions myself. There is no doubt.
that good diagrams and booklets improve the understanding of certain types of texts. There is no doubt either - because...
less

Then comes the group of librarians, about which I will have much more to say in
the next chapter. Like in any institution where research is conducted and
where new knowledge is the final product, that group constitutes the guardian of the
material or physical accumulation of all knowledge. They take or receive, as a result of
their own efforts or the efforts of others, yesterday's data; they archive it and put it in
order; they take care of them; they distribute them to the people who gather that data in a new order and
they obtain new approaches to the truth from them.

We then have the professional team, which together with the last group, constitutes the
a crucial part of the organization. Without professional experts, there is no intelligence. They are
the people who study the multiple aspects of the external life that I have described
previously. They are social and natural scientists and military experts who possess
passion for research and

for me - that certain distinct classes of texts cannot be illustrated and cannot even improve their understanding by
through these diagrams. The same preparers or presenters do not always have this final impression either.
members of any new and aggressive profession often seem unaware of the limitations of their means and
they feel a certain repugnance to perform the role of a passive service organization. Allowing them to follow their own
inclinations, they have been seen not only to rehearse the impossible in the form of pictorial language, but also to begin to insist

before the professionals whose work must illustrate so that they would change the construction and even the meaning of the texts, so that they would be more accessible to their means of expression.

The analysis, which are masters (or advanced novices) of the instruments and techniques of their special study branch, and for those for whom the discovery of new facts or new relationships between facts, is a race. They are people with a sensitivity huge professional, and whose reception organs register and transmit changes imperceptible changes that occur in the areas under their observation, changes that a lower sensitivity, would never register. They are the people who, stimulated by a change , they automatically spring into action to demonstrate their importance, their insignificance, its validity or invalidity. Moreover, it is the people who take action equipped with the basic knowledge for research in their particular field. They are also those who undertake the investigation at the suggestion of a political official or a designers, they are the ones who solve the food issue in China for Mr. Clayton or those who outline the general guidelines of the program for the Russian listeners of the Voice of America
the possibility of objectives and the knowledge through which policies will be formulated and plans. In summary, they are the human element behind everything that is describe in this book and that, if the departmental practices are not being carried out or not they are fulfilling the functions I have assigned to them, they should do so.

My last group is the group of substantive leaders, who are, in fact, spirit. and training, at least, a fraction of the professional team allocated to others duties. Their task is to ensure that the functions of the professional team are directed specifically towards the current problems of the department and towards those of the higher policy; that the pieces that make up those functions, that is, the studies and maps or reports or "memorandums", come out according to priority in the demands; that the completed projects are complete, perfect, and delivered on time, and to be delivered in a way that is most appropriate for the one who will use them. (One does not send a 200-page study to the White House when a "memorandum" has been requested, he sends a "memorandum" to the operations officer who has wanted an encyclopedia.

To carry out these tasks, substantive leaders must be truly exceptional, as they must combine a high degree of professional skill with a high level of managerial and practical talent. They must have an excellent professional reputation In order to gain the respect of a professional team, it is of utmost importance that they may possess that respect and the goodwill that usually accompanies it. They will have great difficulty in obtaining, either respect or goodwill, without themselves possessing certain reputation and a proven ability in their own systematic field of study. This experience, in turn, will enhance your performance in another almost equally important sense important: it will allow them to gain personal insight regarding the capabilities of team and a perspective on the time needed for the completion of a certain project.

The other quality they must possess is no less vital. It is the quality or qualities that allows them to move freely and easily among their own people department and others, and identify with the intelligence requirements of the main problems that are currently on the agenda; it is the quality that provides them with a correct judgment on the priority of the main issues and that allows them to see with precision where they can be used most effectively, the weight and power of their

organization. What I describe here is not what each professional obtains at the time of their graduation; in reality, it's not something that can be acquired anywhere either. Because of the In general, it is something you are born with. It is good sense, discretion, tact, skill in dealing with the people, skill to drive and direct it, certain knowledge of what they do marching the world and a sharp understanding of the place the world occupies today.

There is no doubt about the importance of professional specialists. competent and their executive control team. However, departmental intelligence, at however, he behaves differently; he conducts himself as if the secret of success resided in a clever organization; like inexperienced people using instruments and refined tools. I maintain that this is a completely erroneous idea: I maintain that knowledge of great subtlety and usefulness cannot be produced from it. way in which automobiles can be produced. Following the principle of assembly line and multiplying the individual steps and stages of an intelligence company at the point in that each of them is so reduced in complexity that even an employee not a professional can fulfill or accomplish them, at the end of the process it will not be possible to obtain the knowledge. At least nothing of value will be achieved, virtually. And it will remain that way until that those who work on rudimentary tasks also know enough about the process complete and be capable of working effectively in many of the positions. advanced of that process.

The simplest example of what I have said is constituted by the usual division. of work between a foreign language translation service and the analysis of texts translated. There may be something similar to a very simple translation, but rarely have I. seen. Language, being such a complicated instrument, is capable of hiding from anyone. the message he wants to convey, except for that man who agreed in advance with his meaning. Just as some intelligent men cannot read a schedule in your own language, in the same way other equally intelligent men who have spent their lives learning and teaching a foreign language will find many things written in that language that cannot be translated. They can only translate those passages. where foreign and American meanings are familiar to them by experience. The man who can translate every nuance of the meaning of a foreign novel to our language, will not necessarily be the man who can translate a technical article. More still, all the dictionaries in the world would not help him out of his difficulties. He will not be able to to translate the article until I have deciphered its complicated vocabulary, which in turn it means that to some extent he has deciphered the main topic. The issue is that the official of intelligence that must have someone translate the materials that he himself must analyze, It is at the mercy of the translator and in my experience, there are few satisfied people. with the execution of the monotonous routine translation work that I would choose as for to be able to trust them.

But the division of labor in the translation service is only one example among many. The separation of the meeting phase from the evaluative phase and the evaluative phase of what is designated by the name of 'research' in the organization diagrams, they are other parts of the same picture and even more open to the question about the same foundations.

The teachers and learned men of public administration who have outlined the organizational diagrams, it seems they have forgotten this too often, the same as the high-ranking officials of the departments that must carry out an intelligence mission crucial. I find it particularly difficult to understand that service along those lines. Part of the premise that the troop officer will not become a specialist in another class

of effort and that the higher positions of the career, whether in the general staff or in the troops will be occupied by officers of proven experience. Although the forces recognize tacitly the importance of specialization in areas such as medicine or the communications or logistics do not give these specialists the same opportunities as to troop officer, ensuring both have identical opportunities in their career. Paradoxically, although no institution places greater value on staff work, that these services and few institutions place so much emphasis on it, the official with too much staff experience in his life or the officer who would only choose that job, he finds itself in a situation of disqualification similar to that of the technical or professional specialist. They are to regret the results that arise from this line of thought about the function of intelligence.

The senior officer in charge of information at the general staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Force is, almost invariably, a man of recognized experience in command. For that reason, it is almost never a man who has dedicated his whole life to strategic intelligence. The people in his organization in the who deposit the greatest confidence and exert the greatest authority, their representatives, their heads of the operational branch, their advisors, and sometimes even some of their 'experts', almost with security will come from the same layer of command experience. Those who have a future in the forces, they cannot afford to prolong a task too much specialized –including intelligence–, and the best of them who, in a few years of study and practice in a specific area of intelligence would turn them into experts in every sense of the word, they are the ones who truly need to move forward. Behind them they can leave, more or less permanently, the men who are not going to reach the top. This will not imply that they are necessarily the least intelligent men, imaginative or active in strength, but certainly not always the most intelligent the imagination nor the most active.

Given this situation - in which the personnel of the highest degree of competence is necessary, but it is not achieved, it is perhaps reasonable that the forces try to produce or find a remedy for the organization diagram. On the principle that a group of X men can carry a 16-inch cannon tower to punish a target invisible and neutralize it through skill, but without understanding the use of delicate and complicated devices, this reasoning is equivalent to a similar case in a division similar de trabajo, en un problema de análisis económico, por ejemplo. Divídase la tarea in its simplest components and let us use as many men as there are components. With artillery, the solution yields better results than with the economy.

The forces have an extremely challenging problem in their hands. They can escape the fact that their primary obligation is to win battles and wars. One hundred and fifty years ago, the state of military art was such that informed men and In a general sense, the intelligent ones were adequately equipped to use the then relatively simple war machinery. At that time, a percentage An overwhelming army could take its place in the lines and a very small percentage he should take care to locate, preserve, and improve the machines. Under these circumstances, the forces could afford the luxury of not dedicating themselves to specialization and so they did. But Not a decade has passed without changes in the art of warfare, changes that were in tune. with the growth of sciences and techniques. Today, an army, a navy, or a force airborne, must still be in a position to deploy a force on the battlefield winner and at the same time employing the new implements incredibly

Complicated. They are so complicated that a force could concentrate its entire capacity. learning its refinements and the gradations of its most effective use. In the opinion of the forces, there is a very natural apprehension that, unless they are put on guard, the armed forces will fall under the control of the new devices, instead of being operated otherwise. Hence, another of those well-known setbacks occurs. cultural, which in this case is harming the professional specialties of the forces. The forces understand that they must possess them, but they have not yet reached the point. suitable to grant an appropriate value to their talents. And while these talents specials do not achieve the same opportunity for fulfillment, advance, and encouragement as for the line duties, the specialist's role will suffer.

Currently, strategic intelligence is one of the phenomena of war and of the peace that has advanced the most in complexity along with all the other techniques and machines. Already It is not something that a competent officer can carry out between two appointments. It is a specialty of the highest order and until the forces do not recognize it as such and recruit, train, and adequately reward the staff that make it a career, They will undoubtedly carry out inadequate work.

But the forces are not the only departments to blame. The Department of The state, for example, did not have intelligence service by that name until the year 1945. It previously had some research units that did not last long. The intelligence mission was carried out by untrained people, who also had thousands. of other things to do. Among the conservative element of the department, which was to the At the same time, the reigning element, there was little or no willingness to support a information competent personnel. In fact, when the Research Section and Analysis of the Office of Strategic Services was transferred to the department by Order Executive (September 20, 1945, to take effect on October 1, 1945), the old the faction strongly opposed it. They did not want a similar intelligence team, although They showed some interest from part of the staff and in the library. They demanded the disintegration of the inherited organization and the proration of its regional experts to the appropriate operational desks of the so-called geographical offices. Although this It meant a serious harm to the organization, Mr. Byrnes was forced to take such a measure.

During the debate that preceded Mr. Byrnes' action, high officials of The Department of State based its arguments on one point. basic; according to their opinions, they already had an intelligence organization in which all of them were officers of intelligence. Therefore, they did not need – nor did they actually want – an organization that one could reach different conclusions than their own. Considering that sensible beings they usually know and think before acting, those officials of the State Department - some of whom were very capable individuals - were correct in asserting that they were intelligence officers; but considering what they knew and everything they had to they could have known before acting, they were not. Of the two important aspects of the intelligence, they only had time to do no more than an indifferent job of observation and no time for research. If an army had followed a line of similar argumentation and based his actions on it, would have attempted the landings of Normandy with knights in armor or the reduction of Japan through fire artificial

Since Mr. Byrnes' decision, the situation of the State Department has changed considerably. One of the first acts of General Marshall after becoming Secretary of State, was opposing Mr. Byrnes and restoring the

intelligence organization of the department to its original form. If it had been left thus, giving him the opportunity to rebuild his team would have been of enormous value. But hardly had the reconfiguration been carried out when the organization began to suffer losses in their budget. They had been cut in the department and misunderstandings in Congress. The cuts had been severe enough as to have caused a fatal wound.

There are other civilian agencies that have a secondary role in foreign policy and they have given intelligence its exact value more or less continuously. Although not they have always called her by that name and although they have not been able to keep her at a high level in each budget, have nevertheless demonstrated a continued understanding for their problems. They have understood the importance of the task; they have had a decent respect for the complete and reliable knowledge; they have employed the right kind of professionals to produce it and they have received good guidance. It is in some of the extensions of departments such as Labor, Commerce, and Agriculture, that one finds the encouraging element of departmental intelligence.

Let's assume that departmental intelligence overcomes the difficulties in which works; let's assume that he recruits the right people and manages them properly efforts; that each department intelligence unit deepens in that area departmental jurisdiction. The question is: Can we expect that the sum of information Will departmental help with the demands of the grand strategy and national security? I think we can expect this, only if the coordinating and managerial task carried out by a central intelligence agency has the same level of expertise as that of the personnel of control of the intelligence department. In other words, the Central Agency of Intelligence (in its coordinating function) is to the whole of intelligence what the director nouns (called the Control Team) of any intelligence unit departmental is to the departmental professional team. It must carry out the same kind of work, although on a larger scale; it must have the same type of personnel, but even better.

CHAPTER VIII

ORGANIZATION OF DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE: TEN LESSONS DERIVED FROM EXPERIENCE

It is virtually impossible to separate the substantive elements from something as large as it is. the intelligence, of the methods of training and operation of an organization of intelligence. In the preceding pages, although I have not discussed the issues administrative, except when they inevitably appeared in context, I have touched many of them. The selection of the problems and the interpretation I give to them, derived from my five years of experience in war and post-war intelligence. As you will see, I will not attempt to outline the master plan of the organization, nor will I try to cover all the lands of the administration. I will limit myself, in the first place, to the problems of organization that are characteristic of intelligence and secondly, to only ten of they. Some readers may prefer to overlook this kind of "escape"; if they prefer, They can go directly to chapter IX.

Problem No. 1: Should the structure of the Intelligence organization be regional or Functional?

The task of strategic intelligence deals with foreign countries and with the complex of the lives of foreign people. Anyone, especially those who greater importance for our strategic intelligence, it has many ways of behavior. They conduct themselves like organized military beings in establishments. armed; as political beings committed to orderly arranging their relationships formal relationships with each other; they act as economic entities that satisfy the needs of their fellow citizens and as social, moral, and intellectual beings, giving expansion of their gregarious instinct, their consciousness, and their mind. Strategic intelligence that puts people under observation and investigation, studying them in two aspects: individual and national. It studies them as French, Swedish, Russian, and Belgian and at the same time as military, political, and economic figures. Moreover, it studies their combinations, when they act under the military and economic aspects, for example; with the Swedes and Russians, like economists in a trade agreement; to the British and the French as politicians seeking their joint security. The basic question is: How to project a organization in a way that deals in the best possible way with both the national phase and with the functional phase of external or foreign existence?

The inconveniences begin with the customs of American education. Certain groups of people who become expert critics in a line of studies, specialize in a geographical area or a region or a single nation. Historians, the modern geographers and some political scientists, for example, tend to be regional in your specialization and learning everything about Greece, the Iberian Peninsula or Latin America. They learn the necessary languages of primary literature, they learn everything related to that literature, they travel through the area whenever they can and write books about it. In these books move from topics in which they are truly scholarly to others in which they are not. The modern analytical historian inevitably finds himself working in the field of the philosopher, politician, economist, and sociologist.

Other groups dedicate their time to functional study. Many economists and sociologists, for example, advocate for the discovery of economic and social laws that Prevail for the Chinese just like for the Egyptians or the Dutch. They specialize in the topics of 'economics' or 'sociology' and they often do so without delving into their research in a specific country or race. At those times, they work in terms

purely theoretical, without solid basis or any references. Other times, when they must have A base or reference choose the most convenient: United States. These are not regionalists. they only learn the languages in which their theoretical literature is written; they can learn the French or German, in order to resort to the works of economics or sociology not they are translated and that they should know. But they rarely take the trouble to learn any other.

In other words: let's assume that, of the possibilities of success of the recovery Iran's economy would depend on a loan granted to that country. Let's assume that a The strategic intelligence team has been tasked with making an estimation of these. possibilities. What kind of organization will do the job better: an organization that It has a section dedicated to Iran or an organization in charge of the project. At the forefront is an economics section? The argument is endless. Regionalists argue that, unless the nature of the Iranians, their traditional behavior, the myths is known Nationals who defend and the character of Iranian politicians and their society, none The amount of theoretical economic analysis will provide the answer. The functionalists or economists in this case say that economic considerations expect all of these things; that the Iranian economic problem is not substantially different from other problems economic; that their function (of the economists) is the analysis of this behavior universal economy and that if the regionalists wanted to lend them a team that would act as a translator or visual informant, they would carry out the work.

From this dilemma, it is clear that one must rely on people who know about Iran in general (and that, I insist, can read the Iranian language) and people who know it economic ground. Knowing which of the two groups could perform the function better, not it's so simple, there is not even a defined answer to the following major problem: if the The entire organization should be structured along regional or functional lines.

The simplistic administrative criterion tends towards a middle ground on the lines simplistic. Faced with the basic organization problem, it divides the world into a series of regional units, known as the European Division, the Latin American Division, etc. and divide the functional theme into another set of units known as Division of Economy, Division of Psychology, etc. The result of such a trend is chaos. immediate and total administrative action. It is an invitation, immediately accepted, for a civil war mayor. In those matters that have an economic or psychological aspect and that they also belong to a group of people (that is, in all matters except those of interest only for functional theorists), the regionalists and the functionalists are they will rise in defense of their specialty, they will discuss and argue, often ending up by to produce two separate analyses that may be contradictory, that is, be different one from another.

In reality, there are more possible middle terms, subtle and elaborate, in addition to the simple average term and annulled as outlined above, but from experience I can say they were so complicated that they tempted human nature to overlook them and that cuando daban resultado, lo daban gracias a algún genio sobrehumano situado en algún key point of the organization.

The middle term that I have always defended is the one used in regional analysis. as much as possible. The first step is to divide the world into four or five zones. main geographical areas; the second step is to break down those areas into components minor geographic ones. Thus, there could be the Division of the Far East, composed of four sections, one of which would be that of Southeast Asia. Within the Section of Southeast Asia could have the Unity of Burma and as many other units as there are countries.

it would have been in Southeast Asia. This would occupy regional specialists. But the possibilities that functionalists could not be regionalized within the limits of a country, would be enormous. Our education system does not produce economists whose the main competition resides in the field of the economy of Burma. Hence, serious difficulties would arise.

Of economists, if possible, a group should be formed at the level or of the category of the Southeast Asia Section. If economists could not be found competent for such a strict regional specialty, should be trained and at the same time time grouped at the level of the Far East Division. But, in my opinion, the more we condone the defects of American training and the more large are the geographic areas used for grouping the functional team, the greater the administrative errors that occur. Ideally, for many of the most important phases of strategic intelligence, the regional and functional expert there should be only one man and the same one. The ideal unity of Burma should be formed by people, each of whom could handle every complex and technical problem of the existence of Burma, whether that political, social, economic, legal, military or of any other kind.

The trend I have defended would not seem to functionalists precisely a halfway term. They would consider it a victory for the regionalists. But I think a the essentially regional pattern would prevail for three reasons, namely:

One: the functions that an intelligence organization must carry out are, in form predominant, national or regional. Foreign policy and grand strategy seem to first interesting place in other states and groups from other states.

Two: Most of the primary data that arrives or that is already prepared in the files or in the library, they come from a national source or are connected to national or regional problems. The statistics, reports, and publications officials, the observations, the criticisms, the press, the radio programs, and others, continue to a large extent the scheme of the political boundaries of the world appears in the language state official in question. The units of value and quantity in which things are measured, they also tend to follow local national practices.

Three: The insights achieved together in the meaning of the trends of a region will often be more valuable than what could be called eclectic discernments reached through the fusion of the work of an economist with the focus on "economy" and a political specialist with the thought fixed in the 'region'. Example: if an economist who thinks about the problem of coal French works with a politician who thinks about French politics, the result will be probably better than what could have been achieved otherwise.

For these reasons, the intelligence organizations that have rehearsed the non-regional procedure or the functional one, they have found practically inoperable. A very important organization that felt the weight of functionalism was helpless until he was able to assign, for example, all the tasks related to Latin America to his sociological division (which, as a result of this, was almost exclusively occupied with political, economic, social, and military information about Latin America), all tasks related in the Far East to its political division, etc. The functional names of its different units were a mere facade of the regional organization that existed under her.

When our highest learning institutions adopt the so-called
zone programs, whose trends are to produce exactly the kind of experts that
I have referred in my supposed unit of Burma, the administrative problems of the
Intelligence organizations are meant to facilitate each other. We must look towards the day when
that the team is satisfied with the position it occupies in the organization and that it
end the foolish discussions about the superiority of your special discipline.
Meanwhile, waiting for that state of affairs, the formula for the best temporary solution.
it is to establish a direct regional organization to blend the regionalists and the
functionalists (and mix them at the lowest possible administrative level) to make them
work together to encourage them to respect the professional competence of others
others and absorb it at the same time.

This solution would remedy, at least on paper, much of the classic resentment.
regional-functional, although not all. The following remains:

Problem No. 2: How to handle issues that challenge regionalization?

In a strategic intelligence operation (same as in the condition of the
Foreign relations themselves) there are problems that are impossible to conduct on a
regional or national base. I am referring to things such as the developments of law
international, the United Nations and other international organizations. There is a
second extension of problems that is international like the one mentioned above. These
problems still have their distinctly national core. They revolve around institutions such
like the World Federation of Trade Unions, the Catholic Church, and the Cominform.
There is still a third group of problems that are international only in the sense that
multinationals: matters such as global trade and finance, the
transport, food and a number of strategic master items, such as rubber and the
oil.

An intelligence organization must deal with three kinds of problems. It must
carry out an observation task on what is happening in those lands and must be
ready to put a research team to work on them. An organization
regional could not do one job and the other. Therefore, there must be some kind of
functional coorganization that is an auxiliary to the main regional.

There is a simple principle that could govern the establishment of that team.
functional. The units that understand the problems that have the least connection with
national states (my first category) can be appropriately built in the
necessary size to handle the task on their own, referring to the sections
regional when necessary. The units that must understand the problems not so
purely international like the previous ones (my second category), must be
maintained with minimal force, relying more heavily on a suitable
personal regional. Units that must deal with problems that are essentially
multinationals rather than international problems (my third category), will consist of
simply no more than one or two top specialists, whose task
The main task will be to link the regional units and coordinate the regional effort.
Moreover, these third category units should be strictly restricted to the
themes or matters for which the intelligence organization has no responsibility
primordial.

For what has been said, the principle I suggest in establishing the functional part of
The organization is a principle of precaution. A precaution so that the units

functionalities that need to be formed do not grow to the point where they constitute a threat to the orderly and methodical work of the regional team. If this principle is followed and the functional units remain in a secondary but highly specialized, the organization will face another category of work for it there is no formal organization. The management of this last category constitutes my next problem.

Problem No. 3: How to address those multinational nature problems, for the since the organization does not provide a full-time national supervisor or coordinator.

The type of problem discussed here is a very common one in intelligence functions; arises from phenomena such as the Franco-British defense pact, the rebellion of Greece northern, the birth of the Republic of Vietnam, or the racial issue in Africa meridional. In each case, the situation requires the competence of more than just a simple regional unit[38].

The Greek problem, for example, should be properly addressed and studied by the Greek, Yugoslav, Albanian, Bulgarian, Russian, English experts and probably also by Turkish experts. It will require a good dose of political experience, economic, Dedicated especially and fully to the task or mission

(N.del T).

I am assuming that it will not be a single unit that will have exclusive responsibility for Great Britain and France. and that no single unit will be responsible for several States directly or indirectly involved in the Greek situation or by France and its eastern colonies or by Great Britain and its dominions.

Social and military on all those national fronts. It will surely require knowledge. of man and men who are functionally specialized in movements international communists. How does one embark on such a project?

The answer is that it is undertaken on "ad hoc" bases. Let's assume that a An important consumer has requested this study. Once formally accepted by the equipo superior de dirección o control que lo equipara o pesa con otros compromisos y le assigns a certain priority, is delivered to a project supervisor. This could be the man with the greatest knowledge noun about the subject, who is in turn the best director, coordinator, and editor. Let's say he is the head of the Greek unit, or if the staff problems are acute, a special assistant from the main division in that land. Talk to people from other units, gather the pieces, outline the structure and establishes the lines of conduct. When he has gathered all the pieces, he directs the work Personally, if he doesn't do it himself. He is the champion of the finished work; he takes care of it. from your office with the senior management team or control; its reproduction and its dissemination to the important consumer and to other people who know it you will find it useful. The following week, you will be able to be working exclusively about their own region or country or may be a junior member of another ad hoc team.

The task of the senior management team members during this process review the greatest importance. To begin, they must define the relative importance of project; they must ensure that the entirety of the organization's best competition is they must be ready to assist the supervisor with the issue; project to smooth out differences of opinion; they must critically examine the work finished and its presentation (length, language, degree of perfection, etc.) and they should try to

to perceive and identify the weak points, even when they themselves were not specialists in the Greek issues.

The work team sometimes shows disdain towards their services arguing that their ineptitude only hinders the tasks of the professionals. But the fact is that not all professionals are truly realistic. regarding the type of work they are doing. They pay, for their expertise, the well-known academic price; they are often very jealous of minor issues such as delivery dates; sometimes they pay too much attention to matters of little practical importance can sometimes confuse the point or points crucial to the matter at hand or to bury them among destinies. It corresponds to the team directivo o de control, introducir, cuando sea necesario, el corre_

39. I will later refer to the issue of dissemination in more detail.

of utility and applicability to the problem at hand. This leads to:

Problem No. 4: How is effective control exercised without harming compliance with the mission?

First of all, allow me to say that control is the axis of a successful operation and that A good control demands a certain level of severity that a team of substantive experts must have. it is quite unpleasant, almost unbearable. Hence the control is justifiably included in this list of main administrative problems.

As already mentioned, control should focus on the following tasks:

1) You must ensure that the intelligence program is in line with what is happening in the world in terms of politics, plans, and operations. This involves:
   a) Observe that the appropriate external activity is kept under observation. special and that interesting directions are systematically followed.
   b) Observe that the research is conducted on problems that need clarification and that all relevant resources of the team are made available to the service of these projects. This means that the control will know, to the extent in which things such can be known, the daily development of State affairs and will take care of having prepared, in advance, useful knowledge.
   c) Ensure that regular and special observation and investigation are scheduled according to the priority of the importance of the matters.
   d) Anticipate, through some study, certain problems that have not yet arisen. still on the horizon.
2) Arbitrate disputes between the professional team during the course of the work.
3) Review and critique the finished product from the perspective of its form in search of possible errors or lack of balance.
4) Maintain a standard of excellence for all work.
5) Cuidar de que el producto terminado sea reproducido en forma adecuada.
6) Ensure that it is distributed appropriately and that a record is kept of those who receive.

Now, virtually, in each of these tasks, control sometimes develops certain interaction with the professional team. For example, a broad field of discussion arises establish who knows the subject better and, therefore, who is better equipped to establish priorities. The professional team, which is continuously in contact with global events; you may have the feeling that your knowledge the internal aspect of those events provides a better basis for judgment than that of control.

Or consider the situation when the control vetoes the execution of a project.
based on the fact that the subject is inconsistent. It could be that the unit you wish to undertake
the project is working in a very quiet part of the globe, where everyone
projects are relatively unimportant. If the professionals are capable men and
dedicated, this is a fact that will certainly escape your attention: your work must
to constitute, inevitably, the most important part of your life. To which, the control could well
Perfectly, let them work on their low-priority tasks - they have nothing better.
what to do - but they will also have to wait for less priority in the benefits,
reproduction of its products and distribution.

Or let's suppose that the control criticizes what it considers an impolite language; or doubts
from the perfection of a substantial conclusion; let's see what happens. The professionals
they receive objections in a field where, at least formally, they are allowed
to consider oneself beyond all criticism. And they will be outraged at what they will call patchwork of
some less experienced. But the fact is that professionals are already far from the
freedom in the learning institutions from where they came and that they revere, and
although what they have to offer to intelligence is a unique, priceless ingredient,
they cannot expect to enjoy the same class or degree of freedom under obligations
practices of government service. There is, therefore, a tremendous and inherent
conflict between the 'professional team' and 'control'. How can it be alleviated?

Given that it can never be completely smoothed while control is present
perched at the peak of the administrative pyramid. I believe the ideal solution would be
place the control function as low as possible in the hierarchy. If this were done, each unit
the professional would have their own control officer; almost certainly, this would be a
trustworthy and skilled professional team member for control work,
he would probably be the head of the unit. If that were the case at the lowest level
administrative, the unit head would dedicate half of his energy to the problems of his
own unit and the other half to the control of the entire organization. The head of the level
immediate superior, would dedicate less energy to local problems and more to general ones.
The top-level leaders would constitute the governing body of all control officers.
and the director of the organization, the president ex officio. In this way, the most
close to the realities of substantive work, would establish the 'standards' of
excellence, procedures, styles, etc. But that solution stumbles upon enormous
practical difficulties; I will list them:

1) The budget wizards would immediately face a regrettable duplication.
work and would insist on centralizing the function and reducing the necessary team for
carry it out.
2) If by miracle, the budget wizards allowed it, the problem would arise.
of the relationships between the small unit chief and his control officer (if both
jobs are not unified in the person of the boss). After all, the function of
Control is of utmost importance, and the unit chief will only deny it poorly.
win.
3) If he did not deny it, he would have to comply with it, just like all his other duties. This
it would mean that he would have to do more than what can be demanded of a single man.
In reality, there probably aren't enough men capable enough in
this type of work to fill the vacancies.
4) If capable men could be found, they would probably not accept the
salary that the civil service prescribes for a low-level unit chief.

Despite these practical difficulties, the decentralization of the control function I deserve all the efforts. Nothing would better define the responsibilities. of those who must carry it out.

But if we abandon the idea of decentralization for the moment and focus on in tune with the situation in its practical realities; if we agree that control must, even if temporarily, to be maximally centralized, there are several principles that it is necessary to take into account.

First, as I have already said, the control staff should have all the skills. professionals who can own a professional team. If the control is formed with people what has happened to professionalism, that they know their own rights, that they respect them professional facts of others, and if they have also had an experience of intelligence at this level of work, the restrictions imposed on the team's freedom they will be accepted as good will. On the contrary, with rare exceptions, nothing will be done more abhorrent their necessary activities for the team than their experience previous or their previous area of specialization, whether they have been different or remote to the acquisition of knowledge. Let's say that if they do not possess the necessary skills to be honorary members of that exclusive club, their functions will awaken dissent or transfer requests.

Second, the control must keep the amount of bureaucratic work in order that requires the equipment and ensures that it is maintained to a minimum. If the professional equipment is not is continually compelled to fill out forms, write defense 'memorandums', keep a careful account of your efforts, participate in complicated written procedures, etc., will accept the most important regulation of control with much less animosity.

Third: the control must be capable of demonstrating its usefulness, due to the speed execution of your task. You must act quickly in the authorization of projects, in the approval given for the reproduction and distribution of the finished product. Moreover, for the sake of speed, it must be willing to break its own rules.

If the control can be equipped with the right people and devote some of its efforts to restrict their natural bureaucratic tendencies, this would lead to their relationships with the team were more effective...and pleasant.

The four originating problems have a certain continuity relationship among them; the six that follow are not so closely linked to each other another.

Problem No. 5: What is the most effective administrative arrangement for governing the functioning of a campaign force?

It goes without saying that the proper management of intelligence requires a force that fulfills its tasks abroad. Intelligence cannot perform. correctly in its observation or research functions, unless it can physically project a part of itself to the places where they are developed events, or where the raw materials of knowledge are being produced. Without a campaign force of its own, any department intelligence organization, it will lose a necessary sense of reality in any type of activity that was needed to obtain the one you want: discovered, clandestine or both at once. And if the force in

the issue was involved in both types of activities at the same time, it should, by supposed, to be under a single direction. If such an arrangement were possible, the team discovered could provide the clandestine team with the specifications of the parts losses or missing. And, on the contrary, the clandestine team could not only provide such pieces abroad, but what is more important, new ones could happen to him hypotheses acquired in their clandestine research. Perhaps, to achieve these advantages, Some countries have established departmental campaign forces with obligations. discovered or clandestine. The Soviet Union embassy in Ottawa housed the representatives of five internal departments (a sixth was about to be added), which, among other things, they were presumably engaged in jobs of discovered and secret intelligence.[40]. Pero tal vez insisto, tales países escogen esas combined activities, because they ignore the difficulties and are blind to the risks.

Reality is different from the ideal. As the Soviet experience has demonstrated, the the risks of clandestine activities being discovered were enormous, and when this It happened, the entire mission of Ottawa was discredited. Not only this; the most significant are all the other states justified in placing the Soviet missions in their land, under certain restrictions, that would not have been established otherwise. It is necessary saying that the imposed restrictions adversely affect the activities of permissible discovered intelligence. Hence it should be necessary to recognize the risks of such combined activities and ensure that clandestine activities are separated of the discovered.

40. Report of the Royal Commission..., June 27, 1946 (Ottawa, 1946), pp. 12.17 and especially 19-29. The departments the represented internals were: the NKVD (Security Police), Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Commissariat of Foreign Trade, the Red Army, and of course, the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. The navy was preparing probably to establish its own representative.

Siendo éste el caso, en los párrafos sucesivos efectuaré la separación y me limitaré a los problems of the departmental campaign force discovered. The problems Administrative matters regarding such a campaign force derive from the following circumstances: First, the man who is sent, let's say to Great Frusina, should be a member of the internal professional team responsible for the affairs of Gran Frusina.[41]. To be effective in the campaign, you must maintain the re- the closest possible ties with their unit in their own country.

Second, the large organization (of which the unit deployed in Gran Frusina is a small part) that man sends to Gran Frusina, will send other men to other parts of the world. To manage such an operation, it will be required to establish some kind of central administrative unit in the office of the chief of the

41. At this point, he will not make the slightest concession. The worst snub that can be made during an operation of intelligence is to send abroad the personnel that was specially recruited for it and to embark them before they can to carve a path in the heart of the internal team. The campaign men could be men of the internal team, who they would meet all the conditions required for an assignment abroad. They could know, without much mental effort, what those are. what are the main problems of the internal team, what they need to know or not, what they need to discover, what they need in that sense of physical materials obtainable only in Gran Frusina, etc. They could know personally and if possible, they should to estimate and admire the team members they leave behind. Even under these conditions, the problems of the perfect Understanding and perfect comprehension are not insignificant.

organization. Furthermore, if the man in Gran Frusina were to find data about Pakistan that could be of interest to the Pakistan unit of your country or the prominent man in London would discover things that deserved the attention of the Far East Division, There would be an administrative reason to intercalate a subjective unit in the administration. This last unit will ensure that all consumers interested in the final product of campaign work are served. Therefore, the headquarters of the large organization it comes to have a dual administrative pull in the campaign operation.

Third, when the man on the campaign arrives in Great Frusina, he is subordinated to a third master. This is the head of the official mission there, who in turn reports to the secretary of State and the president.

The problem consists of maintaining close personal contact between man and campaign and the head of his small unit deployed in Gran Frusina – which is absolutely vital-, and at the same time, keep other parties satisfied with the triumvirate. For this problem, I do not have a certain answer; in fact, I believe it does not exist. The hope is that human understanding and accumulated experience will make adjustments will save all the inherent difficulties. This will be achieved more quickly if everyone those involved in the operation understand the importance of maintaining the professional team in Gran Frusina as closely united as possible to its representative and make all reasonable efforts to adjust and promote that relationship.

Problem No. 6: Is there any 'librarian' function in an intelligence organization? strategic?

The answer is: Yes.

An intelligence operation that has both the attributes of a newspaper metropolitan, like a large research foundation, manages a large daily cantidad de material que se incorpora día a día. En su aspecto periodístico, recibe una continuous flow of regular and irregular reports from their own campaign team, some of which arrive in the form of cables and others in sacks. It is also likely that receive similar reports from other intelligence teams approximately about the same line of work. This gives intelligence a certain resemblance to press services, whose best example is the service operated by the government, which is in charge of the programs foreign popular radio. Always within that similarity, it receives, based on the of the exchange, the finished product of other departmental organizations that follow and they study the external conditions. In this general category, there are many other points that cover all shades of classified and unclassified documentation that arrives to Washington from all over the globe.

In its aspect of research foundation, deliberately and consistently search for other materials that their research program considers essential. They subscribe to a large number of professional newspapers, foreign daily newspapers, to the official and unofficial publications and others; also keeps its collection up to date reference works "standards" and, more importantly, new books on topics of peculiar interest. Has access to the Library of Congress and makes arrangements for interlibrary loans with the major libraries of the country.

The problem is whether all these functions and some others can or cannot be handled. at a central point and whether that central point could also be the storage of the

physical materials. I am convinced that a unit could exert all these functions and take care of everything that comes in. In summary, I advocate for a central library that contains all the material (excluding maps) that an organization needs intelligence.

A central library of the class I am referring to may consist of several parts separate: one part for unclassified books and magazines – this is a collection highly specialized and consists of reference works and new publications techniques that cannot be easily found elsewhere. A second part will be composed of the photographs; the third and most important will consist of material classified documentary of all kinds. The library, excluding the number of parts what it is composed of, has the following obligations:

As a result of its own activities, it constantly acquires material. new. This means that it is supplied with things such as the latest foreign books from that year, the same as gazettes, statistical yearbooks and others; it is supplied with the records of foreign parliamentary debates and other official publications of the foreign governments that can serve the mission of strategic intelligence; it is provided from foreign diaries and technical newspapers. For this type of acquisition, it has received the advice of the professional team from the inside and the outside.

It also gathers classified documents. Know, for example, that practically all the cables from the State Department (the non-administrative ones) are important; you know that almost all reports from the attachés and the studies conducted on situations outdoors by other departments and federal agencies, such as the Department of Agriculture and the Tariff Commission are important. Know that everything that results from this or that intelligence operation is important. The library seeks, for the so, on their own, provide themselves with said materials. It will extend their orders to all the places where I can find all the official products from a large number of organizations whose lines of work are similar. In addition, when a team member a professional requests that such or such document be obtained - naming it by its source and topic, Otherwise by the title-, the library deals with it.

2) Record all those documentary materials and keep the team informed professional of what has been received or entered, through sheets reproduced with a mimeograph.

3) By means of rigorous organizational rules and whatever procedure is at its scope, tries to intercept all similar material that the team has acquired on its own count and record it like any other document. The professional team will acquire those materials through their personal contact with opposing members in other organizations. They often work on papers, notes, or 'memos' that are not considered appropriate. for routine distribution. They are often what could be classified as operational or opposed to informational papers and therefore, inappropriate for the external exam. There is a large amount of this type of material that the highest-ranking member of the team It will obtain; it probably consists of its most valuable material.

The library must be able to register, classify, and reissue that material, delivering it. to the acquiring member of the team in the capacity of a permanent loan. (See problem No. 7)

4) Register all materials in index form, regardless of how they were acquired on 3 x 5 cards, according to the place of origin and theme. Place each document a order number and enter it in the central registry. The operation of the execution of a clear index is the most valuable and costly part of all the functions of the

library. Without it, there is no library in the true sense of the word. It will no longer be that a report accumulates papers.

5) At their request, provides the professional team with the materials required by their work and keep a record of where those materials are when they leave the library. If later, any other team member wishes the document, the The library claims it or, otherwise, makes some arrangement for it to be seen.

A library operating along these lines will not assume functions that do not belong to it. belong properly (see the following problem, No. 7), will carry out a work of simple and clear service, and will gather, over time, a large volume of registered materials in order. Such a collection constitutes one of the organization's most valuable assets.

Problem No. 7 Should there be a separate administrative unit for the meeting and dissemination?

Before risking an answer to this question, it would be necessary to define the terms.

By meeting, it means the exclusive right to pursue, for the use of professional team, all the raw materials you need. It does not merely mean the meeting of the components I have referred to regarding the activities of collection of the library, but to all the other components. For example, a unit meeting, after being informed that the professional team is going to start a study on the opinions of the Iranian Tudeh Party in the Arab League, has the duty to gather or collect all the information on that topic that can answer every question that could be conceived by the minds of Iranian specialists. Hence, meeting, in this sense, implies the collection that any good librarian can fulfill in their function of gathering books and also the collection that a professional researcher carries out after exhausting the static sources of their library.

By dissemination, I mean the exclusive right to distribute to consumers: a) raw materials that those responsible for observation collect outside and not in the own country[42]b) the finished product as it has come from the hands of the professional team.

From my point of view, establishing a meeting and dissemination unit with those homework is little less than absurd. The thing changes enormously when it is assigned a exclusive meeting function. Because one thing is, for a library, to fulfill the mission of acquire basic material for general use (such as cables from the State Department and reports from embassies), and something very different to grant a librarian the right exclusive to acquiring all the materials that Mr. Jones, let's say, an Iranian specialist, You will need to conduct a study on the Tudeh Party and the Arab League. Another matter completely different is to ask Mr. Jones to communicate to a collector what he thinks what will be needed to carry out your study. And it is also a completely different matter to make it administratively difficult, if not impossible, for Mr. Jones in person to resort to people from other government agencies to allow him access to their files about Iran.

The meeting phase in research cannot be done all at once in the initial stage of a project; the meeting phase permeates or invades all other phases and in reality, is the phase that is never complete, and the only man who can carry out the data meeting (outside of the evident material), which cannot be specified through a title is the man who knows what he is looking for. If there were a man in the library unit that was an Iranian expert so skilled that Mr. Jones could

tell him what he wants without giving a prior course of lectures on life and politics Iranians, then, that man should not be among the library staff, he should be among the library staff, should be on Mr. Jones's team.

It will be argued that, unless the meeting is centralized, two will ensue. calamities: one, the professional team would systematically request external sources of information and, as a result of these repeated uncoordinated forays in search of the same material, those sources would ultimately be antagonistic. Two, the professional team, to acquire materials through their own gathering efforts, will tend to form their own library and treasure materials that could be utilized by other parts of the organization.

There are answers for both points.

One, anything that the professional team requests by specific designation, could certainly be provided by the regular library acquisition methods, con tal que la biblioteca pueda actuar con velocidad. Los materiales que el equipo A professional cannot designate specifically, they must acquire them on their own. In these circumstances, it will be necessary for certain unavoidable duplications to occur demands. But this is not necessarily an unforgivable sin, especially when it gives as a result, a higher level of compliance. I have always considered that a man who usually bursts with indignation every time two from the same agency They make identical requests; it would be better if used somewhere else.

Two, the professional team will indeed tend to form its own library. Thus It should be. On the other hand, the professional team is the first to understand the advantages. to have their private loot, registered and cataloged by the library; they could thus claim it and in most cases, keeping it saved forever. Certainly, it will not be recorded. all private loot and the organization will suffer as a result; but that portion that does not Recording in a central file will be relatively unimportant. That amount will be always small and will remain so, through the constant effort of the management and the quick registration and return of all materials.

Let's talk now about the dissemination function. First of all, about the dissemination of the so-called raw materials, from which the finished product emerges. Should they be scattered in raw? I see no reason, whatever it may be, for external distribution of this raw material. Allow me to clarify the terms 'exterior' and 'raw'.

By exterior, I mean the outside of the main intelligence organization. assumption, must circulate within the organization and circulate quickly and systematically. The fast and effective circulation of incoming data among the internal observation staff and internal research is one of the main tasks of the library. But I don't think that the circulation of this raw material outside the organization is beneficial for no one.

By 'in raw form' I mean 'just as it comes in', precisely as it enters. Certain amount of that material, which the professional team deems appropriate for distribution external, it would be sent outside after having undergone the review by the experts. The This would be described in a weekly or daily newsletter, in order of origin, by topic or both and people from outside interested in it would find it first in that newsletter. In case that If they would like to see a specific material of interest, they could stop by the library.[43] I admit that there are certain disadvantages that this procedure imposes on those from outside who they need this material, but the disadvantages are small compared to those inherent to a circulation without discrimination of everything that enters, in its original form.

43. This is actually a widely established system among established intelligence organizations. Without embargo, there exists among the majority of them a continuous pressure from the library team to take out the raw material before it has been reviewed by the professionals. The people in charge of receiving the material entrant, from your registry, catalog and file, experiences a forgivable desire to exhibit even if it is just a pinch of same.

In the current state of affairs, when the campaign work is done by too many inexperienced people and when it is likely that their virtues will be assessed in terms of bundle or amount of paper that is sent, there seem to be good reasons to establish some high-grade professional screen class through which the raw material must pass before leaving. In chapter X I will refer to this issue again.

Secondly, let's talk about the dissemination of the finished product. The organization of information should be and is, for everyone in the organization, a matter of the utmost importance, that the daily or weekly summaries, the reports, studies, maps, etc., shall be delivered to persons with responsibilities for order, projection and operation. It is a function of great importance. There are two reasons why not must be placed in the hands of a special unit for gathering and dissemination and, in change, it will be delivered to what I previously named control.

Administratively speaking, the control must know where it is sent. goods and how they are received. It has the primary right over the records of distribution and receipt. If the copy of those records is placed anywhere else, the control must still have the duplicate in its possession. Hence, it seems very reasonable to leave all the work to the control. Secondly, the control is closer to the team. professional than any other unit and the control and the professional team together know more about the problems that need to be addressed and, therefore, more about the people who deal with those problems. Their continued efforts for the applicability of their knowledge, the automatically puts them in close contact with their potential consumers. Hence, There is a compelling reason for it to be responsible for the dissemination of the finished product.

Following the reasoning of the previous paragraphs, I find it impossible to accept the concept of an administrative unit to exclusively handle the functions of meeting and dissemination. The meeting of the materials that can be designated by name or place or origin can and should be carried out by the library; other materials must be gathered by professional staff. The dissemination, both of the subjects raw materials or finished products, is a matter in which the professional team it has such an intimate connection that it cannot be excluded. My own response to the problem it is the establishment of a skilled and active library and a small unit of aggregated distribution to the office of the head of the organization, where it maintains the close contact with the control and the professional team.

Problem No. 8: How should the function of biographical intelligence be fulfilled?

Acquiring knowledge about personalities is one of the most important tasks. of an intelligence organization. It is also a gigantic task. A file An ideal biography would contain tens of thousands of names. and each name, in turn, a variety of data. This data must be numerous and varied, because always

There are countless questions to ask about people. What kind of man is he? What are
What are his political and economic opinions? What is his full name and when was he born?
{"Does he speak English? Who are his closest friends? What are his weaknesses?":""}
How long might you possibly hold your current position? Where were you in 1937?
etcetera.

These questions and hundreds of questions more show that a perfect grade biography should include an astonishing amount of coldly realistic information and a large amount of critical appreciation. Those who use the note, likewise participate of those two shades of interest. A large part of them will only want to know the title. exactly of that man's current job or his rank or his address.

44. It is a gigantic problem in itself to decide which tens of thousands of trillion possible names there are in the world, must be included in those files. However, it does not constitute an administrative problem and subsequently I will refer to him.

Another group will want to know what the chances are of him becoming the number 1 man in. his party, army, company or church; his probable feelings regarding the situation local sugar mill, about Mr. Bevin or the Christian faith. The first group of consumers carries out a considerable part of his work by phone; the second, on more or less demand In this way, the administrative problem begins to take shape.

First, you need to gather a large amount of realistic data about a amazing number of people. As this work is mostly a job of cutting and pasting can be done by a group of employees specifically assigned to that mechanical task.

Second, this realistic data must be stored in a central file where they can be on hand to be used by the telephone consumer. But since it is impossible say where those data start and end and ensure that all consumers phone operators will ask for data of that nature, all biographical material will be stored in the same file.

Third, the critical and evaluative part of the biographical note is located outside of the limits of competence of the group of employees dedicated to browsing the dictionaries biographical and current periodicals.

The problem is as follows: Should the central file be maintained and the biographical team with top-tier professionals? Should the file be subdivided? central in its regional components, making the regional units of Does observation and research do their part? Or should a middle ground be chosen?

I think that if the first procedure is adopted, that is to say, to form a large complete biographical team or unit of personalities, can result in two damages: First, since it is ridiculous to try to divorce people from the actions they take, the unity of personalities would probably turn into a grouping of small units of regional research that would only repeat or duplicate a large part of the functions of the main regional group. Second, it is useless to try to stop this duplication telling the regional units of the main group that they will not be informed professional of the personalities in their respective areas.

If the second course is adopted and the entire operation is decentralized towards the main regional units, two inconveniences of equal magnitude arise:
First, the advantage of a central file and a central telephone service is lost.
Second, the type of professional management that is characteristic of the main units regional, will not have the appropriate enthusiasm for the mechanical part of the work, that is, to copy and cut and it will not be done with the necessary emphasis.

The only solution is a kind of middle ground. The file must be gathered, the personality unit must provide all the work and mechanical assistance and the units Regionals must recruit all first-degree professionals for their part of the work. There is no valid reason for these specially recruited people to be the only ones, in the regional units, who work on biographies, nor who work on them exclusively in biographies, but there are indeed many reasons to insist that, whatever be the circumstances, they or their professional equivalents, dedicate the hours of ritual to biographical work. In case there is a rush in a more pressing project, there will always be a tendency to temporarily abandon the biographical work merging into the biographers with other teams; and this should not happen.

Problem No. 9: What is the best solution for the map problem?

The map is one of the most useful tools of intelligence, and one of its best vehicles. It has substantial importance for the team's work. professional and it is the most direct method of presenting a large amount of its findings. There are therefore, at least, two aspects in the problem of maps that an organization of intelligence must face. The first of these is the problem of map meeting; the second, the problem of its execution or cartography.

Let's first consider the meeting; it should consist of all the maps. produced all over the world and that contain the latest data likely to presentation on a map. In this an incredible task. Some organizations of intelligence manages to get close to a certain distance from the goal, but to do so they struggle with all the resources they can rely on. Since an ideal collection of maps It constitutes one of the most powerful reference works that can be imagined. It indicates to the political specialist how was the communist vote geographically distributed in the last one Brazil's election and what are the new administrative divisions of the USSR; indicate to economist where is the population of China concentrated and why is it unlikely new industrial development in Turkey; speaks to the strategist on the ground, and to the person in charge of the logistics, about the supply channels.

The administrative problem is the following: Who carries out the collection of maps? And who takes care of her? Is this the task of the library, or of a special 'library'? maps?

The answer seems clear, if we turn to the second function, that is, the function Cartographic. An intelligence organization that deserves that name must make maps. You must make them as illustrations for your studies and various types of presentations and you must to do them for their own benefit. Generally speaking, the type of map that results is known as a special small-scale map; that is, it is not the kind of map suitable to plan a military operation or the route of a railway line or an artificial port or a irrigation project. It is the description of data or a situation that has a geographical significance and that can at the same time be represented safely and

clear in a stylized replica of some part of the surface of the globe. To make those maps, the cartographer must have the maps of someone else, for the reference data that they can contain and all the information that he or the regional team can extract from gazettes, books, and documents. In other words, cartography is one of the greatest clients of the maps meeting: without that collection of maps, cartography cannot to operate.

And thus begins to emerge the answer to the administrative problem: the functions of meetings or collections of maps and cartography must remain inseparable. Should both be subordinated to the library? I think there is no reason for that; in reality, I believe there are many reasons for it to be just the opposite. The main one is that certain phases of cartography are highly professional tasks that involve a large part of the research class carried out by the rest of the professional team. Not serves no good purpose by placing a high-power investigation operation under a service operation. Secondly, and almost as important as the above is the it is necessary to possess a more than ordinary talent to gather, catalog, and care for of the maps. A great professional knowledge is required, and the best collectors of maps are probably geographers or cartographers of considerable reputation. If their task it is considered a simple and routine librarian function, they will not wish taking care of her and, nevertheless, the collection or gathering of maps will be a very laborious task. poor and imperfect. Hence, the only conclusion I can reach is that everyone Inherent duties related to the maps should be gathered, giving them the same autonomy. administrative to the largest regional unit. This is not a perfect solution, because it They will undoubtedly produce some overlaps and perhaps one or two frictions between the units. regional and cartographic research, but this cannot be avoided; other solutions they would bring even greater difficulties.

Problem No. 10: How to maintain a competent professional team under the Law of Social Service and under budget constraint conditions?

The intelligence agencies of the regular government departments are operating under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission and are subject to its regulations. The Civil Service legislation tends to favor the impartial selection of the most qualified people to perform tasks in the government and no one will challenge it validity of this purpose. Unfortunately, that ideal has not been fulfilled.

During the war, the human flow was scarce, the needs were enormous and it was necessary for individual agencies to have some freedom to select their employees. If one had a vacancy to fill in an intelligence operation and she found the man who seemed to meet her demands, the possibilities resided in that one could offer him the job. It was unlikely that that man had or was interested in a civil service position, but that didn't matter.

In these circumstances and with funds for the expansion of the organization, I could to maintain a good team. Competent and clever people were eager and willing for becoming part. Once incorporated, they attracted their colleagues and the weight and prestige the organization of intelligence increased like a snowball rolling. It was what it was called a "good team" and the annual funding demands found a favorable reception among those in charge of the budgets and Congress.

Even in those days it was very difficult to say goodbye and replace the people who, for one reason or another,
Another reason, they will not be satisfactory. The organization needed to expand, not only take on new roles, but also make room for new and better people who will carry out the work, neglected by the incompetent. When the war ended, the economy in the federal budget became a political issue; few were those who they wanted to admit that intelligence needed a team almost as large in peace as in the war. In addition, the civil service regulations began to be enforced again. applied with all their weight.

Throughout the government, including its highly skilled intelligence teams specialized, the force reduction procedures were followed wherever desired that the reduction of budgets made the reduction of personnel necessary. In general, these procedures ensured that employees with fewer rights or lesser antiquity, were the first to leave. And many times it happened that people would say goodbye valuable, while other less competent employees remained. The people less valuable -those that virtually lack work outside the government-, consolidated quickly their position and took quick advantage of all the rights that the system granted.

When vacancies occurred, they had to be filled with people who they had the highest ratings, according to the rules of the civil service; these could Have been people who have recently been laid off from other agencies and, often, do not they managed to fit well into the jobs they were assigned to. Only in the positions of elevated step and in those that required the greatest specialization, it was possible to appoint men of prominent professional qualification, if they had never suffered a civil service exam or had never worked for the government.

Naturally, this situation disheartened the good elements of the intelligence. Many of them were insecure in their own positions, although their "performance" would have been one of the best, and everyone else was worried about the real or future loss of a good team. His concern, when he communicated with the outside, was became a reason for external bidding in pursuit of their services. The businesses, the industry, its employers and previous colleagues, of all forms of services not governors began to consider them available and started to make tempting offers to them offers. Two disintegration forces are now working in combination on the elements more valuable; they were repelled from the inside and attracted from the outside.

His loss was a catastrophe for the federal work. It was virtually impossible. find replacements anywhere in the country. The only remedy was one of dye heroic: the highly specialized personnel, like the professionals of an organization of intelligence, they should be immune to the regulations of ordinary civil service. I fully understand the heresy of such a suggestion, but unless a certain action is taken. special disposition for intelligence, the whole issue of preserving progress democratic can become somewhat academic someday.

The aforementioned do not constitute, in any way, the only problems. administrative issues of intelligence, but they are problems on which a great experience in recent years... with a waste of sorrows and dollars from the taxpayers.

PART THREE

INTELLIGENCE IS ACTIVITY

CHAPTER IX

INTELLIGENCE IS ACTIVITY

In the language of the profession, the word intelligence is not only used to design the different types of knowledge that I have described and the organization that it produces, but it is also used as a synonym for the activity it fulfills. the organization. In this chapter and the next two, I will refer to intelligence as an activity or, perhaps better, as a process. Above all, I will dedicate myself to the great number of methodological and other kinds of problems that are peculiar to intelligence process. But before talking about those problems, I will do it, although briefly, about the process itself.

The knowledge I have been calling strategic intelligence has two applications or uses; a protective or defensive use that alerts us regarding what other powers could plot to the detriment of ours national interests and a positive type, which paves the way for our own active foreign policy or grand strategy. But the important thing is that, excluding the diversity of purposes that it must serve, the knowledge in question is produced through the research process.

Sometimes, that research is formal, highly technical, and substantial; other times, it is informal, not technical and quick. Sometimes, a research project requires thousands of days - working man; others, it is done only in minutes - man or less.

The process of research, especially that of intelligence strategic, it begins, mainly, in two ways.

When politicians or planners from our government begin to formulate something new in our foreign policy, they often resort to intelligence in search for data or background information. With your request for such or such knowledge, estimulan, a la fuerza de la inteligencia, a dedicarse a cierta clase de investigación There is a course of special recognition. However, there is a second reason. by which the force of intelligence begins some investigation; and it is for the reason of his own systematic and continuous observation of what happens outside.

That observation or general recognition is so important that it Menudo is conceived as separate from research. I don't think it should be. to be considered separable, but I will speak about this later.

Observation, in the sense I give to the word here, is the recognition of what happens outside with the deliberate intention of giving it a meaning. The physical process of observation takes place in foreign countries and in the country itself; it can occur openly or secretly, or in both ways at the same time.

In foreign countries, we carry it out through a large number of people who act openly and secretly at the same time – some are civilians, other soldiers - whose duty is to keep 'eyes and ears open' to inform about everything they come to know. These people are the officials of the servicio exterior y los agregados que he mencionado con anterioridad. Cada uno each of them has their own sphere of action and specific task, whether political, military, commercial, or cultural and it is supposed that each of them sustains itself same and keeps their superiors within their specialty.

Some foreign governments complement the work of visible people.
of this type, with espionage activities, that is, they send secret agents, in order to
to make discoveries and send reports on matters that would be very difficult
discover openly. If my readers wanted to have an example of the
the way such activities are established and how they are operated, you will be able to read
The Soviet spies

by Richard Hirsch of[45] the "Report of the Canadian Royal Commission..."[46] based
extensively on the matter.

Not all observation or recognition activities take place in the
foreign; some, very important, are developed in the country, in the barracks
general of intelligence. Although it may seem very strange that one can observe a
foreign country from an observation post located within our own
country, there are various reasons in defense of this apparent paradox.

First, the observation must exist in the country pure and simply as
matter of convenience. For example, what the official French radio sows
about the rest of the world is a matter of considerable interest to us; we
You will like to know the content of your comments and political news. This does not
means, however, that we must establish a chain of radios in all the
cities of the world. The technical difficulties would be immense, the enormous
staff necessary for the execution of those operations, frowned upon in some
countries and the costs, tremendous.

New York, 1947.
46. "Report of the Canadian Royal Commission to investigate the facts relating to the communication of secret and confidential information to the agents of a foreign power, June 27, 1946" (Ottawa,
1946

Hence, that important observation organization, known as
"External Radio Information Branch" is established in our country. Its
stations collect the most significant programs; the internal office them
transcribes, translates them, often makes an excerpt, reproduces them and sends them to
all the people in the government. The departmental organizations of
intelligence, they are, of course, the main beneficiaries.

A similar case occurs with the official use of the large amount of news.
foreign news that our press correspondents gather and cable to
their newspapers. The expert journalists, even though they have no connection with the
strategic intelligence work of our federal government is important
observers of foreign and important affairs, albeit unconscious
contributors to the observation activity we are talking about. Well done the
the government not trying to intercept their shipments at the point of origin, but
allow them to reach our domestic newspapers and allocate the content for use
official. Doing it this way means that an intelligence operation dedicated to the
the discovered observation must have a small force in the country to continue
the best foreign news.

There is a second reason that supports the activity of inner observation, it is
say, carried out in our own country. It is based on the fact that anything that

trame en el extranjero en detrimento nuestro; está rodeada de un ambiente de conspiracy: it is plotted in secret and there are several people or groups of people who participate in it. In the world of international relations, these participants in the conspiracy may be residents of half a dozen countries and the relationship of what they do, if they manage to meet someday, they must meet or to weave together fragments from half a dozen different sources nationals. For example, what Franco thought at a certain moment, It could be less accessible to the sources of Madrid than to those of the city of Mexico, Buenos Aires, Lisbon, Bayonne or Rome. This is not argue that Washington is the only place where the observation could take place, but, Given the complicated nature of the modern world, there must be a position for listening and observation and a compensation camera at a central point.

In any way it is conducted - whether openly or clandestinely, abroad or within the country - observation serves two functions vitales. Nos dice cuando otro estado está proyectando una política o una acción that may hurt our national interests; in this paper, it stimulates the production of the necessary defensive-protective knowledge for our security. It also tells us what we need to know about foreign affairs to to conduct our own active foreign policy. In this second function, the strength has gathered, observed and reported the scale of phenomena that I have mentioned in chapters II and III and without which the content of intelligence strategic would have little importance.

When talking about observation, there is always the danger of visualizing something entirely passive. Observation may give the impression that it is being carried out. sitting and waiting for the impression. But the observation that deserves to really be called that, it must be vigorous and aggressive. Aggressive in the sense of that the observer must make all necessary efforts to follow after the impressions I get from those phenomena.

As long as I use the imprecise term 'follow', I find myself on safe ground. regarding the reader in general and the brotherhood of intelligence in particular. It involves checking the security or accuracy of the source of origin. the comparison of divergent accounts, the broadening of perspectives through the expansion of the research area, the discovery of new conduits, everything gives rise to a proposition that seems to be the truest of all possible propositions. Now, I would prefer to give the follow-up process the more precise term for 'research' and to say that certain classes of investigations must accompany the observation activity. This research should be characterized by a systematic effort to extract from the observations without research only It will produce sporadic and superficial information.

The research has an even greater importance. It has a completely own role, in service of the positive aspects of projection or propaganda of politics. In times of war, it produces the knowledge of the enemy strategic capabilities and their specific vulnerabilities; produce the knowledge of the political and economic strengths and weaknesses of enemy; produces the knowledge of the physical installation that the enemy uses for the prosecution of the war. Our offensive military projects are based on

in such knowledge. In times of peace, it produces about foreign countries the class of knowledge that is necessary to possess in order to say, for example, if an economic recovery program for Europe could be projected and then defend it in Congress and before fellow citizens.

Research is the only process that we, of liberal tradition, we want to acknowledge as capable of providing us the truth or the closest approximation to the truth, of which we now enjoy. A medieval philosopher would have been content with obtaining the truth by studying the Holy Scriptures; an African chieftain, consulting with their sorcerers or a mystic like Adolfo Hitler, through the communication with your intuitive ego. But we insist and have insisted on through several generations, one must approach the truth, if it is not possible reach it through directed research, by a systematic method. In the social sciences[47], which constitute in

I include the science of military strategy among the social sciences, along with social psychology, economics, politics, sociology, geography, anthropology, history, and others. It is worth noting that the intelligence of the physical science and technology has a thick veneer of social science. For example, it is very important to know with accuracy regarding the point at which country X is in the development of new fuels, vaccines, or weapons and presumably Only a man well-versed in the appropriate exact science possesses the necessary competence to handle the details. technicians of such intelligence problems. But just as important or possibly even more so, is knowing the benefits or advantages that such developments will produce for the nation that

a large part of the base theme of strategic information, that method exists. It is very similar to that of physical sciences. It is not the same method, but that does not mean to be a method.[48]It can be described in very different ways. For example, One could explain the discussion about the sciences.

the effects. If country X has found a new fuel that will revolutionize its aviation industry, does it possess Is that country willing and able to benefit from that revolution? And if country X is prepared to take advantage? From that revolution, what will be the results for its commercial aviation, its attitude in relations. exteriors, etc.? These last questions are of utmost importance and the answers will not be found necessarily within the sphere of the wise or engineer responsible for the development. The answers constitute the end and the work of social scientists. Any foreign country that works on States United was the atomic era, it will not only be of interest to know how it will affect our foreign or domestic policy possession of the atomic bomb and other secrets of atomic energy, but in uncovering our secrets highly technical. Therefore, it would be expected that the central intelligence team of Division X in The United States will employ several scientists in order to find out how we do it and a large number of sociologists who distributed the findings within the appropriate political, social, and economic contexts.

48. It is often noted that the method of the social sciences differs greatly from that of the sciences. exact, in the enormous difficulties they face in the execution of controlled and repeated experiments and in achieving secure bases for forecasts. Despite these great disadvantages, the social scientists continue to seek to improve their method in order to achieve the accuracy of physics and the chemistry. Some of the physical scientists, such as President Conant of Harvard, although respectful towards objective and impartial analyses, achieved by the

Physics (such as that of President Conant, from Harvard), saying that the method of social sciences involves the development of new concepts derived from the observations and that the new concepts, in turn, indicate and lead to new observations. But to extend this formula –admirably simple–, in such a way that fits the special case of social sciences, it might be less useful than to state others specifically designated to meet the demands gifts.

In this other formulation, seven steps or stages are recognized:
The emergence of a problem that requires the attention of a team of strategic intelligence.
2) The analysis of this problem to discover which aspects of it are real importance for the United States and which of the various approaches, it is

social scientists tend to dissociate the two methods. They feel that the method of social science is as different from that of the physical sciences (for the reasons already mentioned and for others as well), which tries to make them The affairs only tend to confuse them more. Mr. Conant says: 'To say that all exact and impartial analyses of The facts are to calculate the problems of physical science" (James B. Conant: From Physical Science, New Mr. Conant, as a chemist, is primarily interested in avoiding the confusion in the realm of pure science. Social scientists have a very different interest.
they will probably serve their government consumers as well.
3) The collection of data about the problem as indicated in step 2). This it involves a review of the available and existing data in the libraries of documentary material and an effort to seek new data to fill in the gaps.
4) The critical evaluation of the data thus received.
The study of the data evaluated with the intention of finding some kind of inherent meaning. The moment of the discovery of such meaning could be called the moment of the hypothesis, although some students of the method, more that nothing is out of convenience, they speak as if it exists. Nor can it be said categorically at what stage of the process the hypothesis appears. One would like to to think that it appears in this stage, stage 5, but in practice, it starts to appear when the first data has been gathered. There has been a case where it appeared still before that, and that they can continue appearing until it was closed process and even after this.
6) A greater collection of data, along the lines indicated by the most promising hypotheses, in order to confirm or reject them.
The establishment of one or more hypotheses as the most accurate and the declaration that these hypotheses are the closest to the truth.
This is the final stage and is commonly referred to as the presentation state.

At each of these stages, two types of problems occur. methodological. A class is characteristic of all research. systematics in the social sciences and the other derives from the peculiarities of the research activities in intelligence. In other words: The strategic intelligence has a series of methodological problems that are relatively unknown to social scientists working in the University. In the next chapter, I will mainly focus on describing this class of special methodological problems.

CHAPTER X

PROBLEMS OF SPECIAL METHODS IN INTELLIGENCE WORK

Strategic intelligence faces difficulties at every stage of the method. discussed in the last chapter. As I have already said, these difficulties are not general to all research related to social sciences; they are peculiarities of intelligence work. In the following pages, I will discuss them stage by stage.

The word 'problem' can cause some confusion; I will use the word frequently and in two completely different ways. I will designate as methodological problem, when I refer to the characteristic problem of method followed to try to establish a new approach to the truth and, as a 'substantive problem', when I refer to the problem in the substance effective strategic intelligence. As an example of a 'substantive problem', consider the strategic stature of the Chinese communists; as an example of methodological problem, consider the means that one would use to obtain the basic data relating to the military establishments of the Chinese communists.

1. First stage: the emergence of the substantive problem

The substantive problem, in strategic intelligence, can arise from three main ways:

a) The substantive problem can arise as a result of reflections of a man employed just to foresee the problems. In reality, intelligence he employs too small a number of these men. But let's suppose that they exist; their work consists of asking themselves meaningful questions and investigators to then pass them to the professional staff. An operation of intelligence could become greatly entangled with such questions, and a part substantial part of their work program would be to obtain the answers. A a disaster like Pearl Harbor could be attributed, and not to a small extent, to the absence of some persistent and unpleasant person who knows the mood from Japan, you will ask: When will he/she come? the attack for where

how will it be produced?[49]

The methodological problem presented here is very light, because less in appearance; it consists of projecting the means by which those "anticipators" will be assured of formulating good substantive problems. The only answer is to take a man who already knows quite a bit about the substantive area in which it is assumed that it will ask questions, and that also possesses, an inquisitive mind; and then take care that they have free access to every trace of new evidence about it, to all those who know something about her and who are located free from any other obligation. But if one looks beneath the surface and asks, How can someone begin to ask themselves good questions? to transit through one of the main paths of epistemology, and that is not my intention.

b) The substantive problem can arise when observation recognizes the development of something unusual or unusual.

49. See Why We Were Caught by Surprise at Pearl Harbor, by Seth W. Richardson (General Council of Combined Investigative Committee (on Pearl Harbor). "Saturday Evening Post", vol. 219, No. 47, May 24 from 1947. Mr. Richardson documents the proposal, which is generally accepted.

For example, let's assume that the people watching over Gran Frusina have knowledge that this country is expanding its Christian mission program in the Belgian Congo and has appointed a certain Brother Nepomuk as assistant of the new director. If the observation is sharp enough to recognize the unusual nature of this change in the minor policy of Great Frusina, has begun a substantive problem that could be of great interest when studying it, or which could, on the other hand, lack any importance.

The methodological problems of the present case are very similar to those mentioned above: How can observation be sure to have located the unusual, the really unusual? How can one have the assurance of he has pointed out, among the thousands of things he observes and the millions of things that occurs, those to the previous one: one has to obtain the services of men intelligent and wise - wise in that subject - and to pray that for their mysterious ego interior sea of the class capable of producing hypotheses of national importance.

c) The third and final way in which the substantive problem can arise is at the direct instance of the consumer. For example, let's suppose that politicians, who are the main consumers of intelligence, face a review of the policy established in China. Let's assume they cite part of the control and the professional intelligence team to a meeting where it is the problem has been presented. During the course of this meeting, aspects may arise about the Chinese issue that politicians have not had news of before. Let's assume that those aspects are related to the population. A change Anticipation in politics has given rise to a substantial problem.

In this case, as it is presented, there is no methodological problem. real; from the perspective of intelligence organization, things have happened as it should happen. In reality, the task is so large and so general, which must necessarily present serious difficulties; but since the intelligence was required at the meeting, intelligence can wait for its consumers provide them with some guidance to delineate, with some precision, the problem noun within their needs. (This is stage 2 and will be discussed immediately). But what happens very often is that the decision de revisar la política haya sido tomada y comenzada la discusión sin incluir en ella to intelligence. Weeks later, when politicians find themselves before a immovable problem, they discover that they must immediately obtain a new one estimation of the population through intelligence; thus they present a noun problem, with great dismay and despair on the part of the intelligence, which is thus forced to carry out in one night the work of a month.

2. Second stage: the analysis of the substantive problem.

The substantive problem has arisen abruptly. Before the staff of observation or research that can be addressed must undergo certain analysis deep and investigative. The object of this analysis is not merely to discover and discard the elements that are unimportant, otherwise, what is more important, to give the problem the necessary form so that the solution (when (appear), is directly applicable to the consumer's task.

For example, the observation staff has many options open to them. possible observation processes to discover the new heat of Great Frusina in his mission in the Belgian Congo. He can begin by monitoring church relations-state in search of new angles; you may start to observe relationships between Gran Frusina, Belgium and the Congo to go in search of new developments produced in the general field of missions, in order to discover new curial policies in them. They will certainly appear in those studies. new fields of exploration, whatever line they choose.
the issue is not this; the question is: What particular line of further observation it may prove to be of greater importance for the security of the States United?

The research staff attending the meeting about the policy with China may have to make many similar deductions.
they had requested data about the population; let's assume that the request was no more explicit. Evidently, there are dozens of classes of data about the population, of only one or two of which could bring some interest to the politicians' task.
What are those data and to what degree of detail should they be worked with? elaborate?

While the observation and research staff work hard on their substantive problems, in order to find the most fruitful lines of attack, they will also need some guidance or direction. This guidance can come from both their inner egos, as the understanding of their respective increases substantive problems, those of politicians, project managers or operators, to whom

offers its services. Allow me to address the issue of direction or guidance such as it appears to the man dedicated to observation.

He discovered that Gran Frusina was expanding its mission program. Christians in the Congo; know that the Congo has large uranium deposits and ask yourself: Is there any connection? When your forays into the investigation reveals that Brother Nepomuk has won a Nobel Prize for his works on geology, he understands that there is a connection and that it has been presented an aspect of the most fruitful line of attack. It now has a hypothesis: that Gran Frusina is trying to obtain uranium from Congo and that the Brother Nepomuk is an agent of hers. At this point, he already needs external guidance. What other lines of attack do the people you serve consider fruitful? What do they propose to do regarding Gran Frusina if such and such lines indicate a malicious activity on your part?

Regarding the research staff working on the matter of the China's population, the exact opposite can occur. In their need for guidance, they will soon turn to political consumers and ask them for advice on the lines of attack. They will also ask how they face their task, and what object they chase when reviewing the old policy; if they obtain the answers to these questions, they can establish the substantive problem in such a way that an answer to it, it has practical utility for its superiors. Even more so as they progress in their research, they will obtain useful hypotheses that will arise from their familiarity with the theme, and that consumers would never have obtained on their own.

But the methodological problem in question is not that of the inner guide; it is the guide or direction coming from outside, guidance provided by those who will use it the knowledge that the intelligence personnel are trying to produce. It is one of the critical problems of the entire intelligence process and one to which I have dedicated a substantial paragraph of the next chapter. It is enough to say here, that the relationships between intelligence producers and consumers of the they have been irregular; that intelligence often finds it impossible obtain the corresponding address class to produce a useful product, and that one of the points where this lack of direction produces results more disastrous, it is precisely at this second stage of the intelligence process. Unless the intelligence organization knows what matter it is working on; what is your product intended for, what actions are being prepared and with what kind of elements, the analysis and the true formulation of the substantive problem suffer in direct relation to that ignorance.

3. Third stage: data collection

Data gathering is the most characteristic activity of the entire process. of intelligence. There can be no recognition or observation without a meeting of data, nor can there be any research either. In the same way, an organization of intelligence there will not be so much effect if a broad and systematic work of meeting. However, in this task, there are methodological problems that are difficult, that are almost insoluble, and this state constitutes a perpetual source of ineffectiveness.

a) Let's start with the easiest one. It is the methodological problem with which a team member stumbles when embarking on something research. After having defined your substantive problem, your next step the next step will be to see what data related to the topic exists in your own organization. intelligence or in others. Let's assume that your own files are fine. provided and that your team has a centralized document library properly cataloged. In a short time, you can review the materials that are they find in their own power, so to speak. These materials indicate, just like its common sense that there are other materials related to the above other nearby intelligence organizations. And it must reach them. intelligence organizations nearby. And it must reach them. I have already noted the inherent difficulties in the task of reaching them, if 1) that member must communicate your wishes to another person within your own organization, who has the exclusive mission to gather data, and 2) if the other organization does not have a library central cataloged documents. The fact that organizations of intelligence tends to centralize the collection function and does not tend to maintain a central index of their documents presents a barrier to our researcher considerable.

b) To continue with a further step in this process, let us assume that the team member discovers that, even after scrutinizing each of the sources in their own barracks in the city, there are still a large number of substantive issues without answers that need to be explored. Must communicate with the overseas team: should try to explain to someone in a foreign capital, what what he wishes to find. Now, if the man situated at the other end of the Cable has previously been an employee of the office of his homeland, if he knows the ... operation of those offices and personally meets the team of their country, will understand more quickly what is asked of them and will also do it with greater effectiveness and pleasure. It will understand the received instructions and will act. really like a projection of the team of your country; but, if you have not been in the office of his homeland and instead has taken his place abroad without being intimately aware of the problems of his country, great things can arise difficulties.

The inconveniences begin when it comes to explaining accurately, in a letter or telegram, exactly what is desired, and in trying to explain it to someone who is unaware of the beginning of things. The request for data from this the class must be stated in detail and, to yield results, must be understood in its content a certain sense of urgency and importance. Those requests are "time consumers"; if they are not stated in the form of brief commands and directly, they will tend to be fulfilled carelessly, simply by themselves effect of being relieved of obligations.

The inconveniences increase when the request refers to something to which the recipient is completely foreign. The office established in the very country I could wish for a foreign official to be interviewed regarding a matter. technical demographic, what the reporter would hear from someone at a conference scientific. But the man stationed abroad has training a professional who does not agree with that, or lacks any training professional, resulting, therefore, totally incompetent to fulfill that

mission. Or, more likely, the campaign team is engrossed by complete in solving another issue that seems more important to him.

I have classified the stated problems as those with the easiest solution. among the collection problems, because certain common sense rules can to be resolved so easily and are inherent to the observation phase of the intelligence. It is believed that the power of observation, in an operation of Strategic intelligence is primarily focused on monitoring enemies. real, imaginary or potential of the United States and report on their activities. Secondly, it is assumed that the observation force must to seek a class of information less dramatic, aimed at hastening success of our own policy or provisions. In certain aspects of both lines of work, the observation force must operate secretly, or, in other words otherwise, an observation force that is not equipped to work clandestinely, he will not be able to carry out a small part of the tasks that, although reduced, it is extremely important. In general terms, you will not be able to to produce information that another country considers as a state secret. Many those secrets can only be known by strange methods that, to their sometimes, they constitute state secrets. Thus, a certain important fraction of the knowledge that intelligence must produce is obtained through techniques highly developed secrets. Here begins, perhaps, the biggest problem methodological stage of data collection in the intelligence process.

It begins with the segregation of the clandestine force; this segregation is dictated by the need to maintain secrecy. An absolute minimum of people is the one who should understand the operation in its entirety and the greatest Precautions and disguise must protect the movements. But, unless this clandestine force watch carefully, it can become its own and worst enemy; because, if it allows the security mechanisms to separate it from some of the most significant guidelines, that destroys its own reason for existence. This guide can come from two sources: it can come directly from the consumer or indirectly from them, through the uncovered part of the intelligence operation, which this consumer has resorted to in search of help. How the relationship between the clandestine personnel and the direct consumers the indirect sales of your product have been suspended (perhaps for long periods); how it has been formalized to the point that communication is carried out by written word only; how it loses the information of a discussion of man to man, some of their most important tasks are practically done impossible. The request for information turns into orders mechanical and cold that, through the consumer's innocence, cannot to learn about the possibilities of the organization. The consumer can ask for something that the organization is not ready to deliver, or can request a more extensive information, that the entirety of the organization's resources are completely occupied for months, or you can ask for something that, although obtainable, does not deserve such effort. Through a wall of impenetrable reserve, the the consumer has great difficulty in not abusing the organization, and the organization has the same difficulty in keeping itself within the limits of greater utility to the consumer. It is constantly exposed to gather the unnecessary or incorrect information and not obtaining the appropriate one.

This danger is intensified by the clandestine nature of the work. intelligence. Its process involves extremely complicated techniques: the appropriate or correct approach to a source, the 'development' of the source, the[50] protection of the source once it has been developed, the security and reliability of its own communications and others. Isolated by the security barrier, the the perfection of these techniques threatens to become an end in itself.

50. For the meaning of the word 'development' used in this sense, see The Soviet Spies, by Richard Hirsch (New York, 1947), chap. 16. The people whom the Russians in Ottawa induced to betray their country, they did not do it for money. They betrayed him because, due to a subterranean and persistent instruction, they gained the assurance that by doing so they benefited humanity. There are many others ways to 'develop' a source without the direct use of metallic backing...

One can understand the engrossed interest of the technicians in the artifices of their task, but it is difficult to forgive them when they confuse their means and their ends. There are cases where clandestine intelligence has exploited a difficult source. and little fruitful, neglecting the exploitation of an easier and more rewarding one. This kind of inconvenience would occur less frequently if the operation did not was free to follow its own course through the fog of its own safety regulations.

4. Fourth stage: the evaluation of the data

If the language of intelligence were more precise, it should use the word "criticism" instead of the word "evaluation" and, if the expression were allowed "data criticism," we could advance even faster and with more certainty. The The critical word means the comparison of something new and unestablished with something. older and better established; the best critic, in these terms, is the man that has a greater number of established things and an adequate mindset, for that will be able, through direct or indirect comparison, to appreciate the validity of new things as they arise. When it occurs appreciations for the direct method, for example, when it rejects a report that grants Gran Frusina a steel capacity equivalent to 45,000,000 tons, because he knows from other evidence, of undeniable certainty, that his capacity of 36,000,000 tons, it can be said that it has a true information. When making the appraisal by the indirect method, it is to say, when rejecting a report that establishes that the total harvesting team from Gran Frusina is 30,000 per year, because it cannot understand what it could doing with a similar number, is putting into practice what he hopes will be a correct criterion.

In the aspect of intelligence research, the data collected on the The noun problem must, of course, be subjected to criticism before

may become the substance from which a hypothesis arises. If the data incorrect ones are not rejected, the emerging hypothesis will also be incorrect when just like the final chart. The methodological problem boils down to a matter of the expert critique, of the understanding and of the freedom with which one is allowed to arrive at the appreciation of the data. Perhaps, as in the case of a previous problem, this is a problem of both administration and methodology; but the case that intelligence, in trying to follow the principle of assembly line and trying to replace administrative techniques with high-category professional personnel, is in serious danger of falling into the always important question of criticism data. This means that we have lost too many men of science. of knowledge and wisdom, in a pursuit that is not possible to continue precisely without its course.

There is, however, a problem in the area of evaluation that can is appropriately called methodological problem and which is peculiar to the activities of intelligence. This problem arises due to the two means to through which the product of the observation operation is distributed to the consumer. The first of these distribution methods is through the collection or completed report or daily or weekly summary. The new material is placed on the expert's desk; he subjects it to criticism, judges its importance, it mixes with other data received the day before or a week ago. before, it provides it with basis and meaning and sends it to the consumer. This activity could being classified as an "informer"; but, as can be seen, it contains all the elements of the research. The second way in which the product of the observation operation is distributed is a less finished form; the collectors deliver what they have collected to a kind of intermediary, this one grade the data according to the security and trust that the source deserves and its content and can then distribute it directly to the consumer or the team of research of your own organization and also another organization of intelligence. The only ostensible reason for the existence of this intermediary is that it manipulates data that has been obtained clandestinely. On the organization must protect the sources it relies on. But, the intermediary - Whatever the reason for its existence - in reality, it does much more than just hide. the identity of the source of origin: it seeks to establish the degree of trust that the collected data deserves. To do so, it is guided by some strangers canons of thought.

The intermediary, according to standard practice, is restricted to make their evaluations, to a limited language. They are allowed to graduate the confidence earned by the source according to the letters A, B, C, D, and the content according to the numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4. Thus, A-1 would designate a report containing a simple and direct truth, deserving of full trust. The data from less reliable and less secure sources could be B-2, C-4, etc. Yes the data comes from some document, a newspaper or press service or something like that the style, the school of evaluators designates its value with the simple word "documentary". The intermediaries have insisted on not expanding their comments further. beyond this elemental code and have done everything possible so that those who they would like to expand it but would be prohibited from doing so. They defend this procedure,

arguing that they are suppliers of a raw material and that their duty is distribute it in the most basic way possible.

If this argument has any strength, the same intermediaries they contribute to denying it; because they do not distribute the item in a way that that even resembles a state that can be called 'raw'. They draft it, they abbreviate it, translate it, hide it or obscure it, if necessary, its source of origin. Furthermore, they often lose the point of observation or what could called information angle. Was it a French communist, socialist, or right-wing, the one that has reported on the number of machine guns existing in the headquarters of the communist newspaper. "L'Humanité" or the one that reported on the new political instructions from the Vatican? When it comes into the hands of Consumer, it is a semi-finished good.

The evaluation of the source of origin can be a valuable service of intermediary. If the source is reliable, without any doubt, and if it must be protected at all costs, it may be advisable to plow it with grade A. But, that is only convenient and valid when the intermediary knows the matter thoroughly in hand, or when the validity of the source has some relation to the content. Often, intermediaries do not have their own concept about the source security and, instead of admitting it, proceed to adjust it according to the apparent reliability of the content. This movement in vicious circles lacks both useful and valuable.

Apart from the value of an authorized evaluation of the source, there are, within of this procedure, so many questionable elements, that one hardly knows by where to start. In reality, one would feel absolutely obligated to start, if these intermediaries will not plant their product among people who are the last consumers of intelligence who tend to use data without criticism subsequent systematics. But the fact is that this evaluated data reaches this group of consumers, who will likely accept the evaluation as it is re

ciben, suffering the consequent mistakes.[51]

The first peculiar element consists of the same intermediaries. Who are these people who do not run the clandestine operations nor are In a place where they are obligated to see all the materials that come in? all the materials that come in, I mean those gathered openly by discovered sources (newspapers, government reports, transcripts of foreign radio broadcasts, etc.) and those gathered clandestinely in other secret sources. Positioned in that place, the intermediaries seem to be isolated both from practical experience or from the operator's campaign like from the researcher's laboratory experience, which constant and aggressively works in a specialty. I can understand that a man who lives in Rome and dedicates all their time to gathering information about politics Italian, can develop a strong critical sense. I can understand that a researcher in Washington, who delves into the data of their specialty and to every moment of his professional life runs an obstacle course with his own

51. It should not be forgotten that there is another identical document. The very busy consumer may lack time or inclination to read material delivered in that way, in which case one remains ignorant of both the good like of the bad.

hypothesis and those of others, must have a high critical sense and great skill. But, I can't understand how a man, who passively reviews a great amount of material of all kinds, without doing anything about it, except to keep it, it may have, it may have the necessary critical sense.

Another peculiar element of the evaluation is one intimately linked to previous. It must be found in the assumption that the data of the sciences social values are unique, not relative; that the data 'Mr. Truman will work for "the democratic candidacy in 1948" is at the same level or has the same category of class, that the data: 'All material objects will travel sixteen'} feet during the first second of their fall in a perfect vacuum," that is to say, if Mr. Hannegan gives the first piece of information, it constitutes a matter or work equal to that of the same category as if Dr. Millikan gives the second.

As an explanatory note: during the war, a document was circulated. graduate A-3, which accounted for the failure of the United States to supply to the inhabitants of the city of Oran in Algeria, in the winter of 1943. The source was rated with an A, because he seemed to be someone familiar with the situation: the content was rated as unsafe because the evaluator knew that the The conditions in Orán were not as bad as they seemed. A recipient of this document that was in excellent condition for systematic criticism, conducted investigations until he identified the source, which was none other than a important French official and the document, the text of one of his speeches not registered. The officer was undoubtedly a source A in the matter: he could know which it was the situation through direct informants or even through personal experience. But what he said about Oran under the Americans was relatively little. importance even if it had been correct. The important aspect of this the document was that a violent and adverse criticism of Americans had born of an important man who could be claimed to be his friend and ally. Its importance as a source regarding Oran was relative compared to its importance as a source of ill will or treachery from the official himself. One of the uses of the document, in true real value, were completely hidden by the coded evaluation. To serve the most important use, the evaluation could have drawn attention to the author of the document. If the document had fallen into the hands of American intelligence, thanks to the work of an agent secret whose identity should be protected, the evaluation would have required four five sentences instead of one. But suppose that these sentences could not to be written without compromising the agent, Is this an appropriate reason to mislead the consumer with the A-3 evaluation? I would say no, and that if the intermediaries could not think of another way to handle the problem, they had to to quit that job.

The last peculiarity is the evaluation of a newspaper clipping through of the use of the word 'documentary'. I have never understood what purpose or to what it is useful. Furthermore, removing the name of the newspaper in the reproduction of the clipping. it constitutes a positive detriment to the recipient. Without it, the latter finds itself

private, perhaps, of the most useful piece of information when making your own assessment. For example, wouldn't you like to know if it was the 'New York Times' or the 'Daily Worker'? the person responsible for the estimate that Henry Wallace would receive ten million of votes for president in 1948? Or would you prefer the attribution of 'documentary'?[52].

The official justification for this practice is that new elements can be established as news. false and that the person in charge of the evaluation does not wish to increase the deception. Hence, he uses the word "documentary" as a warning signal and as evidence that he is strictly neutral in what regards to interpretation refers. I am not influenced by reasoning.

5. Fifth stage: the moment of the hypothesis

What is desired in the realm of hypothesis is quantity and quality. What what is desired is a large number of possible interpretations of the data, a large number of inferences or concepts, which are provided with a wide base and may still produce other concepts.

There are two things that an intelligence organization must possess in order to generate more and better hypotheses: 1) professional team of the highest level competence and devotion to work and 2) access to all necessary data and pertinent.

There were many men contemporary to Mahan and Mitchell, to Darwin and Freud, Keynes, and Pareto, who might have made the same discoveries. than they did, but they lacked the training and the necessary mental quality. But the fact that those men did not do the same does not mean that they did not they would have the necessary facts. For the most part, the facts were at the scope of anyone. Great discoveries are the result of rigorous, agile, and profound meditations; the great discoverers possess minds capable of such meditations, and the fiber necessary to face an intellectual responsibility. Great discoveries are not made by a group of second-rate minds, no matter how they may be juxtaposed They are organized. Twenty men with a mental capacity equivalent to five, gathered in a room, they will not produce the ideas of a man with a mental capacity equivalent to 100. Minds cannot be added together as if they were fractional parts of genius. As long as intelligence behaves as if it could doing it will not produce the kind of essential hypotheses for its mission.

But intelligence recruits its professional staff from among the most favored by the nation, will not produce good hypotheses, unless those people have access to all relevant data; this is not, by any means, easy to fixing, two things are in the way and the first of them is the security.

Despite the fact that the majority of the fundamental issues of the strategic intelligence falls within the realm of social sciences, I do not this infers that the man who makes intelligence has exactly the same problems as the university researcher or the journalist. He has to to deal with them on state secrets, on which they can very well rely the security or the well-being of a nation. About the theory that the degree of the security of a secret depends on the number of people who know it, a

Very important secret cannot therefore be too well known. But a
A man cannot produce good hypotheses about something related to a secret.
important, if you do not know everything you should know about it. It is still
It is interesting to suppose what Lord Keynes could have done if libraries had not...
they would have allowed access to a multitude of economic data that
what operational considerations or progress Dr. Freud would have made, if the
mental clinics would have sealed their records before him, alluding that the
they were considered very confidential. However, intelligence employees
they always have to face this kind of arguments; security is
obtains at the cost of a great disadvantage in the results and, on the contrary, should
to be allowed to interfere only when absolutely necessary. Should not
allow it to be an excuse or a mask for inter-official jealousy or
interdepartmental.

These jealousies constitute the second barrier that stands in the way.
In the next chapter, I will refer to them in detail. Allow me to say
aquí que cualquiera sea la causa, uno de sus resultados es escatimar a la
intelligence is one of the two main ingredients of a good hypothesis.

6. Final stage: the presentation

I skipped the previous stage (i.e., greater collection and greater examination of
hypothesis) of the intelligence process, because it contains few or none of the
problems that have not been described in stages 2 and 3. The final stage, the
stage in which the established hypothesis is presented as new and improved
approximation to the truth contains at least two important problems that
they are born from the form that the finished product must assume; the most important aspects
outstanding in this way are: brevity and clarity.

Intelligence produces long reports - some can reach a
length of many hundreds of pages-, but there are few studies, reports or
monographs that do not also provide the reader with the summary of one or two
pages; in a way, that's how it should be. The imposition of a limit of
words, forces intelligence producers to be clear in their
thoughts and concise in their presentation, which allows the hurried one
the consumer quickly learns while reading. But the result, although
necessary, it is not, in any way, a pure commodity, without mixture. There are things
such as an idea so complicated that it cannot be expressed in 250 words
or on two pages. The consumer who insists that there is no idea, because it is complicated
that it cannot be exposed in a summary of 300 words, only contributes
to harm oneself. He is asking for the impossible and paying a high price.
price for it. Paying in two ways: one deceives oneself in the belief of
that really knows something and contributes to the demoralization of their team
intelligence. The intelligence employees who spend weeks of work
exhausting in a substantive problem and emerge with a response whose
meaning resides precisely in its refinements, they feel offended by the
distortion that occurs in a careless summary, from which everything has been removed
real meaning. The next time they have to deal with a problem similar to the
previous, they will undertake the exhausting work with less enthusiasm and will produce a

regular study with an even worse summary. This is not asking for the busy consumer. a man of action who reads in detail the hundreds of pages of knowledge that they come to him, but it is asking him to understand that there is an intermediary position and that, when I let know that he is not willing to read anything longer than a page, many of its loyal and efficient workers will lose a large part of their fervor in serving you.

The second problem of the presentation stage is that of references. at the foot. Intelligence consumers, unlike more serious readers critics have not asked for clarifications; in fact, they have often despised them, as further evidence of the little practical sense that the academic producer has of intelligence. The producer himself has his difficulties as well, with the citation from source. In those intelligence organizations where the style rules are made by men who do not understand the method of research, there is frequent opposition to the reference note. Moreover; even in organizations where the value of citing sources is well understood, muchas fuentes no pueden ser enunciadas por razones de seguridad. De ahí que, On both sides, there are good and bad reasons to set aside the references and this is how it's done[53].

53. Some organizations have developed the practice of citing as many sources as the text requires and of cite secret or delicate sources in code. The consumer, in these circumstances, obtains information better, although some of the references may not make sense to him. If he should know the source of a a determined report is always free to ask

I do not know any formula for harm and detriment that is more certain than a poorly conducted investigation lacking footnotes. A sloppy research with footnotes is not good; but sloppy and without notes, multiplies danger in a way that Lego cannot imagine. The The following example will help to clarify it:

The military high commands of countries 'X' and 'Y' held several pre-war conversations about the aerodromes that 'Y' owned in one of its colonies. "And" said to "X" that he had several airfields built, some almost to be constructed when the lands had been acquired. The initiation of the hostilities turned the content of those conversations into important material from intelligence and one of the intelligence teams of 'X' distributed a report that named and located the fields precisely, noting that some were ready, others not yet built and others just planned. He cited his source of origin. and provided information about the conversations. Until Aquí todo fue bien.

clarification to the producer. He, however, would seem to be the main beneficiary. He has his record before him. para el momento en que alguien pueda recusar una de sus declaraciones o deba revisar o extender su study.

A few months later, another intelligence team from another country, 'Z', had occasion to obtain a report on the colony, a report that had a section dedicated to the airfields. The information it contained came from the study

previously, but it was changed in two aspects: the issue of land for those airports whose land had not yet been purchased were omitted, as well as the reference to the source of origin. We now have a report that contains information about operating aerodromes without footnotes and about another group that will soon be finished.

A little later, a second intelligence team from country 'Z' took the second report and recorded the data on the airfields on cards. These cards were printed formulas that did not have a proper division or compartment to note whether an aerodrome was in operation or in the process of construction. The cards did not have references at the bottom. The three categories of airports were therefore included in category one. Based on the information thus produced, it could be thought that there existed, in the area in question, fifty more airfields than there actually were.

More or less at that time, a third intelligence team was formed in 'Z'. what the second's file inherited. Developed a technique to present airports on maps, with symbols to indicate the length and type of runway. Now, in the original document, no length was given for the tracks. nonexistent fields that have not yet been built, but it had been noted that the areas to acquire for the development of airfields would be one mile square. This data was repeated in all subsequent reports. But when the Map tracers found that data, they found it little. convenient. Not wanting to do something so unrealistic as drawing a track square mile on each side, they resorted to the average. They reasoned that the tracks would have the maximum length; therefore, they would follow the diagonal, thus having a little more than a mile, let's say about 7,000 feet in length. Having decided on this point, they drew their maps, assigning a symbol to the fields, which indicated a runway length of 7,000 to 8,000 feet. In reality, as demonstrated more In the end, only one or two of the fifty nonexistent fields were built.

This kind of error cannot be attributed entirely, in any way, to the lack of footnotes, but I would say that the lack of reference increased. considerably the odds of it happening. Furthermore, the lack of reference made correcting the original error increasingly difficult, as the information passed through the producer-consumer chain. By the time the map is finished, discovering the error took hours of time from the the most effective and competent man who could dedicate hours to the issue. And yet the damage was irreparable, because the most correct and cautious appreciation what that man did about the situation of the airfields in the “Y” colony I couldn't reach all consumers of the incorrect reports or convince them. to all those who had received the report that theirs was the true one appreciation.

The methodological problems I discussed above will seem to be of the most annoying. But my catalog is not exhausted. There are others problems and there are other facets, in addition to those already considered, that make very the profession of intelligence is difficult and is a cause of the results of the intelligence processes fall below the necessary standards of quality.

CHAPTER XI

PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS OF INFORMATION

There is no phase of intelligence that is more important than the appropriate ones. relationships between the same intelligence and the people who use its product. It is strange to note that with this relationship, one would expect it to establish itself by itself the same, automatically, such a thing does not happen. It is established as a result of great, persistent, and conscious efforts and tends to disappear when such forces decrease.

The appropriate relationships between intelligence producers and the consumers are extremely delicate. Intelligence must be found in the suficientemente ligada a todas las operaciones políticas, de proyectos y demás, to obtain as much direction or guidance as possible, but it should not to be so close that it loses its objectivity of integrity of judgment. The object of The following pages explain precisely the meaning of this last one. sentence.

The problem of direction or guidance.

One of the main theses of this book can be summarized as follows manner: Unless the type of knowledge being discussed here is complete, safe and timely and unless it applies to a problem that has already occurred or to point of being produced, it is useless. This thesis recognizes the fact that the intelligence is not knowledge for knowledge itself, but it is knowledge through the practical act of undertaking an action. The fulfillment of This function requires the intelligence team to gain extensive knowledge. about the subject in discussion in the other units; for example, of department responsible for policy, projects, and operations that possesses the maximum amount of guidance and cooperation that they can provide.

The need for direction or guidance It is evident, because if the staff of intelligence is separated from the world in which the action is planned and carried out, the knowledge that produces will not fulfill its purpose.

Let me be more precise regarding the meaning of the word guide; to be adequately guided in a given task, intelligence must to know almost everything about that task. If one wants to know about a builder of what proportions would the work of building a piece of road acquire in In particular, I would not approach him asking: 'Is it difficult to make a path?'. Before to receive a sensible or correct answer, I would have to clarify what the two would be points to connect the ends of the path, what volume would the traffic have that does not I would like the load per axle of the heaviest vehicle to be applied to it, etcetera. After having made those specifications one must wait even before receiving the final answer. The builder could provide a calculation

approximate, but refuse to commit until having researched the nature of the terrain that must be crossed, the climate to which it will have to fight while the road is being built, the efficiency of the local workforce, etc. After if these investigations had been carried out, I could present a figure for a road, in which all the preliminary specifications were included, but that was prohibitive due to its high cost. At that point, one must go back to start. conversations about a middle ground. Do you accept a longer route but with fewer cuts, embankments, and difficult slopes? Does it accept a lesser surface? How? As one discusses these matters with the builder regarding things similar to how to avoid such or such technical difficulty, the builder, Although he is not a professional in transportation, he starts to act like one. questions about one's own problems. If things are going well, one does intervene in the discussions with his technical staff and he does the same. Before that one realizes, the two organizations have faced each other directly, developing a community of interest and understanding that results in a practical plan and an operation that will work on gears well accepted. And one, naturally and unconsciously, has provided all the guidance that was necessary for the success of the builder and of oneself.

Now then, this same kind of guidance is essential in intelligence. strategic. Intelligence is not the one who determines objectives: it is not the executor of operations. Intelligence is an aid to all of them: it fulfills a function of service. Their task is to ensure that the makers are well informed: provide them with necessary help, draw their attention to an important fact that they may be neglecting and, at their request, analyze alternative courses without choosing one or the other. Intelligence cannot provide any service if it does not know. the mindset of doers; cannot provide any service if it does not enjoy its trust; they cannot lend them either, if they do not possess the kind of leadership or guidance that any professional must obtain from their client. The uninitiated is would be surprised to know that the guiding element, which is present in the form it completes at the lowest operational levels, it becomes rarer and rarer as that the work of information increases in majesty.[54]

Without proper direction or guidance and the confidence that derives from it, the intelligence cannot produce the appropriate kind of knowledge. Its operation of observation, although relatively safe to keep the gaze fixed on the obvious foreign problems, could neglect the less obvious ones, although they were significant. I could present a series of ideas: "Keep an eye on Bolivia, in a month they will howl asking for information!; "Hasn't it arrived the moment to monitor the events in Madagascar... or the activities Soviets in India?; "What is happening in Spain... and what about nationalism? in West Africa?" There will be many speculations about what should monitor oneself first and what can be left for later.

54. To see the relationship between operation and intelligence in its best and most effective form, one must descend. very far down the administrative and command scale. There, in the smaller units, the officers of intelligence and operations often exchange their tasks, and sometimes there is only one man for both missions. In these circumstances, there is no problem of direction and one can count on the intelligence. carries out his work with a minimum of useless effort.

There will be differences of opinion regarding what is important.
to discourage, they should certainly be continually urged with the best
advice that creators and consumers of intelligence can offer.

The research aspect of intelligence suffers even more than
observation when misled. Firstly, the
knowledge that it provides may be inapplicable to the use it is supposed to serve,
incomplete, insecure and late. It is not reasonable to expect anything else, because the class
of homework that is often required to perform intelligence in, let's say, a
a week or a day can simply be found beyond all competition
human. In order to carry out their work in the manner and with the quality that
apparently it is expected, I would need a research team
large enough to encode and keep up to date virtually the
total sum of universal knowledge. Still, it is doubtful that the result was
the requested, unless the intelligence had some prior warning of the
next job.

Secondly, the need for appropriate and timely guidance is the main
contributor to the worst disease that can affect intelligence: the
irresponsibility. Intelligence loses the desire to participate in what it has to
comply; loses the willingness to adequately attend to the coordination of the
efforts. It settles for dressing up some information without trying to uncover or
to know what is hidden behind the order of the same; without trying to seek
meaning to what seems to lack it. When intelligent and sensitive men
they proceed in this way, they cease to be intelligent and sensitive; they begin to
to behave like automatons that care, if they do at all, about things
less suitable. The one they have in the form of knowledge is
vigorously in the additive; it must be worked by someone else, less well
informed that they themselves, before it has value for the company. And more
still, what they have available is not only additive, but it can also be lacking
current or being inadequate, because for a long time they have stopped
to worry.

There are a certain number of reasons why producers and
intelligence consumers stumble upon difficulties in establishing relationships
appropriate; the first of them is, perhaps, at least superficially, more typical
of the armed forces than of the civil departments.

The forces are organized according to the well-known model of the state.
mayor. At the highest level, in the Department of War, for example, to
The chief of staff is subordinate to a deputy chief of staff, the state
general staff and special general staff. The general staff is composed of
In addition, there are six divisions each under the command of a general.
These are respectively responsible for matters concerning personnel,
information, organization and instruction, supply needs for the
forces, plans and operations, and research and development. With certain
modifications, this model can be easily recognized at the upper level of
the other forces and it is typical for all forces (always with modifications) in
the descending order of their formations. For example, the commander of a
infantry division, a squadron of combat aircraft or a battleship,
would have a general staff made up of half a dozen officers, each of whom

which would have functions more or less similar to those of the directors of the general staff[55]

The main function of all general staffs is to maintain the informed commander and help him prepare the "correct military decision."

55. It has not been said that the research and development function is usually not represented in this. level.

Every staff officer has the primary duty to contribute to ensuring that their Commander, gain a comprehensive understanding of the matters in your specialty and a secondary duty towards their fellow staff members. It is to be expected that the loyalty that must exist in every human institution should also exist throughout the entire administrative line. That is to say, the staff under the orders of the Director of Plans and Operations will feel the greatest loyalty towards those who work closely. of him in the same small administrative unit and then towards the entire tier of which part follows then the immediate upper step and so on until to reach the director himself. Until the different degrees of loyalty of the staff of the entire Plans and Operations organization has crossed this line vertical, generally will not have connected with the organization and will not be until that has happened, they will be able to start integrating with the others similar organizations (for example, the one for 'intelligence' or the one for 'personnel').

In these circumstances, there is a formal reason, inherent to the structure from the general staff, by which the intelligence director could stumble upon difficulties in obtaining, from the other directors, the kind of guidance that should be to have concerning plans, projected operations, task force, etc.
The same reason could explain why the lower rungs of the various organizations find it difficult to meet; but, generalizing across this line is dangerous. Perhaps the only generalization that holds validity is that one that a rigorous staff structure increases the inertia of any organization and what seems to be true at the highest levels of armed forces, it is equally true in any great commercial adventure and industrial.

Some, basing their arguments on a well-known aspect of the doctrine of the armed forces, have maintained that the inflexible relations to the Along the main administrative lines, they are more serious in the forces. fleets that in large businesses. They point out the doctrine that is deeply rooted in one of the basic service formulas called 'The appreciation of the situation[56]and they claim that there is something that is not enclosed there contributes price

56. Esta fórmula está destinada en primer lugar a satisfacer una función esencialmente militar. Desde el the moment that textbooks do not limit it to a tactical military situation, much more is enclosed in it tactic than strategy. Moreover, the strategy in question seems to be a purely military strategy. Not However, the formula is applicable to what I have called the grand strategy and it is not unlikely that the high Military commanders interested in that grand strategy should think in those terms.

only to reduce unsatisfactory relationships between producers and the consumers of intelligence.

The assessment of the situation is what a military commander must make before deciding on a course of action.[57]In brief strokes: above all, the estimation implies a knowledge of the environment in which it will develop course of action (terrain, hydrography, climate, etc., in a situation of great strategy, these factors would include the general nature of the policy, economy and society); second, an understanding of the effective forces combative and disposition of enemy forces (in a situation of great strategy, this would go back to what I have defined as strategic stature fewer specific vulnerabilities); third, a similar knowledge of the the commander's own strengths. From this knowledge, the commander deduces the courses of action that the enemy can execute, and the courses of action that to They will be feasible and will be able to lead him to the fulfillment of his mission.

57. It tends to vary from one situation to another, whether it is the commander or their chief of staff or their operations officers, who prepare the assessment. Rarely or not at all will the officer do so. intelligence. In combat conditions, the chief of staff or chief of operations are the candidates. more likely.

After having assessed the enemy's capabilities and action plans and the their own, decides what their own action plan will be.

In the briefly described process, the commander recounts, of course, with the services of his staff; each of the officers of his staff the mayor has a clearly defined role in the entire process, the operations and the logistics speaks to them precisely about their own strength; intelligence points it out physical environment and the enemy force. The degree to which it allows you to intelligence is having knowledge of one’s own strengths and action plans that the commander will be able to analyze, are matters that are not stated in the formula. Since all discussions of the estimation formula are related primarily with the responsibilities of the commander, it is not considered specifically in it what the intelligence officer should or should not know about the forces of his commander. Apparently, he has not dedicated himself to that issue either. no formal study. It may be unnecessary to say that a commander competent, in a tense strategic or tactical situation, would generally wish that his intelligence officer knew everything that could contribute to his success, that is to say, that of the commander. If his opinion were that of an intelligence officer well informed could add their effectiveness or wisdom to the general staff, would take care of that he was well informed, despite everything that doctrine could say.

There is, however, a reason why the commander might deny his G-2 (that is, their intelligence officer), knowledge about their own forces. It can be argued, and in fact, it has been done, that the G-2 would tackle its work of enemy estimation with full activity, something that might not happen, perhaps, if would pose a complete knowledge of their own strengths and the way that they can be used. If this were to happen and you were unable to make your estimate of an objective way, I could consider the odds of their chance of losing or overcome and their fear or joy would be reflected in their estimation of the enemy. If they saw winners to their strengths, the argument continues, would tend to underestimate the

enemy forces; if I saw them as losing, I would tend to diminish them. The commander, who stumbles with quite a few difficulties in conquering their own subjective ego, he will not want to complicate the task by having to correct the mistakes of his official intelligence. In these circumstances, it can be justified, one might say, that the the commander wants to keep his intelligence arm in ignorance regarding to his plans and operational force; however, I believe that there is something wrong with the actions of that commander. If he is able to achieve on his own certain objectivity, it is difficult to understand why one should retain in its highest state to someone whom I don't believe is capable of such objectivity. Setting this point aside, I believe that the doctrine at least allows the commander to choose not to say. nothing to intelligence.

Whether you accept that option or not depends on the personal attributes of the commander, the magnitude of your command, the tension of the situation, and the necessity of impenetrable security. A wide range of possibilities can be conceived, from the action of a small unit in which the commander could not to keep an intelligence officer ignorant of everything, up to the determination of a great strategic action plan, in the General Staff or in the Command of Naval Operations, where considerations of time, security or anything else, they could justify the fact that the commander kept on his information officer in the dark. At this level, also, the commander He could tell everything to his G-2, but at the same time demand confidentiality for the same. reasons, regarding their team (that of G-2). However, it is necessary to say that, despite how good these reasons may seem to the commander, never They may seem so good or so strict to their intelligence officer.[58]The latter will always have the feeling that their superior doubts their ability to succeed to his subjective ego and that his boss considers him, the same as his team or organization, somewhat insecure. And he might get upset upon realizing that, despite his effort and work always run the risk of producing something useless.

Those who argue that the doctrine of the appreciation formula of the situation, carries within it the means to hinder a free exchange between the producers and consumers of intelligence, are not entirely correct. It would be more in agreement with them, if this doctrine were the only effective cause, and if the civil departments that have not inherited such doctrine, do not have their own as well difficulties in the relationships between producer and consumer. There are other causes, without a doubt, and the civil departments lacking doctrine are victims of them just like the military.

58. The classic case of operational information hidden from intelligence is that of the atomic bomb. Months after its use, it was expected that high-level national intelligence would continue its speculative work (see chapter IV) without greater knowledge than any other citizen. It is something that I have great difficulty accepting that an analysis of the strategic height of Gran Frusina could have some meaning, if that analysis was carried out without references to the specific vulnerabilities that Gran Frusina could present to the bomb.

The first of these could be called psychological. One of the safest means... To dissuade a collaborator is to question their ability to contribute. column of figures, take charge of a situation or understand what one sees or reads. The vocabulary of insults and abuse regarding mental capacity goes to the pair of derogatory observations about kinship and lineage and it can even to be even more annoying. Perhaps this can be understood by remembering the theory that the

The intellect of man is the only thing that distinguishes him from others. animals. Now, setting aside all the various steps necessary to fulfilling an end, that which we call intelligence (intelligence) (in the sense that it is given) in this book) and conferring it to a group of men, with formal exclusion of everyone else does not mean that those who are excluded are being diminished. In the deep in their subconscious, they may harbor the feeling that someone has said indeed: 'Don't worry, we will think for you. We relieve you.' of all thought, providing it with an external brain. We call it intelligence. Whenever you want to know something important, go and ask intelligence. For many men, the separate existence of an arm of intelligence could to produce that hateful comparison.

If intelligence were equipped with supermen and geniuses, I would readily and they invariably provide the correct and useful answer, it could, perhaps, be avoided that feeling; intelligence would be seen by its consumers as a brain superior. But as long as intelligence does not possess that kind of people, but men who, at least in the armed forces, often have little taste or special disposition for the work and do not intend to turn it into a career, the the relationship between producers and consumers will continue to stumble upon that. inconvenience.

A second cause of this state of affairs (and one that is unfortunate occasion is closely linked to the first) is what the language of the intelligence would call it the reason for security. "Security", in the present work, it means of course the 'reserve' or 'secret' with which certain should conduct themselves state affairs.

As long as time and surprise are essential aspects of politics and the strategy, there must be secrets. A boxer who telegraphs his "punches", a player who shows their cards or a "thrower" who inadvertently reveals their launch, they will undoubtedly have the losing side. The great strategist - military or civilian - whose intentions and exact possibilities are known to the opposing side, they find likewise without strategy.

The policymakers and the planners will naturally deal with state secrets, the discovery of which could lead to a calamity national. (Although in times of peace there are examples about what I am Speaking, it is war that provides the most understandable: what would have It happened a month before the Allied assault in Normandy or the landing. North American in Leyte, the enemy would have known exactly the moment, the place and the magnitude of the projected attack?) Similarly, the staff of Intelligence must keep its secrets. A powerful organization of intelligence can develop sources of information of extraordinary value or invaluable. Those sources could have enough value to become starting points and the guarantees of success for a policy, a plan or a operation. The revelation of such sources, or simply an idea about their identity, could cause its extinction and perhaps the failure of action based on them. Their loss could be equated to the loss of an army or of all the dollars invested in the Marshall Plan or, on some specific occasions, to the loss of the state itself.

Safety and its rules are an absolute and essential necessity;
The first rule of safety is to let the secret be known to the smallest number of people.
possible individuals and those who possess undeniable discretion and who must,
at the same time, to know the secret to be able to do their part in the task
common. What effect does this rule have on the relationships between the producer and the
consumer of intelligence?

When the rule is rigidly applied by the producers, the
consumidores tienen derecho a tener legítimas dudas, acerca de la validez de los
findings of the producer. Suppose that a person, as a designer, is given
says something that is contrary to all knowledge and all previous beliefs and
contrary to the laws of common sense. Would you accept it blindly,
based on that a policy or a project? What would be their emotions, their
trial and its final decision if, after receiving such information, it confronts again
with the producer asking for confirming details and receives the following response:
I'm sorry, but I can't say more than what is stated in the memorandum.

Similarly, when consumers rigidly apply the rule,
give the intelligence producer a good reason not to comply or to
produce a useless knowledge. Let's assume that an intelligence producer
receives from one of its consumers the order to inform them of everything
what can be known about Java. Let's assume that the request was written up
precisely in those terms; let's assume that the entire production team's
I was busy with other missions of undeniable priority and could not
dedicar a ninguno de sus componentes a ese pedido sin alguna justificación y que
this is indicated to the consumer. It could happen that he or she felt that they could not give
to the producer the justification, without creating a gap in their security. They can occur
two things; in some cases, the consumer would leave things in that state, but,
in others, he would return to his office and elevate his request through two steps of
his own organization, so that in this way it would return to the producer two
steps above in their own organization. Finally, the product receives the
order to start the task. All indications are that an order that arrives
In this way, it is an order in which security is of paramount importance.
the consumer does not really want to know everything about Java; they merely wish to
to know something about a tiny fraction of the whole. But, does not want to stipulate that
fraction for fear of revealing their intention. So they ask for everything hoping
obtain your information in a paragraph or chapter of the encyclopedia. It does not have
no guarantee that this paragraph or that chapter will be considered devoid of
importance and left aside by the producer. Nor does the latter have any
guarantee that if you write that paragraph or chapter, you will write it in such a way that it serves
better for their interests.

Now, what I said above is the extreme case. When the matters
they are of the utmost importance, both producers and consumers
they resort to all permissible means to help each other for success in
the common task. But the previous case confirms the existence of the basic problem
that security brings on the path of a perfect relationship; even more so when the
substantive matter belongs to a lower order of importance, the opposite does not occur
similar and something akin to the "impasse" that I have
described.[59]

59. The security problem within a single military department causes some of the difficulties. that I have enumerated in my extreme case. But it causes worse ones when it comes to relationships between the civil and military departments. For a good reason - some, if not all - of the civil departments they have a quite bad reputation regarding the safeguarding of state secrets. They have not investigation has been carried out on the dubious personnel or they have neglected it

I don't want to give the impression, in these paragraphs, that I diminish the importance of safety rules and compliance; I want to explain that the the same is like armor. One can reinforce the armor until the A man inside her is completely safe and is completely useless. Both the producer and the consumer of intelligence have their own secrets. and in safeguarding them, they can be isolated to the point of becoming unable to serve their reasons for existence.

They have spoken when the strictest silence was ordered. They have been responsible for atrocious leaks. In these circumstances, the officials of the forces, who have received severe training on the need for security, are they show understandable reluctance to open their hearts to civilians. Furthermore, these officers, who become liable for severe penalties if they were responsible, in turn, for a leak, they naturally understand that these penalties do not can be imposed on civil employees. Without a law on official secrets like the one held by the English, a loose-tongued civilian or a man under the influence of a foreign power, in most cases, does not They will suffer greater harm than the loss of their job.

With that said, I do not mean to imply that all people who wear uniforms are trustworthy, nor that those who wear civilian clothes should not be. I mean that the military record of safeguarding secrets is much better that the civil and that this fact, plus the existing differences between the applicable penalties, aggravates the problem of the security in military-civilian relations.

This problem is so critical for intelligence that it deserves to be studied with special interest in a powerful board. It cannot be resolved by the serious, but formal and sporadic efforts that are common today. Nor do I believe that disappear with the birth of a law for official secrets. A law such would provide tremendous help, but it would not constitute the panacea that your proponents would like.[60]

One last reason for the misunderstanding between producers and consumers of intelligence, it is the understandable disgust from consumers towards to embark on a risky venture based on the opinions of others. After all, if someone is to be harmed, it will probably not be the producer.

60. If such a law existed, it could do nothing more than impose penalties for unauthorized discovery of state secrets. The penalties have been preventive of crime, but despite the severity they may achieve, they have not avoided it. There will always be people for whom punishment is a consideration secondary. Some would not hesitate to uncover state secrets of a certain order of importance, even if the penalty were death. Is it reasonable in these terms that the secrets of this order of Can they be protected more strictly than they are today? I would say that a law on official secrets would have little or no effect on the relationship between intelligence producer and consumer, where the substantive matter was of great national importance and therefore very secret.

I would ensure that the G-2s of the Light Brigade were the same as those on the list. survivors of the charge at Balaclava. The same will be under less circumstances. dramatic. The casualties, both in the figurative and literal sense, will be, first place, for those who use intelligence and in very last place, for the producer. In these circumstances, it is easy for the one who uses intelligence adopt the attitude expressed in the rhetorical question: Why was there intelligence to bother doing a perfect job, if in the end it's not their neck What is at stake? This can give rise to a feeling of neglect. towards the word of those who do not carry the weight of the Operational responsibility. If the intelligence makes any kind of error to in which there is a natural penalty, the relations between both will become even more worse.

One last word: intelligence is destined to make mistakes; Some of the questions that must be answered require a divine. omniscience: others require a much more exhausting job than one can to be fulfilled in the given time and others can only be answered with the most refined kind of covert preparations that were never made before. But, if intelligence makes a mistake or produces an inadequate response and the consumer will react in an incomprehensible and bitter way: 'I wouldn't ask to Those geniuses don't even know how many meters are in a kilometer. When the intelligence strays, there seems to be less tolerance for its error than there can be to expect the error of other mistaken specialists. For example, when a dentist extracts a tooth that shouldn't have been, by mistake (just like the best dentists do they have done), or a lawyer loses a case, the client's reaction does not appear in the sense that he himself could have done a better job and that, from there from now on, he will be his own dentist or lawyer. However, in matters of intelligence forgivable errors of diagnosis y presentations Understandably inadequate, they often produce that reaction in the customer. For a good or bad reason, an intelligence failure does not seem to keep proportion with its importance and even seems to justify the fact that the the consumer performs their own intelligence work from then on.

From there, there are a certain number of reasons that make the relationships between producers and consumers are sometimes extraordinarily difficult, resulting in the loss of the very important element of direction O guide. Once this happens, intelligence must remain free from the consumer demands and they, in turn, free from the capacity of the intelligence to contribute to the solution of their problems. 61 During the time of war, the closer the front line was and the more the smaller the operating unit, the better the relationships and the more effective the address; the further away from the front line and the larger the unit, worse was the direction. In times of peace, there are few situations comparable to that of the front line. And where they exist, they do not possess the element of common physical danger that makes all men brothers of a band. In times of peace, high-level intelligence must operate in the same area where wartime relations were worse and where, without the abandonment of what could be called first-line tolerance, they will continue

probably being worse. One concludes that, of the two dangers: that intelligence is too far from the consumer or that it is too close, the worst is being too far away. As for the other one danger, let's see what happens.

The problem of objectivity and integrity

The other danger - that of being too close to the consumer - cannot, without embargo, to excuse oneself easily. In a moment of intense exasperation, the producers and consumers of intelligence might agree that they should to abolish the administrative barriers between them and that intelligence should divided into several sections or into regional and functional units, dispersed among the appropriate parts of the total organization. If that were done, the intelligence would probably acquire all the guidance it could measure, perhaps even more. that I would need. It would have great and obvious advantages; it will also have inconveniences, some of them considerable. Let's start with the most significant.

Intelligence tends to be separated from its essential task. And I say this in rawer sense: the intelligence personnel, made up of scholars professionals and also possessors of some of the talents of the maker, are going to being forced to share the office workload, which has nothing to do with intelligence. Los “raids” de personal de esta clase son, en todas partes, muy familiares a los intelligence workers; practically every person who does not work in the intelligence tends to imagine the best of the intelligence team, to consider it like a well of chosen human flow, unimpeded, ready to be drilled will. Avoiding those "raids" is a well-known necessity. In the matter of discussion, the resistance seems to be futile and once the man of the intelligence has stepped out of its framework, it will stumble upon the greatest difficulties to return to intelligence. In general terms, once outside the base of task intelligence will find itself increasingly engrossed in the daily work of the new occupation. In a short time, the intelligence staff will be reduced to its least valuable members, which is the same as saying that intelligence has lost its identity and functional integrity. This has happened several times sufficient to deserve serious consideration.

Secondly, intelligence, if it is taken too close to its consumers tend to be diverted in a slightly less crude sense, worse equally damaging. For example, the detailed issues of an office of operations can be many and urgent. A large number of them require a type of general research and the trend will be to put the intelligence team in that task. With this, I do not mean to say that that task is not important, but to employ too much informational talent in it is to make very poor use of the intelligence. Intelligence should have large amounts of time available. uninterrupted, in order to carry out long-term projects that do not they can be done under different circumstances.

Thirdly - and this would apply not only when intelligence was obliged to cross the line administratively, but also when it was divided and scattered among sections of plans or operations, the essential integrity

it can be seriously damaged. In a previous chapter, I indicated how it can lead intelligence to the issues of observation and research that intersect its regional or functional lines. According to this method, a problem such as the Hispanic influence in Argentina would become the mission of an ad committee. So, under the supervision of a project manager (either an expert from Spain or Latin American) and under the general direction of the body that I have called Team of Control. In that way, one can be relatively sure that the entirety of resources that intelligence can dedicate to the problem, is dedicated really. But, when the intelligence organization has been fractured or separated in the sense of space and put in intimate contact with the consumers, it is not necessary to follow that method. In truth, it is easy to imagine how the head of the Spanish unit would call one of his men, he would ask him to I will look for everything I can about the Spanish events in Argentina without prohibit him from going to other buildings to talk to his Latin American colleague. It is not only possible, but highly probable, that the multitude of problems of this Classes would be led by people experts in a single sector of the subject.

This is not the only disadvantage; there is also the issue of 'standards'. of contrasting 'performance', which would be another drawback of the dispersion. A intelligence team that is administratively separated from its consumers and unified in itself, is equipped to provide a product uniformly excellent. The best work that passed through the Control will become inevitably on the scale by which all others will be measured. Destroy yourselves the centralization and unity and the best and most natural method will have been destroyed establish the competition and derive a great benefit from it.

Podrían hallarse remedios administrativos para todo lo mencionado; dudo that those remedies may be entirely effective, but they could face the worst objections. However, there is a first-order disadvantage to carrying out producers and consumers of intelligence too close to each other Others: it is the disadvantage of bringing intelligence too close to politics.

This does not necessarily mean the high politics of a country, officially. accepted, if not something less elevated. I mean what is often expressed with las palabras “punto de vista individual”, “posición”, “opinión”. Casi cada hombre o group of men, confronted with the duty to plan something or do something, they they will find what they consider the only desirable action plan. By In general, this happens soon. The way in which those people arrive at that plan. of action that they consider desirable, does not compel them to critically examine and dispassionately all the facts. They can arrive at that solution, ignoring many relevant and important facts, due to their prejudices and personal opinions. This kind of "homemade" solution tends to become what I have called politics. in the least elevated sense of the word. Their "opinions" are such and such; their "position", therefore, that one or the one beyond; their "viewpoints", in support of his "opinions" and his "position", these and these. Add the factors of time and opposition and we will have something that can be called 'politics', without forcing too much the language. Even when this policy can be reached by chance, By chance or blind intuition, it is not inferred that it is invariable and necessarily wrong. Sometimes, it is perfect as inspiration. But my opinion, for now, is that unless the need for action is too pressing to avoid

allow the impartial analysis of all available facts (preferable before the "opinion" becomes "position", except in any event prior to the action), this procedure is fraught with unnecessary risks. If there is a information team on the periphery should receive instructions to carry out the systematic analysis.

Now, a team of information that must provide an analysis reasonable and impartial, has its own difficulties with opinions, positions and viewpoints. Ultimately, it is made up of men whose standards of thoughts tend to color their hypotheses and whose colored hypotheses they tend to draw a conclusion that is more attractive than what the evidence indicates. main difference between information professionals on one side and all the other people is that it is assumed that the former have had greater Training in techniques to protect oneself against their greatest weaknesses intellectuals. Even so, it does not always succeed. The history of information is filled with battles between the pro Mihailovitch and pro Tito factions, between the champions and opponents of aid to China, among the defenders and the detractors of the Jewish nation in Palestine. The fact that such existed. differences of opinion among professionals who consider themselves objective and impartial, who have had access to the same subject, is evidence that someone surrenders to their irrational ego. These differences of opinion have missing in information organizations that were administratively separated from the people they were supposed to serve.

If the information, in its best condition, is found guilty of having come to too hasty and incorrect a conclusion, will it have probabilities of making more mistakes of that kind when one is under the administrative control of its consumers, in projects or operations? My the answer is: yes. I don't think that, in terms of human nature, it can be another way. I don't see how the information can avoid falling into the political zone. from the employing unit and to prostitute oneself in the production of what the Nazis They used to call it kamphende science.[62]. I don't see how, if it happened.

62. Approximately translated as 'knowledge for further aspirations of state policy', the class of 'knowledge' proposed by the 'intellectual' party trying to objectively prove phenomena such as the Aryan Supremacy, the German Destiny, the necessity of Lebensraum, the Judeo-Capitalist-Bolshevik Circle, Stab in the Back, the Versailles Kiktat, etc.

Unexpected and the information will invariably yield findings in disagreement with the policy of the employer unity, could the information wait to receive its payment for an indefinite period. I cannot abandon the belief that, under the referred circumstances, the information would be at the center of the policy and that at times she would be the blatant apologist for a certain policy, more although its analyzer is impartial and objective. As Walter wisely states Lippmann: "The only institutional defense (for impartial and objective analysis) is separate as absolutely possible the executing team from the team that Investigate. The two would be parallel bodies of people, but completely different, recruited in different ways, who would receive their pay, if possible, from separate funds, accountable to different bosses and intrinsically indifferent to the personal success of one or the other.[63]

For these reasons, what is unquestionably gained in direction can getting lost in the integrity and objectivity of the operation. The absorption of the information producers by the consumers--

63. Taken from Public Opinion (The Macmillan Co, N.Y., 1922, with the kind permission of its publisher, chapter XXVI, paragraph 2.

information network, it could be too heroic a cure for both the disease as for the patient.

I believe the only solution to the dilemma lies in the middle ground, which by In general, the aim is to guarantee the administrative integrity of the information. substantive, keeping it separate from its consumers; keep testing all possible means for consumers to become familiar with the organization of the producers and for them to become familiar with the organization of consumers.

The problem of information and policy formulation.

What has just been said about information and politics is not all that It must be said. By the way, the information should not be an apologist for politics, but this does not mean that the information does not play a role in the formulation of the politics. The role of information is defined and simple. Its task could be described in two stages: 1) the exhausting examination of the situation for which it is a policy is required and 2) the objective and impartial exploration of all the solutions that the problem offers.

It has not been said that the information can cut your findings at any stage, especially in the second one, so that an alternative will appear many times more attractive than the others. It is not encouraging to think that this has it has been done, although it would be hard to prove that each similar crime was one in who undertook the information at their own responsibility. For example, during the war, some British information organizations could prove that there was a weak point and that, compared to it, all the other portals to the fortress Europe, they were like granite. But that the information is capable of making erroneous assessments is not a sufficient reason to exclude them as if careered by principles. As long as its professional staff possesses a high caliber intellectual and moral, the risks that political consumers run by accepting the analysis of information about the alternatives is much lower than the they would run if they excluded the information from their meetings.

The problem of information (the product) and its acceptance.

What an information team desires above all is that its findings they prove to be useful for making determinations or reaching decisions. Without embargo, there is no universal law that obliges politics, projects or operations, to accept those findings. If the information is guilty of a deficient method or errors in judgment, there is nothing that forces consumers to act according to his advice. This fact has its bad and its good. The benefits are

almost too obvious to need mentioning: for
for example, no one would advocate taking a course of action whose evidence does not
considered by the information, will prove to be suicidal. Just because one
the aberration of the information could indicate that the law of gravity does not exist in
Lent, this does not constitute a reason to jump in blindly. But in this commendable
freedom to disregard information poses a source of danger.
Where should one start to disregard information and where should one stop?
ignore it?

In one of the children's books written by James Willard Schultz, there is a
story related to some Indian tribes preparing to take the path of the
war. The combined chiefs meet to discuss the projected operation and
give instructions to the chief of the G-2 (a sorcerer named White Antelope) to
that they raise an appreciation about enemy possibilities. In a couple of
days, White Antelope, after having made the necessary turns
professionals, returns to the combined bosses with their calculation. It seems that the
gods have favored his ceremonial, granting him a vision in which he has seen to
a solitary crow perched on the skeleton of a dead deer. Like the
the crow was focused on its feast, did not see a magpie that slid up to a
tree that extended over the sea, from where he made some observations,
He noticed that the magpie was signaling for the concentration of its forces.
deployed. When the concentration of magpies was sufficient, they descended upon the
crow in attack form. The crow fought bravely, but as things
they worsened, he decided to withdraw to defended positions. Yes, White Antelope
it would have been an irresponsible G-2, I would have left things there, but since it was a
a responsible man and felt that he should make a contribution to the meaning
common, risked an interpretation. For him, the crow represented the forces
allies and the magpies, to the enemy –the events would later justify that interpretation-
and, evidently, the enemy possibilities were enormous. The allies
they would receive a beating. But Cabeza de Toro, who was the supreme commander, raised
the voice said, "What you have just expressed means nothing more than this: the force
the expedition will be in danger. We already knew it. As for the raven and the
Magpies, it is my belief that we are the magpies and the enemy is the crow.
Tomorrow we will begin." The G-2's assessment had not been accepted.

It is important to note that Antílope Blanco had done everything as best he could.
I knew and according to a method that was a 'standard' operating procedure.
The same Cabeza de Toro could admit it. Cabeza de Toro did not reject the
appreciation of your G-2 based on a reasoned analysis of your data or in a
rational doubt about its objectivity; it was rejected on the basis of an idea and
probably an idea that I unconsciously wished it were like this.

Now, I do not want to be one of those people who reject everything.
ideas and intuitions considering them uniformly dangerous, because there are ideas
based on knowledge and understanding, which are the substance of truth
more perfect. What she wants to reject is the intuition based on nothing and that
it comes from an intimate desire. The information consumer who has been in
contact with the producer's problem, who knows it in all its extent,
it can have a discernment that the producer does not have. The fact of looking at
look for the broad aspects of the problem and to be so remote from the nebulous

details and traffic of observation or research, it can be what you
it allows for a more secure synthesis of the truth than that given by the
producer. But it is necessary for the consumer, in this circumstance, to be
cautious. If it rejects the conclusions of its information arm and makes a
correct estimation, one must deeply reflect on how they arrived at it. That does not
gain the notion that you only need to consult your stars to surpass
on G-2. If that notion is acquired, it will destroy your information organization, because
its members will not seek the truth for a fortune teller to deny their conclusions
and enters into a dangerous course. If there is something in the rational philosophy of
The West –which holds that the mind is, in the end, the one that best clarifies the
unknown-, the consumer who mocks philosophy runs the enormous risk of
make a series of devastating mistakes. And I might not have, after that, a
second chance.

Adolf Hitler was a consumer of that nature. There are reasons to
to think that your information, at the technical levels of observation and the
research, was appropriate. In fact, there are reasons to believe that it was much
more than that. There are reasons to believe that their overall team was technically
competent. There are reasons to believe that he was not acquiring an insecure knowledge of
that information or poor advice from the team that based its judgments on that
Knowledge. Hitler had his ideas, the first of which were brilliant.
Thanks to luck or to a deep and perhaps subconscious knowledge of the
situation, reacted correctly and in opposition to his more formal ones
warning sources. But the problem was that, apparently, it did not try to analyze the
why of her happy intuition. She continued as if her intuition were a source of
natural, personal and infallible truth. When he began to experience the punishments
natural errors such as believing they were greater than they really were, the
possibilities of the Luftwaffe in Great Britain or underestimate the possibilities of the
Soviet Union, when it ordered to reduce military production in Germany,
In the autumn of 1941, because he thought the war was won, he not only gave
some of the most direct and positive steps to lose the war, but it gave
an indirect and equally harmful one that severely damaged the usefulness of his
body and information service.[64]

64. The following data is illustrative and I have no doubt that similar incidents have occurred outside the Third Reich: Shortly after Mr. Roosevelt's message to Congress (January 6, 1942), in which he nailed our production of tanks and airplanes to what seemed astronomical figures (we were going to produce 45,000 tanks during the year) Ribbentrop, who was influential in the highest Nazi circles, called the chief negotiator and economic affairs advisor of the Foreign Office, a man named Riitter. Ribbentrop's question,
Of course, he was referring to the 'bluff' and propaganda that he believed were involved in the figures given by the president. Already
I had decided (perhaps by intuition) that the figures mentioned by the president were exaggerated. What
asked Ritter for an estimate on the steel capacity of the United States.

Ritter replied that the latest available figure on production was 45,000,000 tons and that
the consensus increased the capacity to 57,000,000. Ritter may have spoken in the familiar mode of
expert and instead of using the word "million", simply used the numbers forty-five and fifty
seven. A few days later, after hearing that some experts had raised the figure to 110,000,000.
of tons, Ribbentrop called him again and scolded him for what seemed to be an inaccurate description, and Ritter,
clarifying his own position, he assured that, according to his understanding, the figure of 110,000,000 was too much
high, and that its own calculation gave a figure between 60 and 70 million tons.

A few days later Ribbentrop appeared again. This time, with a note of triumph in his voice,
He asked the following question: Do you think it is possible to reach the figure of 45,000 tanks? The answer
He said: "Yes, I think it is possible." The next question was: "But if you accept the number of tanks and each
The tank contains at least two tons of steel, has already reached 90,000 tons of steel. All the

the capacity of steel would be absorbed in the tanks." To which Ritter replied: "But, Mr. Minister, you We're talking about thousands of tons. When we mention steel production, we do so in "millions." Ribbentrop jumped up.

It was within Ribbentrop's jurisdiction to inquire about the experts' assessment and the the fact that his technical ignorance was profound does not seem to have inhibited him in any way. Certainly, In other circumstances, one can easily imagine a difference between the idea of the consumer and the producer estimate that does not provoke a final and clarifying phone call. In these cases, it could to adopt an action plan that was very close to being a complete stupidity. (I must thank the Professor Harold C. Deutsch for this anecdote.

When information producers understand that there is no usefulness someone to offer a consumer knowledge that does not correspond to ideas preconceived, then the information is unnecessary. There is no longer any information in that point and the consumer acts on their own, alone, with no guidance other than the divination or chance. It could be that they were favorable to him, but I would not give a cent for your head. Without dismissing intuition if it were invariably. treacherous, I would advise the consumer to use it, but with full knowledge of their weaknesses and fragilities. When the findings of intelligence they are regularly ignored by the consumer and this is due to their intuition, should recognize that it turns its back on both instruments through which man, since Aristotle, has incessantly expanded the horizon of your knowledge: the instruments of reason and the scientific method.

APPENDIX

CLASS OF INFORMATION

Information, at the national level, both in times of war and in peacetime. of peace, has a large number of distinct and separate forms and is carried out by many classes of departments and federal agencies. (See the diagrams at continuation. Until the general reader is aware of the multiplicity of Forms and their general functioning can easily justify their confusion.

In the following pages, I attempt three things: First, to establish in a an orderly, albeit somewhat arbitrary, classification of the main types of information in what our federal government is committed. I will carry this out in the diagrams and explanatory text. Second, I will indicate the specific classes of information that has been discussed in this book. And finally, after having Given a very brief description, I will try to reintroduce a corrective element. from the darkness and confusion where these are characteristics of the canon of federal information.

EXPLANATION OF THE TERMINOLOGY OF DIAGRAMS.

1. Safety and positive information

a) Security information.

In simple terms, we could say that security information, basically, it is the information related to the function of surveillance or police. Its the mission is to protect the nation and its members from the wrongdoers who operate seeking to cause national or intentional harm. In one of its most dramatic forms, it is the information that continuously tries to point to clandestine agents sent to the country by foreign powers. In another, it is the activity that protects our borders against unwanted intruders: people illegal entries, smugglers, drug dealers and others.
Identify the traitors born in the country and the individuals who violate the law. federal. Security information is the knowledge and activity that our order-defending forces must possess before embarking on a specific action against the malicious or individual wrongdoer.

b) Positive information.

Positive information is more difficult to define. If one wanted to speak in terms more or less enigmatic, I could say that

DEPARTAMENTOS Y AGENCIAS INTERESADOS:	CATEGORIAS PRINCIPALES DE MATERIAS (No todas las organizaciones se interesan en todas las materias) Contra:
Oficina Federal de Investigación Departamento del Tesoro Departamento de Justicia	
Oficina ("Bureau") Federal de Investigación Ramas de los Departamentos de Justicia y Estado	ESPIONAJE SABOTAJE CONTRABANDO NARCÓTICOS ENTRADA ILEGAL DE PERSONAS Etcétera
Departamentos de Justicia Departamento del Tesoro	
Comités Congresistas Oficina ("Bureau") Federal de Investigación Departamentos de Justicia	contra: "UN AMERICANISMO" FALSIFICACIÓN ESCLAVOS BLANCOS FRAUDE POSTAL SECUESTROS EVASIÓN DE IMPUESTOS Etcétera
Oficinas de Seguridad Comisión de Servicio Civil Oficina ("Bureau") Federal de Investigación	
Funcionarios ejecutores de las leyes federales (Inspectores Postales, Servicio Secreto, F.B.I., agentes del Tesoro, etc.)	
La Agencia de Información Central "Ad Hoc". Comités de Información Interdepartamentales actuando bajo la Agencia de Información Central	

EXTRANJERO (Todos los países y pueblos extranjeros)	MEDIANO ALCANCE	La Información de Política Departamental, sobre todo la de esos departamentos con una misión-llave en los asuntos exteriores de Estados Unidos: Estado (Relaciones Exteriores), Ejército, Marina y Fuerzas Aéreas. Otros departamentos con responsabilidades secundarias en los asuntos exteriores: Comercio, Agricultura, Tesoro, Justicia (esp.), Agencias Federales tales como la Comisión de Tarifado. En tiempo de guerra, este alcance podría incluir la información de Teatro de Operaciones, tal vez, la información del Grupo de Ejército.
	CORTO ALCANCE	La información de Operaciones Departamentales. En tiempo de guerra, esto incluiría la información operativa y de combate de las fuerzas armadas.
INTERNO (Estados Unidos continental, territorios y posesiones)	LARGO ALCANCE	La Información del Bienestar Nacional (investigaciones precedentes a la legislatura reparadora o reguladora).
	MEDIANO ALCANCE	La Información Gubernamental, por ejemplo, la que encierra las órdenes e instrucciones periódicas de agencias administrativas, etc.

Comité Conjunto de Informaciones de los Jefes del Estado Mayor Combinado


Organizaciones de Información Departamental:
1) Las oficinas de Investigación de Información y de reunión y distribución de información, en el Departamento de Estado.
2) Las ramas de Información Positiva en:
   a) La división de Informaciones-Departamento de Ejército.
   b) División de Informaciones Navales - Departamento de Marina.
   c) División de Informaciones - Departamento de Fuerzas Aéreas.
3) Ramas de "información" (no llamada así) en otros departamentos, tales como el "Bureau" de Economía Agrícola en el Departamento de Agricultura. "Bureau" de Comercio Exterior e Interior en el Departamento de Comercio.
4) Fuerzas departamentales: los Agregados en funciones en el extranjero.

1) Misiones en el extranjero del Departamento de Estado y funcionarios en la oficina del propio país.
2) Agregados: Militar, Naval, Aéreo, Comercial, de Trabajo, de Petróleo, Cultural, etc. de departamentos con responsabilidad primordial o secundaria, en los asuntos exteriores.
3) Oficinas en el propio país de esos departamentos.
4) Unidades de información militar, naval, aérea y de fuerzas expedicionarias o de ocupación.

1) División de Referencia Legislativa, Biblioteca del Congreso.
2) Comités Investigadores Congresistas.
3) Comités establecidos por el presidente, tales como el Consejo Proyectista de Recursos Nacionales.
4) Organizaciones como el "Bureau" de Estadística, del Trabajo, Comercio Interior, etcétera.

PERSONALIDADES:

MILITAR
POLÍTICA
ECONÓMICA
SOCIAL
MORAL
CIENTÍFICA
y TÉCNICA
CULTURAL
Y LAS ARTES



(The types of information referred to in this book are included in the area closed within the dotted line.)

the positive information is what remains from the whole after subtracting it security information.

To define it more directly, we will say that it is the sum of all things. what one should know before starting an action plan. For example, the positive military information, before an offensive operation, provides to the commander all possible knowledge of the enemy's strength and disposition and of the physical conditions of what will be the battlefield,

Research and observation branches in the major agencies administrative, such as the Federal Trade Commission, Commission of Values and Change, etc.
Meteorological Office, Statistics of Labor and the Census. Many divisions of the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, etc.

the intention for the commander to know what to expect before entering into combat. There are many other types of positive information, in addition to military. but they all have that typical characteristic of preparation for that phase of the military information.

If this were the only aspect of positive information, its definition would not It would be so difficult. But there is another aspect that is sufficiently analogous to the security information as to produce some confusion. Everyone who knows that there is such a thing as positive military information, knows that it is not limited to provide strategists, designers, and campaign commanders with the type of knowledge they must possess before taking action. Virtually all the The world knows that military information must also try to uncover what they are the enemy's plans, so that the enemy cannot catch by surprise the own strengths. In other words, positive information is not merely a information for the commander on the offensive (the man who has taken or projected to take the offensive); it is also the information that protects that commander of the surprise movements of his enemy. In this aspect, it has an important defensive and protective nuance. In this distinguishable nuance from which Has the security information been given? Undoubtedly it is.

Let me illustrate this distinction. A police officer, alerted by the security information, will protect a house against intruders, or, if the house it has already been looted, it will use the security information to catch the thieves. But the police officer will not be able to warn one when the price of meat will go up or when the Bank one operates with will fail. This is not its mission. For to obtain that kind of protective knowledge, one will have to resort to the service of the positive information.

2. Foreign and domestic (or exterior and interior)

"Foreign" and "domestic" in information refers to the objectives of the information, not to the place where the information activity takes place. For For example, by 'foreign security information', I mean the information about security that applies to spies, saboteurs, or provocateurs of another country or the one that identifies foreign circles of smuggling and narcotics. By "positive-foreign information", I mean that kind of information that must deal exclusively with local people and problems of the States United, their territories and possessions.

Long range, medium range, short range.

There are many possible levels of information. One knows, for example, that there is probably one or two information projects designated by miembros del gabinete cuyo tema actual es la política soviética; que hay otra information that keeps the Department of State informed about the political events in Iran or Italy, for example, and that there is still another information that informs an individual officer of the Department of State what tone should be used in a note addressed, for example, to the Danish ambassador in Washington. One instinctively feels that there are several "information" or various levels of information, as actually occurs. In the military information, there is usually an information organization in each headquarters or command level. In wartime, starting from the Joint Information Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff moving down the scale of the different services, to the section of information about the smallest land, naval, or air unit has been touched upon. perhaps more than fifty levels. As one descends, the function of information becomes more restricted and more and more technical. But in a diagram just like the one I have given or in a book like this, there is no reason to to carry out an excessively detailed division in the 'function to be served.'

4. Function to be served

What has already been said in the section on scope could be extended to the explanation given for this section.

The issue is that the federal government has many levels of responsibility, and in general a level of information to serve each one of Their primary and utmost responsibility is to protect national security.

against internal or external enemies. I have called this long information scope on high politics, national security, national welfare, and the great strategy. This information is the information of national survival.

Right below, I placed the policy information departmental. For this reason - and I have called it medium scope - I refer to the kind of knowledge (and the activity that produces it), which is necessary for the Department of State, the Department of Army, the Department of Navy and the Department of Air Forces, in order to carry out its specific functions. Assuming that it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to identify a problem departmental that does not have supradepartmental significance, at the same time It should also be taken for granted that there are departmental technical issues that they have more or less the same meaning as the others.

The least function that I have included in the diagram is the function of departmental operations. This constitutes, in my positive category foreign

I will illustrate the three levels with a current topic of interest: armament the Latin American republics. The necessary information for the basic decision to make useful or available for good neighborliness, the military 'standard' equipment of United States, must be provided at the highest level. This information It has to work with the global situation, the strategic stature of other countries and the open action plans for them. Try to estimate how it would alter our decision in the global situation and whether it would be advantageous or not for us.

Let's suppose, now, that based on the information of the highest level, our high-ranking individuals decide that we should work in order to "standardize" the military equipment in Latin America. Immediately, several departments will have to resolve their own problems in politics. The The State Department may have had issues with Cuba, Chile or Argentina could have been following a policy that is at odds with the new decision. The task of putting everything in order will be enormous and the own organization of information from the Department can also play a role important.

The lowest level of departmental operations could be illustrated together with the Army Department, let's say, regarding the detailed implementation from high decision. Before sending small arms ammunition to Brazil for to supplement local supply, one must know, among other things, what forces land forces are set to maintain the Brazilians. The knowledge of strength Brazilian in this situation would be what I have qualified as information of departmental operations.

5. Interested departments and agencies.

In the two upper scopes of information 'positive, foreign' and 'of security, foreign," the designation of the departments and agencies interested parties is complete, with all intention. In other areas of information, What I note on the diagram, the designations only aim to be purely illustrative; I have included the most important organizations, but anyone that If you are familiar with the federal government, you could add many more.

6. Main categories of subjects

These categories also aim to be illustrative. Chapters II, III, and IV they deal in detail with the substantive content of the classes of information that are the theme of this book.

7. A note on techniques: the element of compliance.

All the information operations noted in the diagrams tend to develop their own special techniques for achieving their goals. These techniques are numerous and differ greatly from one another... so enormously, for example, like ballistic analyses and fingerprinting they differ from the estimates of coal or wheat production. In a book of this nature, there is no space even to try to enumerate the techniques that do not they are peculiar to the "information" under examination (for example, positive information) foreigner). But one of the points must be clarified: the information experts they tend to consider the mass of individual techniques as belonging to a two main categories, the discovered and the secret or clandestine.

By 'discovered', I mean the technique of finding things by methods open and in plain sight, such as those used for all kinds of purposes scientific, commercial, and journalistic. I mean, the kind of technique that one you could use if you want to make cakes for the first time or find out the price at el mercado de un “stock” de mercancías. En algunas clases de trabajos de information, especially in positive foreign information, one can arrive to know a multitude of things through those open methods. One studies literature current technique that has been published or read the foreign press or listens to the official broadcasts from foreign radio stations or walk the streets from a foreign city (without attempting to hide its identity) and observes what happens. Some information devotees have assured that one can discover, through those methods, 90 percent or more of what you need to know. The percentage the remainder constitutes what other countries consider state secrets and that it can only be obtained through clandestine operations.

I label the technique of discovering things through means as "clandestine". various hidden, disguised or surreptitious activities. I am referring to the use of encrypted messages, from secret agents, to the interception of correspondence, etc. Some areas of information could do nothing without the use of those. covert techniques. The best example is, of course, the information from counterintelligence, where the secrecy of the espionage of the other side must be more than overcome by the secret of the countermeasures themselves.

How these two main categories of information technique can not applicable to every topic of intelligence - it depends on factors of time, degree of emergency and of the official mandate within which the branch is allowed to operate I have not indicated a compliance element in the diagrams. The reader who wants to think for himself a clearly defined problem at work information, you will be able to make good guesses about how much of each technique would be required to solve it.

THE BRANCHES OF INFORMATION THAT PARTICULARLY INTEREST THIS STUDY

Of the many types of informational activities described in the diagrams, Only two are of particular interest in this study. They are the ones that have been enclosed. on the dotted line in the diagram of positive information, that is, Positive, Foreign, Long and Medium Range (Open and Clandestine). Is this the information of high politics, national security and the great strategy: the information required by our men dedicated to the most high foreign policy, in each federal department.

DOES THE MEANING OF EACH ONE FIT REALITY? NUMEROUS BRANCHES OF INTELLIGENCE INCLUDED IN THE DIAGRAMS DO THEY HAVE THEIR OWN INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE?

The general outline presented above is very simplified. It is necessary to make now some grades.

First of all, it is not always correct to conceive of a barrier that is too high, between the positive information and the security information. There are phases of one that are of the greater importance to the other. Let me give you an example. Suppose that some foreign power establishes a spying system in our country to to observe us. The pursuit of these spies is the task of the branch of counterintelligence of security information and theoretically, it does not correspond to the positive information, whatever it may be. To a certain extent, that is the case, there are products derived from counterintelligence activities that are of the highest interest in positive information, so interesting, in fact, that often It has been argued that safety information and positive information (especially in the higher levels of the foreign field) should not be separated. Which Are those derivative products?

Let's suppose our counterintelligence service is moving clandestinely and penetrates into the foreign espionage network. That is to say, it manages to to infiltrate one of its own secret agents into the enemy's spy network. Suppose that this agent not only comes to know the identity of many of the foreign agents, but reaches a position where it can read the communications and directives that foreign agents receive from their office. These documents are not merely descriptive of espionage activities from that country; they probably also reveal a lot about their activities, politics and general projects. They can contain the information that positive intelligence have desired for a long time and could not obtain from any other source. I I would dare to assure that the products derived from counterintelligence Canadian, in its fight against the Soviet espionage network was so important like the destruction of the network itself. Canada's positive intelligence must

having known less than if it had, in turn, clandestinely penetrated into the Politburo, a task that would have posed serious difficulties.

The moral of what has been presented is that, whatever the case may be, there is undoubtedly a class. of information that can be called security information and, although many of the activities of this kind of intelligence are contained within themselves its limits, there are other very important aspects of security information that pass over the artificial barrier I have raised and become confused inextricably with positive information.

The same happens with domestic and theoretical foreign intelligence. example, in the course of their daily occupations of advising, doing and to implement our foreign policy, the State Department is facing a large number of American organizations whose parents came from others countries. Many of those organizations –the Poles, for example– have strong opinions regarding the policy that the United States should have with regarding Poland. Now, what those foreign nationalities in The United States thinks or acts regarding our foreign policy, it could possibly be a matter of some importance to us and him knowledge of what they think and do can constitute a significant phase of what could be called positive domestic. But only because those people are Americans by birth and the issues that concern them are issues Americans, it is not reason to consider it exclusively a source of domestic information. The roots that have in the old world, the contacts and communications that the visitors from there have with him, whom they see or who they speak to, turns them into a subtle and sometimes unique source of intelligence foreign positive. Here too, the products derived from an operation of purely domestic information, can have a high significance for the foreign sections.

Sometimes, domestic intelligence operations unexpectedly descubren asuntos de gran interés para la información extranjera. Por ejemplo, la The Securities and Exchange Commission sent an investigator to the Hawaiian Islands in 1938. to investigate an unrecorded sale of some Japanese government bonds. These bonds were sold and bought by Americans of Japanese descent. that referred to domestic information, the compulsion of a federal statute, but it was much more than that for foreign information, because the investigation of that domestic matter revealed that the Japanese consul He felt great curiosity for many things that were not within his legitimate jurisdiction and had a large organization and had a large unofficial organization of volunteer agents who submitted their reports to him. These facts and others, they were matters destined for the urgent consideration of the staff of the foreign positive information.

Perhaps more artificial than either of the two preceding cases of separation arbitrary (the intelligence of the positive, the domestic of the foreign) it is to make too strict a separation between what I have called the information of long, medium, and short range. The separation exists, but not it should be thought of as absolute. For example, a new weapon may have has been developed secretly and dedicated to a small military action, some how many test models. The existence of a few of those weapons can

first to fall under the attention of the force against which they are going to be used. Let's say that the new weapon is a new piece of campaign and the force against the What is being used is an infantry battalion. The information about the weapon is of great operational importance for the battalion. The intelligence officer of the the battalion must discover everything possible about her, so that its strength is not canceled by the weapon. The one that embarks is the shortest of the activities of short-range intelligence; it could be more appropriately defined as combat intelligence. However, what he discovers about the weapon may be of prodigious importance. If the weapon is effective, its short-term intelligence work scope is of great importance for activities not only of medium scope, but also of long range. A weapon like the German 88 mm rifle. Triple use, tested on the battlefield during the Spanish revolution, constitutes a example. The knowledge that would be obtained about it was important, not only for the republican unit that faced him for the first time, but also for the great strategists of all general staffs of all world powers. The same applies to the first guided missile, first .50 caliber machine gun, the V-1 and others.

On the other hand, long- and medium-term information has its importance of short range. It is almost inevitable that a complete study of the French communists' policy, for example -–studio intended primarily to assist our men and designers of economic policy foreign superior-, let it also have some small operational value (short scope) for one of our representatives in Paris.

Finally, even the clandestine and discovered intelligence activities. they have such a tendency to mix with each other that it is difficult to draw a line defined. For example, when a secret agent knows something thanks to a activity for which concealment was not necessary –for example, if he read it in a newspaper- and elevate the report, could be considered as compromised in the information discovered. Or, on the contrary, when an aggregate without funds officials to spend on the purchase of confidential information, purchase from a hungry source and potential a series of expensive data with its own money, it finds very close to the clandestine information.

More important than this unnoticed merging of functions is the merging unintended by what both intelligences, discovered and clandestine, produce in the meaning of substance. A discovered information organization must account for with the product of the clandestine information to complete their descriptions, reports and speculations. He cannot expect to acquire everything he needs. through their own open methods; there will always be missing pieces that the clandestine personnel must produce. But, on the other hand, clandestine personnel he will not know what to observe, unless he uses, in turn, a large amount of information that he himself or some other team has acquired openly. The identification of an appropriate objective, its study, and the report on its study, They are activities that exist in an atmosphere of free and open information. A a good clandestine intelligence report can contain a large dose of information discovered.

The real description of the diversity of classes of information is what I have I have been trying to profile it in these last pages. Its essence is enclosed.

in this truth: many branches of intelligence arbitrarily defined are independent from each other and interdependent. Each one can have its clearly defined primary objective that becomes its main interest, but both the pursuit of that objective and the products derived from it lead to the most of the independent branches, to enter into a certain relationship with the others. The information, as an activity, is at its peak when this fact is understood and accepted in good faith.

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